


WORK IN PROGRESS

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COSATU CONGRESS

Editorial

If Home Affairs Minister Stoffel Botha did not have so much power, his comments on the media would be funny.

A man who seriously suggests that South Africa's progressive media, already restricted in what it may publish by some 100 statutes and reams of often unintelligible emergency restrictions, furthers 'fear, hatred, intimidation, murder, mutilation and other similar evils' is difficult to take seriously.

But his powers to close publications are serious.

His notion of 'media terrorists' - 'people who are in a position to provide publicity for the revolutionaries' - is easier to understand. For Stoffel Botha is a leader of a political party which has, for 40 years, systematically undermined the most elementary aspects of democracy. He is not really expected to know much about the media's duty and right to inform its readership.

Work In Progress remains under threat from state sources which believe that publication of information they do not like is 'media terrorism'.

But if its political survival is to some extent out of *WIP*'s hands, its publishers can at least secure its economic future. Readers will have noticed that *Work In Progress* is being printed on a lighter paper than before. This makes the publication somewhat thinner, although a changed design format allows for more copy per page.

Work In Progress has not raised its selling price since January 1985. Indeed, the cost for some categories of readers has actually dropped. Subscriptions were last increased at the end of 1986 - and then only marginally.

Inflation has hit all facets of publishing - paper, printing and distribution costs have all jumped each year. Only *WIP*'s ever-growing circulation has enabled its cover price to remain constant.

Recently, however, something had to change. Rather than increasing cover price or subscription costs, the publishers decided to print on a cheaper and thinner paper, while upgrading cover quality. Hence a slimmer *Work In Progress* - but no price increase.

Also new in this edition is the inclusion of a number of short briefs. This is a section the editors hope to expand and improve in the future - Stoffel Botha and his 'media hit-men' notwithstanding!

Cover picture: Eric Miller (Afrapix)

Offering nothing - but lots of it

In Afrikaans there is a phrase: 'Maak asof jy loop, maar loop nie'.

Literally translated, it means: 'Appear to walk, but don't', although a more accurate translation is: 'Mark time'.

Either way, it's what President PW Botha was doing on April 23 in the white section of South Africa's three-chamber parliament - the day he announced his latest set of political reforms.

With much energetic waving of arms and legs Botha managed to disguise the fact that he hadn't moved an inch. He was offering nothing, but he was offering lots of it, one observer complained afterwards.

In his first reform speech for several months, Botha announced:

- * the possible inclusion of 'recognisable' leaders of African communities in the electoral college which elects the South African president;

- * that he was prepared to change the content and functions of his proposed National Statutory Council (NSC) - and even its name, if it would help get anyone to participate: the government was giving serious consideration to requests that the NSC be called the 'Great Indaba';

- * that he was considering the idea of appointing non-parliamentarians (Africans) to the cabinet;

- * that the government was thinking about setting up regional authorities for 'non-homeland blacks' - super-community councils from which the government could draw members of the 'Great Indaba' if it cannot find them anywhere else.

What Botha didn't say was that in none of these structures would Africans actually have any power - nor would most of them be elected.

The electoral college, the first of

these structures, is probably the best example of 'reform' at its most meaningless. As it currently exists, the college is made up of members of parliament (MPs) of the majority parties in the separate white, coloured and Indian chambers. But the 1983 tri-cameral constitution specifies that the white MPs will always form an absolute majority in the college - thus effectively guaranteeing that the National Party



PW Botha - A large, but empty reform package

elects the president. And in his April 23 speech, Botha said he was considering 'slight' changes to allow for African participation.

Allowing a black majority (even one made up of the Labour Party,

Amichand Rajbansi's National People's Party and 'recognisable' Botha-appointed Africans) would be more than a slight change. So it is safe to assume that the entrenched white majority will remain.

In addition, there is the question of who will do the recognising of 'recognisable' leaders of African communities: past experience suggests that it will not be the communities themselves.

The NSC - soon to be renamed the Great Indaba - is going ahead despite almost universal rejection even by 'recognisable' African leaders, among them heads of most of the 'non-independent' bantustans.

Without openly acknowledging this rejection, Botha said he was prepared to change virtually anything about the NSC, even its name. But, he made clear, he wasn't going to actually give it any power.

'The government is...committed to the concept of a forum for deliberation', he told the white parliament.

While Botha's English has been known to falter at times - when for example he told a foreign journalist that government did not force people 'to move to new homes, we coerce them' - the dictionary definition of 'deliberation' is: 'careful consideration, debate, slowness and carefulness in movement, speech etc'. In other words the Great Indaba will remain a forum for debate rather than decision-making. Botha has offered nothing to address the criticisms voiced last year by Inkatha's Gatsha Buthelezi or any other possible participants when the NSC bill was tabled: the major criticism being that the NSC/Great Indaba takes elected African representatives (or even unelected African individuals) no closer to decision-making on national issues.

And even if the NSC/Great Indaba was given some legislative or executive authority, that criticism would remain.

The proposed empowering legislation offered by Constitutional Affairs minister Chris Heunis last year, provided for the election of

nine African NSC members, plus the participation of 'non-independent' bantustan leaders. But it also provided for nomination by the state president (Botha) of enough additional members to outvote them.

Africans in the cabinet: While the very idea might be horrifying to the increasingly restive far-right under Andries Treurnicht and Eugene Terre'blanche, recent history suggests that the presence of coloured and Indian ministers alongside white cabinet ministers has not revolutionised South Africa.

Alan Hendrickse and Amichand Rajbansi were in the cabinet when, in mid-1986, the coloured and Indian parliaments rejected amendments to massively strengthen the Public Safety and Internal Security Acts. The cabinet had the amendments passed anyway - by getting the President's Council to rubber-stamp them - and, while it was about it, imposed a national state of emergency still in operation today.

And when Hendrickse last year demonstrated his opposition to 'petty apartheid' by swimming in a 'white-only' bathing area, he quickly discovered how effectively his destroying-apartheid-from-within policy actually was: he was forced out of the cabinet.

The lesson is this: Botha is happy to have black ministers in his cabinet, as long as they do as they're told. Of course, for the Africans Botha envisages in the cabinet, this would not be a problem: they will be nominated individuals, without even the limited leverage Hendrickse enjoyed as an elected leader of an elected majority party in the house of delegates.

Regional authorities: Botha kept his options open here, referring to the need to develop political representation for non-bantustan-linked African communities, 'for example ...by means of elected regional bodies'.


These would, he said, have two functions:

* offering communities 'authority

of their own affairs that affect them' (in other words, no authority outside the townships); and

* they would serve as a basis for participation 'in a formal forum for deliberation' (the NSC/Great Indaba, if it can't get members any other way). This additional structure will thus be no more involved in political decision-making than any of the others.

While adding four additional structures to regional and central government, Botha has succeeded in keeping the country's 20-million African majority as distant from political power as ever. But, as he told a German journalist in 1986: 'Majority rule cannot be applied in South Africa because we are a country of too many different structures'. - *WIP correspondent.*



Cedric Nunn - Afrapix

Unions to continue the fight for May Day

The success of a government attempt to de-politicise May Day into a first-Friday-in-May public holiday has not yet been seriously tested. For this year, May 1 fell on a Sunday.

There are, however, significant indications that the union movement, which last year

negotiated May 1 as a paid holiday with over 40 companies, has not said its last word on the issue.

A straight comparison between last year's estimated two-and-a-half million-strong stayaway and this year's response is impractical: this year May 1 fell on a Sunday, and the union movement did little to actively encourage support for a Monday stayaway.

But the May 2 stayaway did attract some support. And a small but significant number of workers demanded and won May 2 off in place of May 6 - the first Friday in May, now enshrined in South African law as 'Workers Day'.

At several factories in the Western Cape, the Cosatu-affiliated Amalgamated Clothing and Textile

Workers Union of South Africa (Actwusa) successfully negotiated a swap, with workers taking off May 2 and working the 'holiday' on May 6.

In addition, members of both Cosatu and Nactu-affiliated unions took off May 2, as part of May Day agreements signed in the past. Nactu also reported that several factories treated May 6 as a paid holiday - President PW Botha's Labour Day announcement last year applies only to shop and office workers.

The major focus of this year's May Day rallies was the Labour Relations Amendment Bill (LRAB) and state clampdowns on the liberation movement and the media.

May Day remains a politically sensitive issue, with its roots deep in the South African labour movement. While May 1 was first marked in Australia in 1887 - as part of the campaign for an eight-hour working day - it was only acknowledged in South Africa in 1904, by white workers.

The first black South African workers to mark May Day did so 14 years later, with a joint demonstration taking place the following year, 1919, and only sporadically in the following decades.

The steady de-radicalisation of the mainstream union movement in the years after the 1922 Rand Revolt helped nudge May Day further and further off the workers' calendar, and by 1965 May Day was specifically excluded from wage determinations and industrial council agreements.

Today, of the country's predominantly white unions, only the Federation of SA Transport Services Unions supports the idea of a May 1 public holiday in principle. And even it acknowledges that its members are more interested in a guaranteed first-Friday-in-May long weekend (May 1 could, for example, fall on a Wednesday).

For non-racial and black unions, however, the May Day issue remains alive and well: of 56 unions

contacted by the Labour Forum - a labour resource and research institute run by former Tucsa officials - 47 supported the idea of May 1 only being recognised as Labour Day or an equivalent.

Of the 47, 32 said it should be a mandatory holiday, while 15 said they would be prepared to drop the Day of the Vow (December 16), Republic Day or Ascension Day as public holidays if this meant getting May 1. Only six unions - all either totally or predominantly white, opposed May Day as a public holiday.

Next year the government-approved Labour Day falls on May 5, as usual a Friday. But May 1 falls on a Monday, so the 'long weekend' argument cuts both ways and the government's attempt to de-politicise May Day will be more seriously tested.

Shareen Singh.

Speedy organising in fast foods

Despite ongoing divisions within Ccawusa, the union continues to make substantial gains on the shopfloor.

In addition to building on last year's gains at the major supermarket chains - Pick 'n Pay, Checkers, OK and others - the union has broken into the fast-food industry for the first time, becoming in the last three months the first union to win recognition from the country's three dominant fast-food chains.

According to Wimpy marketing director Pieter Oberholzer, the vast number of corner-cafe hamburger joints enable the three fast-food giants to account for only an estimated 20% of the country's fast-food outlets. But Interleisure, Avbak and Fedics employ more than 7 000 workers.

And with Avbak, Interleisure and Fedics steadily buying out

independent fast-food outlets and smaller chains, this number is likely to increase steadily.

Between them, the three fast-food corporations cover the country's best-known fast-food stores.

The Interleisure Group consists of five divisions: food, cinema, services, film production and sport. The major holding companies are Federale Volksbeleggings (40%) and Sol Kerzner's Kersaf empire (40%). Ster Kinekor, Computicket, Toron Television as well as Squires, Longhorn, Porterhouse, Pizza Inn and Bimbos, are owned by Interleisure. Ccawusa has recently concluded a recognition agreement with Squires which involves Squires Loft and Longhorn. Agreement was reached between the company and the union that this recognition agreement should be the standard one negotiated at all Interleisure subsidiaries.

The union is also in the process of concluding an agreement with Juicy Lucy, which, with Milky Lane, Wimpy, Pizza Hut, Burger Faire and BJ Pantry is owned by Avbak Food Holdings, a division of Anglovaal.

The agreement concluded with Jan Smuts Airport catering, run by Fedics, will also form the basis for other Fedics operations - mainly catering outlets at airports, universities and colleges.

These agreements are a major breakthrough in tying up a large portion of the commercial catering sector. Ccawusa claims workers in this sector place a lot of emphasis on formal recognition agreements and this could be an incentive for unorganised workers to join the union and raise the level of organisation in the industry.

Ccawusa is not party to the industrial council, but the issue of national bargaining is being researched by the union. This could be a step forward in the direction of centralised bargaining as Avbak, Interleisure and Fedics are parties to the council.

Shareen Singh.

Pretoria's newest homeland - 'Savimbistan'


South Africa has piously warned that the Angolan government's military thrust into southern Angola is putting peace talks in jeopardy.

But only weeks before the talks started in London early in May, Pretoria's strategists launched a major military campaign to slice Angola in two and set Jonas Savimbi's Unita up as a rival to the Luanda government.

This secret campaign was aimed at seizing control of the Cuando, Cubango and Moxico provinces, setting Unita leader Jonas Savimbi up as an alternative president to Angola's Jose Eduardo dos Santos in the Moxico capital and - if necessary - calling in American troops from neighbouring Zaire to defend Savimbi's 'government'.

The idea of an alternative (Unita) Angolan government has been on Pretoria's agenda for some time. But it was given new urgency towards the end of last year when, with South African forces bogged down at the fiercely defended southern Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale (see map for town names), Ronald Reagan's US administration began pressing for a solution to the 13-year war.

Angola's successful defence of Cuito Cuanavale challenged South Africa's formerly unquestioned ability to dominate southern Angola. While the military deadlock around Cuito continues to serve Pretoria's basic interest in being there - depriving Swapo and the African National Congress of forward bases within striking distance of Namibia and South Africa - it also weakened South Africa's bargaining strength at any



'Savimbistan': The South African plan involved declaring the area in grey an alternative Angola

future peace talks. And, with both the US and the Soviet Union pushing for resolution of the Angolan war, peace talks were increasingly on the agenda.

The military deadlock at Cuito had its origins last September in a powerful assault by units of the Angolan army (Fapla), backed by Cuban (and later Swapo) troops on Mavinga, in south-eastern Angola. Cuito was seen as the jump-off point for a subsequent attack on Jamba, the base of Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed Unita guerrilla movement.

South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan later acknowledged that the assault would have succeeded if South African units had not rushed to Unita's defence, counter-attacking and forcing Fapla

back to Cuito Cuanavale. At Cuito, the Angolans stopped the South African counter-attack and, for the first time, broke the South African Air Force's domination of the southern Angolan skies.

With neither side able to use their aerial superiority to break the deadlock on the ground - as South African planes have done repeatedly in the past - fighting became a series of artillery duels with both sides deeply dug in south of the town.

A South African analysis in January this year concluded that a combined Unita-SADF infantry assault could take Cuito, but only with the loss of an estimated 300 white (South African and Namibian) troops and 2 000 Namibian soldiers, plus an unspecified number of Unita fighters - a guerrilla force already

BRIEFS

badly weakened by six months of fighting in regular combat. With South African conscript losses - at the time officially acknowledged at just over 20 - already causing major political embarrassment to President PW Botha's government at home, the plan was shelved.

Pretoria therefore began casting about for alternative means, both to take Cuito, and to win back the initiative in future peace talks.

In March, Pretoria launched a massive tank attack on Cuito, getting within 600 metres of Fapla's defence perimeter before being forced to retreat with the loss of four tanks - three damaged and one captured intact, according to the Angolan news agency, Angop. SA Defence Force (SADF) officials claimed they had lost only one tank, and denied that, in their haste, retreating SADF armoured vehicles had overrun Unita lines, killing a number of Unita troops.

And after abandoning the idea of an infantry assault, Pretoria contacted US assistant secretary of state Chester Crocker, telling him they could take Cuito and suggesting the establishment of an alternative Angolan government under Savimbi, according to the London-based newsletter, *Africa Confidential*. The idea was not as implausible as it sounds now, in the wake of the US-brokered peace talks in London and Brazzaville, from which Unita is excluded. For Washington has never recognised the MPLA-Workers' Party government and has given substantial military aid to Unita.

At a secret meeting with Savimbi and unnamed South African officials, Crocker rejected the idea - mainly, according to *Africa Confidential*, because US President Ronald Reagan was keen to bow out of his second term in December with a diplomatic victory in Southern Africa. A 'Savimbistan' demanding recognition from the US would cause problems, not solutions.

Despite this, Pretoria and Savimbi went ahead with the plan shortly afterwards, with Savimbi declaring

that he was establishing an alternative government to Dos Santos' MPLA-Workers' Party government.

And early this year South Africa and Unita began transporting large quantities of military hardware past Jamba and Mavinga northwards towards the Benguela railway line, bypassing Cuito Cuanavale and moving north.

After reports of heavy fighting at several sites along the Benguela line, Unita units seized control of Munhango - amid reports that white soldiers were seen fighting alongside Unita rebels.

The thrust then hit up against strong resistance from Fapla units at Cuemba, with its vital airstrip, and failed to take the town.

Had the attack on Cuemba succeeded, according to the weekly newsletter, *Southscan*, other Unita units would have moved eastwards towards the coast to establish a north-south line of defence along the Cubango river - as the probable eventual western boundary of the area the new government would rule.

The powerful, combined Fapla-Cuban-Swapo thrust southwards into Huila and Cuando Cubango provinces (bordering Namibia) in early May appears to be partially motivated by Luanda's desire to break through that line of defence.

While the Unita fighters and their military support were thus establishing the western border of Savimbi's new country, the Unita force which had taken Munhango and unsuccessfully attempted to take Cueniba was scheduled to move westwards along the railway line towards Zaire and, in late April, take Luena, capital of Moxico province. This, according to *Southscan*, was the planned 'capital' of Savimbi's new Angolan government.

The plan stumbled over the rebels' failure to take Cuemba.

London sources claim that the campaign was timed to coincide with joint military manoeuvres by US troops and units of the Zaire

army in Zaire's Shaba province - across Angola's eastern border - in late April and early May. The idea was that once Savimbi had announced the formation of his 'alternative government' in Luena - forcing rapid, if reluctant, US recognition - he could call for assistance from US troops conveniently across the Zairean border.

While Crocker had indicated at the January meeting that the US would not recognise a second 'Angola', the existence of an alternative Savimbi government would clearly change the nature of any future peace talks - talks which South Africa, since being stopped at Cuito Cuanavale, realised were very much on the agenda.

Pretoria's negotiators would be able to argue convincingly that peace talks should be between Angola's two governments for the formation of a single government of national unity. Instead, negotiations eventually involved only a single Angolan participant, Jose Eduardo dos Santos' MPLA-Workers' Party government, and two foreign powers (South Africa and Cuba).

Sitting astride the Benguela line - and with South Africa's east coast allies, Renamo, able (to a degree) to veto the transport of goods from Zambia and Zimbabwe to Mozambique's Indian Ocean ports - Savimbi's government would have been able to apply strong pressure on Zambia to back an Angolan government of national unity, if not Unita itself. It would also finally solve Pretoria's Namibian border problem - cutting off all possible Swapo access routes except those through the easily-monitored Huila province's coastal desert strip.

South Africa and Unita are thus back where they started in January: bogged down outside Cuito Cuanavale, with Pretoria participating in the peace talks as it plays for time and a new administration in Washington, and the resultant postponement of US pressure for a settlement.

WIP correspondent.

As 1 400 union delegates made their way to their seats in Wits University's Flower Hall on May 14, the scene was not one to inspire confidence in trade union unity.

At the south end of the huge Flower Hall 314 delegates from the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numisa) were chanting their support for socialism.

At the other end, Cyril Ramaphosa's mineworkers were singing the praises of African National Congress president Oliver Tambo and the Freedom Charter.

Socialism and the Freedom Charter may not be mutually exclusive, but at the Flower Hall ten months earlier, during the bi-annual congress of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), they had come to symbolise the major contending trends within Cosatu and, increasingly, within the country's extra-parliamentary opposition.

And while few within the union movement argue against socialism as the final goal, ongoing rivalry between the two positions - entrenched in Cosatu terminology as 'workerist' and 'populist' - was one of the reasons (although not the only, or even the major, one) for what the union federation itself says has been its failure to end differences between its 13 affiliated unions and meet the many challenges facing it as a united class bloc.

The singing with which the delegates warmed up for the special Cosatu congress did little to suggest that the contending trends were any closer than they had been ten months earlier, although they now faced the most serious challenge yet to confront the union federation.

Which goes to show how misleading songs can be.

The special congress was called in response to two specific challenges to Cosatu:

* The government's February 24 restrictions - which legally limited Cosatu to a narrow range of factory-floor trade unionism, and effectively banned 17 other organisations, among them the United Democratic Front (UDF), a close and formal Cosatu ally; and

* the Labour Relations Amendment

It's testing time for Cosatu

DAVID NIDDRIE reports on the recent Cosatu congress - perhaps the most important gathering in the federation's brief history.

Bill (LRAB) - a bill intended, according to Manpower Minister Pietie du Plessis, to 'restore the balance in industrial relations in favour of the employer'. Even after it had been slightly softened in the final draft presented to the tri-cameral parliament 24 hours after the special congress, the bill will substantially limit workers' right to strike, open trade unions to civil action for losses incurred by their members' actions, and outlaw solidarity action in industrial disputes.

Combined, the restrictions and the bill attempted to deny Cosatu a right woven into the fabric of its existence: the right to operate on the national political terrain, both to achieve its members' factory-floor demands, and in their broader, political interests.

'Taken together, the bill and the restrictions effectively ban Cosatu', said general secretary Jay Naidoo on February 25.

The effect on Cosatu was much as political commentator Samuel Johnson had suggested 200 years earlier:

'Depend on it: when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates the mind wonderfully'.

Cosatu's mind was, very rapidly, concentrated.

By February 24 this year, Cosatu had lost some of the impetus with which it had burst into its second year and the opening months of 1987. After spending the first year after its December 1985 launch feeling its way into a national role and gradually building up momentum, the federation exploded into action in the first months of last year: industrial action by its affiliates rocketted strike figures for the year to 9-million work-days, the highest in history and eight times higher than the previous year (itself a record); its membership was expanding at the rate of 500 a day, every day; and its actions were, increasingly, defining the union federation as the major focus of opposition both to the apartheid state and to the institution of capital.

Cosatu's mid-year second national



Rats Mayet - Afrapix

congress became an exuberant celebration of the federation's political policy - marred only by the deepening split between the two dominant tendencies.

But even before the congress began on July 15 last year, the state, employers and more shadowy opponents had given notice that they would not be sitting back while Cosatu and its allies took their policies to their logical conclusion.

The counter-offensive opened with the powerful and highly-professional bombing of Cosatu House in the early hours of May 7 1987, only hours after Cosatu's most effective and explicit political act yet - the stayaway, organised with the UDF, against the May 6 whites-only election. While the government had already launched (through the good offices of the SABC) a major propaganda campaign against Cosatu, employer attitudes hardened: between the Cosatu House bombing and the February 24 restrictions, more than 20 000 workers were dismissed or locked out for taking part

in industrial action. This figure excludes the 50 000 miners dismissed during the NUM's three-week strike.

By year-end, industrial action had eased back dramatically; for the first five months of this year, strike and stoppage figures were close to those of 1986, eight times down on 1987. Membership had dropped from a paid-up peak of 712 000 to 691 000 - although the 50 000 NUM members lost accounted for this decrease and more; elsewhere in Cosatu membership was rising, but more slowly than before.

Politically, Cosatu was feeling the effects of the second year under state of emergency rule and the hardline employer attitude. Central to the policies which had crystallised at its July congress was the idea that the federation would flex its political muscles in alliance with like-minded 'community' organisations - the UDF, the SA Youth Congress (Sayco) and others.

But by 1988, community opposition

structures had been organisationally weakened and some were barely operating. Cosatu itself was drifting, although it was slowly beginning to focus on the looming threat of the LRAB.

Its mind was anything but concentrated. But February 24 changed all that.

The dual threat of the restrictions and the bill demanded several things of Cosatu:

- * An immediate and decisive response - both as a warning to employers and the government that Cosatu would not knuckle under without a struggle, and to generate support for further resistance;

- * on-going agitation and action to demonstrate to employers specifically that support for the bill might cost them more than it was worth; and

- * an actively-pursued, long-term strategy to take the political fight to the state - thus denying it the leeway to isolate and destroy different

The Cosatu congress

elements in the opposition.

The special congress on May 14 and 15 delivered the goods, endorsing:

* As an immediate response, an ambitious (but after the congress, increasingly controversial) three-day national protest from June 6. Both the emergency regulations and the February 24 restrictions legally bar Cosatu from calling a stayaway;

* a major intensification of until-then localised and scattered factory demonstrations against the LRAB.

Within a week of the congress one union local alone had drawn 9 000 workers from 33 factories into lunchtime protests, now uniformly staged on Tuesdays to increase their impact (see Labour Trends, page 29). And in the 48 hours before the congress 18 000 miners - not traditionally enthusiastic participants in national campaigns and with their bruising three-week strike still casting its shadow over NUM - had come out in anti-LRAB demos, some of them during underground shifts.

As a long-term strategy, the congress endorsed proposals for a Cosatu-initiated conference to establish a broad front of anti-apartheid forces. This was explicitly aimed at bypassing ideological differences which have, in the past, limited united action - the first major strategic shift in the opposition since President PW Botha's government launched its political counter-offensive to the rising tide of opposition on June 12, 1986.

Initiation of a broad front will not,

however, end previously negotiated Cosatu alliances with the UDF and some of its affiliates. Organisation of the broad front conference and formulation of a parallel programme of action will be undertaken by a planning committee of the Cosatu central executive committee and representatives of its 'traditional allies' (the UDF itself cannot legally participate, but representatives are likely to be drawn from a similar school of political thought).

But the idea opens the way for inclusion of both the black exclusivist-groupings, most importantly the National Confederation of Trade Unions (official membership 450 000, although officials privately acknowledge a figure of around 180 000), and of extra-parliamentary 'white sector' anti-apartheid groupings (Frederick van Zyl Slabbert's Idasa and the Five Freedoms Forum are the most likely invitees).

While the broad front decision itself is significant, the fact that Cosatu took it was even more so.

Taken with the approval of a powerful delegation of 'community' representatives at the congress, the decision represents a major shift in opposition politics.

Since the re-emergence of mass, non-racial political organisation in the wake of the 1976 uprisings, community-based, multi-class organisations (and, more recently, the UDF) have tended to be the dominant expression of black political aspirations -

and thus the major defining factor in the direction of opposition politics. Even last July, after a debilitating 13 months under state of emergency rule, the UDF still exercised enough political clout to strongly influence Cosatu congress decisions. But on May 15 it was Cosatu which took the decision to call for a broad front. While the legal constraints imposed on February 24 obviously limited the UDF's ability to participate formally, the moving force behind an explicitly political decision was Cosatu - albeit with the full endorsement of 'community' representatives.

Organised workers were making the running.

The broad front decision was tacit acknowledgment that after two years of sustained government action, the detention of more than 30 000 people and the death of a further 2 500 - most of them linked to the UDF - the dominant legal opposition force had been organisationally decimated.

But if Cosatu was now required to map out the road ahead - even with the indirect assistance of the outlawed African National Congress (ANC), which implicitly endorsed the idea of a broad front after meeting Nactu (following several prior refusals) a week before the congress - it needed first to chart the terrain across which that road must run.

In the run-up to the congress, three distinct positions emerged:

* 'The state is strong, the opposition weak': this position argued that, as virtually the only surviving legal opposition force with any organisational strength, the unions should conserve and build their support where they did it best - on the factory floor. From there they could again set about clearing space for themselves to operate. In a paper debated widely within Cosatu before its delivery, Naidoo explicitly rejected this option at the start of the congress: 'There is no question of retreating into economism', he said.

* 'The state is weak and indecisive, the opposition strong': this position held that, although it had been weakened, the opposition retained the initiative and that government actions were not so much part of a coherent strategy as ad hoc responses to opposition actions. The nature of the struggle had not changed qualitatively -

Where they come from

Paid-up membership of Congress of South African Trade Unions affiliates at the May 14-15 special congress:

* Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union of SA (Actwusa): 68 507 - A gain of 38 000 in the textile sector, following a merger between Cosatu's NUTW and several non-Cosatu unions. Actwusa's congress delegation included 20 delegates from the 100 000-member Garment and Allied Workers Union (Gawu). Despite some post-congress squabbling, the two unions are due to merge in the next few months.

* Construction and Allied Workers Union (Cawu): 18 176 (down from 26 291 at the July congress).

* Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA (Ccawusa): 42 221 (July congress interim figure of 56 000 has been disputed within the union - over whether Johannesburg branch membership stands at 22 000 or 40 000).

* Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU): 32 739 (up from 29 859).

* Food and Allied Workers Union (Fawu): 65 803 (65 278).

* National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (Nehawu): 5 876 (9 197).

* National Union of Mineworkers (NUM): 207 941 (261 901).

* National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa): 156 519 (130 796).

* Paper, Print, Wood and Allied Workers Union (Ppwawu): 25 046 (23 310).

* SA Municipal Workers Union (Samwu): 14 892 (16 967).

* SA Domestic Workers Union (Sadwu): 8 700 (9 402).

* SA Railways and Harbour Workers Union (Sarhwu): 23 685.

* Transport and General Workers Union (T&G): 21 046 (18 281).

While Cosatu as a whole dropped 21 000 members between its July 1987 national congress and the special congress, the 50 000 members lost by the NUM in the wake of the miners' strike more than accounts for this. Excluding NUM, Cosatu grew by 33 000 for the period.



Rafis Maveti - Afrapix

Cosatu... The truth is that only the Highveld and the Western Cape function as active regions - the majority of regions are paralysed... Affiliates take no steps to encourage their leadership to involve themselves (in locals) and in some cases actually boycott (their locals').

The Living Wage Campaign, seen by Naidoo in his report to the July 1987 congress as having 'captured the imagination of thousands of workers', had fizzled into little more than organisational rhetoric.

And even the heady debates on disinvestment and the correct distribution of the interests left behind by foreign companies seemed to have stumbled in the run-up to the congress, with Numsa members at Anglo American's Samcor plants in Port Elizabeth and Pretoria striking against a union-negotiated deal by which divesting Ford executives signed over 24% of company stock to a union trust.

While some workers demanded a cash pay-out - the union planned to use income from the trust for community projects - many opposed the deal on a straight ideological level: 'We don't want to be small capitalists, we're workers', a Pretoria Samcor worker told journalists.

Despite this gloomy picture, delegates went into the congress with reasons to hope.

The drop in Cosatu membership was more than accounted for by the 50 000 members lost by NUM - and NUM had lost those in a head-on clash (the biggest in South African labour history) with the country's most powerful employer grouping, the mining houses. And although NUM had come out weaker, it retained a membership of more than 200 000, the largest in the country.

Elsewhere in Cosatu, other unions - Actwusa, CWIU, Fawu, Numsa, Ppwawu and T&G - continued to grow (see box).

And if inter-union rivalry continued, it did so alongside significantly different trends. Numsa's decision to join an International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) four-union bloc in negotiations with Seifsa was just one indication that the process was not stalled. The establishment of an SA Breweries' National Shopstewards' Council of 11 unions - six of them Cosatu affiliates - was another.

Indicative of a growing preference

'Two Numosas and a NUM please' ... delegates stock up on T-shirts during a break in proceedings

ly, advocates of this position argued. There was, thus, little need for a change of tactics. At the congress they argued that no debate was necessary on what action was necessary - all that needed to be discussed was the date and duration of protest action.

* The third and dominant position argued that while the state was strong and acting according to a well-planned strategy, the opposition, and in particular the union movement, had not been defeated and thus had no reason to retreat.

After three months of debate - between February 24 and the congress - elements of all three positions were distilled into the repeatedly redrafted position paper delivered by Naidoo.

'The state knows that liberals find it difficult to support it if the repression is too bad (or lasts too long)', Naidoo said in his opening address. '(It) wants to be able to rule without the state of emergency, but can only do this if the democratic movement is destroyed and it wins the support of the liberals'.

The government's inability to enforce the widespread passivity and subservience that followed its 1960s state of emergency had limited its options and left it with less room to manoeuvre. While it had contained the political challenge of the past three years, it could meet neither the political aspirations nor the material needs of most South Africans.

Nevertheless, the paper argued, it

remained powerful and increasingly confident of its ability to win allies and take the political initiative.

Business too was increasingly siding back towards Pretoria after a brief flirtation with the ANC by some of its more liberal members. In most South African company boardrooms, opposition to the LRAB was limited to quibbling over details - most business executives favoured Manpower Minister Pietie du Plessis' efforts to 'restore the balance'.

While opposition groupings had lived through the most sustained period of repression in modern South African history, the relative success of this year's patchily and hastily-organised March 21 stayaway demonstrated that 'the spirit of our people has not been broken'.

But the fact that Cosatu was taking the lead in response to the latest government actions rather than the community organisations indicated that the spirit might be willing but the organisation was weak.

This was true even in the federation itself, Cosatu leadership acknowledged shortly before the congress. In a pre-congress CEC report, Cosatu office-bearers said: 'The differences between our leadership and between some of our affiliates are paralysing our organisation... The office-bearers failed to offer decisive leadership... Unions represent their own specific interests and not the interests of


The Cosatu congress

for joining bargaining, the initiative will mean SAB negotiators will face a union team representing not only the vast majority of direct SAB employees, but also of 14 of its subsidiaries.

Less tangible than these has been a mood of militancy within Cosatu and the broader union movement. 'There's a lot of confidence, our members don't feel the need to retreat - they haven't been beaten, so why retreat?' Cosatu assistant general secretary Sydney Mufamadi said before the congress. 'Our members sensed a lack of clarity in the leadership, a lack of direction and began to assert their own feelings - of a need to go forward, to resist state action - and it came through at the congress', added a union organiser. When an initial position paper in one union argued for 'retreat', the authors were swiftly and angrily called to account by the union local.

At the congress these factors were subjected to a range of different interpretations. At the one extreme, Actwusa argued that the relative strength of the state was so great that extreme caution was necessary - and, ideally, a down-grading of Cosatu's political profile. At the other extreme, Sarhwu acknowledged that President PW Botha's government had won itself some space and, since 1984, had formulated a strategy. But, a Sarhwu position paper argued, the tactics of mass resistance had demonstrably succeeded, and the potential for further mass action remained. In effect, no change in tactics was required.

When the congress moved on to



Rais Mayet - Afrapix

Cosatu general secretary Jay Naidoo: 'There is no question of retreating into conservatism'

practical action, this resulted in the argument, pushed most powerfully by the strong delegation of 'community' representatives, that there was no need to debate 'whether' or 'what', but only the specifics of the action.

When it came to the debate on action, however, it was the central position - acknowledging Pretoria's gains and the opposition's weaknesses but believing neither was so substantial as to demand a retreat - that was the major influence. Advocates argued

that, with Cosatu and its 'traditional allies' as a foundation, an opposition could be built which was capable not only of surviving but of advancing.

The delegates concurred: the state might be strong, but Cosatu was no push-over, and would not be abandoning the political arena.

The broad front decision, nevertheless, represented a major compromise by both the 'workerist' and 'populist' blocs in the congress. The 'workerist' bloc pushed for emphasis on non-racialism, and the 'white sector' to draw in liberals and weaken the ruling bloc, while the 'populist' bloc pushed for an alliance of 'organisations of the working class ... and of the oppressed'. The compromise was brokered by an emerging bloc of unions - T&G, Ppwatu and Ccawusa - straddling the positions taken by the two major protagonists, NUM and Numsa. But it was possible primarily because of a shift of the balance of forces within Cosatu, now evenly divided following the decline in NUM membership and the growth of other unions.

Ironically, it will not be the broad front - the most intensely debated of the actions - through which Cosatu's move to opposition centre-stage will be tested. Instead it will be the three-day national protest, the details of which were worked out hastily, almost as an afterthought, as delegates began moving out of the Flower Hall late on Sunday with the congress already overrunning by five hours.

In the run-up to the national protest a range of state, para-statal and business representatives spoke out against the action. A manpower ministry spokesman warned workers against participating; Sasol officials spoke of action against workers who stayed away; and major employers, among them Anglo American and Anglo Vaal, barely bothered to deny Cosatu claims of a joint business strategy to head off the protest or punish participants.

And just days after the congress, debate had already begun within the union movement and among its allies about the advisability of a three-day action.

The crackdown has already started

Work In Progress went to the printers on June 1 amid mounting signs of a major crackdown on Cosatu.

Since the May 14-15 special congress, which defined a higher and more clearly defined political profile than Cosatu has shown since the national stayaways last May, police have moved against several Cosatu or Cosatu-affiliate meetings.

Underlying all these actions has been a common attitude: discussion or action on the special congress' 'political' decisions is illegal in terms of the February 24 restrictions imposed on the country's major union federation.


* In Port Elizabeth more than 100 police surrounded a building where members of the Cosatu local were meeting for a congress report-back on May 24. After police had taken details - and photographs - of everyone there, a senior security policeman addressed the meeting: no discussions on the special congress' decisions were permissible, he said. Delegates to the local were welcome to discuss trade union affairs, but nothing else.

* In Pretoria police sealed off a hall in which a three-day union training workshop was due to take place from May 27 - apparently under the impression that it was linked to the congress.

* On the same day police detained 250 Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (Ccawusa) members demonstrating outside the Carlton Hotel in central Johannesburg over an ongoing wage dispute.

Isolated incidents in fact began even before the congress: on May 12 police prevented a metalworkers' caucus south of Johannesburg from taking place - forcing the workers to lie on the floor for two hours.

The next day they again harassed delegates attempting to meet at the same venue.



The strange saga of Mr X1

What makes an experienced soldier join enemy ranks?
GLENN MOSS reports on the evidence of a secret state witness who left Umkhonto we Sizwe to join the security police.

The man in the witness box was highly trained. That much was clear to everyone in court.

His name was known to many of those present. So was his fighting name, his MK name. He had been a soldier of Umkhonto we Sizwe, armed wing of the African National Congress. But in court he was called 'Mr X1'. For the witness was now a constable in South Africa's security police - a 'supergrass' testifying against former colleagues.

By court order, nothing may be published which reveals X1's real identity, or place of residence.

Yet his name was published in a South African newspaper long before he started testifying in a Bethal treason trial. The report also men-

tioned that he had 'turned', and was now working closely with the South African police.

Even police witnesses acknowledge that the ANC has known for some time of 'X1's' conversion and newfound relationship with the security police. And on his own evidence the three accused in court know who he is. They can easily pass on his identity to those who visit them in jail where they are held as awaiting trial prisoners.

But presiding Judge Daniels insists that X1's name cannot be mentioned, even though he is giving his evidence in camera.

He has even forbidden defence lawyers from asking questions aimed at eliciting his true name, or one of his pseudonyms used while an

Umkhonto soldier.

Judge Daniels ruled that where X1's testimony refers to people with whom he had important conversations, defence lawyers may mention X1's real name to those people in consultations - but may not reveal that X1 is giving state's evidence in a treason trial.

X1 leaves South Africa

On trial for treason are Acton Mandla Maseko, Simon Dladla and alleged ANC 'big fish' Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, who was kidnapped from Swaziland and delivered to security police headquarters in Pretoria.

They face a main charge of treason, with 26 alternative counts including terrorism, membership of the African National Congress, and

attempted murder.

One part of the state's case involves allegations that Maseko and Dladla were responsible for acts of 'land-mine warfare' in the farming districts of Breyten and Volksrust. According to the state, in 1986, ANC headquarters in Lusaka instructed the Swaziland Regional Military Political Committee (RMPC) to begin laying land mines in white South African farming communities. As a result, Maseko and Dladla mined farm roads near Breyten and Volksrust. In explosions which followed, several vehicles were destroyed and eight people injured.

The other major aspect of the state's case involves Ebrahim's alleged involvement in senior ANC structures, including his role as chairman of the Swaziland RMPC.

It was Ebrahim, claims the state, who instructed Umkhonto we Sizwe's Transvaal implementation machinery to lay mines on farms and farm roads.

Linking these two parts of the state's case is X1's evidence. X1 is probably the most senior MK operative in years to defect to the security police. In his evidence, X1 claims he rose through the ranks of the ANC's army to become a senior military intelligence officer in the Transvaal Regional Command.

X1 comes from a political family. His brother served time on Robben Island after being found guilty of 'terrorism' in the 1970s. X1 claims that his brother's imprisonment affected him deeply, and was a major factor in his decision to leave South Africa during 1977.

The other important factor was lack of funds for university study: X1 had previously matriculated, and hoped to attend university as a full-time student.

When he illegally jumped the border fence between South Africa and

Swaziland, it was with the intention of applying for a scholarship to study further. He reported to the Manzini police station, and applied for political asylum. It is not clear from his evidence why the Swazi authorities granted his application, since there is no indication that he had been politically active in South Africa. After a night in police cells, X1 found himself in the Mawelawela refugee camp together with some 20 other refugees.

Over the next few days, senior ANC and PAC officials explained their policies and programmes to the

representative in Mozambique, Lennox Lagu, drove the four new recruits to Matola, a dormitory suburb of Maputo. There they were introduced to other ANC members, including some who had undergone periods of military training.

One of these was Jacob Zuma, then deputy chief representative in Mozambique. Over the next month, Zuma instructed the new recruits in politics and political theory. So impressed was X1 by Zuma's lessons that he decided to drop his academic aspirations and join Umkhonto we Sizwe.

Within a month, X1 was in Engineering Camp, just outside Angola's capital city of Luanda. For a week he rubbed shoulders with Cuban instructors in the Angolan army, and soldiers from Zapu and Swapo.

But Engineering was just a transit camp, and X1 was part of a group of 30 who left for East Germany in June 1977. After a brief stopover at the Berlin airport, and a four-hour bus ride into the country, they ar-

rived at Teterow, which became their home for the next six months.

The camp was run by East German instructors, who communicated with recruits through an English translator.

Training began with conventional marching and drill, under the watchful eye of an instructor named Idu. Topography included practical and theoretical lessons on ground configuration - important for a guerilla army operating in both hilly and flat terrains. Compass and map reading was followed by fighting tactics - skirmish lines, consolidation of trenches when fired upon by the enemy, and the like.

Training was geared to guerilla warfare. But recruits also received instruction in the structures of more conventional armies, including



An ANC car - allegedly destroyed after an MK mission

group. Joe Mwanazi - who subsequently broke away from the PAC for a period to form the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) - put forward the Pan Africanist position. The ANC was represented by Stanley Mabizela, then its chief representative in Swaziland.

X1 joins the ANC

When the ANC offered to organise study scholarships for X1 and three others, they jumped at the chance. After a brief stay at Mabizela's Manzini house, they were driven by landrover to Swaziland's Lomahasha border with Mozambique. After another illegal border crossing through the fence, X1 spent the night in an ANC transit house just inside Mozambican territory.

The next day, the ANC's chief



Western military models represented by the South African, British and American armies.

The course in engineering included instruction in the use of explosives, including TNT, plastic explosives (PLNP-10) and home-made explosive devices. The F1 defensive and RGD5 offensive grenades were mastered, as were various weapons - the Tokarev pistol, Scorpion machine pistol, AK47 and its AKM cousin with a folding butt, RPK light machine gun, and the anti-tank rocket, popularly called the Bazooka.

Politics was not forgotten, and an East German instructor named Horst lectured the MK recruits on the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin. More practically, the organisation of underground combat units was dealt with: in this cell structure, there should never be more than three members per cell, and no member of one cell should know the identity of members of other cells. And as in all armies, physical training was an important and regular feature of X1's military instruction.

The specifics of the South African situation also featured in the training. Pallo Jordan and Aziz Pahad,

both currently members of the ANC's national executive committee (NEC), lectured on African history, trade unionism, and contemporary South African politics. And *Sechaba* editor Francis Meli instructed recruits in ANC history.

A failed mission

Back in Angola after six month's training, X1 claims to have met Acton Maseko (accused number 1) at the Funda camp, where they underwent a refresher course. The idea of this course, according to X1, was not to see who was militarily most competent, but to establish and correct areas of weakness in recruits.

March 1978 saw X1 - now a trained cadre of a guerilla army - back in Mozambique, where he was attached to a military machinery. Within each machinery - or group of guerillas operating in a demarcated area - there was an established command structure: a commander, commissar, and chiefs of staff, security and logistics.

The command structure planned military actions undertaken by specific units, and set up auxiliary structures for a unit once it had suc-

cessfully infiltrated South Africa - underground houses, food and other supplies.

Once a unit has been infiltrated, it reports back to the command structure on its actions. These reports are in turn channelled to central headquarters, which decides on requests for weapons, money and other supplies requisitioned for the unit.

X1's first infiltration into South Africa as part of the Transvaal Rural Military Machinery was hardly a success. Two of the unit's four members were arrested, while X1 and his chief of staff fled back to Mozambique via Swaziland. Their mission - to recruit and train recruits in Venda - was aborted.

Remaining in Matola for the whole of 1979, X1 was wounded in the South African raid on that suburb. And during that year he took an oath of allegiance to MK. He declared himself a soldier of the South African revolution, and pledged to serve under MK until death. The oath, administered by ANC president Oliver Tambo and MK chief Joe Modise, ended with X1 grasping a spear: 'With the Spear of the Nation, till victory or death' was his pledge.

As a member of the Transvaal Rural Military Machinery, X1 witnessed a number of units leaving for missions. During 1981 George Mokoena successfully sabotaged a railway line near Acornhoek. His attempt to sabotage a goods train at Bushbuckridge was less successful. And on Mokoena's third mission - to place a limpet mine on a diesel engine at Bushbuckridge - railway police arrived in the middle of the operation. When Mokoena produced a hand grenade, police opened fire, killing him. A policeman also died in the incident.

For a May 1982 attack on a fuel depot at Hectorspruit, five limpet mines, four AKM rifles with folding butts and money had to be requisitioned.

X1 testified that after an attempt to sabotage a power station, the unit used limpet mines to blow up their vehicle to avoid possible detection. For months afterwards, he complained, he had to deal with queries from ANC headquarters about the loss of this vehicle.

A visit to the Soviet Union

X1 underwent further training during 1983. He was part of a group led by the ANC's chief of intelligence, Ronnie Kassrils (often called ANC Khumalo), which travelled to the Soviet Union for specialised instruction in military intelligence. Members of an elite KGB unit taught them about bugging devices, invisible ink and clandestine communications. Theoretical instruction took place in a Moscow building, but practical training was carried out in Esmelova Park.

Soon after X1's return to Maputo, the ANC learnt that the proposed Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa would force MK personnel out of Mozambique. X1 left for Lusaka, but by mid-year he was in Swaziland, where a co-ordinating committee initiated by Joe Slovo was operating. This committee, to co-ordinate military and political activity in the Transvaal was, according to X1, chaired by Kassrils, with Ebrahim functioning as both secretary and treasurer.

At an April 1984 meeting in Swaziland, there was detailed discussion on both political and military units

operating in the Transvaal at the time. Kelly Mabuza, who was with X1 on his first infiltration mission into South Africa, had been killed while sabotaging the Bethal magistrate's court - ironically the same building in which X1 was testifying. But, according to X1, other units were still operating in the Transvaal. Wally's unit in Soweto; a political unit headed by an attorney named Poswa in the Eastern Transvaal; 'Dr Harvey's' political unit, run by a member of the Soweto Civic Associ-

ation of how he became a South African security policeman.

X1 says he was arrested as an illegal immigrant by Swazi police in mid-August 1986. Under cross-examination, he conceded that the arrest probably took place on the afternoon of August 13. He claims that Swazi police assaulted him badly - and he certainly bears the scars of a savage beating. Inexplicably moved from the relatively secure Manzini prison to a small prison in Mankayane by Swazi

police, X1 claims that a group of ANC colleagues 'sprung' him on August 14. He further alleges that this group, including his commander, Paul Dikeledi, instructed him to hide out in South Africa, where Swazi police would not find him. It is not clear why South Africa, rather than Mozambique, was the logical choice for his hide out.

Early on the morning of August 15, X1 claims, he was walking in the bushes near Piet Retief. Suddenly tired of nine years as an MK operative, he resolved to hand himself over to the South African police. Finding the Piet Retief police station, he surrendered to a warrant officer Pienaar - who initially did not believe his story. But when X1 told Pienaar that two of his colleagues who had helped him escape from the Swazi jail - Bernard and Tollman - would be illegally crossing from Swaziland into South Africa that night, Pienaar detained X1 under section 29 of the Internal Security Act.

Bernard and Tollman were killed by South African forces on the night of August 14, when they walked into a trap as they crossed the border near Nerston. But August 14, on X1's version, was prior to his surrender.

On July 8, 1987, Paul Dikeledi was gunned down in Swaziland. The only three people who could confirm or deny X1's story of escape from prison are therefore dead.

X1 is not unique. Indeed, already the state has produced three further alleged ANC defectors - X2, X3 and X4 - in the case against Acton Maseko, Simon Dladla and Ismail Ebrahim. But his evidence provides a glimpse into a world of military struggle usually hidden from public gaze.

X1 turns

Controversy surrounds much of X1's evidence. Particularly around his ex-



Heribert Mabuza - The Star

State clamps on school structures

Detentions of school students and class boycotts in protest at this new wave of repression have turned on the political heat in Soweto as the 12th anniversary of the 1976 uprising approaches. JO-ANNE COLLINGE reports.

Class attendances in many regions of Soweto became more and more sporadic during May.

This was the reaction to early-morning security police removal of students from their homes, and the arrest of students as they returned from school. It is claimed that some arrived in detention cells still wearing school uniforms, and carrying school books.

By the end of May, more than 100 Soweto students, including two Soweto Students' Congress (Sosco) executive members, had been detained, according to Sosco publicity secretary Moses Mseko.

Most of the detainees were members of students representative councils (SRCs), said Mseko. Sosco general

secretary Lawrence Bayana and executive member Mbali Seheri were among those detained.

Sosco president Khotso Chikane, like other of the organisation's leading members, is in hiding to evade detention. 'Their homes are visited daily, with the result that they are unable to study and prepare for the half-year examinations', claimed Mseko.

It was clear, said Mseko, that democratic organisations like SRCs were seen as a threat by a government trying to exert its control of schools by 'suppressing students with an iron heel'.

According to Soweto students, more than a dozen high schools had been affected by boycotts by the last week in May, including schools in

Naledi, Tladi, Diepkloof, Rockville, Orlando West and Meadowlands.

Sosco, however, urged students to return to classes in time to write their mid-year exams. During the exam period, students would be asked to sign petitions demanding the release of their school mates, said Mseko.

In addition, the three days of national protest called by the Congress of South African Trade Unions would be fully supported by Sosco members.

Reactive protest

The Soweto protests constitute the most concerted education boycott in the Transvaal this year. Differing slightly in focus from the sporadic class stayaways that have occurred in this province and the Northern Free State since

School boycotts

January, they share the quality of being reactive protests rather than the mobilisation of the early boycotts mounted under the banner of the now-banned Congress of South African Students.

A senior member of the Soweto Youth Congress said he believed the authorities had recently become aware of the successful restructuring of SRCs at many schools and were determined to destroy the resurrected structures before June 16.

Some warning of this was given in March when *The Citizen's* Tony Stirling quoted 'intelligence sources in Pretoria' saying there were definite efforts to re-organise black scholars and that Soyco was playing a leading role in this.

The pressing nature of the present police crackdown is suggested by allegations of maltreatment of young people recently detained in Soweto. In the third week of May two urgent applications concerning the alleged assault of detainees held at Protea police station came before the courts within 18 hours. These prompted Judge Richard Goldstone to order that a district surgeon report to the supreme court on the condition of all detainees held at Protea. At least one detainee was admitted to hospital within days of arrest and parents who visited detainees also reported allegations of assault.

At some Soweto schools, boycotts have been organised as sharp, time-limited protests and students have returned to classes. Elsewhere, the stayaway appears indefinite.

Soweto students on boycott

In early May all six high schools in Diepkloof staged a three-day boycott of classes in protest at the spate of detentions which had hit their area. They reckoned that more than 25 students had been detained by the time the boycott began and that a further ten saw the inside of the cells before the class stayaway was over.

Although the boycott kicked off with a picket protest, in contrast to events of 1985-86 police did not intervene and there were no casualties from shooting, teargassing or sjambokking.


The boycott was organised by the joint SRCs of the six schools, a spokesman for the group said. He maintained that the detentions were the result of growing awareness by the authorities that student structures had

been resuscitated and were once again functioning coherently.

SRC representatives met with principals to demand that they make representations for the release of detained students. Department of education and training spokesman Edgar Posselt refused to state whether his department meet with police on student demands. He maintained that detentions were out of the DET's hands.

people wearing balaclavas accompanied security police to the school and pointed out students who were later detained.

The Naledi boycotts, still in force in late May, were preceded by upheaval in Naledi Extension 2 late in April, where members of the community clashed with Sofasonke supporters. Sofasonke representatives claimed that a member was injured during the



Heribert Mabuza - The Star

Two weeks later two high schools in nearby Meadowlands were reported to be boycotting classes indefinitely because of the detention of classmates. The boycotts came at the time of mid-year exams.

Students from Naledi, where Thomas Mofolo High and Naledi High have been hard hit by detentions, state that there have been class boycotts for several weeks in the area. The pattern there, as elsewhere, is that students come to school premises, but refuse to enter classes.

At Thomas Mofolo High, according to reports made to the Black Sash,

breaking up of one of its meetings, while Naledi Residents Association members claim they were attacked by vigilantes, acting in reprisal for the disruption of the Sofasonke meeting.

Sofasonke supporters then abducted and allegedly tortured 18-year-old Isaac Dira Thula in an attempt to obtain information about their opponents. He was allegedly forced to sign a statement, the content of which he was unaware.

Within three days Thula and 11 adult members of the Naledi Residents Association had been detained. Five were released about a month later. The

School boycotts

action against NRA members was paralleled by sweeping detentions at the two Naledi High Schools.

In parts of Soweto the battle against Sofasonke has become inextricably linked with the detention/boycott dynamic, Sosco members say.

The intensity of animosity evoked by Sofasonke in some quarters is highlighted by the grenade attack made on an open-air meeting held by

denied responsibility and said students had probably been angered by the DET's failure to address their grievances.

Students at Soweto's Molapo Teachers' College began boycotting classes at the beginning of May. The key issues are the inadequacy of their training and dissatisfaction with the quality of lecturers. Their latest demand is that a mediator, attorney

In Kroonstad, students at the high school serving the oldest area of Secosville, Bodibeng High, boycotted classes for about three weeks. They demanded the recognition of their SRC and the re-admission of former detainees. Sources in the community said these issues were successfully resolved in a meeting with the school committee, and the boycott ended in mid-May.

In Daveyton, school attendance in the second half of May was disturbed as students debated a boycott in sympathy with former detainee Aubrey Nxumalo, who was refused re-admission after spending a total of 31 months in detention during two states of emergency.

In the Parys township of Tumahole there was a one-day stayaway at the start of the year in protest at non-admission of former detainees. The action evoked an immediate intensification of security force action and was broken after the first day. The matter of admission of former detainees was handed over to lawyers.

In Mohlakeng near Randfontein on the Far West Rand students began an unplanned boycott when the circulation of pamphlets containing students' grievances led to an open confrontation between senior staff members and students at the two high schools. Senior staff members allegedly assaulted two students and brandished firearms. Several students were detained. It is not known how long the boycott was sustained or how it was resolved, but the DET said that 'legitimate educational grievances' were receiving attention at the two schools. Grievances included the toting of guns by senior staff, refusal to allow SRCs, refusal to re-admit former detainees, the 'buying of examination results' (having to pay school fees before getting report cards for previous year), and running of 'DET tours'.

There are thus far unsubstantiated reports of school boycotts in Katlehong, Warmbaths and Krugersdorp. But in the absence of overtly-functioning student structures - and in view of the DET practice of giving information only when forced to - these reports are hard to verify.

But whatever the breadth of school boycotts in the Transvaal, it is clear that police detention of students is again a major factor as the emotionally-charged anniversary of June 16 approaches.



Diepkloof students protest

the organisation in Orlando West on May 22. Two people died in the attack and nearly 40 were injured. Police allege guerilla involvement.

In two of the boycott-stricken areas, Diepkloof and Naledi, there were outbursts of violence early this year when vehicles of visiting DET officials were damaged. Students said they were determined to keep inspectors of the DET away from their schools. DET regional director Gunther Merbold blamed the Diepkloof attack on the Soweto Students' Congress. Sosco

Brian Currin of Lawyers for Human Rights, be appointed to resolve problems at the college.

The question of detentions has played some part in most of the recorded class boycotts in the Transvaal and Northern Free State this year.

In Tembisa in early May all high school students and some at higher primary schools boycotted classes when a teacher, Thembu Mahambi, was detained. The return to school occurred when he was released on the third day of the boycott.

Biggest protest since 1985

A schools crisis which could blow up into 'another 1985' is unfolding in Western Cape high schools. But it is now 1988 and students say they are more organised and disciplined than before.

SAHM VENTER reports.

The crisis, which has its roots in problems at Langa High School last year, culminated in a three-day April protest action involving over 90 schools.

Spearheaded by the Western Cape Students Congress (Weesco), the protest mobilised at least 100 000 students in the Cape Peninsula, and was acknowledged by the department of education and culture (DEC) and the department of education and training (DET) as the area's biggest protest action since 1985.

But there are several differences

between the 1985 student action and the present protests. In 1985, the sporadic protests were often sparked by purely political grievances (especially the state of emergency). But this year has seen a co-ordinated programme of action under the Weesco leadership, which already oversees 70 000 members at 65 affiliated schools.

'Before deciding on protest action, proper mandates are taken at every school. Representatives from schools come together, discuss it and go along with the majority decision. Students would meet again and assess the protest action and decide whether they must take further action and what form it must take', a Weesco representative explained.

It was discussion such as this which led to the three-day action from April 25. On that day, students at over 70 schools held awareness campaigns on school premises to mark the start of their protest. The next day students from close to 80 schools had planned to participate in mass rallies. But these were broken up by the police, and students clashed with police in some areas.

Empty schools were evidence of the response to a call for a total stayaway on the last day of the protest. Over 90 schools - about 150 000 students - participated on the last day.

Some solidarity action came from the Boland area, including Mbekweni township in Paarl, and the Worcester township of Zwelethemba. On the West Coast, which includes Saldanha, Picketberg and Atlantis, students also came out in support of the Weesco call.

Just before the three-day action, police and army personnel informed the education authorities that they intended to go onto school premises to ensure that teaching took place. This did occur, especially in Mitchells Plain, Manenberg and Bonteheuwel schools where security forces entered schools to check if students were in classes and teachers were teaching. 'It was really a terrifying sight', a teacher said. 'It was clear that they were out to smash students if they saw anything else but teachers teaching. But students were determined to go ahead with their protest action'.


Student demands

Leading educationists, including Franklin Sonn, rector of the Peninsula Technikon, Stuart Saunders, principal and vice-chancellor of the University of Cape Town, Jakes Gerwel, rector of the University of Western Cape, and Andile Jonas, Western Cape vice-president of the NECC, expressed outrage at the heavy-handed reaction of the education departments. Education and community organisations protested that the provocative action of the SAP and SADF had 'added fuel to the fire'. Education 'cannot happen at gunpoint', they noted.

Weesco, too, was quick to demand that police and army get off school premises - a demand which was met soon afterwards, when Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok gave the house of representatives an undertaking that the security forces would keep their distance.

Numerous other Weesco demands have still not been met. These include:

- * that locked-out students be reinstated;
- * an end to the 'blue card' system restricting access to school grounds;
- * that Manenberg teachers and students be allowed to organise democratically without interference;
- * that suspended teachers be un-



Protestors at Spes Bona High on the first day of the boycott

Rashid Lombard

School boycotts

conditionally reinstated and that detained students and teachers be immediately released

* an end to corporal punishment;

* the right to peaceful protest in the form of marches and rallies;

* the lifting of restrictions on the NECC and Cosatu;

'In no case', said group of organisations which support Wesco's demands, 'has there been a serious attempt to address grievances or negotiate with the recognised leadership'. The group warned that if the authorities did not address the issues, a serious crisis would develop.

Current student demands are both political and educational in nature. And since the three-day protest in April, students have organised awareness programmes on May Day and discussed whether to attend school on May 6, the government-allocated Workers Day.

Origins of the crisis

The latest crisis in Peninsula schools began last year when the DET attempted to transfer African students to other schools because they claimed some schools were overcrowded.

And when students at Langa High refused to attend a DET sports tour in Natal - only about 30 participated - it ended in physical attacks involving students and teachers.

When the DET closed Langa High on January 6 and said it would only re-open if students registered, this was seen as an attempt to oust student activists and SRC leadership.

Students and the joint PTSAs (parent-teacher-student associations) decided that students should not register, but that, together with teachers and parents, they would re-open the school themselves. Prominent figures such as Saunders, Gerwel, Allan Boesak, Desmond Tutu and Sacos' Frank van der Horst accompanied them to the re-opening. The school began operating normally, but state repression in terms of detentions and harassment continued.

The PTSAs rejected a DET plan that students would have to register before the school year ended. This plan was first implemented in January this year.

Students read in the press that all



Student demands are both political and educational

five African township high schools were closed until a few days before they were due to open on January 8 and that students would have to register.

Teachers were ordered to attend 'special DET courses' at which they found they were expected to inform on other teachers and on students.

When students met, they decided to boycott registration. They also rejected clauses in the registration forms which said that parents would be liable for any damage to school property and that students were banned from participating in activities not in the school curriculum.

The fact that the registration form did not state which school students attended and which schools they would like to attend was seen as an attempt to relocate students, especially activists.

Disciplinary action could also be taken against students if they did not accept these clauses.

The Democratic Teachers Union

(Detu), the Joint PTSA and the NECC supported the boycott call, which was publicised through pamphlets distributed in the townships.

Ending the boycott

Few students registered. Because of holiday breaks, student organisation had had no contact with their mass base since late in 1987. Parents' meetings were stopped by police in terms of the emergency regulations. It was therefore easy for 'wholesale confusion' to be created by phoney pamphlets published in the names of Weesco, NECC, Joint SRCs and the Joint PTSA stating that their position regarding registration had been reviewed and that students must register.

Mass meetings were impossible. A sympathetic local printer, Allie Parker, was detained and his wife Rashieda prevented from publishing NECC, Weesco or PTSA media. No other printer was prepared to touch the material.

The registration of some students created the potential for splits in the student movement. As a tactic to get back to schools and begin a programme of action, student leaders decided that the boycott should be reconsidered.

This move was supported by the NECC and Detu, and the UDF also eventually endorsed the call.

About 9 000 students registered but the DET did not accept applications from some 1 500 others. The 'blue-card system' was introduced as a means of identifying students at school entrances, making it virtually impossible for unregistered students to enter.

Besides DET officials checking the cards in the morning, SADF and SAP members patrolled the schools.

Detu teachers went en masse to DET and presented a memorandum demanding that excluded students be allowed to attend school, and an end to the harassment of teachers and students. Students had been detained, teachers threatened and some called into DET offices where they were questioned by security police on school and community activities. Their demands were rejected.

During January, Detu had cooperated with the Peninsula African



Adil Bradlow - Afrapix

Athlone students build road barricades

Teachers Association (Penata) in a three-day stayaway which won support from teachers at the lower primary and junior schools. The involvement of Penata, an affiliate of the conservative African Teachers Association of South Africa (Atasa), and teachers from the highly-controlled primary schools, was widely viewed as a victory for the Detu and NECC decision not to isolate Penata.

When DET agreed to extend the registration date by four days, Detu and Weesco immediately informed the 'locked-out' students. While a few students refused to register on principle, most did attempt to meet the new registration date.

But the DET processed the applications individually and only accepted about 20 of the excluded students. Most of those still locked-out were Cape Youth Congress (Cayco) members and student activists. Some student activists were relocated to Guguletu and Langa Comprehensive schools which had opened at the beginning of the year.

The crisis worsens

By the time the Weesco stayaway was called, the NECC had been restricted and was unable to co-ordinate activities. Weesco took up the challenge, and kept affiliates outside the African townships informed of developments.

This strengthened Weesco and got students in other areas to take up the campaign more effectively. What was essentially an African-area campaign became an issue for all students in the Western Cape. Students in the coloured and Indian schools began unifying over the demand that students

in the DET schools be admitted to schools of their choice.

Solidarity action in the form of demonstrations, regional mass rallies and petitions was taken up all over the Peninsula.

On March 31 five teachers at DET schools were suspended. Earlier, two teachers at Manenberg Senior Secondary, Emily Fairburn and Laurence Hoepner, who between them had 20 years teaching experience, had been dismissed.

When coloured schools re-opened, students immediately embarked on boycott action and demanded that the teachers be reinstated. The state and the DEC clamped down heavily, teachers and students were detained, and a number of them harassed. Police and army personnel went into schools at one stage and arrested over 150 students for questioning. A teacher and a student are still in detention.

A number of teachers were visited by the security police, who are still searching for several others.

At Mitchells Plain, students were still dissatisfied about the 1987 demolition of Glendale Senior Secondary School principal Peter Carelse. The Mitchells Plain Students Congress (Mipsco) also focussed on detention and repression, with class boycotts, placard demonstrations and sit-ins. Solidarity action was taken at other schools in the area.

Students in Bonteheuwel and Athlone have taken up detentions of students and teachers, and students facing public violence charges. On March 29 about 140 students were detained in the centre of Cape Town where they had decided to stage a pro-

test action. Monday April 18 was declared a day of protest in solidarity with the Sharpeville Six.

As the crisis became more serious, Detu convened a meeting of Western Cape organisations, where Weesco proposed three days of protest action.

A Weesco executive member stressed the significance of DEC schools taking up grievances of DET students and vice versa. This non-racialism began developing in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and has been consolidated this year. 'It is clear that students are working very well together and they are seeing their struggle as one struggle', he said.

Students embarked on the three-day protest action realising they were not in a position to embark on an indefinite boycott, which could have lost them support from parents and teachers.

'But once the state declares war on the students and forces students into a classroom at the point of a gun, parents are going to come out in support of them', said a Weesco leader.

Students in the community

Early in May Weesco had its annual congress at which a 'clear programme of action' around the schools crisis was discussed. It is also planning awareness programmes at schools, and considering whether to support Cosatu's call for three days of action in June.

Students will also take up community issues. In that vein they will look at issues such as the 'Save the Patriots' campaign, June 16, August 9 and the October elections. 'They could push for a 1985 situation if they wanted to, but realise that these are not the only issues they will address in the year', said a Weesco executive member.

The organisation is also working towards the formation of a national South African students organisation, putting pressure on teachers to form a single national teachers union, and working more closely with teachers on alternative educational programmes.

According to a Weesco spokesperson, students decided that they were too unorganised to participate in the national Sharpeville stayaway call of March 21. 'But just two weeks later we see that Weesco is able to hold massive protest action throughout the Western Cape. Students are going from strength to strength'.



Flirting with the residents' committees

A cautious relationship is developing between a government department and villagers in the 'white corridor' between Ciskei and Transkei. The department of development aid seems determined to win the hearts and minds of residents - but villagers are just as determined not to be co-opted.

FRANZ KRÜGER reports.

Intricate political wrestling has developed around government's implementation of an upgrading programme in black spots of the Border area.

In an unusual development, the state is dealing directly with democratically-elected residents' bodies in some black spots. These organisations are devising new strategies to secure the benefits of upgrading on their own terms, while avoiding the pitfalls of co-optation. In turn, the state has made it clear it wants the committees with which it deals to become 'community authorities'. These authorities fall under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 on exactly the same terms as the old tribal authorities.

Clyde Attwell, regional representative of the department of development aid in East London, made the link clear: 'When I got here, we had no form of contact whatsoever, and that made control difficult. The headmen had left, so we formed contact committees in all the areas. They helped us with pensions, ID books, and identifying infrastructural needs.'

'We haven't prescribed who should

Operation Upgrade

represent them; each location elects two people to represent them on the contact committee. One can see the development in those areas that take initiative, those that are constructive rather than negative'.

A Kwelera Residents' Association (KRA) member saw it differently: 'The government is trying to set up its own structures in Kwelera because the headmen ran away to the Ciskei in April 1986. The government is trying to turn the residents' associations into tribal authorities because it wants control of Kwelera.

'The only way it can get control is by working through the residents' association and co-opting it into the structure. At the moment we think it might ask us to get involved in these elections in October. But we are not prepared to do that'.

Eight communities in the 'Border white corridor' squeezed between Ciskei and Transkei have long been scheduled for incorporation into the Ciskei. They are Mgwali, Lesseyton, Goshen, Wartburg, Heckel, Kwelera, Newlands and Mooiplaas.

After the Ciskei accepted 'independence' in 1981, these areas were administered by Lennox Sebe's bureaucracy in terms of an agreement between Ciskei and South Africa.

But in September 1985, the Mgwali Residents' Association challenged the legality of this agreement. The supreme court ruled in its favour and Pretoria was ordered to resume administration of the areas. The Ciskei pulled out its services, in some cases overnight. Community residents saw the court ruling as a major victory over the threat of forced removal.

Meanwhile, chiefs, headmen and their tribal authorities fled to the Ciskei, amid some incidents of violence. Their areas were left without administration, and residents' associations began to fill the gap. They took over functions such as land allocation and the confirmation of ID books and pension claims.

In May 1987, the newly-elected National Party MP for King William's Town, Ray Radue, announced that the government was allocating R12.5-million for the upgrading of local

communities.

Included in the plan was Need's Camp, outside East London, which South African authorities established for people evicted from Kuni by the Ciskei government. This was an unusual situation for the government: it was forced to take back several rural communities which had suffered from decades of neglect. These communities also had strong residents' associations which had taken over some administrative functions.



Having won the right to remain in South Africa, they now face the challenge posed by the government's 'reform' strategies

For the state, the task was clear: in line with strategies in urban communities, it would attempt to regain control by co-option, using upgrading projects to obtain agreement.

The task for affected communities and their organisations was somewhat different. In the words of a Grahamstown Rural Committee newsletter: 'Having won the right to remain in SA, the people of Kwelera and the other Border communities now face the daunting challenges posed by government "reform" strategies'.

Communities began to seek ways of dealing with the government. They badly needed facilities like schools, improved water supply, roads, and fencing, but they had to avoid co-option.

Relations that developed between the local state and community organisations were highly complex, and differed from community to community. Residents remained united on the whole in areas like Kwelera and Mooiplaas - but in Mgwali the state succeeded in setting up a body in opposition to the Mgwali Residents' Association, which had been weakened by the detention of key members.

Government authorities initially announced that R12.5-million would be allocated to upgrading in the Border area, but financial limitations meant only R5.5-million was actually spent in the last financial year. A newly-revamped regional office of the department of development aid (DDA) was responsible for implementing the upgrade.

In an interview, DDA regional representative Attwell gave some details of the upgrade project. A first priority was water supply, and 33 boreholes have already been drilled. 'The policy is to bring water to the people, eventually via standpipe', he said.

Fifty-three classrooms are currently being built in terms of a building programme aimed chiefly at schools, with work scheduled according to a list supplied by the department of education and training.

A shortage of funds means that no new clinics will be built at present, but five existing ones have been upgraded.

And divisional councils have undertaken road improvement projects on behalf of the DDA.

Agricultural development will be undertaken in three phases. The completed first phase involved mapping the area. In the second phase the maps will be used to identify the extent of infrastructural needs: shearing shed points, dipping tanks and so on. In the third phase this work will be started.

In the interim, communal schemes have been encouraged. Existing facilities that have deteriorated are being improved. Other projects include inoculation schemes and job creation.

Attwell emphasised the need to consult with communities about upgrading: 'We are not planning for, we are planning with the community. If



Franz Kruger - einews

Building schools to build bridges: A DDA project in Kwelera

we don't approach it this way, we won't accomplish very much. When we started, I presume there was a certain amount of suspicion, although it was not highlighted. At present, there is very little, if any'.

But communities involved believe the authorities see this consultation as taking place with 'co-operative' people on its own terms. Liaison between the DDA and communities takes place through 'development committees'. These are chaired by a member of the DDA staff, and include representatives of each village in a given area. There are also agricultural liaison committees for consultation between local white farmers and the communities.

Although Attwell was at pains to paint a picture of happy co-operation between the DDA and residents, it was clear that the department regards Kwelera and Mooiplaas as problem areas: '(In) the areas with progressive, objective committees, you can see the difference in development', he said.

Attwell made it clear the intention

was to form 'community authorities' in each area. Wartburg, Heckel and Mgwali had already decided to set up a single community authority. He said the community could determine the terms on which these authorities were formed. 'They can form their local authorities any way they want'.

But a look at the legislation and regulations governing 'community authorities' reveals that they are identical in structure and function to the discredited tribal authorities. In fact, they fall under the definition of 'tribal authority' in the 1951 Black Authorities Act. The regulations governing 'community authorities' are only remarkable for the close control government authorities have over them.

The Kwelera and Mooiplaas Residents' Associations have been wary of rejecting the government's plans outright. They recognise that the concrete benefits of upgrading cannot simply be rejected and believe it is important to try to influence the process in the real interests of residents, while

preventing the emergence of other bodies claiming representivity.

Among the principles adopted by the associations are that negotiations should be held in public, directly with government officials and not their political representatives; and that no other organisational structures should be formed.

The associations have formed development committees which deal with the DDA. These committees remain fully accountable to the association, and may not exceed their brief of dealing with development issues. Constitutions are being drafted to formalise these limitations.

Residents feel the DDA's protestations of interest in development, and not in politics, should be turned against it. As a member of the Kwelera Residents' Association (KRA) explained: 'The only way we can prevent co-option is to let the development committee work only on development in the area, and to recognise the KRA. The DDA told us they are not interested in politics, and the

Operation Upgrade

KRA is a political organisation, so we decided to set up the development committees. Now they can't use development for political ends'.

If the DDA tried to broaden the development committees' duties to include things like land administration and the allocation of sites, the committees would have to refuse. At present, site allocation is controlled by the KRA, although the government is trying to wrest back this crucial power.

In practice, relations between the two parties in the development committees have been fraught with tensions and conflicts. The state has consistently tried to isolate 'unco-operative' elements.

There are many examples: a Mr Roji, who is described as being attached to 'special services development aid', has played a key role, visiting individuals and promising them good things if they co-operate.

According to a Mooiplaas resident, 'he does not recognise the residents' association structures, but goes to talk to the nurses. He says he will recognise the committee, but he wants to deal with a superior person in each village. He promised to pay one person willing to sign that he was a member of the executive committee'.

And another resident said: 'The DDA had stolen two locations (won influence there) and the chairman and secretary of these decided to co-operate with the DDA without consulting the others, because Roji organised them with promises of beautiful flowers, so they became weak. But we managed to correct that, they are now with us again. What we have learned is that development aid should be called the department of demolition aid, because they are trying to divide people'.

Tuba, a village in the Kwelera area, had long been distanced from the KRA. The chairperson of the separate Tuba Residents' Association set up the first black branch of the Progressive Federal Party. The PFP connection has since been broken, but tensions between Tuba and the rest of Kwelera have not yet been healed.

The DDA has exploited these divisions. Development in Tuba is markedly faster than in the rest of Kwelera, giving new meaning to Attwell's words that '(in) the areas with progressive, objective committees, you can see the difference in development'.

In Mooiplaas too, 'co-operative' areas have been favoured over others. And in Mgwali, the DDA has been able to set up a development committee in opposition to the residents'



'The only way we can prevent co-option is to take the development committee to work only on development in the area'

association.

There have also been conflicts about what upgrading involves. The DDA planned to install taps to improve water provision. Residents opposed this because they feared they would not be able to afford the charges, and 'to preserve the rural character of our areas'.

In Mooiplaas, the government tried to survey the population, handing out forms to the heads of households. Residents refused to fill them in as they feared the information would be used to control the influx of others.

A resident said about the job creation programme: 'People are happy

about the job opportunities, but the ways they are created are causing divisions. They find people in one location, and not another, and then they tell the other village they are not working for their own development'.

There was also dissatisfaction with the distribution of jobs among applicants, but the residents' association changed the system. 'Beforehand, the people were just told numbers so and so to so and so are employed', said a resident. 'Now, the jobs are allocated

by each village's committee of ten. People who want jobs draw numbered slips out of a hat'.

There has also been direct repression of individuals seen as unco-operative. Some have been detained, while there have been threats to arrest others. Residents' meetings have been broken up, while meetings between residents and the DDA have been closely monitored by police.

A former KRA chairperson has been served with an eviction notice for allegedly occupying communal grazing land allocated to him by the KRA.

In this case, the pressure is not only on him as a 'recalcitrant' individual. At issue is also the crucial power over site allocation.

Of necessity, the authorities have had to allow residents' bodies some freedom to operate. But this has always been conditional on a certain level of co-operation. For government authorities this is a

'second-best' option where it has not been possible to split off an element willing to co-operate fully. The threat of an outright clampdown has always been there.

Looming on the horizon are the October municipal elections. There are fears that pressure may be put on residents' associations to participate. Attwell has denied this intention, saying that the new community authorities will have to go their own way, and will not hold elections in October. In any event, the associations are resolute they will resist any pressure to participate in municipal elections.

Southern Africa's economic mercenaries

Despite their attempts at economic independence, five of the nine states involved in the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference have actually increased their trade links with South Africa. A London-based contributor examines this development, and the emergence of a new form of 'buccaneering capitalism' in Southern Africa.

Since 1981, South African armed forces have crossed the borders of neighbouring states at least eight times. The SADF is presently deeply involved in Angola; in Mozambique the MNR, which has benefitted greatly from South African support, has laid waste to much of the country; and across the region there has been a spate of bombings and assassinations of ANC members.

Together, these activities have produced an impression of Southern Africa as a region on the edge of all-out confrontation. This has tended to obscure the other side of the relationship - the trade, aid and economic co-operation that is now a regular and accepted aspect of relations between South Africa and the frontline states. In particular it has meant that important developments by private companies have been ignored.

Recently Pretoria has adopted what Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe describes as 'South Africa's new strategy' - one which involves the carrot rather than the stick.

This approach is obviously paying dividends. Despite the best intentions of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) to reduce dependence on South Africa since its formation at Arusha in 1979, it is now clear that at least five of the nine SADCC member states are increasing, rather than decreasing, their co-operation with South Africa. These

are Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho and Mozambique.

In the last two years Pretoria has underwritten investments in the region in excess of \$5 000-million (about R10 000-million). The largest project is the Highlands Water Scheme in Lesotho, which will provide hydro-electricity and revenue to Lesotho and water to the industries in the Vaal Triangle. This alone will cost over \$4 000-million by the time it is completed, with Pretoria agreeing to 'provide such guarantees as the lenders of loans, credit facilities or other borrowing, may require', as the treaty between the two countries puts it.

The Sua Pan project in Botswana, which will provide the South African market with around 300 000 tonnes of soda ash a year, will go ahead only because Pretoria has used the Southern African Customs Union to fight off a concerted American attempt to undermine the project. American Natural Soda Ash Corporation, a cartel of six soda ash exporters, put pressure on South Africa not to back the Botswana scheme, arguing it would be a costlier and politically riskier supplier than the Americans.

Support from Botha

Despite this, Foreign Minister Pik Botha travelled to Botswana last October to promise the government's backing for the project, and assured Botswana that tariff barriers would be used to keep the American producers at bay. On the very same day the Commonwealth Conference - of which Botswana is a respected member -

opened in Vancouver, to hear passionate calls for sanctions against South Africa.

In Mozambique the finishing touches are being put to a plan to rehabilitate the Cabora-Bassa hydro-electric project, rendered useless by MNR attacks. At a February meeting between the three partners in the rehabilitation scheme - South Africa, Mozambique and Portugal - it was agreed that power supplies to South Africa would be restored 'at the earliest possible date'. Negotiations are now proceeding on the appointment of contractors, arranging a financial package to pay for the work, and the delicate question of security arrangements for the power lines. There are suggestions that the security will be handled by private firms, supporting the efforts of Frelimo troops.

In addition there has been considerable South African help in the development of the port of Maputo, with about \$100-million being provided to upgrade the harbour. Pretoria is also funding projects in the Malawi capital, Lilongwe, and unspecified work in Zaire. As one businessman in Zimbabwe put it recently: 'South Africa is now engaged in Constructive Engagement, Mark Two, Regional Version'.

Regional reaction to this initiative has been varied. At one level countries such as Zimbabwe and Zambia are fully committed to sanctions. But it has become increasingly evident that this commitment, although genuinely held by Mugabe and Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, is not shared by

the rest of their countries' political elites. The key moment for Zimbabwe came in September 1987, when after ten days of confusion and indecision the cabinet rejected a proposal by Mugabe to impose sanctions. Ministers were told by businessmen that the country would be crippled by such action, and in the end Mugabe was forced into an embarrassing retreat from promises he had given at the Commonwealth conference. Kaunda was equally unable to persuade his colleagues, and also had to backtrack.

Regional businessmen unite!

Kaunda's difficulties were graphically illustrated early in 1987 when he revealed what he said was a coup plot planned by businessmen in conjunction with the Zambian military. A remark by Kaunda at a press conference gave the flavour of his concern: 'You now see Zambians trooping to South Africa to dine and wine with colonels, God forbid. These are businessmen with flat black noses like mine'. Whatever the truth of these allegations, they provide a striking example of something that is today self-evident throughout the region - that businessmen increasingly see Southern Africa as one unit in which to operate. Borders and ideologies are no barrier to their activities.

Just how extensive are these links? Since there has been almost no study of the subject, one can only make rough estimates. In 1984, trade between SADCC members and South Africa totalled just over \$2 000-million. In Botswana, Anglo-American and De Beers alone own \$300-\$400-million, and South African firms dominate the economy - as they do in Lesotho. In Swaziland, South African companies dominate mining and manufacturing. South African firms control around one quarter of all Zimbabwe companies, with a value of around \$750-million. In Malawi, South African ownership is small, except in freight, fertilizers and insurance. In Mozambique, it is confined to shipping, and in Angola to diamonds.

As the trend towards disinvestment of foreign companies from South Africa increases, it is likely that links with the rest of the region will, paradoxically, increase. At least 60 American companies have already pulled out; some have genuinely abandoned the region, others have simply

moved to Botswana or Swaziland. Coca-Cola, for example, now merely ships its syrup from Swaziland to the lucrative markets in South Africa.

To facilitate their operations in Southern Africa, the region's businessmen have gone out of their way to cultivate the political elites of these countries. Anyone who doubts this should visit the plusher restaurants of

South African firms control vast economic assets in Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Angola

Harare to see Zimbabwean politicians being wined and dined by the business community. This should not be seen as a conspiracy - it is normal procedure for businessmen anywhere.

What is significant, however, is how vulnerable the political movements of the frontline states have become to such advances. In Zimbabwe - despite the leadership code which is meant to restrict ZANU leaders to ownership of one medium-sized farm - there is extensive evidence that many politicians are now deeply involved in making money as fast as possible. Links between ZANU leaders and business are strong, and getting stronger.

SADCC

One of the key institutional supports for business in Southern Africa has been the SADCC.

In 1985 Simba Makoni, the executive secretary of the organisation, met a number of influential businessmen, and challenged them to take the initiative in investing in SADCC projects. The response was favourable, and by 1987 had gathered enough support for a host conference to be held in Botswana at which 200 foreign and local businessmen were present. Dennis Norman, Zimbabwe's first minister of agriculture after independence, and a driving force behind the new initiatives, said: 'Private sector companies which are now remaining in SADCC countries are committed and here to

stay'.

The businessmen chose the Beira Corridor as the first project in which to invest, and so the Beira Corridor Group was born. Today it has the backing of some 250 firms, and plans to invest \$150-million a year over the next four years. Everything from restaurants in Beira itself to farms along the war-torn corridor and even factories have been developed by the group's member companies. Much of the development is based on purchasing former Portuguese investments at rock-bottom prices, rehabilitating them and then running them with labourers who have few alternative forms of employment.

Clearly such investments are not without risk - both political and military. So far the support of SADCC and the frontline presidents has been enough to guarantee the companies against the predatory activities of greedy politicians. The military problem has been taken care of partly by Zimbabwean troops who patrol the corridor in strength, and partly by the 200-300 private soldiers paid by the companies themselves. War may be a terrible business, but it does open up opportunities for companies willing to take the plunge.

For the group, the Beira Corridor is only the start of much bigger things to come. In the near future the group plans to become involved in other SADCC projects, including the planned northern corridor through Malawi to Tanzania. Even poorly-managed nationalised industries in SADCC member states could in future be run by group members, given the wind of privatisation that is being blown through Africa by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the many Western donor countries.

Businessmen, who were only a decade ago quaking at the thought of what socialism might do to their investments in Southern Africa, are now more confident than at any time since the end of the Second World War. A new breed of buccaneering capitalism, for which ideology and border mean nothing; willing to take on politician and rebel alike; prepared to risk cash for large rewards, and not beyond hiring the guns needed to safeguard investments, is changing the economic face of Southern Africa.

Labour trends 1 April to 23 May


In the wake of the record nine million work-days lost in strikes and stoppages last year, industrial action in South Africa has plummeted this year.

While 1987 kicked off with a wave of strike action, drawing in 153 468 workers in the first five months, the corresponding 1988 figure is calculated at just 33 105 by the Southern African Research Service.

Even with the two lengthy public sector strikes - by Potwa and Sarhwu - excluded, the 1987 figure stands at 117 468, nearly four times this year's figure. Industrial action on the mines alone from January to May 1987 drew in more than double the 1988 figure for the entire economy.

The reason, at least in part, for this massive drop can be found in the increasingly confident and aggressive thrust by the state and employers to regain ground lost to the union movement since 1979 - a thrust most noticeable since the Chamber of Mines' victory over the National Union of Mineworkers last August. The chamber used the victory to dismiss 50 000 miners and, in the process, weaken the country's biggest union, an achievement which may in fact have been the chamber's main reason for provoking the strike. If so, recent signs of revitalisation in the NUM made it an extremely expensive and short-term achievement.

Either way, the chamber's tough stance during the miners' strike crystallised widespread and steadily-increasing employer concern at the direction industrial relations was taking - Manpower Minister Pietie du Plessis recognised this when he produced the redrafted Labour Relations



Eric Miller - Afrapix

Amendment Bill (LRAB) shortly afterwards: the bill, he said, was intended to shift the balance in industrial relations back in favour of employers.

The LRAB was both a consequence of what the state and employers saw as a rampant, uncontrolled union movement, and a cause of focusing employer resistance to union militancy.

Despite powerful opposition from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Confederation of Trade Unions (Nactu), all but a handful of employers tacitly or explicitly welcomed the draft legislation.

While *Seifsa News*, journal of the Steel and Engineering Industries

Federation of South Africa, suggested the tough second draft issued late last year did not go far enough in curbing union power, the more restrained employer groupings, among them Assocom and FCI, have endorsed the final draft tabled in parliament in mid-May, saying it would curb 'irresponsible behaviour...harmful to both employers and workers'.

Employer dissatisfaction with massively increased union activity can be gauged from the rapid increase in incidents of explicitly anti-union action by employers and the state - lockouts, dismissals, court interdicts and police intervention - from mid-1987. And this year at least two employers have threatened to sue unions for production loss during industrial action. This is a tactic seldom, if ever, used in the past even by openly anti-union companies, but one, significantly, provided for in the LRAB.

Faced with these manifestations of 'employer militancy', union officials appear to have become, in the opening months of this year, more conscious of the consequences of wildcat strikes. They maintain, however - and recent events suggest they may be correct - that worker militancy remains at the levels which last year saw the highest level of industrial action in South African history. The rapid escalation of factory demonstrations in the run-up to the special Cosatu congress on May 14 and 15 appears to suggest workers are as prepared to take action as they were last year. But with the LRAB, the February 24 restrictions and the generalised anti-union campaign facing them, the targets and nature of their action have changed, argue union officials.

This would, in part, account for the decrease in industrial action since January, although not for anything like the entire 80% drop.

Although the living wage demand did not take off as a fully-fledged campaign, it captured the imagination of workers and spurred militant worker action in most industrial sectors. The chances of

the campaign taking root this year are even weaker given the current repressive climate. However, different forms of organisation and tactics are emerging in the labour movement, and the challenge to state and capital may take on a form significantly different from that of last year, making space for the campaign to develop more concretely.

In some cases, organised workers have seen opposition to the LRAB as being almost as crucial as their wage demands. The IMF unions, representing 120 000 workers, provide one example: the four unions declared a dispute over Seifsa's refusal to oppose the bill - a decision taken early in the negotiations, as workers insisted that opposition to the bill was more important than wage demands at this time.

Wage negotiations

NUM's opening wage demand to the Chamber of Mines is for a 40% across-the-board increase - 15% lower than last year's opening demand. The union has also demanded a R350 a month minimum wage. Anglo American, whose current minimum on the mines is close to R300 - could well agree to NUM's R350 minimum demand. But the monthly minimum at other mines ranges between R239 and R252. The chamber's minimum wage rate on the coal mines is R223 a month.

After last year's experience, there is uncertainty whether the union can sustain a strike this year. In 1987 the union settled for less than expected, miners lost four weeks pay, and were subject to police violence and mass dismissals.

The alliance of four IMF unions has united Nactu and Cosatu affiliates in annual wage negotiations with Seifsa. Although there has been some scepticism by Numsa members over the Nactu union's commitment to the IMF bloc, an agreement was reached by the unions to abide by the decision taken by the majority of workers. Workers have already decided to reject Seifsa's offer and a dispute is

looming in the metal industry.

Ccawusa was involved in two major disputes - with Gallo/CNA involving 5 000 workers and OK Bazaars involving 10 000 workers. Both companies experienced large-scale strike action in previous years, pressurising management to succumb to some worker demands.

Shortly after Gauw's formation on December 6 1987, the union - although not a Cosatu affiliate - embarked on a living wage campaign. As part of the campaign, the union has been negotiating a cost-of-living increase as a separate issue from annual wage negotiations. The union has been engaged in disputes in the Eastern Cape and Natal involving close to 44 000 workers, and a strike involving about 2 500 workers in the Western Cape was in its third week at the time of writing. The garment industry is facing a new and powerful force with the possible merger of Actwusa and Gauw.

Wage settlements

Pick 'n Pay seemed to ignore government's call to exercise wage restraint when Ccawusa and the company settled for a 22% increase - well above the official inflation rate of 13,7%.

CWIU and two petroleum refineries in Durban - Shell and BP - also concluded favourable settlements which guarantee a minimum wage-increase of 15% for all workers. Employees on lower pay scales will receive increases of at least 21%. The same agreement was reached between CWIU and the Mobil refining company.

The wage gap between black and white workers' wages is not necessarily shrinking in terms of rands and cents although percentage increases seem to be narrowing. Last year the chamber and CMU settled for increases of between 13,5% and 15%, while NUM settled for an average of 20%. Taking into account the standard rate for CMU members at the lowest grades (R1 532 per month), and the minimum rate for NUM members (ranging from R239 to

R252), there is a huge gap in the actual amount of money received by white and black miners. So even if some companies do give increases higher than the inflation rate, it does not necessarily constitute a living wage in cash terms.

The wage freeze


The Federation of SA Transport Services Trade Unions, which expressed strong opposition to the wage freeze, has applied for a conciliation board after reaching deadlock in its demand for a 17% increase. The union has said members will decide on what action to take if the demand is not met. However, the federation has no history of strike action apart from minor incidents involving train drivers. FSATU's Abraham Koekemoer said white workers have not acted militantly because they are not prepared to embarrass the government they put into power.

The potential for united action does exist among unions whose members are affected by the wage freeze. The three Cosatu affiliates organising public sector workers, the South African Railway and Harbour Workers Union, National Education, Health Allied Workers Union and the South African Municipal Workers Union, have, with the independent Post and Telecommunication Workers Association (Potwa), National Union of Public Service Workers and FSATU, indicated a willingness to unite with other unions fighting the same cause. But this unity is largely rhetorical at present, with only Potwa and the Cosatu affiliates holding joint meetings.

The industrial court

Just two months after the industrial court's ruling in Sacwu vs Sentrachem, the union has gained another victory in court, which ordered the reinstatement of 80 Cape Lime workers, dismissed after a sympathy strike in November last year.

The union has suggested that the court rulings in both cases were not



Eric Miller - Afrapix

necessarily favourable to the workers, but a compromise solution by the court. In the Sentrachem case workers were reinstated with eight week's pay although they had been out of work for two years; and in the Cape Lime Case, workers were reinstated without back-pay. However, the Sentrachem case did involve a ruling on racial inequality which was viewed as a progressive step by unions.

Lockouts, interdicts and harassment

The tough attitude adopted by management and the state is expected to harden further, especially after decisions taken at Cosatu's special congress. Two days before the Cosatu congress, policemen with guns stormed 22 Numsa delegates during a caucus at the union's local office in Heidelberg Road, south of Johannesburg. Workers were ordered to lie on the floor on top of each other for about two hours while police stood guard. Workers were harassed again two days later during a local meeting at the same venue

and some claimed police assaulted them. After the union consulted its lawyers, police undertook not to interfere, as long as only trade union matters were discussed at the meetings.

There was a similar incident at the Port Elizabeth Cosatu local on May 24. More than 100 security police surrounded the building where the meeting was being held, while a smaller contingent took photographs, names and addresses of everyone present at the meeting.

Unions organising in agriculture, one of the most exploitative sectors of the economy, continue to face immense problems. In June last year, Sapekoe Tea Estate dismissed about 900 Fawu members. The recently-formed NUF, a Nactu affiliate, also faced dismissal of 82 members at Impala farm. In the Sapekoe case management forcibly evicted workers from their compounds, while management at Impala laid charges of trespass against workers who refused to leave the compounds. Farmworkers are not covered by the Labour Relations Act and thus lack even the

most basic legal protection against employers.

Management at Rex Truform has threatened to sue Gauw for R2-million in production loss while workers were on strike.

There were 1 554 workers dismissed during the period under review and over 2 000 workers faced retrenchments. Police intervened in a strike at ABI in Durban resulting in nine workers being injured. From January 1987 to February this year, over 110 union members and officials were detained - mostly under emergency regulations. This figure excludes mass detention for brief periods, for example during the Sarhwa detentions. And at a lunchtime placard demonstration against the LRAB, police arrested 129 Ppwawu and Fawu members in Industria. The workers were released the same day on bail of R100 each.

In a further incident on May 25, at Germiston's World Centre which houses some seven Cosatu-affiliated unions, scores of police raided offices for over five hours.

Shareen Singh

COMPANY	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS
Strikes and Disputes: TRANSVAAL				
ABI Reef & Durban	Fawu	2 700	May 1988	A strike which started at ABI's Phoenix plant spread to three other plants in the Transvaal and Natal. It was sparked off by the issue of black workers' training. Police intervened in demonstrations in Phoenix, leaving ten injured.
Anbeeco Dehver	Ccawusa	170	09.05.88	Ccawusa and Anbeeco signed a recognition and wage agreement. The company agreed to an increase of R175 a month bringing the new minimum monthly wage to R520.
Afcol	Ppwawu	340	05.05.88	Afcol turned down demands for the reinstatement of 340 Star Furniture employees who were striking over the dismissal of four colleagues. The union has applied for a conciliation board.
Bergvlei Chicks	Saawu			Wage negotiations between Saawu and Bergvlei Chicks deadlocked. The union had demanded a minimum wage of R500 a month and an additional increase of 49c an hour. The company, a subsidiary of the Premier Group, offered monthly increases ranging from R31,54 to R33,84.
Chamber of Mines	CMU	24 000	15.04.88	CMU declared a dispute with the Chamber of Mines after negotiations reached deadlock at the annual wage negotiations. CMU revised its 19% increase demand to 17%, but the Chamber's final offer stopped at 9% (see Trends).
Fedics Turfloop	Ccawusa	200	28.03.88	Catering workers at the University of the North (Turfloop) went on strike, demanding recognition of their union and a fund of 'mysterious' deductions from their salaries. The union and management were discussing the matter (see Briefs).
Gallo/CNA	Ccawusa	5 000	02.05.88	Gallo/CNA and Ccawusa were in dispute following a deadlock in annual wage negotiations. Ccawusa demanded an across-the-board increase of R300 a month, while management offered R100.
Garankuwa Hospital	Nehawu	500	28-29.03.88	Cleaners, labourers and kitchen staff at Garankuwa Hospital returned to work after a one-day strike. The workers were dissatisfied about disparities in their wages. Management agreed to meet the union.
Hart Wadeville	Numsa	200	11-13.05.88	Workers were locked out for one day when they returned to work after a strike. They had gone on strike over management's refusal to withdraw a warning against a shop steward. Numsa plans to declare a formal dispute with the company.
Impala Magaliesburg	NUF	80	18.04.88	About 80 labourers from a Magaliesburg farm were dismissed after demanding that management negotiate wage increases with their union (see Trends).
Johannesburg Country Club	Harwu	300	April 1988	The Johannesburg Country Club, which caters for the elite upper classes, has offered its workers a monthly minimum wage of R340. The union declared a dispute with the club over its demands for a monthly minimum of R400, an across-the-board increase of R150, six months paid maternity leave, free meals while on duty and June 16, May 1 and May 21 as paid holidays.
Macsteel Profile	Numsa	250	24.05.88	When management terminated the employment of temporary workers, the workforce went on strike.
Makro	Ccawusa		19.04.88	Ccawusa and Makro signed a wage agreement which includes an across-the-board increase of R120 effective from April 1. The agreement also provides for a minimum monthly wage of R500 for permanent employees.
MAN Truck and Bus Isando	UAMWUSA			Wage negotiations between MAN Truck and UAMWUSA deadlocked. The union had demanded an increase of R1,50 an hour, while management offered 45c. The union also demanded a reduction of weekly working hours from 45 to 40, and May 1 and June 16 as paid public holidays. The dispute was referred to the motor industry's industrial council for mediation.
Mono Pumps Edenvale	Numsa	350	05.05.88	After several demonstrations by Mono Pumps employees over a disinvestment package, the UK-based parent company, Gallagher Ltd and the union reached agreement. In terms of the settlement Gallagher will finance a R200 000 trust and a further R200 000 will be paid out in equal portions to the 350 employees. Each employee will therefore receive a lump sum of about R575. The union has campaigned locally and overseas for an acceptable package since the sale of the company was announced in March 1987.
Perskor Johannesburg	Mwasa	2 000	10-11.05.88	Mwasa members at four plants in Johannesburg went on strike, demanding a R180-a-week minimum wage. The current lowest minimum is R35 a week. Management's revised offer is a R100 a week minimum. Workers returned to work while management referred the matter to the National Industrial Council for the Newspaper and Printing Industry.
Pick 'n Pay	Ccawusa	13 400	01-29.03.88	Pick 'n Pay granted its employees a R140 across-the-board increase effective from April 1. This brings the company minimum wage to R630 a month, and the 22% increase is above the official inflation rate of 13,7%. The company also agreed to grant four weeks leave from the fourth year of service, rising progressively thereafter (see Trends).
Rand Scope Germiston	Numsa	200	13.05.88	Workers staged a stoppage over management's refusal to pay shop stewards for the time they attended Seifsa negotiations. The union is in the process of declaring an official dispute.
Samcor Pretoria	Numsa	3 000	15-25.04.88	More than 3 000 workers at Samcor in Pretoria went on strike. Their demands were contrary to an agreement signed by the union and the Ford Motor Company when the company divested from South Africa last year. Numsa and Ford had agreed that dividends from the 24% shareholding which the company donated to its workforce should go to a community development trust administered by workers. But after a rumour about the way in which the dividends were to be used, workers went on strike demanding they be paid out for their shares. Workers dismissed the existing shop stewards and elected a new shop stewards committee. Although the workers accepted the agreement last year, they apparently did not fully understand what it entailed, and have now

COMPANY	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS
Strikes and Disputes: NATAL				
Seifsa	IMF unions	120 000	20.05.88	Metal industry wage talks reached deadlock, and the IMF group declared an official dispute with Seifsa. This covered wages, working conditions and Seifsa's refusal to oppose key aspects of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill - a key demand that the IMF unions put forward in their annual wage negotiations. At the time of deadlock, the IMF unions had revised their demand from R5 to R3,80 minimum, and a R1 across-the-board increase for all grades. Seifsa's final offer included a R3,00 an hour minimum, a 39c across-the-board increase for lower grades and 72c across-the-board for higher grades. The current Seifsa minimum is R2,61 an hour (see Trends).
Triangle Furnishers	Ccawusa	80/450	08.03.88-	The longest-running strike of the year reached its twelfth week at nine Triangle stores. The union has demanded a minimum monthly wage of R500. Management offered a monthly minimum of R320. The union has claimed 450 members are on strike while management says only 80 were involved. Ccawusa has called on the parent company Amrel to pressure Triangle into settling. A meeting between the union and management was planned for May 26.
Wicker Craft Industria	Saawu	55	17.05.88	Saawu and Wicker Craft were engaged in negotiations over recognition of the union.
Wits University Johannesburg	Nehawu	15	16.05.88	About 15 Nehawu members staged a placard demonstration at Wits University, protesting against the dismissal of a shop steward on the grounds of a parking violation. The union threatened a strike if the worker was not reinstated.
Strikes and Disputes: CAPE				
Aberdare Cables Port Elizabeth	Numsa/EIWU	250	08-13.04.88	Numsa members at Aberdare Cables staged a sit-in demanding the suspension of a worker belonging to the rival Engineering and Industrial Workers Union whom they said assaulted a Numsa member. Management suspended the worker and instituted a disciplinary hearing.
Allied Publishing Cape Town	Mwasa	1 000	April 1988	Mwasa and Allied Publishing were in dispute over the issue of equal pay for equal work. The union demanded that salaries at Allied Publishing be the same as those at Argus and Times Media Ltd.
Broadway Footwear Manufacturers Atlantis	Actwusa	86	11.05.88	Broadway Footwear Manufacturers' recognition of Actwusa marked a decisive step in terms of the union moving into the leather industry in the Western Cape. In a ballot conducted among members belonging to the National Union of Leatherworkers and Actwusa, 51% voted in favour of Actwusa.

COMPANY	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS
Cape Lime Cape Town	Sacwu	80	April 1988	The industrial court ordered the reinstatement of 80 workers dismissed after a sympathy strike last year. The court held that employers have to apply procedurally fair disciplinary steps before dismissing workers who act unlawfully (see Trends).
Dorbyl Port Elizabeth	Numsa	500	21-25.04.88	The entire workforce at Dorbyl held a strike in protest against the employment of a worker from outside the factory. This breached an agreement between shop stewards and management that vacancies would be filled by in-house promotions. Workers also put forward other demands during the strike. Management said the issues would be discussed after workers returned to work, but failed to keep the promise. Instead, 15 workers were suspended and a disciplinary hearing was instituted. The union is waiting for the outcome of the disciplinary hearing.
Eastern Province Clothing Manufacturers Association	Gawu	3 800	14.04.88	Gawu conducted a strike ballot of close to 3 800 members. The union had demanded a R19 across-the-board increase and that negotiations take place annually instead of every 18 months, or every second year as stipulated by the industrial council. Actwusa was party to the negotiations. The minimum wage in the industry in the Eastern Cape is R43,05 a week (see Trends).
Goodyear Tyre Co. Uitenhage	Numsa	1 200	13.05.88	The entire workforce at Goodyear Tyre Company went on strike, resulting in the plant's closure. At issue were the dismissal of 32 workers after previous strikes, the termination of annual bonuses also because of previous strikes, and an alleged management breach of agreement not to take disciplinary action against strikers. Goodyear depots in the Eastern Cape came out in strike in solidarity with Uitenhage workers.
PE Technikon	TGWU	80	21.04.88	PE Technikon and TGWU entered into wage negotiations. The union demanded a R500-a-month minimum wage, while management offered to bring the minimum up to R300 a month. The current monthly minimum is R250.
Rex Trufom Western Cape	Gawu	2 500	29.04.88	Gawu staged its first legal strike in the garment industry since its merger early this year. The dispute was over the union's demand for a R15-a-week increase and the right to bargain at plant level. The minimum wage for the industry in the Western Cape is believed to be R56 a month. The union's demands were not part of annual wage negotiations but part of its living wage campaign. Although the industrial court ruled that the union had the right to negotiate these demands, management refused to negotiate. The matter was referred to the supreme court and management threatened to sue the union for over R2-million for lost production during the strike. Gawu members in other factories were discussing solidarity action (see Trends).
Rhodes University Grahamstown	TGWU	300	29.04- 03.05.88	University workers went on strike demanding a minimum living wage of R800 a month. Presently, the minimum is R224 a month for ground and garden staff and R196 for cleaners. The workers went on strike after misunderstanding management's response to their wage proposal. They were incorrectly informed that management had frozen all previous agreements between the union and Rhodes. Rhodes, which is believed to be the lowest-paying university in the country, offered workers a minimum wage of R320 a month. A dispute has been declared.
Tek Manufacturing Industries East London	Numsa	900	07.04.88	Management at Tek in East London dismissed its entire workforce of 900 and started recruiting scabs. Workers were dismissed after they refused to sign booklets containing conditions of employment. Ironically, management started dismissing workers on the day that recognition talks with the company were due to start. The union plans to take the company to the industrial court, and Numsa members in the Border region are discussing solidarity action.
Trek Express - C Town	TGWU	90	18.04.88	Workers staged a stoppage over the dismissal of a worker at Trek in Transvaal.
U-Freight Cape Town	TGWU	100	30.03- 11.04.88	About 100 U-Freight workers staged a legal strike following management's failure to recognise the union's demand for a national bargaining unit. They returned to work pending arbitration.
University of Port Elizabeth	TGWU	275	19.04.88	TGWU and UPE commenced annual wage negotiations. Workers demanded a R500 increase. The minimum wage presently stands at R380. Management offered an increase of R30 a month.

Strikes and Disputes: MINES

Amcoal	NUM	80	May 1988	More than 80 Amcoal workers each accepted five Anglo American shares in terms of the employee share ownership scheme.
Anglo American	NUM	9 600	11.04.88	Anglo American agreed to arbitration in the dispute over last month's dismissal settlement. This followed NUM's Rand Supreme Court application against the company. The dispute concerned a disagreement over the definition of 'pay' in the reinstatement settlement reached by both parties on March 17. NUM believes 'pay' includes the value of non-monetary benefits such as board and lodging. Anglo maintains the word refers only to cash earnings.
Chamber of Mines	NUM	280 000	May 1988	NUM opened annual wage negotiations with the Chamber of Mines with a demand for a 40% across-the-board increase and a R350 monthly minimum from July 1. The 40% demand is 15% lower than last year's opening demand. Other demands included improved annual leave, a 100% leave allowance, an 80-hour working fortnight and June 16 as a paid holiday (see Trends).

Compiled by Shareen Singh

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
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
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The nature of *Work In Progress*, which is to stimulate debate and present views on a wide range of issues, ensures that the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editorial collective.

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The major diseases of our time are 'social'. This book looks at the society in which the current 'social' diseases exist, and why. It includes: a social history of tuberculosis; a look at urban health and state policies; health in the bantustans; and the issue of health and ideology.

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