

# reality

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The article 'STUDENT VOICES IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL DIALOGUE' by H.W. van der Merwe which appeared in the May issue of REALITY was originally printed in THE CAPE TIMES

## EDITORIAL

# 'FAMILY DAY'

The second Monday in July is dedicated by our Public Holidays Act to a somewhat amorphous celebration known as "Family Day". For White, Coloured and Indian families this holiday is almost meaningless since the children are on holiday anyhow, and if they belong to a happy family there can be no very cogent reason for a special celebration. But for many of the majority group of our nation, the Africans, the celebration of "Family Day" can only evoke reflections of bitter irony. A Family Day ought surely to be spent together, father mother and children joining in the celebration. This is precisely what is NOT permitted by our Government to African families. On Family Day most families in the "homelands" lack a father. The youngest child has probably never seen him. To some of the older ones he is a fast-fading memory. He on his part may be consoling his loneliness by living with another woman.

The evils of migrant labour have been exposed often and forcibly, not least by the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk, but it goes on year by year. The remedy which would commend itself most strongly to the N.G. Kerk is the return of the father to the "homelands". This would mean that the family would be together, but they would starve together. The urgent need of the family for money, the urgent need of the industrialist for labour, combine to bring the father into town. The inhuman and pitiless ideology of the Government keeps his family in the country.

This bureaucratic rigidity is a very strong barrier and its removal provides the only easy chance of modifying family separation. Migrant labour is a deeply rooted institution, often

accepted by Africans themselves, but what is intolerable is that when the labourer wishes to bring his family in he is forbidden by law to do so. Many of us had strong doubts as to whether there was anything to be glad about on Republic Day. There is surely still less reason for jubilation on Family Day.

### BASTARDS BEGET BASTARDS

Let us look at the urban villages with their more settled - but still far from secure - conditions. Here there are the most frightful statistics of illegitimacy. Cases are known of illegitimacy in the third generation; the bastards will as likely as not beget bastards. These are ugly names for a most disquieting thing.

No doubt this illegitimacy is partly the result of original sin; but there are many unions which are rather irregular than immoral. The Code of Native Law, so utterly inapplicable to modern urban conditions, is still in force. The consent of a distant "guardian" never before seen and living in some distant "homeland" is required in most cases. The custom of "ukulobola" cannot be carried out in its entirety. For one thing cattle are not permitted in most urban villages. It is easier to live together without benefit of clergy than to get married, and public opinion has become so accustomed to this that it condones the irregular unions.

We must confess our surprise and indignation that the Government has never yet appointed a Commission to investigate "Native Law" as it affects women and marriages. We must confess our even greater surprise and indignation that the Women's Associations of our country have never made a serious, thorough and effective investigation of the position of urban African women. We must confess finally our supreme surprise and indignation that eloquent defenders of the rights of man have had so little to say about the rights of woman and the rights of the child.

Most men in the urban villages when they have got a girl "into trouble" leave her to it. Her own kindly family helps her out, but it is really an irregularly matrilineal society. Nothing can erode manhood and responsibility more than begetting children and doing nothing for the mother or child. Growing up in our urban villages are men who have thus lost courage and honour, and these are the men on whom the future of South Africa largely depends.

## MORAL ANARCHY

We do not deny, nor would we wish to deny, the existence of many families where the marriage tie is respected, and where children are properly brought up. Heroic efforts are - and often with real success - made by such families to keep their children from the moral anarchy which surrounds them. Even in such families the sons at the age of eighteen are not entitled to live at home except under specified conditions. Imagine what white parents would say if at the age of eighteen their sons were regarded as "lodgers"! Nor is the family so carefully brought up secure in its home and status when the father becomes too old or too ill to work in the city. He is there for the benefit of the European employer, he is not a person in his own right, he can be turned out pitilessly after serving industry all his life.

**All this cries out to heaven for judgment and for that mercy which guilty men have been so loath to extend to Africans. If there is a special hell for pitiless bureaucrats the percentage of South Africans in its population will be high.**

Humanity is made for family life. An unhealthy family life means an unhealthy society, a sick commonwealth. Those joys of happy family life (which we ought to be able to commemorate on Family Day) are being sacrificed not so much to man's lust and greed as to an insane and impracticable ideology administered by unimaginative and unfeeling bureaucrats. The ancient Hebrews in one of their worst deviations from the law of God made their children pass through the fire to Moloch. Modern South Africa makes its children pass through the fire in sacrifice to Form B.A.D. 27 - in triplicate.

## BOOK REVIEW

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# A NEW SOUTH AFRICAN CHURCH HISTORY

by Edgar H. Brookes

Jane Sales, known to many by her work at Inanda and at the Federal Theological Seminary, has produced a compact, readable and accurate account of the establishment of the various churches in South Africa. Rather more than one-fifth of the book is devoted to the eighteenth century, the Dutch Reformed Church under the East India Company and the first Moravian missionaries. From the arrival of the first L.M.S. missionaries in 1799 the pace quickens, and Mrs. Sales then proceeds to divide up her subject not according to denominations but according to geographical areas.

The necessarily summarised treatment of the early history of all the great Churches and Missionary Societies is remarkably impartial, and the writer's selection of facts is judicious. A brief but useful account of the Separatist Churches follows. "That there is a liberal tradition in South Africa is due in part to the early missionaries, their children and the institutions they fathered" writes Mrs. Sales. "But the great gulf between the white and non-white populations of South Africa is the story of the failure of the Christian Churches to express the Gospel in the social order". This should be written in letters of fire on every "European" church in South Africa. For the great fault of the early missionaries, a fault in which they reflected the general church life of their day, was a too exclusive preoccupation with personal evangelism. Even when they opened (as they did at an early date) schools and hospitals, this still did not adequately challenge the social and political structure of South Africa. This was not true of all. Philip of the L.M.S. and Colenso of the Anglican Church were missionary tribunes of great influence, and in Lesotho the missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society

fought gallantly to preserve the Basotho from the encroachments of the Orange Free State.

Much can be said to explain, if not to justify, the failure of the Churches to bring the challenge of the Gospel to the social order which placed the whites everywhere in the dominant position. Language difference made for separate congregations even in Churches which recognised the essential unity of Christians in their controlling organisations. The hostility of some Chiefs to missionary enterprise threw missionaries back on the protection of the benign Queen Victoria. The modern picture of the missionary as a conscious and active agent of colonialism and imperialism lacks adequate historical foundation, but the fact remains that most missionaries preferred annexation to insecurity.

The book is illustrated by good clear maps, is excellently indexed and has a full bibliography.



## by S. Hayes

For the average South African, however, the issue is theoretical. The vast majority of South Africans have never been to South West Africa, and know next to nothing about it. The purpose of this article is therefore to give something of the human background. It aims to give an impression of the country, with a little history, a little geography, but not too much emphasis on statistics.

To a South African living in South West Africa, there are some similarities, but many differences. One notices the German atmosphere in Windhoek, the relics of the Kaiserreich. One notices, as a Natalian, that the lingua franca is, however, not German, or English, but Afrikaans. One notices, too, that many of the tendencies in South Africa are here distorted, exaggerated, and made monstrous. In South West Africa one finds the platonic ideal of migratory labour and influx control. Even the whites are for the most part migratory labourers. On the other hand, there is a slightly freer atmosphere. Pubs are open on Sundays, and women (white) are allowed into bars. There are no reference books, no identity cards. Censorship was only applied to South West Africa this year.

What of the people? 150 years ago, South West Africa could have been roughly divided into three. South of what is now Windhoek, in the Kalahari semi-desert, lived the Nama Hottentots. Most of them lived with flocks of sheep, and goats. North of this lived the Hereros, or as they were then called, Damaras. A nomadic people, they roamed around with their herds of cattle from western Botswana in a crescent to the Kaokoveld in the extreme northwest of the country.

Further north still was Owambe, which straddles the border between the present day Angola and South West Africa. The land is named after the Herero name for the people living there – “Ovambo” – meaning people who have cattle posts. The Ovambos are not a tribe, but were a number of independent kingdoms speaking related languages, each with a semi-divine priest-king at its head. Unlike the nomadic Hereros and Namas, their life was feudal, in addition to cattle raising, they grew crops, and it was their practice of sending the cattle out into the remote regions to find grazing in certain seasons that gave them their collective name.



There were other groups as well, the Berg Dama, who lived scattered through the areas occupied by the Nama and Herero, who had no language of their own, but only spoke Nama, and were usually oppressed by their more powerful neighbours. In the North East are the tribes of the Okavango territory and the Caprivi strip, and some Bushmen. But they have not played a great part in the history of South West Africa.

Until the coming of the whites, the Hereros, Nama and Ambos were the dominant groups. The second half of the 19th century was marked by wars between the Hereros and a Nama group which had trekked from the Cape. The Oorlams, as they were called, led by Jonker Afrikaner, settled at the hot springs called Aigams, and named the place Winterhoek after their Cape home. Fifty miles north was the Herero capital, at Okahandja, and between 1860 and 1880 there was little peace in the land. For a decade the Namas were dominant, and for the next decade the Hereros. In 1880 the influx of Germans began on a big scale, and the colonial period began.

## CAMPAIGN OF GENOCIDE

In the first decade of the 20th century, the Hereros, supported by their former Nama enemies, rose in revolt against the German colonial regime. There was a bloody war, which lasted three years. After the Hereros were defeated at the battle of Waterberg, many of them fled to Botswana. There followed a campaign of genocide officially carried out by the colonial government, a 'final solution' to the Herero problem. After this, the Herero population was reduced from about 80 000 to about 15 000. Today, the Hereros are a minority group, but something of their former influence remains.

In spite of the lines on the map drawn in colonial Europe, Owambo was never under German rule. The effective border of Deutsch Süd-West Afrika was at Namutoni, about 150 miles south of the present Angola border. In 1915, South African forces conquered and occupied German South West Africa. In 1917 the South Africans and Portuguese launched a joint attack on Owambo, and divided it between them. The Kwanyama nation now lives half on one side of the border, and half on the other. Mandume, the last Kwanyama king, was killed in the 1917 conquest.

For 50 years after the conquest, the South West African side of Owambo remained semi-independent. There was a government officer who represented the South African government, but did not interfere much with the life of the people. The kings continued to govern, and those nations which had lost their kings were ruled by headmen. The Kwanyama in fact asked the officer in charge of the South African forces to accept the kingship, since it was their custom that he who kills the king becomes the king. Under South African rule, the old division continued. The part which had been under effective control of the Germans was known as the 'Police Zone' — the southern two thirds of the territory. North of this, the South West African police, which amalgamated with the South African police in 1939, had no authority, except in the case of serious crimes.

## PARADOX OF 'SELF-GOVERNMENT'

In the 1960s, Owambo lost its powers of self-government, in typically paradoxical South African fashion, by being 'put on the road to self-government.

The first step on the road to self-government was an influx of white administrators and civil servants on a vast scale. The white population of Ovamboland (the SWA portion of Owambo) has tripled in the last 18 months. A large number of these administrators are armed with rubber stamps labelled 'Ovamboland Government', and a vast bureaucracy has been created virtually overnight. A legislative council, complete with mace and other foreign symbols of power, has been created. The headmen complain that they now have to attend meetings of government bodies where they do not understand the proceedings, and so are not able to give time to their people. They lose contact with the people, and so do not have time to be good headmen any more. They are told what decisions to take, and are confused and bewildered by an illusion of power. The Minister of Education has not reached Standard 8, the Chief Minister can hardly write.

One cannot help feeling that in this case, the South African Government, eager to impress the outside world, has embarked on development programmes far too ambitious for the people to grasp and control. There is development, certainly, but much of it inappropriate to the real needs of the people, designed to impress critics from outside rather than really benefit the local population. In order to carry out this ever-hasty development, a complete system of colonial rule has had to be set up. At its best, it is well-intentioned paternalism; at its worst, it is brutal oppression.

The blueprint for this development is to be found in the Odendaal Plan — which shows how apartheid is to be applied in South West Africa. This plan has been greeted with little enthusiasm by any group. Even the whites, with a few exceptions, show a resigned acceptance. The Hereros have rejected it outright.

## HEREROS

Since 1915, the Hereros have for the most part been suspicious of government agencies. At the South African invasion, they hoped that their lands, which had all been confiscated by the Germans, would be returned to them. They were disappointed. In 1922 they were given some small scattered reserves, a tiny fragment of the former Hereroland. For many years they seemed to lack the will to survive. Without their land, they felt that life was not worth living. They deliberately practiced abortion, and the remnant left after the extermination policy hardly grew at all. The formation of the United Nations in 1945 gave them a new hope. In 1947, at the request of refugee Hereros in Botswana, the Revd. Michael Scott visited South West Africa, and took a petition from the Hereros to the United Nations.

The South African Government, embarrassed by the opposition of the Hereros, has tried to divide them, and undermine their leadership. In 1960, when the chief Hosea Kutake was 90 years old, the council of headmen decided to elect his successor, fearing that on his death the South African Government would take advantage of the confusion to appoint a puppet chief. They elected Clemens Kapuuo a teacher turned storekeeper. On the death of Kutake, in July 1970, they confirmed the election of Kapuuo. While recognised by the majority of the Herero people, and chosen by their elected representatives, the headmen, Kapuuo is not recognised by the South African Government.



When a journalist asked him about the proposed plebiscite on South West Africa, Kapuuo said that the Hereros saw it as a trick on the part of the South African Government. He said that South Africa had no right to make the offer, since the mandate had been terminated in 1966. Even if it were to be held, it should be entirely under U.N. supervision, and political leaders now in jail should be allowed out for a reasonable time beforehand to conduct a free campaign.

The whites in South West Africa are also divided along tribal lines. The ones who have roots in the country are the German-speaking farmers, but the remainder are for the most part a floating population. South African firms with interests in South West Africa send their staff for a few years to gain experience, and they then return to South Africa. In the 1930s there was a large influx of Afrikaans-speaking farmers, which was encouraged by the Smuts government, who feared the possible subversive influence of the Germans when Hitler was in power in Germany. A considerable proportion of the Afrikaans-speaking population is made up of civil servants.

## BASTERS OF REHOBOTH

The coloured population is divided into two groups. There are the Basters of Rehoboth, who came to South West Africa before the Germans, and bought the land they now occupy from a Nama chief. They drew up a constitution, the 'Partiarchal Laws', by which they governed themselves, and regarded themselves as an independent state. In the 1920s the South African Government forced them to accept a Government appointed magistrate as chairman of the Baster Council. The Basters, like the Hereros, reject the Odendaal plan, and in 1970 the Baster Council sacked its chairman, the Government appointed magistrate. However, the council continued to meet, with the magistrate. Recently when the Minister of Coloured and Rehoboth Affairs arrived to open a new government building, he was met by over 200 demonstrators, carrying placards reading "Loots, you must get out of SWA". "It is better to be poor than a rich slave" (A reference to the government-sponsored Rehoboth Development Corporation) "A dog may bite, but not a Baster" "Loots, you pig" and others.

Only about forty people were present at the actual opening ceremony.

The other coloured group consists of coloureds from the Republic, who are not as antagonistic to the South African government as the native Basters. Recently a branch of the South African Federal Party was formed and that party supports the policy of separate development. The South African coloureds live in difficult circumstances. They are generally skilled artisans in the building trade (job reservation does not apply in South West Africa), but they need a permit to enter South West Africa, and must have permanent residence permits in order to get municipal houses. These permits are only reluctantly granted. There is some friction between them and the Basters, as the Basters are not generally allowed to travel to the Cape to train as artisans, and they resent the immigrants who get paid more for skilled work.

## CONTRACT WORKERS

Even worse is the situation of the Ambo contract workers. They are not allowed to leave Ovamboland without a labour contract or a special permit. Contracts may only be got

through an official government recruiting agency, which lays down a minimum wage of R9,00 a month. A contract normally lasts 12-18 months, after which the workers must return to Ovamboland for at least a month before they can sign another contract. In Windhoek 5000 contract workers live in a barrack-like compound, where the police fear to enter. Recreational facilities are minimal here, and even worse in the case of farm labourers, who are also the lowest paid. Mine workers are paid a little above the minimum, while workers in industry and construction are paid about R1,00 to R1,50 a day. As in the Republic, the family life of the contract workers undergoes great strain. Because of its more thorough application, in many cases the effects are worse. There are no fences round the Transkei, as is the case of Ovamboland. Because of the monopolistic contract system, the workers are treated like cattle, herded into railway buses and trucks. They are ordered on an official order form. Even the border control points, where documents are checked to make sure that everyone entering or leaving has a contract or permit, are labelled 'Stock control point'. Under these circumstances, migratory labour can be seen at its worst, as a dehumanising system of near-slavery South West Africa is a harsh land. **Both in its scenery and its society, the contrasts are sharp. The highlights are brighter, the shadows deeper. In some ways it is like a caricature — features are exaggerated, and distorted. And yet from the caricature, one can perhaps see more clearly what is happening in the republic, the developments which are taking place there are reflected in South West Africa too.**



S.W.A. — The 'Mukarob', a Hottentot word meaning 'finger of God'.



# BLACK ANGER AND WHITE POWER IN AN UNREAL SOCIETY

(Extracts from the Edgar Brookes Lecture delivered at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg on the 19th May, 1971)

by Beyers Naude

The title of this address was chosen just after the eruption of violence at Gelvandale Coloured Township of P.E. but before Chief Kaiser Matanzima or any of the other Black leaders in a number of public speeches expressed so forcibly some of the frustrations, bitterness and anger which some of us have for a long time been aware of — thereby providing clear proof for the convictions many of us hold regarding the social system of cultural and racial separations which the Whites have built up in South Africa over many years. The most adequate description I could give to the social system which we have created is to define it as an unreal society maintained by White power and now being threatened by Black anger.

Why do I describe it as an unreal society? And in what sense could it be termed as such? Could any society which has been operating for at least 20 years be termed an unreal one?

1. **Morally it is an unreal society** because the basic religious and moral presuppositions upon which it is being built are immoral and therefore indefensible. There are a number of inner contradictions which refute the claim that ours is a just society based on the principles of justice as contained in our Judaeo-Christian tradition. We claim, for instance, that ours is a Christian country with a Christian heritage ruled by a Christian government in the



best of our Christian traditions of the West. This claim is made a mockery by the deliberate disregard for the fundamental law of the Christian faith, namely love to God and love to one's neighbour thereby removing any legitimacy to describe our society as Christian. We claim that separate development is a policy aiming to create fully equal although separate freedoms for all the inhabitants of our country. This claim is made a

mockery by the fact of nearly one hundred acts on our Statute Book of such gross discrimination and denial of basic freedoms that any person in his sane mind must hang his head in shame.

**2. Politically it is an unreal society** because a political ideal is envisaged and a policy agonizingly enforced which is both unrealistic and unrealizable. We claim that a political system is being evolved in which full political rights on basis of equality will be granted to all racial and ethnic groups each in its own area, territory, homeland or region. This claim is made a mockery by the fact after 23 years of desperate attempts by all kinds of means we have created a political system and structure where a much larger number of people have less political rights than at any time in the history of our country. We claim that we hold in high esteem and practise a system of democratic government serving the highest good of the total population. Our claim is made a mockery by the fact of a political system of oligarchy practised and controlled by a small White minority with the deliberate and intentional exclusion in political participation of four-fifths of the population.

**3. Economically it is an unreal society** because a small White minority evolved an economic system and buttressed it with a number of protecting laws which had as goal to ensure that the economic privileges and power would remain in the hands of this group ad infinitum — or in any case as long as possible. This in itself is not something new: many societies in the past and present have tried to do the same, but in all such cases they represent feudal structures or rural agricultural communities in a non-industrialized society. But South Africa is probably the only example in the world of an already industrialized society with a high economic growth rate which implemented an economic policy which legally restricted the field of skilled employment to one fifth of the population only in the misguided belief that in some unique way the economic laws would operate differently for the Whites than they would for any other society in the world.

**4. Socially it is an unreal society** because a small White minority, initially seemingly successful, has tried to create and maintain a structure of the largest possible measure of social separation of people of different races and colours of which the greater part was living and working together in regular and close proximity in the same geographical area or surroundings. But with the rapid economic development and educational progress of people on both sides of the colour line it soon became clear that such separation could only be maintained by force — and therefore a spate of laws were manufactured in a desperate attempt to maintain a strict social separation despite physical proximation.

## **SOUTH AFRICA'S "UNIQUENESS"**

A number of White leaders have in the past described our situation as unique thereby implying, usually with a measure of pride, that because of its uniqueness, it should not be judged on the same level and with the same criteria as other societies. I would rather, in the face of the factors mentioned above operative in our society, describe our society as unique in the sense of its unreality — an unreality created and maintained on the basis of certain racial concepts which, although they

were initially subscribed to and practised in some other communities, have in the meantime been rejected by all civilized communities as not in keeping with the ethical values, cultural norms and economic demands of the world of to-day.

Human nature being what it is, it was inevitable that at some state some of the millions of people subjected to these many forms of discrimination and humiliation, would rise in protest, rejection and rebellion against such an unreal and unjust society. I do not regard it within the scope of this lecture to trace the numerous and varied efforts undertaken by leaders of the African, Indian and Coloured community to change this system in order to meet the legitimate demands of the millions of Blacks in our country. Names like Ghandi, Luthuli, Matthews and Sobukwe have become household words and more such names will be added as time progresses. The fact is, however, that all these attempts at ensuring basic human rights for the millions of Blacks failed for a number of reasons thereby creating feelings ranging from despondency and deep pessimism to bitterness and even hatred.

## **RUTHLESS SUPPRESSION**

At the outset there was the sincere hope that the White man would understand and accept the demand for sharing the political future in the country with the Blacks. As time went on and in view of the fearful reaction of the Whites, it became clear that a long struggle would ensue before any increase in political power would be accorded to the Blacks. The ruthless suppression of strong political movements and organizations such as the A.N.C. emanating from the African and Indian communities with the declared aim to secure political rights by peaceful means led to the growing disillusionment in the White man. The peaceful protest marches of Sharpeville and Langa, stimulating the irrational fears of many Whites, led not only to a severe increase in racial tension but also to more repressive legislation on the part of the Government against the different non-white racial groups. This in turn created from 1961 onwards a sense of deep despondency amongst Africans, Coloureds and Indians, a spiritual and mental lethargy born out of despair of any hope that any meaningful political change would be effected in the foreseeable future. It also expressed itself in an attitude of lack of interest in matters political and this was aggravated by the widespread police system of harassment, interrogation and intimidation which created a society where suspicion, distrust and fear became part and parcel of the life of the whole community, both Black and White.

In the meantime the Government, slowly beginning to realize that with the winds of change blowing all over Africa, the granting of basic political rights to the Black community could not be withheld indefinitely, started to create limited channels of government within the framework of separate development through the establishment of the territorial authorities of the homeland, the creation of a Transkei Parliament, of Urban Bantu Councils and eventually of the Coloured Representative Council. Initially these opportunities were viewed with the greatest measure of distrust by many Africans, Asians and Coloureds. So many times in the past hopes had been raised which were afterwards dashed and promises made which were not kept that one can comprehend the deep suspicion with



which these newly offered channels of political expression were viewed. It also caused a deep division within the different Black communities as some regarded any support of and participation in these "separate development structures" as a betrayal of the ideal of equal rights and opportunities for all in a common society, whilst others saw this as a possible, though very limited and unsatisfactory way of gaining some political foothold in a long and precarious climb to the top of the mountain. **Practically nobody could foresee that some day the most serious threat to the Government's policy of separate development would eventually come not from its Black opponents but the seeming Black proponents or supporters of this policy.**

After an unwilling and very doubtful start in support of these legislative and advisory bodies created by the Government a long and frustrating period followed where many of those men elected or appointed to such Councils felt themselves to be little more than stooges of the White man's Government.

## SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

In the meantime, however, slow but significant changes were taking place which were destined to bring about a totally new situation. First and foremost of these was the completion of the process of decolonization throughout the whole of Africa except the Southern politically White controlled part and the establishment of a number of sovereign African states, some of which became hotbeds of corruption, violence and revolution but others of which were able to establish responsible and reasonably stable forms of Government.

A second factor which deeply influenced the development in South Africa was the increased awareness and concern throughout the world during the last 10 years of the dangers which racialism in any form constitutes to sound human relations and to world peace. **And here in South Africa the Blacks became increasingly conscious of the fact that world opinion and world sympathy was on their side. As a leading African said to me in the early sixties: "We can afford to wait a little longer because we have three unconquerable forces on our side: truth, world opinion and numbers."**

A third factor which led to a significant change in mood and attitude in the ranks of the Blacks of South Africa was the discovery of the crucial role the Black labour force was playing in the South African economy and the fact that the large and evergrowing lack of White skilled labour necessitated the relaxation of job reservation laws and the training of many Blacks for new skills. Economic need was bringing in its wake a gradual social revolution in which many Blacks for the first time discovered and began to assert their human dignity.

A fourth factor which has only recently emerged but which already has begun to exert a deep influence on the attitude and thinking of our South African Blacks is the emergence of a Black Power consciousness and a new call for Black Power and Black Identity which was first heard in the United States but which has now been taken up by many in our country, especially of our younger generation.

## BLACK BITTERNESS

If we analyse the development of the last two years we become increasingly aware of new forces at work, many of which are growing expressions of Black Power and Black Bitterness. From every quarter of our country many voices are heard which prove how rapidly (almost overnight) and how widespread this concept has grown. This became very clear in the last few months. Think of Saso, the Black counterpart of Nusas, already operating over a fairly wide field. Think of Asseca (the Association for the Educational and Cultural Advancement) which has received a strong boost through the financial support given by Polaroid — an action which has significantly strengthened the confidence and self-esteem of the Blacks. Think of the new mood amongst African clergy as reflected in the call for Black clergy to stand together, to work for the ideal of a united Black Church, to reject the concept of a White Christ and to insist that Black theologians should take over from Whites in Black seminaries.

**But the new trend of Black awareness and Black anger was nowhere revealed more clearly than in two recent developments. First of these was the latest calls of Chief Kaiser Matanzima with his "pro-apartheid" parliamentarians and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Zululand for more land, more rights and more opportunities for their people. The fact that neither Matanzima nor his followers could be silenced by the reprimand of an angry Minister M.C. Botha shows very clearly that a long-suffering patience of more than seven years has now been exhausted and a new feeling of controlled anger, understandable impatience with overtones of racial hostility is taking over. The second clear indication of a new outlook and attitude is the new aggressiveness so clearly noticeable amongst the Coloured people — especially amongst the more educated groups. Gone is the old attitude of subservience and submissiveness; gone is the apathy and lethargy regarding political and civic matters; gone are the days when Whites could dictate and Coloureds had to obey. A deep bitterness has entered the soul of our Coloured people and the anger, long suppressed, has come to the surface in the recent eruptions of violence at Gelvandale (Port Elizabeth) and Dysselsdorp (Oudtshoorn). More and more coloureds are rejecting the Afrikaans language as the language of the oppressor; more and more young Coloureds are calling for closer links to be forged with the African and Indian communities in the solidarity of a common Black front against the White. In both of these two groups (African and Coloured) the major thrust is made with an acceptance of the concept of separate development as interpreted by Blacks for Blacks — which in many respects is fundamentally different in interpretation or in motivation from the concept as created and developed by the Whites. The circle is now being completed: White power has created its counterpart of Black Power insistence on White identity has now led to the emphasis on Black identity and White separate rights have now developed an even impetus for Black separate rights. The Frankenstein creation is now slowly turning against its creator.**

In such a situation it is inevitable that White power, privilege and prestige must assert itself in order to curb any dangerous growth and to contain the possible development of bitterness and anger which could so easily lead to violence. The tremendous political, economic and military power held by the Whites has strengthened their belief in the inherent and undisputed



supremacy of their own kind; it has created a sense of security in their position and has developed an attitude of indifference to the suffering of the Blacks. This in turn has increased the frustration, bitterness and anger in the hearts of many Blacks which must eventually steer towards a collision course. Black anger as a reaction against White supremacy is like a rumbling volcano which could erupt at the most unpredictable moment in the most unpredictable way.



*Sharpeville — The African crowd immediately before the shooting.*

tions, business concerns, Government departments, sporting bodies, student societies, theological colleges and welfare organizations catering for the needs of the Black communities. Increasingly efforts are going to be made to establish business, banking and other economic concerns which would normally operate in predominant African and Coloured townships with Black initiative and Black capital. It should create no surprise if a number of these ventures are going to flounder and fail

## WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

The question therefore arises: What could one reasonably expect to happen under these circumstances? It seems to me that in such a situation of uncertainty and of so many new factors at work only a prophet would dare to predict what the future will bring but I make bold to suggest that one could reasonably expect the following :

1. The political awareness of all the Black communities in South Africa is going to gather increased momentum thereby creating increasing embarrassment and serious problems not only for the Government but for every White person in South Africa. It will take the form of a growing militant Black power consciousness, accompanied by an increased psychological withdrawal from the White man and a deliberate estrangement of himself as a Black man from everyone and everything White.

2. Existing Black organizations will be gaining more support and new all-Black movements will emerge. Everywhere voices will arise to africanize (or should we say "Blackanize"? ) all bodies and institutions operating amongst and serving the African, Coloured and Indian communities. I would not be surprised if in the near future the demand would increasingly be made that Whites should withdraw or be excluded from academic institu-

but where previously this would effectively have curbed similar future efforts, this would no longer be the case. A new determination to grow economically at all costs and against all odds has been born in the heart of the Black man — and it will no longer be quenched by adversity, opposition or failure.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL LINK-UP

3. Increasingly there will be an organizational and/or psychological link-up with Black organizations in other parts of the world. Publications dealing with the emergence and growth, the struggles and victories of Black Power movements outside South Africa will be read, studied and debated on a much larger scale than up till now.

4. If the pace of change towards full political, economic and social participation on a basis of justice is not substantially increased in the near future for all Black groups it is inevitable that the existing bitterness and emerging anger will lead to the eruption of violence. More and more such flashpoints which could lead to uncontrolled outbursts are building up and on the basis of the trend of events in other countries it does not need a prophet to predict what could happen.

5. The position of organizations usually described in the term of "White liberal" or "White controlled" will increasingly become unenviable. Organizations such as the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Black Sash, the Civil Rights League and Nusas (and on the religious side the "liberal" churches and ecumenical bodies like the Christian Institute) will find that as pressures build up from the Black side there will be a measure of increase in support coming from Whites who formerly refused to face the realities as presented to the



country by these organizations. On the Black side, however, there will be an inevitable withdrawal of active participation and support not because of disagreement with the ideals and goals which these organizations have stood for but because firstly there were too many Whites in these institutions who, with the best of intentions, never fathomed the depth of humiliation and rejection which the Blacks experienced for so long at the hands of a supremacist White society; and secondly, because many Blacks, in the growing consciousness of their own dignity and identity would rather go-it-alone with the possibility of failure than do-it-together in the White man's way. It seems to me, therefore, that there will be a certain period of temporary rejection or estrangement from such organizations until the Black community feels that it is strong enough to move back as equals or unless these organizations are willing to change their understanding and methodology in order to meet the legitimate demands and to deal wisely and sympathetically with the unreasonable demands which a racial relationship such as South Africa's inevitably calls forth.

## TASK OF RECONCILIATION

Under such conditions and in such a climate the task of reconciliation will become increasingly difficult. Distrusted by many Whites, on the one hand, for their sincere although



sometimes misguided efforts to effect justice for all, and rejected by many Blacks, on the other hand, because of their failure to achieve their liberation, the situation of such individuals and institutions is indeed an unenviable one. If violence erupts from within or if certain nations take up armaments against South Africa the question of violence, now still largely an academic one as far as Whites are concerned, will become a crucial moral issue for millions. Therefore it is of the utmost urgency that all bodies which have expressed their opposition to and rejection of violence as an effective method of achieving justice for all, should initiate on a much wider scale and at a much more rapid pace a multiple strategy of peaceful change toward a more just society. Time is of the greatest importance in such a programme. If we wish to break down the mutual suspicions, the growing fears, the intensifying antagonisms and mounting anger it must be done much more rapidly, determinedly and on a much wider front than we have done up till now. To meet Black anger with duplicity or delay is dangerous. To try and meet it with brute White force is fatal. To talk about goodwill and tolerance without a concerted action is futile.

## RESPONSIBLE AND SIGNIFICANT

If the question is raised of the kind of action required I wish to refer especially to the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (Sprocas) where more than hundred and fifty specialists in their respective fields have, during the last two years, undertaken the most comprehensive and, to my mind, scientific study on the future course of South Africa based on principles ethically acceptable to all Christians as well as those of other religious traditions who subscribe to the same moral values. I do not wish to imply that the reports and recommendations of this study should be accepted as they are to be presented. I do, however, wish to state that these studies are a responsible and significant attempt on the part of able and committed men, to point the way to a new future. I also wish to state that these reports could form a definite and well thought-out basis for discussion and guidance for all the people of South Africa. If up till now there were those who out of ignorance, self-interest, fear or indifference still tried to justify their attitude by the question: "But what is the alternative?" They dare not ask this any longer.

**There is still time to avoid the tragic and dangerous consequences of an open conflict between Black Anger and White Power. I personally do not believe that we are going to avoid a confrontation of violence of some kind. But I do believe that the Whites are still in the position of power to diminish the harmful and unpredictable results of such a conflict. There is still time -- but time is running out. More than 20 years ago one of South Africa's great sons and writers, with rare and prophetic insight, made a gentle Black man in his *Cry the Beloved Country* say :**

**"I have one great fear in my heart that one day when they turn to loving, they will find we are turned to hating."**

**The older White generation of to-day is largely unwilling to comprehend, accept or to heed the serious truth contained in these simple but profound words. It is up to you, gentlemen, the generation of to-day and to-morrow, to heed and to act to build a responsible society where there will be freedom and justice for all.**





# THE AFRICAN MINEWORKER

by Barend W. F. Schuitema.

My brother is with me, carrying  
His pick and shovel on his shoulder,  
And, on his feet, are heavy boots:  
He follows me towards the shaft:  
The earth will swallow us who burrow,  
And, if I die there underground,  
What does it matter? Who am I?  
Dear Lord! All round me, every day,  
I see men stumble, fall and die.

*Benedict Vilikazi.*

Two African brothers are killed down in the gold mines. A fear come true, a fate described by their surviving colleagues as "having gone home by post". A tragedy which for the European employers ends by providing space in the mine property's cemetery. A tragedy which for colleagues ends by providing the burial, clearing out of personal belongings of the deceased from the compound and placing these neatly on the loose sand of the graves. A tragedy which for the bereaved begins by receiving word by post in the homelands and by the start of a haunt on friends returning from the mines for more detail and comfort.

## TWO OF THE THOUSANDS

The two brothers are two of the thousands who either die down in the mines or who return to the homelands maimed for life

or afflicted by that dreaded lung disease phthisis. The deaths are painful while the maimed and diseased merely become a burden in the homelands.(1)



The brothers are two of the hundreds of thousands of African workers who go down the gold mines to help build that great illusion of South Africa's fabulous wealth. Behind this illusion lies the stark reality of the most persistent misuse of human potential since the formal abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century. A reality measured by the fact that during the last four decades the wage differential between European and African workers has doubled and is continuing to widen. (2)

Down these mines' rewards for dehumanizing specialization in the form of gains from increasing productivity have been completely denied to the African. The fact is that African labour has been too cheap to replace by machine. The African is further denied the right to organise and claim any share in productivity gains which have occasionally been achieved. (3) This callous misuse of African labour has shown little improvement over the last three quarters of a century. The lashing boy with his shovel and pick is still the significant feature down the gold mine. He knows the meaning of the word "strike" but dreads instant action by the mine police should even a passive attitude be declared a strike by the European employers.

## MECHANICAL GRAB

It is true that after the war a significant step forward was taken to conserve African labour in the mines by the introduction of the mechanical grab, a labour-saving device used for the sinking of shafts. (4) However, all that this has meant to the African labourer is replacement, with no reward in the form of increased earnings. The share in this gain in productivity went to the European miner who is allowed to organize and strike. (5) Ironically, the introduction of this labour saving device took place while African miners were out on strike and being shot.

It is also true that the gold mines are at present on the threshold of a major technological break-through. (6) This is being forced on an unparalleled mining expertise, which is monopolized by the European, because of rising costs in stores, materials and European labour. (7,8) The stimulus for this invention seems to be less the noble ideal to upgrade and raise the dignity of African labour, but more the mundane ideal to extend the lives of the dying gold mines. At present trends this benefits only the European miner at the expense of the African miner. The share for the African in this break-through will, as in the past, depend on the disposition of the European employers who have set themselves up as the trustees of African trade union rights. (9) The European Employers in turn are dependant on the disposition of the nationalist politicians. (10)

## RIGHTLESS CONDITIONS

**Slavery? Under these rightless conditions the difference between African labour and slavery cannot be great. The difference probably lies in the fact that the African has the right to refuse to sign a contract. But what sort of right is this which gives him no alternative but to leave his family in a homeland to be exploited in a manner that repulses the modern world? : to waste the prime of his life on a series of short term contracts where all rights and obligations end when he is automatically repatriated as a contract expires, without adequate provision for disability and old age? : to have to leave his family in order to earn them a ration of maize meal while he himself is fed a high calorie ration by his European employers so that he may be fit to work under sub-human conditions down a mine? The difference between this and slavery cannot be great.**

## TWO OF THE MILLIONS

The brothers are two of about a million involved in South African mining as a whole which is principally based on gold, diamonds, coal, iron ore, platinum and copper production. Cheap African labour in the coal mines makes it possible to produce the world's cheapest coal. This is of great importance to the economic future of South Africa as cheap coal is the basis of industrialisation which has to compensate for a dying gold mining industry. Cheap coal— based energy is considered a great asset to the South African economy. Further, coal has handsome export prospects as it is competitive in price even though not in quality. (11) All this is based on cheap labour.

**The brothers are two of the millions of migratory labourers in Southern Africa who support the South African economy as a whole, in the mines, industry and on the farms. An economy which sustains a European plutocracy. (12)**

The brothers are two of the tens of millions, fathers, mothers and children, who have to experience the disruption and pain of departure with the fear of never seeing one another again: or who return to find themselves estranged from family and environment, or who after the first few days of elation after a return, have to experience the decision of how long it may be possible to remain together before going out on another contract. The painful question here is again how much freedom is there in the decision. (13)

## FOR WHAT?

**The economic history of South Africa is a history of considerable achievement. At present the economic prospects for South Africa are not favourable and more than ever are we placed before the very clear cut alternative: either prosperity on the basis of equality, or an impoverished blankistan. The present prosperity enjoyed by the European section of the population is based on a social system riddled by contradictions which will be the undoing of all that has been achieved. If the choice should be the latter, then the tragedy of the two brothers, two only of the tens of millions, will go down in history as a futile affront to the dignity of man. (14)**

## REFERENCES

1. In 1970 the fatality rate was 1.20 per 1000 of employed. The hospitalization rate for underground African workers is in the order of 7.7 to 9.6 per hundred per year. (based on statistics of three goldmines.) This is a total of 4252 for seven mines. There are fifty such mines, excluding coal and diamonds. (For these statistics see the *Journal of the South African Inst. of Mining and Metallurgy*, Vol. 71 No. 5, Dec. 1970. by J.J. Bettencourt and A. Jensen.)

During the years from 1912 to 1962 there were 300,000 Africans lost to the mining industry due to pneumoconiosis. The equivalent figure for European workers was 30,000. (Hansard 28th May 1962, col. 6602). (Compensation for pneumoconiosis from the earliest days has cost South Africa R260 million. (Hansard 4th June, 1962, col. 4804). The annual rate in 1962 was 9 mn.rand (Journ. of the S.A. I.M.M., Vol. 70 No. 8, March 1970, by R.S.J. du Toit). In 1968 the amount of money which went into the crazy Bantustan policy was 11 mn. rand for its first six years. (Green Bay Tree in Econ. 29.6.68.). This is the closest to any sort of compensation which the African mine worker gets. Not a whiff of the European amount! )



2. The ratio between European and African wages in 1936 was 10.7 to 1, in 1966 it was 17.5 to 1, in 1970 it was 20.3 to 1. (Financial Mail, March 26, 1971.)

3. "Are we correct in assuming, however, that an increase in Bantu productivity is a primarily desirable objective in all circumstances ? . . . . ."

"Investment in capital equipment designed to improve Bantu productivity is seldom justified on purely economic grounds. The "present value" of a Bantu labourer (that is the sum that can be spent to displace him) over 10 years at current interest rates is some R 2,000. This does not go far in modern equipment — especially as part or all may be absorbed by maintaining costs.

"Improvement in European worker's productivity on the other hand (where the present value for a skilled worker ranges up to R 50,000) is good business — a fact fully realized by the industry." (Journ. of the S.A.I.M.M., Vol. 71, No. 7, Feb. 1971, by J.M. Pike).

4. "In the limited field of vertical shaft sinking the industry has enjoyed success and its record of achievement has been recognized and acclaimed through out the world. This, however, cannot be said of the day-to-day production effort where the productivity growth rate is distressingly poor." (J. of the S.A.I.M.M., Feb. 1971, by E. Margo). The great advance in shaft sinking was due to the invention and introduction of the mechanical grab in 1946. During this year there was a strike of African mine-workers who wanted R1 per day. Six were shot dead during actions to break the strike.

5. The earnings differential between European shaft sinkers and African shaft sinkers is very much greater than the 20 to 1 ratio. Earnings per month of a European sinker of R1,000 per month is more a norm than an exception. (My own observation.)

6. "An experimental rock cutting machine was designed primarily to test the feasibility of cutting rock underground; . . . . . Extensive testing of such machines has shown them to be capable of initiating mining by this method." (J. of the S.A.I.M.M., Feb. 1971, by J.P.M. Hajem et al.)

7. "If the supply of Bantu Labour diminishes sharply for any reason, South African engineers are only eager to meet the challenge. Professional pride has, in the past, in fact, often been unable to resist the temptation to mechanize uneconomically. (J. of the S.A.I.M.M., Feb. 1971, by J.M. Pike.)

8. The great store houses of mining technology are the Univ. of the Witwatersrand and the Witwatersrand Technical

College. These great institutions are reserved for Europeans. The council of Mining Unions has decided to bar its members from training Africans for skilled or semiskilled work in the Bantustans.

Said the chairman of the Council, Mr. Ken du Preez, and the Secretary Mr. Tom Murray: "This is the position as it stands now. Even if we wanted to we could not lawfully take part in any scheme aimed at training Africans to do work in homelands' mining ventures or anywhere else for the matter."

9. After the Africans miners strike was broken by force in 1946, the Chamber of Mines publicly set itself up as trustee.

10. " . . . the most important reason for the low Bantu productivity improvement centres around the highly capital intensive nature of the gold mines? It probably is a factor but the one single main reason can be found in the almost impossible restrictions imposed on the industry by the colour bar philosophy. Our efforts to improve are thwarted by the Mines and Works Act and Regulations under which only scheduled persons are permitted in so many instances; by the attitudes of the various trade unions where perhaps understandably the laws of the country have to be obeyed and by political pressures which seem to single out the mining industry. " . . . We are all aware of the much publicized experiment conducted a few years ago where the boss boy was given greater responsibility. The experiment gave the most promising results but was terminated by Government pressure. One wonders how much better the improvement of 1 per cent in Bantu productivity . . . . . would have been had the experiment been allowed to flow throughout the industry." (J. of the S.A.I.M.M., Feb. 1971, by E.W. Thiel).

11. Australian coals are of a higher quality, generally speaking than S.A.—, but higher priced. S.A. has recently won an export contract with Japan to export R240 mn. worth of coal per year, and it is estimated that exports to Europe will equal this by 1974 (S.A. Financial Gazette — 26.3.71.)


12. A large proportion of African migratory labour in the mines come from outside the country: Malawi, Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana and Swaziland.

13. "We also applaud . . . . . a solution to the migratory labour problem. This problem has not only destroyed the fabric of our society, but it has destroyed the very moral fibre of our people. The spiritual development of our people also envisaged under your policy cannot take place so long as this is the position". (Inauguration speech by chief M.G. Buthelezi, as Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority.)

14. This is the alternative which the nationalists have created. That they are prepared to make all in South Africa pay for their introduction of nazi ethics into South African politics, is made clear by Diedericks' budget in which he has sharply reduced the growth prospects of the economy in order to save their industrial colour bar.



# COST OF LIVING — FOOD FOR THOUGHT



by J. P. Blumenfeld.

The term "inflation" is becoming increasingly familiar in our daily lives. Various referred to by economists, businessmen and politicians as a "creeping paralysis", a "cancer", an "ogre" and a "spectre" and numerous other forms of "threat", inflation and its causes, effects and remedies are debated at length by the more technically minded. For the man in the street, the intricacies of these arguments are bound to be somewhat academic, but his experience of inflation is nonetheless very personal and direct. With the passage of time, he notices a decline in the quantity (and frequently also the quality) of goods and services which he can purchase with a given sum of money. Thus, even though his income (in money terms) may have risen, he frequently finds, after allowing for the decline in the purchasing power of his money, that in "real" terms he is no better off than he was before.

For the ordinary citizen, then, inflation manifests itself in a rising "cost of living". The purpose of this article is not, however, to explain why inflation takes place, nor even to outline its effects. Rather it is to indicate how increases in the cost of living are measured, and more particularly, to investigate how realistically these measurements reflect changes in the cost of living for the various race groups in South Africa. In other words, in view of their widely disparate income levels, does a given increase in the cost of living mean the same thing to the "average black" and "average white" alike?

Inflation is measured via the "consumer price index" (sometimes also called the "cost of living index"). This index, which shows the extent of the average change in prices between any two points in time, is compiled each month by the Department of Statistics on the basis of regular information on price changes in a wide range of commodities and services. (1). The latter cover virtually all aspects of household expenditure from the basic necessities of food, clothing and housing to expenditure on less essential items such as washing machines, telephones, cinemas and cigarettes. (2). Medical and educational expenditures are also included.

## OVERALL COST

Since the average family spends less on milk each month than on house or flat rentals, an increase of (say) 10 percent in the price of milk will clearly not affect the **overall** "cost of living" as much as a 10 percent increase in rents. Hence the influence of a change in the price of a particular commodity or service is incorporated into the price index in proportion to the relative importance of the item concerned in total household expenditure. This procedure is known as "weighting" the index. In other words, the more the "average" household spends on a commodity, the greater will be the "weight" given to the price of that commodity in compiling the index of prices of all commodities.

An obvious prerequisite, therefore, for compiling such an index is a knowledge of the detailed composition of household expenditure. This knowledge is obtained and brought up to date from time to time by means of extensive sample surveys of the expenditure patterns of white families in the principal urban areas of the Republic. The last such survey was in 1966 — the previous ones were in 1955 and 1936 (3) — and the information used in calculating the current "weights" was limited to that obtained from families with total annual incomes below R7,000 (4). In this way, the influence of the very well-to-do families, whose patterns of expenditure tend to be rather different from those of the middle and lower income groups is excluded. (5). The "average" expenditure pattern of white families in metropolitan areas revealed by these results is shown in Table 1. This is the pattern on which the consumer price index "weights" are correctly based.

**"From the above discussion, two factors stand out clearly: Firstly, the consumer price index is essentially urban-orientated; and secondly, it is based only upon the consumption patterns of white families in the lower, middle and upper-middle socio-economic strata.**

An obvious question that arises now is whether an index derived in this manner is valid for black families in the urban areas and for both whites and blacks in the rural areas. Unfortunately, despite the fact that about half the total population of the Republic live in rural areas (6), there is not a great deal that can be said about this aspect until detailed information is available on rural consumption patterns. However, there can be little doubt that for the overwhelming majority of Africans in the Reserves, and particularly for those who lead a subsistence existence (and who are thus not really part of the cash economy of the Republic) such an index is of little or no relevance and



provides no clue to the cost of living for such people.

For non-whites in the urban areas, however, a certain amount of relevant information is available. This information is derived largely from an excellent series of systematic investigations into the income and expenditure patterns of urban non-whites in Pretoria, Benoni, Soweto (Johannesburg), Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage, undertaken between 1961 and 1965 by the Bureau of Market Research at the University of South Africa. (7). Although some differences in definition do exist between these studies and the Department of Statistics' survey of white families in 1966, these differences are sufficiently minor not to invalidate broad comparisons between the results. (8). Table 2 shows the expenditure patterns for the "average" black households in the larger population groups studied by the Bureau of Market Research, whilst Table 3 compares the actual average total monthly household expenditure of the same groups with that of white families derived from the 1966 survey.

Table 1 shows clearly that the major items of expenditure for urban white families are food, housing (including light and fuel), transport (public and private), clothing, and furniture and household equipment, which together accounted for more than three-quarters of total expenditure. Of the remainder, alcohol and tobacco represent the largest outlay.

In any comparisons made between the results in Tables 1 and 2, the absolute levels of expenditure shown in Table 3 should be borne in mind (9).

**TABLE 1: AVERAGE COMPOSITION OF WHITE FAMILY EXPENDITURE IN PRINCIPAL URBAN AREAS, 1966 (AS USED IN CURRENT CONSUMER PRICE INDEX)**

ITEM:	%
Food	25
Housing	18
Light and household fuel	2
Furniture and equipment	8
Washing, cleaning, etc.	2
Clothing and footwear	10
Public transport	1
Private transport (cars, etc.)	13
Medical	3
Alcohol and tobacco	4
Personal care (cosmetics, haircuts, etc.)	3
Education	1
Recreation, entertainment, sport	3
Servants wages	3
Other	2
<b>TOTAL *</b>	<b>100</b>

\* Due to rounding, individual figures do not always add exactly to 100.

**TABLE 2: AVERAGE COMPOSITION OF BLACK HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE IN CERTAIN URBAN AREAS (FROM BUREAU OF MARKET RESEARCH SURVEYS)**

ITEM	P.E./ UITENHAGE COLOURED (1965)	C.T. COLOURED (1964)	P.E./ UITENHAGE AFRICANS (1964)	DBN. AFRICANS (1964)	JHB. AFRICANS (1962)	DBN. INDIANS (1964)
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Food	41	42	49	43	42	41
Housing	8	11	5	8	8	11
Light and fuel	4	4	4	4	7	5
HP and Loans	5	4	5	4	5	5
Washing, cleaning and repairs, etc.	4	4	4	4	6	3
Clothing, etc.	12	12	12	12	9	12
Transport (Public)	4	5	4	7	6	5
Running costs of motor vehicles	1	1	— *	— *	1	2
Medical and Dental	— *	— *	— *	— *	— *	—
Alcohol and Tobacco	7	5	7	9	7	4
Personal care	3	3	2	2	2	3
Education	— *	— *	1	1	1	1
Recreation, etc.	1	2	1	1	1	2
Other	10	7	5	5	5	7
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

\* Less than 0.5 percent.



**TABLE 3: AVERAGE TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENDITURE (WHITE AND BLACK HOUSEHOLDS)**

	R
S.A. Whites (1966)	321,4
P.E./Uitenhage Coloureds (1965)	98,6
Cape Town Coloureds (1964)	103,9
P.E./Uitenhage Africans (1964)	63,9
Durban Africans (1964)	67,4
Johannesburg Africans (1962)	62,7
Durban Indians (1964)	94,3

## HIGH PROPORTION ON FOOD

The outstanding feature of the monthly budget in black households is the very high proportion of total expenditure which goes to food purchases — generally varying between 40 percent and 50 percent of total outlay, compared with only 25 percent for Whites. Even allowing for the fact that all the survey results were based on sample investigations and not on censuses (and are thus subject to a certain amount of error), this difference is clearly both very significant and very real. Again, as with whites, housing (including light and fuel) is the second largest item of expenditure for black households. In general, however, it constitutes a slightly smaller proportion of total expenditure than in the case of whites, probably due largely to the fact that a large proportion of urban non-whites live in sub-economic housing schemes. Clothing replaces transport as the third largest expenditure group for non-whites and here the proportions tend to be slightly higher than those for whites. Since the majority of non-white purchases of furniture and electrical equipment are made on terms rather than for cash, these items are largely accounted for by the "HP and loans" category. This item appears proportionately less important than the "furniture and equipment" item for white families largely because the "HP and loans" category does not cover those items of household equipment purchased for cash or on open account — e.g. household linen, blankets, kitchen utensils, hardware, etc. (10.)

Thus, as in the case of whites, food, housing, transport and clothing and furniture and equipment account, in general, for between 75 percent and 80 percent of non-white household expenditure. Alcohol and tobacco is again the most important of the remaining items.

## SENSITIVE TO CHANGE

In the light of these results, it can be concluded that the cost of living for non-whites is very much more sensitive to changes in food prices than is the case with whites. Moreover, food prices have, over the years, risen far more rapidly than the prices of all other commodities combined. Between 1910 and 1967, for example, the index of food prices rose almost four-fold (395 percent), whilst the overall consumer price index increased only three and a half times (357 percent). (11). Thus the index for all commodities other than food must have increased by an even smaller percentage than the latter figure. Since food accounts for a much higher proportion of non-white than of white expenditure, the influence of a given rise in food prices upon the cost of living for non-whites would be correspondingly greater than for whites. In this respect, then, non-whites would appear, at first glance, to have been at a considerable disadvantage over the years compared with whites.

However, it must again be remembered that the index of food prices is based on white patterns of expenditure on food and the differences between these patterns and those of non-white households must be investigated before any firm conclusions can be reached. Table 4 compares the "average" patterns of food consumption for metropolitan whites, as currently used in compiling the consumer price index, with those for coloureds in Cape Town, Africans in Johannesburg and Indians in Durban.

The most significant differences between white and non-white food consumption patterns appear to lie in the proportions accounted for by grain products, dairy products and eggs, fruit and vegetables and "other foodstuffs". With the exception of the last-mentioned, these differences are probably largely attributable to the different income levels and to the different cultural backgrounds of the various groups. (12). The variations in the "other foodstuffs" category reflect differences in the extent to which meals are purchased and eaten away from home.

In order to investigate the effects of these differences on the comparative effective cost of living, the official (white) index of food prices has been recalculated for each non-white group by weighting the price changes in each of the food categories (grain, meat, fish, etc.) by the corresponding expenditure patterns shown in Table 4. Unfortunately, detailed information on food prices broken down item by item is available only for the period from 1958 onwards, and the analysis had perforce to be restricted in its time span.

**TABLE 4: AVERAGE COMPOSITION OF FOOD EXPENDITURE (WHITE AND BLACK)**

ITEM	S.A. Whites (1966)	Cape Town Coloureds (1964)	Durban Indians (1964)	Jhb. Africans (1962)
	%	%	%	%
Grain	12	19	23	20
Meat	25	24	20	24
Fish	2	5	6	1
Fats, oils, etc.	2	3	6	2
Dairy products and eggs	22	16	15	11
Fruit and vegetables	18	16	19	11
Sugar, etc.	6	6	4	6
Non-alcoholic beverages	6	5	5	5
Other foodstuffs	8	4	3	20
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

The official consumer price index for food items only, based on urban white consumption patterns rose by 28,3 percent between 1958 and 1969. If the food consumption pattern of Cape Town's coloured people had been used instead to calculate the index, the 1969 index level would have been 28,1 percent above the 1958 level — an insignificant difference. If the eating habits of Durban's Indian or Johannesburg's African households had been used, the index would have risen by 26,8 percent for the former and by 26,6 percent for the latter — a difference of only 1,5 percent from the "white" index in 11 years.



Although some differences in consumption patterns also occur within the categories grain, meat, fish, etc., and although comparisons are not possible for earlier years, these results would suggest that the food component of the consumer price index is not significantly affected by racial differences in food purchasing patterns and hence that this component affords a valid reflection of changes in food costs for the major urban black communities. This in turn would seem to support the earlier suggestion that, in view of the higher proportion of black household expenditure which goes to food purchases, the rise in the cost of living over the years has left non-whites in urban areas relatively worse off than their white counterparts in respect of the decline in the value of money. The above analysis is, however, not conclusive, and confirmation of this suggestion must await more detailed analysis of the problem.

## DISTURBING IMPLICATIONS

But if the above suggestion is true, then its implications are disturbing. In order to demonstrate these implications, it is first necessary to point out that the proportion of total household expenditure which goes to food purchases is primarily a function of income. Research in this field has established firmly that this proportion declines as income rises. (This is the so-called "Engel's law of consumption".). The experience of white families has been no different: as a result of the 1936 family expenditure survey, food was taken to account for 35 percent of total expenditure in compiling the consumer price index; after the 1955 survey, the proportion dropped to 28 percent and after the 1966 survey to 25 percent. At the same time, average white family income rose from about R720 p.a. in 1936 to over R4,600 p.a. in 1966.<sup>(13)</sup> It can therefore be confidently assumed that as black incomes rise, food expenditure will become proportionately less important. The process is, however, a slow one — the food proportion for whites fell by only 10 percent in nearly 30 years and for some black groups, food still accounts for nearly half of total outlay. If, in the intervening period, food prices continue to rise at a faster rate than other prices, then the money incomes of black households will have to rise at a faster rate than the money incomes of white households if the gap between the "real" standard of living of whites and blacks is not to widen further. Since there is grave doubt whether the current rate of growth in black money incomes is even keeping pace with that of whites, let alone exceeding it, prospects for a rapid increase in the real standard of living of urban non-whites in South Africa are not bright.

## References:

- (1) Information is collected on some 600 separately specified items each month (See Supplement to "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics", October 1965, page 25)
- (2) Certain "expenditures" are not taken into account in compiling the index, e.g. income tax, life assurance premiums, pension fund contributions and expenditures of a capital nature (e.g. redemption, but not interest, on house loans). Most of these are, however, "investments" rather than "expenditures".
- (3) See "Survey of Family Expenditure— November 1966", Report Nos. 11-06-01 and 02, and "Survey of Family Expenditure — November 1955", Report Nos. 1-4; also
- "Report on the Inquiry into the Expenditure of European Families in Certain Urban Areas — 1936", Report No. U.G. 21/1937. (Bureau of Statistics, Pretoria.)
- (4) See "Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics, December 1970, Page 208.
- (5) For example, Table 1 of this article shows that families with incomes below R 7 000 spend over 50 percent of their expenditures on food, clothing and housing. The 1966 Survey showed that families with incomes exceeding R8 000 p.a. spend less than one-third on these items.
- (6) According to the 1960 Population Census, 53 percent of the total population of South Africa was "rural" at that date. Results from the 1970 Census are not yet available, but they will probably show a slight drop in this proportion.
- (7) See Bureau of Market Research Reports Nos. 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16 and 17 published in Pretoria between 1961 and 1967.
- (8) The main definitional differences between the data in Tables 1 and 2 are:
  - (a) the data of whites relate to families only (i.e. husband and/or wife with or without dependent children) the data for non-whites relate to households (i.e. persons sharing a common table and budget in a private dwelling)
  - (b) the former (Whites) excludes tax outlays and the latter includes them
  - (c) the former includes purchases of all durable consumer goods; the latter includes only those purchases affected by way of hire purchase or loan.
- (9) Note that the data relate to different points in time. Thus the non-White expenditure figures are probably all slightly understated for comparison with the 1966 White figure.
- (10) See (8) above.
- (11) (Calculated from "Union Statistics for Fifty Years" (pp H-23 and 24) and from "South African Statistics" (1968) (pg. 1-17).)
- (12) For example, the relatively low proportion of food outlays which Indians spend on meat is related to the fact that Hindus generally eat very little meat.
- (13) Figure for 1936 estimated from page 10 of the 1936 Family Expenditure Report, 1966 figure from 1966 Survey report.



# THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC

by Edgar H. Brookes

"The Union of South Africa", said Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon in April 1960, "stands alone to-day in the whole world. They may be a brave people, they may decide to stand firm, but they stand alone, isolated in a kind of moral wilderness, against the whole-hearted opposition of the whole world." It is from this unpromising position that Nationalist foreign policy has had to start. Some minor gains (e.g. Lesotho, Malawi) it has made, but Africa as a whole remains hostile, and the wider world refuses to be convinced. Nothing will satisfy the critics of the Republic short of the renunciation of apartheid, and our Government is ready to offer anything else but not to renounce apartheid; thus we stand in a position of perpetual deadlock.

G.D. Scholtz's rather sketchy "Suid-Afrika en die Wêreld-politiek 1652-1952" and his fuller "Die Republiek van Suid-Afrika en die Nuwe Wêreld", published in 1962, attempt to survey the Republic's foreign policy from a Nationalist point of view. Some aspects of the matter are dealt with in Nicholas Mansergh's "South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity". The nearest approach to a survey of the subject in English is J.E. Spence's "Republic under Pressure: A Study of South African Foreign Policy", but this was published in 1965 and thus does not deal with the latest developments of Mr. Vorster's external policy. It may be said, therefore, that Professor Amry Vandenbosch's "South Africa and the World" is the most complete study in English of South Africa's foreign policy available to serious students to-day.

Amry Vandenbosch, an American of Dutch descent, is a Professor Emeritus of the University of Kentucky, and the author of several books on international affairs. He has had practical as well as academic experience, having been a member of the postwar planning division of the U.S. Department of State from 1942-5. His knowledge of Dutch led him into research first in Indonesia, then South Africa, but he has been unlucky. Indonesia excluded him because he knew Dutch, South Africa excluded him although he knew Dutch. He has, of course, visited South Africa and knows it at first hand, but the recent refusal of a visa to him illustrates our Government's inexplicable ineptitude. An author who is not unsympathetic and who is obviously trying to be fair should not have been so dealt with. The right hand of the Government knows not what the left hand is doing. While on the one side it desires to build up a favourable world opinion, on the other side — not least by the refusal of visas — it is doing itself more harm than its enemies could do it.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Professor Vandenbosch is not one of those who are blind to the historical background of our present policy. More than one third of his book is devoted to the period before 1948. In this

he is right, for the historical background explains much in our present policy, though it cannot justify it. He then proceeds to consider at length and with great fairness the three controversies between South Africa and the United Nations — the treatment of Indians, the question of South-West Africa, and Apartheid. For this full treatment alone the book is worthy of study. The Indian question has become merged in the general question of apartheid; but South-West Africa poses its own problems, and is likely to put the Government of South Africa in immense difficulties at no very distant period; and this may well bedevil any international dialogue on the general principles of "apartheid".

Much of our Government's activities have been directed to getting African States to agree to this process of "dialogue" on apartheid. Even if the Government were to be more successful in this than seems likely at present, it would be naive in the extreme to expect that the end of the dialogue would be an acceptance, even a modified acceptance, of apartheid. Neither Africa nor the world of men generally will accept discrimination on race lines. The Vorster foreign policy is, in words quoted by Philip Guedalla,

*"une agorie dans l'impossible".*

Prof. Vandenbosch says (p.285), "There have been many tragedies in the history of Afrikanerdom and South Africa; they may be experiencing their greatest tragedy in the present situation. White South Africans regard themselves and their country as part of the West, and they are passionately on the side of the West in opposing Communism. But because of their racial ideology the West finds South Africa an embarrassment and treats her distantly — even England and Holland, which historically and culturally have the closest ties with them. This near-rejection is a very painful experience."

This is true, but how is the attitude of near-rejection to be reversed?



## ISOLATION?

It is in fact not a good thing that South Africa should be culturally and politically isolated, but can this isolation be ended by anything other than the abandonment of the apartheid policy? Surely a foreign policy which ignores this fact cannot be successful. To combine an outward-looking foreign policy with internal discrimination is impossible, and South Africa must see this. The new technique of speaking of the Republic's problems as "international" instead of interracial will get us nowhere. It may appeal to Mr. Vorster and his admirers as being a clever move, but to the world outside it is a mere prevarication. Like so much clever South African propaganda it deceives no one worth while and hardly deceives those who propagate it.

**As one looks round, one can see no real hope so long as the basic policy of apartheid remains unaltered. There are States of**

some importance which would react favourably to the inclusion of black men in a South African cricket or rugby team, but Mr. Vorster's plan of a Venda cricket eleven or a Tsonga rugby fifteen will arouse no response outside the Republic's boundaries except perhaps mocking laughter. Kindly, wisely, impartially though Professor Vandembosch handles these questions, he is driven to the conclusion to which all unbiased thinkers must come — that apartheid within South Africa must lead to a complete barrier between South Africa and the world outside.

*\* Vandembosch, Amry: "South Africa and the World: the Foreign Policy of Apartheid" (The University Press of Kentucky) 1970.*

# This South Africa

Writing in the Kerkbode, the Moderator of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Dr. J.D. Vorster, relates how, while on his way to a prayer meeting, he was shocked to see that a passing "hippie" girl had decorated her jeans with an inverted broken cross in a circle.

This symbol, he says, is the Nero Cross or Witch's Paw, used as the emblem of Satan-worshippers and witches in medieval times and symbolic of the "revolt against Christ" since the persecution of Christians by Emperor Nero in the first century.

He is not surprised that the emblem was chosen for the "Ban-the-Bomb" campaign, because one of the leading campaign figures, the philosopher Bertrand Russell, "was known not only as an outspoken pro-communist, but once admitted that he took an interest in satanism".

*"Sunday Times" — 16/5/71*

On Friday last week a young Eshowe police constable was found guilty of culpable homicide. According to evidence, a mentally deranged African was shot dead in the charge office after having been terrorised for some time. Three shots were fired, one by an un-named White youth. The policeman was sentenced to a fine of R250 or 250 days' imprisonment.

On the same day, in a Durban magistrate's court, a railways bookstall employee described by the magistrate as "an illiterate foreigner", was sentenced to a fine of R500 or 250 days. His crime: possessing three pornographic books and a pack of pornographic playing cards.

*Daily News.*

The State President, Mr. Fouché, is acquiring quite a reputation for homespun humour — especially for his Jewish stories.

At a recent civic luncheon in Umtata, after he had opened the Transkei Legislative Assembly, Mr. Fouché made a light-hearted speech in which he complimented the town's Mayor and Mayoress (who are Jewish) and mentioned that, when he was young, there was a belief that sleeping with a Jewess brought seven years' good luck.

Some of the guests found it amusing, I am told.

*"Sunday Tribune" — 11/5/71.*

VAALWATER. — Mr. Pik Botha, the Nationalist member for Wonderboom, said last night: "I have often eaten with Black people in overseas countries and at the United Nations.

"It is by no manner of means an unpleasant experience."

*Rand Daily Mail.*

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