

reality

A JOURNAL OF LIBERAL OPINION

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EDITORIAL COLOURED ANGER

The anger expressed by the delegates to the recent conference of the Labour Party is a cause of hope and joy, not so much because they were angry, but because they weren't afraid to be angry. So many South Africans go round today on their hands and knees that it is a matter for joy when someone stands up on his feet.

We remind readers that when Coloured voters were removed from the common roll, the Government created a Coloured Representative Council, with 40 elective and 20 nominative seats. The anti-Apartheid Labour Party won 26 elective seats and their opponents 14, whereupon the Government nominated 20 Government supporters, including no less than 14 who had been defeated by the Labour Party in the election. Mr. Tom Swartz, who was thrashed soundly at the polls, was not only nominated, but made Chairman at R6 500 a year. So much for that.

But although the Council is in that respect a farce, it is not so otherwise. The Labour Party has made the Council into a vigorous and outspoken body, where more truths have been spoken than have been heard in South Africa since the Liberal Party was made illegal.

These truths are hard-hitting. The Party objects strongly to the classification of Coloured people as Cape Coloured, Cape Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Indian, Asiatic, and — most insulting of all — other Coloured. It objects strongly to the grotesque activities of the Classification experts in Pretoria, who decide what

you are. Mr. Norman Middleton, leader of the Natal Labour Party, registered all his children as "coloured" but in Pretoria they classified one as "mixed", one as "coloured", one as "other coloured", and one as "Cape Coloured", although Mr. Middleton has never been to Cape Town in his life.

There is nothing funny about this. It is totally disgusting. And now the Government is giving the Council R75 000 to celebrate the decennial of the Republic. There is nothing that makes the Government angrier than to be asked, **what is there to celebrate?** However, Reality can't be less brave than the Labour Party, so we ask too, **why should such disgustingness be celebrated?**

In fact, some delegates to the Labour Party Conference wanted to know why there should be a term "coloured" at all. Why not just "South African"? Why not indeed?

So far as we know, Reality has never used those most disgusting of all terms, "a coloured", and "the coloureds". If one has to use the word, then at least one can refer to "coloured persons."

CLAPTRAP

The delegates attacked Mr. Heath's proposed sale of arms to South Africa. They wanted to know why some of this enormous expenditure wasn't devoted to education and social welfare. They weren't at all impressed with any of the current claptrap about preserving our national way of life. The coloured people of South Africa are as South African as anything or anybody in the country, but they don't commit the servile folly of supposing that the Government is the country. They say in effect to the Government, **who do you think you are?** It's good to have people here who can do that.

This editorial is not however dealing with the slights, humiliations, and injustices under which coloured people suffer. It is dealing rather with the way they are standing up to them. One delegate said, **the future is dim, what have we to look forward to?**

Well, it's true that coloured people may have some tough things to look forward to. They can't all escape to Canada. But there's something much worse than having to endure adversity, and that is when adversity takes the spunk out of you, and sends you creeping about on your hands and knees, terrified to death of what Big Brother may do to you.

It's also true that some of these delegates will have to pay a price for exercising this freedom of speech. It's not for Reality to give them advice about this. The members of the Labour Party must do their "own thing". And if they go on doing it like this, then they will earn the thanks and respect of every one in South Africa who still has a mind of his own.

FACT OF LIFE

The Coloured people of South Africa didn't create the Coloured Representative Council. It was created by the Government in its mad pursuit of separate

development. But it's there. It's a fact of life. And we on the whole think it's better to use it than not to use it. The Government never intended it to be powerful, but it can be made more powerful than the Government ever intended it to be. It was created as an instrument of power, but the Government intended to wield it itself, and to let it be wielded by its own appointees. It looks as though the Government may have made a mistake. And the mistake could be magnified if only those Coloured people who have so far boycotted the Council would decide to use it, and to win 36 instead of 26 seats for the Labour Party.

Just imagine it, 36 Labour Party and 4 Government supporters, plus 20 Government nominees. Some very fascinating resolutions would be passed. The hypocrisy of separate development would be exposed as never before. It is a proposition that at least merits examination.

Reality, and the Liberal Party before it, are and were totally opposed to the policy of separate development, on both moral and practical grounds. The goal is — as it was always — one common society, whose rights and obligations are shared by all, free of all racial discrimination, and upholding fundamental human rights and the rule of law. But where the Government in its pursuit of separate development, creates instruments of power than can be used, however imperfectly, for the achievement of progress towards these ends, then the proposition that one should use them is one fully to be considered.

EDITORIAL

AN URGENT QUESTION

The dramatic dropping of the immorality charges against five White men and a large number of African Women in the small town of Excelsior raises a question which requires an urgent answer.

Reality stands for the repeal of the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act. It therefore welcomes the dropping of the charges. But it cannot help reflecting wryly on the great fortune that has befallen five white men who might have been ruined by this trial whether they had been found guilty or not.

It is too late to do anything for those who have been ruined by trial under the Immorality Act. It is certainly

too late to do anything for those white men who killed themselves rather than face their trial. But what about those who are being convicted right now, and those who will be convicted tomorrow?

There is only one way in which this dramatic withdrawal can be justified, and that is by the repeal of this terrible act.

EDITORIAL PERFORMING WHITES COUNCILS

If it were possible to arrange the various manifestations of Apartheid on an ascending scale of nastiness, among those crowding towards a place at the top would be the walling-off of Non-Whites from the proper enjoyment of drama, music and opera over most of the country.

The Publications and Entertainments Act makes it an offence for Whites to perform before anyone but Whites without permission, obtained jointly or severally, from organisations like the Department of Community Development, the Department of Planning and the Department of Bantu Affairs. Few of the local representatives of these departments are able to make decisions without reference to Pretoria; and the consequent delays and frustrations are dismaying and in effect prohibitive to all but the most determined performers. And it is little comfort to suggest that Non-Whites may perform before each other. The Eoan Group in Cape Town is active and competent and receives some subsidy; but for the rest the official institutions for providing musical, dramatic and operatic performances at reasonable and subsidised prices are the Performing Arts Councils of the various provinces.

These Councils (to quote one of their directors) 'are subsidised by and function under the Department of Cultural Affairs, which was created by the Act on the Advancement of National Culture of 1969, and which provides, inter alia, for the fostering and the promotion of the **culture of the white population** of the Republic'. Consequently, although these councils receive subsidies provided by taxpayers of all races, they need not and do not — unless they feel strong and enthusiastic

enough to tackle the Department of Community Development et al — provide any performances at all for Non-Whites. In practice the provinces vary in generosity, with the Cape and the Transvaal providing a fair number of these performances, Natal and the Free State very few indeed.

EGREGIOUS

We are accustomed enough in South Africa to using revenue gained from all races to maintain superior amenities for Whites; but this is a particularly egregious example, particularly since the point of cultural subsidies should be to put good performances within the reach of the poorest sections of the population, not the ones who can afford independent professional fees and prices.

(We wonder in passing how scrupulously the overseas artists recruited for the Performing Arts Councils are apprised in advance of the officially 'all-white' nature of their prospective audiences.)

The well-supported campaign to boycott the proposed 'whites-only' Nico Malan Opera House in Cape Town — a campaign which Reality approves and endorses — suggests that this particular meanness towards Non-Whites is one which White South Africans are beginning to feel ashamed of. We hope this is so.

NORMAN MAILER AND THE VALUE OF PROTEST

by peter strauss

(The Armies of the Night; Miami and the Siege of Chicago. Norman Mailer. Penguin Books, 1968, 1969).

In *The Armies of the Night* Norman Mailer invents a name for all that tends to be bloodless and life-draining in liberal politics — the endless speechmaking, the abstraction of problems to fit principles, the deadening of impulse in the calculations of expediency, the priggish arrogance and mental clannishness. He calls all this the *Great Left Pall*, and his record of the days of the march on the Pentagon shows him either submitting dutifully (i.e. uncomfortably) to the rituals of the syndrome, or (finally unable to stand it) scampering to avoid it. It's a good parable for the experience of a South African liberal.

Of course what makes Norman Mailer's discontent worth while is that he believes an alternative (or at least complementary) way of making politics is possible. It is the birth of this new consciousness on the American left that the two books describe — a consciousness that politics can be expressive, that it must have its moments when it partakes of the elation that always goes with self-expression and self-discovery, particu-

larly when the self-discovery is a communal one, a sudden surprising recognition of community in purpose and desire. The value of such a political event resides in the way it is lived, not in the ideas stated; it is through the living-out of a protest, largely through what is spontaneous in it, that the protest becomes more than a protest, becomes the positive expression of new creative forces in the community.

"The New Left was drawing its political aesthetic from Cuba. The revolutionary idea which the followers of Castro had induced from their experience in the hills was that you created the revolution first and learned from it, learned of what your revolution might consist and where it might go out of the intimate truth of the way it presented itself to your experience. Just as the truth of his material was revealed to a good writer by the cutting edge of his style (he could thus hope his style was in each case the most appropriate tool for the material of the experience) so a revolutionary began to uncover the nature of his true situation by trying to ride the beast of his revolution. The idea behind these ideas was then obviously that the future of the revolution existed in the nerves and cells of the people who created it and lived with it, rather than in the sanctity of the original idea.

"The aesthetic of the New Left now therefore began with the notion that the authority could not comprehend nor contain nor finally manage to control any political action whose end was unknown. They could attack it, beat it, jail it, misrepresent it, and finally abuse it, but they could not feel a sense of victory because they could not understand a movement which inspired thousands and hundreds of thousands to march without a co-ordinated plan. The bureaucrats of the Old Left had not been alone in their adoration of the solid-as-brickwork-logic-of-the-next-step; no, the bureaucrats of the American Center, now liked it as much and were as aghast at any political activity which ignored it."

(The Armies of the Night, p. 99)

ESSENTIALLY UNOFFICIAL

The events Mailer describes are almost certainly extremely significant from a historical point of view, but being essentially unofficial events they will be suppressed as far as possible in the official histories. **The Armies of the Night** gives an account of the demonstration against the Vietnam war in October 1967, a demonstration which involved a march on the Pentagon in Washington (and also the arrest of Mailer himself). The other book **Miami and the Siege of Chicago**, describes the Republican (Miami) and Democratic (Chicago) conventions of 1968, including the protests and the police riots* in Chicago. In short, the book is about some of the most mysterious events in one of the most mysterious and diversified countries in the world.

This, I take it, is the hard core of one's interest in the books: Mailer's subtle, inquisitive, perpetually dissatisfied, wide-ranged sense of America — the America of the present with its historically and geographically determined, incredibly variegated psychology. As far as this goes it is the section on the Republican con-

vention in Miami in which Mailer transcends himself, starting off with a Dickensian-gone-Daliesque evocation of the sweltering beach city and its hotels, and moving to a really surprising portrait of the Nixon camp — surprising because of the generosity, disinterestedness (and hence wit) of Mailer's appraisal, as if his novelist's curiosity had permitted him to see the Nixonites without the kinds of heavy emphasis which the fear of the evil in their policies would normally impose on a liberal's vision. He is not as successful in painting Chicago: largely because he is more involved in the city, and involved in it with a kind of blood-and-guts sentimentality.

IMMENSE SPIRIT

What emerges most strongly about America, the unofficial, unDisneyfied America that the books celebrate — and it emerges in a way that must be to a certain extent shaming for a South African — is the immense spirit of the country, its defiance, exuberance, individualism, inventiveness and courage. All these qualities seem to come to the surface in a left-wing American protest. It's a question of who is capable of being historian to such a protest, and here Mailer seems to be the ideal man. None of the groups involved in the protest engages anything like his total loyalty, yet he has a lively interest in the philosophy and life-style of all of them. He has the newspaperman's cynicism and shrewdness about sources of information and the probability ratio between truth and report. (I mean precisely the shrewdness and cynicism that a newspaperman generally has in **private**, but, in all cases but Mailer's, never shows in his articles.) He is unrelentingly and engagingly ebullient, and yet never puts himself beyond the criticism of his reader — his vanity is of the assailable variety. In fact for some reason his unquenchable egotism enables him to lead the reader into the meaning of the protest movement. As far as I know there is no piece of journalism by Norman Mailer which isn't to a very large extent **about** Norman Mailer, and usually Norman Mailer irritatingly referred to in the third person. Yet the writer is aware of his egotism and can treat it with irony and wit — above all with honesty. (He writes, on one occasion: "Yes, Mailer had an egotism of curious disproportions" — and proceeds to analyse it!) Norman Mailer deciding he is through with Negroes; Norman Mailer changing his mind when Negroes respond enthusiastically to a speech of his; Norman Mailer fuming over newspaper reports of his arrest; Norman Mailer uncertain whether he is a friend of Robert Lowell's or not — these are subjects that take on a quite absorbing interest of their own when narrated with such frank self-revelatory gusto. However, Norman Mailer wondering how far fear has played a part in

* This apparently partisan description of what happened is in fact rumoured to have been coined by a right-wing politician from New York who happened to have been in Chicago and who was beaten up 'by mistake'. Nor was he the only one.

keeping him out of a particular protest move that he doesn't believe in; budgeting with his courage; feeling that the events of the day have enabled him to win some tangible victory within himself (an increase in his stock of courage or self-understanding or understanding of what his and other left-wingers' future over the next twenty years can usefully be) — this is a kind of selfinvolvedness which is not irrelevant to the books: it has everything to do with the events they describe, it is what the protests are all about.

PERSONAL EXPRESSION

For the new theory of the protesting left wing in America is one essentially based on personal expression and dramatization — self-dramatization and dramatization of the political situation. The 'living' of a protest is a kind of quest for the symbolic action that will reveal the inner truth to one about the society and about one's own indignation. The key concept in this deliberate enactment of symbolic situations is the word 'confrontation' — the strategy is for the demonstrators and the representatives of authority to meet face to face. The cover photograph of *The Armies of the Night* more or less sums up the situation described with more subtlety and detail (and also in its saner ramifications) inside. It shows a hippy of indeterminate sex delicately sniffing a daisy within six inches of a (sheathed) bayonet held by a soldier whose face could come from a patriotic warfilm or anti-Jap comic-strip. This makes the book's point: the really violent centre of the conflict is in the war between opposing views of the potentialities of man. And this will always be the ultimate centre of politics, until the mass media make us all the same.


Once a man stops fighting for the validity of his whole sense of life he becomes a slave. And for some reason liberals have always had a tendency to surrender the concrete edge of their sense of life. Perhaps it's been their desire for an ultimate, abstract justification of their views — so that they try to live by the carefully sterilized (not to say dehydrated) principles of the UN Freedom Charter, or imitate the political behaviour of the English nineteenth century Whigs — and so lose the actuality of what they are fighting for, the flavour, the possibility of growth and change, the discipline of pragmatism. Of course, in South Africa the danger of

this is multiplied: most left-wing parties have been banned or driven out of existence; the Progressive Party has to try to win votes off the United Party (which must be like wrestling with a ghost, or trying to catch fairy lights in bog country); in short everything conspires to thrust us into unreality.

BOREDOM

Mailer's books suggest a way in which a consciousness of real identity can be won by a group without direct political power or even much cohesion. Is it possible for us to learn from these American protests? South African protests are (first) boring — surely our notorious political apathy is as much the result of boredom as of cowardice? Second, our protests are respectable and inhuman to the point of seeming to embody the depersonalized forces of reaction that they are meant to be criticizing. (This is the result of a belief that protestors must keep in the public's good books, or at least keep beyond criticism. In fact, the only effective protests in the last years have been those which most antagonized the public. All publicity is good publicity.) Above all protests tend to be occasions for reiterating old ideas rather than for discussing or experimenting with new ones.

Obviously the American style of protest is inimitable, nor would a replica of it be desirable (or remotely possible) in this country. But at least our protests might be more expressive, more dramatic, more inventive, individualistic, symbolic, unpredictable, humorous, inspiring, etc. Anything that will allow one to 'feel good' rather than be obliged to feel 'good'.



Acknowledgement Marc Riboub/Magnum

REPUBLIC DAY: WHAT IS THERE TO CELEBRATE?

by neville curtis

Recent news articles have brought to mind the celebrations planned for the 10th anniversary of the Republic of South Africa. It would seem that a great carnival of white patriotic joy is being planned.

Already some millions of rands have been put aside for the celebrations and preparations proceed apace for what seems likely to rival one of those massive Labour Day parades of which the Soviets are so fond.

The army, the airforce and the navy will be there. The school children, the Jeugbond and the loyal party workers are all busily preparing. No doubt Pretoria University students are starting to cultivate Oom Paul beards and (long) hairstyles, and surely plans are being made for a re-enactment of the great trek all over again?

Medals will be struck, and white mothers will be spurred on to greater fertility. There will be calls for greater unity and Afrikaners everywhere will gather to celebrate. The church will bless them, the Government Ministers will exhort them to greater efforts and the volkspele will take place.

The Nationalist Party will salute their creation, the Republic, and will praise their endeavours and successes over the last 23 years, and particularly the last ten.

And all this will be wrapped in the paper of patriotism and love of fatherland.

But what have 10 years of Republic brought us, and what have 23 years of Nationalist rule achieved?

FACTS

We might well look at some of the gloomier facts that have accumulated over those years, and look at them now before they are lost to sight in a tide of white patriotic fervour:

Education:

0.1% of the African population have matric or school leaving certificates (1) and the state and provinces in 1969 spent R238 million on white education and only R14.5 million on black education (2).

Expenditure on African education is less than one eighth of that on white Education and the gap has grown for 13 years (3).

In 1968 there was only one qualified Black engineer, and there was not one registered African apprentice in the whole of South Africa (4).

Poverty:

It is estimated that 50% of the Indian population in Natal live below the poverty datum line (5) as do 68% of the families in Soweto (6). Average non-white income is R7 while that of whites is R95 per head, per month (7). The earnings of whites are thus 485% of those of non-whites and the disproportion increases annually (8).

Starvation:

A coloured child dies of malnutrition every thirty-five minutes and two African Children die during the same period (9). Half the children in a typical African reserve (homeland) die before they are five years old (10). And in the Transkei 40% of the children die before they reach the age of ten (11).

Crime:

The crime rate increased 216% between 1950 and 1966 (12) and the percentage of people murdered increased 377% in 16 years (13). Each year one out of every six coloured men is convicted of a crime and hundreds of thousands of Africans of pass offences (14).

The statistics speak for themselves, and will leave the conclusion that many will have no reason at all to celebrate Republic Day.

But what is more shocking is that the situation is not getting better, is in fact getting worse and has been for 23 years.

The disparities in salaries to different racial groups gets bigger. The disparities in education get bigger (even with recent increases). The real income in the African Reserves is less now than it was, as Sir de Villiers Graaff noted in Parliament in 1969 (15). The rate of crime and rate of violence increases almost daily.

It is not unfair to conclude that after 23 years of Nationalist rule and after 10 years of Republic, South Africa is a sicker society than it was. The real problems have not been solved, and have got worse.

LAW AND ORDER

"But, we are after all a peaceful country. Law and order are maintained even if we do not all progress forward equally." These are words we have heard often. They too are a fallacy, and the facts show it. 'Law and

order' is an euphemism for growing use of force:

The defence estimates rose from R40 million in 1959 to R273 million in 1969 (16) and South Africa now owns R2 000 000 000 worth of military equipment (two thousand million) (17).

The police force has grown from 20 588 men in 1948 to 34 437 in 1969. (18) and the prison population has increased from 284 000 to over half a million in a similar period (19). Over 2000 Africans are arrested every day for pass offences alone, 700 000 p.a. (20). Half the number of people executed in South Africa since 1910 were executed between 1953 and 1966 and South Africa accounts for nearly 50% of the world's known executions per year (21).

Writing in REALITY David Welsh said last year "We have to face the fact that there is something seriously wrong with our society. The enormous crime rate is an indication of a rooted alienation among large sections of the community. To believe that the death penalty gives us protection is a snare and a delusion" (22).

We should face these two facts: That there is something seriously wrong, and that the present solutions (especially the use of force) are not providing the answers.

We should face the fact that there is little for the vast majority of people in South Africa to celebrate on Republic Day, and that the little they have grows relatively less and less.

We should face the fact that the Republican celebrations will be the hollow proclamations of empty vanities by a small minority of Afrikaner Nationalists, people who have done well in those 10 years of Republic and those 23 years of Nationalist rule, at the cost of South Africa and at the cost of real South African patriotism.

We should face these facts and boycott the whole Republic celebration, and mourn for the South Africa that might have been a mighty, united nation holding its head high in the company of the rest of the world.

Student leaders from Black and White Universities and colleges will be debating this proposal to boycott the Republic celebrations in three weeks time at the Annual Executive meeting of the National Union. I will encourage them to recommend to their campuses a full boycott. Who will join us?

Footnotes.

1. Dr. E. G. Malherbe, 'Bantu Manpower and Education', 1969.
2. Dagbreek. 1 September, 1968.
3. Sir de Villiers Graaff in Hansard, 9th February, 1968, Col. 1319.
4. Financial Mail, 31st October, 1969.
5. Mrs Doreen Patrick, Black Sash, February, 1968.
6. Survey of Race Relations, 1969, pp 82-83.
7. Financial Mail. 18th April.
8. Financial Mail. 6th September, 1968.
9. The Post. 30th November, 1969.
10. The Star, 10th May, 1969. (Prof. John Reid).
11. The Star, (weekly) 14th March, 1970.
12. The Star (weekly) 4th October, 1969.
13. Mr Justice H. Steyn, SABC 27th July, 196
14. The Star, 12th February, 1970.
15. Hansard, 3rd February, 1969, Col. 16.
16. Estimates of Expenditure from Revenue Account 1969.
17. General Hiemstra, S.A. Digest, 25th July, 1969.
18. Hansard, 6th February, 1970. Col. 416.
19. Report of the Dept. of Prisons. Star 16th January, 1970.
20. Survey of Race Relations, 1969.
21. Peter Randall, SACC 1970.
22. Reality, July, 1969.

AN INDEX OF AFRIKANER CONSERVATION

by e. r. jenkins

Generalisations can be made about the conservative nature of Afrikaans society; how its Calvinist religion, authoritarian education and political and racial attitudes are inter-related; and how this type of society is a kind of fossil in the Western World. It is not so easy to measure the differences between this and other western societies, which is why considerable interest is attached to the work of two American researchers in the field of the sociology of language.

Their findings which contain reference to the Afrikaner were published in 1960 in a paper which has received little attention in this country. (1)

THE PRONOUN "YOU"

The subject of research was the use of pronouns in

the second person singular — meaning "you" — in many languages. They included English, Afrikaans, French, Italian, Dutch, German, Spanish, the Scandinavian languages, Hindi and Gujarati. Anyone learning one of these languages (except English, where the

usage is obsolete) is aware that there are two alternative pronouns available for addressing a second person. In Afrikaans they are "u" and "jy". The researchers attempted an accurate description of the historical development of the use of these alternatives with an analysis of the implications of their use in the present day.

Roughly speaking, the two pronouns indicate respect and familiarity, or, as the authors call them, "power" and "solidarity". The use of these pronouns between certain pairs of people was analysed, some of the situations being between the subject and his parents, grandparents, wife, certain relatives, an elderly female servant, fellow students, and a waiter, between boss and employee and army officer and private. In all the European languages studied it was found that "well into the nineteenth century" the use of pronouns between these couples had not been reciprocal. The sense of "power" had prevailed, with the more senior or socially elevated person using the familiar pronoun towards his inferior while the inferior used the pronoun of respect towards his senior. However, in the last hundred years there has been a marked and rapid change towards the sense of "solidarity", so that the use of pronouns has become reciprocal, with one or the other pronoun prevailing between couples. For example, where in the past father addressed son by the familiar word and the son showed his respect for his father with the formal word, nowadays both use the familiar pronoun. Between officer and private the polite form is now used by both. This trend is seen by the researchers as an accurate reflection of social changes in western society. "We believe, therefore, that the development of open societies with an egalitarian ideology acted against the nonreciprocal power semantic and in favour of solidarity. It is our suggestion that the larger social changes created a distaste for the face-to-face expression of differential power."

AFRIKAANS USAGE

When the researchers turned to Afrikaans they discovered that the current position reflects a much earlier stage in European history. Of all the languages studied, only Hindi and Gujarati show such distinctions in the use of the pronouns. For example, in eight of the test situations, Afrikaners still maintain nonreciprocal use of the pronouns, compared with perhaps one or two examples in the other languages. Referring to usages within the family, between customer and waiter, and between boss and clerk, the researchers say that these are "almost never power-coded in French, Italian, German, etc., though they once were. The Afrikaans pattern generally preserves the asymmetry . . . and that suggests a more static society and a less developed equalitarian ethic."

OUTMODED FAMILY VALUES

They point out that in certain cases the pronoun for "you" is not used at all in Afrikaans, the coloured

people using "meneer" in addressing whites, and the Africans using "baas" — "It is as if these social distances transcend anything that can be found within the white group and so require their peculiar linguistic expressions." We might add here that it is customary for Afrikaans children to substitute "ma" and "pa" for the pronoun in addressing their parents, emphasising a degree of politeness beyond the two stages offered by "jy" and "u". In itself this usage may be unremarkable, but it gains significance as an indication of the authoritarian Afrikaner parent-child relationship when it is compared with European practice and found to represent a completely outmoded set of family values.

PERSONAL BIAS

Just how closely the distinctive use of the two pronouns is connected with personal attitudes is further revealed by an additional investigation undertaken by the researchers. The Eysenck Social Attitude Inventory test was given to fifty French students in order to find their score on a scale of radicalism-conservatism, based on their attitudes to a number of issues such as religion, economics, race relations and sexual behaviour. The researchers explain that "To be radical on this scale is to favour change, and to be conservative is to wish to maintain the status quo or turn back to some earlier condition." The students' scores were then compared with their "Index of pronoun style", a score devised to register their tendency to use one or the other pronoun. **The results showed a very high correlation between conservatism and the use of the "power" pronoun, and radicalism and the "solidarity" pronoun.** Hence, even among people of similar background and socioeconomic level, personal style of pronoun usage reveals attitudes.

The survey dealt with only a small sample of Afrikaners, so there is obviously scope for more research in this field. But we now have an index by which Afrikaner conservatism can be compared with the social attitudes of European nations, and a scale by which, apparently, a man's degree of *verkramptheid* may be accurately measured.

1. Roger Brown and Albert Gilman: *The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity*. In: *Style in Language*, Thomas A. Sebeok, ed., (Cambridge, Mass., Technology Press of M.I.T.; New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960.)

Reprinted in: *Readings in the Sociology of Language*, J. A. Fishman, ed., (Mouton, The Hague, 1968.)

SOUTH AFRICA'S MARXIST MYTH

by john kane-berman

One of the conventional wisdoms currently fashionable in some quarters in South Africa and overseas is that economic forces are going to undermine apartheid. Ironically enough, this position relies on a rather crude caricature of Marx's theory of economic determinism — that changes in the structure of economic relationships will produce changes in the political superstructure.

People point to the expansion of secondary industry, the ever-worsening labour shortage, increasing criticism of the government's manpower policies by businessmen (and especially Afrikaans businessmen), the alleged rise in the standard of living of Africans, and so on. In a well-known survey entitled *The Green Bay Tree*, the British paper *The Economist* two years ago wrote, "South Africa's economic growth must continue to surge forward, bringing a rapid increase in the standard of living of all its peoples." (1). Yet neither *The Economist* nor others who accept the crude determinist thesis have spelt out exactly how economic growth is going to undermine apartheid or how much of the resultant increase in national income is going to find its way into the pockets of Africans, Indians, and Coloured people.

There has been a lot of talk in recent years of rising standards of living among urban Africans. But figures to substantiate such claims have yet to be produced. It is indeed more likely that inflation is more than eating up what increases in money earnings Africans do get, with the net result that their economic position is in fact deteriorating rather than improving. And it is also clear that the overall differential between white and black incomes is widening.

It is worth noting that the same *Economist* which published *The Green Bay Tree* in the same year published a booklet on gold in which it wrote: "South Africa . . . is in the unique situation of having helot labour. The cash wages of black South African mineworkers average only about £107 a year. In real terms (allowing for inflation) this leaves them about as badly off as they were before the first world war, a fate not shared, so far as is known, by any other group of workers anywhere in the world." (Italics added). With that grand economic vision uncomplicated by moral considerations the writer went on: "No one can afford to be pious about this exploitation: the monetary system of the western world would not have survived in its present form without it." (2).

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

It has also been suggested that one of the motives behind South Africa's present diplomatic activity in Africa is the awareness of the business sector that it must find markets for its goods which it cannot find within the country because the buying-power of non-whites is so low (3).

This, incidentally, is one thing about wages and standards of living in South Africa that often seems to escape notice: they can be improved whether the government likes it or not, given a desire to do so among the white employers.

The greater share (by far) of the business sector in South Africa is controlled by English-speaking people who are not members of the Nationalist Party. A substantial number of influential people among them are not even members of the United Party. If economic growth were somehow undermining apartheid, we could perhaps get a clue to how this was happening by examining the behaviour of this sector. Economic growth is not a mysterious force over which men have no control: it is regulated by business decisions.

Here it is important to introduce a distinction between **apartheid**, by which I mean the ideology of separate development, Bantustans, etc, and **baasskap**, the political system of white supremacy. (4). It is clear that, using these definitions, the apartheid ideology is being undermined to the extent that the flow of non-whites to so-called white areas has not been reversed or even halted. The business sector is partly responsible for this in providing jobs, but the sheer poverty of the so-called homelands is also a major factor in the migration of Africans to the cities. Businessmen are also undermining apartheid to the extent (obviously very difficult to gauge) that they are surreptitiously allowing Africans to perform jobs reserved for whites. However, it is important to note that while employers may be undermining **apartheid** by letting Africans do "white jobs" they are at the same time reinforcing **baasskap** by practising racial discrimination in the determination of wage rates.

DISTINCTION

Once the above definitional distinction has been introduced, it is easy to see that while the business sector may be undermining apartheid in some respects, it is not undermining **baasskap**. An examination of the conflicts between the government and the business sector over the past few years helps to bring out this point. These have been about things like job reservation, the Planning Act, and other governmental constraints upon the "logic of the free market." They have NOT been about the constraints on the political and economic rights of Africans.


The single most important step in the undermining of baasskap — indeed probably the only significant one — would be the recognition by the government and by all employers, of black trade unions, of the right of collective bargaining, and of the right to strike. But there has been little indication that the business sector is dissatisfied to any marked degree with the existing basic pattern of industrial relations. On the contrary, this pattern is as much a product of policies pursued by the business sector as it is of Nationalist legislation. Smuts and the Chamber of Mines are as much the architects of the present weak and impoverished position of the black worker as is the Nationalist Party.

There is often alleged to be a contradiction between the logic of the free market or the colour-blind forces of industrialization on the one hand and racial discrimination on the other. Some people accordingly see apartheid and baasskap as a kind of straitjacket imposed from above on the South African economy. But this interpretation ignores the historical reality that baasskap and industrial development grew up together as parts of the same organism. South Africa today is that same organism. The political power of the whites depends on both the massive coercive apparatus of the state and their economic power. And their economic power, their wealth, and their entrenched privileges depend on that same coercive apparatus, and on their monopoly over all the levers of political power.

RACISM

To be sure, the rigorous application of racism is clearly a more serious constraint upon economic growth today than it has been previously, and the business sector would undoubtedly welcome a more flexible and pragmatic approach by both the government and the recalcitrant white trade unions. But this is not remotely the same thing as wishing to do anything that would undermine the system that reserves all political and economic power to the whites.

One of the popular misconceptions upon which the thesis of economic determinism in South Africa is based is that industrialization gives birth (by a process of peaceful evolution) to liberal democracy. However,



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this view is contrary to the facts. As Barrington Moore (5) has shown in his celebrated book **Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy**, industrialization has also given birth to fascist systems (Germany, Japan) and Communist-authoritarian ones (Russia, China). It took the Second World War to destroy fascism in Germany and Japan; and the Civil War to destroy slavery in the Deep South — but replace it by a more subtle form of bondage.

Even in England, where liberal democracy did grow out of the Industrial Revolution, the process was only **comparatively** peaceful. Moore has shown that two essential preconditions of the evolution of democracy in 19th Century England were (1) the Civil War in the 17th century and (2) the elimination of the peasantry as a significant factor from English political life by a gradual process through the 17th and 18th centuries.

The War was obviously violent, but the latter process also was. As Moore wrote, "That the violence and coercion which produced these results took place over a long space of time, that it took place mainly within a framework of law and order and helped ultimately to establish democracy on a firmer footing, must not blind us to the fact that it was massive violence exercised by the upper classes against the lower."

ABILITY TO REFORM

Marx's prediction that capitalism contained the seeds of its own destruction, producing, through increasing emiseration of the proletariat, violent revolution, proved wrong — at least in respect of England. He was mistaken for several reasons, one of them being that he failed to anticipate English capitalism's ability to reform itself. Industrialization and the growth of an urban working class were of course the context within which liberal democracy came to England. It should be remembered though that the extension of the franchise took nearly a hundred years, from 1832 to 1928. I would argue that **political** factors were far more important in this process than mere economic growth and industrialization. What sort of light do these political factors then throw upon possible developments in South Africa? I think that the main factors were:

(1) The extension of the franchise itself, which once begun could hardly be halted. The Commons debates over the Second Reform Bill in 1867 reveal that politicians of both parties saw both the danger of resisting demands for a wider franchise and the chance of furthering their own electoral interests by yielding to them. Some of the most important legislation protecting workers in later Victorian years was related to electoral considerations. Most, if not all, the legislation facilitating the growth of trade unionism and collective bargaining and protecting the right to strike (under heavy attack by the courts) arose out of electoral mandates. The extension of the franchise and this trade union legislation were also indispensable for the rise of the Labour Party.

(2) The lack of an efficient police-state apparatus to suppress political and trade union movements, had there been a desire to do so.

(3) The existence of freedom of speech, movement, and association and the freedom to organise political demonstrations.

(4) The paternalist belief of several important politicians, at both national and municipal level, that the government had a responsibility to improve standards of living of poor people.

(5) The lack of a powerful diehard opposition to political and economic reform — and the existence of powerful men willing to attack what opposition there was.

(6) An ideological climate generally favourable to liberal democracy.

This brief analysis of democratization in England indicates the importance of the political factors. It is readily apparent that none of the above six factors exists in South Africa. The franchise has been restricted, not extended. The police-state apparatus with regard to non-whites is probably the most efficient in the world. It is thus self-evident that the political factors which could bring about a change in the structure of economic and political power are lacking. Those who make economic decisions have been brought up in, and conditioned by, the master-servant society, and like most men, they do not wish to give up their privileges or their wealth. Earlier I tried to show that despite superficial conflicts, there was nonetheless substantial consensus among white politicians and white businessmen over fundamentals. There does not seem to be any reason why this state of affairs should not continue — an adjustment here, a compromise there, yes, but the basic organism remains the same. The ungodly, like the green bay tree, will continue to flourish.

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GANDHI THEN AND NOW

A Response to Fatima Meer's Book

by c. o. gardner

Apprenticeship of a Mahatma, by Fatima Meer, Phoenix Steelelement Trust, 106 pages. R2.00.

This book, which is based partly on Gandhi's autobiographical writings, is short and fairly simply written, but it succeeds in doing ample justice to its subject — Gandhi's early years and his years in South Africa. To say that the book thus succeeds is to praise it highly, for Gandhi was a human phenomenon of quite remarkable complexity, and it was a considerable achievement to trace very lucidly the various strands in his personality and in the first half of his story.

Gandhi's formative years are not merely complex and fascinating: they are of course extremely momentous partly because all great men are important to their fellows, in one way or another, but more particularly because Gandhi's discovery-and-creation of his vocation was in many ways an extraordinary process and it has had notable and continuing repercussions in the overlapping fields (and Gandhi himself has helped to make us aware of the overlaps) of religion and morality and psychology and politics and law. For readers of *Reality*, especially those who are living in South Africa, Mrs. Meer's subject has an added relevance and poignancy: not only were many of Gandhi's ideas, aims and methods devised in this country, largely in response to South Africa's racial situation, but the situation which Gandhi knew is on the whole still with us, grotesquely unchanged, and the majority of liberally-minded South Africans, of whatever race, must inevitably find themselves pondering those problems and attempting to confront those issues which exercised Gandhi's mind so memorably. There is in fact a real sense in which Gandhi could be said to be, in some respects, a sort of patron saint to all sincerely committed South African liberals; and there is a very real sense in which nearly all liberals must feel hopelessly unworthy of their patron.

It is the challenge of Gandhi that I am going to write about. In doing so I am, I believe, bringing to the surface one of the undertones of Mrs Meer's admirable biography.

STATUS

Why should Gandhi be accorded the status that I have bestowed upon him? . . . For three main reasons. First, he had an intense awareness — both religious and legal — of man's worth and dignity, and was therefore deeply appalled by discrimination springing from racial prejudice. Second, he was incapable of harbouring a deep feeling without in the end bringing his actions, his very way-of-life, into conformity with that feeling. Third, he had an unusually strong sense of human solidarity; indeed his feeling for the com-

munity as a whole was so necessary an extension and completion of his personal integrity that he could never have been content with any purely private moral achievement, any merely inward resolution of problems: he was an artist of society — a man of imagination, a religious leader, a political innovator, a moral and psychological explorer, a subtle lawyer — and he had to propagate his vision and make it a reality.

It is unnecessary, and it would be embarrassing, to examine in detail the ways in which almost all humane South Africans — in fact almost all humane people everywhere — fall short of Gandhi's truth-force or satyagraha (the word must be given a personal as well as a social meaning, for the truths that Gandhi was dedicated to had to penetrate and transform his own life before they could exert an impact upon society) Suffice it to say that if most liberals fail miserably in moving crisply from the first to the second of the points that were enumerated in the previous paragraph, their failure to find any way of progressing from the second point to the third is shameful and somewhat alarming.

Of course one must not gloss over the difficulties raised by a comparison between Gandhi's problems and those of a South African liberal. All black and brown people in South Africa suffer from a lack of political and financial power, and the whites who oppress them are no mere sprinkling of expatriate administrators; and white liberals find themselves a small minority in a racial group that is in many respects possessive, self-righteous, frightened and pugnacious (nor, needless to say, are most of them wholly free of these vices themselves). Gandhi has not left many very noticeable marks upon South Africa, where the Indians that he was organizing were a minority and the politicians that he dealt with were often ruthless. In India on the other hand, which has been completely transformed largely as a result of his efforts, he had in the end an overwhelming majority of the population behind him and the rulers that he confronted were often gentlemanly — partly, no doubt, because they had a motherland to return to. (Whether if he had stayed in

South Africa Gandhi might have managed to weld all its oppressed peoples and its liberals into a politically potent unity is a question of considerable fascination, but it is perhaps hardly relevant to the present discussion.)

TRAITS OF PERSONALITY

It is important to recognize also that Gandhi's originality and power depended to some extent upon traits of personality that most liberally-minded people of the twentieth century find unacceptable. Mrs Meer writes about these traits with commendable objectivity and yet with sympathy too, for she realises that the internal pressures that trouble a great man are often fierce and sometimes tragic. Gandhi's allegiance to the truth — the truths that he saw — was frequently so intense that he was capable of being intolerant, fanatical, almost obsessed; and he was of course profoundly ascetic. His relations with his wife Kastur and his children and the rest of his family were often strained, especially in the years when he was constructing his convictions and his conduct, before his way-of-life had become awesome, almost legendary. Here, for example, is Mrs Meer's account of Gandhi's first departure from South Africa, just after the Anglo-Boer War:

Farewell receptions followed. Mohan's (Gandhi's) service to the country was praised, his departure lamented, and he was showered with many illuminated addresses and valuable gifts — a gold medal from the Tamil Indians, a gold chain from Johannesburg, a silver cup and plate from the Kathiawad Hindus of Stanger, more gold chains, gold coins, a diamond tie pin, a gold watch from the Seths — Dada Abdulla, Parsi Rustumjee, Hajee Joosub, Abdul Cadir.

Kastur's eyes sparkled. She fondled the trinkets and imagined herself wearing them. She was young, she had a husband and it was her right to look resplendent. Yet Mohan, who had shorn her of her wedding jewellery when he had gone to study in England had not since bought her even a bangle, though he had earned as much as six thousand pounds in one year. She dreamed of the day when she would bear these very jewels, or perhaps just their gold reshaped according to the fashion of the time, as gifts for her daughters-in-law. But Mohan saw only covetousness in her eyes and forbade her to possess the jewels. They did not belong to her, not even to him. They were the rewards of the community for the sacrifices that the community had made, and they would be returned to the community. Kastur pleaded and shed great tears, but Mohan arrayed his sons against her and put her to shame. The jewels were placed in trust for the community and the family departed with no greater ostentation than that with which it had arrived. Later, Mohan, with the aura of Mahatma, was to persuade his daughters-in-law to exchange the jewels they had brought from their parents' homes for threads of cotton that he had spun himself, to put around their necks and wrists. (pages 52-53).

There is something magnificent about Gandhi's stern passion in this episode, his burning single-mindedness; but how can one wholly approve? The immoderateness of his condemnation of his wife runs counter to many of our firmest intuitions. He was not always so overbearing, of course; at some moments we see him deeply torn by conflicting loyalties. But certainly most liberally-minded people will not wish to imitate all of the details of Gandhi's moral programme: partly from a broad-minded awareness of life's many possibilities partly no doubt from a certain timidity, they are not on the whole prepared — even, often, those who are suffering bitterly from the injustices of the South African régime — to throw all their energy into one stream of dedication and activity (though it must be stressed that within his main areas of concern Gandhi found a fairly wide range of interests).

COMMUNAL ACTION

And yet, as every sane and honest man knows in his heart of hearts, injustice and prejudice cannot be tolerated. And it is not enough to tell oneself that at least one's own attitudes are correct (they probably aren't anyway), or that one is at least "doing one's little bit" (it probably amounts to precious little): some kind of communal action, ultimately some movement of society, must be envisaged.

Gandhi's puritanical and fanatical zeal does not seem fully appropriate, and South African circumstances, as I have said are very different from those of India in the twenties and thirties. What then of the largely spontaneous, free-wheeling, predominantly young people's protests that have at times been so effective in America and Europe in the last five years? Something of this kind could perhaps prove valuable in South Africa, and indeed we have had a few restrained examples of it among students. But again the circumstances seem not to be wholly propitious: society is far less free here than in the western world, the men in power are considerably more jittery and vindictive; the number of people prepared to flow into the streets seems small. Besides, one can't help wondering whether communal romantic self-assertion and self-expression (in which the boundary-line between valid activity and deluded "activism" is not always easy to draw) would be sufficiently resilient in the face of a powerful and fairly unscrupulous government.

But, still, something must be attempted. Nor can liberals continue to content themselves with protests of a largely formal nature, useful and necessary as these are. They must try to push the life of society forward. And their duty to do this is particularly pressing at a time when white opinion — the body of opinion which is at the moment all-important in the country's social and political life — is showing some signs of unwonted fluidity.

But what can be done?

OUR OWN DISCOVERY

One thing is certain: the decision, the discovery, must be our own. We cannot take over the ideas and techniques of any great innovator, whether he be Gandhi or Che Guevara or Rudi Dutschke. What we can do, however, is learn a few fundamental attitudes and approaches. And nobody can teach us these better than Gandhi.

The first is — to reiterate a point that I have made already — complete moral seriousness and honesty. However we react to Gandhi's asceticism, we must be able to feel sincere pain at the inequities of the society in which we find ourselves — to share some of the pain of society's victims. This is of course particularly a problem for privileged and affluent people, for (mainly) South African whites. At one time Gandhi was comparatively well-off:

...The spectre of those who had less than he, haunted him; and he began to question his moral right to his high standard of living. He began to shed comforts. His laundryman was the first to go, but his dismissal too brought him little solace, for he began to suspect his motive. Was it because the laundryman had failed to keep him in daily supply with crisp white shirts despite his large wardrobe? Next, he dispensed with the barber. His appearance at court in a ragged crop of hair amused his colleagues, but he laughed it away, and joked that the white barber had refused to attend to him. (page 49).

The dilemma is half-comic, like one that one might sometimes come upon in a Tolstoy novel. But it is the dilemma of an alert, compassionate and self-critical nature. A person who scoffs at such scruples has a blunted sense of the relationship between an individual and his human environment. Like some of the greatest artists and saints, Gandhi was constantly aiming at a fuller self-knowledge; he was always ready (according to his special lights) to make fresh starts, to conduct inner revolutions.

WATCH AND WAIT

The second attitude that I would single out is one that might at first appear to be almost the opposite of urgent moral seriousness: it is a willingness to watch and to wait, to allow thoughts and intuitions to coalesce and to form new and unexpected combinations. In Gandhi the ability to do this was linked with his religious feeling, his sense of a mysterious providence:

... He reached Benares, where millions came to seek God. He followed his guide through stench and swarming flies and the calls of a thousand vendors, and entered the sanctum where others sought God in the midst of rotting flowers. He found no God. He saw the temple of Kali in Calcutta where the blood of slaughtered lambs flowed before the Goddess, and thought of the golden pagoda in Burma defiled by rats, and he wondered, as he had as a child, where God was to be found in all this.

He went to Bengal and Bellurmath to search out the personalities behind the names which received nation-wide praise. He saw some splendid ashrams and wondered at their ostentation. He heard Bengali music, and its melodies accompanied him for the rest of his life.

He turned away and gave himself up to time, convinced that he would realise what he sought not by pursuing, but by waiting and holding himself in readiness for the moment when he would be called upon to give. (page 55).

The passage brings out movingly the grandeur of Gandhi's quest, the largeness of his apprehension.

The third attitude that strikes me as significant — this, once again, might at first seem a negation of what I have just said — is a willingness and ability to employ sheer intelligence, even a kind of cunning (though Gandhi was never deceptive). Having crystallized his beliefs and aims, he was prepared to use a variety of techniques to bring about or to promote the changes that seemed to him necessary. He observed people, he observed himself, he observed the social and political situation; he knew the state of the law, he usually knew — often quite intuitively — the precise implications and results of certain actions. He was realistic: generally he knew what could be done and what could not, when to be tough and when to be conciliatory.

SUGGESTIONS

Perhaps it would be wrong to conclude this article without throwing out a few more pointed suggestions. Whether what I shall say is in any sense in the spirit of Gandhi I must leave my readers to decide; my aim, in fact, is to be relevant rather than to be Gandhian — and of that aim, at least, one supposes Gandhi might have approved.

I should like to put forward four brief propositions:

1. Many forms of protest and demonstration are legal and feasible in South Africa — especially for whites (but non-racial demonstrations, where they are possible, are of course very important).
2. White public opinion — economically unhappy, morally unconfident, embarrassed by the spotlight of the world's scrutiny — is unusually malleable at the moment.
3. A demonstration or act of communal dedication which was obviously sincere (involving perhaps some real self-sacrifice), clearly meaningful and inherently interesting would be likely to draw the attention of the English language press and thus make some general impact.

4. The reproduction of such demonstrations in various parts of the country could become a political and social event of considerable importance.

Clearly I must try to give some specific examples. I offer two; both are hypothetical.

A group of white people might get together and all decide to live for a year on the wages paid to African manual workers. It is unlikely that such an action would be allowed to go unnoticed.

Or perhaps one might consider something less as-

cetic and less ambitious, indeed something disarmingly simple. It might be possible to persuade the press to publish photographs of (perfectly genuine and perfectly legal) non-racial parties: it might do some people some good to know about these things.

Maybe "demonstration" is essentially a matter of having something to show, and showing it. Indeed that may be — even in the case of the smallest manifestations — the basic meaning of satyagraha, truth-force, to be in possession of some part of human truth, and to find a way of giving that truth its radical force.

A Terrorist Speaks

(From an address to the court by a South West African man convicted of terrorism.)

My Lord, we find ourselves here in a foreign country, convicted under laws made by people whom we have always considered as foreigners. We find ourselves tried by a judge who is not our countryman and who has not shared our background

We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now, and will not in the future recognise your right to govern us; to make laws for us in which we had no say; to treat our country as if it were your property, and us as if you were our masters

The South African Government has again shown its strength by detaining us as long as it pleased; keeping us in solitary confinement for 300 to 400 days and bringing us to its Capital to try us. It has shown its strength by passing an Act especially for us and having it made retrospective. It has even chosen an ugly name to call us by. One's own are called patriots; or at least rebels; your opponents are called terrorists . . .

I do not claim that it is easy for men of different races to live at peace with one another. I myself had no experience of it in my youth, and at first it surprised me that men of different races could live together in peace. But now I know it to be true and to be something for which we must strive. The South African government creates hostility by separating people and emphasising their differences. We believe that by living together, people will learn to lose their fear of

each other. We also believe that this fear which some of the Whites have of Africans is based on their desire to be superior and privileged and that when Whites see themselves as part of South West Africa, sharing with us all its hopes and troubles, then that fear will disappear. Separation is said to be a natural process, but why then is it imposed by force, and why is it then that Whites have the superiority?

We believe that South Africa has a choice either to live at peace with us or to subdue us. If you choose to crush us and impose your will on us, then you not only betray your trust, but you will live in security only for so long as your power is greater than ours. No South African will live at peace in South West Africa, for each will know that his security is based on force and that without force he will face rejection by the people of South West Africa.

My co-accused and I have suffered. We are not looking forward to our imprisonment. We do not, however, feel that our efforts and sacrifice have been wasted. We believe that human suffering has its effect even on those who impose it. We hope that what has happened will persuade the Whites of South Africa that we and the world may be right and they may be wrong. Only when White South Africans realise this and act upon it, will it be possible for us to stop our struggle for freedom and justice in the land of our birth. (quoted by Joel Carlson in the fifth Edgar Brookes Academic Freedom lecture at the University of Natal).

The Editorial Board of Reality apologises to NUSAS for omitting to state that Mr. Dennis Healey's Day of Affirmation Speech which appeared in our January number was delivered under the auspices of N.U.S.A.S.

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