

WORK IN

WIP 83 • JULY/AUGUST 1992

PROGRESS

incorporating

NEW ERA

**UNCLE SAM
COMES SOUTH**

**CONFUSING
CUBA**

**IS DE KLERK
IN FULL
CONTROL?**

Reconstruct supplement

- Civics spread across OFS
- Democracy in Jouberton
- State land manoeuvres

BANTU HOLOMISA speaks personally



Season of fire FIGHTING THE VIOLENCE



9 771019 626000

R3.95

JULY — AUGUST 1992 NO 83

Published by the Southern African
Research Service (SARS)
P O Box 32716
Braamfontein 2017

2nd Floor
Auckland House
Cnr Smit and Biccard Streets
Braamfontein
Johannesburg 2001

Phone: (011) 403-1912
Fax: (011) 403-2534

Cape Town Office
P O Box 13309
Mowbray 7705

Phone: (021) 448-3727
Fax: (021) 448-5451

Managing Editor
DEVAN PILLAY
Assistant Editor
(Cape Town office)
HEIN MARAIS
Production Editor
MICHAEL HERMAN
Writer
KERRY CULLINAN
Research Assistant
MOSITO RAPHELA

Marketing and Advertising
HECTOR MBAU
Office Manager and Subscriptions
KHOSE MVABAZA
Administrator
SIBONGILE THOMBENI
Sales and Distribution
KENOSI SENGATI
LAWRENCE NTSAMAI

Proofreading
Ruth Nowosenetz
Cover Graphic
Manic Designs
Cover Picture
Dynamic Images
Technical Assistance
Desklink Systems
Reproduction
Central Graphics
Printing
Sprint Marketing & Print c.c.

Editorial

THE BOIPATONG MASSACRE, in itself nothing particularly new, has sparked off a reaction which is long overdue. The people of various Natal communities, Sebokeng, Alexandra, Swantekwane and numerous other places have experienced similar trauma — but not near as much attention.

Why has Boipatong galvanised the liberation movement into taking decisive action at last? There are a number of reasons. As is argued in this issue, the illusion that peace and democracy would come about purely through negotiations has been shattered.

The ANC leadership seems to have realised finally that only a range of mass pressure, stopping short of violent struggle, will ensure that the chief perpetrators of violence — the shadowy white officers within the security establishment — are brought to book, and that the government gives in to democratic demands.

But this is not enough. The security forces must be reconstituted, and brought under effective neutral control, if the violence is to stop (although other measures are needed to combat the more enduring causes of violence). A transition to democracy is otherwise meaningless.

Boipatong also follows two damning reports by Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists, which point to security force complicity in much of the violence. This, and the fact that the 16 June rallies were peaceful, and there was no retaliation for the Boipatong massacre, did not allow the issues to be obscured.

The government has always blamed the violence on Inkatha/ANC 'faction-fighting', and the ANC's (and never Inkatha's) 'mass action', in an attempt to deflect attention from covert security force involvement. With a few exceptions, the press and other observers fell for this neat trick. This time round it did not work.

The Boipatong massacre was too horrifying, and the evidence too blatant, for the government's usual obfuscations to wash. Prime-time SABC-TV news footage of police shooting unarmed, fleeing Boipatong residents after De Klerk was chased out of the township, shocked the nation out of its complacency.

But has the ANC finally developed a coherent strategy against a government that is negotiating in bad faith? This remains to be seen. Massacre victims and the country as a whole, including lower-level ANC leaders, no longer want contradictory signals from the ANC national leadership.

It must no longer be that, on page one of the newspaper you read about the ANC declaring a national crisis, and, on page two, ANC leaders are welcoming sports tours to this country, or jetting off to meet the IMF, as if democratic government were around the corner.

Until now the ANC has given the impression of crying wolf — there is a crisis, but it is not that serious; the government has a double agenda, but they will agree to democracy anyway.

The Codesa deadlock was a blessing in disguise. If there had been agreement on an interim government without effective measures to neutralise the security forces, and end the bulk of the violence, the ANC would have seriously hampered its chances of attaining the power necessary to transform this country into a true democracy.

Only concerted mass pressure, buttressed by international isolation, will force this government to concede to the demand for democracy. □

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL	inside cover
LETTERS	2
BRIEFS	3
WIP/New Era launch; agitated exiles in PE; union unity; ANC economic policy.	
SOUTHERN AFRICA	5
Uncle Sam moves south, while Namibia remains buckled by its colonial past.	
CARTOON	6
RECONSTRUCT	centre pages
<i>Kerry Cullinan</i> visits civics in the OFS; discovers democracy in Jouberton; and looks at clashes in Zevenfontein.	
SPEAKING PERSONALLY	23
Bantu Holomisa talks about dictatorship, rugby and Pavarotti.	
GENDER	25
<i>Tammy Shefer</i> looks at gender forums, popular education and a college for women.	
<i>Mikki van Zyl</i> takes the domestic work dilemma by the horns.	
DEBATE: SACP	29
<i>The SACP's Blade Nzimande</i> reasserts the continuing relevance of Marxism-Leninism, and <i>Devan Pillay</i> sees ghosts of the past continuing to haunt the party.	
INTERNATIONAL	32
Uruguayan author <i>Eduardo Galeano</i> and <i>Hein Marais</i> follow the Bush trail to Cuba and Libya.	
<i>Daniel Singer</i> writes about the stink of money in Europe.	
REVIEW	42
<i>Mamphele Ramphele</i> reviews Gordon Naidoo's <i>Reform and Revolution</i> .	
LEFT BEHIND	40
GLOSSARY	inside back

Special focus on violence

7 MASS ACTION OR MASS STRUGGLE?

Is the ANC serious about mass struggle?
Devan Pillay wonders aloud

10 THICK AS THIEVES?

Rockland Williams investigates DeKlerk and the security establishment

14 SWEEPING INFERNO

From where comes this fury and blood? *Hein Marais* surveys the thinking, and *Marks Raphela* reports from Alexandra

18 DEADLY DEVELOPMENT

Development in Natal can be a deadly business, reports *Lena Slachmijlder* from Umlazi, while *Sipho Gcabashe* and *Rohan Persad* look at strategies to resolve the problems



Warning from El Salvador

The previous issue of *WIP* contained three informative articles on El Salvador.

South Africa has much to learn from El Salvador's 'negotiated revolution'. However, the January peace accord signed between the government of El Salvador and leaders of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) contained one failure which we cannot afford here: the FMLN will not be integrated into the army.

Under the accords the FMLN is to demobilize its forces, estimated at between 6,000 and 8,000 by 31 October. In turn the 63,000 member government army will be halved, the army's role will be limited to the defense of national sovereignty. Special Forces will be abolished and some officers linked to human rights abuses will be sacked.

In negotiations the FMLN first proposed total demilitarisation on the Costa Rica model (Costa Rica abolished its army in 1949). The second line of the FMLN negotiating position was to integrate the two armies: if not entirely then at least to include some FMLN officers in the new army. While the January accords are unparalleled, the FMLN has lost on the issue of integration of the army. Integration will only take place in the soon-to-be-formed National Civil Police. "The National Civil Police shall be a new force with a new organization, new officers, new education and training mechanisms and a new doctrine".

In April, in a meeting in New York with El Salvador's ambassador to the United Nations, the FMLN made a compelling case that the armed forces were blocking compliance with the January accords. This sounds very familiar to us here. In South Africa both the police and defence forces must be totally reconstituted. MK must be integrated into a new, representative and legitimate South African army that is subordinated to civilian control. The social problems of returned MK cadres means this process of integration is a matter of urgency.

In addition, the problem of MK banditry underlines the need for a GI Bill of

Rights type of arrangement to give returning MK soldiers access to jobs, housing and education. While such arrangements to facilitate social integration of individual soldiers are common after periods of war, no such provision was made

in the El Salvador peace accords. We in South Africa must learn from these failures.

Jacklyn Cock
Wits University

Challenge

A New Ecumenical Magazine of Church and People

*Published in Southern Africa by Contextual Publications
(an initiative of the Institute for Contextual Theology)*

- news, views, comment, reflections on current issues
- contextual bible studies, liturgy, theology, spirituality

Editor: Albert Nolan

Editorial Board: F. Chikane, J. Cochrane, T. Farisani, K. Mgojo, S. Mkhathwa, K. Mofokeng, M. Mpumlwana, B. Naudé, B. Ncube, C. Villa-Vicencio

Subscription Rates (10 issues p.a.): South Africa-R22.00; Neighbouring Countries-R25.00; Africa, Asia, Latin America-US\$20.00; Europe, North America, Australia-US\$50.00

Contributions and Subscriptions:
Challenge, P.O. Box 32047, Braamfontein, 2017

DeskLink Systems
Desktop Publishing Solutions

New Technology for Changing Times

This
issue of
Work in Progress
was produced in-house
at SARS using **DESKTOP**
PUBLISHING technology on a
personal computer with **MS-Windows**
Aldus PageMaker 4.0 & Corel Draw 2.1.

Training, Installations, Support, Design & Layout
TEL (011) 402-3808 FAX (011) 402-0174



Launch edition well received

THE LAUNCH edition of *Work In Progress/New Era*, which featured an interview with former MK chief-of-staff Chris Hani, received tremendous publicity after it hit the streets in May.

Virtually every daily newspaper carried a front-page story about the interview, where Hani admitted that serious excesses were committed by ANC security personnel in the organisation's camps in exile.

At the ANC's national policy conference, some delegates were overheard saying that Hani had "gone too far", while others expressed delight at the courage of *WIP/New Era* in opening up such an important issue.

The merged publication was officially launched at a function addressed by *Sunday Times* editor Ken Owen, the ANC's Pallo Jordan and Moeletsi Mbeki of Cosatu.

Mbeki said he hoped that

WIP/New Era would resist 'market pressure' to fundamentally alter its character. The magazine should try and

has always admired it as a source of valuable information and ideas. Alternative publications, he said, have "infinite

value for society, because they give a voice to those that otherwise would be crushed — by the *Sunday Times*."

Jordan said he hoped that *WIP/New Era* would continue to resist attempts to stifle its voice, including "bullying and cajoling from Nelson Mandela, myself or others in the ANC".

The merger has meant that the magazine now has a Cape Town office, which will help ensure that *WIP/New Era* establishes a greater national profile.

With improved distribution and subscription services, the magazine hopes to dramatically increase its sales and advertising revenue in the coming months. □

— Devan Pillay



succeed in the market-place, but still remain a critical voice of the left, he said.

Owen informed the audience that he has been a long-standing reader of *WIP*, and

THERE WERE echoes from the past in Port Elizabeth recently when 200 protesting ANC returnees were accused of being misled by 'enemy provocateurs' and 'agitators'.

The accusation came from the ANC regional chairperson, Linda Mti, after the returnees had staged a sit-in at the ANC offices on 5 June. They were protesting the failure of the ANC to pay them each a promised R2,500 resettlement grant.

According to Mti, the returnees had misunderstood the process, whereby the ANC had stopped giving grants to members after the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) started operating in the country".

"The unfortunate misun-

Voices from the past

derstanding has, however, been hijacked by disgruntled elements within our ranks, spearheaded by enemy provocateurs that had infiltrated our organisation abroad, including four members of the SADF that had to know who the agitators were," he said.

Many of the group are members of Umkhonto we Sizwe. One of them responded to the allegation: "We regard ourselves as genuine members of the ANC (and) we expect that the leaders of the ANC should address our issues properly."

A spokesperson for the group, Richard Mothibe, said that the returnees had received no money since returning to SA — although the ANC had promised them grants and repatriation funds.

He said he had discussed the matter with ANC president Nelson Mandela on 1 June, and had received assurances that each returnee would receive R2,500. The group then set 5 June as a deadline for payment.

When they arrived at the ANC offices, however, they were told the funds were no longer available. Protest actions followed. □

— Hein Marais (with reports by Ecna)

Union unity moves slow down

THE LONG-AWAITED workers summit between Cosatu and Nactu, scheduled for the end of May, was postponed because more time was needed to draw in other federations and unions, says Cosatu spokesperson Neil Coleman. However, "sectoral discussions" amongst affiliates are taking place, in keeping with the view that union unity should be a "bottom up" process, he says.

Despite political differences between the PAC/Azapo-aligned Nactu, and the ANC-aligned Cosatu, Coleman feels that there are enough issues of common interest between the two federations to keep hopes of eventual unity alive. These include demands around food prices, VAT, labour legislation, and a constituent assembly.

Some Nactu affiliates, however, feel that the political differences are major obstacles to unity. Nactu's largest affiliate, the South African Chemical Workers' Union (Sacwu), for example, wants the two federations to dissolve before a new, non-aligned federation is formed.

Sacwu's newly elected general secretary, Madibola Molefe, feels that although the struggle of the workers is not divorced from the national struggle, workers should be able to voice the grievances of the working class. An alignment to political formations compromises this role, he says.

Coleman feels that objections about political alignments

are "red herrings". Cosatu could not be expected, as a condition for unity talks, to dissociate itself from its political alliances, he argues. Such issues should be a matter for discussion during the process of building one federation.

Cosatu is quite prepared to dissolve as a federation if necessary, says Coleman, if that would facilitate the process of unity. But such a step should be taken after agreement on unity had been reached, not before substantive talks have even begun.

Coleman stresses that the process of unity is not a once-off event, but a long process that may take many more months. Sacwu's objections, he feels, are part of Nactu's "internal problems" and should not be allowed to derail the process.

But unity at sectoral level may not come that easily. Sacwu, which claims to have 45,000 members, is concerned about the "poaching" activities of its Cosatu-affiliated rival, the smaller Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU). Molefe refers to the remark of Muzi Buthelezi, acting general secretary of CWIU, that "if our desire for unity and cooperation gets nowhere, there might be no other option (but to poach members from Sacwu)." (*SA Labour Bulletin* Vol 16, No 4).

Whether a workers' summit takes place in the immediate future or not, greater cooperation between the federations, especially around issues such as the workers' charter campaign, is likely. But the goal of a trade union federation that incorporates all the country's unions, it seems, is still a long way off. □

— Devan Pillay (with additional reporting by Mbulelo Mdledle)

ANC resists 'moderate' economic policy

FORGING A new economic policy which is sensible yet meaningful has not been easy for the ANC. It has taken many months and many workshops to come up with a document which is acceptable to the membership and the wider public.

Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Cyril Ramaphosa, spent much time in the economics commission.

Nationalisation was perhaps the most thorny issue. Yet it survived in the final document and the tradition established in the Freedom Char-

elimination of poverty, overcoming inequalities, providing jobs and a living wage.

Also important was the emphasis on the importance of "the development state", and the insertion of the requirement that economic policy should be carried out in consultation with organs of civil society in a way that empowers them. Special reference was made to unpaid labour, especially that of women.

Foreign investment proved a difficult issue. What emerged finally is that foreign investment will be welcome, but investors will have to conform with national norms. In other words, they will not be able to plead for cheap labour concessions, nor engage in practices which will not serve the interests of the people.

Similarly, foreign financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank must respect the integrity of domestic policy formulation and policies which aim at enhancing national self-sufficiency and reducing dependency.

There was no disagreement on a strong policy to counter the concentration of economic power in the hands of trusts and monopolies. This is not in conflict with the requirement of a dynamic private sector which includes small business, the informal sector, cooperatives and other forms of ownership which will expand the economy and empower the people as a whole.

All in all, this a document which carries the stamp of the will of the membership, and is therefore a valuable weapon in the struggle for genuine democracy in the coming period. □

— Ben Turok



Relieved: The economic policy document reflects the membership's will.

There are several reasons for the difficulty. One is that the Freedom Charter set out a radical position on public ownership of the 'commanding heights' of the economy, and this is not attainable in the present phase of negotiated transition. Second, the movement is undergoing enormous pressure from institutions, business and the press to adopt a 'moderate' economic policy. Third, some members of the movement are perhaps too sensitive to this pressure and resort to technocratic solutions.

This emerged in the various stages of consultation before and at the policy conference. The sensitive nature of economic policy is such that top ANC leaders, including

ter remains in place. An issue that did not survive was privatisation, which is unacceptable to Cosatu. Nevertheless, the formula adopted of increasing or reducing the public sector according to practical requirements, is sound.

Another major change from early drafts is the introduction of the concept of development throughout the document, which previously focused only on growth. Once this amendment was made, the policy took on a broader character, giving the necessary emphasis to the needs of the people to play an active part in the economic transformation. The opening section also included concrete objectives such as the provision of basic needs, the

NAMIBIA

Ties that bind

WITH TWO years of independence under its belt, Namibia remains buckled by its colonial past.

The Swapo government has decided to honour the debt burden incurred during SA's occupation of the country. The debt totals R827 million, R697 million of which is owed to South African banks. The move follows fears that repudiation of the debt would have triggered "a loss of credibility

and confidence with the international community", according to finance minister Otto Herrigel.

Pleased with the display of "realism" by its former foe, Pretoria has rescheduled its portion of the debt over 17 years. Repayment will start in April 1995 and will annually remove R78.5 million from the state coffers.

Meanwhile, new statistics show that half of Namibia's 550,000 economically active citizens are unemployed. Hardest hit are the youth. A recent government survey of jobless

young men in Windhoek found that one third of them have never found jobs, while a further 37% occasionally manage to land jobs that pay R5 or less per week. Prime minister Hage Geingob calls it the nation's "nagging plague".

The situation is even worse in Ovamboland where there are some 6,000 formal jobs for a population of 600,000.

The government has set up training centres in rural areas to improve self-employment prospects and block the flow of people into urban areas. There are now an esti-

mated 110,000 squatters in the country. In February, authorities sparked an outcry when they levelled one settlement in Windhoek.

But, as the *Times of Namibia* recently pointed out, the crisis is unlikely to ease until the government redresses apartheid's legacy that left 74% of the arable land in the hands of some 4,000, mainly white, commercial farmers. □

—Hein Marais

BOTSWANA

As the eagle flies

BOTSWANA IS being groomed as a forward staging base for the US in the region.

Warning lights went off earlier in the year when Gaborone announced plans to build a R1,000 million air base development at three sites, the main one at Molopole near the South African border. Reports of US involvement have drawn fervent denials from Washington, but the speculation is justified: with armed forces totalling 7,000 personnel and a minute air force, what does Botswana want with a massive, state-of-the-art air-base?

Now comes news that some 45 officers from the Botswana Defence Force are being trained in the US. And the 'Voice of America' has installed a new transmitter in the country, replacing the one destroyed last year in Liberia. In January, 200 elite US airborne troops staged joint exercises, code-named Operation Silver Eagle, with the Botswana Defence Force near Gaborone.

These links are underpinned by a strategic vision in

Washington, where the end of the Cold War has seen a renewed emphasis on projecting US strategic power into Third World 'trouble-spots'.

The implications are ominous for countries of the south intent on pursuing independent policies. Last year, Nato top-rankers advised that its forces be readied to respond to 'destabilising' situations created by nationalist forces in the Third World. Shortly after New Year 1992, a Pentagon planning document recommended that one third of the US nuclear arsenal be retargeted on Third World 'flash-points'.

The new base, which is reportedly being built by a French company and SA's LTA, will cost the equivalent of one fifth of Botswana's 1991 gross national product. Leasing the facilities to the US seems one obvious way to recoup some of the cost.

Molopole will likely replace Zaire's Kamina base as the US launchpad of choice in Southern Africa. It will be located 300 kms from Johannesburg as the eagle flies, putting



ZAMBIA

Military to be revamped on US lines?

THE ZAMBIAN defence forces have been allocated a staggering nine percent of the gross national product (GNP) in the 1992 budget.

Defence Minister Ben Mwila has been sharply criticised for requesting such a large amount when Zambia is not facing the threat of war, and when the country's financial

position is so precarious. The government has recently embarked on restructuring measures aimed at bringing professionalism and self-sufficiency to the army, which, in the past, has been divorced from the development process.

Following President Frederick Chiluba's first official visit to the USA in February, Zambia has signed a military agreement with that country for the training of military personnel in technical and professional fields.

US Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the European Command, General James McCarthy, and Command Surgeon, General Vernon Chong, were in Zambia recently to formalise the signing of the agreement, which has heralded a new phase in military relations with the West. □

— Researched and compiled by Hein Marais

— Moses Chitendwe (AIA)

The world of Babes Makida

THIS MASS
ACTION IS A
GREAT IDEA!



BUT WE CAN'T
JUST TURN IT
ON AND OFF



LIKE HOT AND
COLD WATER!



FIRST WE
NEED RESOURCES



HONEY! WHERE'S
MY STRUGGLE
T-SHIRT?



THEN WE NEED
PLANNING



YES? YOU WANT
TO TAKE OVER
PARLIAMENT
THIS AFTERNOON?



I'M SORRY, THE
COMRADE LEADER
IS FULLY BOOKED
TODAY



I CAN PENCIL YOU
IN FOR TUESDAY
NEXT WEEK, AT
3:15... PLEASE FAX
TO CONFIRM.




BUT BABES! WHAT
IF THE GOVERN-
MENT REACTS BY
USING PLAN B?

ER... WHAT
IS PLAN B?



CALL UP WHITE
RESERVES! PASS
NEW DETENTION
LAWS! SEND
TROOPS TO THE
TOWNSHIPS!



MASSACRE OUR
PEOPLE! AND
ASSASSINATE OUR
COMRADES!



OH, ER... WHAT
IS THE DIFFERENCE
FROM PLAN A?



FIGHTING THE VIOLENCE

Mass action or mass struggle?

*Is the ANC's turn to 'mass action' merely a tactical move, whereby the masses are turned on and off like a tap? **DEVAN PILLAY** looks at the issues, and argues that the demand for effective neutral control over the security forces should be at the centre of ongoing mass struggle*

THE ANC'S DRAMATIC RETURN TO 'MASS action' after Codesa 2 failed to reach agreement, was given added meaning after the massacre at the Vaal township of Boipatong. At least 48 people were savagely murdered by a marauding band of 'Zulu-speaking' men, believed to be from the infamous Inkatha-controlled KwaMadala hostel, with the alleged collusion of security forces. The gunning down of fleeing Boipatong residents by police a few days later, after president FW de Klerk was chased out of the area by residents, added even more fuel to the fire.

These events occurred against a backdrop of hardening government attitudes since its March referendum victory. Since the ANC's call for mass action, the government has rushed repressive laws (which, amongst other things, allow for phone tapping) through parliament; it called up thousands of white men to the SADF days before 16 June; and, before the ANC programme was launched, the government warned that mass action would lead to violence. After the Boipatong massacre De Klerk hinted at a return to a state of emergency.

These moves fit well into the chilling strategic framework of the government, which was exposed in the July issue of the ANC journal *Mayibuye*. Relying on sources within the security establishment, and investigations by the ANC's own intelligence department, the ANC has revealed that, since February 1990,

the government has been implementing a two-pronged strategy to maintain the essence of power, namely Operation Thunderstorm and Operation Springbok.

Operation Thunderstorm, which sources claim was devised by the Department of Military Intelligence, has been aimed at wreaking havoc in the country, and blaming the ANC for it (while portraying the government as reasonable peacemakers). Its plan has been to weaken the ANC physically, and create such a climate of uncertainty that black people will accept anything if it would bring an end to violence.

The ANC would therefore be forced to accept Operation Springbok — an entrenched coalition with the NP and, if possible, other parties. Such a government would be unable to fundamentally alter the status quo.

'We want guns'

But the Boipatong massacre was a serious miscalculation on the part of those who are implementing Operation Thunderstorm. They overplayed their hand. This time the trail of blood had a clear origin (see Editorial).

When ANC president Nelson Mandela visited Boipatong after the massacre, he took time to listen to the anguished cries of residents. It was clear to them who the killers were, and who was behind the killers. It was a familiar story, heard in Sebokeng, Swanieville, Alexandra and numerous other places on the Reef and in

Natal. The residents pleaded for guns to defend themselves, and for the ANC to stop negotiating with an insincere regime.

The ANC responded quickly, and a few days later all negotiations with the government were suspended. Codesa, said the ANC, was history. Negotiations could only resume, on a different basis, if the government took decisive action to "end its campaign of terror against the people and the democratic movement".

While it is highly unlikely that the ANC will reactivate the armed struggle, or pull out of negotiations permanently, as the residents demanded, the organisation has committed itself to 'a rolling tide' of mass action that is meant to assume the proportions of East European demonstrations prior to the downfall of the communist regimes there.

But has the ANC merely yielded, temporarily, to pressure from below, or has the legalised ANC finally come to terms with the adage that, in the words of former UDF-Western Cape chairperson Dullah Omar, "no ruling class gives up power without a struggle — no ruling class voluntarily abdicates from power" (*Sowetan* 22/5/92).

Long before Codesa 2, Cosatu had been gearing up for a confrontation with the government, particularly over unilateral economic restructuring, and VAT. After the deadlock an Alliance Summit was held, and Cosatu's programme of action, directed against murder, corrup-

tion and the removal of the present government, was revised and adopted.

Cosatu initiative

It seems that Cosatu, more than the ANC and SACP, realised the dangers lurking ahead. Of course, Cosatu was not represented at Codesa, and perhaps that is what allowed it to see the wood for the trees.

The Codesa deadlock merely firmed the alliance's resolve to activate mass action, alongside negotiations, in the struggle for democracy.

This programme was discussed and adopted at the ANC's subsequent policy conference at the end of May. The understanding seemed to be that the turn to 'mass action' was not concentrated solely on the Codesa deadlock. It was conceived of as a continuous process alongside negotiations, regardless of whether or not the deadlock was broken. Mass struggle, which includes a general strike in August, is meant to continue until a constituent assembly is elected.

This understanding is a clear break from past practice, where negotiations took precedence over mass action. But is it a perspective that the ANC leadership will maintain?

Negotiations take centre stage

When Nelson Mandela was released after FW de Klerk unleashed his reform programme in February 1990, he declared his faith in the president as a 'man of integrity'. However, in the face of overwhelming evidence of security force involvement in violence, Mandela began to retreat from his positive assessment of De Klerk's character. The Codesa deadlock and the Boipatong massacre made him

retreat even further.

The ANC now wavers between accusing De Klerk and his government of direct responsibility for the violence, and a less direct but still culpable role. At best, says the ANC, De Klerk is prepared to turn a blind eye to, or not act with sufficient determination to halt, the murderous deeds of powerful elements within his security forces.

Since its dramatic ultimatum to the

be won through the power of the tongue alone.

The four main struggle weapons — international pressure, underground work, mass action and armed struggle — were all kept on hold, or reduced to levels of near ineffectiveness. Thus, the only leverage the ANC had was the vague threat to reactivate these pillars.

Beyond that, the ANC had only De Klerk's commitment to a democratic future; its assessment that, given the current balance of forces, politically and economically, De Klerk had no option but to complete his reform initiative; and the hope that international opinion would not allow De Klerk to derail the whole process and enact a convincing charade.

De Klerk, on the other hand, has kept his entire arsenal intact. He can call on his security forces to ensure 'law and order' in the event of a breakdown in negotiations; he has the power to usher in repressive laws; he has ultimate control over the SABC; and the majority of newspapers, when the chips are down, can be relied upon to support an 'anti-communist' crusade.

Control over security forces

It is true that the ANC made tremendous progress at Codesa. It won its two key demands: an elected constituent assembly, and an interim government. Or did it? The government's chief negotiator, Tertius Delport, in a Radio 702 talk show after the Boipatong massacre, reaffirmed that the NP wants an interim government, operating under an interim constitution drawn up by an unelected body (Codesa), to rule for "at least five years".

The ANC managed to see through government ploys (seemingly at the last minute), and there is now a Codesa deadlock. But what was not brought to the fore throughout this whole process was that, even if there had been agreement at Codesa, of what value would it have been if the two key pillars propping up the old order, the security apparatus and the media, remained intact?

Codesa agreements allow for 'multi-party control' over the security forces, and an independent communications authority to oversee the workings of the SABC.

While the latter could be an effective mechanism to ensure SABC neutrality,

WANTED FOR APARTHEID CRIMES



General Stoffel van der Westhuizen

Wanted for crimes against the people of South Africa

- Issued the directive ordering the elimination of the Cradock Four in 1985
- Head of the SADF's Hammer section – an elite hit-squad unit
- Head of the SADF's Military Intelligence section

SWEEP THE CROOKS AND ASSASSINS OUT OF POWER!



Targetting rogue officers: Not enough to derail covert operations.

government a year ago, when it suspended all talks with the government until certain demands were met, the ANC adopted the position that the only way to stop the violence was to remove De Klerk from power, through the creation of an interim government.

But, although the organisation theorised that mass struggle and negotiations are two sides of the same coin, in practice ANC strategy over the past year has been to pursue negotiations as a virtually exclusive terrain of struggle. ANC leaders genuinely believed that an interim government and constituent assembly could

BARCELONA RETHINK

executive control over the security forces, especially the police and army, does not mean much. As Rockland Williams argues in the next article, even De Klerk and his security ministers do not seem to have full control over the security forces.

Effective control lies in the hands of white officers whose power is derived from the very nature and composition of these forces. Evidence suggests that De Klerk is unable to assert his full authority over his own security forces. How much less can a multi-party committee?

Yet the only way to neutralise decisively the security force's capacity to destabilise the democratic process, is to bring it under effective neutral control as quickly as possible.

This demand, surely, should be at the centre of struggle.

It should include the amalgamation of existing armies, international monitoring and perhaps even control over these forces, and the immediate removal of all those officers known to be, or strongly suspected of being, behind the upsurge of violence over the past few years. These include SADF head Kat Liebenberg and head of Military Intelligence, General van der Westhuizen.

In its demands to government after it suspended negotiations, the ANC did not mention the control of security forces. Will an interim government be charged with this responsibility? If so, does this mean that the ANC is comfortable with what was agreed to at Codesa? Or is the organisation leaving this issue for future negotiations?

Either way, the ANC is not making this issue — the heart of the problem — the focus of mass struggle in the coming period. This may be a serious miscalculation. It assumes that the termination of covert operations, and the removal of known rogue officers and special forces — two of the demands presented to De Klerk — are sufficient to put an end to the regime's double agenda.

But what we know about the security forces may only be the tip of the iceberg. Measures that stop the activities of officers and units that we know are involved in wreaking havoc in the country, but whose scope does not include the brief to deal with a sophisticated strategy like Operation Thunderstorm, will be of little use. An intervention of much greater depth is

needed — urgently.

The longer Operation Thunderstorm is allowed to continue, the greater the damage to the country's social fabric. The demons that have been unleashed by this cold-blooded strategy might take years, even decades, to control and eliminate.

Can the ANC sustain mass struggle?

Nevertheless, the deadlock was a blessing in disguise. It has allowed the ANC and its alliance partners to sit back and say: Hang on, there is much more to this than the Codesa deadlock.

The question, however, still remains. Can the ANC, despite its turn to 'mass action', sustain a vision which sees struggle as an *essential* element in the fight for democracy?

This is unlikely if the ANC does not put control over the security forces at the centre of its campaigns. It is even less likely if it backs down on key demands it put to De Klerk after it suspended negotiations.

In addition to action against covert operations, rogue security officers and special forces, these demands include the control over and phasing out of hostels as havens for murderers; and the immediate repeal of all repressive legislation, including laws passed during the last session of parliament. The ANC also demanded an international commission of inquiry into, and international monitoring of, all acts of violence.

Whether negotiators in the ANC make a distinction between mass 'action' and mass 'struggle' may not be that important. The actions of workers on the streets, and of ANC members in their branches, may be the decisive factor.

If the momentum that is rapidly being established — including strikes, marches, and other forms of mass pressure — continues, then the ANC leadership will have no choice but to see the process through. Maybe the question ought to be: can 'the masses' ensure that, this time, their leaders do not retreat from the commitments they make?

If the ANC's alliance partners, particularly Cosatu, refuse to take a back seat, then it is likely that mass struggle and international isolation will once again assume centre stage in the fight for peace and democracy. □

On the eve of the Olympic Games, the Boipatong massacre and the Codesa deadlock might still trip up South African sport's trek to Barcelona.

A call by Transkei leader Bantu Holomisa in early June for South Africa's withdrawal from the Olympic's was later supported by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and the ANC's Steve Tshwete, a prime mover behind the lifting of the boycott.

This is a dramatic turn of events. At the ANC's national policy conference recently, delegates in the sports commission debated a possible withdrawal from the Games. But the final resolution tellingly contained no reference to Barcelona. However, discussion has flared in branches and regions, says Cameron Dugmore of the ANC's Western Cape regional executive.

ANC members have for a long time been unhappy or confused about SA's easy re-entry into international sport, as if the country were not experiencing a crisis, and the transition to democracy were irreversible. The ANC leadership's perspective that a return to international sport, at the initiative of the ANC, would enhance the organisation's image among white sportspeople, was never properly debated within ANC ranks. It was merely imposed from above.

At the time of going to press, the ANC was still consulting with sports bodies on the issue. But it is likely that, if the political impasse persists, the selective sports boycott will be reimposed.

The matter will be decided by the International Olympics Committee on 11 July.

— Hein Marais and Devan Pillay.

De Klerk and the security establishment

PARTNER OR HOSTAGE?

As the violence surges on, fingers point at a president acting in cahoots with his security forces. But it is not that simple, argues ROCKLAND WILLIAMS

THERE IS A 'THIRD FORCE' — OR MORE ACCURATELY, A VARIETY of 'third forces' — stoking the violence. And the De Klerk administration has done precious little to control the activities of the SA Defence Force (SADF), SA Police (SAP) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS).

It is no surprise, then, that doubts are increasing about the commitment of the De Klerk administration to the negotiating process. In fact, there is a hardening perception that De Klerk and elements of the security establishment are in cahoots, with a deliberate strategy to forestall democracy.



The real power?: Security chiefs Joep Joubert, Heinrich Pfeil, Eddie Webb and Jan Klopper.

But are things that simple? The answer comes in several parts. One needs to examine the balance of power inside the security establishment, its relations to various political factions and indeed to the De Klerk administration, and the efforts that have been made to subject it to executive discipline.

Conspiracy theories do not get us very far, even if some security operations are filled with intrigues and conspiracies (see Nico Basson's 'De Klerk's double agenda' in *WIP* 79).

Shifting alliances within the state

The current security establishment is neither uniform in its political direction nor united in its activities. Tensions and strategic differences exist within and between the various reaches of the state, the federal National Party, and the security

establishment. As a result new factions and alliances are constantly being forged inside and outside the security establishment. Some of these blocs are either existing or potential power bases for contending political and strategic interests.

Undoubtedly, the SADF is the most influential member of the security establishment. But not all sections of the SADF are inclined towards the strategy of internal destabilization evident in the townships. For a variety of reasons, the South African Air Force (particularly its present chief), the South African Navy (including significant sections of the Admiralty), the South African Medical Services and the South African Army's Conventional Forces (mainly Citizen Force), have generally confined themselves to a more conventional role — protecting the country against external aggression.

At the moment, the strategic and political direction of the SADF is being determined largely by a faction that holds key positions in its executive structures. Headed by the present Chief of the SADF, this faction also includes the chiefs (and their deputies) of the most influential seats of power within the executive.

Influential officers serving at present within this faction include Lt General G Meiring (C/Army); Maj General J Erasmus (Deputy/CSI); Lt General JJ Bischoff (CSO); Lt General C Van Der Westhuizen (CSI); Maj General 'Joep' Joubert (Deputy CSO), and Maj General Klopper (Deputy/Chief of the Army).


All of them are veteran counter-insurgency officers with extensive experience in military counter-insurgency structures of the National Security Management System, the SADF's Special Forces Division, and the SADF's formidable intelligence

'family'.

The fundamental difference between Chief of Staff Intelligence (Military Intelligence) and the other intelligence directorates of the SADF 'intelligence family' is that the former is concerned with the acquisition of strategic intelligence whilst the latter confine themselves to a large tactical intelligence brief.

The SADF's Special Forces consist of 1 Reconnaissance Regiment (Durban); 2 Reconnaissance Regiment (Voortrekkerhoogte); 4 Reconnaissance Regiment (Saldanha/Langebaan) and 5 Reconnaissance Regiment (Phalaborwa). Contentious units include 32 Battalion (Pomfrets) and 31 Battalion (Schmitsdrift).

The influence of this faction is not limited to purely



My ding-a-ling: De Klerk has shifted away from PW Botha's military-managerial style.

PIC. PAUL WEINBERG (SOUTHLIGHT)

'military matters' — it also weighs on the political process, mainly through its influence in the SADF Command Council (the supreme command authority in the SADF), the structures of Military Intelligence and Army Intelligence, and the SADF's elite units and Special Forces regiments (the four Reconnaissance Regiments plus 32 and 31 Battalions).

Politically, the loyalties of this faction incline towards the technocratic-managerial wing of the federal National Party (the Barend du Plessis and Magnus Malan camps). These officers fear that the ANC and its allies will use the negotiations process to wrest power from the state. To prevent this, they advocate a tightly 'managed' transition that will not compromise a set of basic strategic objectives.

This means, among other things, that the state deploys a combination of 'slush funding' and covert units to 'urge' the negotiations process in the desired direction. They also worry that De Klerk lacks the managerial ability and experience to oversee such a process.

The SAP Special Branch, for its part, tends to be more conservative and remains openly hostile to the democratic movement. (This is not surprising, given the social composition of its personnel, its history, and its long-standing role of countering the democratic movement.)

Although parts of its command structures appear to support De Klerk's reform strategy, most of its white members at the middle and executive officer ranks tend to support the Conservative Party, while its white non-commissioned officer/constable ranks support the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. It, too, influences the political process via a web of covert structures located mainly in the Criminal Intelligence Serv-

ices, and the Joint Security and Joint Intelligence Committees of the National Co-ordinating Mechanism.

NIS: an ambiguous position

The NIS has an ambiguous position in the security establishment. Largely the creation of PW Botha, it once played a zealous role in fashioning the 'Total Strategy' discourse. But it now finds itself serving De Klerk's 'civilian' strategy. Its inner confusions sometimes pop up into plain view, as with the July 1990 'Rooi Komplot' scandal around Operation Vula.

Once a junior member of the intelligence community, the NIS has now emerged as the dominant intelligence agency. It even has a new HQ in Pretoria, built for R140 million. The NIS formulates the strategic intelligence brief, on which a substantial part of national policy is based. Despite its rise and gradual alignment with the De Klerk camp, its capacity to control the operational activities of the other elements of the security establishment remains limited. It does not have the legislative powers, operational capacity, or force levels which enable both the SADF and the SAP (or factions in them) to influence events on the ground.

Cooperation between the various intelligence agencies varies from being erratic to well-coordinated. Nationally, strategic intelligence assessments are shared. But when it comes to operations and tactics, each agency also jealously guards its secrets and interests. Informally, though, there is apparently some regional cooperation between, for instance, Military Intelligence and Special Branch units in the Natal region (this joint project is known as the 'Inkatha project').

These security structures are also riddled with particular

contradictions and idiosyncrasies. Some units are often heavily influenced by local political attitudes and this might alienate them from the executive levels — for instance, the rightwing sentiments in the SADF's rural Citizen Force and Commando units. Increasingly, such units are meshing with local rightwing activities.

Contradictory relationship

De Klerk's relationship, then, with the major elements of the security establishment is testy and filled with contradictions. Apart from the NIS's open support and the guarded support given by certain sectors of the SA Air Force and Navy, he has a limited ability to control and/or muster sufficient political loyalty from this vast, influential part of the state ensemble. His recent attempts to control the security establishment and the implications of those moves for the current transition deserve a closer look.

Nineteen eighty-nine saw a shift away from the military-managerial style of PW Botha to De Klerk's 'civilian-incorporationist' strategy. New game rules were established and they included limiting coercion by both sides in the negotiations. Like 'softline' reformists elsewhere, De Klerk's aim was to protect certain partisan interests without undermining the mechanisms and principles that underlie the negotiations process.

De Klerk's power base was civilian and comprised the present National Party cabinet (with a few notable exceptions), most of the Cape and Transvaal National Party membership, the Broederbond, the NIS, and the new heavyweight in the state ensemble, the Department of Constitutional Planning and Development.

He nevertheless has tried to exert some executive control over the security establishment. A number of measures have been taken: the National Security Management System was restructured and made to focus on civilian and welfare briefs; the State Security Council became subordinate to a new cabinet committee on security; the strategic intelligence brief has gone to the NIS; the ministers of Defence and Police were demoted (partially on NIS advice); the SADF's controversial Chief of Staff Intelligence got early retirement in 1991; an internal SADF Commission of Inquiry into alleged Military Intelligence and Special forces excesses was launched; and the defence budget has been cut three years in a row.

Yet these measures have failed to reign in the security

establishment. The clandestine collaboration of SB units with Inkatha and the deployment of 5 Reconnaissance Regiment personnel in train and township massacres are a few examples. What does De Klerk's failure in this sphere mean?

Clandestine operations

The first lesson — and it applies to control of the armed forces in both the transition and beyond — concerns the limitations of formal political power. Whatever realignments, restructuring and control are achieved at the top levels of the state, the REAL centres of political and institutional power may still remain in other, less visible branches of the state.

We now have a situation where the dominant factions in the security establishment (the MI/Special Forces axis and the reconstituted SB) do not refer their operations to the executive levels of the National Co-ordinating Mechanism for ratification.

PIC: ROBERT BOTHA



Smooth operator: But is De Klerk pushing all the buttons?

They have developed a strong degree of autonomous power which they exercise via internal channels and institutional networks.

Confronting institutions as entrenched and diverse as these is daunting. But unless they are restructured comprehensively, they will continue to influence the political direction of the state. The implications are ominous.

Political victory and a parliamentary majority, even if coupled with executive restructuring of the state, does not guarantee real power (although it may lay a base for it). Reactionary interests can shift their influence through an elaborate system of dislocations and displacements when threatened by new adversaries within the state.

Indeed, the challenge of the present transition is to not only restructure the executive reaches of the state, but to also identify the core centres of power located elsewhere in the state, particularly in the security establishment.

'Security fallback'

A second lesson relates to De Klerk's limited influence on the security establishment. On the one hand he lacks significant institutional and political support in that sphere. But, on the other hand he needs them, in his own words, as "a security fallback" in case the negotiations fail. There lies the essence of



Talking about democracy: Negotiations alone will not change the status quo.

De Klerk's double agenda.

Whatever De Klerk's reservations about activities of the security establishment, he cannot afford to antagonize them. If his vision of a brokered transition fails, he may not only have to rely on them ... he could also end up being ousted by them! Moreover, as a traditional 'versoener' (conciliator) within the NP, De Klerk is unlikely to risk opening divisions by radically transforming the security establishment.

Far from coordinating the activities of a 'third force', De Klerk lacks the executive and operational muscle to contain them. This offers no comfort to democrats.

As long as the security establishment escapes effective control, the chances of a relatively peaceful transition stay slim. But that is not all. The ongoing complicity in the township violence of specialist units and police, military and civilian intelligence structures threatens the negotiating process. If not halted, it will prevent the creation of a climate for free, fair and open elections.

Looking further down the road, if these units are not restrained and restructured, the very stability of a democratic SA might be threatened, *a la Chile 1973*.

Operational control needed

Effective forms of operational control on the ground are urgently required, in addition to the proposed structures of interim control (the draft codes of conduct, security forces multi-party committee, council of defence and so on).

There are several options:

- an international monitoring presence;
- a network of joint monitoring commissions;
- a joint command council presiding over the SADF, MK and the TVBC armies;
- the disbandment of Special Forces and other controversial elite units.

In addition, the democratic movement should also strive to contain the influence of the armed forces through mass pressure. The highly legalistic deliberations in the Codesa/

interim government framework should not be seen as the only way in which control over the security establishment can be achieved. Focused mass action calling for the disbanding of certain specialist units can help isolate those structures both within the state and the body politic. But in the long-term a much more ambitious and profound programme is needed to limit the influence of these formations.

Latin American transitions show that, despite the restructuring of the executive reaches of the armed forces, the armies kept their praetorian direction precisely

because their key internal centres of power were not restructured.

Political and operational control is therefore not enough to ensure legitimate and representative security apparatuses — there has to be restructuring. The integration of the various armed forces may provide a fairer distribution of personnel within a 'new' SADF, but it will not transform the broader power relations within the SADF.

It seems unlikely that De Klerk is acting in collusion with elements within the security establishment for the reasons outlined above. But if De Klerk is incapable of delivering his security establishment to the negotiating table, then what is the point of entering into the highly formalized deliberations at the Codesa working-groups? Transitional arrangements and new constitutional dispensations without the mechanisms to safeguard and protect them will scarcely be worth the proverbial paper they are written on.

Remember Chile? □

Williams is the coordinator of the independent Military Research Group, which conducts research into defence issues.



THE SWEEPING INFERNO

How can the violence be stopped?

*The new era is being overtaken by fury and blood. What is going on? And is there a quick fix? **HEIN MARAIS** surveys some of the thinking*

AT THE DAWN OF LIBERATION, political violence is claiming on average eight lives every day. The death toll since February 1990 (7,000 people) far exceeds that of the preceding eight fiery years of resistance. Across SA, communities spend their nights in fear and their weekends burying the dead. How is this?

In its second scathing report this year, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in June concluded that the police have the capacity to bring township violence under control in three to six months. It found conclusive proof that violence is being provoked by security force elements and warned that the "total alienation" of the police made necessary the creation of an entirely new civilian police force that could "gain the trust of ordinary people".

Amnesty International's (AI) report went even further, accusing the security forces of going about "business as usual" by continuing "their war against the ANC and allied organisations". The 100-page report documented "a systematic pattern of police and military involvement in torture and assassinations" in the past two years, and said the government is guilty of "gross negligence at best" in failing to take effective measures against culprits. Last year, the American human rights organisation Africa Watch made similar findings.

Together, these reports confirm assessments and demands made locally for several months now. Sadly, they have drawn from the government only a backhanded swipe. Law and Order spokesperson Craig Kotze dismissed the AI report as "partisan" and a "whitewash of the ANC", and complained that it was not "a constructive addition to the debate".

In places more sane, the security forces exist for one central task: to protect and serve the public. When they not only

fail to protect, but participate through idleness (ignoring warnings, refusing to disarm mobs ...) or action (institutional support for Inkatha, attacking township residents, defending the attack and retreat of impis ...) in violence, some concern seems appropriate and welcome.

Not here, though. The government's inaction manages to achieve a level of obscenity that dwarfs Jimmy Kruger's infamous "It leaves me cold" remark of September 1977. The reigning wisdom in the De Klerk camp seems still to be "What, me worry?"

Variety of answers

Inquiries into the violence have taken off in many directions and returned with a variety of answers — ranging from racist whimsy (the tribal barbarism thesis of the regime) to conspiracy theorising (the 'New Total Strategy') to structural inquiries (recent work by social scientists Mike Morris and Doug Hindson) and more.

Lately, the debates on violence tend to orbit in the political dimension of the violence, focusing on issues of moral blame and political responsibility.

Studies by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE)¹ and the Human Rights Commission (HRC), for example, conceptualise the violence in mainly political terms. The recent joint investigation by David Everett (CASE) and Safoora Sadek (HRC) — *Tribal War or Total Strategy* — kicks off with the question: "Who benefits from the violence?". If understood politically, the question — on the basis of overwhelming evidence — presumes the answer: the NP government and Inkatha.

Like the HRC's 'New Total Strategy' scenario of last year², Everett and Sadek go further, and detect a conspiratorial hand in the violence which, they say, "appears to be switched on and off at strategic moments".

"The overriding concern remains superficially a political one — destabilisation aimed against the ANC, and it works," Everett told *WIP*. "If you are able to manipulate the violence, you are also able to present yourself as the one who can deliver peace."

Like some Mozambican observers,



Culture of violence: The socio-economic roots of violence

he discerns in the violence signs of low intensity conflict (LIC), a destabilisation strategy aimed in this case to "hamstring and cripple political opposition".

The thinking essentially follows the lines of the 'Twin Track Strategy', with the NP government pursuing both the negotiating and destabilisation tracks in order to improve its chances of winning a democratic election.

Ample evidence can be marshalled to support the scenario. But how far does it

take us toward quelling the carnage?

There has developed, unfortunately, somewhat of a tendency to pit divergent analyses of the violence against each other, to draft them into a war of perceptions. These comments aim at the opposite -- to extract and lace together their valid insights.

Given the current popularity of the Twin Track theory on the left, a couple of hitches deserve attention.

State not monolithic

In its cruder expressions, it tends to caricature the state as a seamless monolith, untroubled by tensions and internal contradictions. As Rockland Williams argues in this issue, this is not the case; fissures criss-cross the state and a watertight common-mindedness between the political executive and the security forces

the strings of black resistance.

Still the fact remains that elements of the state, mainly within the security forces, are complicit in the violence, most likely for an assortment of reasons. (The constables who casually escort Inkatha impis to and from a rampage are probably guided as much by a combination of culture, vindictiveness and fear as the Special Forces squad might be by crazed Machiavellian strategy.) And the government has the responsibility, the capacity, but not yet the inclination to put the boot in.

The concern is not only moral or humanitarian. Peace is absolutely essential for liberation; without it recovery from apartheid becomes impossible.

The HRC's Max Coleman draws hope from the Namibian experience. He told *WIP*: "The moment they had a new constitution and government the political violence disappeared overnight and there's no reason why that shouldn't happen here — the solution is political."

Struggle over resources

"The problem with the political focus is that it doesn't grasp the totality of the problem—it's too one-dimensional," says Mike Morris of the Centre for Social and Development Studies in Durban.

Crucial as it is to neutralise the state as one of those factors, such success does not rule out that other factors can tilt matters back. "One can sort out the problem of state involvement, but that doesn't sort out the Inkatha-ANC hostility, which doesn't sort out the local contests between warlords, entrepreneurs, gangs, squatter leaders," says Morris. "Ultimately, the root causes lie buried in the struggle over material resources."

The hostel dwellers' phenomenon illustrates this line of analysis — and its obvious compatibility with the more popular 'political' theories.

The transformation of the hostels into barracks (mainly for IFP supporters, though there are a few ANC-controlled hostels, in Sebokeng, for instance) is well-documented, most recently in the Independent Board of Inquiry's (IBIIR) *Fortresses of Fear* study. On what basis did the mobilisation of hostel dwellers occur?

Extremely poor and socially ridiculed, hostel residents have been historically marginalised and alienated from the other township communities with whom they have often been in conflict. "Within black

urban society the hostels increasingly became ethnically introverted ... and socio-economically marginalised, essentially belonging to another time -- that of apartheid," Morris and Doug Hindson (of the Institute for Social and Economic Research) write in a recent paper³.

The hostels became migrant workers' foothold in a hostile environment. The IBIIR study notes the macabre irony that they, the most exploited sector of black society, should come to feel so deeply threatened by the end of apartheid and the move away from migrant labour and hostels. Hostel dwellers, according to Morris and Hindson, "perceived (this) as the destruction of their entire urban survival base". And it was on the basis of those material and social tensions that the IFP made its political intervention, by linking calls for the conversion or demolition of hostels with issues of language and ethnicity.

Morris and Hindson point out other situations where tensions are exploited and amplified not so much for party-political gain, but as part of a struggle over limited material resources which, in turn, becomes linked to battles for political dominance.

Human agency

Everatt agrees broadly with the Morris and Hindson approach, yet complains that by leaving out "human agency and the political battle it misses the purpose of the violence". The objection obscures the basic compatibility of the political and the structural analyses.

Everatt's LIC conception implies the existence of 'autonomous' fault lines and tensions in black communities. "LIC means looking for points of tension in the social fabric and injecting violence into those points (until) the violence becomes



PIC: THE STAR

have to be addressed.

cannot be assumed. If pressures on the government to reign in the security forces are to be effective, they have to take note of and exploit those stress lines.

Another, more unpleasant implication of the theory is that black communities are a kind of social putty, without a history and internal dynamics of their own. Hence, they can be manipulated and be steered this way or that by unseen hands. It is the estranged cousin of that freaky argument that a few agitators pulled



PIC: ROBERT BOTHA

self-sustaining," he argues. And, as Coleman also notes, "the violence has acquired a certain momentum of its own". It seems to follow, then, that a fully fledged solution to the violence has to address both the political and socio-economic dimensions.

SA today bears out Gramsci's oft-quoted maxim about the fierce and confused period that separates the collapse of the old order from the establishment of the new. The state drew its coherence from a political project, apartheid, which was also the central beacon around (and against) which communities and institutions oriented themselves. That project has now crumbled, and with it, the state's cohesion.

At one level, this has provided (in Morris and Hindson's words) "the context for these clandestine interventions by branches and individuals of the security forces" — the 'third forces'.

But the effects are visible also in the wider society. The country stands on the brink of social chaos both because the old rules and power centres no longer hold, and because the legacies of the past per-

sist.

On the one hand, new divisions and tensions have appeared — along class, age, racial and ethnic lines. On the other, Morris and Hindson argue, "old elements, ideologies and strategies remain and social forces committed to the previous order still operate, consciously and unconsciously, alongside and clashing with the new elements." The taxi wars, gangsterism, warlordism and the shanty vs hostel vs brick-home tensions seem to bear out this paradox.

The deadweight of the past alerts one to a third, intersecting dimension in the violence: the ideological or cultural plane. Decades of repression have established conflict as the norm and violence as the arbiter. We live in one country — but without an even remotely common set of values and concrete attitudes.

Culture of violence

Apartheid has bequeathed to us a society in which the most basic elements of social

cohesion are lacking: the judiciary stands discredited, the police and security forces enjoy neither credibility nor trust. Traditionally stabilising and unifying institutions like the churches or community bodies have either been whipped onto the sidelines or enlisted in one or other camp. The threshold beyond which violence lurks has virtually disappeared.

Viewed in its totality, the violence seems to defy solutions. But, says Jayendra Naidoo of the Peace Accord, "we don't expect a big bang to take place and then to have an automatic cessation of violence — we are dealing with a process that has a life of its own".

Recent studies are unanimous in their demand for far-reaching political measures that bring the security forces to heel, establish genuine credibility for the judiciary, and transform the police into an institution that at least attempts to "serve and protect" the public without discrimi-

Sinister thread runs through Alex violence

By MOSITO RAPHELA

Despite all the efforts, peace still does not have the upperhand in violence-torn Alexandra township. The persistence of the violence has fostered a widely-held belief that it is political and calculated to advance Inkatha's interests.

Since March 1991, when a wave of attacks rocked the township, 2,300 people have been displaced. Intense fighting broke out again last March, when Inkatha moved to extend its influence in the township.

The feared Madala hostel (now occupied by Inkatha) has become the centre-point of the violence. The area around it has been the scene of numerous bloody killings — terrified residents have dubbed it 'Beirut' and 'Iraq'. Families living in the immediate vicinity of the hostels have been driven out; their houses are now occupied by "unknown persons". Most of the displaced come from these areas.

According to Nat Kekana, former chairperson of the ANC Youth League and now involved in violence monitoring, the violence is rooted both in local tensions and in efforts to win political advantage.

The squalor and overcrowding is an important factor. A recent study by Planact shows that some 250,000 people are crammed into less than five square kilometres, making 'Alex' one of the most densely populated areas in the country. Services are poor. In some cases several families share a communal tap and toilet facilities. Alexandra still does not have a water-borne sewerage system.

SINISTER PATTERN

But some residents also detect a more sinister pattern in the violence. Richard Mdakala of the Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO) observes that violence has accompanied every attempt by a local progressive structure to hold a gathering. Last year, the ANC's Alexandra branch abandoned its launch because of fears that violence would erupt between hostel dwellers and residents.

The March 1991 night vigil massacre convinced many residents that a "third hand" was involved; the night vigil, after all, is a sacred event in African tradition. Rev. Stuart Gillian of the Alexandra Ministers' Fraternal and a member of the executive committee of the South African Council of Churches, believes the killers were hired assassins.



Hostel of hate: Madala much of the violence.

nation. The onus here rests squarely on the government. Beyond that, a new set of political rules and the new political and constitutional system are decisive elements of a solution.

Where identifiable parties are in conflict, suggests Hindson, "it's absolutely essential to bring them together so the politics of violence can be addressed first".

Root causes

But this does not necessarily address the root causes of violence, which may lie imbedded elsewhere — in a struggle over material resources, in the fragmentation of society. If the socio-economic dimension is dealt with while political conflict rages, the development initiatives might just stoke the blaze.

Says Hindson: "The reason is that in impoverished areas control over develop-

ment resources is critical in the fight for political power: so you have to get the parties together and trash out a political solution."

The inferno sweeping our country is being fed by a variety of factors. Dousing it requires responses that recognise the multi-dimensional character of a crisis with deep historical and material roots, and which threatens to go terminal. Both the Goldstone Commission's interim report and the Peace Accord's brief seem to reflect that understanding. Sadly, the urgency has not asserted itself all around.

There is no guarantee — yet — that we will emerge from the intersection we entered two years ago, freed of the fierce turmoil that crashes through our town-

ships today. The divisions hacked out in the decades gone by threaten to become the battle lines of tomorrow.

Resolute and immediate political measures are vital parts of the solution. But their impact is likely to be lasting only if they are linked to a far-reaching reallocation of resources and power, and to effective steps that soften the enmity and resentment that is petrifying across our country. □

REFERENCES

1. David Everett, *Consolidated Case reports on the Reef violence*, CASE: Johannesburg, 1992.
2. Human Rights Commission, *A new total strategy*, HRC Special Report SR-11, Johannesburg, August 1991.
3. Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, 'Political Violence: Reform and Reconstruction' in *Review of African Political Economy* No 53, pp 43-59.

As in other Transvaal townships, suspicions of security force involvement are widespread. There are numerous accounts of the police ignoring residents' reports of threatened or actual instances of attack. One resident, Martha R., says she has seen people being hacked by hostel inmates. She called the police on every occasion, but is still waiting for them to investigate.

Other residents say they are told by police that "policemen are human, they are afraid to go in the area". Yet, when a policeman was attacked this past March, the hostels were summarily raided.

It seems difficult to avoid the impression that the lives of policemen outweigh those of residents. Residents point out that the same police force disrupted a recent march to local council offices to demand, among other things, that mobile police stations be set up near trouble-spots.

MADALA HOSTEL

Madala hostel has been central to much of the violence. Giving evidence in a recent trial, Dave Robb of the Alexandra Clinic said that most casualties brought to the clinic were picked up around the

Madala Hostel. In some cases, victims had clearly been shot from behind. The ANC branch in Alexan-

dra has over two hundred affidavits alleging Inkatha supporters were involved. Inkatha officials deny the allegations.

A peace forum, comprising representatives from the community, student and church structures, was set up when violence erupted earlier this year. The aim was to help the displaced, end the violence through negotiations, and lobby for the conversion of hostels into family units. Party politics, sadly, disrupted the initiative and it was suspended. The local chairperson of Inkatha, Simon Nxumalo, who was assassinated recently, was active in the forum.

The killing of Nxumalo, a vocal critic of the violence, remains a mystery. Obed Bapela, secretary of the local ANC branch, recalls that Nxumalo signed a memorandum to the council office demanding the closure and conversion of Madala hostel into family units.

"He didn't have the image of an Inkatha warlord," says Bapela. Nxumalo had acknowledged that people were shot at from the hostel, but insisted that the culprits were neither Inkatha followers nor legal hostel residents. He was killed as Codesa 2 was assembling at the World Trade Centre. Observers have pointed out that his killing bore the hallmarks of a classic 'hit', aimed at removing a peacemaker from the equation.

An Interim Crisis Committee was formed in April to continue the work of the peace forum. It has arranged several meetings between the different parties, including the security forces.

Participants in the initiative are hopeful that it can perhaps prevent another nightmarish cycle of attack and revenge, as occurred in March. But few predict an early arrival of peace in Alexandra, at least not until some of the root causes — such as Madala hostel — are addressed.



PIC: EDMOND JIYANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)

hostel has been central to

Madala Hostel. In some cases, victims had clearly been shot from behind. The ANC branch in Alexan-

PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION IN NATAL

- a response to Byerley and Hindson

If violence and development in Natal are to be addressed effectively, local initiatives are not enough, argue SIPHO GCABASHE and ROHAN PERSAD. Regional and national strategies which take into full account the role of security forces, the KwaZulu authorities and 'warlordism', are necessary

WE WELCOME THE CONTRIBUTION OF Byerley and Hindson on 'Peace Pacts and Urban Reconstruction' (WIP 80). Their contribution has started an important process of debate and discussion amongst all political and interest groups committed to finding what seem to be elusive solutions to the 'violence' that is engulfing our country.

However, we believe that there are a number of weaknesses in their contribution:

- it underplays the role of the security forces and does not address the role of KwaZulu and 'warlordism';
- it has a mechanistic view about how negotiations and agreements are reached at a local level;
- it separates the processes of peace and development.

In response to these perceived weaknesses, we will argue that:

- There is an integral link between the security forces, the KwaZulu bantustan and 'warlordism' to negotiating peace agreements. This link has made it necessary to negotiate the National Peace Accord (NPA) to provide a framework for negotiating conflict and to pressurise local actors to do so.
- Byerley and Hindson's theory around credible local mechanisms needs to be placed in context. There are problems that cannot always be resolved at a local level, but require national and regional

intervention.

- The peace process and the development/reconstruction process should be viewed as two sides of the same coin and not as separate processes. In terms of these processes, the roles of the Local Dispute Resolution Committee (LDRC) and local community organisations/civics are central.

Causes of the violence

We agree with Byerley and Hindson that competition over scarce resources, the power struggle between communities and local government structures, and the skewed socio-economic patterns generated by apartheid are some causes of the violence.

However, three crucial elements of the conflict particularly relevant to Natal have been underplayed and largely ignored. These elements are particularly relevant to Natal, namely: the role of the KwaZulu bantustan, the role of the security forces and 'warlordism'.

A key element of apartheid policy in Natal has been the imposition of the KwaZulu bantustan. This effectively divided Natal into two distinct territories in terms of administration, finance, education, pensions, policing and development.

This imposition has been met with sustained resistance from the majority of people, with clear battle lines having been drawn throughout the 1980s and

early 1990s.

The first problem to emerge was the myriad of socio-political formations that developed and sought to defend the interests of KwaZulu as a separate state. The KwaZulu government, Inkatha Freedom Party, the Amakhosi, Kwalogo, Uwusa and Idamasa all have differing degrees of control over the KwaZulu constituency.

The question that arises is: who represents the population of KwaZulu, particularly within the parameters of local agreements? Are these forces legitimised through democratic elections?


A second problem concerns the KwaZulu Police (KZP) and their relationship to the South African security forces. The KZP is seen to be siding with Inkatha. In some instances, they have also been accused of instigating violence and assassinating political leadership of the perceived opposition (ANC, Cosatu, SACP and civic organisations).

Given the ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of the KZP, some communities have called for the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the South African Police (SAP) to quell violent situations.¹ This is despite accusations that have been levelled at the SAP and SADF about their lack of impartiality.

The need for a single command struc-



Killing fields: warlor



© GUY TILLIM (SOUTHLIGHT)

physical — of the authorities, particularly those in KwaZulu. Only two warlords have been arrested and successfully prosecuted so far, namely Samuel Jamile and Psychology Ndlovu. There is an arsenal of evidence identifying particular individuals as consistent perpetrators of violence. The inadequacies of the criminal justice system can only be addressed nationally.

Local peace agreement fails

In the past, the aim of crisis-oriented peace initiatives was to stem the flow of political killings and not necessarily to find lasting solutions. Added to this, three main factors have hindered local peace agreements:

- Bilateral agreements struck by Inkatha and the ANC/Cosatu have been unsuccessful as they were not binding enough on the parties. Also none of the previous bilateral initiatives contained any strong implementing mechanisms. Where such structures were created, it only took one party not to honour its obligations before the structures collapsed. The clearest example of this was the Cosatu/Inkatha Pietermaritzburg Accord which set up a Complaints Adjudication Board.³

- These bilateral agreements excluded the state, security forces, legal processes, the South African and KwaZulu governments, chiefs and other interest groups. This fuelled the notion that violence was 'owned' by the ANC-IFP, or that it was a 'black on black' ethnic conflict. Violence was not conceived as being the responsibility of all interest groups, even though they have also been implicated. Binding the security forces to agreements, in particular around their impartiality, was not forthcoming in local agreements.

- Finally, there was a lack of financial and human resources to implement the necessary programmes and activities of peace; start the process of reconciliation and to promote an understanding of the rights and obligations of political parties, individuals and the security forces in these agreements.

The failure of the local peace initiatives can be understood against this background. It became imperative to look for alternative ways of binding parties to agreements, develop a framework in which peace could unfold and make resolving violent conflict the responsibil-

ity of all interest groups. The peace accord sought to do exactly this.

National and local peace accords

There was an urgent need for binding negotiated strategies to address central problems in various regions and localities. The NPA agreed on the following areas: the role of political parties, a code of conduct for the security forces including the KZP, measures for reconstruction and development and strong implementing structures.

These implementing structures included both voluntary and statutory structures. However, the NPA is still a paper agreement and certain criticisms can be made about the way in which it plans to implement peace processes.

The voluntary structures — including the RDRCs and LDRCs — still allow parties to drag their heels by not attending meetings with full delegations, changing delegations constantly and requesting time to resolve their internal organisational problems. This makes it difficult for the voluntary structures to make the necessary decisions to take the peace process forward.

Secondly, voluntary structures grind to a halt, particularly if the majority parties affected, such as the IFP, ANC, and the security forces, do not cooperate. National political pressure has been successful in the past in forcing local and regional leadership to the dispute resolution structures. However, this alone is not sufficient.

Perhaps the voluntary structures should be given statutory powers to bind parties and enable them to make swift decisions to resolve conflict. If any participants violated or stalled, they would then have to face the wrath of the law.

Finally, the state has also failed to speedily inject the necessary resources into both RDRCs and LDRCs as agreed in the accord (clause 7.15.2). This means that political parties and other groups are dependent upon their own meagre resources to carry the peace process forward.⁴

The formation of the LDRCs has also brought in a new terrain of negotiating conflict resolution. This transition from the politics of conflict to the politics of negotiation is a slow process, hindered by local organisations' lack of experience of negotiation and conflict management.

getting away with murder

ture and code of conduct for the security forces is necessary to develop an impartial, professional policing and security force. The issue of the security forces and KwaZulu has to be negotiated at a national level.

Single command structure

A restructured security force including the bantustan armies and police forces, MK and Apla is a vital component of the peace process and cannot be isolated from the broader politics of constitutional negotiations.

Security force complicity in violence, together with an inadequate criminal justice system (which has failed to prosecute and protect witnesses), has ensured that 'warlords' continue their activities uninterrupted. Maré and Neube have argued that "local level patronage which depends on individualised extortion and redistribution is increasing. The degree of social collapse has made possible the growth of 'warlordism', a form of patronage at 'community' level".⁵

Through their activities, they have secured the protection — political and

ment. Training is urgent as these skills will go a long way to make speedy progress in the peace process.

Despite these weaknesses in the NPA, the framework to effectively address violence, reconstruction and development and community relations with the security forces, has been set in place.

The LDRC offers communities a structure to resolve conflicts or refer those it cannot resolve to regional or national structures. The NPA also provides other statutory mechanisms that could be used by LDRC if necessary, such as the Special Criminal Courts, the Police Board, the Commission of Inquiry and the Police Reporting Officers of the Police Special Investigation Unit.

The LDRC and community organisations

We agree with Byerley and Hindson's position that one cannot separate reconstruction from the broader development process. However, they give the impression that development constitutes the delivery only of a physical product.

Development needs to be conceived rather as a process aimed primarily at empowering people, developing their skills, giving them greater control over their lives and raising their living standards.

Development and reconstruction in the context of violence must therefore aim at improving the material conditions, developing human resources and organisational capacities.

In terms of Byerley and Hindson's formulation, it is necessary for peace to be established first before development can be realised. "The lesson from Hammarsdale and the Richard's Bay/Empaneni areas is that peace must precede development and development is needed to consolidate the peace".⁵

We would argue that, to achieve peace, practical programmes need to be implemented that are aimed at reconciliation, establishing freedom of political association, setting up community defence mechanisms and ensuring security force impartiality and accountability.

Peace and development should not be seen as separate processes. These activities, if implemented simultaneously, could isolate violence at the local level and make it possible to deal with it more effectively.

We agree with Byerley and Hindson

when they argue that development needs to be depoliticised and credible local mechanisms should be formed to deal with development issues. They suggest setting up development committees and point to some of the problems they could experience.

However, Byerley and Hindson do not go far enough, except to suggest that "at some stage there has to be a separation of party politics from urban reconstruction and between party politics and the administration and management of urban development".⁶

But development is a political issue. It would be more useful to examine the role of political parties in the development process rather than their complete separation from it.

We would argue that political organisations should play a facilitative role. They should try to cut through the multitude of bureaucratic institutions and red tape involved in development, and engage funding agencies to finance reconstruction and development projects. This would contribute to significantly speeding up the delivery of development goods at the local level.

The LDRCs could be one of the vehicles at the local level where political organisations could carve out a facilitative role for themselves in the reconstruction and development process. The question then arises as to who should deliver development goods to the community?

We would argue that, if development is to be sustainable, non-partisan and consolidate peace, delivery must be a democratic process where all sections of the community take part in defining development and reconstruction priorities.

For this to become a reality, strong, representative community and civic organisations need to be in place. The question of who determines whether community and civic organisations are representative of the community is a thorny issue.

The LDRC could also play a vital role in this regard. It could act as the legitimating structure for community or civic organisations. If there is a dispute

about whether a civic is representative or not, the LDRC could set up mediation or arbitration to settle the issue.

In Natal, the civic movement is relatively weak. In many strife torn areas, it is non-existent. This poses a particular problem for delivering development goods in a non-partisan way. However, there can be no substitute for mass based, community controlled organisations. Communities need to start building and revitalising civics and community organisations at the local level.

Building the capacities of community and civic organisations is also imperative through the provision of negotiating, management and technical skills. Training will ensure that communities can participate effectively and on an equal footing with local authorities, development agencies and technocrats involved in the development process.

In areas where community organisations are strong and representative, they must be actively supported by the LDRC to ensure that they enjoy the support of political parties. This will make them more credible with the community and members of political organisations at the local level.

Package of strategies needed

The complexities and differential interests at the local level make it difficult for local agreements to be successful on their own. Local peace agreements need to be reinforced by national agreements and make use of interventions at regional or national level if necessary.

The peace process needs to consist of a package of strategies aimed at achieving different objectives at the local level. These processes should unfold simultaneously to isolate the violence. Development and reconstruction should be one component of the overall peace process and should not be isolated as a separate process. Political organisations have a definite role in development but this needs to be clearly defined. □

Gcabashe and Persad work for the ANC-Cosatu-SACP Joint Working Committee in Natal. Their views do not represent the JWC.

REFERENCES

1. Human Rights Commission/Legal Resources Centre, Report on KwaZulu Police December 1991.
2. G Marc & Ncube, in *South African Review* 5, Ravan Press/South African Research Service.
3. J Jeffrey, *The Rocky Road to Peace*, SALB 1989.
4. D Hartford, *Peace Accord has brought scant relief for ordinary folk*, Business Day, p8, 13 April 1992.
5. *Work In Progress* 80, p33, South African Research Service.
6. IBID

Reconstruct

A Work In Progress supplement

issue no. 4

JULY 1992

Civics spread throughout OFS

THE WINDS of change have not yet blown across the Orange Free State (OFS). Harassment of activists is still common and the authorities merely pay lip service to negotiating with democratic organisations.

In addition, the region is vast, transport is poor, skills are scarce and resources are virtually non-existent. Even the weather seems to be against the people, with the drought having resulted in many farmworkers being retrenched.

Yet the SA National Civic Organisation's (Sanco) Southern OFS region is working hard to improve people's lives. Thirty-six of the region's 41 towns have civics. They are particularly strong in Mangaung, Botshabelo, Bethulie, Ficksburg, Weppenaar, Springfontein and Troonsburg. Six sub-regions have also been set up since the region was formed in February.

Joel SAILA and Bobby Sebotsa, the region's assistant secretary and administration secretary, work full-time for the region. They have not been paid in six months, and there is little prospect of them getting funds in the near future. Yet they work on with quiet determination.

"Our priority is to see that every town in the region has a civic," said Sebotsa. "We are also looking forward to intensifying our campaign for the resignation of all town and city councillors, black and white."

The demand for all councillors and township administrators to resign was put to a regional meeting with the OFS Provincial Administration (OPA) on 18 May.

"We told the OPA that there will be no regional negotiations until the apartheid councils have resigned," said Sebotsa.

"Joint administrations will not work until all councillors resign and structures are dismantled. Only then can all parties get together and form new

local councils."

When it was clear that the meeting could go no further, the OPA requested further meetings "but we do not see these meetings going on because the OPA is only interested in maintaining control," said Sebotsa.


The region's hard line stems from the fact that negotiations to address rent and service boycotts in the area have failed.

"These boers and councillors are dragging their feet. We arrange for meetings to discuss the boycotts, but when the day for the meeting comes they just vanish," said SAILA.

"In Mangaung, the civic reached an agreement around electricity last year. But the council is trying to get people to pay rent through electricity. A four-roomed house will get an electricity bill of R600, and most houses in Mangaung don't even have geysers!" he added.

The civics also suffer from a lack of skills. Most members are 'unemployed peasants' who cannot afford to pay membership fees, Sebotsa pointed out. There is a high rate of illiteracy and the administration of civics is 'very poor'.

A joint University of the OFS-civic working group has been set up to design and fundraise for a local government programme. The region hopes this will improve the quality of the civics.



Joel 'China' SAILA

PIC: KERRY CULLINAN

INSIDE

4
DOWN AND OUT
IN
BOTSHABELO

STATE
SELLS OUT

6

THE TPA'S
CRISIS

8

10
DEMOCRACY
IN THE
'WILD WEST'

Land Focus

Mangaung battles against the odds

White Bloemfontein's indifference has forced the people of Mangaung to try to help themselves. **KERRY CULLINAN** reports

IT IS a cold night in Mangaung. The wind blows dust and smoke across the streets and into the houses and shacks. Yet venues across the township are filling up with residents. Tonight is Wednesday, meeting night for each of the Mangaung Civic Association's (MCA) 22 branches.

One of the MCA's biggest branches, Rocklands Three, is meeting at the Lutheran church centre. The hall is packed to capacity to hear a report-back from the central executive committee. Only the coughing, coughing, coughing of people living under unhealthy conditions disturbs the report-back.

"Apartheid is still alive and well here," says MCA's general secretary, Eric Mahabane. "The local authorities are dragging their feet to negotiate with us. We are dealing with people who don't want to reason."

The rent and service boycott is still strong in Mangaung. As a result, the local council — aided by the Bloemfontein city council and the SAP — is evicting people on a massive scale.

"But our street committees are strong and vigilant," says Mahabane. "As soon as a person is evicted, street committee members move their property back inside. The authorities have now resorted to confiscating people's goods."

The MCA's chairperson, Tseko Mabaso, points out that the township's council does not even have enough councillors to make a quorum. But this does not stop them from trying to govern Mangaung. The MCA is also suspicious of the Bloemfontein council's attempts to bolster the Mangaung council.

"It seems that the Bloemfontein

council is trying to revive the township council, and we suspect that they want to form a joint administration with them to make sure that apartheid structures still rule here," says Mabaso.

But sooner or later, the local authorities will have to deal with the MCA. The civic has widespread support in the township. Its structures are built from street committee level to block, area then branch committees. Aside from the 22 branches representing residents from the old township, 17 branches have been formed in the informal settlements.

Representatives from these 39 committees meet together monthly at general councils, while the central executive committee coordinates the entire structure.

"The street committees are the backbone of the civic. If a child is not attending school, the street committee must find out why. Their aim is not to point fingers but to solve problems," says Mahabane.

Self -sufficient

According to the Central Statistical Service, 79,851 people lived in Mangaung in 1985. The MCA believes that there are well over 100,000 residents today.

The MCA gets no outside funding. Volunteers run the advice office, while membership

fees cover the rent and phone bills.

Self sufficiency is something to be proud of in a township as poor as Mangaung. The civic estimates that over two thirds of the township's working population is unemployed, while almost half live in shacks.


"It is unfortunate that we can't pay our volunteers, but the street committee members look after them. Sometimes they bring food to the office for them," adds Mahabane.

The shortage of housing is acute in Mangaung. As a result, large-scale land occupations have taken place. The two oldest informal settlements — Freedom Square and Namibia — were set up in 1990 and each have

PIC: KERRY CULLINAN



Daily grind: 4 000 people collect their water from two taps every day



Freedom Square: Straight roads and equal sites but no houses or facilities

PIC: KERRY CULLINAN

about 4,000 shacks.

When the need arises, more land is invaded. The informal committees take charge of these invasions and mark out sites to ensure that each person gets the same size site.

But unlike other areas where the authorities have accepted the shacks and tried to make life for their residents more bearable, little has been done to accommodate Mangaung's shack dwellers.

Water is in desperately short supply in the informal settlements. Freedom Square has a single tap. Only Tambo Square has managed to get six taps for its 300 residents — by hijacking municipal workers installing taps in an area nearby.

There are no toilets at all in the camps, which poses a huge health risk.

Schools are also hopelessly inadequate. For example, Namibia's four-classroom school caters for students from grade one to standard six. It has over 450 pupils and six teachers, only two of whom have passed matric.

There is not a stitch of furniture in the entire school. Teachers use outdated books and syllabuses. None

of the teachers are paid, as the school is not officially recognised. As a result, they cannot afford to study further through correspondence.

Students are forced to register privately if they want their qualifications to be recognised.

Deaf ears

Despite the Mangaung community's high level of organisation, their demands have fallen on deaf ears.

"We have held very successful consumer boycotts, then business people put pressure on the local authorities to negotiate with us. We reach agreements, but these agreements are never implemented," says Mahabane.

At the time of going to press, the MCA was busy discussing embarking on another consumer boycott in support of their demands for better living conditions and democratic town councils.

As a result of the authorities' failure to listen to their demands, the MCA has resolved that it cannot negotiate with any apartheid structures.

"All councillors, black or white, must resign. Our problems will never

be addressed by such structures," says Mahabane.

In the meantime, the community is trying to help itself. The IDT and the Urban Foundation have been approached to help with upgrading. The IDT has agreed to upgrade 4,000 sites in Freedom Square and Namibia. But this is only half of the two communities and the civic fears that unless all the people get serviced sites, the upgrading will bring division.

Hostels have also been made into family units. But the families themselves have had to bear the costs of converting them to homes. And at present, those living in hostels still share communal toilets.

"We are also bringing people together to form co-operatives and to learn skills such as brickmaking. We are bringing together township electricians and plumbers to serve the community and we are encouraging our businesspeople to become empowered so that we can help ourselves," says Mahabane.

The MCA, he concludes, will always exist to make sure that there is democracy at a local level. "We must act as a community school to teach our people about their rights."

The place of poverty

Botshabelo means a place of refuge, yet it is one of the most inhospitable places on earth. Only poverty, unemployment, harassment and exploitation have set up base there, reports **KERRY CULLINAN**

BOTSHABELO, which is about 50km from Bloemfontein, was originally supposed to be incorporated into Bophuthatswana and QwaQwa. But massive resistance forced the state to abandon that idea. It seems to have since abandoned the area altogether.

It is a deregulated area. Businesses are offered all kinds of incentives to settle there, including being exempted from laws covering minimum wages and working conditions of their workers.

According to the Central Statistical Service's 1991 figures, 180,850 people live in the area. However, the Botshabelo Civic Association (BCA) believes that if shack dwellers are taken into account, the figure is around 500,000.

Most Botshabelo residents try to find work in Bloemfontein, mainly as domestic workers. But this means paying about R100 a month on transport.

Those who are forced to work in the local, mainly Taiwanese-owned factories get paid next to nothing. The BCA's labour secretary, Sililo Klaas, says wages vary from R25 to R70 a fortnight for 12 hours' work a day. Most of those employed there are women, as employers feel they can pay them less.

Gross exploitation

Anyone who joins a union or gets sick is dismissed, says Klaas. And there are always plenty of workers to fill the gap, as some two thirds of the community is unemployed.

"Because of the poverty, people can't afford to pay rent. So most people live in shacks," says BCA general secretary, David Musa.

"But the provincial administration is threatening those who live in the shacks. They have written letters to those living in 'illegitimate structures' giving them until 2 June to move," he adds.

"They say people must move to the 16,000 sites that the administration has, but we know nothing about these



Tent town: Hershel residents fled to Botshabelo to avoid incorporation into the Transkei

sites."

According to OFS Provincial Administration (OPA) official Martie Carstens, the shack dwellers have to move as they "are not residing on land allocated for residential purposes".

She added that serviced sites were available in Botshabelo and that "any person is free to obtain such a stand through the normal official channels".

Youth leads

The BCA was launched in late 1990 to address the terrible living conditions of the people. It has 17 branches, organised down to street level. But, says chairperson Vincent Seqhobane, a major problem is that the youth are the backbone of the civic at present.

"Some of our parents still have fear. The police used to come and detain them for belonging to the civic. Now they still intimidate them by visiting them and questioning them about the civic," adds Musa.

Musa and Seqhobane — both ANC Youth League members — were forced to take over the leadership of the civic late last year after BCA funds disappeared under the last leadership.

"We had to make sure that the civic was strong because otherwise the system could easily infiltrate it and then other structures," says Seqhobane.

Infiltration and repression are still serious problems in Botshabelo. One of the BCA's officials, who was in charge of the disciplinary committee, appears to have been won over by police.

This official attended a meeting with the local SAP against the wishes of the civic association last year. He later appeared on television, claiming to have formed a



crime combatting committee with the police.

During 1989 and 1990, a gang called the Reserves was formed, apparently with the single aim of attacking progressive structures.

Scarcely a year ago, some youths admitted to have been recruited by police to attack striking transport workers. Again this year, unemployed people were recruited to fight members of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (Nehawu) at the local hospital.

Few resources

The BCA has few resources to defend itself beyond its members.

None of the BCA office bearers are paid. This often puts them at loggerheads with their families, particularly their parents, as they do not bring any money home despite working so hard. Rent for the office has not been paid for six months and there is no money for a telephone or stationery.

But collecting membership fees from such an impoverished community is a difficult task.

"We are discussing membership fees, and the region has recommended that we collect money from members. But we still have to decide how much membership fees should be," says Musa.

But at present, the civic's main task is to try to improve services such as getting more schools, improving the water supply, replacing the bucket system with water-borne sewerage and improving roads.

The local hospital is also understaffed, and critically ill people are usually forced to travel to Bloemfontein. Thaba Nchu hospital is a mere 12km away, but it refuses to admit Botshabelo people as they rejected being incorporated into Bophuthatswana.

The BCA has met the township manager — there is no longer a council — in an attempt to have a say in

the allocation of the township's budget. But he merely told them to forward their needs to central government.

The civic is also trying to take up pensioners' problems. They have not received their pensions since February, when the home affairs office that distributes pensions was burnt down. The officials' excuse is that they cannot use churches as distribution points as there is no electricity for the computers.

"In the meantime, pensioners don't have enough food. And sometimes their pension must support a whole family," says Musa.

Fraud and opportunism

The way forward for the BCA is difficult to chart. Given the poor conditions, massive unemployment and militancy of the population, the authorities will have to address some of their needs. But the financing for upgrading the area is scarce. A local branch of the Department of Development Aid (DDA) was supposed to address the community's needs, but the civic suspects that its funds were syphoned off in the scandalous fraud that caused the department to be closed down.

Local businessmen are also unlikely to undertake social responsibility programmes as Botshabelo has attracted the most opportunistic businesses and those that depend on dirt cheap labour for profits.

The BCA's Musa says the organisation is in the process of contacting the IDT to see whether it can help, but any adequate site and service project would need millions of rands.



The township offers only dust, poverty and unemployment

PIC: KERRY CULLINAN

Urban restructuring and state-owned land

A moratorium should be declared on the selling off of state land until there is proper consultation, argues the **DEVELOPMENT ACTION GROUP**

SOUTH AFRICAN cities suffer from the 'apartheid city syndrome': the sprawling, low income dormitory suburbs on the edges, a concentration of facilities and work opportunities in the 'white' core with convenient buffer strips created by Group Areas between. Even if apartheid laws are removed, the ideology is set in bricks and mortar.

Arguments for the development of inner city land for low income housing are mostly rejected as financially unviable -- but the cost of the current urban sprawl is equally huge to the state, the individual, the environment and economic development in the city.

Massive transport costs

According to a study by the UCT-based Urban Problems Research Unit (UPRU), the 1989 annual bus subsidy for Cape Town to Khayelitsha amounted to R1,300 per commuter, a total of about R20 million. Over 20 years at 15% inflation, this subsidy alone will total some R2.35-billion, or the cost of 50,000 housing units. Rail subsidies are double bus subsidies.

Because of the rapid expansion of the city's edge, a massive transport infrastructure is needed to cover ever-increasing distances. One way trips from the metropolitan area to outlying townships have reached a staggering average of 16km. This figure is comparable to car-dependant cities in the developed world (Los Angeles — 15,3km, Detroit —

14,3km). The average one way trip each Khayelitsha bus commuter makes is 35km!

International standards suggest that commuting costs to work should not use more than 2,5% to 5% of an individual's income. However, a Khayelitsha resident is likely to spend between 11% and 30% of his or her income on travel, and 2 hours 40 minutes commuting per day.

If current patterns of urban growth continue, Cape Town will double over the next 15 to 20 years. Another eight developments the size of Khayelitsha will be needed by the year 2010. This kind of growth swallows valuable agricultural land. Between 1960 and 1981, one hectare of agricultural land was lost a day.

The importance of the informal sector is generally acknowledged, but these activities depend on a high density of consumers and are inhibited by sprawling, low density developments.

Available alternatives...

One of the consequences of apartheid planning is the availability of large tracts of vacant or under-used land close to urban opportunities: buffer zones, removal areas, obsolete military bases. These should be used for

low income housing. But the state is quietly selling it off without any consultation, although it is public land.

Cape Town boasts at least seven substantial parcels of land close to urban or large industrial areas (see map). These sites total approximately 1,690 ha and are mostly owned by the SADF, Transnet and Telcom. Hypothetically, if developed in mixed use developments to gross densities of 75 dwelling units per hectare (District Six developers are debating 75-100 in a mix of two to four story dwellings per hectare), this land could accommodate some 127,000 dwellings. Cape Town's current housing backlog is between 120,000 and 150,000 units.

State land available in Cape Town city		
SITE	OWNER	SIZE (ha)
Culemborg	Transnet, Portnet	600
Wingfield	SADF	350
Marconi Beam	Telcom	213
Youngsfield	SADF	210
Ysterplaat	SADF	209
District Six	private, religious, technikon, state	100
Magazine	SADF	8
TOTAL		1690

SOURCE: DAG

Initial findings of a DAG-UPRU study into the benefits of high density residential use of centrally located land further indicates that, with regard to the cost of service provision in the metropolitan area, savings of up to 36% per erf are possible in areas where the costs of bulk services have already been met.

...are ignored by authorities

But is this land likely to be used for public benefit? Recent developments in Cape Town strongly suggest that

this will not happen. Transnet has invited consultants to make proposals for the development of the largest land parcel, the 600ha Culemborg rail and goods yards. Even the Cape Town city council has not been properly consulted in this process.

The Milnerton municipality has earmarked the Telkom land, currently occupied by 900 squatter shacks, as a new commercial focus for Milnerton. Development proposals have also been made for the SADF land, such as Wingfield.

Then there is the Waterfront development on Portnet land. Who decides what is developed on this pub-


lic land and where do the profits go? Only one thing is certain: Portnet will be able to balance its books nicely after this.

There is, of course, the much

talked about District Six development where the Cape Town city council, business and the ANC are engaged in an inner city, low income housing plan. This is the result of the 'Hands off District Six' campaign in the late 1980s, followed by the ANC and civics' threat to invade the land.

The time has come for another campaign to stop the selling of all state land. Publicly owned land must be controlled by the public. Only then can we develop

an overall management plan for our cities that will allow for affordable housing in the inner city areas. It is imperative that the privatisation of state land be stopped.



SOURCE: DAG

PWV land maneouvres

AS IN Cape Town, the state and former state institutions have been quietly selling off land in the Transvaal (see Table 1). The sales are significant as we are in a period approaching an interim government. A number of questions are raised by these sales:

- * Is this a national strategy aimed at entrenching privatisation?
- * Is it aimed at pre-empting land demands by those forcibly removed or prevented by apartheid from access to the land?
- * Is it an attempt to hide land previously owned by the state?

Esperado Annex (Table 1) is 5km north west of the KaNgwane government's head office. The farm is being sold to a private owner in an area that desperately needs agricultural land for its many unemployed and underemployed people.

The Letaba II land in Lebowa and the Klipdrift land (adjacent to the Moretele I district in Bophuthatswana) both fall within or near the boundaries of bantustans. This means:

- * The state may be forced to sell because of urbanisation pressure and the pressure for agricultural land.
- * The state may be trying to quell bantustan community demands for land in white areas.

State bodies are also involved in buying land. With the exception of the National Parks Trust's purchase of 2,713 ha

at Waterval, the state's purchases are small in comparison to its sales.

The Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) has appropriated 53.6 ha of land at Orange Farm and 8.5 ha at Rietfontein. This is despite the TPA agreeing at the Metropolitan Chamber that further development of land in the margins of the Witwatersrand was undesirable at this stage of transition. The TPA's expropriations could mean:

- * It believes it can avoid confrontations with those opposed to

the development of marginal Rietfontein by merely extending Orange Farm, which is just as marginal as Rietfontein.

* The Vaal Triangle RSC, which had a part in planning Orange Farm, could have pressurised the TPA to buy the land.

* Pressure from smallholders, who have insisted that the state address their security, may have forced the TPA to buy them out.

The SA Development Trust, which was declared

defunct by the Government Gazette (31 March), bought 92.7 ha of land at Beestkraalspruit during April and May.

Beestkraalspruit borders Lebowa, and the state could be under pressure from Lebowa to provide land for agricultural or economic purposes without 'endangering' white farms.

Zevenfontein — TPA meets massive resistance

The clash between the Zevenfontein 'squatters' and land owners in northern Johannesburg illustrates the state's lack of an urban regional strategy. Planact's TONY WOLFSON speaks to **KERRY CULLINAN** about the clash and the questions it raises

SIX YEARS after the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) abandoned its Norweto low income housing project, it is looking into allocating land for low income groups in Johannesburg north. Until now, the greater Johannesburg area has been divided predominantly along class lines into the wealthy north and the low income south.

The TPA's turnabout follows ugly clashes between the Zevenfontein 'squatter' community and wealthy landowners in northern Johannesburg. The task force set up by the TPA to look into alternative land for the Zevenfontein people has identified four possible areas, all situated in the north.

At the time of going to press, Diepsloot West and Nietgedacht were, after many disputes, top of the list. But the planned move is being jeopardised by threats of violence from local landowners, including rightwing leader Robert van Tonder, to stop the Zevenfontein people from moving to Cosmo City.

Smallholdings

Aside from acknowledging that the north can no longer be the domain of the rich, the TPA has also moved away from the notion that only big tracts of land can be set aside for low income housing, says Planact's Tony Wolfson.

'There are no big tracts of land available in the north. Diepsloot is much smaller than the land allocated for Rietfontein in the south, for example. The TPA's move away from only allocating big pieces of land means that we can also start looking at people being settled on smallholdings, which are often of no agricul-

tural value,' says Wolfson.

Aside from allocating smaller tracts of land, the TPA should also look at the densification of Johannesburg, as many areas are being under used, argues Wolfson.

"An urgent study needs to be done of services in each suburb and their carrying capacities to see whether



Huckles rise: Landowners take on the homeless

PIC: THE STAR

they are being under-utilised. By services, I don't just mean bulk services like electricity, but also schools, clinics, recreational facilities and post offices.

"For example, in many parts of Bryanston there are an average of three houses per hectare. Some 10km away in Alexandra, there are approximately 160 dwellings per hectare.

"But it's not just the northern suburbs that are problematic. For example, in Soweto one house per plot is not an effective way of using resources."

The Zevenfontein experience has shown that there

is great potential for conflict arising from land allocation. For Wolfson the only way to deal with such conflicts is through land dispute mediators.

"At present, we have mediators who are trained to deal with disputes between management and workers. But there is an urgent need to train people to mediate in land disputes," he argues.

Emotional issue

"Property is an emotional issue. It is usually the biggest investment a person makes in their life. There has to be some mechanism for resolving disputes that takes into account the rights of low income people to public space and the rights of property owners."

When the Bloubosrand landowners protested against the Zevenfontein 'squatters' being moved to a nearby area, they argued that their land would be devalued and crime would rise.

The landowners' grievances centred on how public space should be used, points out Wolfson, yet what rights do they have over public land?

In addition, he argues, the actual value of land is influenced to an extent by public space. Land becomes more valuable if it is surrounded by more sophisticated services and recreational facilities such as golf courses, parks and access to transport networks.

"The state should decide finally who has access to the land," he argues. "Initially, wealthier people's property would decrease in value if a low income housing development was built nearby. But if dual income developments became a trend throughout the country, the market would eventually stabilise," says Wolfson.

"The shortage of formal housing stock ensures that solidly built houses will always command a high value."

Protection for the poor

But even if rich property owners agreed to low income housing developments on their doorsteps, mechanisms would have to be worked out to protect the low income people who gain access to property, especially in dual income areas. There is a real danger of 'downward raiding' otherwise, where high-middle income people buy cheaper land to settle on or develop to make money.

"The state would have to decide whether there should be protected areas, set aside for low income groups. Without some protection for the poor who gain access to property, there is a great temptation for such people to sell out to middle income groups. The wealthier people usually buy property in such areas to 'gentrify' it, then to sell at a profit," says Wolfson.

"But the danger of a state-controlled protected area for low income people is that it would take control of the

land out of residents' hands. Another option then is for the land [in a low income development area] to be administered by a trust or housing cooperative. If a person wanted to move, the trust would only pay them for improvements they had made to their plot. This would make land less of a commodity by taking the value of land out of people's hands."

But the problem is that low income people living in such areas will always be at a disadvantage in comparison to those in the market, who benefit from the growing value of property. This has to be tackled, says Wolfson, so that the rift between the propertied and the homeless does not continue to grow. In other words, the market would have to be regulated to protect low income people.

Wolfson concedes that a trust or cooperative is open to corruption. For such a body to work, he asserts, the state's support would be necessary. State help would be needed to evaluate people's income — probably through their level of taxation — to determine whether a person qualified for low income housing.

Overall approach needed


The problems that have arisen from the Zevenfontein conflict are similar to those in land struggles country-wide. What is clear, however, is that the state needs to develop an overall approach to land allocation. It cannot continue to respond to crises individually.

But the TPA's most recent planning scenario, 'A spatial development framework for the PWV complex', does not provide the holistic guidelines for land allocation.

The TPA is an illegitimate structure, Wolfson points out. It cannot claim to represent the people living in the Transvaal, yet it believes it can plan on their behalf. The TPA's framework was produced in isolation from organisations representing the people that will be most affected by the plan: civics, trade unions, business, women's groups and informal dwellers.

It also fails to take into account the industrial and employment needs of the PWV, or whether the PWV can, in fact, cope with the massive influx of people. Neither does it consider the effects of this influx on the economies of surrounding rural areas.

It is thus clear that, if land allocation is to be fair and properly planned, urban planning will have to involve a group far wider than the TPA's planners.



PIC: THE STAR

Democracy flourishes in Jouberton

Before the mass land occupation in Jouberton in 1990, little was done by the authorities to address the shortage of housing. **KERRY CULLINAN** reports on developments in the Western Transvaal township since the occupation

THE WESTERN Transvaal is well known as the home of the AWB, miele boere and miners. Yet in a small corner of the region — Klerksdorp's Jouberton township — democracy is flourishing, as people work together to improve their lives.

In 1990, Jouberton had a population of 100,000. This number has steadily increased since then as more people pour into the township to look for work on the mines. Overcrowding is a serious problem, with each matchbox house accommodating eight to nine people on average.

When the UDF made its call for people to occupy land to ease the housing crisis, many Jouberton residents had been on the official waiting list for years. It was thus no small wonder that thousands of families responded to the UDF-affiliated Jouberton Civic Association's (JCA) campaign to take over vacant land on 2 July, 1990.

"We believe that if the occupation had not taken place, these families would still be squashed into back rooms. Now the authorities are taking note of them," said Vusi Moyakhe, the JCA's organising secretary.

Permanent improvements

Moyakhe estimates that about 10,000 families now live in informal houses arising from the land occupations. The JCA has managed to get communal taps, portable toilets and refuse removal for the informal settlements,

but conditions are still poor. The civic is thus working on more permanent improvements together with the township's administrator, Dr J J de Wit.

According to JCA officials, the civic enjoys "a very good relationship" with the administrator. This is borne out by the fact that JCA members can use facilities at the council's office.

The JCA and the administrator have jointly set up the Klerksdorp Community Development Trust (KCDT) to address the shortage of land and affordable housing. The administrator has agreed that the trust will be responsible for the development of Jouberton.

"The trust is the first of its kind in the area. There are six trustees from the community and six nominated by the local authority," said George Molaioa, who heads the JCA's land and housing committee.


So far, the KCDT has secured some R6-million from the Independent Development Trust (IDT) to develop 927 sites in Jouberton's Extension 7.

The National Housing Commission (NHC) has also bought land at Extension 12, which will eventually be developed into 8,000 stands. Residents will be able to repay the commission R4,500 a stand at a rate that is in keeping with their earnings. The NHC and central government's Strategic Stock Fund (SSF) have also approved loans of over R7-m to develop services in Extensions 9, 10 and 11.

The IDT development is due to start in the next few weeks. A recent JCA general council meeting resolved that the eight blocks of informal settlements would be given 115 sites each. Block committees will be responsible for allocating sites to people in their area after processing applications. Twenty-three block committee members have been employed to review the applications, and they will be paid from the IDT subsidy.

Moyakhe said the JCA felt this was the most democratic way to allocate the sites. But, he added, this system was not open to abuse or corruption. The JCA would check the

Sites for mites: Development plans are proceeding well



records at the council's office to make sure that each applicant was eligible for a site.

One drawback is that some families will have to be moved to make way for the IDT sites. But this reflects more on the way in which the land was occupied than on the development.

Community driven

Molaioa, who is also the JCA's treasurer, said the civic wanted the Jouberton's development to be community driven.

"People in Jouberton are very

PIC: KERRY CULLINAN

poor. Unemployment is very high, and 71% of those who are working get less than R500 a month. Any development should also help the residents to develop," said Molaioa. The JCA hopes that a local businessman who produces concrete blocks would be contracted to supply blocks to build the toilets on each stand.

"Six 15-person building teams made up of local people have also been identified to build the toilets," said Molaioa. "Each team had been taught how to make the toilets and would be expected to build a toilet a day. This means that the IDT project could be finished in six months."

Molaioa added that the contractor, who would be laying sewerage and water pipes in Ext 10, had been awarded the contract on condition that he employed local residents that he had to train and award certificates to.

"We can't wait for the democratic government. People have to get settled and get on with their lives now," said Molaioa.

Klerksdorp forum

The JCA's quest for better living conditions has also led it beyond development to political discussions with the Klerksdorp Town Council (KTC) about Jouberton's future. The KTC is the only council in the Western Transvaal that is controlled by the National Party and not the Conservative Party. The KTC has withdrawn from a regional forum of white municipalities.

But this does not mean that the JCA's discussions with the KTC were easy. "At first they tried to undermine the JCA. They worked with the former council and tried to discredit us. And in meetings they called us boys and so on," said Moyakhe.

But now progress has been made. A Klerksdorp Negotiating Forum has been set up. This has agreed on a flat service rate of R32 for the township.

In the near future, the forum will tackle forming one municipality and sharing resources.

Hostel harmony



JCA's Vusi Moyakhe

PIC: KERRY CULLINAN

HOSTELS HAVE come to be feared and hated by many township residents after attacks have been waged on them by hostel dwellers. Yet this is not the case in Jouberton.

The approximately 60 single-storey hostel buildings are in a general state of disrepair. The Jouberton Civic Association (JCA) estimates that only about 1,000 people live in the hostels.

"There are mainly unemployed young men and their girlfriends in the hostels. Many of the others joined residents in occupying land, and now live with their families in shacks in the township," says JCA's organising secretary, Vusi Moyakhe.

Little spaza shops and a shebeen are the main activities evident in the hostel. Residents have easy access to the hostel, which is not fenced off from the community. The only clash between residents and hostel dwellers occurred after a resident's wheelbarrow vanished.

The JCA wants the hostels to be upgraded and turned into bachelor flats and family units.

Initially the National Housing Commission promised a R4.1-million loan for the upgrading. However, there is confusion about when the money will be available.

"We have discussed the upgrading with the hostel dwellers, looking at possible costs and rentals. Most are migrants and most are also ANC members. They are all in favour of the upgrading," says Moyakhe.

ANC puts 10 region plan on hold

AFTER MUCH controversy was stirred up by an ANC proposal to divide the future SA into ten pieces, the organisation has decided to put the plan on ice.

The ANC's recent policy conference decided that more discussion on the role, powers and demarcation of regions had to take place before any policy decisions were taken. It was also agreed that a constituent assembly should take the final decision in demarcating regions.

The matter has now been referred to the ANC's 14 regions for further discussion, and the organisation hopes to hold a conference on the issue within two months.

However, the ANC's policy document makes it clear that the organisation would like to see the role of regional government as being almost purely administrative, such as coordinating and overseeing local councils.

The definition of regional government is already emerging as one of the key areas of conflict in national negotiations. The National Party (NP) has already secured the backing of the bantustan governments of KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, QwaQwa and Ciskei for a federal South Africa. Inkatha is also wholeheartedly behind federalism, and it is possible that the NP may be able to win the support of 'verligte' far rightwingers for the federal option as well.

The ANC and its allies, while stating clearly that they want a unitary South Africa, have also publicly acknowledged that 'strong regional government' is important.

The ANC's position is thus a little confusing and, unless its regions treat the matter as urgent, the state will be able to take advantage of the ANC's lack of policy to sell its position to the public.

Briefs

OVER 7.7 million South Africans do not have access to proper sanitation, according to a recent survey. Providing water-borne sewerage for these people will cost an estimated R3,500 per user, or R5-billion in total. This amounts to a staggering 5% of the gross national product, which means that cheaper alternatives will have to be found.

Not exactly flushed with success

Two systems of sanitation hold promise: the ventilated improved pit latrine (VIP) and the low volume flush toilet (LVFT).

The LVFT has a low volume flush connected to a tank. The treated flow from the tank either goes to a soak-

way or a low cost sewer. These toilets have recently been installed in urban areas, but the design and installation still has to be improved.

The VIPs have also recently been introduced in urban areas, and few problems have been encountered. VIPs cost about half the price of full flushing toilets, while the most expensive LVFT costs R2,400 — DAG

Forum gets switched on

AN interim committee to set up a National Electrification Forum (NEF) met for the first time in May. The committee was set up after the ANC's electrification conference in February and has representatives from a wide range of organisations including the ANC, Eskom, the department of mineral and energy affairs, the Development Bank of SA and the SA National Civics Organisation (Sanco).

There is general agreement that the NEF must spearhead the electrification of homes. Only 30% of homes

are electrified at present. The forum will also address restructuring the distribution of electricity, plan electrification and the financing of electrification.

* For more information contact Paul Theron at the Energy for Development Research Centre (021) 650 3230 — DAG

Health care decentralised

THE government is not only privatising health care, but it is also regionalising it. Recently the deputy health minister, Fanus Schoeman,

announced that regional authorities would be responsible for health services in future. One of the guiding principles of the new health service is that individuals have to pay for their health.

Western Transvaal civics launch

WESTERN Transvaal civics launched their regional structure on 6-7 June. The region covers a vast area from Potchefstroom's Ikageng township to Zeerust near the Botswana border and Rustenburg in the far west. There are 23 civics functioning in the region, and these are divided into four zones.



DEADLY DEVELOPMENT

*Even the dead cannot escape the political turmoil, as
LENA SLACHMUIJLDER reports*

NINE VICTIMS OF A MASSACRE AT THE UGANDA SQUATTER settlement lay in a government mortuary for three weeks while families, friends and comrades scrambled to find a patch of politically safe earth in which to bury them.

The dead, which included a two-year-old girl, were among 25 people killed in a pre-dawn attack on the ANC-supporting Uganda area. The killers were allegedly led by IFP-supporting hostel dwellers from the Unit 17 hostels. Uniformed KwaZulu policemen were spotted with the attackers.

Eventually the dead were laid to rest in the Chesterville cemetery, but only after permission to lower them into the ground was denied in Umbumbulu and Umlazi. The ordeal highlights the grim and tense relationship between 'squatters' and the authorities in Umlazi.

Authorities reject civics

The source of the tension lies in the KwaZulu local authorities' unconditional reliance upon councillors as representatives of the communities, coupled with their rejection of

residents' committees or civic structures.

Because the deceased had failed to register their names with the appropriate councillor, they were not, according to Township Manager, Mr Mkhwebane, "administratively incorporated" into Umlazi. As a result, the basic human right of a decent burial was not extended to them.

An independent development consultant confirms that in many cases communities in KwaZulu areas that are perceived as ANC-aligned are sidelined from access to resources and upgrading. She adds that when locally elected structures — who often demand their own development advisors — resist or criticise KwaZulu development initiatives, the projects often come to a halt in that area.

Often upgrading projects depend upon full recognition of local councillors as the sole representatives of the community. On several occasions communities have been told that if they fail to "cooperate" with the councillors and accept the KwaZulu government's development plan, the upgrading will be shifted to other communities.

"We depend completely on the councillors in the area,

who tell us when their area is ready for upgrading," says Umlazi Mayor Marie Xulu. Asked about areas that refuse to cooperate with local councillors for political reasons, Xulu responds: "That is their problem. This is KwaZulu and they have to work with the councillors — who do not favour any parties in any case."

ANC supporters harassed

According to Bheki Cele, a member of the ANC's Southern Natal REC, there are many examples of shack dwellers being promised upgrading and services — until it turns out that they support the ANC. He cites the example of the "Lebanon" settlement, behind Umlazi's King Zwelithini stadium, where services were going to be provided. "When the authorities realised their ANC support, they told the shack dwellers that they were in the wrong place. After that the area was harassed, and following a massive attack in February in which 12 homes were burnt down and one man killed, the area is now deserted."

KwaZulu Government antagonism toward locally-elected civic structures has been publicly expressed by Deputy Minister of the Interior, Steven Sithebe. In a TV interview in April, he said that KwaZulu would not be controlled by civics which, he implied, are haphazard and unrepresentative cliques. Only elected councillors would be part of the development process.

"Sithebe has publicly declared war against the civics," says Lechesa Tsenoli, secretary of the Southern Natal Interim Civic Committee. "But the community is not ready to put away their civics to speed up development."

Allegations of political bias in the upgrading of squatter settlements are sharply denied by the senior deputy secretary in Sithebe's department, Mr T de Meyer. He says that his department is formalising sites and processing title deeds at the rate of 200-250 a month in Umlazi alone, and the political affiliations of the residents do not figure in the process. "We don't bring politics into the upgrading process," he explains, adding that the development process includes discussions with the community. He says his department formalised 2,000 sites in 23 sections of Umlazi since January 1991.

Tensions around development activities are not uncommon — more serious are the allegations that these tensions are feeding into the violence.

Unexpected violence

The unexpected eruption of violence in three Umlazi squatter areas late last year showed signs of outside provocation. Unrest monitors in Natal had noticed that the violence was shifting toward semi-rural areas, while densely populated urban areas were becoming calmer. Umlazi was regarded as one of Durban's most stable townships, with a generally ANC-supporting community interspersed with strong pockets of IFP support and an enormous but peaceful Cosatu-supporting hostel community.

The shack areas adjacent to the Unit 17 hostels also seemed unlikely conflict zones. Many of the residents there were wives, girlfriends or children of the hostel dwellers, coming from rural Zululand and Transkei. All had come to

Durban to find work.

The Uganda area had been a mixed IFP-ANC area since 1989, until conflict arose around the activities of an IFP leader, who was chased out. Supporters of the IFP were expelled from the area or opted to change their political allegiance. By late 1991 Uganda was predominantly ANC-supporting, and an ANC branch was launched last October.

In Uganda and other areas, there are persistent charges that the KwaZulu Police (KZP) participates in attacks against ANC-supporting communities.

The ANC's Cele believes there is a connection between the councillors' animosity towards ANC-aligned squatter communities and the recent upsurge of violence. "We've seen a pattern where some KwaZulu authorities declared that they wanted squatter areas removed from Umlazi," he says. "Then we saw the KZP implement that declaration."

During preliminary hearings into the Umlazi unrest before the Goldstone Commission, KZP District Commander Colonel Vuka Dube was fired amidst questions about his attempts to improve police-community relations in the township. Dube pleaded ignorance of any civics or residents' committees in Umlazi, and said he had only worked with the town council structures. Had he been aware of them, he would have approached them.

'Anti-Kwazulu'

When the councillor versus civic debate becomes a question of pro- or anti-KwaZulu, dragon's teeth are sowed. In meetings between Unit 17, Uganda and security force representatives, the impression was created that Uganda's ANC supporters are anti-KwaZulu, and thus anti-IFP, anti-KZP and against the Zulu nation as a whole. On the ground, such an impression is a recipe for violence. As a Unit 17 hostel dweller puts it: "The people of Uganda say that they're not part of KwaZulu. If they think that way, then they should not be living here."

If the Umlazi violence was intended to remove the squatters, it has worked. The Lebanon area is a mass of shattered walls and garbage. Ekuthuleni is deserted. Uganda's population has shrunk and many people who still consider themselves residents are seeking refuge elsewhere.

Umlazi's nearly 100,000 squatters tempt the politicians. Certainly the IFP will fare better in future elections if its officials, through the KwaZulu structures, are seen to be delivering on the development front. In areas administered by the Natal Provincial Authorities, a more amenable approach is adopted towards civics, especially in areas like Lamontville and Chesterville near Durban.

But in KwaMashu, where money has been allocated to the development wing of the KwaZulu government (the RKDP), civics and councillors have not reached any formal agreement. Civics are fiercely resisting their exclusion from the development process.

It seems clear that KwaZulu, while posing as a bureaucracy that delivers, is not prepared to budge from its top-down approach of sidelining people's committees and civics. And with the political battle for hearts and minds overlaying this old-style development philosophy, the seeds of confrontation and violence remain in the township soil. □



© ELMOND JHANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)



BANTU HOLOMISA

Chairperson of the Transkei Military Council

Your first thought this morning?

I thought of the report I would give to Transkei about the activities at Codesa.

The second thing you did this morning?

I tuned in for Capitol Radio's six-o'clock news bulletin and the newscast on TV1.

Who cooks and cleans at home?

My wife does all that, but I'd love to do it.

Your favourite meal?

Salads.

Tell us your favourite Holomisa joke.

(laughs) I don't know if it is a joke but I always say 'Uya phatheka' (Are you prepared to be ruled?) to anyone; in the military and even to union leaders. That way there will be no tension (laughs).

What animal best characterises

you and why?

I belong to a family of military dictators. We sometimes get impatient with certain bureaucracies. My horoscope is Leo. You can take it from there.

Any addictions?

Sports.

What or who would you die for?

Nobody but my convictions.

What do you no longer believe in?

That the problems of this world can be solved overnight, and violently.

What is the best thing about living in Umtata?

The unpolluted environment. It is unlike Johannesburg and Soweto (laughs).

Your favourite city and why?

Cape Town. Because it is neat, well-looked after. It has unique scenery, Table Mountain and the sea. But most of all, because of the friendly people.

Your biggest regret?

To find myself running a country. You see, I never 'budgeted' for that. Most regrettable was the moment we staged a bloodless coup, because some individuals were inconvenienced. Just imagine the entire parliament going without jobs.

Your favourite pop artist?

I am a classics man.

One song that gives you goose flesh?

I like most of Pavarotti's songs.

What physical exercise do you do?

My schedule only allows me to do push-ups. I used to exercise a lot, but not now.

Complete this sentence: If I were a dictator for a day...

Eh... But I am a dictator already. You should ask a man who is not a dictator. Do you think I am here legally (laughs).

Is it difficult being chairman of the Transkei Military Council?

Not at all.

Your least favourite politician?

No one.

Favourite TV show?

Are Agenda, news and TV sport shows?

What would you change about yourself?

If there is one thing I hate, then it is being a politician.

What do you miss most about your childhood?

I miss sport and being under the care of parents.

What makes you feel secure?

Honesty and truth. Tell it like it is.

Your biggest fear?

I do not fear anything, but perhaps my ancestors.

Favourite cliche?

'It will — and must — be done'.

And South African idiom or expression?

(Laugh) 'From total onslaught to total exhaustion'. This is currently experienced in the upper echelons of the South African government.

Complete this sentence: I think Madonna is...

...human. Envy or hate her, she is a human being.

What is the worst job in the world?

Being a politician.

A secret desire?

Once I tell it to you then it will cease being a secret.

Your happiest moment?

The only happiest moments were when I was playing rugby. I like soccer and cricket but rugby is my passion. Rough sport rugby, isn't it (laughs).

What do you feel about green issues?

Vitally important. In fact, I am involved in promoting that here in Transkei. I would like to see everyone promoting green issues in their communities.

If you were not a political leader, what would you be doing?

I would be a full serving member of the Transkei Defence Force.

What do you feel about homosexuality?

If God permitted it then let it be there.

Who is the apple of your eye?

My wife and my kids.

Your favourite place in Africa?

Of all the places I have visited in Africa, Uganda impressed me with its natural vegetation.

If hell were a place, where would it be on a South African map?

The parliament of South Africa because that is where the hardships and misery of many were engineered and approved!

And heaven a place?

Transkei because of the political tolerance amongst different political organisations.

How do you rate South Africa's chances in the Olympics?

With the Carl Lewises of this world going strong I think our boys and girls won't make it. They needed at least 18 months to prepare.

Do you trust De Klerk?

(laughs) Do you yourself trust him? I do not trust him especially after what they said about Swapo during Inkathagate. They nearly sabotaged Namibia's independence.

An experience that for you sums up SA?

Well, I cannot think of one particularly but alienating one race against the other is the all time feature of South Africa.

When was the last time you used public transport?

Beside aeroplane, a long time ago. I bought my first car in 1978. Since that year I never used public transport.

Who do you reveal your secrets to?

I trust myself. But I usually speak to my wife if it comes to a push.

What chore do you dislike most?

I never get involved in that. Time simply does not allow.

Should employers be allowed to have workers tested for Aids?

Employers should encourage, rather than force, employees to take Aids tests.

What makes you feel guilty?

When you fail to achieve a goal you have set, especially when you have made it public.

And accomplished?

When I make a sound decision to any problem brought to my attention.

Complete: At the end of the day, I...

...must succeed.

Do you smoke?

No.

Should there be censorship in a democratic SA?

No. I never did that in Transkei.

A music instrument you'd most want to play?

Piano.

The person you most want to meet?

The only person I always wanted to meet is Mr Mandela. That I have seen and met him, there is no-one I wish to meet.

Why?

I wanted to see Mr Mandela because of his ideals. He stood — and still stands — for all South Africans. For him to have initiated negotiations while in prison: it is incredible!

Who should answer this questionnaire next?

I can't think of one person. Most of our politicians should answer it. □

Mosito Raphela asked the questions.

Gender and popular education

THE FLEDGLING GENDER AND popular education movement in this country received a massive boost recently.

Fifteen international feminist educators visited Cape Town at the beginning of May to attend a business meeting of the ICAE (International Council for Adult Education) Women's Programme, hosted by the Community Agency for Continuing Education (Cace) at UWC.

Cace began running workshops on gender and popular education in 1991 and decided to use this opportunity to ex-

pose such rich expertise to a wider audience.

The major event was a 3-day seminar held just outside Cape Town, on 'International Perspectives on Gender and Popular Education', which brought together 30 women educators inside the country. Their major aim was to gain a deeper understanding of the theories and practices of gender and popular education across the international spectrum, and relate these to the South African situation. The participants shared experiences of how they have used popular education to challenge women's subordinate position.

Cace also held an open forum in which a panel, including women from Nicaragua, the Philippines, Jamaica,

the West Bank and South Africa, spoke about their experiences. The visitors also spent time with local organisations involved in gender/women's issues around the country.

Local participants found the exchanges very stimulating. According to Gugulethu Nxumalo, "being exposed to women in other countries who have been working with gender and popular education for many years was particularly useful for me. As a popular educator I found the strategies that they have used most valuable for my own work".

Liz Mackenzie, one of the organisers, also pointed out that "it was amazing to see such commonality in experiences, from so many different places in the world." □

New Books

WATCH THE BOOKSHELVES FOR *No turning back: Fighting for gender equality in the unions*, which is about to be released.

The book emerges from a collective process, including members of the Cosatu Wits Women's forum, *Speak* magazine, and Lacom (Labour and

New Books

Community Resource Project of Sached).

Based on nationwide interviews with about 40 Cosatu members, both men and women, the book explores the experience of trade union women at work, at home and in the unions. □

Join us in the launch of our book

NO TURNING BACK

Fighting for gender equality in the unions



AT: Annabels
Down Town Inn
cnr Twist & Plein St
(opp Joubert Park)
DATE: 11 July 1992
TIME: 1.30pm
RSVP: 333 9746 ext 113

Lacom (Sached), Speak & Cosatu Wits Women's Forum


Women's forums grow

COSATU'S NEW GENDER COORDINATOR has breathed new life into the women's forums since she began her work in March this year.

Dorothy Mokgalo tells how there are now six active regional women's forums. Given that only two regional forums were active in the past, this is a dramatic step forward.

The development of women's forums, which were planned as early as Cosatu's launch in 1985, has been a nagging problem. The organisation of women was beginning to be seen as a non-starter. But with a dynamic coordinator, things are looking brighter for Cosatu women.

Mokgalo herself, however, is more cautious: "There is still a lot to be done. It's maybe too early to judge how much progress has been made". □



Women's college opens in Cape Town

THE WOMEN'S COLLEGE, an exciting initiative of the Women's Alliance (including the ANC Women's League and other women's organisations) in the Western Cape, is about to open its doors to women seeking a wide range of basic training.

By the end of June, dozens of women are expected to attend the college's pilot programme of eight courses based in three different venues in Cape Town townships. From this pilot phase it is hoped that a core course will emerge, which will train women for leadership.

Part-time courses will also be available for women who do not want to take the full-time course. Courses on offer will range from technical skills (such as driving a car), to leadership skills (such as public speaking), to analytical courses. It is hoped that courses will be accredited.

Beatie Hofmeyr of the ANC Women's League, who has been closely involved with the project, says that "the college is directed at women excluded from formal education and aims to bring educational opportunities to these women in a user-friendly way in their own areas."

The sensitivity of the college to women's needs is well illustrated by their intention to provide childcare and to teach women in their home languages. Furthermore, no qualifications or experience will be required to qualify for entrance to the courses. □

Domestic work: A LABOUR OF LOVE?

Debates on whether or not to employ a domestic worker are commonplace in many progressive households. MIKKI VAN ZYL pinpoints some of the issues that are swept under the table

SOME PEOPLE ARGUE THAT EMPLOYING a domestic worker links the household into the chain of exploitation of the majority. Others say that it provides some income to a person with few other employment options. But major contradictions are often ignored in the debate.

No-one, for instance, would dare insist that mineworkers should not be employed because the working conditions are exploitative. Instead workers, organised in unions, struggle for formal protection, better working conditions and wages.

Patriarchy perpetuated

The decision not to employ might soothe a conscience here and there, but the effect is illusory. By being excluded from paid economic activity women end up being kept materially and ideologically dependent on men. The sexual division of labour in 'the family' remains unchanged. Patriarchy is perpetuated.

Even if one does not employ a domestic worker, somebody still takes responsibility for the day-to-day maintenance essential in every household. Usually it is a woman who, even if she is not doing all the chores herself, must initiate and control them.

As a Cape Town architect laments: "After dinner, my husband willingly does the dishes if I ask him, but he will not volunteer. Afterwards he looks so pleased with himself, forgetting that I've already done more than twice as many during the day. But housework is only visible if it isn't done."

The irony is that this especially affects middle-class women who entered the job-market to gain economic independence from men. They experienced the pressure to be superwomen: women's magazines urged them to be professional



PIC: LESLEY LAWSON

business partners, sexier wives, loving mothers and more efficient homemakers — all in one. But their choice of economic independence is denied to working class women.

Women's historical exclusion from education and the sexual division of labour in the family, have left working class women with few other marketable skills that offer economic independence. Fewer girls than boys are dropping out of school today, but teenage pregnancies continue to interrupt schooling for girls; in the Western Cape (as in many other Third World countries), for example, women outweigh men as heads of households.

Maggie Oewies of the Domestic Workers' Association (DWA) argues that dual-income households should "redistribute" their income by offering domes-

tic work to other women who need to earn a living. Because of childhood socialisation and the sexual division of labour, women are deemed to be 'natural' domestic workers.

But great differences exist between a rural African homestead and a middle-class urban environment. So DWA has begun providing training to domestic workers. They offer three-month courses in childcare, cookery, kitchen management, home management, first aid, and specialised care for the elderly and ill. Courses have to be attended in a worker's free time at night and over weekends. Some unemployed workers are doing intensive courses to improve their chances of employment. The aim of the courses is to improve the domestic workers' bargaining power with their employers.

Formal protection

Thanks to the efforts of organisations like the DWA and the South African Domestic Workers' Union (Sadwu), domestic workers may soon be protected under the Labour Relations Act.

The National Manpower Commission, however, is concerned that the inclusion of domestic workers in the Wage Act might trigger "large-scale unemployment because employers could not afford to pay the minimum wages".

But organisations like Sadwu insist that minimum wages should be laid down. Some women can barely survive with the money they earn, yet are too tired and dispirited to look for another job, knowing that the chances for improving their lot are slight. It is not uncommon for women to work for R300-350 per month, five days a week, and spending eleven hours a day travelling and working.

Given the high cost of living, the minimum wage demands for domestic workers seem low. Depending on the

Minimum Wage Demands	
Full-time, regular, daily (housework only)	R350 per month
Full-time, regular, daily (housework and childcare)	R450 per month
Full-time, regular, daily (housework, childcare and driver's licence)	R680 per month
Part-time, permanent (4 hour day)	R25 per day plus transport
Part-time, permanent (6 hour day)	R35 per day plus transport

work, the wages would range from R350-680 per month (see box).

Worker organisations are also requesting three weeks paid leave and twelve days sick leave per year. Other provisions in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act would cover maternity leave, overtime, public holidays etc, but the National Manpower Commission (NMC) recommendations still leave many of those details open-ended, presumably to be negotiated between worker and boss. Also, the breakdown of the 'relationship of trust' between employer and employee is given by the Manpower Commission as fair and valid reason for dismissal.

Both the latter points assume equal negotiating powers and status between boss and worker — which the structural relationship between them hardly allows for. In a society where domestic labour is looked down on as unskilled, "women's work" and therefore inferior, organising workers takes on even greater importance.

"So what are your biggest problems?"

"It is the isolation of workers mostly ... difficult times of work ... Sexual harassment is a big problem ... and battering. We have to speak out about violence. There was this one situation where the domestic worker was being battered by her husband, and so was her employer.

But we women feel we have to hide everything — we must speak out as women, and we must come together as domestic workers," says Oewies.

For 'V' (who passed Std 8 and was attending night school to learn First Aid) finding domestic work was a matter of sheer survival. "My husband, he never worked, and he hit me so much, I thought he was gonna kill me. I have two children, so I had to go and work." 'V' started working for a woman for R250 per month. After six weeks the woman left without paying her, ostensibly to visit a sick parent, and never returned. Sadwu has taken up her case to try and recover the money.

As a char, 'V' considers herself to be earning well. "Now I have four jobs. I get about R600 per month altogether, but I get no leave. If I don't come to work, I don't get paid. I must give some money to my family — my mother and brothers. I work mostly half days, but sometimes I stay longer when my work isn't finished; other times if I must do other things I come late. I am very happy now."

The question of whether the organisation of domestic workers is political, draws different responses from DWA and Sadwu. The latter believes that poli-

tics and economic life are inseparable, while DWA states firmly that they are "not political".

Building equality

Materialist feminist views endorse women's economic independence from men as a basic requirement for challenging patriarchy, and any changes which iron out the economic gulf between women and men will be welcomed.

Transforming perceptions of domestic work — so that it is valued as essential and productive work — is one step towards economic independence for women. But will men start competing for jobs as soon as these struggles have been won?

"Over the last two years we have seen many things change," says Oewies. "More men are doing domestic work. But a country cannot develop if the women aren't developed. Work has no limits, but the conditions must be reasonable and just, that is what we want. I was a domestic worker for 22 years, and I'm proud of it."

But while the myth of the idyllic heterosexual nuclear family persists, more than half the world's population will continue to own less than one percent of the land. Men will receive preferential access to houses and jobs while millions of women throughout the world will go on doing two jobs, one for wages, and the other for life." □

Alienated: But working class women have few other skills that offer economic independence.

PIC LESLEY LAWSON



A response to Devan Pillay:

A CARICATURE OF THE SACP

By BLADE NZIMANDE

IFIND IT RATHER STRANGE THAT AN ANALYSIS OF OUR 8TH SACP congress and our party in particular can be caricatured by a progressive journalist such as Devan Pillay does in *WIP* 80. Of course Pillay has a right to make his own reflections about us, but one wonders what type of report *WIP* would have carried if our congress was closed to the press.

Without interfering with Pillay's right to comment on our party congress, it is important that I respond to his analysis of the congress to set the record straight; otherwise, *WIP* readers will be left with what I believe to be an incomplete, inaccurate and somewhat distorted picture of what actually took place. Further, the picture that Pillay paints of our party is more of a caricature of his own biases than a portrayal of what the South African Communist Party actually is.

Conspiracy

Firstly, Pillay reduces what is a genuine challenge facing the South African Communist Party in the present period — carving its own political space and a distinct political profile — to a suggestion that communists can only survive through conspiracy, infiltration and manipulation. As a press observer at our congress, he had sufficient time to listen to and read the party documents circulated there. It is strangely ironic, and in fact disturbing, that a progressive journalist can so easily imbibe the apartheid regime's and imperialists' characterisation of our party and communism.

It needs to be reasserted again that the party has always been insistent that party members who belong to other organisations should act on and carry out the mandate of those organisations, without acting as an SACP cabal within those structures. In fact I would argue that the prestige and respect earned by our party and its cadres has been largely because of their dedication and loyalty to the cause of the ANC, and MK in particular, as well as to many other mass formations and the trade unions. If party cadres in these organisations were acting as a cabal, they would not have earned the respect that they have.

Instead of labelling us as people who best survive in a conspiratorial type of operation, Pillay would have contributed more constructively to the debate about the role of the party if he had taken up the issue of party members dedicating themselves to activities in other organisations, sometimes at

the expense of building the party. This is the crucial question that faces the SACP in the present phase of our struggle.

Secondly, Pillay creates his own caricature of the theoretical thrust of the SACP, and then responds to it as if it were true — a perfect 'straw-person'. Pillay characterises Marxism-Leninism as the old school in our party and democratic socialism as the new. Neither of these 'camps' in the party, I believe, would agree to such a simplistic dichotomisation of Marxism-Leninism and democratic socialism.

Marxism-Leninism

It is also a grossly unfair and misleading assessment of our party congress for Pillay to simply reduce the re-affirmation of Marxism-Leninism by the SACP to a "...decision to stick to the jargon of communist orthodoxy". This does a serious injustice to the debates that preceded the resolutions of congress over a period of four days. It was not simply a question of sticking to jargon but a re-assertion of the continued relevance of Marxism-Leninism as a revolutionary theory and a guide to revolutionary action.

This conclusion was based on a very careful and critical assessment of Marxism-Leninism as a theory that has the tools needed to re-evaluate itself, as well as to reflect on the crisis of East European socialism. This understanding was sharply distinguished by our delegates from the 'Marxism-Leninism' that was frozen into the official ideology of the communist parties in Eastern Europe. Such a conclusion by Pillay indicates a very patronising attitude towards our delegates, as if they did not know why they retained Marxism-Leninism other than just for the sake of 'orthodoxy'.

Thirdly, Pillay assesses our party on a series of unfounded assumptions rather than through substantive analysis and argumentation, such that one begins to wonder what it is that really lies behind his assessment of our congress.



Pondering the future: The congress reaffirmed the



PHOTO: ELMONU JYANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)

relevance of Marxism-Leninism.

For instance, he accuses the SACP and ANC of having stated that racist political parties will not be allowed to operate in a non-racial democracy. He then suggests that this approach to racism by these two organisations means that all those parties whose policies are against the wishes of the majority will be silenced under an ANC or SACP government.

Unfounded assumptions

One really wonders how Pillay arrived at such an absurd and ridiculous conclusion. Is this in defence of racism? He further says that this means that capitalist political parties will not be allowed to operate. Is this in defence of capitalism? There is no necessary connection between asserting that racist parties will not be allowed to operate and the silencing of all oppositional forces. This is too far-fetched.

It is really disturbing to see the extent of the similarities between what Pillay says here and the apartheid regime's 'fears' of what they call 'simple majoritarianism'. This is also a further caricature of the SACP in terms of the images of communism created and reproduced by the apartheid regime and its imperialist supporters.

Pillay further asserts, without any evidence whatsoever from our congress or any of the SACP statements, that the attitude of our party is that of "... you are free to form any party of your choice, as long as it is a socialist party".

Whilst commentators have the freedom to critically analyse our party, this should not be used as a licence to make what amounts to wild allegations without any substantive evidence or analysis. From where does he get the evidence that this is the SACP's approach towards democracy? On the contrary, at our 8th congress, there was extensive debate,

reflection, and critique of the problems and mistakes of East European communist parties.

Social democracy

In fact what seems to be at the bottom of Pillay's arguments and assessment is a personal political grudge that we did not convert ourselves into being a party of social democracy. He unashamedly asserts that "(a)lternatives to social democracy, whether from a Stalinist or Trotskyite perspective, have implicit in them a strong authoritarianism".

Here Pillay contradicts himself almost beyond existence. On the one hand he comments favourably about 'democratic socialists' in our party as the people who really want to overcome the problems of the past, while at the same time he asserts that *any(!)* alternative to social democracy is inherently authoritarian. Does this mean that for him democratic socialism is both good and authoritarian at the same time?

In fact Pillay should have been more honest by critiquing our party from the standpoint of his own political perspective — social democracy — rather than trying to do so in a pretty confused and underhand manner. This becomes even clearer when Pillay makes another very problematic assertion that authoritarianism, amongst other things, is the outcome of a desire *not* to be social-democratic. Pillay, you cannot have your cake and eat it!


Candid congress

The rest of the article contains a series of further allegations about what essentially amounts to charges of manipulation, and perhaps corruption, in the way in which the party pushes people for election inside and outside its own structures. I do not think that it is even worth replying to these until Pillay is able to provide convincing arguments or evidence to the effect that, for example, Cde Godongwana was excluded from election to the central committee by a group of "re-born democratic socialists or watered down or quiet or confused Stalinists"!

It is quite ironic and unfortunate that Pillay's assessment and pronouncements on our congress are in exactly the same vein as those things of which he accuses the party. It is also unfortunate that these are the same kinds of accusations that our party and other communists have been persecuted for in many parts of the world!

Whilst we definitely did not discuss or resolve all the problems that face our party in the current conjuncture, our eighth congress will definitely go down in history as one of the most honest, candid and critical assessments by the party of both itself and the challenges facing communists throughout the world.

Blade Nzimande is a member of the SACP's central committee



THE GHOST OF STALIN

A reply to Blade Nzimande

By DEVAN PILLAY

DESPITE ALL THE ADVANCES MADE BY THE SACP IN RECENT years, the tone of Nzimande's response confirms that the ghost of past thinking and practice still haunts the party. Although Nzimande has pointed to areas of ambiguity in my original article, he has misunderstood, and therefore distorted, the thrust of my comments. But most disquieting is his employment of well-known Stalinist devices to discredit my critique of the party.

The SACP at its worst used to lump leftwing critics with CIA agents and other devils. Nzimande does the same, by associating my comments with that of "the apartheid regime and its imperialist supporters", and with "the same kinds of accusations that our party and other communists have been persecuted for in many parts of the world".

Now, a casual reader, who has not read my original article, would be led to believe by such remarks that I am serving the same purpose as government/bourgeois propaganda against the party. Whether Nzimande intended it or not, these sorts of associations usually have the effect of stifling criticism and open debate. In the past, of course, they have led to expulsions and even death.

Leninism and authoritarianism

Contrary to what Nzimande believes, I have no "personal political grudge" that the SACP did not convert to "social democracy". My intention was to point to areas of ambiguity and tension in the party's formulations, some of which will have to be resolved soon if the party wishes to present a credible socialist platform to the nation. Hence I urged that the party needs to present a vision of socialism that moves beyond 'abstract generalities'.

I will concede, however, that later on I give the impression that *all* alternatives to social democracy are *inherently* authoritarian. What I meant to say was that all *existing* alternatives (other than those which for me are either 'abstract generalities' or look very much like leftwing versions of social democracy) are based on authoritarian assumptions. This is particularly the case with Leninist alternatives which are moulded into a Stalinist or Trotskyist framework.

Indeed, a close reading of Lenin's *State and Revolution* will reveal a restricted, authoritarian understanding of democracy. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly after the Russian revolution was, for example, severely criticised

at the time by that other great revolutionary, Rosa Luxemburg, as being anti-democratic. It was during Lenin's time, *after* the civil war, that political pluralism was suppressed, amongst other things.

'Democracy' is not democracy

Now it is perfectly within anyone's right to declare a belief in authoritarian forms of rule. This can be justified in terms of the need to "defeat the counter-revolution", and to effectively mobilise resources for the collective good.

The standard Marxist-Leninist understanding of 'democracy' has been only freedom *from* (hunger, poverty etc), and not freedom *of* (speech, association etc) as well. Many still hold to this restricted understanding of 'democracy' — but it is not the democracy the SACP says it now upholds.

Some have tried to redefine 'Marxism-Leninism' to embrace both dimensions of democracy (as the social democrats claim to be doing) but have failed to justify this in terms of Lenin's writings and practice. All I was doing was to point to the logical inconsistency of supporting all democratic freedoms (as embraced by the party) *and* Leninism. It is either one or the other. It cannot be both.

Lenin was after all only a human being, and a product of his time. We have the benefit of hindsight — over seventy years of 'socialist' experimentation, where everyone had food to eat and a place to live, but little else. (Cuba is much more democratic — but it is still an authoritarian state (see Galeano on page 32)).


Was it merely a case of bad application, or was there a flaw in the theory and method itself? Was Lenin's one-time mentor, Karl Kautsky, the demon Lenin painted him to be, or is there something we can learn from his insight?

The observation of British Marxist, Robin Blackburn, seems appropriate here:

"Kautsky was indeed struck by the fact that Leninism and Stalinism, far from being a realisation of Marx's ideas, represented, to a significant extent, an atavistic return of the conspiratorial, Jacobin and doctrinaire strains within socialism, which Marx had spent much of his early political life



Demigod: It is one thing to




AD
BUT
ON
WE
DOWNS

combating." (*After the Fall: The Failure of Communism and the Future of Socialism*. Edited by Robin Blackburn, Verso, London, 1992, p179).

Jargon?

Nzimande accuses me of having a "patronising attitude towards our delegates" because I said that the conference had decided to stick to "the jargon of communist orthodoxy". Far from being jargon, he says "Marxism-Leninism" is still relevant "as a revolutionary theory and a guide to revolutionary action". Unless I am missing something, this is just more jargon!

SACP general secretary Chris Hani, in a recent interview with *WIP*, accurately identified the ghost still haunting the party:



admire Lenin and quite another to be blind to his mistakes.

"You must remember this is a new membership, and their thinking has been dominated by material and literature published by these (fallen) communist parties. And if you think that that propaganda has not made an impact, you are making a mistake."

It is most tragic to observe the tunnel vision of some of our brightest and most courageous working class militants, who have learnt their 'Marxism' from the Stalinised texts of Moscow's Progress Publishers — a thoroughly perverted form of 'Marxism'.

It seems to me, therefore, that the key immediate task of the party is not to carve out "its own political space and a distinct political profile", important as that is, but to engage in a thorough assessment of theory and practice. Unless this is done, the party will continue to make fatal errors — like associating with the Chinese and North Korean 'communist' parties.

There is nothing in Chinese 'market Stalinism' that even resembles socialism (in fact, it smells more of Fascism). Why then is the SACP, as Hani tells us, "ready to establish bilateral

links with the communist parties" of China and North Korea? Is it because they call themselves 'communist', or is it purely for material gain? Whatever the reason, it is a serious miscalculation that does nothing to advance the cause of socialist renewal.

Hani's assurance that establishing links "is not to say that we are uncritical of the situations in those countries" is not very comforting. The ghost will not be exorcised if the party leadership sends its members contradictory signals.

Bannings no answer

Because I opposed the banning of racist parties, Nzimande asks whether I was defending racism. This is a very crude association.

While the intention behind banning 'racist' parties may be very clear — racist propaganda should be removed from the realm of public discourse — the practice can take us down the slippery slope to political intolerance. This is an area that needs to be fully debated.

From my own perspective, international experience tells us that once we allow for the banning of political parties for whatever reason, we place excessive power in the hands of the government of the day.

All governments grow used to their power, and they often reach a point where opposition, instead of being seen as a creative democratic necessity, becomes a threat to the personal ambitions of those in power.

It is at that point that the power to ban becomes most dangerous. Suddenly, as in Orwell's *Animal Farm*, definitions change, and those in power begin to label any opposition to it as 'racist', just as the apartheid regime labelled everything it did not like as 'communist'. This is a sure road to authoritarianism.

Surely the best way to deal with racism and violent racist groups, is through effective mass education, political argument and the normal laws of the land where the courts, and not the government of the day, decide who is behaving anti-socially. Government could set up semi-independent complaints boards to hear and investigate allegations of racist and sexist practice (as in the UK), and bring these to court, but this is as far as government involvement should go.

I mentioned this issue in my article in the context of a *particular*, restricted understanding of a 'multi-party' state, which I detect amongst *some* SACP members who, for example, support the concept 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. This concept fully embraces the method of bannings to achieve political ends.

Far from making 'wild allegations', all I did was to draw out the logical implications of this thinking, and say that if 'racist' parties will be banned during the 'national democratic' phase, then surely 'anti-socialist' parties can be banned during the 'socialist' phase. I did not say that this was what the conference discussed, or that this is SACP policy, as Nzimande accuses me of having done.

I do, however, concede that the "charges of manipulation and perhaps corruption" which Nzimande saw in my article were not properly substantiated. I was trying to balance, on the one hand, the genuine attempts by the party leadership to shed its conspiratorial image, and the fact that many of its members still cling to ideas and practices of the past. □



US blockade of Cuba: HYPOCRISY WRIT LARGE

As it closes its doors on Haitians fleeing from a brutal dictatorship, the US continues to pound Cuba, the only Latin American country where children do not starve, into submission. Celebrated Uruguayan writer EDUARDO GALEANO asks why is Cuba being confused with hell

1 LATIN AMERICA IS NO LONGER A threat. Therefore, it has ceased to exist. Rarely do the universal factories of public opinion deign to throw us a glance. However, Cuba, which threatens no one, is still a universal obsession. This little island, subject to a ferocious state of siege, condemned to extermination by hunger, refuses to give up. Because of national dignity? No, no, explain the experts: out of suicidal vocation. Coffin in hands, the undertakers wait. A wait which irritates them.

In Eastern Europe, they did a speedy and thoroughgoing job, hired by the corpses themselves, and now they are anxious to inter this stubborn red dictatorship which refuses to accept its fate. The undertakers have already prepared the funeral reading. They will not say that the Cuban revolution is simply dead: but that it is dead because that is what it wanted.

2 AMONG THE MOST IMPATIENT, AMONG the most furious, one finds the repentant. Yesterday they confused Stalinism with socialism and today they must erase these traces of a regrettable past; the lies that they have told, the truths that they have killed. In the New World Order, the bureaucrats become the champions of freedom of expression.

3 I HAVE NEVER CONFUSED CUBA WITH paradise. Why confuse it now with hell? I am among those who believe that one can love it without lying or remaining silent.

4 FIDEL CASTRO IS A SYMBOL OF NATIONAL dignity. For Latin Americans accustomed to five centuries of humiliation, he is a well loved symbol. But Fidel has, for a long time, been at the centre of a bureaucratic system: a system based on echoes of the monologues of the regime, which imposes the routine of obedience against creative energy; sooner or later the bureaucratic single party, single truth system ends up in a divorce from reality.

In the period of tragic solitude which Cuba is suffering, the all-powerful state reveals itself to be completely impotent.

5 THIS SYSTEM DID NOT FALL FROM THE sky. Above all, it emerged as a result of imperial veto. It appeared when the revolution had no other choice than to enclose itself to defend itself, obliged to wage war by those who forbade Cuba from being Cuba: and the incessant external harassment has consolidated it over the years. For thirty years now the imperial veto has been applied in a thousand ways, to prevent the realisation of the project of the Sierra Maestra.

A continuing hypocritical scandal; since then, Cuba has been obliged to take examinations in democracy before the fabricators of all the military dictatorships which previously existed in the country. In Cuba, democracy and socialism were born as two names for the same thing; but the big power brokers of the world only gave it the freedom to choose between capitalism and capitalism.

6 THE EASTERN EUROPE MODEL WHICH so easily collapsed there, is not the Cuban revolution. The Cuban revolution, which did not come from above, which was not imposed from outside, has grown from the people, and not against them or despite them. That is why it has been able to develop a collective consciousness of the nation: the indispensable self-respect which is the basis of self-determination.

7 THE BLOCKADE OF HAITI, announced with drums and trumpets in the name of sacred democracy, has been a transient spectacle. It has not lasted very long. It finished well before the return of Aristide. It could not last: under democracy or dictatorship, there are 50 US companies which benefit from cheap Haitian labour.

On the contrary, the blockade against Cuba has been strengthened through the years. A bilateral affair? That is what they say. But everybody knows what the US blockade implies in the world today, a universal blockade. It also implies, even if there are many who ignore it, the negation of the right to self-determination.

Privileged class: W



The suffocating siege erected around Cuba is a form of intervention, the most ferocious, the most efficient in internal affairs. It leads to despair, it stimulates repression, it discourages freedom. And those who apply the blockade know this very well.

8 THERE IS NO LONGER A SOVIET UNION. One can no longer exchange, at a air price, sugar against petrol. Cuba is condemned to isolation. The blockade magnifies the cannibalism of the international market. In response, Cuba turns to tourism.

And the remedy could well turn out to be even worse than the cure. An everyday contradiction: the foreign tourists enjoy themselves, an island in the island, they have all that which the Cubans lack.

Is a country that favours its children so persecuted?



Old wounds open up in the memory. There is a popular anger, a justified anger, in this country which had been colonized and had been a brothel, which had been a plaything. A painful situation, without doubt.

But who can throw the first stone? Are not the privileges of foreign tourism judged normal throughout Latin America? Worse still, is not the systematic war carried out against the poor also judged to be perfectly normal?

9 THERE ARE PRIVILEGES IN CUBA? Privileges of tourism and, to a certain extent, privileges of power. Undoubtedly. But the fact is that there exists no more egalitarian society in the whole of Latin America. Poverty is shared: there is no milk, it is true, but milk is not withheld from the children and the old.

Food is rare, there is no longer any soap, and the blockade cannot explain all these shortages in itself; but, in the midst of such a crisis, there are still schools and hospitals for all, which is difficult to conceive in a continent where for so many people the only school is the street, and the only doctor is death.

Poverty is shared, I said, and it shares itself. Cuba is still the most solidarity-inclined country in the world. Recently, to give an example, Cuba has been the only country to open its doors to the Haitians fleeing from hunger and military dictatorship, who on the other hand, have been expelled from the United States.

10 A TIME OF UPHEAVALS AND PERTINACITY; a time of great doubts and few certainties. But perhaps the element of certainty is not so small: when they are born from within, when they grow up from below, the great processes of change do not end up badly.

Can Nicaragua, to cite one case, emerging from a decade of astonishing grandeur, forget what it has learned in the matter of dignity, justice and democracy? Will Sandinism end in some leaders who have kept their cars, houses and other public goods? It is certain that Sandinism amounts to very much more than these Sandinistas who were ready to sacrifice their lives in the war and who, in peace, have not been capable of sacrificing material things.

11 THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WITNESSES a growing tension between the energies for change which it contains and its petrified structures of power. The youth, and not only the youth, demand more than democracy. It is not a model imposed from outside, prefabricated by those who discredit democracy by using it as an alibi for social injustice and national humiliation.

The real, and not formal, expression of the popular will wishes to find its own road. A Cuban road from inside, from below. But the full liberation of these energies for change does not seem possible as long as Cuba is subject to a state of siege. Foreign harassment feeds the worst tendencies of the regime: those which interpret any contradiction as a possible act of conspiracy, and not as a simple proof that life is living.

12 CUBA IS JUDGED AS IF IT HAD NOT suffered, for more than 30 years, a continuous state of emergency. It is a cunning enemy, undoubtedly, which condemns the consequences of its own acts.

I am against the death penalty. Everywhere, in Cuba also. But can one repudiate the executions without repudiating, at the same time, the siege which denies Cuba the liberty to elect and obliges it to live in uncertainty?

Yes, one can. Cuba is receiving lessons in human rights from those who look aside when the death penalty is applied not occasionally, but in a systematic fashion: in frying black people on the electric chairs of the United States, in massacring Indians in the mountains of Guatemala, in firing on the street children of Brazil.

If executions in Cuba are lamentable, when all is said and done, is not the courage of this tiny, stubborn island, condemned to solitude in a world where servility is a high virtue and a proof of talent, for all that admirable? In a world where those who do not sell themselves, rent themselves out? □

*Galeano is the author of the 'Open Veins of Latin America'. This article was first published in the Bolivian newspaper *Aquí* on 24 April 1992.*

Another anti-Libya PRIME TIME CRUSADE

Libya is in the dogbox again, this time for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. But who is hiding the truth? And can Moammar Gadhafi re-elect George Bush?

HEIN MARAIS rounds up some answers

EVERY EPOCH HAS ONE. A LONESOME scoundrel that can be kicked about at leisure and blamed for everything but the weather.

Libya has endured the role for almost a decade. Now, six years after the US bombed Tripoli, Western wrath targets it again for its alleged role in the downing of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland.

British and US authorities claim that two Libyan citizens planted the bomb on the aircraft. They demand that they be extradited to stand trial in the West. The demand seems perfectly reasonable and legal — until the facts are consulted.

Writing in the *New Statesman*, Francis Boyle, professor of international law at the University of Illinois, has assembled some of the background details:

- Libya, like all members of the UN Security Council, signed the Montreal Sabotage Convention of 1971. It allows a country either to extradite or itself try citizens accused of aircraft sabotage. Libya chose the latter route, then offered to hand over the suspects to the Arab League.

- The Montreal Convention obliges both the US and Britain to assist Libya in prosecuting the suspects, by providing evidence and other help. They have refused to do so.

- The US and Britain are contravening Article 2, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter which states: "All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security is not endangered."

- Because Libya does not have an extradition treaty with the US, it is within its rights when it refuses to hand over the suspects.

Boyle deduced from these "contradictions" that both the US and Britain "know full-well that Libya was not re-

sponsible for the Lockerbie bombing".

Gadhafi's — former, he now insists — weakness for naïve foreign adventures casts him inevitably as the villain. But there is more to this latest round in 'global policing' than meets the eye.

For one, the current consensus on Libyan guilt is rather recent. In March 1989, British, German and American investigators concluded that Flight 103 had been bombed by a Palestinian splinter group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC), "with Iranian money and Syrian collusion," reports the American journalist Christopher Hitchens. The terror attack was meant to avenge the shooting-down of an Iranian Airbus passenger plane by the US warship, USS Vincennes in July 1988.

It is unclear what new evidence overthrows that finding: Britain and the US have not made public any proof. But it is clear that a witch-hunt against Syria no longer holds geo-political promise for the Western powers. Syria 'came on side' during last year's war against Iraq and is a key player in the latest US Middle East peace initiative.


Sceptics spot a few ulterior motives at play in the 1992 anti-Libya Crusade. The most tempting involves the US presidential contest. With Bush's approval rating dipping under the 35 percent mark, and the economy still on the slide, creativity is called for. A 'prime-time' mission against Third World 'thugs' might just rescue Bush from a job search in the New Year. (The 1986 bombing of Libya was the first 'prime-time' bombing in history, coinciding with the 6:30 pm newscasts of the three major American TV networks.)

On its own, however, the 'vote-winner' scenario ignores the global context within which US (and other G-7 nations') power operates.

The Gulf War did more than impose the much-abused concept of 'international justice' on Iraq. Iraq represented, in brutal and dictatorial fashion, an effort to develop a society along an independent path — and it had the potential to resist Western dominance of the region. It had to be tamed, and its attempts at expansion provided a cut-and-dry pretext for discipline.

Libya, since 1969, has entertained similar ambitions. In maverick and generally foolhardy fashion, Gadhafi has sought to kindle the flame of pan-Arabism once brandished by Egypt's Nasser. Since the signing of the Camp David Accord, that project has gradually crumbled. The sight of Arab nations lining up behind the imperial onslaught (registered by history as the 'Gulf War') confirmed the 'taming' of the region. For good or bad, Gadhafi's Libya represents the region's stubborn hold-out, the one who still 'talks back'.

This year's crusade does not confirm Libya's self-inflated stature. Instead it is aimed at removing a regional irritant that complicates the otherwise smooth and terminal integration of the Arab world



into Bush's New World Order.

That thorn is personified by Gadhafi. And the Lockerbie disaster is the lever with which the West hopes to dislodge him. Stay tuned, the show has only just begun. □



Fighting back: German workers have refused to bear the brunt of unification, while business benefits.

Letter from Europe

THE STINK OF MONEY

The new message is: Profiteers of the lands unite! But, as DANIEL SINGER reports, the scandals rocking Europe have revived some older insights into the power of money

LOS ANGELES IS NOT THE ONLY PLACE FLUSTERING THE preachers of history's end and capitalism's eternal youth.

From Western Europe, too, come all sorts of tales of woe. From Bonn comes news of a country threatened by strikes as well as suggestions that the Germans may by now be fed up with performing as Europe's models of virtue. From Milan come stories of corruption on such a scale that Sicilians are soon likely to give the Milanese lessons in honesty. From the Corsican city of Bastia comes proof that the disaster at a sports stadium, which killed fifteen and injured more than a thousand, was the result of sordid financial calculations.

Yet the fact that Western Europe thus reveals the seamy side of its system in no way discourages its eastern neighbours. Indeed, judging by the Mayor of Moscow's spirited defence of his own mafiosi, one is tempted to say quite the contrary. The new message reads: Profiteers of all lands unite.

A misbehaving model?

After years of successful union-bashing, it is almost taken for granted that wage and salary earners will swallow anything. So it came as a surprise when the German union of public employees took on the government and, after eleven days of coordinated strikes, forced it to grant salary increases of more than five percent, a barrier the government swore it neither could nor would break.

The surprise deepened when union members then voted against the compromise reached by their leaders. This did not relaunch the strike, but it conveyed the mood of rank and file on the eve of the crucial trial of strength between the private-sector employers, who stuck to three percent, and the powerful engineers' union, the more than four-million strong IG Metall, which asked for nine percent but was ready to settle for anything above six percent. Franz Steinkühler, its leader, dismissed accusations

of "unpatriotic behaviour" by saying that he saw no reason why reunification should be a boost for business and a burden for working people. The two sides eventually struck a deal at just under six percent, roughly what the public employees received.

Since reunification, Germany has been a puzzle to its neighbours and the subject of contradictory assessments. Has it bitten off more than it can chew or are we dealing with the teething problems of a growing empire? Should the relatively high rate of inflation and the budget deficit be taken as first signs of a broader European crisis, or are they merely transitional symptoms as Germany proceeds with its "creative destruction" in the east? And if the latter, how will it issue its increased power: to federate Western Europe? to resume eastward expansion? to proceed with both policies at once?

The questions are unanswered because reunification has not gone very far. Yet the preoccupation of the Western establishment, and of its press, can be attributed to the part the Federal Republic used to play in the old order of things. It could always be relied upon to prop up NATO or ensure the unity of the Common Market. The allegedly independent Bundesbank was the keeper of the interests of big business well beyond Germany's frontiers, while the German workers were being presented to their supposedly more class-conscious British, French or Italian comrades as proof that collaboration with management is not only virtuous by a paying proposition. If this anchor of capitalist stability in the heart of Europe is weighed, where will the continent drift?

Milan and morals

In Italy the system was already shaken by the April elections, which showed that people have had enough of the permanent rule of Christian Democracy and its allies, with the resulting patronage and scandals. The corruption, however, was associated in the public mind with the backward South, not with the advanced North, very much part of modern Europe. Now it has been discovered that the real den of thieves is to be found in the heart of Lombardy, in worth, bourgeois, prosperous Milan, the 'moral capital' of the country.

The miracle is how the long-existing scandal was uncovered. Once again, as in the movie *Z*, it is a case of brave magistrates showing zeal. The prosecutors arrested a few industrialists and kept them in jail. Unused to such treatment, they began to sing and, together with the politicians involved, they produced the libretto of a gruesome opera likely to echo throughout the country for some time to come.

The gist of the story is that Milan had an elaborate system of kickbacks and handouts. No contractor could get work on, say, the municipal sports stadium or subway without a bribe, and the money duly found its way to party coffers and private

pockets. While dozens of businesspeople and politicians have been indicted, the hunt goes on. The Christian Democrats, as usual, were prominent at the receiving end, though the Socialists were the main beneficiaries. This affair is a terrible, possibly fatal, setback in the brilliant career of Bettino Craxi.

Craxi took over the Socialist Party sixteen years ago, joined the ruling coalition and wanted to share the spoils. He turned the party into an efficient electoral machine and an instrument for getting cushy jobs for the boys.

The operation proved at once a success — he got the premiership and the promise of even higher prizes — and a failure, since his party did not manage to overtake the fast-declining Communist Party. Now Craxi is likely to pay the price, because he cannot deny the connection: Milan was his party's showpiece; his own son was the local leader and his brother-in-law is among the accused.

But for the scandal, Craxi would have been a serious contender for either the presidency or the premiership. And the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), formerly the Communist Party, which based its conversion on an alliance with Craxi, must now reconsider its strategy.


Money stinks to high heaven and the Italians are put off by the stench. In one sense, that is healthy. People realise that money, glorified and no longer disputed as a standard, actually corrupts everything it touches, both personal and political.

But it serves little purpose to bring down a system if you does not have a better one to put in its place. With the Socialists betrayed, the PDS bewildered and its splinter, *Rifondazione Comunista*, already torn between conservatives and reformers, the left seems in no position to offer an alternative. Until it does, the leagues and demagogues will benefit from the natural revulsion of the people. Fortunately, the Italians have learned through bitter experience that there are cures worse than the disease and saviours who begin by promising to clean the air by imposing a totalitarian climate.

"Money that kills"

Corsica was promised a fiesta. Instead it had a massacre. On 5 May, in the semi-final soccer match of the French Cup, Bastia was to meet Marseilles, the champions. Just as it was to begin, the provisional stand collapsed, bringing its toll of dead and injured.

The inquiry has shown beyond doubt that they were victims of greed. Since there was no problem selling tickets even at high prices, it was decided to more than double the seating capacity. A metal structure was put up in a rush. For the sake of profit, regulations were violated and safety checks ignored; the number of people guilty of at least negligence is growing. As the scandal unfolds, one also learns a great deal about the big-money takeover of sports in general and soccer in particular, with its huge under-the-table payments to star performers, its shady middlemen, its double ledgers and its



Mitterrand: Once keen to damn "money that kills".

double accounts.

The focus on the corrupting power of money comes at an awkward time for the government because a provincial judge seems determined to bring into court an old case accusing a company of acting as a screen for transfers favouring the Socialist Party. If the Minister of Justice blocks the case, he will be accused of bias. If he does not, the Socialists will once again be associated with crooked ways.

Let there be no misunderstanding: the Socialists are no more venal than the other parties. In France, unlike in Italy, the dirty money was used only for party or electoral purposes. Besides, French Socialists can remind the Gaullists or the Conservatives of greater sins committed when they were in office. The snag is that the Socialists must now argue that they are not quite as bad, whereas in the past they claimed to belong to a different species. The unease among their rank and file illustrates the gap between the moral posture in opposition and the party's conduct in office once it had been converted to what is called, euphemistically, the 'culture of government'.

The quotation "money that kills" is taken from a speech by Francois Mitterrand when he took over as leader of the Socialist Party in 1971. He was quite scathing: "money that buys, money that crushes, money that kills, money that ruins and money that rots the very conscience of the people." He probably would be ready to repeat those words today. There is a basic difference, however. At that time Mitterrand also claimed that he was in favour of "a break with capitalism".

Stinking smell of success? Judging by a recent article by Gavril Popov in the Paris newspaper *Libération*, it is pure perfume for the new class rising beyond the Elbe.

The dollar and the baton

With the collapse of Communism and the resulting legal confusion in Eastern Europe, the scope for thievery, for converting public property into private gain, is tremendous. In Poland, banking and other scandals are too many to count. Today it is the turn of the privatisers in Prague. But Russia, too, is getting ready for a mass transfer of property and the rise of great fortunes amid growing poverty. The novelty in Popov's prose is that this daylight robbery is raised to the rank of doctrine.

Popov is not just anybody. Editor of *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, once the Communist Party's theoretical organ, he is one of the leaders of the Democratic Russia movement and was Moscow's first freely elected mayor. It is true that he has been openly accused of allowing fellow councillors on the Moscow soviet to take over state property at a pittance. But one thing Popov cannot be accused of is lack of candour.

In the *Libération* piece, his basic premise is that "the Russian people are, in their majority, against a market economy". Hence, for this democrat, the political system cannot be one "in which Parliament would reflect the existing

structure of society". Change must be wrought by "a thin layer of the intelligentsia", made up of "intellectuals, officials, soldiers and security people". The current regime must help these reformers work in peace "without being compelled regularly to face universal suffrage, without requiring popular sanction in a transitional period".

One of the main functions of the Russian government is to protect private enterprise, Popov claims. The appearance of private shops selling at high prices, he writes contemptuously, has led to the emergence of "protestors" struggling for "people's happiness" by breaking the windows of such shops. The authorities must punish not only the vandals but also the policemen who turn a blind eye.

The author has an odd conception of the role of the Mafia in the West — one limited to its control of drugs and pornography. In Russia, he argues, it has a wider scope. Foreign companies, for instance, need criminals to protect them from other criminals. To Popov, who once had scruples,

PIC: ELLEN ELMENDORF



Eating words: Food for sale, but too expensive to buy.

the only thing that matters is the victory of the market. Give him the *mafiosi*, the *nomenklatura*, any sort of scoundrels, as long as they can be turned into good capitalists.

People who have converted almost overnight from the neo-Stalinist bible to the gospel according to Friedrich von Mayek and Milton Friedman have a strange mixture in their heads. But they also represent real interests. Their bizarre constructions bring to mind Bertolt Brecht's Mack the Knife, who, in a famous passage from *The Threepenny Opera*, announces at the end of the era of small thieves and the beginning of that of big robbers: What is robbing a bank, compared with setting up a bank! □

Copyright The Nation magazine. Reprinted by kind permission.



In search of the **FORBIDDEN FRUIT**

REFORM AND REVOLUTION: South Africa in the nineties

Edited by Gordon Naidoo, Skotaville, Johannesburg, 1991

Reviewed by MAMPHELA RAMPHELE

THIS BOOK IS THE PRODUCT OF RESEARCH done by South Africans, some of whom were in exile until 1990. The common thread weaving the various contributions together is a sense of loss that their dream of a socialist future will not be realised in the post-apartheid South Africa. Gordon Naidoo captures this most aptly in the introduction:

"The flight from dialectical materialism to that of the consumerist variety, from Mother Russia to Maputo, has generated a theoretical and ideological crisis for the protagonists of alternative economic systems. Monopoly capital has received a massive ideological and 'moral' boost globally, and is doubtlessly confident of its capacity to contain labour's ambitions as effectively in Tirana as in the Transvaal" (p9).

The book conveys the view that the current process of negotiation is likely to lead to an elitist settlement which, argues Moeletsi Mbeki, will entail "re-casting the character of the ruling class alliance by bringing in ... representatives of formerly excluded and therefore disaffected social forces" (p46).

The SACP also comes in for criticism for embracing the reform process. Adrian Sayers sees it as operating as a caucus within the ANC "with slim chance of realising its particular objective of leading the working class towards socialism" (p195).

Themes covered in the book range from a critique of current negotiations, a defence of collective rights against private ownership of the means of production, the virtues of nationalisation against privatisation, a glimpse into the cooperative movement, to a final chapter examining organised labour in Zimbabwe and

drawing attention to lessons for South Africa.

Case for nationalisation...

Morley Nkosi makes a case for nationalisation as a policy through which the state "aspires to achieve greater social equality and economic democracy, and more rational use of natural and productive resources through public ownership of the means of production" (p103).

He distinguishes between 'negative' and 'progressive' nationalisation. The former is said to be characterised by the motivation to save bankrupt private institutions, whereas the latter is undertaken under pressure from leftwing groups. Nowhere does he attempt to demonstrate the benefits and effectiveness of 'progressive nationalisation', except by pointing to the success of nationalisation in solving the poor white problem under the Nationalist Party.

The circumstances under which this form of nationalisation succeeded receives no consideration by Nkosi. For example, the particular conditions of national and global economics in the post-depression and post-war years responded favourably to such strategies. Nkosi also ignores the important role blacks, as non-voters, played in cushioning the South African economy against some of the inefficiencies of that nationalisation programme.

Peter Ellis compares the economic efficiency of privatised versus publicly owned enterprises. He makes the important point, quoting some Canadian examples, that the tax system is not necessarily efficient nor effective in stimulating investment in particular areas to achieve set government objectives. The experi-

ence of the National Party's stimulation of employment creation through border industries to discourage african urbanisation, is a case in point in our own history.

... is too simplistic

Ellis needs, however, to make a stronger case for his proposal that the solution lies in the creation of state owned enterprises, which governments would be able to "simply instruct...to accelerate its activities" (p132) when it sees the need to do so. There are too many historical examples of costly failures associated with simplistic government involvement in running state enterprises for South Africans to follow that route.

The Pacific Rim countries (South Korea, Taiwan, etc) have demonstrated the need for governments to be involved in shaping economic policy and in stimulating desirable activities in the national interest. Through well targeted incentive schemes, a differential reward system, sensible fiscal and monetary policies, Pacific Rim countries have established themselves as important global economic forces of note.

Contrary to the view of fundamentalist free marketeers, governments do have a role to play in the economic life of a country. Governments have a responsibility to create the right climate for economic development, but they often lack the capacity to run productive enterprises effectively and efficiently. South Africa cannot afford to experiment with ideologically motivated nationalisation. The stakes are too high.

That governments also have a responsibility to provide for adequate social services for all citizens is also ac-

cepted by most civilized societies. Privatised health care has not proven to be efficient nor effective in countries like the USA. South Africans will have to find a suitable system for themselves, which adequately addresses the legacy of wanton neglect of the past policies, within existing resource constraints.

Superficial analysis

Wentzel provides interesting information on the history of the cooperative movement, and singles out the 'democratic worker controlled cooperatives' as a deliberate strategy by the trade union movement in the 1970s and 1980s to effect economic empowerment as well as political mobilisation (p158-160).

I am, however, disappointed by Wentzel's superficial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the cooperative movement in South Africa. A comparative analysis with successful ventures such as the Mondragon Experiment in Spain would have been illuminating (see Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, p 265-266). I find his statement: "Alas, this is not the occasion to evaluate the 'failures' or the near 'failures' or success stories" (p162) particularly baffling. One should be forgiven for asking what the purpose of the chapter was.

Sayers gives an overview of the history of the labour movement in South Africa. He fears that the labour movement will also fall prey to the forces which have made Africa "the graveyard of trade unionism" (Gordon, 1991, p6).

The lessons from Zimbabwe alluded to by Mbizvo give little comfort to those within Cosatu and Nactu who mistrust politicians, and fear that their contribution to liberation will not be rewarded by a significant voice for organised labour in the running of the country. Cosatu is thus depicted as having to continually evaluate its position within the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance to ensure that working class interests are protected.

Sayers has grave misgivings about the prospect of halting capitalist exploitation. He, however, fails to point to alternatives to the 'graveyard' scenario. It seems to me that the South African labour movement will succeed in maintaining a meaningful role in shaping the future SA only if it engages the other players in the economic sphere in a crea-

tive way. A hostile approach to capital may not always be the best. Labour needs to remember the adage that the worst thing to being exploited as labour, is not to be exploited at all!

Forbidden fruit syndrome

The authors, like many other South Africans of a similar political persuasion, address issues of transformation in South Africa without much attention to the lessons derived from the fall of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe.

The forbidden fruit syndrome is very much evident in the attraction socialism holds for some South African socialists, particularly those given to sloganising. Others, particularly intellectuals, argue that socialism failed in Eastern Europe because it was a distorted variant of the ideology (see for example Legassick, 1991; Callinicos, 1991).

Whatever the reasons for the failure of socialist experiments, those advocating a socialist transformation in South Africa will experience difficulties in implementing such a programme, given the resistance to experimenting with failed models. Cabral reminded activists in Guinea Bissau that people were not fighting for ideologies, but to improve their material condition (Cabral, 1973). The majority of poor people in South Africa desire nothing less.

The view that only the working class can be trusted with power, not just in a democracy, but in a dictatorship of this class, has always been the weakness of Marxist arguments. The reality throughout history is that 'the working class' as such does not exist, and that where they have been invoked, they have not been beyond the corrupting influence of power. There are also differentials of power within that 'class' along race, gender, age, geographic location, and indeed class lines.

Those articulating the views of 'the working class' are inevitably educated males. The argument that such intellectuals are 'organic' to the working class and therefore charged with a historic role, begs more questions than it addresses (for a systematic cri-

tique see Giddens, 1977).

This book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the difficulties the ANC is experiencing in formulating a dynamic and coherent economic policy, within the context of its alliance with the SACP and Cosatu. It also provides a basis for intellectual debate about the various options facing a changing South Africa. I hope that the authors will allow themselves to contemplate the complexities of our society, which they have glossed over in this book. □

Dr Ramphele is a senior researcher in the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cape Town

REFERENCES

Cabral, A (1973) *Return to the Source*. Monthly Review Press, New York / Callinicos, A (1991) *The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions*. Polity Press, Cambridge / Giddens, A (1977) *Class, Power and Conflict*. University of California Press, Berkeley / Legassick, M (1991) *The Necessity of Socialism*. Congress Militant Pamphlet / Wilson, F and Ramphele, M (1989) *Uprooting Poverty — The South African Challenge*. David Phillip Publishers, Cape Town.





Left Behind

TOXIC LOGIC

THE EARTH SUMMIT IN RIO DISAPPOINTED A LOT OF PARTICIPANTS, but not the World Bank. It has been asked to administer a multi-billion dollar Green Fund aimed at slowing environmental destruction.

Critics of the World Bank are fuming. They say the institution has a deplorable environmental record — from financing the destruction of rain forests to flooding huge inhabited areas.

Part of their arsenal is this slice of chilling honesty, courtesy of the World Bank's chief economist, Lawrence Summers. He says it's "just a joke". But Left Behind figures: With jokes like this, who needs tragedies? Now read on.

"Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs (less developed countries)?

"... I think the logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that... I've always thought that under-populated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted ...

"The problem with the argument against all these proposals for more pollution in LDCs (intrinsic rights, moral reasons, social concerns) ... is that they could be turned around and used against every bank proposal for liberalisation."

The World Bank, by the way, will be releasing funds to SA later this year — for the first time in 26 years. The first funds will go towards improving local government skills and will come from the Bank's Economic Development Institute. The fineprint is on the wall. Let's hope that someone, somewhere, is bothering to read it.

ELKE HUIS HET SY PRYS

WHO PAID FOR THE SANDTON MANSION IN WHICH ANC ELDER statespersons Oliver and Adelaide Tambo are living? In late May, the *Sunday Times* reported that the ANC had turned down an offer by Lonrho chief Tiny Rowland to foot the bill, pegged at R1.5-million.

Meanwhile, rumours in the ANC say that American comedian Bill Cosby and music producer Quincy Jones picked up the tab.

Well, they've got it all wrong. Left Behind confirms that Mr Rowland did, in fact, pay for the house. The Cosby link, says our source, "is plain rubbish". Ownership of the sprawling, peach-coloured mansion was transferred into the name of a company called "Henderson". And the price tag was actually "a little under R3-million".

Rowland's Lonrho, by the way, is a world-wide conglomerate with more than 800 companies and an annual turnover of R14,500 million. It employs 150,000 people in

Africa, from where it draws 66% of its profits. Its biggest stake in SA is Western Platinum Mines. Rowland's success on the continent has been linked to his knack for striking up close friendships with heads of state.

Read innocently, the Sandton mansion gift reveals a considerable soft spot for the Tambos and the ANC. His corporation, after all, is in serious financial trouble, leaving Rowland dangling by his fingernails.

HEAVEN — THE REAL THING

THE PHOTO COULD HAVE SHOWN AN OBVIOUSLY PLEASED GENT ringing the spot on the map. The headline should have read: Heaven Discovered!

But, alas, the world's media were otherwise occupied when Coca-Cola president Donald R Keough recently announced his find with these words:

"When I think of Indonesia — a country on the equator with 180 million people, an average age of 18, and a Muslim ban on alcohol — I feel like I know what heaven looks like."

And X marks the spot for a new Coke bottling plant.

AAH, THE WISDOM OF MEN

IN ONE OF THE COMMISSIONS OF THE ANC'S NATIONAL POLICY conference, a woman was feverishly arguing that verbal commitment to 'non-sexism' was not good enough. What's the use of being non-sexist in a structure, she asked, if women don't even make it into that structure? There had to be clear affirmative action guidelines.

The (male) chair "Uhm'd" and "Aah'd", trying to steer discussion elsewhere ... until a male comrade rose to repeat, virtually verbatim, the female comrade's advice.

"Aah-hah!" the chair awoke, "That is very interesting. Can you repeat it?" Across the room, hands began to jot down notes, like the moment was choreographed. Man has spoke, wisdom is in the air.

Well, not always. In another first, Left Behind announces the discovery of a new affliction that strikes only males. (No, it's not the reluctance to clean the house — that one was discovered during the Iron Age).

It's called 'Male Answer Syndrome' and it works like this: ask a man anything — like "What crops are produced in Upper Mongolia?" — and he'll answer with that confident voice. Even if he's never been east of Nelspruit. Ask a female medical doctor what causes hiccups, and the male lawyer will jump to answer. Try it. It works every time.

SOURCES

WIP/New Era research; *Dollars & Sense*; *Africa Analysis*; *Africa Confidential*; *New African* (London); *Utne Reader*.

GLOSSARY

absurd — ridiculous
adversaries — enemies
affidavits — sworn statements
a la Chile — as in Chile
amplified — made louder
arsenal — tore of weapons
authoritarian — dictatorial
autonomous — independent

bequeathed — left to a person (usually in a will)

cahoots — partnership
caricature — poor or ridiculous imitation
caucus — discussion with like-minded people
choreographed — dance arranged to music
clandestine — secret
cliche — phrase that is used so often it has lost meaning
clique — small exclusive group
collusion — underhand co-operation
complicity — partnership in wrong-doing
conspiracy — secret plot
critique — analysis

daunting — a difficult task
deign — condescend
dogbox (in the) — in trouble
dousing — throwing water over

egalitarian — where there is equality
elaborate — explain
elusive — hard to find
erratic — inconsistent

fervent — intense
fissures — cracks
flaw — imperfection
grandeur — something grand

heterosexual — attraction to the opposite sex
hitches — problems

idiosyncracies — peculiarities

WIP strives to communicate with as diverse a range of readers as possible. To this end, we give the meaning of some of the more difficult words found in this issue.

idyllic — perfect
illusory — unreal, deceptive
imbibe — absorb
incessant — never stopping
interspersed — mixed
infiltration — secret entry of spies into a group
instigate — start
interspersed — mixed with
introverted — withdrawn, unassertive

jargon — words known or used only by a particular group

knack — ability to do a particular thing well

macabre — gruesome
marginalised — pushed to the edges, ignored
maverick — unorthodox, individualistic
misgiving — doubt
monologues — one-sided conversation

obfuscate — obscure, confuse
obscenity — indecency
oft-quoted — often quoted
ominous — threatening

patriarchy — male dominated group
perpetuate — continue
petrifying — frightening
praetorian — loyalty to established order

SUBSCRIPTION RATES 1992

RATES FOR 8 ISSUES

SOUTH AFRICA (incl. VAT)

Workers and students	R30.80
Individuals, trade unions and community organisations	R48.40
Companies, libraries and institutions	R132.00
Donor subscriptions	R132.00

NB: Workers and students applying for this special, subsidised rate MUST send a certified copy of a payslip or student card with their payment, otherwise they will be charged the normal rate, and credited accordingly.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Individuals, trade unions and community organisations	R58.00
Companies, libraries and institutions	R132.00
Donor subscriptions	R132.00

USA, CANADA, AUSTRALIA

Individuals, trade unions and community organisations	\$66.00
Companies, libraries and institutions	\$132.00
Donor subscriptions	\$132.00

Please send subscriptions to:
 Southern African Research Service
 P O Box 32716
 BRAAMFONTEIN
 2017

Cheques should be made payable to:
 Southern African Research Service

Enclose payment with order. Subscription begins with current issue until otherwise specified.

R enclosed for 8 issues of WIP

NAME:

ADDRESS:

.....

.....

UK AND WESTERN EUROPE

Individuals, trade unions and community organisations	£26.00
Companies, libraries and institutions	£52.00
Donor subscriptions	£52.00



**Let all
know peace**

