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
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WORK IN PROGRESS 20 - October 1981

Cover by Kevin Humphrey.

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This issue of Work in Progress edited and published by an editorial collective of 40 jorissen street, 2001 braamfontein, and printed by sached, 54 simmonds street, 2001 johannesburg.

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EDITORIAL

THIS ISSUE of WIP, number 20, is the last for 1981. The first one next year will be dated February. The editors apologise for this annual break, but there is a positive side to it, in that these months can be used to consolidate our position in various areas:
distribution - we have not expanded as much during 1981 as during previous years, mainly because the editors have not travelled as widely and, therefore, not been as active in gaining subscribers and distributors. Readers and distributors are asked to help us in this task. Send us names and addresses and we can introduce new readers to WIP.

direction - the editors intend to re-evaluate WIP's direction and will be speaking to as many people on this as possible. Please send us your comments on matters concerned with WIP, including style, presentation and areas to focus on.

contributions - it is only through the welcome and active support of contributors that producing WIP during 1981 has been as 'painless' as it turned out to be. However, we need a wider range of contributors on a wider range of topics relevant to understanding contemporary southern Africa.

finances - please return the enclosed sheet on WIP finances; your ideas and advice are needed. If you are a distributor, please pay as soon as possible. Please renew your subscription upon receipt of a reminder notice. And thanks to those people who have taken out donor subscriptions.

DETERMINED POVERTY

THE WAGE BOARD attracts frequent criticism. TUCSA has in the past adopted resolutions attacking it for taking the side of employers and for 'showing little concern for the workers' case'. (1) The recent Wage Board investigation into the work conditions of nightwatchmen and other employees in the security services industry has attracted a certain amount of publicity. This article will recount the process of the investigation and, hopefully, illustrate a number of features of the Wage Board's operation.

THE WAGE BOARD

THE official version of the Wage Board's function is that it

investigates an industry and then makes recommendations to the hon. the Minister who in turn makes a determination. The Wage Board attempts to recommend fair wages and other conditions of service, taking into account the industry's ability to pay and the cost of living in the area concerned. (2)

What occurs is that in industries where no form of collective bargaining exists, the Minister of Manpower requests the Wage Board to investigate working conditions in that industry. The Board invites all interested parties to submit evidence, and may hold hearings at which oral evidence may be presented. As a result of the investigation the Board makes recommendations to the Minister as to what the minimum wages and working conditions in the industry should be. If the Minister accepts the recommendations, they are published in the Government Gazette as a Wage Determination.

A Wage Determination contains definitions of the job categories in the industry and lays down minimum wage rates for each category. In addition, it prescribes conditions of work for employees in the industry such as maximum hours of work, maximum overtime and overtime rates, paid leave, sick leave and notice periods.

An employer is not prevented from paying higher wages than those laid down in a Wage Determination, or from granting his or her employees better conditions of work. Failure to comply with a Wage Determination is an offence.

In terms of the Wage Act the Board, when making a recommendation, is required to take into account both 'the ability of employees in the trade concerned to carry out their businesses successfully', and 'the cost of living in any area in which the trade is being carried on'. This clearly envisages the Board as achieving some sort of compromise between the conflicting interests of employers and workers. In reality what has occurred is that the Board has leaned over backwards to accommodate employers' interests when setting minimum wage levels. One of the reasons for this is that it is not common for workers' interests to be represented at Wage Board hearings.

By and large, Wage Determinations are found in industries where no labour organisation exists, and the hearings have been dominated by employers arguing that minimum wage levels should not be raised too high. Minimum wage levels prescribed by the Wage Board are, by and large, very much lower than those contained in Industrial Council agreements. The lowest current minimum wage is for instance R12 per week.

Officially, the representation of black workers at Wage Board hearings is in the hands of

the Central Black Labour Board and its regional committees. Where other groups can show that they represent workers in the industry concerned, they will be able to present evidence but it is not clear precisely how much weight is attached to such evidence. When, for instance, in the early 1970s students from NUSAS' Wages Commissions presented evidence at a number of Wage Board hearings, the then-chairman of the Board said that he did not think that their evidence would significantly effect Board decisions, and their representations were 'to a great extent superfluous'. The Central Black Labour Board, he said,

is the official representative of black workers, and one which is more experienced in matters like conditions of employment. (3)

In the investigation into Security Services Industry, evidence was presented by the Legal Resources Centre on behalf of several night-watchmen who were clients of the Industrial Aid Society. Meetings were held with nightwatchmen to find out their working conditions; at the same time a campaign was launched stressing the inhuman conditions prevailing in much of the industry, and the failure of the Department of Manpower Utilisation to enforce the Wage Determination and to punish employers breaking its terms.

THE SECURITY SERVICES INDUSTRY

NIGHTWATCHMEN can be divided into two groups: there are those who are employed by security firms to guard other people's premises. These nightwatchmen fall under the Wage Determination for the Security Services Industry. Then there are the nightwatchmen who are employed to guard or patrol their employers' premises. These workers will have their conditions of service regulated by whatever Wage Determination or

Industrial Council Agreement applies to their employers. Where the employer is not covered in this way, the nightwatchman will have no statutory protection as they are excluded from most of the provisions of the Factories Act and the Shops and Offices Act.

Nightwatchmen as a group are in an ultra-exploitable position. Many are in the urban areas illegally, generally without a chance of regularising their position. They are often illiterate or possess little formal education and have no lucrative job skills. Security firms can be roughly divided between the larger firms which pay wages at prescribed minimum levels, and 'backyard' and 'fly-by-night' operators who, it is alleged, pay wages in the region of R60-R70 per month and work their employees in excess of 100 hours per week. Tension exists between these two groups of firms, and the larger firms see 'backyard' operations as unfairly threatening their profitability and as damaging the name of the security services industry.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE INVESTIGATION

19 November, 1979: A notice setting out the Board's terms of reference to investigate the security services industry is published in the Government Gazette. Written representations are invited from interested parties and a circular is sent to all employers in the industry requesting information as to wages paid, conditions of employment, and the submission of financial statements.

29 February, 1980 - 12 May, 1980: The Board holds oral hearings in the major urban areas. At these hearings evidence is presented by, among others, the Transvaal Employers' Association of Security Services (TEASS), the National Union

of Security Officers (NUSO), and the Legal Resources Centre (LRC).

13 February, 1981: A draft of the Board's recommendation to the Minister is published in the Government Gazette and comments and objections are invited from interested parties. (This 'objection stage' was done away with by the 1981 amendment to the Wage Act).

17 July, 1981: The Wage Determination for Security Services is gazetted and takes effect on Monday, 7 July. (On this day the minimum wages for nightwatchmen increase by roughly 40%, and their maximum normal working week is decreased from 84 to 72 hours).

10 August, 1981: A report is published in the Sowetan indicating that employers have been taken unawares by the new determination, and that TEASS has requested the Minister to delay its implementation for some months. Although this matter has not been resolved yet, it seems unlikely that the request will succeed as the Minister has no powers in terms of the Wage Act to delay the implementation of a Wage Determination once it has been gazetted.

MINIMUM WAGES

THE Board's approach to minimum wages for nightwatchmen vividly illustrates the inadequacies of the Board as an institution regulating wages and working conditions for close on 500 000 workers. (4) Since the introduction of a Wage Determination in late 1969 the minimum wages for nightwatchmen in the Johannesburg area have been:

December 1969 - November 1970	R7,50 per week
December 1970 - December 1973	R8,00
January 1974 - December 1974	R15,00

January 1975 - December 1975	R16,10
January 1976 - November 1977	R17,20
December 1977 - November 1978	R22,15
December 1978 - July 1981	R23,77

(Wages in other areas vary: in Cape Town the wage is about 5% higher; in Klerksdorp and Sasolburg it is 10% lower).

At the hearings, various evidence was offered as to what the minimum wage should be. The following figures were suggested:

FOSATU and Transport and General Union	R42,69 per week
Central Black Labour Board	R34,00
Regional Committee for Black Labour (written representation)	R28,11
Black Labour Office (Johannesburg)	R38,00
LRC	a sliding scale depending on experience, with a starting wage of R50,00
NUSO	R45,00
Employers (Pinetown)	R25,67
TEASS	R27,80

In its deliberations, the Board anguished over its dilemma in having to reconcile the interests of employers and employees:

Because a service is rendered by this trade and, as previously stated, the employers have to approach their clients for higher fees for their services whenever wages are increased, employers find themselves in a difficult position when it comes to charging higher prices for their services, and too sharp an increase in wages can present them with insuperable problems if their clients do not react positively. On the other hand, the Board is faced with evidence that the present prescribed wages of a watchman are too low, especially if the prescribed number of hours is considered, namely 84 per week, and that these wages compare poorly with those in other industries, more so if regard is had to the considerable rise in the price of the necessities of life, the high degree of danger to which watchmen are almost constantly exposed and the fact that many of them have to perform their duties under hazardous conditions during

nights that are sometimes extremely cold.

The Board feels that it would be failing in its duty and shutting its eyes to facts that merit consideration if it does not at this stage recommend a liveable wage for watchmen. Faced with these two extremes, namely the employer's problem on the one hand and the question of paying a liveable wage for the watchmen performing dangerous work and working long hours on the other hand, the Board decided, after consideration of all the evidence collected by it during its inquiry, to recommend a wage of R37,00 per week for a watchman in the highest wage area, R32,00 per week in the second highest wage area and R27,00 per week in the lowest wage area.

But this was a little too good to be true, and the Board promptly compensated so as not to hit employers too hard:

Because the recommended wages may occasion some difficulties for some employers, the Board decided to recommend lower wages, namely R34,00; R30,00; and R25,00 per week, respectively, for the first year of the coming into operation of the new determination to afford employers an opportunity to adjust and to sort out the position with their clients. The principle is also applied to the other classes of employees.

Insofar as any logic is detectable from the report, it is as follows: a liveable wage (as at November 1980) for watchmen in the Johannesburg area is R37 per week. (Precisely how this figure was arrived at the Board does not state). But employers will not be able to afford this, so we will delay the implementation of the 'liveable' wage for a year and let watchmen receive R34,00 until then. The effect of the Board's economic illogical thought, coupled with the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the Department of Manpower is that the new minimum wage that took effect on July 27, 1981, was already R3,00 per week below the Board's own conception of what a liveable wage was in November 1980. This 'liveable' wage will eventually be introduced in August 1982 and it

will be in effect for at least a year and probably longer. By this time, the wage will be 50% below the Board's own conception of what a liveable wage is, taking inflation into account, and probably 100% less than any minimum subsistence level. An additional irony is that while the Board sees the first year of the new Wage Determination as being a period of 'adaptation' for employers, watchmen will in real terms be worse off in the following year. The rise in the minimum that will occur in August 1982 from R34 to R37 will be of the order of 8,8%. This will be well below the expected decline in the buying power of money during this period.

These arguments were raised by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of Witwatersrand, when it made submissions objecting to the contents of the draft determination. They were, however, rejected by the Board which stated that the implementation of higher wage levels would adversely affect employers, especially as the maximum normal working week had been reduced from 84 to 72 hours.

While nightwatchmen have received a 40% rise in their minimum wage, it is suggested that this has done nothing to enhance their buying power. Prior to the increase the wage had been static for 31 months and the increase does not even compensate watchmen for the decline in buying power of their earnings. The table above shows that wages for watchmen have remained consistently below subsistence levels and this pattern continues unabated. While the prescribed wages are only minimum levels, they do play a crucial role in determining what nightwatchmen actually receive. Figures in the Board's report indicate that only 10% of watchmen received a wage

significantly above the minimum level. In areas where the determination did not previously apply, wages were as much as 50% below the minimum level for other areas.

What is unclear is precisely how the Wage Board arrived at its conclusion as to what a liveable wage is. Certainly, the figure is above those suggested in evidence by employers but it is well below those suggested by organisations representing nightwatchmen, and all minimum subsistence levels brought to the attention of the Board. The Board did seem to be guided by the fact that on the average, the returns submitted by employers indicated that their net profit was in the vicinity of 5%, and that this would not enable them to meet a large increase in their wage bills. The Board does not appear to have checked these figures in any way, and this low profit margin does seem odd at a time when South Africa's paranoia about the safety of its property has thrown the security industry into a boom.

PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT

THE new wage determination has resulted in nightwatchmen receiving a 40% increase in their minimum wage levels and their maximum working week being cut by 12 hours. The question as to how effectively this will be done, remains.

The files of the Industrial Aid Society and the Hoek Street law clinic indicate that many security firms honoured the previous determination more in the breach than in the keeping. Frequently, watchmen informed these organisations that they received wages of R60-R70 per month in return for working hours well in excess of the prescribed level. One of the most common abuses alleged is the weekend 'double-shift'. This involves watchmen being on

duty from Friday evening to Monday morning (a period of 60 hours) without a break. In addition, these watchmen usually work four 12-hour days making for a 108-hour week. This type of practice involves numerous contraventions of the determination: watchmen are entitled to a day off every week and where this is not granted they are entitled to double-pay for the seventh day worked each week; only 12 hours overtime can be worked a week and this should be paid at 1 1/3 times the normal rate.

But where a worker is underpaid in terms of a Wage Determination, enforcing a claim is a difficult task. Such workers cannot proceed straight to court but must refer the matter initially to the Department of Manpower Utilisation. The reason for this is that should a worker eventually take an employer to court for underpayment, he/she will have to show that the employer has been prosecuted for breaking the terms of the determination and acquitted; or that the attorney-general has declined to prosecute. But this is no speedy process, for once a matter is referred to the Department it gets bogged down in the quagmires of bureaucratic inefficiency. That is, if the complainant is lucky enough to have the complaint accepted. It was apparently the practice in the office of the Department in Johannesburg for an official at the enquiries desk to telephone the employer when a watchman complained of underpayment. If the employer denied the allegation, the worker would be advised that he had no case. This practice has since been discontinued.

Investigations by the Department take a long time and when they are concluded in favour of a nightwatchman the settlement he receives is a small portion of the amount claimed. Last year, the IAS drew attention to the case of

a nightwatchman who had a claim of R680 and received a settlement of R25.

An additional difficulty lies in the problems connected with proving that a worker has been underpaid. Normally, an employer must prove that he has paid a worker the correct wage; but if a worker has signed an employer's register indicating that he received the prescribed wage, he will have to prove he received less. In this regard, one offence by an employer will often compound others. Employers are required to give workers their wages in pay envelopes indicating the amount received and the hours worked. Certain employers simply pay their workers by hand and as they are often alone on duty when they receive the cash, they have no witnesses to assist proving that they were underpaid.

Paul Benjamin

Notes:

- (1) Financial Mail, 25.08.72.
- (2) Mr L.J. van der Berg, MP. Hansard, 24.02.81, column 2320.
- (3) Financial Mail, 04.08.72.
- (4) Wage Determinations cover 470 865 workers. Hansard, 13.08.81, column 828.

Employer underpaid RDM 26.09.81 workers

Mail Reporter

THE owner of a security firm employing black night-watchmen was fined R100, or 50 days, yesterday after being found guilty of underpaying his workers.

Charles Daniel Elliot, 32, of Elliot Protection Services, Langerman Drive, Kensington, pleaded guilty before Mr C A

Alcock in the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court.

The court found that the offences had been committed since March 1977.

The court also found that he failed to enclose pay slips inside the workers' pay envelopes. He also deducted money from their pay for overalls he had provided.

It was also found he made his workers work from 4pm on Fridays until 6am the following Monday without a break.

He forced the workers to continue working even if they were off-duty, and did not pay them double wages.

Pleading in mitigation Elliot told the court that his firm had been liquidated.


INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY, part 2

This article is part 2 of our series on political economy. The first part appeared in WIP 19, and readers are advised to consult it before proceeding with the second part of the series. Some of the concepts and ideas which appear below are explored and explained in part 1, especially those relating to commodities, labour and socially necessary labour time, labour power, and surplus value. Copies of WIP 19 are available from the editors.

IN PART 1 of this series, we posed the question: where does capitalist profit come from, and how is it produced? Through investigating the nature of the commodity, it was found that the value which the working class creates in producing commodities is the basis of profit.

More specifically, we found that through labour, the working class produced more than enough to cover the costs of reproducing its own labour power. The amount of time which it takes to reproduce the value of labour power, we discovered, was called necessary labour time: that is, the amount of time socially necessary to produce the value of those goods necessary to maintain the worker. That time in which surplus value (the basis of capitalist profit) is produced we called surplus labour time.

Diagrammatically, this was shown in the following way:



We concluded part 1 of this series by noting that

This, then, is the basis of capitalist profit: the capitalist class has the power to force the working class to work longer than is necessary to reproduce its own labour power. Having bought labour power at its value, the capitalist class is able to obtain actual labour for a period longer than is necessary for the working class to reproduce itself. The value produced in this additional time, surplus labour time, is taken over by the capitalist class as surplus value, and this is the way in which capitalists exploit workers - they live off the profits from their labour. Exploitation is thus a relationship involving the taking over of the value produced by the working class during surplus labour time. (WIP 19:29).

TWO IMPORTANT SOCIAL RELATIONS

IN trying to understand the way societies function - finding out what the most important aspects and processes are - we have to look at relations, rather than things or objects. It is not, for example, machines or tools which exploit workers and thus form the basis of conflict in society. Rather, it is the relations which exist between workers, tools and machinery, and capitalists, which allow us to understand yet another relation - that of exploitation.

In this part of our series, we are going to look at two very important social relations which form the basis of the capitalist economy.

They are


- 1) the relationship of classes to the means of production; and
- 2) the ways in which the capitalist class attempts

to obtain more surplus value from the working class, ie the different ways in which the degree of exploitation is increased.

THE RELATION OF CLASSES TO THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION

EARLIER, we noted that the capitalist class had the power to force the working class to work longer than is necessary to reproduce its own labour power. But what is the basis of this power? Why doesn't the working class just cease to produce value when it has produced sufficient for its own reproduction? If this happened, there would be no capitalist profit, and no exploitation.

necessary labour-time (N)	surplus labour-time (S)
value of labour-power produced	surplus value produced



Here, workers will only produce value during necessary labour time, and not work for the capitalist class during surplus labour time.

The basis of the capitalists' power to force workers to produce surplus value lies in its ownership of the means of production. As we explained in part 1 of this series, means of production refer to

on the one hand useful materials from natural sources: minerals, coal, petroleum, wood, water, etc: and on the other hand the instruments of production: tools, machinery and increasingly advanced equipment which makes it possible to extract or harvest useful natural materials, and then to transport and industrially transform them. (Jalee, quoted in WIP 19:28).

The capitalist class owns the means of production, while the working class owns nothing but its labour power, or capacity to work; this capacity to work is sold to the capitalists for a wage, which is necessary for the continued survival of the workers.

The working class, the direct producers, are thus separated from the means of production, which are owned by the non-producing capitalist class. (Direct producers are not separated from the means of production in all types of societies. For example, in feudal society the direct producers had control over a piece of land, seed and the tools necessary to cultivate the land; and in advanced socialist societies the direct producers control both the means of production, and the way the surplus they produce is allocated).

The working class owns nothing but its labour power. If workers owned land, or factories and machinery, they would not be forced to sell their labour power to the capitalist class in return for a wage. But because the working class is separated from the means of production, and has nothing to sell but its capacity to work, the owners of the means of production have a basis of power over workers. For if workers refused to produce surplus value, if they worked only for that period of time necessary to reproduce themselves, the capitalist class could stop employing them, and refuse to buy their labour power. For the capitalist class this may involve a temporary drop in profits; for the working class, with no ownership or control over any means of production, starvation and death face them and their families.


We can thus see why the relationship to the means of production is such an important relation in society: for the capitalist class,

its ownership of the means of production is a basis of power; for the working class, its separation from any means of production causes weakness and dependence on the capitalist class.

This important social relation is also one of the ways in which one identifies classes: the non-producing capitalist class has a relationship of ownership and control over the means of production; the producing working class has a relation of separation from the means of production. Those who own the means of production have power over those who do not. They also have the power to decide how the means of production are put into use, and how the products made are distributed. Thus, ownership of the means of production is a power relation which enables the owners to decide what is produced, how it is produced, and how any surplus produced is distributed.

DIFFERENT MECHANISMS OF EXPLOITATION

As explained in part 1 of this series, value is produced during the length of the working day. However, the working day is itself divided into 2 sections: during the one, the working class produces the value of its wages; and during the other, surplus value is produced.




In order to generate more and more profit, the capitalist class has to change the relationship between necessary and surplus labour time, continually attempting to increase surplus labour time (S) relative to necessary labour time (N).


The relationship between N and S indicates the degree or rate of exploitation of workers; in other words it is an indication of the amount of surplus labour relative to necessary labour which the capitalist class is extracting from workers.

The way in which the relationship of N to S is changed, ie the different ways in which the capitalist class attempts to increase surplus value, is the second important relation to be examined in this part of our series.


If we return to our diagram representing the working day



we can see that one way of increasing surplus labour time (S) is to simply increase the length of the working day.




Thus, for example, if the working day is initially 8 hours, divided into 5 hours necessary labour time, and 3 hours surplus labour time, and the capitalist class is strong enough to force an extra hour of work from the workers, then the length of the working day becomes 9 hours, divided as follows:




This mechanism of increasing the rate of exploitation and surplus value involves lengthening the working day absolutely, and is accordingly called the production of absolute surplus value.

But one can see another way of changing the relationship of necessary to surplus labour time without actually changing the length of the working day: this involves a change in the divisions within the working day.

In the above example, the length of the working day was increased from 8 to 9 hours. Let us now presume that it remains constant at 8 hours:



The line dividing the working day into surplus and necessary labour time (A-B) can be moved, thus changing the relative division of the working day:



In this case, necessary labour time is cut down in relation to surplus labour time, thus giving the capitalist a greater rate of exploitation, and more surplus value.

But how can this be done? How can the labour time necessary to produce the value of the wage be cut down on? In part 1 of this series, we explained that the exchange value of labour power (ie the value of the wage) represented what was socially necessary to survive. We then went on to note that

what is needed to survive is not constant, but changes in different circumstances. If the working class is strong and organised, it may be able to increase what is considered to be sufficient to live on; if the workers are weak and disorganised, the capitalists are able to lower the average survival consumption of workers. (WIP 19:27).

Thus, the power of the capitalist class may, at certain stages, be such that it actually reduces what is considered socially necessary for working class survival, and depresses the level of working class consumption. In practical terms, this means that workers eat less, and that the quality of what they eat is poorer; the quality of housing and clothing may decline, there will be less money available for health care, schooling, etc. This sort of process is detailed in WIP 17 under the general title Inflation and the Working Class. In the section on falling wages, it is shown how the standard of living of workers is actually falling in South Africa, and that what is considered to be 'socially necessary' for survival is declining for at least some sections of the working class. (see WIP 17:26).

Because, in this general example, surplus labour time is being increased relative to necessary labour time (rather than absolutely, as in our first example), this is called the production of relative surplus value. In the one case, the division between surplus and necessary labour time is changed absolutely, by lengthening the working day; in the other, it is the internal divisions of the working day which are changed relative to each other.

There are other ways of producing relative surplus value, apart from the one described above. At this stage they need not be dealt with in any detail, although we will be returning to this question in part 3 of the series.

What is important at this stage is to realise that the way in which the capitalist class attempts to increase the amount of surplus value it takes over (appropriates) from the working class is a very important social relation in society. A society in which absolute surplus value (lengthening the working day) is the major way of appropriating surplus value will in some ways be different from a society in which relative surplus value is more important. In other words, the way in which surplus value is appropriated (taken over) by the capitalist class is an important social relation, necessary to understand in analysing society. For example, if the capitalist class is cutting back on working class consumption, ie lessening necessary labour time relative to surplus labour time, the level of repression is going to be very high in that society. A certain degree of force and violence will be used by the ruling class to enforce a cut back on what is considered socially necessary to survive.

The importance of this will become clearer in part 3 of this series on political economy, when we come to look at some of the ways in which the capitalist class has appropriated surplus value in the development of South African capitalism. This is one of the keys to understanding segregation and the migrant labour system, as well as institutions like hostels, compounds and townships.

CONCLUSION

In this section, we have seen that social relations, rather than things or peoples' intentions or ideas, are a key to understanding how society works. We considered two very important sets of social relations:

- 1) the relationship of the capitalist and

working class to the means of production. Here we discovered that the capitalist's ownership of the means of production was an important basis of power. This power allowed them to force the working class to produce surplus value, to decide what is to be produced, how it is to be produced, and how the surplus is distributed.

2) the different ways in which the production of surplus value is increased is also a key social relationship. In this article, we distinguished between the production of absolute surplus value, and relative surplus value. The way in which surplus value is produced and appropriated is very important in understanding why there are different forms of capitalist society.

In the next part of this series on political economy, we will look at some of the specific ways in which the capitalist class has increased its rate of surplus value appropriation (exploitation) in South Africa, and how these mechanisms explain some of the features of a racially segregated society initially based on a system of migrant labour.

GM


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THE INANDA SCHEME: a briefing

THIS CONTRIBUTION is written in the style of the 'Briefings' in earlier issues of Work In Progress, its intention being to get down on paper some of the events and issues that have unfolded in Released Area 33. A more theoretical background to resettlement, the housing question in general, and the self-help approach in particular can be found in the DSG/SARS information publications. (*)

There are many information gaps in this contribution - possibly the most important concerns the actual residents of the site-and-service scheme discussed below. On this aspect, the Durban Surplus Peoples' Project will be publishing a report, based on a survey of residents, in the near future. This should help to fill the gap. Given the nature of the issue and the difficulty of checking and verifying information, the writer is well aware of the tentative and speculative nature of this article. As with all contributions to WIP, any corrected or additional information and insights would be welcome.

PRIOR TO the 1950s, the area north of Natal's Umgeni River and inland from the coastal strip, was mainly agricultural land. Large tracts were under sugar cane, mainly owned by the sugar estates. Further inland and north of the river there were smaller plots, owned under freehold title by africans, indians and whites. Beyond that was the african reserve of Zululand.

Indian and african labour, servicing the

Durban area, was housed in Cato Manor, behind Durban University. With the massive influx of black labour in the 1940s and 1950s, the Cato Manor area developed into a vast slum with a population of up to 160 000. Local and state officials feared the outbreak of epidemics, uncontrollable vice, crime and political agitation, and in 1958 Cato Manor was proclaimed a white group area.

The removal and resettlement of people from Cato Manor was quickly undertaken. Land was expropriated from the sugar estates north of the Umgeni, and the african township of Kwa Mashu was built. As Kwa Mashu 'filled up', Ntuzuma township was started, next to Kwa Mashu, and in the 1970s Phoenix and Newlands indian and coloured townships were built. When Phoenix and Ntuzuma are completed, the townships north of the Umgeni will house a population of approximately 500 000. The majority of the working population in these townships has to travel the +20km, daily, to work in Durban.

However, not all those removed from Cato Manor were resettled in the townships. Thousands did not 'qualify' for, or resisted, removal to the ordered, controlled bleakness of the townships. Many settled in the informal settlements on the outer area of Durban.

One of these settlements was in the Inanda area, north of Kwa Mashu and Ntuzuma. Inanda is comprised of two parts: an area within the KwaZulu boundry, where the land is under tribal tenure and authority- this area is relatively sparsely settled; and an area immediately adjacent to the KwaZulu boundary, which is Released Area 33 (RA 33).

The Native Trust and Land Act (Act 180 of 1936) declared certain land as released areas. These areas were to be acquired by the South African Native (now Development) Trust (SADT),

to make up the 13% quota of land for the reserves or bantustans. RA 33 is one of these released areas. It consists of freehold land owned by african and indian landlords, and various churches. The SADT owns three sites in RA 33, and it is on these that the Inanda site-and-service scheme was located.

RA 33 had for years been in a sort of administrative 'limbo'. It was not part of the KwaZulu bantustan, it was not an urban area, it was not part of 'white' South Africa. It had no local authority. Officially it was administered by the Verulam magistrate. In reality it was controlled by the landowners. Its uncertain status, however, meant that it was an appropriate place to live in for those who could not get a house in the overcrowded townships; for those not eligible for a township house; for those who did not want to live in a township; and for those moving from the impoverished rural areas. In RA 33 a person could rent a shack, or rent a small plot and build a shack.

The landlords, however, provided no services. There was no piped water supply, and rivers and streams were the major source of water. There were a few boreholes, but these were owned and controlled by landlords and shopowners who sold the water at exorbitant prices.

In the 1970s there was a considerable increase in settlement in the area, and the population in the 30km square area is presently approximately 80 000. During 1978-79 Natal experienced a long drought, and early in 1979 members of the communities in RA 33 approached the Urban Foundation's Natal Region office in Durban with a request to solve the water problem. The Urban Foundation (UF) undertook a study and by June 1979 came up with a proposal for a permanent water supply system that would cost

approximately R2,5-m. The UF study found that there was excess capacity in reservoirs serving the Mtuzuma and Phoenix townships, and that this could be easily extended to serve RA 33.

The Urban Foundation also set about trying to find out which government department was responsible for the area, and to convince it of the viability and need for such a water scheme.

The drought continued into the summer of 1978-79. The water sources in RA 33 dried up or were reduced to a sewage-fouled trickle. Negotiations with government departments continued. It appears that these departments, particularly the Department of Co-operation and Development, were stalling on the issue, using the excuse that there was no local authority for the area. However, the South African Development Trust (SADT) is responsible in terms of the 1936 Act; the Department of Co-operation and Development acts for the Trust and is therefore the legal authority in RA 33.

Then, in January and February, the Durban municipal and state health authorities began receiving reports of dramatic increases in typhoid cases from hospitals and clinics. The media suddenly focussed attention on this 'new' issue, and the Regional Director of State Health, Dr Johan van Rensburg, was quoted as describing the situation as an 'epidemic'. (2) The article quoting van Rensburg was headlined 'Fears typhoid may spread to Durban' and contained the following opening paragraphs:

Durban is sitting on a typhoid bomb. Thousands of workers could be unwitting carriers of the killer disease - and there are fears that the epidemic could spread to the city.

The bomb is Inanda and the solution is water piped within easy reach of every home.

But Inanda - one of Durban's major labour sources - is a squatter's haven. (3)

Typhoid is prevalent in South Africa, with Natal having the highest number of reported cases. (4) When the media got over its initial hysteria at having discovered an epidemic in its back yard, it found out that

Inanda had a bad reputation for typhoid... Last year 160 typhoid cases and two deaths were reported in the 80 000 strong district. (5)

But it was not only the press which became concerned with the epidemic. Those with a greater material interest in the problem of a contaminated labour supply also expressed their 'concern'. Durban's Deputy Medical Officer of Health, Dr Muriel Richter, was quoted as saying '...that while the situation in Inanda gave cause for concern, the threat to Durban was not so great as might have been expected'. Although Inanda adjoined Durban and supplied it and other urban centres with labour, there was no reason to panic, she said.

Our Department has been inundated with calls from commerce and industry inquiring about this, but apart from those industries concerned with the sale and distribution of food there is no cause for alarm. (6)

The prospect of a typhoid epidemic certainly galvanised all parties into action. The Durban City Health Department and the State Health Department mounted inoculation campaigns in RA 33 during March 1980. (7) The UF released details to the press of its June 1979 water scheme report and its lack of success in negotiations with state departments.

The tragedy of Inanda's situation was that no one was prepared to take responsibility for being the local authority for the area, the Regional Director of the Urban Foundation, Mr Alan Mountain, said yesterday.

The Urban Foundation had investigated laying a reticulated water system in Inanda as early as March last year, and after its completion had submitted a report to various departments, including the Department of Co-operation and Development, for

consideration. However, nothing was done. (8)

It must be noted that even at this stage the Urban Foundation was looking beyond the mere provision of water to what it saw as 'long term solutions'. A statement by Mountain refers to the need for the 'upgrading of the area'. (9)

The news of the typhoid epidemic roused the New Republic Party's health spokesman, Nigel Wood, then MP for Berea, to attack the authorities for an 'unforgivable outbreak of a preventable disease'; Wood advocated supplying water to the area by road tanker. (10)

State Health moved two medical teams and a mobile clinic into the area to boost the inoculation campaigns. (11) However, these teams concentrated their efforts on RA 33 whereas the Mzinyathi river to the west of the area had been identified as one of the prime typhoid hazard areas. But the river flows through the KwaZulu district of Ndwedwe which is the responsibility of the KwaZulu Health Department. It appears that there were no contingency plans for co-ordinated action on a metropolitan scale by the three health authorities involved.

The most significant response was the forming of an emergency committee to organise relief for the typhoid-stricken area. Chairman of this committee was Brigadier Charles Lloyd, officer commanding Natal Command. (At present he is a Major-General, in command of SADF forces in Namibia). Quite how, why and when he became involved is not clear. However, Lloyd has been associated with the Urban Foundation before. At an Urban Foundation rural development conference he delivered a paper on the SADF and its involvement in bantustan development. This involvement of the SADF in bantustan rural development was part of the civic action programme - a component of 'total strategy' to resist the 'total onslaught'. (12)

This emergency committee held a meeting on March 14, 1980, and at a press conference afterwards Brigadier Lloyd said that

the prime concern had been to plan emergency measures to defuse the immediate problems of the water shortage and the typhoid epidemic, and not to attempt any solution of long-term problems.

The immediate problems in Inanda - drought and the consequent typhoid epidemic, aggravated by the fact that it lacks the basic services of an organised community - required emergency action by various departments and for that reason an inter-departmental committee was formed.

The committee had drawn up plans for short-term relief and had formed a management committee chaired by the District Magistrate and Commissioner of Verulam, to implement them.

Seventeen tankers had been loaned for free to the Department of Co-operation and Development by the Port Natal Administration Board, Department of Water Affairs, NPA Road Services, the SA Development Trust at Ntuzuma, two civil engineering contractors and the Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery. (13)

Seventeen sites were established in RA 33 and water tankers installed and supplied daily by road tankers from Monday, March 17, 1980. Water was free, and there was no rationing. By March 30, 4 000 000 litres at a cost (in fuel, water and running costs of the tankers) of R10 000 had been distributed. (14)

This is believed to have helped bring the typhoid epidemic....within manageable proportions. 'I haven't received any notification of typhoid cases for about 10 days now', Mr Purvis (Verulam magistrate)said yesterday. (15)

The state did not seem to think the cost of tanking in water at R10 000 for two weeks (or R260 000 per year), to be too great. Mr RN Blumrick, Department of Co-operation and Development's Chief Commissioner for Natal, said at the time that 'he would be granted any additional cash needed'. (16) Yet the Department

had previously ignored the Urban Foundation's original water scheme report which had explored the feasibility of supplying water by tanker. It had estimated the cost at R144 000 a year and rejected this option as 'exorbitant'. (17)

By the beginning of April 1980, it appeared that the typhoid had been brought under control. By now the UF, the SADF, various state departments and local authorities had their attentions firmly focussed on RA 33, and were persuaded that the UF's judgement that a 'long-term solution' was needed, was correct. As Brigadier Lloyd put it, the authorities did not want 'an epidemic every time there is a drought', (18) and a solution could only be dealt with at 'ministerial level'. (19)

The recipients of this flurry of officialdom's attention viewed the matter somewhat differently:

Why did my people have to die before something was done? We always have this problem with water and a lot of people have died from the fever. I do not know how many

said Amawothi deputy chief, Cyprian Nkwanyama. (20)

AFTER THE CRISIS: A LONG-TERM SOLUTION?

IT is difficult to discover what took place in the months following the containment of the typhoid crisis. At the end of March, Co-operation and Development Minister Koornhof announced in parliament that the government was investigating on a 'medium and long term' a water supply for Inanda. (21) In June, the Urban Foundation approached the Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University of Natal, Durban, with the suggestion that the department's students focus on RA 33 in a course planning project. The UF explained that Co-operation and Development had agreed to the Foundation preparing a report on the area. This report would serve as the

basis for the drawing up of a brief for planning consultants. These consultants would then put together a plan for the formal, controlled 'development' of the area. The head of the university department approached, Professor M Kahn, agreed to make RA 33 the focus of a student project, but one which would not be structured to suit the Urban Foundation's requirements, ie it would remain essentially independent. However, the UF did recruit several students in July 1980, to gather information on RA 33. From this, the UF's Inanda Report was prepared.

However, in between Koornhof's statement and the UF's June-July actions, decisions must have been made at 'ministerial level'. In a matter of weeks, Co-operation and Development's town planners put together plans for the three SADI parcels of land in RA 33. Then the sites were surveyed and pegged, dust roads bulldozed, pit latrines with corrugated iron shelters dug on each site, and water standpipes put in every 100m.

No public announcement was made until Sunday, July 13, when Mr Purvis, the Verulam magistrate, called a meeting of residents of the Amawothi area in the north east of RA 33. This meeting was attended by Co-operation and Development, Port Natal Administration Board and Urban Foundation officials. According to press reports, and to various officials with whom the writer has discussed the matter, Purvis stressed that 'nobody would be compelled to move to the new area'. (22) Those who chose to move would be transported free of charge by GG trucks (government trucks bearing the GG - Government Garage - numberplates), and could borrow tents until they had built temporary shelters.

The Urban Foundation did not seem at all



sure of Co-operation and Development's long term plan for the area on which the site and service scheme was to be set up. The UF wrote that

The areas (ie the site and service scheme areas) are administered as 'emergency Areas' under Proclamation 188, pending proclamation as a township within a few years - no date has been set. Under present conditions a monthly rental of R2,60 is paid for each site occupied. Once the township is proclaimed, the purchase of land will be permitted and encouraged. Although the land so purchased will not be freehold, it is understood that it will offer security of tenure equivalent to 60-year leasehold. (23)

Like the Urban Foundation, the residents of the scheme have also experienced considerable uncertainty as to its future development and direction.

In an interview with the Daily News after the July 13 meeting, Urban Foundation's Alan Mountain outlined the UF's role and the advantages which it saw in the site and service scheme:

The Foundation is to set up technical advice centres from which plans and technical help will be made available, he said.

Among the advantages of the scheme are:

- * low income families have an intermediate stage between the unsanitary, fire-

prone shack in a squatter settlement and apermanence which is initially beyond their means;

- * areas will develop with the incomes of the residents, ultimately offering a better quality of life for their inhabitants than the rows of boxes in the established townships could;
- * landowners who rent out minute patches of ground to shack-dwellers, trapping them by absorbing the money they could otherwise have saved towards a better house, would be excluded. (24)

These so-called advantages are nonsense. The 'intermediate stage' was never spelled out to the people involved. In fact, people moved from established shack homes into green tents. Heavy rains later turned the area into a quagmire, latrines overflowed, and the tents became soggy shelters.

A shack (mjondolo) costs between R150 and R500 to build, depending on the materials used. Most people, when moved to the site and service area, put up mjondolos - the same 'unsanitary, fire-prone shacks' as in the rest of RA 33. Of the 3 000 families in the scheme, only 100 have started to build 'permanent' homes, and another 100 have their names on a list for assistance.

Thus, the vast majority are not in a position to afford to build brick/concrete block houses. Where the Urban Foundation gets the idea that the residents' income will increase to the point that they could afford a R3 500 - R4 000 house is not known.

Further, the above statement by Mountain makes the implicit assumption that 'permanent' houses will necessarily offer or lead to a 'better quality of life'. Such an assumption is highly questionable.

Finally, on the last 'advantage' listed above: most residents previously paid R3 - R4 per month, or R30 - R40 per year in rent to landlords. Thus, they will be saving between R0,40 and R1,40 a month by living on the site and service scheme. Hardly the kind of savings necessary for a 'better house'!

It appears that there was no shortage of 'volunteers' to settle on the scheme. However, not just any resident of RA 33 was eligible:

To qualify for a site in the new project, the applicant must be resident in Inanda, and must be a citizen of KwaZulu. (This does not necessarily exclude those who were born in other areas). (25)

It is not known how effectively this 'selection' process was applied to residents.

The response of the landlords and community notables to the scheme is difficult to detail. It has been said that Nkwanyama went round persuading Amawothi shack dwellers to move, whilst one major landowner, Rogers Ngcobo, was said to be initially against the move.

The press greeted the scheme positively - one Daily News headline read 'The hills are alive with the sound of building'.

The scheme's residents seem to have had a mixed reaction. Most people were confused as to what they would receive. Many thought that they would get a month's free 'rations', whereas

in fact they were given only a day's worth on arrival. Others have claimed that they were promised free building materials, and that they have had to resort to bribery in order to get 'a tent and the delivery of temporary building materials'. (26) Many believed that houses would be built for them.

When the first resettlement phase took place in mid-1980, there were no schools, shops, businesses, community centres or halls, police station, post office, sports fields, play areas, creches or clinics. However, a free bus service for school children from the scheme to their school in AmaWothi was started. PUTCO soon started operating a service through the scheme. A year later, there is a tin shack school. A permanent school is scheduled to be built in the next month or two and it is planned that two will be in operation by next year (1982). The KwaZulu Education Department has responsibility for the schools in RA 33 - apart from the independent, church-funded Inanda Seminary school - even though the area is not yet part of KwaZulu. A mobile clinic now visits the area once or twice a week.

The first phase of resettlement was carried out swiftly, and seems to have caught the Urban Foundation unprepared for the large numbers involved - 3 000 families, 15 000 people. The UF managed to get the Department of Co-operation and Development to stop resettlement until the chaotic situation was sorted out. It also seems that the UF was influential in getting the Department to make building loans available at reasonable interest rates.

The main source of finance for the project is the funds made available by the Department...in the form of loans repayable over 30 years at interest rates depending on the income of head of household (1% for income 0 - R150, 3,5% for R151 - R250, etc). 10% deposit is required for

the loan. Maximum amount of the loan at present is R2 500. The loan is made available through the offices of the Port Natal Administration Board, and must be drawn in materials or cash for labour, either of which are to be certified by the Urban Foundation....The deposit is held in the name of the applicant until building to the stage desired is complete. From the deposit are deducted a 2,5% (of the material cost of the house) fee, and escalation costs and contingencies. The balance is returned to the applicant. (27)

On paper this looks to be fairly reasonable. Even the poorest will have access to a loan at a heavily subsidised interest rate.

However, the reality is different. Apparently, a second 'sorting out' or filtration process is in operation. The first attempted to exclude people from the scheme on ethnic/'homeland' citizenship grounds. Since then, a second has informally come into operation. It appears that households with an income of less than R100 are being refused loans, and those non-KwaZulu citizens who have somehow managed to evade the first screening process are also being refused loans.

Informed observers of the scheme believe that at least 60% and possibly 80% of the 3 000 households fall into these categories. The UF intends conducting a survey to determine the income levels of the residents, and will presumably try to use these figures to convince the Department and the PNAB to drop the second screening process. There is strong speculation that the Department will not allow those not eligible for loans to remain in their mjandolos, but will attempt to resettle them yet again. This is an added element of uncertainty and insecurity for the residents.

One form this insecurity has taken is that of rumour. Since the scheme's beginning there has been a consistent circulation of rumours

concerning houses, building materials, landlord/resident conflicts, the Urban Foundation, etc. One rumour was that people had to earn R235 per month in order to qualify for a loan. A second rumour held that people were being turned away from the motor assemblies factory where they bought plywood board. This rumour claimed that the Urban Foundation was behind the move so that they could secure a monopoly on building materials and sell them through their site office. A third rumour that circulated widely concerned the alleged building of blocks of flats on an indian-owned plot in RA 33. According to this, shacks would be demolished and people compelled to move into the flats. These flats were to be built by the UF and would cost R50 per month to rent. A fourth rumour was to the effect that large parts of RA 33 were to be expropriated as an extension to the sprawling indian township of Phoenix. A fifth rumour held that a prominent landlord had been behind an attempt on the life of a residents' committee leader.

Conditions in the scheme further deteriorated when storms hit the area in mid-December last year.

(T)he entire Tent City was flooded and residents had to dig trenches in a vain attempt to divert the water around their tents and toilets.

The toilets which were constructed on a shallow pit were flooded and when I visited the area on Sunday I found human faeces floating around....

Mr Richard Ngubane (a resident) said: 'The area was so water-logged that we could not even go to the toilet. I regret moving from my shack further down the road. Although it was a shack at least no water came inside when it rained. I now fear an epidemic breaking out'. (28)

Residents' resentment appeared to come to a head when, in early April this year, the Urban Foundation was accused of 'robbing the people' and told that it should 'pull out of

Ematendi (the site and service scheme)'. (29)

A meeting on this issue was attended by between 1 000 and 2 000 people:

Present at the mass meeting was the KwaZulu Minister of Works and Roads, Chief Mzonjani Ngcobo of the Anna-Gadi tribe, and the MP for Inanda Mr Rogers Ngcobo, who also heads the Inanda Liaison Committee'. (30)

A report on the conflict claimed that

there was open talk about burning down the community centre built by the Foundation and threats were made against the lives of people working for the Foundation.... (I)nquiries made by the Daily News indicate that the Foundation might be forced to withdraw because of a highly organised campaign specifically aimed at bringing about withdrawal. (31)

On Tuesday, April 7, the conflict was taken up before the KwaZulu Cabinet at Ulundi where discussions were held with Rogers Ngcobo and the UF's Alan Mountain.

Mr Ngcobo said the Chief Minister, Dr Gatscha Buthelezi, and his colleagues expressed their desire not to become entangled in the Inanda controversy and advised both groups to return to Durban and sort out their differences through consultation.

Subsequently Chief Buthelezi was quoted as having urged the Foundation to remain in the settlement.... (32)

However, other reports indicate that it wasn't simply a clash between the UF and Rogers Ngcobo, but a three-way conflict with the residents' committee involved as well:

Chief Buthelezi said it was clear that a serious conflict had developed between the residents' committee and Mr Ngcobo. He said that Mr Ngcobo had conceded that although a number of residents had demanded the withdrawal of the Foundation, there was no evidence to suggest that that was the attitude of most people.

He said that Mr Ngcobo and members of the residents' committee shook hands in his office and agreed to make a fresh start to try to resolve their differences. (33)

The residents' committee was established

through elections in Ematendeni held by Purvis, the Verulam magistrate. It is not known how the voting was conducted, what the percentage poll was, and how representative this committee is.

What follows is a speculative attempt to explain the conflict, and the roles played by Inkatha, the Urban Foundation, landowners, and their overlapping and conflicting interests.

An important figure in the conflict is Rogers Ngcobo. He is the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly MP for Ndwedwe district, and as a major landowner has approximately 1 400 shacks on his property. (This figure was arrived at from an aerial photograph of RA 33). The rental on each is R30 per year, giving him an annual income of R42 000 from shack farming alone. One rumour had it that while Nkwanyama was urging AmaWothi residents to move into the site-and-service scheme, Ngcobo was opposing the move. On one level, the reason for his opposition is obvious - a sizeable income to protect. On the other hand he is also a KwaZulu MP and has his position of power to protect. It is this aspect which probably accounts for his attempts to adopt a 'populist' or 'pro-people' line on the issue.

After the proposed move to the site-and-service area was announced at the Sunday, July 13 meeting, Rogers Ngcobo was at the centre of a row concerning the scheme:

KwaZulu Legislative Assembly member, Mr Rogers Ngcobo has charged the Department of Co-operation and Development with failing to involve residents from the Emawothi settlement in initial consultation on the new Inanda site-and-service scheme....

Mr Ngcobo alleges that the authorities responsible for the scheme failed to consult the Emawothi community when the blueprint was formulated....and that an unofficial committee had been purporting to act in the area.

'A committee had been selected before the meeting by the Department of Co-operation and Development', Mr Ngcobo said. 'I understand this to be improper as they were giving us a committee in a straitjacket'....

Mr Ngcobo said a new committee would be formed within the next two weeks. He declined suggestions that he should serve on the new ad-hoc liaison committee. (34)

In fact he did emerge as chairman of this committee, thus putting himself in the forefront of all negotiations and entrenching his power still further. However, a residents' committee was later elected, and Ngcobo's conflict with this group appears to stem from a perceived threat to his power and control over the residents of RA 33. He seems to have tried to capitalise on the residents' insecurity and resentment, projecting himself as their champion by putting forward their needs, wishes and fears; this seems to have involved an attempt to out manoeuvre the residents' committee.

Ngcobo has adopted this 'populist' strategy not only in confrontations with the Department and Urban Foundation, but also at mass meetings held in RA 33. Here he is alleged to have attacked Inkatha and raised questions about the spending of its membership fees. He is alleged to have asked why some of the money wasn't spent on clinics and facilities for the people of RA 33. As a result of these attacks, he lost his position on Inkatha's Central Committee, which he had been a founder member of.

Ngcobo's attacks on Inkatha seem to suggest that a number of residents of RA 33 have paid Inkatha membership fees, but that there is some resentment concerning its lack of action in the area. It also suggests that the level of Inkatha organisation in the area was weak. A further indication of this is the 'desire not to become involved in the Inanda controversy', expressed by Buthelezi.

Inkatha and the Urban Foundation seem to have close links. The Reverend Enos Sikhakhane is a high-ranking advisor to the UF, as well as a member of Inkatha's Central Committee. (35) Buthelezi certainly seems to have 'confidence' in its operations - he said that if the UF was forced to pull out of the Inanda scheme he 'would be very happy to ask the UF to help in other areas'. (36)

It is difficult to work out precisely why the UF became involved in the scheme. From the way in which events have unfolded, it appears that they were largely 'sucked into' the scheme as a result of their earlier involvement. They wanted to handle the scheme on a far more carefully planned and controlled basis involving smaller numbers of people over a much longer time. They would have preferred to handle it as a squatter-upgrading/self-help incremental housing scheme, their staff and consultants having been strongly influenced by the ideas of JFC Turner and Richard Martin on an upgrading scheme in Lusaka. (37) However, they have had to follow behind the Department and PNAB. The latter do not appear to have developed any sensitivity or subtlety in the handling of a 'voluntary' resettlement programme, and have yet to develop a 'system' or expertise for such an approach to housing. Theirs is still very much the 'GG truck and dump them in the veld' approach. The Urban Foundation seems to have devoted a large part of its time and energies to countering this approach. For example, the Department is at the moment bent on moving another 1 800 families into Ematendeni, whilst the UF is still trying to sort out the chaos and conflicts resulting from the first removals.

The Urban Foundation is highly sensitive to its involvement. In an interview UF's Alan Mountain

strongly dismissed accusations made against the UF that it was doing the South African Government's dirty work in helping accelerate mass removals and resettlements. He also rejected claims that his organisation was bent on 'creating a black middle class' by helping privileged people build posh houses. 'Before we have reached our goal in the Ematendeni project, I don't think it is fair for the world to judge us yet; what we are trying to do has the potential for creating an atmosphere of self-reliance and pride,' he concluded. (38)

It is far too glib and simplistic to see the UF's involvement in the Inanda scheme as an attempt to create a black middle class. The UF knew that it was involving itself with a poverty-stricken section of the working class in Inanda. It is wrong to see the UF as ideologically homogenous. Whilst the Natal regional office is staffed with Turnerites and the like, some of its people on the site have simplistic and even racist approaches. One UF employee on the site once proudly related how he had 'come south with the winds of change via Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia and was used to dealing with the natives'. He was in influential position on the site. Other staff members are guided by the idea that 'they are bringing the benefits of free enterprise to Inanda'. A more comprehensive analysis of the UF's role will have to be undertaken at a later stage of the project when more information is available.

The UF has had some impact on the Department. From the beginning it has argued that the whole of RA 33 and the general labour dormitories to the north of the Umgeni should be planned as a whole, and that this should be done by professional consultants. Hoine Glasson and Partners, engineers, townplanners and architects in Durban have recently been given a brief to draw up a structure plan for

the Inanda area.

The reasons for the state's intervention in Inanda are even more difficult to uncover. There are the most obvious ones: that the UF motivated for an experimental upgrading/self-help approaching to solving the housing problem. The idea that the poor pay for their own housing, with minimal government financial outlay, must have looked attractive to the state; the threat of epidemics to the labour force in the northern labour dormitories is also an obvious motivating factor for state intervention; and the potential security threat that such an uncontrolled area as RA 33 must pose, was probably forcefully brought to state attention by Brigadier Lloyd.

On the more general level, the state has been looking around for a 'solution' to the housing problem. There is a conflict between the Department of Co-operation and Development and the Department of Community Development over strategies to be adopted. The latter is opposed to the site-and-service/self-help approach, which the former seems to favour. (The Co-operation and Development's Louw Commission is likely to have an influence on state housing policy, and will have to be closely analysed). Inanda could be seen then as an experiment, a testing ground in which the idea of private sector (in this case the UF) involvement is encouraged.

Before any more detailed analysis of the Inanda scheme can be undertaken, a far clearer picture of the events, the roles and interests of the various groups and organisations is needed. State strategies, the role of the Urban Foundation, interests of land-owners like Rogers Ngcobo, Inkatha and the KwaZulu administration have interacted in a complicated manner, and the overall picture is not clear.

The responses of those most affected - the residents of RA 33 - also need to be analysed in order to get a better idea of the complex processes at work in the area.

Garth Senecque

Footnotes

- (1) See: Control, DSG Information Publication 1; Population Removals, DSG/SARS Information Publication 3; and Debate on Housing, DSG/SARS Information Publication 4.
- (2) Sunday Tribune, 16.03.81.
- (3) *ibid.*
- (4) Natal Mercury, 15.03.81.
- (5) Sunday Express, 23.03.80.
- (6) Natal Mercury, 15.03.80.
- (7) Natal Mercury, 03.03.80.
- (8) Natal Mercury, 20.03.80.
- (9) *ibid.*
- (10) Natal Witness, 04.03.80.
- (11) Sunday Express, 23.03.80.
- (12) Urban Foundation conference on rural development.
- (13) Natal Mercury, 15.03.80.
- (14) Natal Mercury, 31.03.80.
- (15) *ibid.*
- (16) *idib.*
- (17) Natal Mercury, 20.03.80.
- (18) Daily News, 20.03.80.
- (19) Natal Mercury, 15.03.80.
- (20) Sunday Tribune, 16.03.80.
- (21) Natal Mercury, 29.03.80.

- (22) Daily News, 15.07.80.
- (23) Urban Foundation: Inanda self-help housing project. Undated mimeo.
- (24) Daily News, 15.07.80.
- (25) Urban Foundation: Inanda self-help housing project.
- (26) Surplus Peoples Project, Durban. Background to Inanda Site and Service Scheme. Mimeo, December, 1980.
- (27) Urban Foundation: Inanda self-help housing project, p 2.
- (28) Post, 17.12.80.
- (29) Natal Witness, 09.04.81.
- (30) *ibid.*
- (31) Daily News, 24.03.80.
- (32) Natal Witness, 09.04.81.
- (33) Sunday Times, 05.04.81.
- (34) Daily News, 17.07.81.
- (35) Natal Witness, 12.02.81.
- (36) Natal Witness, 09.04.81.
- (37) On JCF Turner, see P. Wilkinson, The Housing Question Reconsidered: Towards a Political Economy of Housing in South Africa, in Debate on Housing, DSG/SARS Information Publication 4.
- (38) Natal Witness, 12.02.81.

'DISSENSION IN THE RANKS' : comment

THE DIRECTION in which the struggle has been developing in these last few years makes it more urgent than ever for a clear understanding of the role of whites in the struggle for freedom. The recent NUSAS booklet Dissension in the Ranks has helped to re-open that complex question. What follows are a few comments and criticisms of that booklet, all of which are offered in a constructive spirit.

1. In looking concretely at some past examples of 'white opposition' both now and in the past, Dissension manages to land a telling blow against liberalism. By examining the assumptions of the PFP, the Liberal Party, Race Relations and even the African Resistance Movement, the booklet shows that a liberal solution to our problems is no solution at all. In practice, all these organisations have had an individualistic and moralistic approach to the South African situation. Against all evidence (although for obvious reasons) they have generally tried to wish away the connections between apartheid and capitalism. The consequences of all this is that their actions have ranged from 'change from within' (the PFP) and active collaboration with the state (SAIRR and Patrick Duncan's actions during the march on parliament in the 1960s), to charity work and individualistic political approaches (eg the Black Sash's secret 'national convention' attempts). Their persistent attempts to get our rulers to have a 'change of heart' have ignored

the fact that we face not evil individuals, but an oppressive system which can only be changed by the actions of the oppressed themselves. This belief in a 'change of heart' underlies liberal responses, from the PFP to the more militant (and adventurist) actions of the ARM.

2. But having shown, with great insight, the bankruptcy of liberal theory and practice, the booklet does not remain consistent with itself when it examines SACOD. It would be counter-productive to idealise SACOD and the Congress Movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s. To do so would be to ignore the fact that elements of radical liberalism were within SACOD itself. Even whilst the liberation movement was realising the centrality of mass struggle, many leaders were to some extent hypnotised by constitutionalism and legalism. When sabotage was launched in the early 1960s, it was directed at symbolic targets in the hope of bringing the government and its supporters 'to their senses'. It does not help the democratic movement of today to gloss over these problems. As a recent WIP editorial has pointed out, 'the poverty of contemporary liberalism in South Africa does not rule out a different form of liberal ideology - more radical, more activist.' (WIP 19). A liberal viewpoint can easily, in the circumstances, be disguised as a progressive, democratic stance.

Certainly it is true that SACOD avoided many of the pitfalls of the liberal groupings by the simple act of open alliance with the ANC and the Congress Movement. By doing this it was supporting a 'mass approach' in politics, and taking its cue from a pre-existing black national organisation. Unfortunately, Dissension fails to emphasise that it was the fact of having an external mass-based point of reference that enabled SACOD to avoid (by and

large) the political errors of theory and practice that inevitably arise from the white position of privilege and isolation from the masses. This crucial point is particularly important for us today. It is debatable

whether this external point of reference can presently be provided by any organisation/s currently operating legally in this country.

3. Judging by the booklet, between SACOD and the present lies nothing! But we cannot base ourselves solely on a past which most white democrats are too young to remember. We have to assess what white 'democrats' were doing throughout the 1970s, the immediate past.

In this respect, Dissension largely ignores the significance and lessons of black consciousness for white democrats. One lesson has been absorbed - that the principle of non-racialism does not necessarily mean that the multi-racial form of organisation is the correct strategy.

But apart from that there is little assessment of the structural position in which white democrats find themselves socially, culturally, economically, educationally, etc etc. If we can understand our own structural position then we can also understand how and why we often dominate and engage in manipulative politics (and not only in non-racial situations). We carry our privileges with us, often in the form of superiority complexes, high self-confidence, and extreme individualism. Whilst it would be narrow to argue that one must be poor or black to understand the social dynamics of poverty and oppression we must acknowledge that the white democrat (usually an intellectual), whose life-style and daily experience is remote from that of the oppressed, will have difficulty in formulating policies of struggle for the oppressed. Despite recent statements and actions by some individuals under

the banner of black consciousness, we cannot say that black consciousness is simply false consciousness. It is not! It emerges from real conditions of racial oppression, which we ignore at our peril.

4. The final section in Dissension, 'The road ahead', holds by its title the most promise but is disappointing in its content. It correctly points out that it is examining the position of the broad group of white democrats (already a sizeable group), and not that of the few whites who are active in non-racial organisations. It is also aware of real problems, such as the danger of adventurist and opportunistic actions on the part of inexperienced sections of this group. And yet it fails to confront the options open for organised whites. What should they do? How should they mobilise? etc. Instead it mostly offers vague generalities and incomprehensible advice such as the following: It is 'the duty of white democrats to adopt a strategic approach to their privileged position...!' What does this mean?

In the end Dissension is suggesting that organised white democrats should provide resources to other (black) groups and individuals. Whilst certain individual whites may genuinely be able to do this, organised white democrats would be perpetuating certain divisions in the democratic movement. White domination, where it occurs or threatens, is (a) partly a result of structural advantages (of education and other skills), and (b) partly the form in which the division between mental and manual labour, which emerges in any popular movement, occurs in South Africa. Are we combatting this danger by having whites play the 'resource role'?

The question of the role of whites in the struggle is arising today in a very different context to that of the 1950s. There are many

differences, but one key can be seen in the fact that SACOD membership was numbered in the hundreds whilst white democrats (unorganised) today number in the thousands. This is because of very real grievances which a significant and growing section of young whites have. For example, they see injustice all around them and are aware that there will be no peace until there is freedom. They are angry at having to join the army to defend a system for which they are not prepared to die. Very few can play a resource role (apart from the dangers of whites playing this role), and to confine white democrats to this is a certain recipe for disillusionment, and the drifting into exile or complacency of the bulk of white democrats.

TW

Editorial note: The booklet referred to in the above comment is Dissension in the Ranks: white opposition in South Africa, and is published by the National Union of South African Students. An article on Liberal Party and COD: opposition to apartheid appears in WIP 19; the same issue of WIP contains an editorial on some of the issues raised above. The editors would welcome further contributions and comments on this subject.

INFLATION AND FOOD MONOPOLIES

WE are publishing the final part of an article entitled 'The Nature of Economic Growth in SA - 1978-1980: Monopoly Capital and the Erosion of Black Living Standards', by Jeremy Keenan. The first part is an examination of the widely believed statement that earnings of africans have increased during the 1970s.

Jeremy Keenan examines the figures that are used to support this position and points out inaccuracies, misleading information and omissions and concludes:

- * that incomes of africans have 'declined more or less constantly in real terms since 1976';
- * that the 'increase in Black (african)

unemployment is due primarily to the increasing capital intensification (using more machinery relative to living human labour) of most sectors of the economy, and that much of the growth in 1979-1981 has come from the utilisation of spare capacity' (firms had money and machinery that was lying idle, and this could be brought into action);

- * that when one looks at the distribution of wealth (the 'National Cake' in South Africa the 'national accounts indicate that the balance of economic power between capital and labour during the last two years has swung dramatically more in favour of capital'.

These findings were confirmed and reinforced by other research that examined incomes and employment within individual households in

Soweto. A summary of this research was published in WIP 17 in a section under the title 'Inflation and the Working Class'. Readers are also referred to other contributions in that section of WIP 17.

Keenan introduces the studies of aspects of the local food industry reproduced below by, firstly, examining the nature of inflation; and, secondly, discussing the role of large business in price increases.

THE NATURE OF INFLATION

THE argument put forward in this section of Keenan's paper is that inflation cannot simply be attributed to 'inflation', but that inflation itself needs to be explained.

The commonly held explanation in the media, put forward by the state and by business, is that 'the supply of money has been allowed to increase too rapidly and so cause "demand inflation". Too much money is allegedly chasing too few goods'. In other words, money should reflect the value of goods produced in a society. As is argued in the first part of the Political Economy series (see WIP 19: 27-8) money (gold) is the equivalent of the value of commodities produced. So, if there is too much money, not all of it will find commodities to purchase and, therefore, the prices of artificially 'scarce' commodities will rise (the market - supply and demand - determines the price of goods). The remedy, if one accepts this explanation, is, therefore, simple - reduce the supply of money printed by the state. This also normally means cutting state expenditure (such as welfare expenditure under Margaret Thatcher who is one of the adherents to this explanation).

Keenan presents an argument against this view. He says that Professor Botha (a Wits economist) has shown that if the money supply

has risen by 21% during the year July, 1979, to June, 1980, 15% of that increase was taken up by the increase in the price of goods and services (of 15%). We then still have to explain the increase in the price of goods and services, but we will return to this below.

This leaves a real 6% increase in the supply of money. During the same year the South African economy experienced a high 8% growth rate. In other words, Professor Botha argues, the increase in the supply of money could have been too low, rather than too high!

The first argument, the 'monetarist' position (too much money and too few goods) would say that there is a scarcity of commodities in South Africa.

The second position, held by Professor Botha and others, shows that there is no 'scarcity of goods in general and the volume of production has increased'.

If the monetarists can't explain inflation in South Africa, what is the explanation? Keenan says that

the explanation is to be found in the changing nature of capital and the capital accumulation process (profit making) in South Africa during the 1970s.

Aided by enormously increased foreign investment in the 1960s South Africa passed to a 'monopoly phase of accumulation'. In other words, a few firms (or one single firm) in every sector and in the economy as a whole have grown tremendously and dominate the various sectors and the economy. Two processes have taken place: concentration of capital - more and more production

in one branch of industry has come under the control of fewer firms;

centralisation of capital - a few firms have expanded into and control many different kinds of activity (eg mining firms expanding into the building industry,

metal, textiles, etc).

But, Keenan says, the process of growth (through take-overs) was expensive because share prices were high at the time of the take-overs as the economy was growing. This meant that when the crisis of profitability of capital in South Africa started in the mid-1970s, large-scale capital had a difficult task of getting back the money that had been spent while growing, and also achieving a high rate of profit. Their position was worsened by growing working class action and the blow that the 1976 uprising gave to money availability.

It was the rise in the gold price and a concerted assault on the Black working class (viz Wiehahn and Riekert) under the ideological guise of 'reform' (that) provided the stimulus and necessary confidence for the economy to move slowly at first, from mid-1978, into a boom phase.

MONOPOLIES AS FETTERS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS

KEENAN argues that, because of the processes of concentration and centralisation of capital, most sectors of the economy became oligopolistic (a few firms dominate each sector) or monopolistic (a single firm totally dominates the sector).

This means that prices of commodities produced in that sector are set by the controlling firm or firms, and are higher than what it costs to produce them. The large firms can do this because they also control how much of anything is produced - if too much was produced the price would fall.

However, normally increases in production would mean that less time is spent on producing each commodity and, therefore, its value and price decreases. But because monopolies control the market they can increase a price while productivity increases and it costs less to produce that commodity. This is called 'monopoly super-profits'.

Keenan says that 'this is precisely what happens in many sectors of the South African economy', and that it is this that causes inflation.

He continues:

THESE processes are seen most clearly in the South African food industry. It has been food prices more than anything else which has fuelled the rapid increase in the rate of inflation of the last two years, and especially in the last twelve months. During the twelve months to April 1981 the food price index had risen by 30%, with the meat prices alone going up by 57%.

It is these price increases that have had the greatest effect on the lower income group, that is mostly africans, and which are primarily responsible for the erosion of their material conditions of living.

What has been going on in the food industry? The industry has undergone a radical change in structure and emphasis during the seventies. The increase in real black incomes in the first few years of the 1970s offered new horizons to the industry. The general poverty of the black population made it obvious that much of their additional disposable income would be spent on foodstuffs. The two big food giants, Tiger and Premier Milling, consequently geared themselves up for a massive anticipated black consumer generated growth, particularly in the more profitable protein rich secondary foods. Between about 1972/3 and 1978 Premier and Tiger have invested about R100-million and R150-million respectively in capital expenditure (buying machinery and buildings) to meet this new demand.

The giants basically transformed themselves

by diversifying away from their traditional bases of primary foods, which, although protected by government price control are not so likely to release big profit margins, and integrating their production both vertically and laterally (controlling all aspects of food production and distribution).

By 1980 Tiger had listed investments in 16 companies and unlisted investments in another 111 others. It consisted of 170 wholly-owned direct subsidiaries; ten partly-owned direct subsidiaries; 42 wholly-owned indirect subsidiaries; and 106 partly-owned indirect subsidiaries. Its interests extended from its traditional base of maize milling (12 companies), wheat milling (five companies), oat milling, baking and confectionary (49) to vegetable expressors and refiners; manufacture of fats and peanut butter; manufacture of margarine; animal feeds; egg production, processing and hatcheries for layers; mushroom growing and canning; fishing (rock lobster processing; pelagic fishing; production of fishmeal and fish oil; salt snook processing; deep sea trawling, and cold storage); manufacture and distribution of pharmaceuticals, hospital surgical supplies; wholesale and retail chemists; pet food manufacture; export and shipping; distribution; etc, etc.

The activities of Premier were broadly similar. By 1980 Premier's interests involved 349 operations ranging from wheat and maize milling (18 mills); biscuits (two plants); bakeries (46); distribution plants (46 in most centres); agribusiness, animal feeds and processing in eggs, poultry, food sugar and cotton; edible oils and preservatives; industrial feeding; bookshops (18); pharmaceuticals (ten marketing outlets and wholesale distribution outlets); liquor (15 outlets and one bottling plant) (liquor interests were sold off in September 1980



with the exception of 51% holding in Benny Goldberg); and about 60 other sundry installations and branches involving travel, leasing, shipping and clearing, packaging, general trading, etc.

By 1980 these two food giants dominated the industry with annual turnovers of R1 175-million (Tiger, 1980) and R1 205-million (Premier, 1981)

The structure of the other food giants was not dissimilar:

Imperial Cold Storage (ICS) in which Tiger has an 18% holding (1980 turnover R588-million)

Fedfood (1981 turnover R444-million)

Tongaat (1980 turnover R308-million)

Irvin and Johnson (1980 turnover R200-million).

The food giants geared themselves up for real growth that did not materialise. With the onset of the recession they were left with large surplus capacities and turned to relatively vigorous but short-lived price wars amongst themselves in the many sectors of the food industry least controlled by the government.

This general situation is reflected in Premier's declining profit margins for 1975 to 1978.

The beginnings of an upturn in the economy presented the food industry and 'monopoly' capital in general with the opportunity to recoup these costs of transition. The effective cartelization (see postscript below) of most markets enabled prices to be raised excessively in relation to the price of production. This has been nowhere more apparent

than the food industry in general and the meat industry in particular.

With the onset of 'boom' conditions in 1980 it seems to have been widely assumed that incomes would rise across the board. After all, the dominant ideology in the market place was testifying that economic growth was beneficial to all sectors of the population. Indeed, one reason why this economic growth has not benefitted the black population is because the food industry in particular, from its position of monopolisation and consequent muscle in the market, was able to set prices. This has assured excessive profits in most branches of the industry and has been the major contributor in driving up inflation.

Most sectors of the food industry, and monopoly capital in general, deny these sorts of accusations. The food industry, in particular, has been particularly reticent and careful not to release information that would furnish 'proof' of these charges.

We can, however, look at some of the ways in which these companies have attempted to control the market and so establish a monopoly rate of profit, and the extent to which profits have been achieved through excessive price increases rather than increased turnover or productivity.

THE 'EGG SCANDAL' (NEPCO)

THE sort of muscle that the food giants have brought to bear on the market in their attempts to control and cartelize (see 'postscript' below) specific branches of production and marketing is



probably nowhere better seen than in the field of egg production.

In the first quarter of 1978 the big three milling companies (Premier, Tiger and Tongaat) are alleged to have held a confidential meeting to discuss ways of 'stabilising the egg trade' (ADM, 27.09.79). The head of the Public Relations Department of the SA Co-ordinating Consumer Council informed the ADM that the chief executives of these three milling companies met to discuss the possibilities of 1) a price war against smaller producers. It was estimated that this would cost R27-million and would be too expensive, particularly as it would not guarantee protection from competition as it would not stop free entry into the market place;

2) starting a loose cartel;

3) forming a formal cartel

and inviting the 'independents' to join them.

The big three decided on the third of these strategies in the form of a co-operative, namely the National Egg Producers' Co-operative Ltd (NEPCO), which was registered as limited liability company on 27 September, 1978, and began trading on 16 October, 1978. The formation of a co-operative as distinct from a loose cartel was particularly significant in that it required that all members pool their profits and their losses.

The co-operative comprised a number of egg producers owned and controlled by Tiger Oats, Premier Milling and Tongaat, referred to as the 'majors', and a number of producers who were not controlled by these three companies, referred to as the 'independents'.

In the early 1970s these milling companies expanded their chicken feed production capacities and then began buying egg producing organisations to ensure outlets for their feed. Since then the number of egg producers has constantly diminished

with the majors coming to own more than 40% of the laying hens under permit in the country. With the formation of NEPCO, the majors acquired effective control of approximately 70% of the permitted laying hens in the country.

The problem for the majors was that they had been pushing feed (80% of egg costs) and consequently over-producing eggs. This increasing egg surplus meant that they were very often losing on egg production, or having to sell at substantially less than many of the independent producers. With the establishment of the co-operative, the majors thought that they had established an effective monopoly of egg production. As such NEPCO wrote a tough letter to the retailers on 4 October, notifying them that they would be supplying them with eggs as from 18 October and that credit terms from then on would be strictly ten days net from date of statement, with a penalty rate of 1,5% per month or part thereof on all overdue balances.

It was clear to the supermarkets that a monopoly situation had been formed and that if it was allowed to continue they would clearly be paying more for their eggs.

The effective monopoly held by the big three meant that most of the independents had to buy their feed from them, buy their day-old chicks or pullets from them, and then finally ask them for credit. In the event of a confrontation with the independents, the majors were not only in a position to cut prices below production costs, but were also in a position to disrupt feed supplies, provide inferior laying stock and to cut off credit.

It is alleged that the big three's disregard for the ethics of a free market even went so far as to 'induce' independents to pay protection money. Under the guise of a franchise agreement, Nulaid, owned by Premier Milling, allegedly

induced independents to pay a fee of 1 cent a dozen for eggs sold and to buy only Epol feeds (made by Premier Milling) in return for not marketing in their areas. The alleged background to the 'franchise' agreement was a prior short period of price cutting, undertaken significantly by Steinbro (Tiger) and not Nulaid (Premier), 'in order to soften up the independents'.

The deputy-chairman of Premier, Mr Wrighton, told the Sunday Express (30.09.79) that 'as a large public company we feel we contribute substantially to the economy of the country and are entitled to a place in the sun' (my emphasis).

As far as egg production went, Premier did not find its place in the sun. As Premier's chairman, Tony Bloom, admitted, 'the egg division continues to be a disaster area' (Sunday Times, 26.08.79). The supermarkets, aware of the monopoly situation created by NEPCO, backed the independents. When NEPCO cut its egg price in the Lowveld by five cents a dozen, the Norwood Hypermarket cut its price by nine cents a dozen in order to support the independents and so bring competition back into the market. On 7 December, 1979, Premier announced that it was pulling out of NEPCO at the end of the financial year (30 June, 1980). Gerhard Scholtemeijer, an executive director of Premier, explained that the main reason for Premier quitting NEPCO was 'the blatant misuse of the organisation by people outside it' (my emphasis). He said that Premier had 'bent over backwards' to bring about a fair deal for companies, producers and marketers through NEPCO (ADM, 08.12.79).

The impediment to a monopoly rate of profit is competition. As the chairman of Tiger Oats explained in his annual report for 1980, 'In the case of margarine, increased competition between producing companies also affected profitability as is evidenced by the fact that, in spite of

an increase of about 20% in oil seed prices in 1980, the maximum price of margarine was only increased by 15%(!).

An even more blatant example of monopoly pricing is found in the food canning industry. In February, 1980. Langeberg bought out H Jones, the canning side of Piccan. A memorandum on the takeover noted that 'the takeover of Piccan will cost the company just under A7-million over the next 5 years, for the five factories that have been taken over, but will give Langeberg a 75% share of the domestic canned food market, with the resultant rise in selling prices of canned foods'. Canned food prices were immediately increased by 15%!

As far as the meat industry is concerned prices have risen by over 50% in the year. The industry is controlled by three 'giant' companies. The most recent annual general report of the chairman of one of these companies, Imperial Cold Storage (18% owned by Tiger) on 19 May, 1981, made particularly interesting reading.

The chairman, Mr Neate (on the board of Tiger), began his review of the red meat industry by summarising some of the general causes of concern that had been felt in the industry over the preceeding three years. These, he said, were the increasing marketing of beef on the controlled market caused by adverse climatic conditions in certain pastoral areas; only marginally increased producer prices despite much higher production costs and the decline in the country's cattle production.

'The cumulative affect of these factors', said Mr Neate, 'with the exceptionally buoyant demand in the current economic climate resulted in a steep rise in meat prices in the last quarter of 1980. (CPI for meat rose 57% in 1980 - JK). This in reality was the correction of prices which remained below the CPI during the

previous 5 years' (my emphasis).

If we are trying to make sense of Mr Neate's report, it seems that he is saying that the one (the main) reason for the present meat price rise was under-supply due to a decline in the country's cattle production in the face of 'exceptionally buoyant demand'. As far as the herd size is concerned, widespread allegations have been made that Mr Jan Lombard, general manager of the Meat Board, actually 'suggested' that red meat producers should cut back herd sizes over the last year or so. The meat industry would appear to be a perfect example of restricting production in a monopoly situation to force prices up.

As far as the 'exceptionally buoyant demand' is concerned, consumer resistance led to a substantial decline in consumption. This was denied emphatically by the meat board, but Mr Neate obligingly tells us later in his report that 'the consumption of red meat dropped alarmingly (in 1980)'.

Having begun to explain the massive meat price rise as due to the reduction in size of the national herd (9,4-million in 1980 to 8,3-million in 1981), Mr Neate carries on to advocate a further raise in the meat board's floor price (raised on June 26th!) 'to encourage producers to increase the national herd' (white-owned).

There we have it. If the supply goes down prices go up. For supply to go up, prices must go up further! It would be much easier to have explained it all in terms of straight-forward monopoly rather than taking shareholders through the contortions of Catch 22.

Mr Neate's report is particularly helpful in that it basically confirms what this paper has been arguing, namely that the current high rate of inflation is not the result of demand, but

rather of cost or price increases. In the case of meat, prices were forced up by 57% in the face of alleged demand, while consumption actually dropped dramatically. This is in line with what appears to have happened, albeit on a less dramatic scale, in several other sectors of the economy (eg food). It would appear that increases in prices and hence profits have been increasing more rapidly than physical volume of turnover. This has not been because of excess money supply, with too much money chasing too few goods. On the contrary, excessive price increases, have enabled 'monopoly capital' in general to generate super-profits, in excess of the rate of increase of turnover in volume terms.

The figures that we have for the food industry as a whole are indicative of this. The Consumer Mail published figures to show that consumption of food in volume terms has dropped since 1976. Food consumption, instead of expanding in line with population growth, has declined in real terms (RDM, 21.04.81). Results in the food industry over the last 12-18 months are indicative of the successful establishment of a monopoly rate of profit. What is horrific about this is that it would appear to have been brought about, at least in part, by certain deliberate cut-backs in production (eg meat) to generate a 'recovery' in prices - and this in a country and at a time when infant mortality rates in some of the bantustan areas are in the order of 400 per 1 000 in the first 12 months of life.

It is this so-called 'recovery' in prices, reflected in massive 'super-profits' in most of the country's major companies and corporations over the last 12-18 months that has given capital a dramatically larger share of the 'national cake'; that has led to a massive increase in

the rate of inflation and consequent erosion of black living standards; and which led the Minister of Industries, Commerce and Tourism, Dawie de Villiers, to warn commerce that 'the government will not sit idle when exploitation - the ugly face of the free-market system - and unfair trade practices make their appearance' (Star, 21.05.81). (What he meant was that capital - whether small or large, monopoly or competitive - should not expose its ugly face. Exploitation is inherent in capitalism - eds).

EDITORS' POSTSCRIPT: A 'cartel' is an agreement between manufacturers regulating output and prices. Such an arrangement is also called a syndicate.

At the end of August it came to light that several maize millers (some of the companies mentioned in the article above) were proposing to form a cartel to 'stabilize the chaos in the industry' (as one of the millers involved put it in the language of capitalism, and interestingly enough, the same language used about the establishment of NEPCO - see above).

Among the firms in the proposed cartel are said to be the Premier Group, Tiger Oats, Tongaat and Fedfoods Ltd. A document to be signed by member firms makes it clear that prices and output will be regulated 'to ensure a fair return for the parties on their investment' (in other words, to increase profits as much as possible); and to undercut in specific areas in order to close down and buy out 'rebel' producers (ADM, 28.08.81 and 31.08.81).

Let us just briefly see what profits and statements some of these firms are already making:

Fedfood - 'In the year ended March 31, Fedfood, which has its main interests in milling,

fishing, snacks, frozen foods and edible oils, boosted attributable income by 54,7 percent to R16,7-million...

After-tax income was up 59,1 percent to R463,6-million' (Star, 18.08.81).

Tiger Oats - This firm 'announced an after-tax profit of R27 085 000 for the six months ended June 30 as an increase of more than 20 percent on the R22 457 000 profit for the same period last year' (Star, 12.08.81).

Tongaat Group - 'The Tongaat group is on target for its objective of earning at least 125c a share in the year ending March 1982 ... This would be a 25,5 percent increase over the record 101,2c earned in the year just ended...'

Said chairperson, Chris Saunders: 'The restructuring of the foods division has proceeded satisfactorily and the benefits of this have started to materialise. This division, particularly, offers substantial scope for improved profit performance and this began to be realised during the current year' (Star, 03.08.81; Sunday Tribune, 02.08.81).

Premier Group - managing director, Tony Bloom, in an interview before the planned maize millers' cartel became public news, denied talk of cartels in the food industry - 'It's patent rubbish. The food industry is probably the most competitive sector of all'.

He also claimed that Premier aimed at 'attainment of excellence and it is also a service to the community. We are also very hungry (sic), profit-motivated, and aggressive. We just don't think the two are incompatible' (ADM, 31.07.81).

The Minister of Agriculture, PTC du Plessis, said that he would institute price control

on maize products if the cartel should push up prices or 'exploit consumers'.

The PFP's Philip Myburgh asked for stronger action in terms of the Promotion of Competition legislation than the Minister of Trade and Industries has at his disposal. Myburgh suggested that the members of the cartel must have taken legal opinion on the move - 'It would appear to me that they must be pretty sure of their case and one wonders whether the creation of this monopoly is not taking place with the knowledge of our Government authorities' (ADM, 01.09.81).

Then the farmers entered the fray. Firstly, because they stand to gain nothing directly from a price increase on maize meal (the price of maize grain is fixed); secondly, and of greater importance, they opposed the planned cartel because they were going to lose money! The argument runs like this:

- 1) the maize industry has had a record harvest for the second year running (a surplus over domestic consumption of 7-million tons this year);
- 2) however, this surplus is partly exported (transport limitations are said to prevent more than 5,39-million tons from being exported during the current year) but at a loss. This loss would amount to R275-million plus a deficit of about R66-million from the previous year;
- 3) farmers have to pay levies of R15,42 per ton (white maize) and R18,25 per ton (yellow maize) - to 'replenish the stabilisation fund' that in part cushions the export losses;
- 4) so if the millers' cartel pushed up meal prices this could reduce local consumption (which would not necessarily affect the cartel members' profits) and, therefore, increase the mass of maize to be exported. This would then, obviously, increase the loss on exports and increase the amount farmers have to pay into the stabilisation fund (ADM, 23.07.81 and Star, 03.09.81).

Dr Kit le Clus, of the National Maize Producers' Organisation (NAMPO), said that any 'millers' cartel would be fought tooth and nail'.

(The maize producers also have it in for the state's policy of subsidising and protecting local industry, such as steel, tractor engines, etc, which push up costs to agriculture. Said the NAMPO journal: 'Despite the role the protected domestic industry plays in pushing up maize prices, the State expects the maize producers to bear the brunt of the losses incurred on foreign markets' - the export of maize could earn R800-million in foreign exchange).

The Minister of Agriculture has repeated his threat to re-introduce price control on meal 'if the consumer should be exploited'. When and how will he decide that the consumer is being exploited? Starvation, malnutrition and poverty is there already - will it need food riots?

SCHOOLBOY POLICE

THE use of 'schoolboy police' arises directly out of the starvation and land hunger that characterises the bantustan regions, and indirectly out of the 'militarisation' of white society that is essential to the maintenance of white political domination.

This briefing will trace the origins of the present moves to include white boys formally in the repressive structures of the South African state. It needs to be situated within a wider analysis that looks at other examples of such political and ideological preparation of, primarily, white society; and that looks at the range of 'police' forces that exist in South Africa at present (from industrial commandos to pistol clubs (see, for example, WIP 7:15-21)).

CATTLE THEFT - TERROR OR STARVATION

ONE of the first reports that appeared on the use of schoolboys to aid the regular South African police said that cattle were having their tendons slashed, in the same way as the 'terrorists' had been doing in Rhodesia in order to 'help along' the depopulation of certain border agricultural areas. In this case it was the northern areas of Natal being spoken about, and the operations being reported on were against cattle rustlers.

Twenty boys, aged between 16 and 18 from the Vryheid and Newcastle High Schools were being used to aid the police operating in the Ubombo area of northern Natal. The boys manned (sic) roadblocks 'to search vehicles for dagga, weapons and illicit liquor', patrolled routes thought to be taken by poachers, and

searched for snares. This was at the end of 1979.

One article quoted SAP Public Relations Officer Lt Col Leon Mellet (the one who wore camouflage uniform to appear on television) as saying:

We're undermanned and asking the school-boys for help seemed like a good plan. It also gave them some idea of what being a policeman is all about, and as a result several have indicated they want to join the force when they leave school. That's great - we really need them (Scope, 21.03.80).

Another report on the same incident spoke of the scale of the poaching that was going on - 'an average of 25 stock thefts a month were reported in the past. In the first six months of the year 425 cattle were stolen from farms' (Natal Mercury, 14.12.79).

During 1979 the SAP investigated 27 000 cases of stock theft involving 130 000 animals, and initiated 8 000 prosecutions involving 12 000 people. 'Most thefts were for the pot', concluded the same article (Sunday Tribune, 04.05.80).

DAGGA - CORRUPTING THE YOUTH?

DURING the early part of 1980 schoolboys were used in several raids against dagga plantations in Natal. For example, in January 32 schoolboys were enlisted to help with the pulling out of dagga plants after crops had been spotted by an air force helicopter (Star, 17.01.80). This was at Paulpietersburg in Natal. Early in April a report said that 'Volunteer schoolchildren, police reservists and South African Defence Force aircraft helped destroy huge dagga plantations in Northern Natal' (RDM, 02.04.80).

Later that month the man who was said to have introduced the idea of using schoolboys

in this role, Brigadier Muller van Eyck, Divisional Commissioner of Police in northern Natal, mentioned 'camps' that could only accommodate 40 pupils at a time, and he was also reported to be planning the use of schoolboys 'on patrols in small towns without any unnecessary risks'. He saw the exercise as recruiting for the SAP and as relieving the critical staff shortage in the SAP, said to stand at 2 500 men of all races in 1980.

RESPONSES

THE matter was by now getting too much publicity and official responses were being demanded. The Sunday Times (20.04.80) reported that the SAP 'are planning to launch a national force of schoolboy auxiliaries to help ease their manpower shortage'. The report stated that the SAP hoped to be ready for the first 'intake' by the time of the July holidays. It said that the reason why the boys would not be armed was that there would not be enough time to train them. They would not be paid but given a 'small memento' after completion of their 'term of duty'. A dossier was said to be in the hands of the secretary for National Education, DJT van Wyk.

The reported move was strongly condemned by the Transvaal Teachers' Association and the RFP. The Minister of Police denied that there were any official moves to form a schoolboy reserve (Star, 21.04.80). The Citizen put it as strongly as an 'emphatic denial' by Louis le Grange, whom they quoted as saying that the previous day's Sunday Times report 'was not only wrong' but was an example 'of how a newspaper in South Africa or elsewhere should not act' (21.04.80).

Die Transvaler, in a report headed 'No chance of police boys', was far less adamant than the Citizen that there would be no schoolboy

police. They quoted Le Grange (obviously a man who speaks with a forked tongue, if the newspapers are to be believed) as saying that he would not hesitate to make it easier for scholars to help the police 'if something lovely (moois (sic)) can come from it' (21.04.81).

An editorial in the same newspaper said that a peaceful society depends on the white population but that there was, however, a shortage of police. Schoolboy police were, therefore, a good idea. It attacked the RFP's Ray Swart, and said that the plan is not 'abhorrent (afskuwekkend)' - 'practical necessity counts for more than bourgeois (sic) notions of the role of the youth' (!)

Not much more was said until, in September this year, the same Minister le Grange announced the formation of a 'junior police reserve force'

- * 16 years or older
- * voluntary
- * physically suitable
- * during school holidays
- * no remuneration, but transport and 'equipment' to be provided
- * no uniforms, but 'visible mark of identification would be worn'.

The plan has since come in for a lot of criticism, and support. Rapport quoted headmasters at Afrikaans-language schools as supporting the idea whole-heartedly. Criticism has come from English-language newspapers, especially of the powers of arrest that the schoolboys will have ('always subject to supervision and control'), the Black Sash (the kids could be used in the enforcement of the pass laws), Professor John Dugard of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at Wits, and a clinical psychologist. Dr Ntatho Motlana's quoted response is less clear in its condemnation - he asked 'why young boys were being recruited for a reserve force when

thousands of black men were unemployed and would eagerly (sic) perform such a duty' (Sunday Express, 20.09.81). The Sowetan said that the Minister had stated that all race groups would be given the opportunity to serve the community in this way (16.09.81).

Contributions on the issues raised by these moves are welcome.

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CROSSROADS AND NYANGA: passes and places to stay

THE ARTICLE 'Legalism and Democratic Organisation' in WIP 18 raises a number of critical issues which are well illustrated by case studies of Crossroads community resistance, and the Nyanga bush confrontation.

An outline of events in the Nyanga bush until 26 July, 1981, was given in WIP 19. This article covers the Crossroads case study, an update of the Nyanga bush position and some comment on the similarities and differences.

CROSSROADS: 1978 - 1981

'The fight was actually won with the April 1979 statement of Koornhof which laid down the general rules for re-settlement.' - Urban Foundation Regional Director

On 5 April, 1979, Dr P Koornhof issued a public statement, which he presented as a blue-print to solve what he called 'the Crossroads problem'. The solution was a new township to be built between Nyanga and Guguletu. In it he made it clear that this was an 'ad hoc' decision for Crossroads and on the other hand stated that influx control measures would be increased to ensure that a similar situation did not re-occur.

Two years later it appears timely and important to review not only the events which gave rise to the issuing of that statement, but also

to review the implications of the 'solution' upon the community as a whole. The process demonstrates the confusion, division, co-option and organisational disintegration when community resistance is met not by the bull-dozer of the past, but the negotiation and co-operation politics of the Dr Koornhof era. Crossroads is an example of total strategy at its best.

'The level of tension started high, but through communication this was lowered and they responded as any group under similar circumstances. They were not out of the ordinary.' - Steyn Du Plessis, Urban Foundation.

PRE 5 APRIL STATEMENT PERIOD

SINCE 1975 the people had been struggling to remain as a community in the area. During this time there were numerous pass raids, harassment and individual home demolitions. The women organised themselves into an ad hoc committee and solicited the help of a lawyer. As a result a number of successful court cases were won. (This early legal history gave rise to the later dependence and high expectations placed upon lawyers and legal battles). In 1976 the camp was declared a legal Emergency Camp and with this timeous legality it escaped the 1977 demolitions of Modderdam, Werkgenot and Unibell. These demolitions and their effect upon the wider Cape Town public had future implications for the Crossroads community, since many of the people who later committed themselves to 'help save Crossroads' did it out of an emotional response to the demolitions of 1977 and early 1978.

In February 1978, Crossroads itself was threatened with demolition. The 'struggle for Crossroads' began a new phase.

The community, through its existing committees, let it be known that it was not willing to

move. The women, who had been loosely organised, formalised their organisation, electing a committee with a new chairwoman, secretary and treasurer. The Women's Committee took its place alongside the existing Noxolo and Sizamile Committees.

All three met once weekly at a joint committee meeting to follow and discuss the issues affecting their community. (Tensions already existed between various individuals of these committees but the threat of demolition forged a degree of co-operation and unity. These differences which were suppressed emerged at a later stage of the process.)

The women played the most important role in the community during 1978, tackling issues as they arose:

1. The threatened demolition of 400 homes by Divisional Council for non-payment of rental arrears was successfully countered by the women. For a period of 2½ months they screened cases from 07h00 - 12h00 and helped subsidize hardship cases.
2. A painting project was organised in all 4 sections of the camp as an attempt to upgrade the community and to express resistance to the alleged temporariness of the camp. The women collected 50c from members to buy the paint.
3. During the daily pass raids of June, the women organised a march of 4500 women to see Brigadier van der Westhuizen (Chairman of BAAB) at Goodwood in protest against the raids, and to demand an explanation.
4. Close links were established with local and overseas press and frequent press statements were released by the women to publicise events as well as their interpretations of these actions to the public.

Whilst the other committees worked alongside the women, it is important to stress that it was the

women who took the lead and saw the threatened demolition as affecting them in particular.

Whereas many of the men had rights to be here, the majority of the women knew they were 'illegal' by Government standards and felt they had nothing to lose in openly resisting. They were present on the site during the day (to receive visitors and discuss strategies) while the men were at work.

External to the community was another organisation involved in this struggle - the so-called Crossroads support group. It had been called together by the Crossroads lawyer in February and consisted of a number of local individuals and organisations with a history of involvement in squatter and human rights issues.

This group was eventually to play a major role in the events leading to the intervention of Dr Koornhof. The issues of concern for the group included: family life, Christian concern, the maintenance of a stable, economically viable community (using the existing informal sector in Crossroads as an example), the spirit and unity of the 'model' community, and those who wanted to raise the political cost of demolition. The underlying causes of Crossroads were hardly touched, ie the migrant labour system. Some members of the group felt the issue should not be broadened and seen in its whole context if a solution was going to be found. (This strategy gave Dr Koornhof the leverage to be able to treat Crossroads in an 'ad hoc' manner and drive a wedge between Crossroads and the existing townships.)

The support group met weekly with a small number of community leaders throughout 1978. There was no clear programme of action. They tried the petition, community statements, liaison with local authorities, public awareness through

frequent newspaper articles etc. The dynamics within the community itself were not clearly understood, nor perceived as that crucial. Often community workers in the area found themselves having to confront key individuals on community development principles versus the success of the 'campaign'. Eg, the lawyer wanted to obtain funds to subsidize the women's painting project in order to have the houses painted in time for the Day of Prayer and became angry at the community workers' refusal to speed up what was a community initiated project.

Many in the group, not recognising the existing divisions within the community, operated as though working with a verified and democratic leadership. Others fostered the individualising of local leaders eg paying people to interpret when taking overseas visitors around. This caused some resentment, and led to difficulties in obtaining interpreters for community meetings.

Albeit with 'the best of intentions', the seeds for the later escalation of internal conflicts and divisions were being sown during this period of support group involvement.

Later in 1978, the harassment upon the community intensified with frequent pass raids. The biggest and last on 14 September culminated in the death of a resident. Overnight Crossroads became a household word and an issue beyond the wildest expectations of all concerned. The raids were followed by local and international outcry. Pressure upon the community continued. People were already physically and psychologically worn down and when in November (following the squashing of the plan drawn up by the SP, BAAB and Military in the Castle to surround and demolish the camp) Dr Koornhof intervened, indicating that he wanted to come to Cape Town personally to solve the Crossroads 'problem', he not only caught all concerned off-guard, but was welcomed by a

community weakened on all levels and by now dependent upon external solutions to their situation.

During September and October the Urban Foundation had become increasingly involved in attempts to negotiate on behalf of the community. They feared the international political and economic implications of Crossroads as well as the possible local political instability should it be demolished. They were secretly meeting with chosen leaders from the community and already discussing and proposing solutions prior to Dr Koornhof's visit to the camp in November.

When Dr Koornhof visited the camp in November it marked the end of the bulldozer era and ushered in a new one of co-operative politics and promises of humane solutions to the 'problem'.

Let there be no misunderstanding. There is a policy and the law. That is why your co-operation is so important. With your co-operation it may be possible to find a solution to the problem. If I get the co-operation of the churches I will do everything to look at Crossroads as a problem in itself.

The year ended with a memorandum to Dr Koornhof prepared by the Joint Committees, in which they put forward two proposals:

1. to remain on the present site and have the houses up-graded;
2. as an alternative, permanent accommodation should be provided for all residents in Crossroads in the greater Cape Town area.

Dr Koornhof rejected these proposals, but indicated that he was willing to enter into negotiations with an elected delegation in early 1979 in an attempt to reach a solution to the 'problem'.

If 1978 had its own particular problems and difficulties, in some ways they were easier to deal with than the complex and sometimes more subtle struggle which ensued in 1979.

The negotiations promised by Dr Koornhof

in late 1978 began in earnest in 1979 and lasted until the end of March, ending with the now famous April statement.

From the beginning it was clear that what was taking place was not a negotiated settlement but a solution in the interests of the government. The fact that Dr Koornhof was able to manoeuvre the assistance of the community's own representatives in obtaining the solution was a stroke of political genius.

A reading of the minutes of these meetings shows that there was very little room to manoeuvre on the part of the Crossroads delegation. Dr Koornhof indicated at the first meeting that he felt the solution to the Crossroads 'problem' was a township one and when questions concerning this were raised by the representatives he never gave direct answers. He merely asked the delegation to co-operate and trust him.

I am a preacher's son. I don't want to preach to you, but you must bear with me. I believe it is in your interest to do so. As I have said in the beginning. If you assist the officials to fill in these forms in a truthful way, we can solve this problem in a humane way. You have heard me say often that I want co-operation. I tell you now again that I want co-operation between the officials and you. If there is co-operation then things will go well.

I have been in this department for 30 years and these officials have put up with a lot of difficulties which you don't know of, but I know of and I really request you to make it as easy as possible for them by co-operating. If I was preaching my message would be simple, it would consist of two words "please co-operate". You will not be sorry. That is the way in which this problem will be solved. I wish you God's blessings. (Dr Koornhof, February 1979, in response to questions raised by community leaders re co-operating with the officials on a survey, given past experience and mistrust.)

The delegates were bound by confidentiality concerning these meetings and it was with difficulty that meetings were eventually convened to

review the negotiation process. Objective input from people outside of the negotiations did not appear to be seen as crucial to the process. Criticisms and advice were largely ignored, eg at the meeting at which the blueprint was presented containing the categories which would supposedly cater for the majority of the community there was concern and clear rejection of involvement in such a settlement using government categories. Despite these criticisms it was this very blueprint which appeared as Dr Koornhof's categories for Crossroads in his statement of 5 April. Other criticisms concerned the speed of the negotiations, the confidentiality and its effect upon the broader community and the inadvisability of meeting individually with Dr Koornhof. They appeared to fall on deaf ears. The process was clearly in the hands of a few specialists and although the advisors can and do argue that decisions were never their own, by the time the 'negotiations' ended the struggle was completely out of the hands of the people. Throughout 'negotiations' the leaders expressed unwillingness to agree to any plan which would divide the community and were sceptical of trusting the promises of Dr Koornhof. As a result of this mistrust negotiations did in fact break down in late March over these very points. However in a last endeavour to persuade the community to accept the solution the 'advisors' called in the Urban Foundation (Judge Steyn) who spent an afternoon convincing the community 'to acquiesce as opposed to agree'.

The factors of increasing pressure from the advisors, the Urban Foundation, Dr Koornhof, and the reality of their own position of weakness and simplistic political understanding led to the community 'acquiescing' to an agreement the implications of which they never fully understood.

These then were the major events which preceded the April statement - a statement hailed by many as a major break-through on the part of the government with high hopes that all would qualify for the new township. Others were less optimistic since state policy remained intact. The fact that there was to be an increase in influx control measures on blacks in general in the Western Cape seemed to escape the general public. The difference of assessment and trust of Dr Koornhof's promises set the tone of events which were to follow within the community and amongst those who had previously played a supportive role.

Dr Koornhof's statement of 5 April managed to a) defuse a highly political local and international issue, b) set forward a blue-print which would mean effective stronger control not only of Crossroads but of africans in the Western Cape, c) confuse and divide people further both within and outside the community.

POST 5 APRIL PERIOD

AS STATED above the immediate effect of the statement was to escalate the already existing divisions and confusion within the community. People were now forced to answer the question 'what were we really fighting for'? In reality nothing changed as the residents still found themselves arrested for pass offences and not free from the reality of being black and living in the Western Cape.

The first visible sign of a new process was the survey which Dr Koornhof had indicated would take place in an attempt to ascertain who would qualify for the new township.

The period May to July was filled with meetings between the Urban Foundation, BAAB, the 'advisers' and the committee in attempts to reassure the leaders that they had nothing to fear

in freely answering the questionnaires. Once again there was resistance and a dead-lock was reached as community leaders refused to agree to particular questions concerning present urban area qualifications. When Dr Koornhof heard this the lawyer was specifically phoned and sent by him to obtain the trust of the committees. Unless they co-operated, all would be lost was the message. The leaders were at this point in no position to argue. Much of their strength had already dissipated and the dependence upon external advice was firmly entrenched. (The issue was never taken to a mass meeting.)

Despite the fears, the survey proceeded and the close working relationship between local leaders and the BAAB officials began: a relationship which, as previously feared, ear-marked the further disintegration of community leadership; a liaison which eventually resulted in charges of fraud on the part of both committee members and local BAAB officials as permits were allegedly issued for R10 and a bottle of brandy.

The next significant event to take place in the community was an election. A new executive committee was ushered in during late July with Ngxbongwana as the elected chairman, with his own hand-picked committee - a committee which excluded women from the decision-making body and immediately dissolved all previously elected committees in Crossroads (from Sizamile to the school committees to the creche committee). Despite some resistance inside the community to the undemocratic handling of the elections, this went relatively unsupported by outside groups who chose to work with the elected body since it was felt to be expedient to do so if the Koornhof deal was to go through. A group was needed to relate to and make decisions. The internal dynamics and democratic processes of the community were largely ignored in an attempt to

achieve the 'solution'.

The divisions could not, however, be contained and 1979 ended with physical violence within the community as the different interest groups clashed, leaving two dead and the executive committee in total control. All who questioned their authority were attacked and ostracised.

As the year ended Crossroads appeared to be a different community with stark divisions, wholesale corruption and internal disorganisation. Members of the support group either pulled out or left confused as to what their role should be in the present situation.

1980 began with the arrest of 6 Crossroads residents for fraud; with L Fouche, the Secretary for Community Development, announcing plans for the new township in Nyanga called Nyanga Two (he indicated that the township would house Crossroads residents as well as others from neighbouring townships); and with reports that Crossroads residents applying for permit extensions at the Nyanga offices were being questioned by the security police - some were being given only 3 month extensions as a result.

In February, with the assistance of community workers, a 14 point memorandum was presented to Timo Bezuidenhout, Chief Commissioner of the Western Cape. The memo referred to:

1. an apparent break-down in the relationship between the authorities and the people;
2. large security police presence at the issuing of extension permits resulting in intimidation of residents;
3. the committee demanded security police withdrawal and impartial observers to be present at the Nyanga offices (to be chosen by the committee);
4. regarding permit issuing certain irregularities were taking place: reports that some

were even required to sign for their wives and families to return to the homelands before being granted extensions; some were told that unauthorised lodgers were reflected in BAAB records and, therefore, only three month extensions were given;

5. Crossroads residents were being charged for fraud, but questions were put forward about the officials involved and whether they too would be charged;
6. dissatisfaction with the name 'Nyanga Two' instead of the New Crossroads as promised;
7. difficulties were already occurring in the permit process and the promised Appeal Committee not yet operating;
8. Crossroads residents were informally promised jobs in the building of the new township and this wasn't happening satisfactorily;
9. meetings between BAAB and the residents shouldn't just be to inform the committee of decisions already taken, but should be meaningful consultation in the true spirit of the word.

Some assurances were given on the points raised, but there was growing community insecurity. This intensified when BAAB announced that Crossroads would become a formal township at the end of March. What formerly had been an abstraction was now becoming a reality and fears and doubts began to surface. As a result the executive took the issue to the broader community and were given a mandate to see Dr Koornhof.

The meeting with Dr Koornhof took place in April, 1980. He once again reassured them on all points raised, avoiding direct answers to questions about their future position. It was a repeat of his earlier diplomatic performance and once again the tension was lowered through direct communication.

For the remainder of the year things went

from bad to worse. The advent of Bezuidenhout as Chief Commissioner in the Western Cape (he replaced hard-liner Frikkie Botha in September 1979) was a significant move on the part of Dr Koornhof. He played an increasingly important role in co-opting the executive and playing off one power group against the other in the community.

With an executive which no longer reported to, and, therefore, took no direction from the broader community, with the careful political manoeuvrings of the Commissioner and his local officials, with the women no longer able to play a meaningful role and the increased presence of the Urban Foundation in the area (Kweza was sent in as a community worker) it became impossible to change the direction of events. The support group, including the advisers, were nowhere to be seen. The only hope being that eventually the general community would resist the dictatorship of the executive, as they experienced the reality of being left off the survey for the new township, or could take the financial exploitation of their leaders no more.

One could only hope that the day to day reality of oppression within Crossroads itself and the reality that not everyone was in fact qualifying for the new township (many were left out of the survey), would eventually force the general community to make its leadership accountable and revive their struggle.

During this period 'consultations' were being held over the new township. When notices were delivered for the first families to move, the women's committee (whose members had been monitoring and watching events up until this point) decided to re-engage in the decisions affecting their community and set up an appointment to see Bezuidenhout. (They had on a number of occasions attempted to speak with the executive, but without success.) This they did.

However, once again Bezuidenhout played off one group against the other. He phoned the executive to inform them of this meeting. This further polarised the men from the women.

In November 1980, the first families moved to the new township. The move found the community divided between those who wished to move, those who felt they couldn't move unless certain concrete guarantees were given, and those who wished to remain in Crossroads to explore the possibilities of a site and service scheme.

The degree of successful co-option of community individuals since the 'deal' was demonstrated by the fact that at the time of the move four of the executive were paid employees of BAAB. One of the men even drove the truck which removed the zincs and belongings of the residents in transit to the new area. The dismantling of the houses and subtle demolition of the community went relatively unnoticed. As Bezuidenhout stood at the side of the road watching the process, he could with some justification view it as a victory on the part of the State.

PRESENT SITUATION

IF ONE reviews the period from late 1978 to the Koornhof statement of April, 1979, there is a definite shift from the previous style of community organisation in the 1975-78 period (frequent mass meetings and reports-back) to a growing dependence upon external organisations and the advice of specialists who defined the nature of the struggle. This shift resulted in the leadership and broader community having limited understanding of the negotiation process and agreements, especially the implications of the settlement upon the community in the long-term.

It further created an elitist group of those directly in touch with the specialists, who saw themselves as separate from and above

the community - a factor which resulted in the early transition from such an elitist group to the extremely bureaucratic executive committee which emerged in mid 1979.

But organisation is not a static process. There are periods of progression and regression. The position of the community from 1978, until residents moved into the new houses in November 1980, was one of confusion, division and lack of direction. Organisation was retarded and the state was clearly in control of the process.

However, as one views the events of 1981 (up to the present - September) there appears to be a return of the struggle to the hands of the community.

WHY THIS SHIFT?

A NUMBER of pressures from the State, the community itself and other sectors have moved the process in this direction.

On the part of the state, confident that decisions could be taken with minimal challenge (if any) from what appeared to be a divided community, local officials

1. proceeded to re-house residents from the nearby squatter camp KTC in the New Crossroads township, by-passing the committee as a whole and the residents;
2. the issuing of permits was not satisfactorily completed with many not yet surveyed, who as a result found themselves subject to the 'normal' pass checks in the peninsula;
3. residents in New Crossroads were notified of additional water charges as meters were installed in the township (no other townships are subject to this). Some faced accounts of up to R80.
4. -children from the old Crossroads schools were told to attend the school in New Crossroads without consulting the existing school

committee;

-four teachers, including a principal, were installed in the new school, again with no school committee consultation;

-the position of the teachers at Noxolo school, resident in Crossroads, remained insecure despite assurances during the negotiations and subsequently that they would be transferred.

Pressure from the community to deal with all these issues forced the leadership back into a position of action and community accountability. Mass meetings were demanded (largely motivated by the women) and the bureaucratic nature of decision-making and the execution in particular, successfully challenged. Once again there is active community participation on key issues affecting the community. This is clearly demonstrated by focussing on the struggle over the school.

SCHOOLS

WHEN the school committee, parents and teachers at Crossroads were by-passed in the running of the new school the community responded by a) teachers and children initially boycotting the new school; b) the school committee calling a mass meeting (with the support of the executive committee) to explain the position and to obtain community support for their stand; c) demanding an explanation from the local school inspectors.

Community support was obtained. However, when the local inspectors met the community they made it clear that as far as their department was concerned the running of schools and decisions were no longer controlled by Crossroads people. This evoked a heated response and raised the concrete reality of township control versus community control in the history of Crossroads.

The meeting demanded to see Scheepers (Chief

circuit inspector). When contacted by the school committee the following day he refused to come to Crossroads but suggested that they send a delegation to him instead.

When this was put to a mass meeting it was viewed as an attempt to co-opt them and the position remained one of deadlock for a few weeks. Eventually (with instructions from above) Scheepers came to Crossroads and agreed to re-negotiate the position, but asked that they give the department until the present school term expired to do so. This was accepted.

However, when the new school term began, the position remained confused. The school committee was not contacted, the teachers' job positions in Crossroads at the old schools were still insecure, not all children were registered, and the new principal and teachers still remained at New Crossroads without being processed through the existing school committee.

Attempts were made to contact Scheepers, but to no avail. The leadership responded by calling a mass meeting on 26 July at which a decision was taken to stage a sit-in at the school in New Crossroads in an attempt to make the education authorities (particularly Scheepers) take note of their grievances.

Cars and buses transported parents and children to the new school early Monday morning. While this was taking place, the chairman of the Crossroads committee, Ngxobongwana, went to see Scheepers and advised him that he should come to New Crossroads and meet the parents and school committee.

At first reluctant, Scheepers was eventually persuaded (a frantic phone call from the principal at the nearby school helped) to visit the school and was met by singing parents and children. He agreed to a meeting which was held in the nearby community hall. Parents aired

their views concerning the existing confusion and dissatisfaction. Eventually Scheepers agreed to close the new school until such time as a) pupils were registered; b) the teachers' positions clarified; c) the school committee elected according to government regulations. A deadline of 16 August was set. At this meeting a new school committee was democratically elected, consisting of most of the former school committee members, and accepted by the department as the official school committee. All future appointments of teachers will be approved by them. Pupils have been registered at the two new schools and all teachers from old Crossroads were transferred and satisfied with their present position.

The struggle over the school is in many ways a test case. It not only mobilised the community, but also illustrated that Crossroads community strength is being re-built and able to force concessions from the state. It tested Crossroads' response to the reality of normal township control compared with the decision-making processes in Crossroads which the community is clearly unwilling to relinquish.

In the struggle over the schools, the need to maintain closer liaison with New Crossroads emerged as crucial, if the unity of the entire community was to be maintained despite their geographical separation. A decision was taken to elect a working committee in New Crossroads to liaise with the existing committees in old Crossroads in an attempt to minimise this happening. New elections for the entire community have been discussed and are planned in the near future to consolidate leadership and strengthen the mandate for future action.

In addition to the pressures from the state, and the Crossroads community itself, which have helped shape present developments, a further pressure has evolved from the realisation that,

although isolated and treated as a 'special case' by Dr Koornhof, Crossroads residents in fact remain subject to the laws affecting all africans in the Western Cape. When pressure was exerted upon the Nyanga bush people, questions concerning their relationship to this struggle and township people in general were raised.

The Crossroads leadership responded by inviting all community-based township organisations and a successful meeting took place at Noxolo school on 28 August.

At this meeting the present position in Crossroads was related and an appeal made from the Crossroads leadership for all township organisations to unite in their common struggle as black people in the Western Cape.

The community's response to all these issues shows not only a return to former mass community participation on issues, but also a move away from their reliance upon external advice, legal battles, etc, to deal with community issues. And, more importantly, a realisation that their struggle is not isolated from the broader political struggle.

It appears that despite the strategies adopted in 1978-79-80, lessons have been learned. There are clear indications that total strategy has not worked successfully and that Crossroads is no longer the divided, confused community of 1980.

NYANGA BUSH

THE HISTORY of the 'no name' camp next to the Peninsula Administration Board offices at Nyanga until 26 July was detailed in WIP 19.

The Crossroads Executive Committee and 43 community organisations had offered to help the Nyanga Bush people, but had been rebuffed by the Bush Committee which chose to work with church and outside (mainly white) support groups.

On 27 July Die Burger reported that officials

had to be brought from the rest of the country to cope with 1 100 people charged with pass offences in the Langa Courts. Lawyers had offered their services defending those arrested during the raids of the past few weeks. The number of defended cases slowed the notorious 'assembly line' pass courts. There had been some talk of not taking bail or defence at the beginning but it is not clear what happened to that strategy. Until Parliament debated the squatter position, the main news was the legal proceedings surrounding the bush people.

On 5 August Die Burger reported that Dr Koornhof had said South Africa would not tolerate a second Crossroads, and that the government had no intention of lifting influx control. On 8 August, Dr Koornhof denied that shelters had been removed from those in the bush and the Cape Times published a photograph taken on 17 July of a policeman removing shelter from an old lady.

Thomas Mandla, chairperson of the African Chamber of Commerce, said that those in Cape Town 'legally' were not against the rest - 'We'll share our crumbs of bread', he said in a statement to the Argus on 10 August.

Next morning there was another pre-dawn raid. American Congress members visiting Cape Town condemned the inhuman treatment of the Nyanga Bush people. By 13 August social workers, churchmen and relief workers were no longer allowed into the camp. A fund was set up to raise money for the squatters; a petition, strongly objecting to the recent evictions, arrests and intimidation, signed by thousands of Capetonians was handed to Dr Koornhof; a mass meeting in the City Hall condemned government action and four Progressive Federal Party (PFP) Members of Parliament had a long discussion with Dr Koornhof on 14 August. Helen Suzman said that they had had 'no joy' from the Minister.

News of the action was being published around the world.

The Bush Committee was told to expect a visit from Dr Koornhof that night. He did not arrive and instead released a 'new deal' through the press. According to the statement in the Cape Times (15 August) Dr Koornhof had made an agreement with the Transkei government that:

-Uncontrolled squatting could not be tolerated and would not be allowed in the interests of the squatters themselves;

-No squatting would be allowed on the relevant site in Nyanga;

-The case of each individual apprehended on the site in question as from 16 July to 3 August, 1981, would be considered on merit. Where the person was in employment, his/her position would be legalised. Housing would be taken up with the employer and, if accommodation was not available, the person would be accommodated on a 'single' basis.

-The unemployed would be helped to find jobs elsewhere in the country. Steps had been taken to find them private sector employment in the Transvaal and Orange Free State where jobs were available. Women not having employment and men not willing to take up jobs offered could not be accommodated in the Western Cape.

He added: 'The people can rely on me not to rat on or go back on what is written here, but we must have co-operation to resolve the problem'. Dr Koornhof repeatedly rejected criticism of recent actions, saying his department was trying to solve a difficult problem in as humane a way as possible.

On 16 August Brian Bishop, chairperson of the Civil Rights League, said the deal was not acceptable as the people would not be able to take their families with them. He urged moderation and tolerance on both sides and added that 'if we

can arrange a meeting we would be pleased to do so although we realise that this will place our credibility at risk'.

Meanwhile eight PFP MPs had spent the weekend visiting Ciskei resettlement camps. This was the first public attempt to broaden the issue to forced removals and the public was informed about the scale and conditions of relocations.

By 17 August 2 500 people had gathered at the bush 'no name' camp, having heard that Dr Koornhof was offering jobs. People interviewed say that they were told to go to the camp if they were looking for jobs or passes. One even said that an official had told her to stay at the camp as the authorities were coming around to 'regularise' the people. (This was the second time such reports were made. The first was the time when people gathered on the night of 16 July. It is not impossible that this was a state strategy to gather many of those 'illegally' in the area in one place to be deported.)

The Chief Commissioner explained Dr Koornhof's statement to the people on 17 August. A meeting was scheduled for the next day for the Bush Committee to report what the squatters felt about the deal. It was cancelled and instead the camp was raided by 100 police in 80 vehicles with dogs at 06h20. About 2 000 people were arrested, taken to Pollsmoor and told to divide themselves into 'Ciskeians' and 'Transkeians'. Many people regarded themselves as neither. One man said that 'in Transkei everything is nothing'. He had worked in Cape Town 13 years and was one of the 800 meat workers who were sacked for strike action in 1980. He said he knew he could get a job if he had a Peninsula stamp; he did not need to be sent to the OFS or elsewhere.

Meanwhile the Transkei Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, the Rev G T Vika, said on 18 August that the squatters had been incited.

They had refused jobs offered by Dr Koornhof, insisting that they be allowed to stay with their families. The same day the Urban Foundation made R10 000 available for relief work.

On 20 August 1 059 people were reported to have been deported. They were taken by bus to the Transkei, then given train tickets to the station nearest 'their villages'. 1 283 had been detained at the camp, six took job offers, 60 were legally in Cape Town and 74 had not been dealt with by the time of the report.

A meeting of 1 000 people was held at lunch-time at St George's Cathedral to protest and demand rights for the squatters. It was followed by an attempted march to Parliament to hand a memorandum to Dr Koornhof. It was handed to the Minister of Police while riot police dispersed the crowd. For the next week Parliament was in uproar with the National Party accusing the PFP of taking part in illegal activity such as marches.

On 21 August the Transkei 'border' was sealed and roadblocks were set up between Cape Town and the Transkei in an attempt to stop deportees from returning to Cape Town. On the 23rd Chief Matanzima accused South Africa of not recognising the status of the Transkei by sending people 'back'. Next day foreign diplomats in Cape Town tried to launch a joint protest but it was halted by the American representatives.

800 people were held in a pre-dawn raid on the Holy Cross Church at Nyanga on 26 August. Most were deported. The Langa Courts were no longer being used for those allegedly from the Transkei - they are deported in terms of immigration legislation as 'prohibited immigrants', while those from the Ciskei are being tried in Commissioners' courts in terms of the Urban Areas Act (until, presumably, the Ciskei becomes 'independent' in December 1981).

On 27 August 60 deportees managed to get

through roadblocks to return to Cape Town to fetch children and belongings left in the chaos. Kathy Locket, a church worker, was trying to find 90 children of mothers stranded in the Transkei. Dr Koornhof announced in Parliament that about 43% of africans in Cape Town are there 'illegally'. The government estimated a de facto population of 199 600 and de jure 114 164.

On 1 September Dr Koornhof announced that he would always treat illegals this way. He named the Womens Movement for Peace, the Civil Rights League, the Western Province Council of Churches, the Black Sash and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission as organisers behind the squatters, accusing them of inciting people and paying for them to return from the Transkei. The organisations denied the allegations. Dr Koornhof added that it was interesting to note that neither the Crossroads nor the 'legal' township people had become involved in the issue.

The deportees in Umtata were being sheltered by the churches, fed by the Transkei army. At the time of writing about 800 are still refusing to move until they can return to Cape Town. The Transkei government accused South Africa of not carrying out its undertaking of legalising those people with jobs in Cape Town. Instead the South Africans had deported everyone. It seems that PAB officials may be sent to investigate this.

In Cape Town townships were surrounded by roadblocks, particularly during weekends, with more than 300 people being arrested for pass offences on the weekend 5-6 September according to the Black Sash Advice office.

Having described the events surrounding the deportation of thousands of people to the Transkei, probably the first mass removal to that territory a brief comment on the current situation might be useful.

DEMANDS: PASSES AND PLACES TO STAY

GOING through press reports no demands of the bush people are to be found. A duplicated list of short and long term demands handed to the PAB reads:

SHORT TERM -

1. MORATORIUM in regard to all Board and Police action until negotiations resolved.
2. AMNESTY for those of community presently in prison or awaiting trial.
3. RECOGNITION that we are not criminals but ordinary people.
4. ERECT temporary shelters pending resolution.
5. FREE ACCESS to us for doctors, priests, lawyers, health and welfare services.
6. FREEDOM of religion and religious observance on site.

LONG TERM -

1. RIGHT to live together as families.
2. RIGHTS to live permanently in the Western Cape.
3. RECOGNITION as citizens of South Africa.

Talking to people waiting for a meeting with the Chief Commissioner on 18 August, observers were told demands were 'Passes and places to stay'. At no stage were jobs demanded. Many people are employed in Cape Town 'illegally' so that what they require is the right to live and work in Cape Town and access to accommodation. Dr Koornhof offered jobs far from Cape Town where it is unlikely that family accommodation would be available. Unemployment in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State is just as bad as that in the Eastern Cape. If Dr Koornhof had really managed to organise over 100 jobs, it is likely that the people of Onverwacht (a resettlement area of about 140 000 people outside Thaba Nchu, OFS) or Gannalaagte (a closer settlement in the Sannieshof district) or Kwaggafontein (a resettlement camp in KwaNdebele) or hundreds of other relocated areas in the bantustans, would

jump at the opportunity. The moment one group of people organises and has international media focussed on it (such as Crossroads), the government comes up with a 'deal', which attempts to make that group a little more privileged than the rest, thus dividing their struggle. But this time, however rudimentary the organisation, the people refused the deal. They were summarily deported and now sit demanding their rights in the Transkei which disclaims them, saying it is South Africa's problem. South Africa's response is that they are citizens of the 'independent' Transkei.

State strategy was successful in that having made a superficial attempt to negotiate, it could remove the people physically off the site and export the problem for the time being - out of sight and mind of the media. In spite of loose organisation over the last three months, the united stand of the people has been remarkable. They still demand to return to Cape Town. They have elected working committees to deal with day to day problems in the church halls and hospitals in which they are staying in Umtata, but when the officials come to see them, they speak as one body. The Bush Committee still exists in part in Cape Town. Most of them were never arrested.

The support group(s) strategy was not clear. Concerned individuals and groups poured food, clothing, firewood and moral support into the 'no name' camp. From the beginning there were tensions. Some saw their aid as humanitarian relief for people in terrible circumstances. There were those who saw the need for relief work, but felt that the issue was a political one and as such should be challenged by the church, by concerned citizens of Cape Town, or both. The community with most experience in such matters, Crossroads, was excluded apparently at the wish of the Bush Committee. The

township people and voluntary organisations that tried to get involved were also rebuffed. The supporters did manage to rally tremendous material and moral support among whites by petitions, a march, mass meetings, debates in Parliament, but involvement could have been much wider and the squatters' stand could possibly have been sustained had those closest to them been actively involved.

On 21 September four South African officials were held hostage for three hours in Umtata by the squatters. The confrontation arose from a statement by the officials that only 50 squatters would be allowed back to Cape Town to find children and collect belongings. The 50 refused to be divided from the rest of the people at the Catholic Youth Centre and it was made clear that as officials had provided buses for them to be taken to the Transkei, until buses were provided to take them all back to Cape Town, no one would move.

After a month in Umtata the people are still together, morale is still high and it seems militancy is growing.

The same day a report appeared in the Cape Times detailing the grievances of the Crossroads Community. A mass meeting on 20 September had discussed their fears that Dr Koornhof might not be sympathetic. Several speakers at the meeting dismissed the 'Koornhof deal' saying they were not prepared to abide by its letter or spirit.

Influx control is not working and while the government may make short term gains, in the long term many lessons have been learned:

-The state has the force to implement its policies and uses that power despite public outcry, promises of humane treatment, international rugby tours, foreign investment and the threat of sanctions, should it be critical for the survival of policy which protects political and

economic privilege of the few.

-State officials are still state officials ie Dr Koornhof is Minister of Co-operation and Development, the department which implements the pass laws. He has clearly reaffirmed that he will not change the policy. Despite smooth talking to the contrary at times (eg April 1980: there will be no more forced removals), he is a Nationalist Cabinet Minister, not a frustrated liberal.

-The state does not always need to negotiate; it can gamble on using force. It lost in Crossroads in 1978, won in Nyanga three years later. Organised resistance from the people themselves makes the difference.

-The 'reformist' element in total strategy days is over - it is back to confrontation in Nyanga, Angola, the trade union movement, etc.

-The International climate is different with right wing leadership in the USA and UK particularly. South Africa need no longer be as careful about its 'overseas image'.

-Transkei is an agent of South Africa - forced removals cannot be refused by a bantustan.

-There is no substitute for organisation - demands should have been clearly stated by the people themselves, as they were in Crossroads, then outsiders could have related to demands rather than helping to articulate them.

-Resistance cannot be sustained without community support - the Bush Committee should not have refused support from 43 community organisations.

-Remarkable resistance and unity have been sustained for three months - in the short term the people have lost for the right reasons (direct repression) rather than for the wrong ones (co-optation in Crossroads).

It is not inconceivable that Dr Koornhof and the Cabinet could renege on their 1979 Crossroads agreement. Hundreds, if not thousands, were left

off the survey and as Crossroads is cleared, not all the people are qualifying for houses in the New Crossroads. Some who have qualified are being given three month permits, then told to return to the Transkei. It is possible that Dr Koornhof could claim that the Crossroads Committee has not kept its side of the bargain in not allowing new people into the area. The vast majority of those left off the survey (estimated over 3 000 by the Committee) have lived in Crossroads all this time and only become conspicuous as official sifting progresses.

Should the special status of Crossroads be withdrawn, it is unlikely that such a politicised community with a long history of organisation and experience from which to learn, would allow itself to be deported from the Western Cape. Crossroads leadership has reverted to holding general community meetings and is well in touch with township representatives. It would be an unwise state that tackles that alliance lightly.

BACK TO COMMUNITY RESISTANCE

WHILE the Crossroads people had clearly stated their demands before the negotiations, there was no real participation from or accountability to the broader community once the experts were brought in. Having won some limited legal battles in the law courts, they came to rely on the legal advisers for political advice, rather than on their own community. In the light of Dr Koornhof's demands for speed and confidentiality, it was almost impossible to take issues back for general discussion. The lawyers and experts were far more familiar with procedures as well.

The Nyanga people were not even given that opportunity. Draft agreements were drawn up by outsiders, an interdict was being discussed and compromises could well have resulted had the state not moved quickly with its offer of jobs

and subsequent deportations.

Clearly in Crossroads now there is healthy cynicism towards the Department of Cooperation and Development and its Minister. With the possibility of the hard won agreement being withdrawn, there may be scope for the selective use of legal strategies ie testing the 'deal'. The community and its leaders have moved through their dependence on outsiders. Their confidence in their own ability is being re-established as they organise themselves first. In turn the state seems aware of this resurgence and rumours are rife that the leadership is about to be arrested and charged with fraud (issuing passes illegally) - the same tactics used before when leaders sought direction from their own community.

Both groups of people - those from Nyanga - bush and those from Crossroads, old and new - are organising, with support from outsiders, but with the initiative firmly in their own hands.

Fears on 'Koornhof deal' at Crossroads

Political Staff

ABOUT 600 Crossroads residents held a mass meeting yesterday to voice their fears that key elements of the historic 1979 agreement reached with the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof, were collapsing. The community leaders called on Dr Koornhof to take urgent steps to ensure that his officials carried out the letter and the spirit of the agreement to rehouse the shanty dwellers and their families at a nearby site, now known as New Crossroads. Several speakers expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the way Administration Board officials were implementing the agreement

pto

reached with Dr Koornhof in 1979.

However, Mr Timo Bezuidenhoud, chief commissioner of the Department of Co-operation and Development in the Western Cape, last night strongly denied that the "Koornhof deal" was breaking down. "The community leaders have not approached me with these complaints and I am surprised that such fears are now being expressed."

"We will continue to implement the Crossroads agreement in consultation with Crossroads leaders," Mr Bezuidenhoud said.

Grievances

The grievances of Crossroads residents centre on:

- Problems many face to get the necessary permit to be in Crossroads. Without these permits they cannot get a house in New Crossroads and face the constant danger of arrest under the pass laws.

- The uncertain position of contract workers who say they were told not to apply for permits and now find they are unable to move to New Crossroads — in spite of Dr Koornhof's pledge that they would be included in the deal.

- The fact that people are being issued with temporary permits although they believe they are entitled to blanket permission to remain.

- The inadequacy of a survey conducted to establish which Crossroads residents could take advantage of Dr Koornhof's deal. Community leaders say many people who were in the area before the December 31, 1978, deadline were omitted from the survey.

- Anger at the deportation of several Crossroads residents back to the Transkei during recent pass raids in the Peninsula.

- Extreme dissatisfaction over high water accounts received by many New Crossroads residents. Community leaders have objected to the water fees, as no other townships are subject to such fees and the matter was not discussed with community leaders, although they were assured of consultation on all important issues.

Suspicion

There is also a deep-rooted suspicion within the community that the Administration Board wishes to bypass the elected leaders, under Crossroads "mayor" Mr Johnson Nxobongwana, and set up other leadership groups.

Mr Bezuidenhoud rejected these allegations, saying there was "no truth" in them.

Several speakers at the Crossroads meeting said they believed Administration Board officials rejected the "Koornhof deal" and were not prepared to abide by its letter or spirit. They called on Dr Koornhof to take steps to ensure that the agreement was carried out.

Community leaders have also decided to request a meeting with Dr Koornhof if matters do not improve.

Residents hope that progress can begin today towards solving the permit problem, as they have been promised that an administrative committee will be reconvened to consider cases of people who believe they have a right to a permit.

INFORMATION

Transport

TRANSVAAL

Kagiso: It was reported (Sowetan, 30.07.81) that the Kagiso Residents' Organisation (KRO) had organised a meeting to protest against rent and bus fare increases. The residents had gathered around the local Lutheran church. They were refused entry into the church by the parish.

Police intervened to break up the meeting and a 'punch-up' broke out between the security police and people at the meeting (Sowetan, 31.07.81). The police attempted to make arrests. They were, however, fought off and eventually driven away by the crowd, amid chants and freedom songs.

At a subsequent meeting residents decided that they would boycott the Greyhound Bus Lines. The local community councillors were accused of being government stooges and the community council was asked to resign.

In addition, the R20-million hostel project in the area was slammed with people saying that 'We need houses, not hostels' (Sowetan, 31.07.81).

A few days later it was reported that KRO leaders had been arrested by Krugersdorp police after they attempted to march to the WRAB (West Rand Administration Board) offices in protest against increased rent and bus fares (Star, 03.08.81). The march came after 6 000 people had gathered in protest. Ten 'youths' were arrested after the stoning of Greyhound buses (RDM, 04.08.81). It was reported that a student in the area stated that there was mass confusion in the higher primary schools as pupils had

been told to go home as there was no school (Star, 04.08.81).


Chairperson of the community council, J Mango, said that classes had not been disrupted. Furthermore, he condemned the unrest and stated that if people hoped to solve matters through violence they should accept the consequences.

The RDM (05.08.81) reported that eight men and two women appeared before W Aucamp in the Krugersdorp Regional Court, charged with stoning buses in the Kagiso township. They pleaded not guilty to a charge of 'public violence, alternatively hindering workers from boarding buses and malicious damage to property'. Bail was granted and the hearing was postponed to 19 August, after the court had been told that the accused would be defended by Johannesburg attorneys.

Meanwhile, the day before the court appearance, police fired rubber bullets to disperse a group of 'youths' (Star, 05.08.81). They arrested four people who were released later. A teacher at Bosele Higher Primary School said that the day before (4 August) a group of young people from 'The People's Eye' entered the school and dismissed pupils saying that 'there was no time to sit at the desk while their brothers were fighting for their rights' (Star, 05.08.81).

The RDM (06.08.81) reported that the township was 'back to normal' as 'workers boarded buses to go to work and pupils returning to school without any incidents of violence reported'. There have been no further reports.

Putco - West Rand: JL Coetzee, financial executive of Putco, announced an increase application to come into effect in October (Star, 04.08.81). The company is seeking an increase in revenue of 35% which will be made



up by government subsidy and fare increases. This increase was sought, according to Coetzee, to meet increases in running costs. This application comes a month after Putco increased its fares by 7,5% (see WIP 19).

Katlehong councillor, Morogosi, described the proposed increases as shocking and stated that it would worsen the critical conditions in the townships that existed as a result of increases in the cost of living (RDM, 05.08.81). The Sowetan (06.08.81) reported that Dr Joe Joshua, chairperson of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) stated that his organisation would plan a national boycott of Putco buses if fares were increased: 'We have resolved to issue a nation-wide directive to boycott the Putco transport service if ... fares are increased. We feel that black commuters ... are already undergoing tremendous economic hardships' (Sowetan, 06.08.81). Bishop Tutu described the fare increases as 'sheer highway robbery'.

Hendrik Schoeman, Minister of Transport, said that the application by Putco for a 35% increase would be referred to the Commission into Bus Passenger Transportation (see 'general' section, below). Responding to the PFP spokesperson on transport matters who asked the government to avoid passing on increases to passengers, Hendrik Schoeman said that the matter would be handled by the Commission, but did not give any assurances that the increases would not be passed on to commuters.

Meanwhile, the Sunday Express (13.09.81) reported that Putco made a record profit of R4,8-million last year. Contradictory explanations of these profits came from Putco executives, with one stating that the profits came from a special fuel cost bridging subsidy, and the other stating that the profits came from increased

business (the fuel subsidy came to about R10-million).

Putco's financial controller, Button, was asked why seven months had lapsed between the granting of the last fare increase and its implementation. He replied that the timing of fare increases was a politically sensitive issue. He added that after the National Transport Commission had approved and granted increases, the timing of implementation was investigated by the Lotter Commission. This Commission consults the security police, the police, the Department of Co-operation and Development, and community councils, to test public opinion and determine whether there are likely to be boycotts or other protests against fare increases.

Pretoria Area: Residents of the Mabopane township complained to Putco about the poor bus service, accusing Putco of 'gross neglect'. The complaints included chaos at the Shoshanguve transfer station; half-hour delays; over-crowding. The Putco public relations officer stated that things were expected to go smoothly at the transfer station since the company has employed queue marshalls to 'protect passengers' (Star, 02.09.81).

J Gomba, director of the Black Unity Express Bus Service (BUEBS) (see WIP 19) was refused a road carrier permit to carry passengers between Saulsville, Giyani and Lebowa. Putco opposed the application stating that the service it operated in conjunction with the SAR and taxis catered adequately. In a strongly worded memorandum to the Minister of Transport Gomba stated that he had been pushed out of business and that black-owned businesses are being replaced by white run companies. He added that the prices of transport offered by those companies are very high and submitted that the transportation of black people be handed over to the

'department of black affairs' (Sowetan, 11.09.81).

CAPE

In the Cape the struggle to keep bus fares down continues. In WIP 19 it was reported that 21 community organisations lodged their objections to the application for increased fares by City Tramways to the Road Transportation Board. The Cape Herald (22.08.81) reported that representatives of about 30 community organisations, churches and trade unions are opposing the application in 'round two of their fight' against increases.

Over 100 representatives filled the Board's room in the Foreshore offices, while many people had to stand outside. City Tramways legal representative, S Selikowitz, stated that the increases were necessary because of higher costs and higher wages for City Tramways employees. In addition City Tramways want a penalty for over-riding and a system 'whereby drivers would not have to provide change late at night'.

Between them City Tramways and Associated Bus Holdings (who had also applied for an increase (RDM, 26.06.81; WIP 19)) control the buses running to and from Mitchell's Plain and Atlantis. The Atlantis Civic Association (ACA) has called on the government to subsidise bus fares. The chairperson of the ACA said that increased fares would hit Atlantis residents hard since they were completely dependent on bus transport - there is no train service in the area. 'Without the buses we are as good as cut off from the outside world', he said. At a protest meeting held the week before a resident called on the government to pay the residents' bus fares since it forced people to live there. Jeff Leonard, a former chairperson of the ACA stated that with Cape Town being

50km away a bus boycott by Atlantis residents would be extremely difficult.

The Road Transportation Board hearing continues.

The Cape Herald (29.08.81) reported that the Western Cape bus companies and the objectors would have to wait a few weeks before the National Transport Commission makes a decision on whether to grant the increases. Bus company representative, Selwyn Selikowitz, stated that the Mitchell Plain Bus Service Ltd had lost money since a railway service started in the area. Replying, Geoff Budlender, appearing for 22 organisations, stated that the companies could put in a claim to the government. He added that the holding company, Associated Bus Holdings, did not show a loss.

P le Roux, director of the Institute for Social Development at the University of the Western Cape, said that 30% of people in Atlantis live below the breadline and that bus fares should not be increased because of the human aspect and political resentment that would be caused. A petition signed by 2 500 residents of Mitchells Plain objecting to the proposed fare increases was handed in. More than 23 000 people have signed petitions objecting to the fare increases.

Meanwhile, Boland Passenger Transport, the bus company serving the Strand, Somerset West, Stellenbosch, Paarl and Malmesbury applied for an average three cents increase on all fares. A spokesperson said that the company had applied for the Department of Transport to subsidise the proposed increases.

NATAL

Post (24-7.06.81) reported that the Phoenix Working Committee (PWC) sent letters of complaint from Phoenix residents to the Local Transport-

ation Board and to the Bus Owners Association. This step was taken after owners who had been invited to a meeting to discuss problems related to transport did not turn up. The chairperson of the PWC, JM Singh, said that 'the indifferent attitude of the bus owners to the meeting was a "declaration of war"'. 103

According to JM Singh some of the problems were dagga smoking on buses; the bus drivers rarely keep on time; and that owners are not making use of all their certificates (?). He added that there were outside bus owners who could provide better services and the PWC is fighting to get the present owners removed. One of the directors of Springfield Omnibus Service, G Raghbur, said that he had not received an invitation to the meeting. There have been no further reports available to us.

Meanwhile, the RDM (13.07.81) reported that Putco would raise its Natal bus fares by 7,5% in August as a result of the 1979 fuel increases. Putco managing director, C Bailey, stated that further increases could be expected later in the year to accommodate the fuel hike of July this year!

It was reported (Leader, 07.08.81) that a R20 000 libel suit was to come before the Durban Supreme Court. SV Naicker, a member of the SAIC, is suing three officials of the Lot 14 Bus Passengers Interim Committee, arising out of a pamphlet which called on passengers to boycott the bus service. It is alleged that the pamphlet was defamatory. The people being sued are Amar Sewpersad, Danny Naidoo and Dan Mundra. We have no further reports on this matter.

GENERAL

The National Institute for Transport and Road Research (NITR) which is part of the Council for Industrial and Scientific Research (CSIR), drew

up a report recommending to the government that 'a strictly commercial' corporation be allowed to run the bus services in Johannesburg and surrounding areas. Ian Horton, an international public transport expert with the NITR, who drew up the report, is quoted as saying (Star, 28.08.81) that a public transport corporation run by a board of directors 'who are required to break even annually is the only sensible answer to the current problems in the metropolitan areas'.

The report suggested that private companies, such as Putco, would be contracted by the corporation who would be able to check their finances and set standards. The report further suggests that such moves could mean a new deal for all passengers, black and white, which would include faster travelling times, upgraded waiting facilities, and new forms of transport and interchanges.

This corporation is called the 'Passenger Transport Corporation' (PTC) by Ian Horton. Such a PTC would have powers to plan a 'co-ordinated multi-model transport system'. The board of directors would be responsible for policy while the PTC would be subject to the control of the Road Transportation Boards, and the state National Transport Commission would be the overall watchdog (Star, 31.08.81).

Two new Commissions of Inquiry were announced in the Government Gazette (reported on in the RDM, 11.09.81), one into bus transport and the other into tourism.

Dr Peter Welgemoed (MP) has been named as the chairperson of the transport inquiry, which will look into tariffs, subsidies, subsidisation of commuters, energy supply, urban planning, and facilities for buses and their passengers, the necessity for security in the bus transport industry, the need for a co-ordinating body for

metropolitan transport areas, and the desirability of establishing a national bus transportation corporation.

RAILWAYS

The Minister of Transport announced in his railway budget that return tickets, which represented a discount of up to 60% on single fares, were to be abolished on commuter trains from 1 October. In addition the weekly and monthly season tickets will be increased by an average of 10%, affecting the majority of commuters. The discounted return tickets, however, affects casual workers, shoppers and students.

A railway spokesperson stated that one of the reasons for abolishing the discounted return was to clamp down on fare evasion. The chairperson of the Commuters Watchdog Association said, however, that tickets were examined at departure and often on the trains, and it was a result of inefficiency on the part of the railways if the staff could not catch fare dodgers. He added that fare increases would discourage pupils from using public transport.

Ntatho Motlana of the Committee of Ten, described the fare increases as 'monstrous'.

This increase comes six months after an increase of on average 12,8%, and parliamentary reports indicate that further increases are likely next year.

These fare increases come in the context of inadequate railway facilities for Soweto commuters. While the Director of Passenger Services and his assistant claimed that the 420 trains provided for the 235 000 daily commuters, coped with needs, this was strongly denied by the commuters interviewed by the Sowetan (07.09.81).

NOTE:

We would like contributions on the issue of transport in South Africa.

Courts

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS

On June 11, 1980, workers in the Cape Peninsula began boycotting the bus service run by City Tramways. Fares had been increased by between 30% and 100%, following an application by City Tramways to the National Transport Commission. By mid-July, it was reported that City Tramways had spent R25 000 on propaganda, in an attempt to break the boycott. However, the Sunday Times reported that the boycott was still 100% effective in Crossroads, Guguletu and Nyanga, while 50% of people were still boycotting buses in other areas (ST, 13.07.80).

A secret Cabinet committee, consisting of representatives from the security police, army, and Departments of Co-operation and Development, Indian Affairs and Coloured Affairs, was set up to break the boycott. It issued various anonymous pamphlets, including one falsely claiming to speak for taxi drivers, calling for an end to the boycott.

However, by mid-August the boycott was still in force, and it was at this stage that an arm of the state intervened in a more direct manner in support of City Tramways.

During the boycott of buses, many township residents used taxis to travel to and from work. Large numbers of these taxis were not legally registered with the Road Transportation Board, and are thus referred to as 'pirate' taxis. Late in July, police baton-charged workers

boarding pirate taxis, and strong police action was taken to force these taxis off the road in an attempt to break the boycott. Reports mentioned the arrest of taxi drivers, and even confiscation of cars and lorries.

Then, on August 11, police once more acted against the pirate taxis and their passengers - and this time large-scale violence resulted. According to the chairperson of the Western Cape region of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Daphne Wilson, the violence followed a confrontation between police and commuters waiting for pirate taxis at a bus stop where empty buses were standing. Riot police attempted to force waiting commuters to board these buses. 'The people refused to get into the buses - they walked instead', said Mrs Wilson. She claimed that the ensuing violence was a direct result of the clampdown on pirate taxis, involving strong-arm action and wholesale arrests. At one stage, police and armed officials of the Road Transportation Board stood at pirate taxi tanks and prevented people from entering the taxis.

In the violence and community anger that followed, vehicles were stoned and set alight in Klipfontein Road, near the Crossroads squatter camp, and at least 5 people died. 2 of them, George Beeton and Frederick Jansen, were stoned and severely burnt by petrol bombs thrown at their cars when they drove past Crossroads. All 3 schools in the area were closed, and a crowd set fire to a post office maintenance vehicle at the Nyanga bus terminus.

Chairperson of the Nyanga Residents' Association, Oscar Mpetha, issued the following statement on the conflict:

We are told the police are here to protect the people from intimidators, but it is the police who are the intimidators. When we saw the riot police arrive this morning we

knew there would be some sort of unrest. It was the action of the police which caused the riot situation. Why are they protecting City Tramways? It seems as if they want the people to use their money against their will.

Police denied that they had provoked the people, and caused unrest, and according to Brigadier DB Nothnagel, Divisional Commander of Police in the Western Cape,

The pirate taxis are committing an offence, and when we act against lawbreakers we are accused of provoking unrest. This does not make sense.

The then president of the South African Institute of Race Relations, René de Villiers, disagreed:

At a time when everything possible should have been done to defuse the situation... the authorities saw fit to insist on the strictest implementation of the Transportation Act provisions about unlicensed carriers (in this case, pirate taxis).

A few days later Johan Barnard, managing director of City Tramways, admitted that inspectors of the company were reporting the activities of pirate taxis to the authorities. A community leader responded in the following way:

The action of the police and the Road Transportation Board officials has simply made people angrier and more united because they can see that the Government is helping City Tramways. Instead of making the company look into its fares, they came in with sub-machine guns and dogs and tried to force the people to board the buses.

It has been an education for some of the people to see how the Government works together with business. They must just realise that the people are not going to go back to buses until the fares go down.

Two days after the events of August 11, police began detaining community leaders and students from the Crossroads-Nyanga area. One of the first to be picked up was Oscar Mpetha, 71 year old chairperson of the Nyanga Residents'

Association and organiser for the African Food and Canning Workers' Union, who had the day before condemned the police intervention in the bus boycott.

Some four months later Mpetha and 17 others emerged from the secrecy and solitary confinement of security police detention, to face charges of murder and terrorism.

The accused in the trial are Oscar Mpetha (71), Lawrence Lerotholi (18), Morgan Makubala (19), Aaron Tshangama (28), Peter Kube (18), Alton Sabuwa (18), Fumanikile Buoi (18), Vuyisile Kzaza (19), Johannes Nhlapo (20), Jeffrey Baardman (20), Vuyisile Diba (21), Richard Amaondo (19), Welile Mazothana (21) and 5 youths.

That state alleges that between August 8 and August 12, 1980, the accused incited people to damage motor vehicles by throwing stones and petrol bombs, and setting alight the vehicles. The accused are charged with assaulting and injuring 6 people, 2 of whom subsequently died. Other charges relate to the barricading of Klipfontein Road by placing stones, tree stumps and tyres in the street; marching in singing groups armed with sticks, stones and other weapons; ordering the closure of black schools; and congregating in various churches to encourage people to participate in 'terroristic' activities.

The first part of the trial involved various procedural applications made by both state and defence. Defence counsel applied for the state to supply further and better particulars to the charge sheet, and this application was granted by the trial judge.

The state then applied for the whole trial to be held in camera, as there were a number of minors amongst the accused. This was opposed by the accused who, through their lawyers,

expressed the desire for the trial to be heard in open court. In ruling against the state's application, the judge said that 'it would be wrong for me in this situation to force a sort of semi-private trial on all 19 accused when not one of them wants it'.

The opening days of the trial were noticeable for the amount of public support shown for the accused, and demonstrations, marches and large court attendance were reported.

In its opening address, the state claimed that trade union and community leader Oscar Mpetha was the brains behind the bus boycott against City Tramways. In addition to this, the state claimed that it would prove that Mpetha had planned the stoning of vehicles and killing of whites on August 11, 1980.

The state's first witness was a 15 year old girl, who gave her evidence in camera and may not be named. In her evidence she claimed that a number of the accused had taken part in various meetings, a march, building a barricade in Klipfontein Road, stone-throwing, and the overturning of a car. She attended a meeting at the Assembly of God church on August 10, 1980, where a speaker told those gathered to join others waiting near Crossroads.

The crowd met a man driving a van who raised his fist in a salute and urged the crowd to sing a song - 'There are guns in Angola'. She claimed that this man was Mpetha.

The witness claimed that one of the accused (Kube) told people in the crowd to pick up stones. Another of the accused stood in the middle of the road and stopped traffic. Stones were thrown at a car and a white man was injured. Kube pulled the man from the car, and a group including 6 accused overturned the car. Another accused then threw a match into the

petrol tank of the car.

The witness was then cross examined for some 8 days by defence advocates, and during the course of the cross examination the accused which the witness had implicated denied their involvement.

The state's second witness was a 16 year old youth who had been in detention since August 1980. According to the first witness, this second witness had played a leading role in the events on August 11.

This witness told the court that he had joined the Comrades movement in 1978, and had been taken to Mpetha's house by Amapondo. There, Mpetha had said that the Comrades were fighting for the nation, and that if any of them were arrested he would see to it that the ANC helped to defend them.

The witness further claimed that at various meetings at Mpetha's house in August 1980, Mpetha had told people to take schoolchildren out of their classrooms, burn schools, kill whites and destroy their cars. Mpetha had produced a map and pointed out the place where people were to start rioting, and which routes people were to follow. The first key point had been the bus terminus in Nyanga where cars and buses were to be destroyed. The groups were then to proceed to Landsdowne Road, and any vehicles belonging to whites on the way were to be destroyed and the drivers killed. The groups were to split into three, and 2 of the accused were group leaders. People were told to arm themselves with petrol bombs, barricade the road, and throw the petrol bombs at cars. According to the witness, Mpetha then instructed a group to organise a meeting at the Assembly of God church the next Monday: 12 of the accused were present at the meeting, and one of them, Nhlapo, said that the young people would have to

be violent.

The witness testified that after the meeting, the crowd went to the Nyanga East bus terminus, and attacked a GPO vehicle. On the way to Crossroads they met Mpetha who taught them to sing 'There are guns in Angola'. They broke up into 2 groups, and his group went to the Noxolo school in Crossroads. Present was Booi, leader of the Crossroads Comrades, who said that they must go together to kill whites and burn cars. Booi bought a container and filled it with petrol, and after stopping a car, a group pulled the driver from it. Booi, Amapondo, Nhlapo and 2 people not accused stabbed the driver and set the car on fire. At this stage, according to the witness, Mpetha arrived and threw stones at the driver of the car. He then left.

The following day, after a meeting at Noxolo school, a group went back to Klipfontein Road. There a car swerved off the road, and the driver was pulled out and stabbed by Booi, Nhlapo and Amapondo.

The witness claimed that after this series of events, he and 3 others fled to the Transkei with the idea of contacting the ANC in Lesotho. However, after a period, he returned to Cape Town.

In cross-examination, which lasted 7 days, the witness admitted that after his arrest he made a false statement to a magistrate. Defence counsel also put it to this witness that much of what he said in evidence was false and fabricated.

When the court reconvened after the mid-year recess, Mpetha was excused by the judge from attending court until he felt better. During the lunch break he had been unable to walk down the court stairs to the cells, and 2 of his co-accused had to carry him.

He returned to court on his 72nd birthday

on crutches to hear state witness Michael Mlangeni, 26, saying that he was prepared to say anything to get out of detention, and that a lengthy period of detention had affected his memory.

The next day the accused were involved in a scuffle with police when they refused to get into a van transporting them between prison and the court. The presiding judge inspected the van, and decided that there was sufficient space in it for the accused. He warned that if there were further problems in this regard, he would move the court to Pollsmoor prison, where the accused were being held.

Towards the end of August, defence counsel informed the court that Mpetha's diabetes was out of control, and that he might have to have an operation. Mpetha was then admitted to hospital, where a toe was amputated. In the meantime, the trial continued in his absence, and a 16 year old witness, weeping while giving her evidence, told the court that she could not remember seeing any of the accused in the vicinity of one of the cars attacked.

The trial, which is expected to last into 1982, continues in the Cape Town Supreme Court.

Norman Yengeni (22), Edward Mbundu (28), David Linda Mampane (20) and Eddie Bafana Khumalo (30).

Charge: The state alleged that all the accused had undergone military training, and were ANC members. In addition, Yengeni was charged with gathering information (for the purposes of sabotage) on a Cape Town oil storage depot, and Mbundu and Khumalo were alleged to have collected information on an oil depot in Alberton.

Mampane was, in addition to the charges of undergoing military training and being an

ANC member, alleged to have been part of an ANC assassination squad, and to have had the intention of killing a policeman. Mampane was arrested with Johannes Shabangu, who was sentenced to death recently for his attempted assassination of a policeman in Bosfontein (see Pretoria treason trial).

At the start of the trial the accused all pleaded guilty to being ANC members, and to undergoing military training. Mampane also pleaded guilty to the intention of killing a policeman. The state accepted the not guilty pleas of the accused in regard to the gathering of information on oil depots, and in Mampane's case, possession of a Makarov pistol.

The accused were accordingly found guilty on the counts they pleaded guilty on.

The state called two witnesses in aggravation of sentence, one of whom was Colonel Hermanus Stadler of the security police, who regularly testifies in political trials on the nature of the ANC.

The other witness, who may not be named in terms of a court order, was the person who was kidnapped in the SADF raid on Matola, and who testified for the state in the Pretoria treason trial.

Sentence: Mampane was sentenced to 8 years for undergoing military training, 2 years for ANC membership, and 8 years for his intention to assassinate a policeman. Because the 2 years for ANC membership is to run concurrently with the other sentences, the effective sentence is 16 years.

The remaining 3 accused were sentenced to 8 years for military training, and 2 years for ANC membership. Effective sentence is accordingly 10 years each. (Pretoria Regional Court, 15.09.81).

Tsoeu Mokhele (21)

Charge: It is not clear from reports whether the accused was charged under the Terrorism or Internal Security Act. He was charged with illegally crossing the South Africa - Lesotho border while in possession of ANC, SACP and SACTU pamphlets.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 5 years.

(Bloemfontein Regional Court, 21.08.81).

PRETORIA TREASON TRIAL

Anthony Bobby Tsotsobe (25), Johannes Shabangu (26) and David Moise (25).

Charge: The accused faced a main charge of high treason, with alternate counts of terrorism, robbery with aggravating circumstances, and four counts of attempted murder.

They first appeared in the magistrates' court on 16 April, 1981, where they were not legally represented. Despite their lack of legal representation and the seriousness of the charges they faced, they were questioned by the presiding magistrate and all 3 made very damaging admissions which were recorded as evidence against them.

Tsotsobe admitted that he was an ANC member, that he had received military training in Angola between 1977 and 1980, that he had attacked Uncle Tom's hall in Soweto on 5 May, 1980, setting it on fire, that he had launched an attack on Dube railway station on 14 September, 1980, and that he had hidden ammunition, weapons and explosives intended for acts of sabotage. In addition to this, Tsotsobe was also charged with participating in a guerilla attack on the Booysens police station during April 1980.

Shabangu, who was charged with attacking the house of a South African policeman at

Bosfontein, Malelane, near Barberton during April 1980, admitted in the magistrates' court hearing that he was an ANC member, and had received military training in Angola.

Moise, during the course of the magistrates' court hearing, admitted participating in an attack on Sasol 2 at Secunda on 1 June, 1980, and returning to South Africa on 26 August, 1980 to gather information for a second attack on Secunda.

The Supreme Court trial began with the defence contesting the admissibility of the admissions made in the magistrates' court. Defence counsel pointed out that the accused were brought directly to court from section 6 detention: pages of complicated charges were read to Tsotsobe, 'an unlettered man' with standard 1 education. The magistrate then got admissions from him after reading the charges to him.

It is clear that when an undefended man is asked to admit to admissions the effect should be explained very clearly. This man knew nothing whatsoever about legal proceedings and gave his consent in circumstances which were most unfair, argued a defence lawyer.

The accused gave evidence on this aspect of the trial, and 2 of them testified that they were released from section 6 detention only moments before they appeared in the magistrates' court. Moise told the presiding judge, Justice Theron, that he was under the impression that he was still under section 6 when he appeared in court.

Despite these arguments, the trial judge ruled that the admissions made in the magistrates' court hearing were in order, and would be used as evidence against the accused.

The other major element in the trial related to the 'confessions' which the three accused

made while in police custody. All 3 accused, testified in some detail, alleging that they had been systematically tortured by security police. In addition to this, they called a number of ex-detainees who gave evidence of a general course of conduct involving the security police. The defence argued that the statements of the accused had been made under extreme duress, and should not be accepted as evidence by the court. For some details of the allegations made against the security police, and their denials, see WIP 19:47-8.

The state's major witness was an ANC guerilla captured by the SADF in its raid on the suburban house in Matola, Mocambique. The witness, who may not be identified in terms of a ruling given by judge Theron, told the court that he had undergone ANC military training in Angola and the Soviet Union. In April 1980 he returned to South Africa as part of a group which planted explosives at the Sasol plant in Sasolburg. He returned to Mocambique to report on this mission, and subsequently entered South Africa a second time to gather information on a fuel depot at Mafikeng.

After returning to Mocambique, he was kidnapped by the SADF from the house in Matola, and brought back to South Africa where he was handed over to security police.

At the conclusion of the state case, the three accused decided not to give evidence, and called no witnesses in their defence.

Verdict: Guilty of high treason, in terms of the various acts they were charged with undertaking.

Sentence: On 19 August, in the Supreme Court of Pretoria, the judge who 3 years earlier sent Solomon Mahlangu to his death, sentenced all 3 accused to a sentence of death.

Labour Action

MINING

ON the 18th July six miners were killed and 20 injured in 'faction fighting' between Shangaan and Xhosa workers at JCI's Elsburg Mine at Westonaria. A few rooms were burnt out and windows were broken, according to the single report on this incident that appeared in Johannesburg newspapers (RDM, 21.07.81).

The next weekend, on 25 July, one african miner was killed and three badly injured in fighting between a reported 3 000 Xhosa and 3 000 Basuto miners (these figures were later denied by the mine authorities). Mine police at the Kloof gold mine compound where the incident took place, used teargas and dogs. This mine, owned by Gold Fields of South Africa, is also close to Westonaria. About R10 000 worth of damage was done, and 500 miners asked to be released from contract.

On 27 July, at the Venterspost mine compound in the same region, further fighting occurred between Xhosa and Basuto miners. Cars were reported to have been stoned and at least eight miners injured. Teargas was used by mine police and the SAP was called in. The fighting was said to have involved about 800 miners.

TRANSVAAL

Ansol Metal Co (Alberton): Approximately 200 workers at this firm downed tools on 14 August in demand of a 60c an hour across the board increase.

The firm told the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) that the firm was to introduce the 'Patterson grading system', which would allow

productive workers to earn more than the industrial council determined wages for the industry.

No further news.

Cobra Brassware (Luipaardsvlei, West Rand):

A series of short stoppages hit this firm. The first report referred to the second strike in a week. This second strike occurred on 31 August (a Monday). Rita Ndzanga, organising secretary of the General Allied Workers Union (GAWU) said that almost the entire workforce - about 600 workers - had gone on strike over union recognition, rejection of the liaison committee, reinstatement of a dismissed worker, and the refusal by management to let workers leave the premises at lunchtime.

This stoppage was said to have lasted four hours. Management met with the GAWU and a recognition ballot was said to have been discussed (Star, 01.09.81).

On Thursday, 3 September, workers downed tools again, demanding a wage review (R3,00 an hour minimum) and recognition of GAWU. More than 200 workers were involved and police stood by on this and the next day.

Managing director, Terry Davidson, said that workers who had not returned by Monday (7 September) would be fired. He also said that the firm would not give GAWU sole recognition as the registered Steel, Engineering and Allied Workers Union had also contacted him for recognition (RDM, 05.09.81).

All but 20% of Cobra's 540 workers were fired on Monday after refusing to return to work. New recruits and former workers would be signed on Wednesday, said Davidson.

Samson Ndou, GAWU president, said that workers had been locked out on the Monday (Sowetan, 08.09.81).

Four hundred workers collected their pay cheques on Wednesday. A GAWU organised meeting of workers decided that rather than seek re-employment they would 'continue the struggle'.

Colgate-Palmolive (Boksburg): For background see WIP 18:44-5; WIP 19:54-5.

A recognition agreement has been signed between Colgate-Palmolive management and the FOSATU-affiliated Chemical Workers Industrial Union during August. The agreement makes provision for 'grievance and disciplinary procedures ... as well as shop steward elections' (Star, 25.08.81).

Deluxe Consolidated Laundries (Koedoespoort, Pretoria): Some 2 000 leaflets, said to have been issued by the General Workers Union of South Africa (GWUSA), called for a boycott of this laundry over denial of union rights to the workers, low wages and no canteen facilities.

A GWUSA spokesperson, Donsie Khumalo, said that nine laundry employees had been fired for union activities. Laundry manager, B Kaplan, said that one worker had been fired for theft 'and the other eight after they had refused to continue working' (Sowetan, 08.09.81). Kaplan said that the firm did not stand in the way 'of any worker who wanted to join a union'.

On Thursday, 10 September, about 150 workers stopped work, demanding higher wages (to be increased to R2,50 an hour) and union recognition, better working conditions (workers were said to be earning R21,00 a week, even after long service with the firm) (Star, 11.09.81).

GWUSA regional secretary, Donsie Khumalo, said that he was picked up by security police shortly after the strike started and taken to security police offices in Compol Building in

Pretoria for three hours of questioning (Sowetan, 11.09.81).

No further information.

Johnson Tiles (Olifantsfontein, Pretoria):

Workers were said to have gone on strike on about 11 September, demanding the recognition of the Building, Construction and Allied Workers Union (the BCAU was said to represent 365 of the 860 workers at the firm (Beeld, 12.09.81).

No further information.

Greyhound Bus Lines (Krugersdorp): For background information see WIP 17:40.

Workers at this firm, who went on strike in February, were brought to court on the day of the strike, and 176 (unrepresented workers) were sentenced to 18 months, suspended for five years and on condition that they returned to work immediately.

This sentence and the conviction was set aside by the Transvaal Supreme Court in September (even though there had been no appeal against conviction). The judges criticised the magistrate's sentences as 'draconian'.

The judges said 'it was highly undesirable for people accused of "complex charges" to be tried without access to legal representatives and without having the charges fully explained to them' (RDM, 08.09.81).

Gundle Plastics (Bedfordview, Johannesburg):

See WIP 19:53 for coverage of a previous strike.

On the morning of 5 August (Wednesday) 'about 100' workers stopped work, and were dismissed after 'ignoring a management ultimatum to return to work' (RDM, 06.08.81). Management released a statement in which they said that not all workers had gone on strike and that they did not know what the strike was about.

On Thursday, 6 August, 'about 120' of the dismissed workers held a meeting near the factory. Some wanted to confront the police who kept a watch on them, but were dissuaded from doing so.

Factory director, Bill Golden, admitted that the factory was struggling to keep going. It was now rumoured, in the press, that the strike had started 'over a dispute with a company official' (Star, 06.08.81). The Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) officials, representing many of the workers, were talking to the strikers.

On 14 August it was reported (Star, 14.08.81) that the entire day shift that had gone on strike had been paid off. Those members of the night shift who had joined them 'would be rehired selectively', said management.

Auto Industrial (Isando): See WIP 19:53.

The MAWU was also involved in the dispute at this firm. A wage strike started on the afternoon of Tuesday, 4 August. Dr Bernie Fanaroff, a MAWU organiser, said that he had been assaulted by Auto Industrial staff and also questioned by the security police at the Kempton Park police station on the current strike wave on the east Rand.

MAWU said that workers had asked for a 50c an hour increase. Managing director, Dean Fragalo, told workers that if they did not like their pay they should leave - which they did. Management told the Star newspaper that the strike was 'political'.

Workers returned on 6 August, but it was said Auto Industrial had fired most MAWU shop stewards (RDM, 07.08.81). Workers were to meet with union officials over the weekend of 8 August to discuss their wage demands and the dismissals.

A later report said that about 90 workers

had been dismissed by the firm. It was never reported how many workers had been involved in the strike.

Hendler and Hendler (Boksburg): See WIP 19:52 for a report on the strike by more than 2 000 workers at this firm. They had returned after their union, MAWU, had entered into wage consultations with management (who had earlier said that there would be no pay increases).

However, two weeks later it was reported that management had agreed to a 13c an hour across the board increase, following meetings with MAWU officials.

These increases, along with those at Vaal Metal Pressings and Tensile Rubber, are seen as victories for MAWU (and other FOSATU union) demands for plant level negotiations (Star, 28.07.81).

Henred Fruehauf (Wadeville, near Germiston): On Wednesday, 29 July, yet another east Rand firm was hit by a strike when the approximately 400 workers at this trailer manufacturing firm downed tools in protest at the suspension of a worker who had allegedly hit a white employee.

MAWU, having been pushing for formal recognition at the firm for some time, entered into discussion over the strike (RDM, 31.07.81).

Workers returned on 31 July, while talks continued (Star, 31.07.81).

No further information.

McPhail (Kazerne Depot, Johannesburg): On Monday, 24 August, about 200 workers at this coal merchandising firm, went on strike over wages. The strike was settled two hours later.

McPhail ('We won't fail you') had recently been taken over by the Triton Group. New managing director, AJ Laughland, said that the

workers had been 'grossly underpaid for years' and brought forward by a month a 20% wage increase.

This is still starvation level as the workers had been paid at the wage determination minimum for the industry (between R18 and R26 per week - see article on nightwatchmen in this WIP) (RDM, 25.08.81).

The Sowetan (26.08.81) quoted Laughland as saying that the firm wanted their workers to earn not less than R60 a week.

DG Mtshawulana, a Soweto coal dealer, while accusing white-owned firms of exploiting coal workers, said that he thought the township dealers paid a minimum of between R24 and R25 a week, employing mainly contract workers. He said that 'black employers in the townships were faced with a number of handicaps, so they could not pay competitive wages like their white counterparts' (sic)(Sowetan, 26.08.81).

Mine Steel Products (Boksburg): A four hour strike at this firm by all 130 workers brought about the reinstatement of four men. These men had been dismissed for refusing to carry, in pairs, 80kg boxes of sand to the moulding line. Previously they had been expected to carry 42kg boxes.

MAWU shop stewards at the firm negotiated their reinstatement and the return of the workers.

National Co-operative Dairies (Boksburg): See WIP 19:52. About 500 african workers went on strike in demand of recognition of the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union. Management said that 'about 60' workers had been involved in the assault of two scabs.

NCD chairperson, Dr M Hermann, said that a 'large percentage' of the workforce were prevented from doing so by 'some intimidators' (RDM, 28.08.81).

Recognition negotiations were said to be



planned for Monday, 31 August, and workers returned to work at 14h00 on 28 August, according to union secretary, Maggie Magubane.

However, 17 workers were not re-employed, despite an agreement with the SFAWU that no dismissals would take place without consultation (RDM, 29.08.81; Star, 31.08.81).

Paper Packaging Industry (Rosslyn, Pretoria): About 500 workers at this Barlow Rand company went on strike over pay demands on Monday, 17 August, at 12h00. The next morning general manager, T Mocke (?), addressed workers and reportedly told them to find jobs at the motor assembly firms in the area if they wanted higher wages.

Workers were said to be asking for a R1 an hour across the board increase (some were earning only R1,09 an hour) (Sowetan, 19.08.81; Star, 19.08.81).

Training manager, A Bannister, said that workers had 'ignored grievance procedure' and no talks would take place before they returned to work - which workers did on the morning of 20 August, on the apparent understanding that their demands would be discussed with the workers' council.

However, on Tuesday, 25 August, nearly all workers went on strike again. Management said that the SAP had been called in 'to protect workers who wished to continue with their work'. This strike followed a breakdown between bosses and workers' council - the former wished to delay a unilateral decision about wages (Sowetan, 26.08.81).

On Wednesday, 26 August, workers started filtering back with the outcome still not clear.

It is not clear who even suggested such a thing, but the South African Typographical Union felt called upon to deny any involvement in the strike - 'the union did not believe in strikes as a way of solving disputes ... he (the SATU spokesperson) believed the strikes were instigated by political activists' (RDM, 27.08.81).

Poolquip (Wynberg): On Tuesday and Wednesday, 15 and 16 September, about 90 workers at this firm stopped work, demanding a halt to the retrenchment of workers and proper worker representation. They were fired, said FOSATU's Aaron Thlobejane, and told that the firm was closing down (RDM, 18.09.81).

Another report said that workers were taken to Bramley police station by the SAP and warned to stay away from the firm (Sowetan, 18.09.81).

It appears that the firm was to take on new workers on Monday, 21 September.

No further information.

Plant Protection (Brakpan): Management refused to deal with the FOSATU-affiliated Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) during a brief strike by about 70 workers at this small rubber company. The strikers were demanding wage increases and the reinstatement of two fellow workers, when they refused to work on Monday, 27 July.

Management agreed to the second demand, and workers agreed to return to work on the next day after talks with the union. Management said that they would talk to workers in groups of five. Company managing director, Phil Myburgh, said that workers (after an increase in March) were earning between R1,00 and R1,09 an hour (Star, 28.07.81).

About 70 workers were fired a month later after the third stoppage at Plant Protection

in a month (Star, 25.08.81). They had stopped work this third time on Monday, 24 August, after the dismissal of two workers on the Friday before. They once again demanded wage increases and CWIU recognition.

The second strike appears to have taken place a few days after the first and involved 30 fellow workers from the rubber rolling plant (Sowetan, 26.08.81).

A last report said that the ten day dispute ended on 3 September, when about 30 workers still on strike chose to 'sign off' rather than accept selective re-employment.

Putco (Wynberg Depot): On this firm's labour relations see WIP 13:34-5; WIP 14:53-4; WIP 16:45; WIP 19:53.

Press confusion exists as to the recognition agreement (not?) signed between the Transport and Allied Workers' Union (TAWU) and management (an agreement with the Transport and General Workers' Union had already been signed (Star, 28.07.81)).

Star of 24 July said that the TAWU agreement was to be signed 'next week'. Four days later it was reported as signed by the same newspaper, while the next day it was reported that reporters stood round in vain, waiting to witness the signing, when the union members did not turn up (TAWU was said to be still consulting with members about the agreement).

On Friday, 11 September, all Putco workers, including 250 drivers, at the Wynberg Depot, went on a three hour strike in protest against the transfer of a supervisor from the Alberton branch of the company to their depot. A meeting was arranged to discuss the matter with management.

No further information.

Pick 'n Pay (Boksburg): One hundred workers struck for two hours on Wednesday, 2 September,

demanding the reinstatement of a dismissed fellow worker. They were successful, said the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (Star, 04.09.81).

Siemens Electrical (Pretoria): See the Labour Action sections in WIPs 14, 16, 17, 19 for previous information on this firm.

About 70 workers went on a lightning 15

SIEMENS

minute strike in protest at the appointment of a foreman, who allegedly uses abusive language at the workers and treats them badly.

Top management met with the workers to sort the matter out.

Sigma and Leyland: Both of these firms have featured in previous WIPs in connection with strike action (see, for example, WIP 19:54 and 50).

In August it was announced that the Sigma Motor Corporation is to buy Leyland's Blackheath assembly plant while Leyland would expand its Elsie's River plant. Sigma is to take occupation on 31 December, 1982 (see reports in, for example, Star, 07.08.81).

All good rationalising sense, one might say, but class struggle on the assembly plant floor also played a prominent part in this deal involving some R75-million in purchase and modernisation costs.

Rapport, after an interview with Sigma managing director Fred Butler, reported (09.08.81) that he had confirmed that the 'risk of strikes was a major consideration' in the taking of the decision. If another assembly plant was to have been erected at Sigma Park in the Transvaal a total strike in this region would have affected the production of private and

commercial vehicles.

No doubt attempts will be made to create and play on regional and racial divisions within the working class.

Tedelex Ltd (Johannesburg): Two young men, Godfrey Nkosi and Mlamli Soga, were acquitted in the Johannesburg Regional Court after being charged with attempted arson and malicious damage to property.

This followed the discovery of a burning candle amongst boxes at the Tedelex factory in July. Chief security officer at the firm, Richard Haley, said that the two men had been pointed out to him as having been seen leaving the building where the candles were found.

This, plus the fact that he had been warned 'of two cases of possible unrest at the factory' and had been given 'two documents which were of a "subversive" nature', convinced Haley that he should do his duty and arrest the two men (Star, 28.07.81).

More information?

NATAL

Blind workers (Umlazi): About 100 african blind workers (members of the African Blind Workers' Union) won an increase of R1,50 a week after striking. These workers earned between R16,50 and R34,00 a week in sheltered employment, making baskets and schooldesks. The scheme is said to be heavily subsidised.

The workers' action was said to have been brought about by the deteriorating condition in over-populated and drought-stricken KwaZulu. Commented director of the Natal African Blind Society, John Randles, 'Most of the workers here have families in KwaZulu who are begging them to send more money home' (Sunday Tribune, 09.08.81).

Coates Bros (SA) (Isipingo): For brief and inadequate coverage of the strike at this firm see WIP 16:48. A report in the Cape Herald (08.08.81) said that 58 workers at this firm had been found not guilty of 'unlawfully striking' in January over the dismissal of a colleague.

There was doubt as to the identity of those who stopped work, and the magistrate also found 'that the conduct of the management had almost amounted to a lock-out'.



Dunlop (Ladysmith): A stoppage occurred during the second week of September, involving half the workforce.

President of the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU), Makhosini Khumalo, said that 200 workers had been paid off and 150 new workers hired at higher wages than the going rate at the plant. Works director, John Lowe, denied this and said that only 30 workers 'had elected to be paid off' (ADM, 15.09.81).

No further information.

Grinaker Construction and Murray and Roberts Construction, and Alusaf (Richards Bay): On Monday, 10 August, more than 800 workers employed by the construction consortium stopped work in demand of higher wages. Negotiations were said to be in progress through a 'works council', according to managing director of Grinaker, RG Bennett. He was confident that the workers would be back the next day (Natal Mercury, 11.08.81).

The secretary of the National Federation of Labour, Matthews Oliphant, claimed that the

NFL had members at the site.

Grinaker's Bennett's confidence was given a knock when, on the morning of 13 August, police had to use a 'mobile teargas machine' to disperse more than 1 000 Grinaker and Murray & Roberts workers meeting at the Richigata site. About 200 workers from the Arboretum (a suburb of Richards Bay) site marched to join their fellow workers, but were halted by police and finally they dispersed at noon on that day.

The workers had requested R1,00 an hour during negotiations, while management offered an increase of 13c an hour (on the minimum wage of 55c an hour). Management also said that that workers, who had 'discharged themselves', could collect their wages on Friday, 15 September.

On the day of the police confrontation (Wednesday) workers at the giant Alusaf plant went on a brief solidarity strike with the construction workers. This is one site where construction was halted.

A worker was said to have been arrested.

By now, 14 August, about 3 000 workers employed by the two firms in the construction consortium, were said to be on strike. The MAWU was making statements on the strike, and the KwaZulu government had been asked to intervene (by whom is not stated) (Star, 14.08.81; Daily News, 14.08.81).

On Friday, 14 August, 21 workers appeared in the Empangeni Magistrate's Court, charged with 'possession of dangerous weapons'. Major J Gijssbers, regional head of the SAP's Riot Task Force, said that these workers had been part of a 'mob' trying to stop buses carrying workers to Alusaf. They were all found guilty and sentenced to R60 or 30 days, with a warning that they would be sent to jail if they appeared again on similar charges (Natal Mercury, 15.08.81).

It was reported that on Monday 'about half' of the workers had returned to work. MAWU said that two Grinaker and Murray & Roberts foremen accompanied police to compounds in the Enseleni and Ezikhaweni townships, where workers were forced into company trucks and taken to work. Police denied this (ADM, 18.08.81; Star, 19.08.81).

The companies had agreed to meet with MAWU, but this meeting was subsequently described by MAWU as unsatisfactory.

By Wednesday, 19 August, 90% of workers were said to be back (Daily News, 20.08.81). Grinaker chairperson, O Bornheimer, said that 'it had been decided to drop the threat of sacking', and that wage demands would not be met as it 'just was not economically possible'.

The Riot Task Force was still very much in evidence at this stage of the events.



Ola W Grinaker, in the Grinaker Holdings annual report, said that 'We commence the new financial year with a group very different and stronger than last year, with our progressive image intact'. Prospects were said to be more encouraging than ever before, while earnings had risen by 65% and dividends by 67%, thanks to the 'booming construction profits'. Pre-tax profits were R24-million (Star, 16.09.81).

Murray & Roberts increased turnover to more than R1 000-million and 'group operating profit before taxation' from R31,2-million to R50,8-million (after tax profits to R33,1-million) (Star, 16.09.81). These are the firms who find it economically impossible to increase wages.

Their confidence stems from a knowledge that few workers read, never mind look at the financial pages of the newspapers.



Huletts sugar mills (Natal): On 27 August the first of these strikes at Huletts sugar mills started when some 250 workers at Mt Edgecombe stopped work demanding refunding of pension fund contributions. They returned to work about six days later. 'Police in riot gear' tear-smoked the strikers on the first day, after the police had been stoned and a switchboard at the mill smashed.

Workers at the Amatikulu mill then went on a one day strike on Tuesday, 1 September, over the same pension issue. About 600 workers were involved in the action at this mill.


Huletts public relations manager, Ron Phillips, said that the firm was not willing to pay out the money, 'but had offered to place them in a trust fund to be administered by the trade union and management' (ADM, 03.09.81).

The union, the National Union of Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Workers (NUSMRW), said that workers returned on condition that the union takes the matter up with the industrial court. General secretary, Selby Nsibande, said that workers rejected the Huletts offer.

On Wednesday night, 2 September, about 600 shift workers at the Darnall mill stopped work, but returned the next afternoon. Once more workers were said to be afraid of their pension contributions being frozen by planned government legislation (Star, 04.09.81).

Ilco Homes (Natal): See WIP 19:49 for a report on the strikes at this firm, Industrial Low Cost Homes (Ilco) whose construction methods got a write-up in the Star (28.08.81).

Durban City Council is not so happy with



the firm, Ilco having fallen behind on four Phoenix housing projects (totalling 3 146 housing units) and having asked for extensions (Daily News, 21.08.81).

Iscor (Newcastle): About 150 workers in the Iscor rod mill refused to work a new shift system and were then locked out on 15 September.

There were to be two instead of three shifts, entailing longer working hours as well as more

awkward hours, said the Black Allied Workers' Union's BE Khumalo. BAWU's complaints had been rejected because 'the new system had been cleared by the metal industrial council and was acceptable to workers' (ie, unions party to the industrial council), said management (Star, 16.09.81).

The workers had ignored the management imposed system for a day and followed the old shift system, and had then been locked out.

On 16 September, 62 workers were paid off (ADM, 17.09.81). Management said that the four-day 12-hour shift system had been forced on them by reduced production needs, and was instituted to avoid retrenchment (Star, 17.09.81).

The BAWU said that 150 workers had left (were paid off). Management then revised their earlier figure of 62 and said that 'no one had been paid off but 98 had resigned and taken their discharge'.

Reduced output was attributed to a world steel recession and a complete drying-up of export orders with no expectations of a revival. (Star, 18.09.81).

No further information.

Mooi River Textiles (Mooi River): About 1 000 workers went on strike over the dismissal of a National Union of Textile Workers shop steward at the firm, on 11 August. NUTW secretary, Obed Zuma, said that the union had 90% support at Mooi River Textiles.

The union had met with management the next day, but no agreement was reached as the firm's representative refused to discuss the dismissal (Natal Mercury, 15.08.81).

The workers returned on Tuesday, 18 August, with negotiations with the NUTW said to be continuing. Management said that the shop steward had 'discharged himself' and would not be re-employed (Star, 18.08.81; Daily News, 18.08.81).

No further information.

Regina Carpets (Pinetown): A one day strike took place at this Romatex-owned firm in August (6 August), in demand of a wage increase.

Romatex Floorcoverings Ltd



Some of the workers were said to be members of the FOSATU affiliated National Union of Textile Workers, but management does not recognise the union and elected to negotiate with the liaison committee.

Obed Zuma of the NUTW said that this move was 'like putting the water on to boil again' (Natal Mercury, 07.08.81).

It was later reported (Daily News, 07.08.81) that workers returned and that management would negotiate with the union once managing director, J Whitney, had returned from the USA on 17 September.

No further information.



Tonga Group (Tonga, Natal): On Tuesday, 18 August, between 2 500 and 3 000 Tongaat workers (both indian and african) went on strike. Police used teargas and dogs when workers threw stones at them in their march to the David Whitehead factory to get those workers to join them.

The workers were dissatisfied with the implementation of their demand to receive their contributions to the superannuation (pension) fund. They had had to resign and reregister with the company, which meant that they lost certain long-service bonuses (see Natal Mercury, 19.08.81; Daily News, 19.08.81).

By the next day the strike had spread to the group's mushroom and egg divisions. Group managing director, Alan Hankinson, said that the strike was the 'flexing of its muscles' by the National Union of Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Employees (see Huletts, above), described as a 'company union' by other unions.

On the first day of the strike Selby Nsibande of the NUSMRW had been allowed to address workers while two South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) officials were told by the SAP that they had no right to be there.

By Thursday, 20 August, workers started returning. Company managing director, DJ Woodroffe, said that nobody had been fired but that a 'return to work' ultimatum had been given (Daily News, 20.08.81). Hankinson said that the matter would be discussed through the 'proper channels', and paraded the 'agitator'

thesis (is it a fresh discovery each time it is used?).

Minister Owen Horwood had announced in August that the government was going ahead with the controversial pension legislation, but with greater worker choice in the freezing of contributions.

Union Co-operative Bark and Sugar Company (Dalton): See WIP 18; WIP 19:49. The case brought by the FOSATU-affiliated Sweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union (SFAWU) in the Natal Supreme Court has been postponed to 2 October. The union is 'asking the court to order the reinstatement of (the strikers') compound housing which they lost after being dismissed', and that the stoppage be declared a 'lock-out' (RDM, 25.08.81).

If the decision goes in favour of the union (as an earlier interim decision had), it would have far-reaching implications for employers providing hostel accommodation, in that they would not be able to 'remove migrants from their compounds while their contracts were still in operation'.

ORANGE FREE STATE

Dairybelle (Welkom): About 250 african drivers at this firm brought milk deliveries to a halt during 'a brief work stoppage' in August.

Workers were said to have 'dismissed themselves' and new drivers and some of the strikers were taken on again (Star, 13.08.81).

No further information.

WESTERN CAPE

Gourmet Fish Products (Stompneus Bay): Workers went on strike on 13 July in protest at a new minimum wage of R31,28 a week. Management had threatened to dismiss them (see WIP 19). The

workers refused to sign resignation papers. Management dismissed the 40 workers on 24 July. They started to enlist new workers and said that they would 'selectively re-employ' the striking workers. There were allegations of workers being threatened by the police.

Murray and Roberts (Bellville): Seventy workers went on strike at the beginning of August for a few hours demanding higher wages. They returned when management said they would reply to their demands within 14 days.

More information needed.



Leyland (Cape Town): This strike has been reported in WIP 18:49 and WIP 19:50. It has been reported that management has gone back on its undertaking to re-employ workers. 170 workers were to have been taken back by the end of July, another 100 by the end of August, and the rest as vacancies occurred. They were to have been taken back in order of seniority. When the first 170 workers reported only 64 were accepted. Management did not re-instate those with the longest service, and many got lower pay than they had been getting. NUMARWOSA was to have meetings with management (Cape Herald, 01.08.81). Leyland, meanwhile, maintains that there has been no deception, and that the unions must have misled the workers about management's undertakings. (Star, 28.07.81).

Besterecta (Mitchells Plain, Western Cape): More than 850 workers, mainly Transkeian and Ciskeian contract labourers, downed tools on 14 August,

1981, in a demand for an increase on their R1,27 an hour wage rate. They cited the higher price of bread and other essentials in their demand. They also asked to be exempt from contributions to the building industry's pension fund.

More information needed.

EASTERN CAPE

SA Cape Fellmongers (Port Elizabeth): The entire workforce went on strike on 9 July, and was dismissed (see WIP 19). Management refused to reinstate the workers unconditionally. The General Workers' Union appealed to unemployed workers not to accept jobs, and appealed to management to adopt a reconciliatory approach.

KSM Milling (East London): Workers returned to work on 25 August after a go-slow strike for higher wages. The South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) was to meet with management to negotiate a recognition agreement.



Volkswagen (Uitenhage): About half of the workforce walked out of Volkswagen's new engine plant before the official opening ceremony on 19 August in protest against the presence of some of the guests. The guests included Dawie de Villiers, Allan Hendrickse and Bonana Tini, a member of the Uitenhage Community Council. They claimed that the invitations of these people showed 'insensitivity to the feelings of the majority of employees' (statement issued through the NUMARWOSA).

Meanwhile, in his talk, Dawie de Villiers praised VW for their interest in developing sound labour relations (sic). He cited the Chair in Industrial Relations at UPE that VW has established, as an example.

Da Gama Textiles (formerly Good Hope Textiles) (King Williams Town): On 25 August 44 loom mechanics went on strike over wage demands. The strike spread to the weaving department of 1 200 workers. The entire workforce (4 000) was sent home, and watchmen were given instructions not to allow anyone to return to work.

Brigadier Charles Sebe met with management. Sebe blamed SAAWU for the strike. SAAWU claims a membership of 1 000 at the factory but denied involvement (Daily Dispatch, 28.08.81).

Production was resumed on the Monday evening, but only one third of the workers reported for duty. On 28 August, about 1 000 workers went to the factory gates and demanded higher wages. Sebe arrived and addressed the workers, telling them to submit a report of their grievances to the Ciskeian Legislative Assembly, and denying that he had blamed SAAWU for the strike. He was jeered by some workers. Management addressed the workers and told them there would be no further increases this year. The workers were told that the company had no money and could not increase wages (ADM, 29.07.81). It was reported that by Thursday, 30 July, 95% of the workers were reporting for work and management claimed that production was back to normal. 10 workers had been detained, according to Brigadier Charles Sebe.

Firestone (Port Elizabeth): 100 workers in the tyre building department went on strike on 15 July over incentive pay. It was reported

JOIN THE SWING TO "STONES"

Firestone

in the Evening Post on 17 July that they were still on strike.

No further information available.

Dorbyl (Uitenhage): For previous coverage see WIP 19. It was reported in the Evening Post (13.07.81) that the Motor Assemblies and Components Workers' Union of South Africa (MACWUSA) supported the blacking of Dorbyl products, and that the issue was being considered by NUMARWOSA.

No further information available.

Municipal quarry (Grahamstown): On Wednesday, 5 August, workers went on strike and demanded wage increases of R15,30 (on their basic pay of R59,70 a fortnight). 35 were sacked after having 'ignored 3 deadlines to return to work', the last being on Monday, 10 August.

Deputy town clerk, Derek Coetzee, said that the men also earned incentive bonuses averaging R17,38 a fortnight. Coetzee said that the men could reapply for their jobs on terms set by the municipality (Star, 12.08.81).

Model Dairy (East London): 100 striking milkmen (no information about the cause of the strike) were given until Friday, 4 September, to reapply for their jobs. They were given busfares 'home' to the Transkei when they failed to do so.

Workers who then refused to leave were evicted from their hostel by the East Cape Administration Board. They were given 72 hours in which to leave East London in terms of the Urban Areas Act.

By 10 September about 70 posts had been

filled with outside workers.

SAR (East London): On 8 July the General Workers' Union (GWUSA) branch secretary, David Thandane, called for the recognition by the SAR of GWUSA and a workers' committee. 5 members of the committee were then questioned by railway police, according to GWUSA. They were threatened with dismissal or detention if they continued to support the union. This was denied by the railways.

Wilson-Rowntree (East London): For previous coverage see WIP 17, WIP 18 and WIP 19. The scale of the protest against Wilson-Rowntree continues to grow. A report in the Cape Herald (08.08.81) maintains that the British Anti-Apartheid Movement is to put stronger pressure on Rowntree-Mackintosh to reinstate the sacked workers at their South African subsidiary, and to give recognition to SAAWU. Meanwhile, Thozamile Gqweta, president of SAAWU, has been released after 6 weeks detention under the Terrorism Act. He resumed his work with the union immediately upon being released.

Sisa Njikelana, vice president, was released on 10 August, after 2 months in detention. He also returned to East London to continue with his union work.



Ford (Port Elizabeth): For previous coverage, see WIP 19. Ford executives are holding mysterious meetings, according to Post. They met with ANC leader Oliver Tambo in June; and were meant to meet with the Natal Indian Congress in July (the meeting was called off when Broderick from Ford realised that there were journalists from Post present).

Trouble at Ford continues, with the latest incident being a canteen boycott by 1 600 workers in protest against the demotion of MACWUSA organising secretary, Government Zini, and another union executive member. They were demoted from salaried positions as lecturer and supervisor, to ordinary hourly-paid labourers on the factory floor.

Meanwhile, 4 MACWUSA leaders are still in detention under section 6 of the Terrorism Act.

Dissatisfaction with pension funds continues, and industrial relations officer, Ford's Fred Ferreira, maintains the company might have to pay out R1-m if workers choose to withdraw their funds and not to reapply for membership.

Eastern Cape detentions: 'The biggest swoop so far on South African trade unionists', was how the detention of 205 unionists under the Ciskei security legislation was described (RDM, 03.09.81). Those detained are members of SAAWU, GWUSA, and the African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU). They were detained under Proclamation R252, which provides for 3 months detention without trial.

Brigadier Charles Sebe, head of the Ciskei Central Intelligence Service stated that police were investigating charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act and 'perhaps public violence'. The unionists were travelling back to Mdantsane from East London in 3 buses when they were stopped by the police. Brigadier Sebe stated that the unionists had been singing freedom songs and songs against the independence of the Ciskei (Star, 09.09.81).

Thozamile Gqweta, SAAWU president, described the arrests as 'outrageous', and as further harassment of trade unionists by the Ciskeian authorities (earlier this year the Ciskei detained 57 unionists). GWUSA stated that

the detentions were 'the actions of frightened people who, realising the deepening opposition to their rule, resort to constant and hysterical police action'.

SAAWU officials said that they would be contacting lawyers in Johannesburg to discuss the possibilities of legal action. In the meantime, both local and international pressure mounted against the Ciskei government.

Australia's Council of Trade Unions decided at their congress in Sydney to call a boycott on the handling of South African goods for one week. FOSATU attacked the detentions by the 'tin pot state' and P Camay, general secretary of CUSA, stated that that organisation 'abhorred detentions' (Star, 10.09.81).

Meanwhile in East London Wayne Munro of the firm Johnson and Johnson said that the detentions had disrupted activities at the company.

On 10 September it was reported that Chief Minister Lennox Sebe confirmed that the unionists would be charged 'very, very soon'. He added that 'the unions must stop their bluffs. You cannot tell me they are more interested in the welfare of my people than I am. The unions just seek publicity'. He alleged that the unions were being misused by the same people responsible for a bomb blast at a bus terminal at Mdantsane the previous week.

It was reported (RDM, 11.09.81) that SAAWU will ask the East Cape Division of the Supreme Court to order the release of the 205 detained trade unionists. An application filed by SAAWU asked the court to declare the detentions null and void. It cited the Ciskeian Ministers of Police and of Justice as respondents and asked the court to order them to pay the costs of the action. The application further stated that the detentions were invalid because the

Ciskeian security authorities had followed the incorrect procedure in detaining the unionists. SAAWU's lawyers alleged that as the Ciskei is not yet 'independent', it falls within the Cape and, therefore, within the Eastern Cape Division of the Supreme Court. In addition, the application questioned Sebe's detention of the workers under Proclamation R252 since it was unlikely that the passengers in the 3 buses were all directly involved in actions against the security of the Ciskei.

Meanwhile Fanie Botha, Minister of Manpower, said that he would not involve himself in the matter. He stated that he had no power to intervene. Sam Kikine of SAAWU had appealed to Botha to intervene on behalf of the unionists. Botha stated that an appeal should be directed to the Minister of Police.

On 11 September it was reported that some of the unionists had been released. Brigadier Sebe, however, refused to confirm this and stated that the detainees would be appearing in court the next week.

In the meantime, about 400 trade union members boarded buses after a mass meeting in East London on Saturday, 12 September, and travelled to Mdantsane as a direct challenge to the Ciskei authorities. They were singing songs and defying arrest.

A statement issued by Transvaal labour organisations including the Transvaal divisions of SAAWU, Food and Canning Workers' Union, FOSATU, General Allied Workers' Union, the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union, and the Hotel, Liquor and Catering Association, added their voices to the protest. This statement said that the real reason for the detentions was the refusal of the Ciskei authorities to recognise the growth of a

democratic union within a bantustan.

The court application was postponed to Friday, 18 September, to allow the respondents to file opposing affidavits.

After appearing in court on 16 September, the trade unionists were all released on R50 bail.

Eric Mntonga, former chairperson of the Wilson-Rowntree workers' committee and presently a SAAWU official, and Sibawu Sikwigshi, a former Wilson-Rowntree worker, have also appeared in court, and were both acquitted of arson and damage to public property.

Branch chairperson of the AFCWU, Ernest Qwesha, was given a 3 month suspended sentence after being convicted of possessing banned literature.

Charles Nqakula, acting president of the Media Workers Association of South Africa, was served a 2½ year banning order on 31 July. Chief Minister Lennox Sebe agreed that, as Nqakula was a Ciskei 'citizen', the banning could no longer continue after 'independence' (star, 04.08.81).

Union Comment

CONFERENCE OF TRADE UNIONS HELD IN LANGA, CAPE TOWN, 8 AUGUST, 1981.

STATEMENT AND RESOLUTIONS AGREED ON BY UNION DELEGATES.

WE accept that trade unions are public bodies and accordingly we do not object to providing information with respect to our constitution, finances and representativity. However, we refuse to subject ourselves to control by anybody other than our own members. We therefore resist and reject the present system of

registration insofar as it is designed to control and interfere in the internal affairs of the union.

The meeting specifically agreed to support each other in defiance of any abuse in the powers of investigation given to the authorities by the Industrial Conciliation Act.

The meeting also agreed that unions would support each other in defying the restrictions on supporting striking workers. It is an internationally recognised right of workers to withhold their labour. Moreover, under present conditions and legislation, strikes happen so frequently because of low wages, inadequate bargaining procedures and completely unworkable official dispute procedures. Workers therefore have no alternative to strike action outside of the law. It is, in any event, the duty and function of unions to stand by its members in any circumstances including the payment of strike pay. The prohibition on financial support for strikers will not be obeyed.

Resolution - Industrial Council: The meeting rejected the present Industrial Council system as an acceptable means of collective bargaining. The meeting recommended that unions that are not members of Industrial Councils should not enter any Industrial Council and requested that participating unions refer this back to their respective unions for endorsement. The unions agreed to support each other in the event of any union resisting participation on the Industrial Council.

Resolution - Ciskei: The meeting noted the severe difficulties created for workers by the homeland authorities and in particular by the current situation in the Ciskei, where union members and officials are subjected to

severe harassment and constant attentions. The meeting resolved to send a delegation to Chief Minister Sebe to express our extreme displeasure at his anti-union stance, and to obtain assurances about the security of the workers after the so-called Ciskeian independence.

Resolution - banning and detentions: The meeting resolved to continue resisting banning and detention in any way possible and warned that continuation of the practice could only worsen the already deteriorating industrial relations situation.

Resolution - solidarity action: To give effect to the resolutions at the meeting the unions resolved to establish ad hoc solidarity committees in each region. These committees would discuss and initiate solidarity action arising out of our co-operation.

The meeting also resolved to convene again by November.

The following trade unions were present at the meeting and endorsed the above statement:

The General Workers Union
The Food and Canning Workers Union
and African Food and Canning Workers Union
The Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU)
Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA)
South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU)
MACWUSA (Motor Assemblers & Component Workers Union of South Africa)
The General Workers Union of South Africa (GWUSA)
The Black Municipal Workers Union
CCAWUSA (Commercial, Catering & Allied Workers Union of South Africa)
The Orange Vaal General Workers Union
General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU)
Cape Town Municipal Workers Association

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