reality

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in this issue . . .

EDITORIAL

THE ENGLISH PRESS

The "Engelse Pers" seems lately to have replaced NUSAS as the government's chief whipping boy. Threats of censorship are rife. It has been traditional for liberals in circumstances like these to defend both press freedom and the views being put forward by English-language newspapers. But we think it is time to look critically at the English press and to point out where it is of value and where it is not.

Despite the obvious differences between the various newspapers as regards their values, their clarity of though and their courage, it would be fair to say that English papers do a fine job in their reporting of internal affairs. We will return to this point later. However there is less cause for congratulation with regard to reports and editorials dealing with South African's external policies and with events in other countries.

BASIC POLICIES SUPPORTED

To begin with this country's basic external policies are usually supported. Unfortunately this does not involve taking up a particular, legitimate viewpoint; it involves distortion of reality and prostitution of the English language. For instance the press believes or pretends to believe that the government is really seeking "dialogue" in its relations with other African states. Now it is obvious that what South Africa is trying to do is extend economic and political control over as much of Africa as it thinks necessary (see Robert Molteno's articles.) The government has repeatedly rejected any serious attempts by Black Africa to have dialogue with the White South. A little debate does flow between Vorster and say, Banda, when they make public speeches in each others countries, but this is just a display to give credibility to the myth of "dialogue" It does a great deal to bolster our overseas "image" – the Banda visit received wide coverage overseas and nearly always with the implication (spelt out most clearly in an article in "Time" entitled "Cracks in the Apartheid Wall"), that Apartheid is on the way out. This, if nothing else, strengthens the case of the more complacent overseas investors in South Africa. Now if the English language Press want to support this aspect of South Africa's policy the least they can do is to call it what it is and to remove the word "dialogue" from their news reports and editorials.

White South Africa intellectuals often are incredibly reluctant to face unpleasant truths; the government caters for the Afrikaner intellectual with the myth (created to a large extent by misuse of language) of "separate development." The average white supremacist is able to say quite clearly that he does not fear South Africa's "friendship" with Black States solely because is to this country's economic and political advantage, and yet highly intelligent newspaper editors seem unable to grasp this

point. One newspaper editor, who was discussing the most recent O.A.U. conference which was split on whether to enter into economic ties with South Africa, concluded his editorial with the words: "It is highly ironic that the organisation that was formed to promote dialogue on the African continent should split up over the issue of dialogue". It is this kind of intellectual seduction by euphemisms that an independent press should avoid most strongly.

FANATICAL AND EXTREMIST

Another unfortunate aspect of this is that it makes the countries which do not want to enter into relations with the much more powerful South Africa appear fanatical and extremist. And this is aggravated by the systematic omission from the English - language press of the intelligent arguments made by African States at O.A.U. conferences and at the United Nations. Instead one is subjected to tedious reports of what South Africa says at the United Nations (or what Lesotho or Malawi say at the O.A.U. conference) and all one hears from our serious critics at these two places are a few selected phrases that sound unreasonable and emotive out of their contexts. We do not think the fact that White South Africans can now look on Banda and Jonathan as "good guys" means that their prejudices or desires for retention of privileges have necessarily been lessened. It is a difficult question. The racial prejudices of Whites spring from a variety of sources. Perhaps Banda's visit did cause a few Whites to shed their racial prejudices. But most Whites were long ago able to think highly of Black political leaders like Tshombe in Katanga; the reason was (as it is with Dr. Banda) that they knew he was on *their* side against real African interests.

Most White South Africans fear any African who seems to be a threat to their privilege. That is why they fear Africans en masse, as well as many individual Africans. And it is validity of the African cause that the Whites have to face before they can lose their fear and prejudice.

The distortion of reality through misuse of language is apparent in other terms used by the English-language press — like the word "terrorist" for soldiers engaged in guerrilla warfare. (Here of course the press might endanger itself by calling guerilla fighters anything other than "terrorists".) But the government makes great capital of the term and is able to link the guerillas with real terrorists in the Middle East and in the Americas and talk of the world-wide treat of anarchy and terrorism. So even if the press did not drop the term "terrorist" at least it could give equal publicity to outrages from right wing forces. A report from Mozambique about villagers fleeing to Zambia because of their fear of Portuguese soldiers who, some alleged, had battered their babies brains out in gourds, only made an inside page.

LEAST SERVICE TO SOUTH AFRICA

Perhaps the area where the press does least service to South Africa is in the way it reports events in other countries. The guiding principle for so many foreign correspondents appears to be 'what White South Africa would like to hear We are not here talking of major international news transmission agencies like U.P.I. (which cannot be controlled by the South African press), but of foreign correspondents working for local newspaper groups - like those in Black Africa, those that accompany Springbok teams overseas and report on the "demos", and those in the U.K. and America. The South African correspondents in the U.K. and America are not by any means all bad, though the principle already referred to does seem to be the guiding light for some of them. But there seems to be a tradition for Africa correspondents (which started at about the time of the Congo trouble) to report adversely on emergent African states. We are not asking for a White-washing of African politics, but even adverse criticism of events in Black Africa is so often cheap and sneering. Now that it is abundantly clear that "the North" is not one unholy mess, newspaper editors could tell their Africa correspondents to write serious articles about Black Africa — taking cogniscance of both good and bad.

Colin Eglin was most impressed by modern Africa. He talked to White audiences about his recent African trip and one could see his obvious sincerity and enthusiasm when he spoke of the exciting and constructive changes that are taking place. And he not only believed what he was saying but he also considered it good political sense to convey his impressions to White South Africa. Most English-language newspapers are supporters of the Progressive Party and yet they seem unaware of the need to tell the truth about Africa.

Certainly, as we have said, REALITY has great respect for the imaginative and couragous reporting of many English-language newspapers when dealing with internal matters. Furthermore one or two of these newspapers do have a reasonably objective approach to some of South Africa's external policies. But the English press as a whole maintains a strange balance between fighting the status quo and giving it (perhaps unthinkingly) a great deal of support.

WHERE THE LIBERAL ROAD MAY END

By Jonathan Crewe

Albert Camus

(A review article of the book CAMUS by Conor Cruise O'Brien1)

"I have always condemned terror. I must also condemn a terrorism which operates blindly, in the streets of Algiers for example, and which may one day strike my mother or my family. I believe in justice, but I will defend my mother before justice."

Thus spake Albert Camus, in a speech made in Sweden in 1957 just after he had received the Nobel Prize. The candour of the statement – which stands out like a rock in the ocean of modern political cant – is both magnificent and disturbing; the more so since Camus chose that moment (immediately after receiving the greatest accolade an author can be offered) to make what was in effect a confession of failure. That it was such a confession is undeniable. The issue in which Camus chose, or was forced to choose, his mother before justice was that of the Algerian war. The justice of the Arab cause seemed inescapable, and for Camus the love of justice had been a profound passion.

The effect on Camus of being trapped in a tragic dilemma – simply and almost banally stated as a choice between mother and justice – is described as follows in Mr. O'Brien's book:

"....his position in the fifties was one of extreme intellectual and emotional difficulty and tension. He had written about freedom, justice, violence and revolt in abstract terms and asserted principles which he presented as both of fundamental importance and universal application . . . yet his actual positions were political and partisan . . . freedom was an absolute for the Hungarians and their violence in asserting the will to 'stand upright' was 'pure'. The violence of the Algerian Arabs, who thought they were making the same claim was 'inexcusable' and the nature and degree of freedom to be accorded to them was a matter to be decided by France, in the light of its own strategic needs – a plea which was irrelevant when made by Russia."

Before one can take in the full significance of Camus' dilemma it is necessary to recall some of the biographical facts contained in Mr. O'Brien's fascinating and perceptive little book. Camus was born in Mondovi, Algeria, in 1913. His father was a wine cellarman, who died in the year Camus was born, and his mother, an illiterate woman of Spanish origin, became a charwoman in order to support her family. 'Camus, his elder brother Lucien, his mother, his grandmother and a paralysed uncle shared a two-room apartment in the (racially mixed) working class district of Belcourt.' After a promising school education, interrupted by an attack of tuberculosis, a disease which was to recur throughout Camus' life, he entered the University of Algiers. In 1934 he joined the Communist Party, for which he worked until 1937. During the war he was prominent in the French Resistance, finally editing the underground newspaper Combat, in which position he continued for three years after the liberation of France. Until 1952 Camus and Sartre were politically associated – both were committed to social revolution in France and both were opposed to *political* anti-communism (Gaullism) on the grounds that it exploited anti-communism in those ways that are all too familiar to South Africans. In short, Camus had seen the ugly side both of political and economic repression.

THE LAST RESORT

In addition to these biographical facts it should be remembered that Camus was a superbly gifted political journalist and thinker (if not philosopher) with a marked revolutionary bias and a hatred of social injustice, and was, finally, a major novelist of unquestione

sensitivity and integrity. Such was the man who, in the last resort placed the interests of his mother – and by inevitable implication, those of the 1,200,000 strong French colonial minority – above justice for the Arabs. As Mr. O'Brien tersely states it:

"The defence of his mother required support for the French army's pacification of Algeria."

One should not assume that there was anything very special about colonialism in Algeria – that the society was characterised by 'Latin' tolerance or 'Mediterranean' mystical unity of the races. The French in Algeria appear to have been as tough, reactionary, and as much estranged from the indigenous population as colonials commonly are. Behind the French colony stood the army of metropolitan France, and already as early as 1945 local uprisings occurred against which:

"repression was ruthlessly carried out by the air force and naval artillery. Official death list: 102 European victims; 1,500 Moslems – 15,000 Moslems according to the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry."

It must not, of course, be imagined that Camus threw in his lot unreservedly with the French in Algeria at any time in his career. He fought and argued tirelessly for social equality between colonisers and colonised, for a progressive extension of the franchise and for the elimination of brutality and injustice – indeed, he once said that for twenty years he had been publicly concerned with little else. He was, in short, the left-wing coloniser – 'the coloniser who refuses' – and he must have had very little in common with his Algerian compatriots. At the same time he could not withdraw spiritually into the relative security of a Parisian 'literary' existence, admired in intellectual circles and detached from the nagging difficulties of the land in which he was born and in which his family remained. Nor could the man who had written in this strain about Algeria:

"We enter into a blue and yellow world where we are greeted by the odorous sigh of the Algerian summer earth. Everywhere pinkish bougainvillaeas hang over the villa walls; in the gardens the hibiscus plants are still pale red, the tea-roses foam as thick as cream, and the long, blue irises stand in delicate flower beds. All the stones are warm. As we step off the buttercup-yellow bus, the butchers in their little red vans are making their morning rounds and calling to the villagers with trumpets.....

easily acclimatise himself in Northern France. Indeed, in his final novel, *La Chute,* Holland is presented as a kind of 'anti-Algeria'; both hallucinatory and hellish:

"Holland is a dream, sir. A dream of gold and smoke. More smoky by day and more gold by night. Did you ever notice that the concentric canals of Amsterdam are like the circles of hell? A bourgeois hell, naturally, peopled with bad dreams."

SERIOUS REFLECTION

For many white South African liberals the experiences Camus articulates must seem very close to the bone. In fact, one might see Camus (in some aspects) as the ideal type of the South African liberal; as that type, but gifted with intellect, courage, magnanimity, compassion and honesty in a quite remarkable degree. His political and spiritual development might, therefore, prompt South African liberals to very serious reflection. (It may be necessary to say that Algeria was colonised in 1836; that the colonial population was large and intransigent, and had had time to evolve its 'traditional way of life'. The similarities between Algeria (pre-independence) and South Africa are notable enough to warrant close attention.)

For Camus the need to resist Nazi tyranny in France raised no moral difficulties of the kind he later encountered. The record of that experience is contained in The Plague, a book which it is difficult to praise too highly, and *which evokes,* with rich particularity, the moral climate of occupied France and the French Resistance. Of course, *The Plague* is more than just a 'war book', it is a classic – which is to say that the particular events and experiences have been fully digested in the author's imagination, and given a permanent significance in human history. The book is, as Mr. O'Brien says, a great allegory, and one which, in spite of every doubt and qualification, presents a clear moral issue: the plague is an evil, and it has to be fought.

Mr. O'Brien is (understandably, considering his African experiences[2]) interested in the political aspect of Camus' career as a writer. While acknowledging that *The Plague* is undeniably a masterpiece, he makes some comments on it which he is in a singularly advantageous position to make.

Noting, first, that ideas about Camus among English-speaking readers have been decisively influenced by Germaine Brée, and that in her view:

"the working-class population of Belcourt is impervious (sic) to the racial barriers that exist in the more prosperous middle-class milieux . . . "

O'Brien replies:

"A working-class population that would be 'impervious to racial barriers' would be an unusual phenomenon. A population that could attain this condition when the barriers were not only of race, but also of religion, language and culture would be unique. And Camus' writings do not reflect any such state of affairs, as we shall see."

DON'T EXIST

The Plague is set in Oran. Yet, as Mr. O'Brien points out, in the novel the Arabs of Oran simply do not exist. There are only two fleeting references to them (though presumably they would be worse afflicted by the plague than the more prosperous whites) and in one of those references the Arab quarter is described as being 'strangely deserted'! Therefore the Oran of *The Plague* is not Oran at all, it is a city that never was. Mr. O'Brien continues:

"The difficulty derives, I believe, from the whole nature of Camus' relation to the German occupiers on the one hand and the Arabs of Algeria on the other. It comes natural to him, from his early background and education, to think of Oran as a French town and of its relation to the plague as that of a French town to the Occupation. But just below the surface of this consciousness, as with all other Europeans in Africa, there must have lurked the possibility of another way of looking at things – and extremely distasteful one . . . For the Arabs the French were in Algeria by virtue of the same right by which the Germans were in France: the right of conquest. The fact that the conquest had lasted considerably longer in Algeria than it was to last in France changed nothing in the essential resemblance of the relations between conqueror and conquered. From this point of view Rieux, Tarrou and Grand were not devoted fighters against the plague: they were the plague itself."

Mr. O'Brien quotes a number of other instances in Camus' work in which the Arabs appear not to exist (he also notes Camus' unconscious use of the distinction between 'us' and 'them') and all this is in the work of an author whose political sophistication

and conscious emancipation had progressed very far indeed; who, as a member of the C.P. had propagandised among the Arabs, and who possessed the awareness of other human beings that qualified him to become a major novelist. In fact, one is driven to recognise that with *very* few exceptions 'left wing intellectuals, even communists, unconsciously share the assumptions of the colonialism which they have consciously rejected,' and it is perhaps for that reason that there is so often a lack of ultimate seriousness about the challenge they present to the *status quo* (which has nothing to do with cowardice or bad faith). It is simply that they are 'the plague itself', and to become something other than that is an undertaking of almost superhuman difficulty.

AN HONOURABLE CHOICE

Camus' attitude to the Algerian war may partly be accounted for by the survival in him, in spite of everything, of a certain colonialist imaginative limitation. However, there is also the positive claim made upon him by his mother. In the face of terrorism – and that, not 'guerilla warfare', is what Camus calls it – the personal bond came first. Whether one likes it or not, it was an honourable choice. Of course, it may be possible to suggest that Frenchmen have a special, slightly unholy, regard for their mothers, and that Camus was never more French than when he he chose as he did – but this won't really dispose of the problem. What may not lie behind that bare biographical statement 'An illiterate woman of Spanish origin, who worked as a charwoman to support her family'? I know nothing about Camus' mother besides these facts, and yet it is possible, without being sentimental, to envisage her life as one of terrible, perhaps heroic, privation (one recalls that over-crowded two-roomed apartment) and to imagine the intensity of the relationship that might have existed between the mother and the sensitive, gifted son supported by her drudgery. At all events, one would not necessarily find Camus more attractive had he slighted that obligation in the name of Justice, and one can hardly doubt that the same qualities of passion and humanity that made Camus so distinguished a fighter for justice were the ones that later made him, to a certain degree, renounce justice. In the last resort his two chief commitments became tragically separated, if not mutually exclusive.

I have stressed that Camus' tragic dilemma crystallised only in the last resort. Fortunately for them, most white South African liberals have not been driven anywhere near the last resort, and have not been compelled to make a decisive choice between justice and loyalty. There is no revolutionary terrorism in the heart of Johannesburg, and nothing that has happened in South Africa has quite equalled the Algerian 'local disturbance' of 1945, let alone the Algerian war. Partly because of this there is still a fairly widespread assumption among liberals that only greed, stupidity, brutality or some equally low motive could ever induce a white South African to support the cruelty and injustice of apartheid. We enjoy the luxury of being able to believe that we have 'chosen' justice, and that the chief moral imperative is dissociation from white repression. In the last resort, if there is a last resort, we may have to recognise that the 'choice' has to some extent been illusory, and that we may be plunged into something of the misery Camus suffered. (I can remember a young liberal, called up for military training, who said, 'I'll be damned if ever I'll fight for the Nats', to which a wise friend replied, 'You won't fight for the Nats, you'll fight for your family.') What one can, perhaps, say, is that there is no excuse for those liberals who trifle irresponsbily with ideas of revolution and guerilla warfare, as though they would be immune from the moral consequences.

A SPECIAL MEANING

I have tried to show that Mr. O'Brien's book, apart from its considerable intrinsic interest (Camus is a figure to reckon with in fields other than the political), might have a special meaning for readers of *Reality*. It is not a comfortable book. The spectacle of the left–wing hero swinging to the right under the pressure of – shall we say reality? – is disturbing, especially when that left–wing hero is a man of genius and profound integrity.

Camus broke with Sartre in 1952. Their quarrel may be summed up as follows: to Camus the protection of Western freedom (warts and all) was the primary politcal obligation; Stalinism and totalitarianism generally were the chief enemy, and if some bones (including some belonging to Algerian Arabs) had to be broken in the course of defending freedom, that had to be accepted. To Sartre, on the other hand, the primary obligation was the creation of a just society within the Western democracies, especially France, and the resistance to Stalinism, etc., was secondary. Sartre took the extreme libertarian view of the situation in Algeria, Camus did not, to which one might add that Camus had personal commitments there, and Sartre did not. Today Sartre's side of the argument appears to be the more powerful; it is certainly the one that is currently more fashionable. I do not propose to judge between the two men – it would be presumptuous to do so without going into the arguments in detail. Which of the two will appear to have been justified in the long run – especially if the Western democracies come under increasing pressure from the 'third world' – remains to be seen.

What is to the point is that Camus, who had been the darling of post-war revolutionary youth (to say nothing of parlour existentialists) found himself increasingly isolated, and in an increasingly untenable (apparently) political position. Unable fully to support either side in Algeria, he alienated both, and found himself, perhaps, in the situation referred to by the protagonist of *La Chute:*

"You know, then, that Dante accepts the existence of angels who were neutral in the quarrel between God and Satan. And he puts them in a limbo, a sort of ante-chamber of his hell. We are in that ante-chamber my friend."

It may just be that this *is* where the liberal road ends.

1. *Fontana Modern Masters, ed. Frank Kermode, London, 1970.*

2. *Conor O'Brien was the United Nations official who authorised the use of force against Tshombe in Katanga, and was sent to Katanga as Hammarskjold's representative. He has also been Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana.*

INSIDE SOUTH WEST AFRICA

by David de Beer



David de Beer

The last weeks of September and October once again saw the question of South West Africa raised in debate for the world to take note. Yet in many respects the long hours spent in session in the Security Council and the Trusteeship Committee were spent on technicalities, and the real issues often sank in political quagmires. To many outside observers and to almost all the inhabitants within South West Africa what is happening inside South West Africa is of greater import than the debates about it, although the two are really complimentary.

Politically South West Africa is a very different place from what it was a short six months ago before the Advisoty Opinion of the World Court was announced in June. The international action which led to the Opinion was aimed at liberating South West Africa from South African control. In this it has not yet reached its final goal; but some kind of liberation within the territory has been obtained — the liberation of frustrated political action and the renewal of hope. It is perhaps significant that the Churches in South West Africa have played a major roll in this.

The first re-actions to the World Court opinion (after South African Premier John Voster had rejected it out of hand) was from the minority groups of the Rehoboth Basters and Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo. The Basters had an election for their local Baster Council immediately after the judgement and elected a seven-man council totally opposed to South African Government policy, and one of their first actions was to appeal to the U.N. Security Council to end South Africa's occupation of South West Africa.

Chief Kapuuo issued a statement and called upon the whites who wished to stay in the territory to sever their allegiance to the "outgoing" South African government and to align themselves with the indigenous people of South West Africa.

The whites in the territory were duly un-impressed. They were used to this sort of thing, and after all, if South Africa had offered before the World Court for a plebiscite to be held, it must be certain that most of the blacks would support continued South African rule.

SHATTERED THE ILLUSION

It was the churches which shattered the illusion. Just four weeks after the World Court Opinion the joint Boards of the Evangelical Lutheran OvamboKavango Church (formerly the Finnish Mission) and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of South West Africa (formerly the Rhenish Mission) disclosed the contents of their open letter to the South African Prime Minister. This letter accused South Africa of withholding basic human rights from the black inhabitants of the territory and called for South West Africa to become a "self-sufficient and independent state." Partly because the Lutheran Churches had not taken such an action before, and also because they represent over half of the territory's blacks, the whites showed some signs of agitation. Prime Minister Vorster saw fit to meet with a delegation from the two Church Boards, and stayed nearly four hours in "purposeful" discussion. But neither side would change their views; the Churches still wanted a unitary state and eventual independence, while Mr. Vorster was emphatic that he would develop South West Africa along a discrimatory and fragmentary line which apartheid policies demanded.

The Lutheran Churches went into their meeting with Vorster

knowing that they had the support of the Anglican Church and the qualified support of the Roman Catholic Church. The Anglican Bishop Colin Winter had issued a statement giving his full support to the Lutheran action, and called on the authorities to listen to the courageous words of the Black Lutheran leaders Bishop Loonard Auala and Moderator Paulus Gowasob. The two Roman Catholic Bishops in South West Africa had declared themselves in favour of the Lutheran stand as far as the denial of Human Rights was concerned, but did not mention the independence question.

Just before Mr. Vorster's meeting with the church leaders, his Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C. Botha, had visited the northern 'homeland' of Ovamboland to open the costly Ongwediva State High School complex which is supposed to epitomise the South African Government's educational policies in South West Africa. Most of the seven hundred students boycotted the opening in protest to the treatment they were receiving and the type of education that was being forced upon them. Immediately after the official opening the school was offically closed for 'administrative' reasons, while the 'ringleaders' were sorted out. After several weeks there were still only two hundred students attending classes, and the students' parents took up their struggle with the authorities saying that the Germans, the Finns and the English had all brought education to Ovamboland in their mission schools, but the Afrikaners had brought 'education with tear-gas and guns'.

At the same time as Vorster's visit another event in South West Africa gained prominence through its non-occurence. American Negro Congressman Charles Diggs had been given permission to visit South Africa on a fact-finding mission. This was hailed by the English South African Press as a breakthrough for an enlightened approach. Exactly how enlightened this move was became evident when Diggs was told on his arrival that he would not be allowed to visit South West Africa but would have to confine his tour to South Africa. It seemed obvious that with the disputed territory in a state of turmoil the South African Government could not bear the thought of the black Congressman crusading through and opening fresh wounds.

ROBBING THE TERRITORY

Further surprises were in store for South Africa. In a totally unexpected move Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo briefed a firm of London lawyers, Lawford & Co., to give a legal opinion on the legality of the presence of foreign mining companies in South West Africa, which he claimed were robbing the territory of its natural riches without giving sufficient share to the indigenous inhabitants because South Africa had usurped the power of granting mining concessions. Kapuuo also announced that he was arranging talks with the leaders of the Rehoboth Basters to discuss matters of common concern. The forging of links between the Hereros and the Basters is significant in that the South African Government has always claimed that different 'ethnic groups' had to be kept apart because they would find it impossible to work together. Despite all obstacles Kapuuo is determined to show them that goodwill does exist across cultural differences within the territory.

At the beginning of October the Churches once again stepped into the foregrpund. Delivering the opening address to the Synod of the Anglican Church in South West Africa Bishop Colin Winter gave what the Nationalist mouthpiece "Die Suidwester" termed a 'fighting' speech. "We are tired of being brow-beaten by petty Government officals and have licked our wounds too long," he said while announcing that four full-time workers of the Church within South West Africa had been refused permits to visit African Reserves on official church business between April and September. The Bishop himself was among those refused a permit. The Synod later condemned apartheid to be a 'sin of the first degree' and pledged itself to fight racialism where-ever it manifested itself within the church. Strong support was also given to the efforts of the Lutheran leaders to obtain Human Rights for all.

Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo

Seemingly re-action followed soon after: less than two weeks later the Principal of the Anglican High School in Ovamboland was ordered to leave the homeland within forty-eight hours, and not even the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C. Botha would give the reasons or comment, save that he had ordered a report to be drawn up on the running of the school, which is the only school for blacks in South West Africa which uses English as a medium of instruction. All other schools use Afrikaans. Only a matter of days later the church authorities announced that a permit had been refused to enter Ovamboland for a young British mechanic who had planned to service the four-wheel drive vehicles the church uses in its mission work. This particular application was lodged more than three months previously, and once again no reasons were given. Early in November yet another application was refused – this time for a priest to help prepare the theological students for their ordination to the priesthood.

During the latest clashes between the Church and State, Dr. Bruckner de Villiers of the Christian Institute in Johannesburg arrived in Windhoek. He had been asked to produce a full report on the relationship between Church and State in South West Africa, for the Christian Institute. After a week-long stay during which he claimed that his hotel bedroom had been searched while he was interviewing the Acting Administrator of the territory he produced a report in which he blamed apartheid for the church's clash with the State, a clash he said which neither side wanted, but which he thought was inevitable because of the directly opposite views each side held.

VOICE FOR THE VOICELESS

A contributing factor to this is that the churches have become a platform through which the blacks of the territory can get a hearing. This 'voice for the voiceless' function is readily admitted by Bishop Winter, who sees one of the church's main tasks as enabling all its members to obtain their full Christian potential and opposing the frustration of God's Creation.

The South African Government's claims before international audiences that it has the support of the inhabitants of South West Africa seem rather brittle when recent happenings within the territory are examined. The South African propaganda machine may paint a pretty picture, but inside South West Africa the indigenous people are not fooled by the faked masterpiece. For they live within its shadow.

Windhoek on the day of the World Court judgement – no consternation yet.



Hoachanas. Established a hundred years ago, it is the oldest mission in South West Africa.

THE COLOURED PERSONS' REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL

by Norman Middleton

In accordance with Section 1 of the Coloured Persons Representative Council Act, 1964 (act 49 of 1964) this Council was established. This new political development resulted in the dissolution of the former Department of Coloured Affairs and the establishment of the Administration of Coloured Affairs.

The act laid down that the Council shall be constituted as follows:

Cape Province:	28 elected	and	12 Nominated.
Transvaal:	6 elected	and	2 Nominated.
Orange Free State:	3 elected	and	1 Nominated.
Natal:	3 elected	and	1 Nominated.
Nominated to represent the Griquas:			2 Nominated.
Nominated to represent the Malays:			2 Nominated.
Giving the total of	40 elected	and	20 Nominated.

An election took place on the 24th September, 1969. At this election the Labour Party of South Africa won 26 of the 40 seats, the Federal Party won 12, the Nationalist Party won 1 and the Republican Party 1.

The Government then nominated 20 members all from the Federal Party. To add insult to this injury, 13 of the members elected were candidates during the election and had lost their seats, including Mr. Tom Swartz who was moreover nominated by the Government as Chairman of the Executive. The Labour Party, although it had won the elections, found itself in the opposition benches. The winners became the losers.

The act lays down that the executive of the Council shall consist of 5 members. These 5 men hold the following duties:

Mr. Tom Swartz:	Chairman of the executive and Finance
Mr. W.J. Bergins:	In charge of education.
Mr. W.J. Louw:	In charge of Community Welfare and Pensions.
Mr. P.J. Peterson:	In charge of Local Government.
Mr. S.S. Cloete:	In charge of Rural areas and settlements

LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE COUNCIL

According to the act, before legislation is introduced in the Council, approval to do so must first be obtained from the Minister of Coloured Affairs, who in turn must consult the Cabinet. If permission is granted and the Council has passed the legislation, it must be submitted to the Minister of Coloured Affairs for approval and for submission to the State President for his assent after which it must be promulgated in the Government Gazette. In reality the Council is merely an advisory body. Dr. Adam Small the Coloured poet had this to say about this Council:

"This is the outstanding thing about the political structure for the Coloured people, as, of course, for all Non Whites in South Africa; that in respect of it any decision of theirs counts for nothing; and being decisionless like this, is of course the essence of unfreedom."

The first session of the Council, which was held from 20th to 21st November, 1969, took place in the library hall of the of the Western Cape, because the Council buildings were not ready.

The official opening during this session was conducted by the Hon. Marais Viljoen, then Minister of Coloured Affairs. At this session certain formalities such as the swearing-in of members, the executive were disposed of. The standing orders of the Council were also adopted and the Chairman and Vice-chairman of the committees were appointed.

Only one resolution was submitted by the opposition (the Labour Party) in this session — equal pay for equal work. This resolution was supported by the governing party and adopted unanimously. I will discuss the outcome later as an indication of the uselessness of this Council.

BOYCOTTS

The second session was held over the month of August 1970 and lasted over four weeks. This session took place in the new Council chambers in Bellville. The official opening of this Council was by the Hon. the Prime Minister. As a mark of protest, the Labour Party members did not attend this official opening.

The third session of the Council which lasted for six weeks, was officially opened by the Minister of Defence Mr. P.W. Botha. Mr. Botha was greeted at the entrance of the C.R.C Buildings by a line of about 25 young demonstrators carrying anti-apartheid placards.

Inside the chamber Mr. Botha, was greeted by empty benches from the Labour Party side. During the opening speech Mr. Botha pointed to the empty opposition benches and said the boycott would achieve nothing and that it only showed irresponsibility on the part of the Labour Party.

NO CONFIDENCE DEBATE

This customary debate which is allowed 5 days, lasted only for half a day in this last session. The Leader of the Labour Party moved for the total abolition of the Council and that all the elected members of the Council be transferred to the Central Government to represent their people. Mr. Leon was the only speaker on this motion as agreed by our executive. After Mr. Leon's motion, Mr. Swartz moved an amendment that, "This Council re-affirms its full support for the policy of parallel development and the institution of C.P.R.C. as a medium through which the Coloured people of South Africa, could achieve full citizenship. He was followed by three speakers from his side after which Mr. Leon replied in a matter of less than a minute. Leon's reply:

"Mr. Chairman, I have never in my whole life listened to such a lot of trash as I have had to listen to today. Without further wasting of my time. I want to tell members on the other side that they stand condemned in the eyes of the Coloured people of South Africa."

On a division the voting was; for the no-confidence motion 28; against: 31.

BUDGET DEBATE

Three days had been set aside to discuss the budget, and the debate lasted for less than an hour. The Labour Party had decided that it would have nothing to do with this budget debate due to the fact that it had already been finalised by the Minister of Coloured Affairs together with the Minister of Finance. In fact the Council has no powers at all to alter any of the items in the budget.

The Coloured Peoples' Rehabilitation Bill was the first ever so called legislation to be handled by the Council. After the various stages and amendments from our side were accepted, this bill was agreed to. Yet, the Bill and the amendments must still be submitted to the Minister of Coloured Affairs for his approval.

HOTTEST POLITICAL POTATO

I forsee this Council as providing the Government with the hottest political potato it has had to handle if the Coloured people do not get meaningful advances through it. This was clear during this last session, when even the Government nominated members were most outspoken against the Government policy of separate development. The indications are at present that the Federal Pary will continue to co-operate for the time being, hoping to achieve what they can for the people and themselves.

The Labour Party on the other hand, does not believe that this Council can achieve anything at all for the people and this belief is shared by the majority of the Coloured people. For the time being the Labour Party will continue to use this Council as a political platform to express the will of the people in view of the legal protection attached to it.

The Government has gone out of its way to insult the Coloured people. First it packed the Senate to take our voting rights away. It then created this institution and when people voted for the Labour Party (the rejection of this policy) they packed the Council with nominated men to make this institution workable. The Coloured people will soon be losing their last political rights – the Municipal franchise.

It is my firm conviction (and in fact that of the majority of the Coloured people). that the Government's policy has no moral basis as far as we are concerned. This deliberate attempt always to axe the political aspirations of the Coloured people has always been the hallmark of Whites generally in South Africa. We find ourselves now in a position where all these created institutions to serve our people, are filled with members who are nominated either by the Government, Provincial Authorities or Local Authorities.

Gen. Smuts' son, J.C. Smuts, describes the White man's attitude correctly when he says in his book on the life of his father: "The Whites came out to South Africa, not merely to missionise and to settle on a trusteeship basis. He made it clear that he had come to stay. For 300 years he had been here and he is determined to stay indefinitely. But the advancement of civilization and gradual evolution of the Native and the gap between White and Black, has narrowed alarmingly. It is doubtful if the old master and servant relationship will be tenable for many more years to come. The White sees a great danger for his children."

This makes it clear why the White man in South Africa is afraid to grant the Black man political rights because it may endanger his privileged position. I don't believe that the present debate about the future of the Coloured people is due to the fact that some people have developed a sudden

Mr. B.J. Vorster opening the 1970 session of the C.R.C. Empty opposition benches on the right.

love for the Coloured people. It seems to me it is the fear that even the present policy will eventually lead to integration — even to political integration.

White South Africa through its policies, whether you call them White Leadership, Apartheid, Separate or Parallel development, is reaching for the unattainable. With the present trend we can expect even more oppressive laws during this decade. Yet they call this development. Only a fool can escape the writing on the wall should this system continue. The tragedy of these inhuman laws has resulted in the shootings at Sharpeville, riots in Gelvandale, riots in Oudtshoorn, etc.

A typical example of this so-called development, is the race classification act. Our population in South Africa has always been divided into three groups: Whites, Bantu and Coloured. Now the Coloured and the Bantu are divided into sub-groups. Yet it is not the case with the Whites. The Coloured group is now divided into seven compartments: Cape Coloured, Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Indian, Other Asiatic and Other Coloured. Under the Group Areas Act the Indian and Chinese group is no longer under the Coloured group. An Indian can not live in a Coloured area. If an African woman marries a Coloured man, she may live with him in a Coloured area, but if the husband leaves her she must return to her Homeland. But what happens then to the children who are now perhaps registered as "Other coloured."?

This bogey of "Integration" works with the White voter because of fear. Fear that he will lose his privileged position. Fear for the loss of being "boss". Yet we work with him daily; we fought with him in times of war, trekked with him in the days of the Voortrekker, died with him at the hands of Dingaan and yet he still fears us.

Let me end by quoting from Olive Schreiner's prophetic words written in 1908:

"For the dark man is with us to stay: not only can we not exterminate him, but we cannot even transport him, because we want more and more of him – to labour in our mines, to build our railways, to work in our fields, to perform our domestic labours. . . . . But if we fail in this? — if, blinded by the gain of the moment, we see nothing in our dark man but a vast engine of labour; if to us he is not a man, but only a tool; . . . . if we force him permanently in his millions into the locations and compounds and slums of our cities, obtaining his labour cheaper; . . . . if, uninstructed in the highest forms of labour, without the rights of citizenship, his own social organisation broken up, without our having aided him to participate in our own; if, unbound to us by gratitude and sympathy, and alien to us in blood and colour, we reduce this vast mass to the condition of a great seething ignorant proletariat — then I would rather draw a veil over the future of this land."

LITERACY WORK IN SWAZILAND

by Nell Green

Eleven years ago a small group of men and women came together to consider certain aspects of life in Swaziland which were being completely neglected by the authorities and yet urgently needed attention. It was decided after considerable discussion to tackle the vast problem of adult illiteracy, which at a rough estimate was 75% and contributed a great deal to other prevalent evils like poverty, deficiency diseases, and apathy about the handicapped.

The organisation then formed was called the Swaziland Sebenta Society (Sebenta meaning to work), and it has grown slowly but steadily from a purely voluntary group to an organisation employing 14 full-time staff. We own a very adequate centre in Mbabane containing offices, classrooms, a hall and simple catering facilities, where we are able to run teacher training courses for up to 30 teachers. In addition there are two small flats in which we house Peace Corps or I.V.S. volunteers when we have them, and let as a source of income at other times.

The Society has become the Sebenta National Institute and now receives an annual grant from the government. After years of patient hard work the idea of adults becoming literate has been accepted by the people; and the demand has grown to include instruction in English and Arithmetic.

NEW THINKING

The primers in siSwati were prepared and printed with the help of the Bureau of Literature and Literacy in Johannesburg, and have fulfilled their purpose reasonable well; but much new thinking is taking place all over the world about literacy teaching, and Sebenta is experimenting with a new method, somewhat similar to that used by Paulo Freire in Brazil. In this method, the basic idea is that the words that are learned first, to introduce the syllables of the language, must relate to the work and activity of the group who are being taught; there should be a close and obvious link between the work the group are doing and the use to which the skills in reading and writing can be put. In the present experiment a group of progressive farmers are being shown how to keep records of fertilising programmes, crop yields, and return on capital.

Photo: M. Ibstedt

A set of words using all the syllables needed in the language and relevant to the special interests of women's groups, will also be prepared. Many industries already employ one or more full-time or part-time literacy teachers, and several have expressed interest in having special sets of words prepared for their own particular needs.

The trouble with the general primers is that although they are Swazi in setting and illustrations, they do not deal with the real and immediate concerns of adults, and are therefore somewhat contrived, childish and boring. The adult has to force himself to persevere because he wants to be literate, or has been persuaded that he ought to, rather than because he is really interested in the words he is learning. But if the words mean something in his own life, and relate to his own thinking and planning, his interest is genuine.

Once the ability to read and write has been firmly established through its practical value and immediate usefulness, there is every chance that it will be used to gain more general and academic knowledge later on. Without that first practical use, the skill can soon be forgotten and although the learner may be the proud owner of a literacy certificate dated 1969, by 1972 he may not be functionally literate.

INDIVIDUAL LEARNER

In both systems as little 'class teaching' as possible is done, and the 'elbo method' is used where the instructor moves from learner to learner, explaining and correcting quietly, thus allowing each person to advance at his own pace. But in the new system, more stress is laid on the individual learner's building his own words from newly mastered syllables, than on the reading of a uniform primer. The technique proposed is not the handing—down of facts from a know-it-all teacher, but rather the exchange of ideas between learners and the teacher or 'animateur' of the group, encouraged by discussion of local problems.

The present experiment is also testing the feasibility of an intensive two-month course during a slack period in the farming year, working 3 to 4 hours a day, 6 days a week, instead of the slow process of one hour once or perhaps twice a week over many months. The course is not yet completed, but the results promise to be interesting. The co-operation of the agricultural field officers in the area will be essential to the success of the work which deals with farm records, and we expect a great deal of help from them, since the project fits in well with their efforts to raise the small farmer from the rut of subsistence farming to the status of the cash crop producer.

NO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION

At present, using the old system reinforced with flash cards and wall charts, there are 70 classes operating throughout the country, containing about 1,500 learners; and about 3,000 literacy certificates have been issued. We do not however consider that a significant reduction has been made in the percentage of adult illiterates in the country. No census figures actually reveal the position but since there is not yet compulsory education each year adds to the number of adult illiterates.

Sebenta is about to embark on an expansion programme, preferrably using the new method if results warrant it; and this will demand the inevitable fund-raising efforts. The Government is faced with such demands for the extension of child education and teacher training that it hesitates to increase funds for adult learning and may even reduce them; the present grant does not cover expenses and certainly does not allow for expansion.

The support that we have received from Southern Africa and from overseas shows that the value and importance of adult literacy are appreciated both by local industry and by international agencies. It is true that well-wishers often respond more immediately and directly to appeals from developing countries for food, or the provision of health and child welfare services; but we believe that adult literacy, where it is combined with a sense of community, is an almost indispensable element in altering those circumstances which make the other appeals necessary. This work is a long-term but exciting and challenging exercise in any country where the bulk of the population is struggling to attain a healthier, fuller, and more responsible way of life.

SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPANSION POLICY

by Robert Molteno

(The second in a series of three articles)

The third argument for ending confrontation with, and the isolation of, South Africa – that Black Africa can benefit from close economic ties with the Republic – has been put most clearly by ministers of the Malagasy Republic. In November 1969, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs told a South African deputation that Madagascar expected great benefits from its projected links with South Africa.[1]

On the face of it, this kind of argument appears valid. And if valid, its implications – far more than the previous two arguments – affect all African states. If Madagascar can profit from economic links with White minority regimes, then so could Ghana or Kenya or Ethiopia.

THE APPARENT BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Malawi is that country which so far has responded most willingly to South Africa's determined efforts to draw states into her 'co-prosperity sphere' – to use the South African Foreign Minister's term. The reason is that, unlike the former High Commission Territories, Malawi is not yet heavily dependent on the Republic. It has therefore been able to exact a price for its friendship. This stands in stark contrast to the former High Commission Territories. Although in the most desperate economic straits, they have received only derisory assistance from South Africa. These states, of course, are already compelled to comply with South African wishes (in relation to refugees, freedom fighters, and so on) because of their dependence. The aid carrot to compliance is therefore unnecessary and has been dispensed with.

Indeed Malawi is the only African state so far to have received significant economic aid from the Republic, although Madagascar is about to be the second. Let us examine the economic benefits which the Malawian Government claims it has derived from its links with South Africa.

The most spectacular benefit is capital. As early as June 1966, the South African Government granted Malawi a £1 million loan to finance the building of the new capital; and a £6.4 m loan to finance the Nacala rail link between the Malawian and Portuguese Mozambique systems. In the wake of this, 1969 saw a limited amount of private South African capital come into the country. The South African firm, Koornhof Holdings, is to spend over £¼m building a tourist hotel on Lake Malawi. And another firm is opening a fertiliser (bagging and blending) plant.

In the field of trade, Malawi has achieved a slightly larger market for some of her agricultural exports – notably tea, tobacco, coffee, groundnuts, and tungoil. Her exports to South Africa doubled to R1.1 m in the first 8 months of 1968 over the corresponding period in 1967. She also claims that the manufactured goods which she imports from South Africa are cheaper than they would be from any alternative source.

Finally, by being able to export up to 80,000 migrant workers to South Africa each year, she is able both to reduce the pressure of population on the land, and even to augment the national income through the earning these workers remit to Malawi.

The case of Malawi seems to show that South Africa can offer considerable economic benefits to Black Africa – capital for development; export markets; cheaper imports of manufactured goods; tourists; and even the exporting of unemployment. These benefits must each be analysed in turn.

THE EXPORT OF MIGRANT WORKERS TO SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa's demand for foreign African workers on a migrant labour basis is still rising. Most of them work on the mines, and in the 1960s the mines increased their dependence on foreign labour slightly – from 60.8% of their labour force in 1962 to 65.7% in 1968.[2] Many also work on the white-owned farms of the platteland.

The resentment which developed in Zambia's Western (formerly Barotse) Province after 1966 when the Zambian Government ended the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association's recruiting there shows that individuals had come to depend financially on periodic employment in the Republic. This is only natural since many families find it difficult either to produce enough food for their own subsistence or to earn cash in their own countries. This is because of land shortage (given existing techniques); the decline in output in the rural sectors of many Central and Southern African economies (due to the withdrawal of a high proportion of able-bodied manpower who are away as migrants); and because of the underdevelopment of their modern sectors and so a shortage of local employment opportunities.

Nevertheless, there are costs to the individual migrant which any independent government should take into consideration before it encourages or initiates the export of men to South Africa. Real wages of African miners have been kept constant (or possibly even reduced) over the last half century between 1911 and 1968.[3] Wages are therefore extremely low. In 1968, the average African mineworker's wage was only R216 per annum – the starting wage being R106.[4] On the farms where several hundred thousand more migrants work, wages are even lower. On both; the annual income is not sufficient to support the workers and his family. Moreover, the foreign migrant in South Africa (and the local African miner) gets none of the fringe benefits normally associated with employment. No sickness benefits, no unemployment benefits, no holiday with pay, above all – no pension. He is not allowed to bring his family with him. The migrant has no say in the choice of his employer on the mines. He is by law prevented from improving his position by joining a trade union or taking collective strike action. He acquires no permanent skill which will be of productive use to him when he return to his own land. He lives in a society whose assumptions are the opposite of his own – that black men are inferior and unfitted for self-government.

SMALL NATIONAL INCOME BENEFITS

The benefits to national income of those countries exporting migrants to South Africa are very small. In 1965, for example, Lesotho which had 164,000 men and some 30,000 women working in South Africa (a larger number than any other African state) only received R5.4 million in remitted earning. This constituted an addition to national income of roughly R5 per capita.[5] This is much higher than for any other state exporting workers to the Republic. The corresponding figure for Malawi is probably about 50 cents.

But the greatest disadvantage to African states of continuing their export of migrants to South Africa is that, by exporting their unemployed, they are only temporarily alleviating their economic distress. The unemployed inevitably return at the end of their contracts. Their absence has not equipped their home economy to cope with their needs any more adequately. Indeed, their very absence means that the economy of a country like Malawi loses a significant percentage of its able-bodied manpower in the most productive years of their lives.

There is no doubt that to argue that Malawi and other countries benefit from being able to send migrants to South Africa is an oversimplification which overlooks the social and economic costs involved.

THE IMPORT OF CAPITAL FROM SOUTH AFRICA

The only African state to have received significant South African government loans so far is Malawi. Private South African capital is seeking foreign investment opportunities ever more vigorously. The bulk of it is invested in Rhodesia and Zambia (notably the Anglo-American Corporation whose investments, however, largely preceded independence.) New capital is flowing mainly into the White-controlled states of Southern Africa – into Rhodesia, where six of the ten largest companies are South African controlled and into the Portuguese territories. But a little has found its way into Black African states. Recent South African investments in Malawi have been mentioned. The Anglo-American Corporation has opened up a new copper mine in Mauritania. And South Africans are talking more and more of investment in Africa – subject as the journal Newscheck states, to appropriate safeguards as to "taxation, repatriation of profits, guarantees in relation to nationalisation, and the position of expatriate (white South African) workers".[6]

In a world of falling foreign aid and reluctant private investment in Africa, can the Continent benefit substantially from opening its doors to South African capital – public and private? The economic disadvantages of doing so must be spelled out.

NECESSITY OF INDUSTRIALSATION

Firstly, South African capital very rarely goes into industry. Yet it is industrial investment – more than anyting else – that Africa needs if it is to raise its living standards. The reason is that South Africa is determined not to set up industries in neighbouring states which might compete with her own. The result is that most private capital has gone into mineral extraction – Zambian copper; Swaziland ironore; Rhodesian coal, gold, chrome; Angolan gold, diamonds and ironore; and imminently Botswana diamonds, copper, and nickel. And most public capital has also gone into non-industrial investment. The major example is South Africa's biggest loan – for the essentially non-productive project of building Malawi's new capital at Lilongwe. A notorious case of bogus industrialisation by South African capital is the recently announced fertiliser plant in Malawi. The firm, Optichem, has obtained a five-year monopoly on all fertiliser imports (from its South African holding company). The only processes to be performed in Malawi are bagging and blending. In return, the Malawi Government merely has a vague statement from the company that it may at the end of the five years build a factory actually to manufacture fertiliser.[8]

President Kaunda

Secondly, South African investment, like most bilateral investment, is usually tied to the use of South African firms, and goods. South African Cabinet Ministers have stated this to be a feature of their aid policy, and one of considerable benefit to their economy. A leading example of this is the Nacala rail link in Malawi. In return for the loan, the Malawian Government has been obliged to have the construction done by a South African firm, Roberts Construction, and to use South African steel for the track.[9] Such tying of bilateral aid, irrespective of the wishes of the recipient country is, of course, a well known disadvantage.

RACIALIST LABOUR PATTERN

Probably the most serious drawback to reliance on South African capital is that, in the past, it has involved the importation of a racialist pattern of labour relations as well. The copper mines of the Anglo-American Corporation in Northern Rhodesia are an obvious example. The Company, when it developed its mines in the 1930s, transplanted its patterns from South Africa. It is taking Zambia years to break away from this pattern, which has been the source of social strife,

industrial unrest, and economic inefficiency since Independence. It seems likely that a similar pattern of labour relations will be imported into Botswana in the near future when Anglo-American opens its new mines there. For the Botswana Government has not felt strong enough to insist that white South African miners not be recruited, or to demand a timetable for localisation of all manpower.

There is clearly a danger that the importation of South African capital involves the importation of its racialist system as well – particularly where South African construction and mining firms are involved. The results in various economic disadvantages – the high price of imported white labour which raises production costs; the strain on the balance of payments due to the repatriation of salaries; and the potential instabilities consequent on continuing dependence on foreign manpower. The economic costs, and the social and political costs already mentioned, must be weighed against the possible economic advantages of attracting South African capital.

Finally, South African private investment involves all the disadvantages usually associated with foreign capital – lack of local control over the economy, and strain on the country's balance of payments stemming from the remission of dividends and the repatriation of capital.

TRADE TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA

For most states in East and West Africa, the issue of economic relations with South Africa is basically one of trade. It would not be economically feasible for them to export migrant workers to South Africa. Most do not have a tourist industry. They may not have great hopes of attracting any significant quantity of South African capital. But, in the field of trade, more and more African states are quietly reversing their previous policies and entering into still largely sub rosa trade relations with South Africa. Certain West African states in particular have moved in this direction. Although the total quantity of trade is not yet significant either for South Africa or for these states, if they are correct in seeing major economic benefits to themselves from such trade with South Africa, we can expect both its volume to rise significantly in the 1970s and more and more states to decide to trade openly with the Republic. It is therefore appropriate to examine closely the alleged benefits to be gained from such a reversal of policy.

Firstly, South Africa is not prepared to open her domestic market to the manufactured exports of African states. Yet Africa needs to industrialise. And the pace of her industrialisation depends in part on the availability of export markets. South Africa, by reason of her size and geographical proximity, could, if willing, provide a large market and so a major spur to the Continent's industrialisation. Moreover, non-exploitive trade relations in the long run depend on the exchange of manufactured goods between countries.

Yet South Africa refuses to allow such a development. Her reason is that, despite a fairly diversified and – by continental standards – large manufacturing sector, she suffers from the handicap of being a high cost economy. This is partly because of the high costs of white labour. In 1968, average white wages in manufacturing were R3,144 (compared to R576 for Africans)[10] It is also because the scale of production is usually much smaller than in Western Europe – both because of the small home market (itself due to artificial restrictions of the purchasing power of Africans) and because she has found it difficult to build up a large export market in manufactured goods.

VULNERABLE TO COMPETITION

Being a high cost economy, South African industry is vunerable to competition from manufactured imports. Indeed, even within the country, tension has developed between the old established textile factories on the Reef and the new Border Industry mills. The latter – with lower paid Afican workers and a partial substitution of Africans in jobs usually held by whites – have lower costs and have been able to undercut the established factories. It is precisely this pattern which South Africa fears could result from the industrialisation of other African states.

The Government has therefore taken concrete steps to keep the manufactured exports of neighbouring countries out of her market. Thus the 1967 Trade Agreement with Malawi provides for preferential access of certain South African agricultural and manufactured goods into Malawi; but only of Malawian *agricultural* exports into South Africa.[11] In 1968, tension developed between Rhodesia and South Africa. Rhodesian manufacturers – in terms of a 1964 trade agreement – responded to their loss of other markets following UDI by expanding their exports of textiles, radios, footwear, etc. to South Africa.[12] They were so successful in undercutting South African manufacturers that the latter got their government to pressure the Rhodesian Government into curtailing Rhodesian manufactured exports to South Africa. This in defiance of a trade agreement to boost two-way trade.

And in 1970, South Africa's leading financial journal – The Financial Mail – admitted that Rhodesia would refuse to join South Africa's Common Market unless "Rhodesian infant industries . . . are given generous access to the South African market. It is precisely the latter concept which has been so difficult to sell to South African industrialists."[13]

The most drastic attempt by South Africa to prevent industrialisation of other states and so protect her own producers came in 1969. Her Common Customs Union with the former High Commission Territories was up for revision. She used this opportunity to demand a controlling say in these states' industrialisation policies (presumably to prevent the establishment of competitive industries) in return for giving them a large share of the customs revenue – to which, on the trade figures, they were in any case entitled! South Africa only climbed down after lengthy delays and a leak to the press.[14]

NO OUTLET

These actions reveal starkly that African states cannot look to South Africa as an outlet for their growing output of manufactured goods. She is determined that the trade relationship between herself and Africa should be the classic one so common between industrialised and underdeveloped states – the latter being confined to exporting unprocessed raw materials and agricultural crops on ever deteriorating terms of trade.

Moreover, South Africa's main concern is not to promote two-way trade with Africa, but to increase her own exports to the Continent so as to improve her deteriorating balance of payments. Africa is the only continent with which she has a favourable balance of trade. Further, in the last five years, she has succeeded in increasing this favourable balance enormously – from R6.2 m in 1965 to R130 m in 1968.[16] This concern with ensuring a growing margin of exports to Africa over imports is a further reason why South Africa is not, and will not, become a market for the Continent's manufactured exports. And because of South Africa's near complete self-sufficiency in minerals and her rich variety in agricultural produce, the Re-

public does not even hold great prospects as a market for Africa's agricultural and mineral exports.

The second alleged area of benefit to Africa of trade links with South Africa is the possibility of reducing the costs of imported manufactured goods by taking them from the nearby Republic. Several considerations need to be borne in mind here. South African goods are not always cheaper than those from other countries because its economy is relatively high cost. In textiles, plastics, and electrical goods, countries like Japan and Hong Kong can often supply more cheaply than South Africa. Moreover, South Africa's cost advantage over Europe because of its location does not extend to West African states which are as near Europe as they are near South Africa. Only for Central and East Africa does South Africa have an advantage in transport costs over the major industrial nations.

Finally, even when manufactured imports from South Africa would be cheaper, there are still drawbacks to buying from there. Once a significant volume of one's imports come from one country, one's economy becomes tied to that country in many ways. The machinery in one's factories depends on a continuing long-term flow of spares, replacements, and maintenance advice from the supplier in that country.

DIFFICULT TO BREAK TIES

This means that, once a high degree of dependence on South Africa has been built up, it would be difficult in future to break those ties without great cost and disruption to one's economy. Yet there are at least two reasons why African states, even if wanting to trade with South Africa now, might want to cut those ties at a later stage. Firstly, the Republic is prone to inflation – partly because of the artificial shortage of skilled labour due to the reservation of these jobs for whites. Any cost advantage which may exist now in certain lines of imports, may well disappear in future years. Although then no longer in the interests of an African state to import from there, it would be difficult to switch at that stage. Secondly, South Africa is basically an unstable society. The early 1960s saw general strikes, sabotage movements, the Pondoland Rebellion in the Transkei, the POQO uprising, and systematic revolutionary planning by the African National Congress. It is only since 1966 that these internal oppositions have been temporarily destroyed by a combination of armed force, informer networks and suspected torture of suspects by the police. To assume that the apparent calm of the last four years will last indefinitely is foolhardly in the extreme.

There are other reasons why it would benefit Africa to look for its imports of manufactured goods elsewhere than South Africa. African states want to industrialise. One of the immediate opportunities is import substitution. The more costly imports are (either because of tariffs or a deliberate decision not to buy in the cheapest market), the more likely that either private or public enterprise will be able to make a profit by manufacturing the product locally. Cheap imports are not the best way to encourage investment in industry. Local industrialisation may be stimulated by keeping out South African goods.

TRADE INTER SE

This argument can be taken further. Developing countries should as far as possible trade inter se, and not with the industrialised countries. This applies especially to manufactured goods. Every developing country wants and needs to industrialise. But one of the difficulties is the smallness of each one's domestic market. One solution is to develop export markets. But the developed countries – including South Africa – have been unwilling to allow in the cheaper products of the developing states. The experience of Japan in earlier years and of Hong Kong today demonstrates this. Developing countries must therefore use one another's markets for their manufactured goods. It is in their long-term interests to develop trade among themselves, even at the short run price of higher import costs.

For example, it would be to the mutual long-run advantage of Kenya and Zambia for the latter to import light consumer goods from Kenya and not South Africa, and for Kenya to import steel from Zambia's projected mill and not from South Africa. For such trade will enable both countries to advance their industrialisation further than would have been the case if they had merely relied on the allegedly – and sometimes actually – cheaper imports from South Africa.

FOOTNOTES:

1. African Research Bulletin – Political Social – and Cultural Series – 1576 (1969).
2. H. Houghton – The South African Economy (OUP – Cape Town – 1967.) Page 105, and Survey of Race Relations in South Africa. 1968 – Page 104.
3. Study by Dr. F. Wilson – Financial Mail (Johannesburg) 10/5/1968.
4. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1969 – Page 104.
5. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa – 1967 – Page 92
6. Newscheck – 28/2/1969
7. For evidence, see later in the article.
8. The Star (Johannesburg) – 1/11/1969
9. Africa Research Bulletin – Economics Series – 1529.
10. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1969 – Page 94.
11. Africa Institute Bulletin – June 1967 – Page 134, 135.
12. The Star (Johannesburg) – 4/3/1968.
13. Financial Mail (Johannesburg) – 29/5/1970.
14. Financial Mail (Johannesburg) – 24/1/1969.
15. Trade Data drawn from Barclays Overseas Review, State of South Africa annuals, and H. Houghton – The South African Economy (O.U.P. – Cape Town 1967).

TWO POP SONGS

(Written not in order to induce complacency – but to be sung at the Potgietersrus Pop Festival).

by Vortex

1. BLOWN SKY–HIGH BY A POP–GUN

Hands moving swiftly over a guitar
Tear the heart strings of Mr. Voster.
Laughs on the faces of young people
Spoil the well–earned drink at the nineteenth hole.
(If only they would play a **mature** game!)
Hands tightly clasped
Loosen Mr. Vorster's will to survive.
Hand-shakes, arm-clasps, of black and white
Make Mr. Voster go redder than China.
Gentle folk songs
Terrify the volk.
(**Of course** the volk still exists: you need go no further than Volksrust to find it, just to the right of the national road.)
Thoughts hot from London
Make Mr. Voster South African-sick;
Songs winged from America
Make Mr. Voster platteland-pale.
Every inch of lengthening hair
Prepares a noose for Mr. Vorster's neck.
(Unfortunately it was the leftists who favoured abolition.)
Every beat of a Beatles tune
Stamps down the earth on Mr. Voster's grave.
Every stone rolled in by the Rolling Stones
Helps to build the whited sepulchre.
(But ah, the security of a segregated cemetery!)

2. ON THE WAY DOWN AND OUT

The swish of an SAA jet
startles the dear old platteland.
The shout of a crowd in Sydney
silences the noisy old platteland.
(Hush: Mr. Voster is trying to think.)
The shaking of a black fist
shakes the innocent old platteland.
The thump of the latest jazz
jabs the soft old platteland.
(Mr. Waring is elaborating a plan – to put an end to all this nonsense.)
The thoughts in a student's mind
mystify the dumb old platteland.
The existence of an "outside world"
puzzles the proud old platteland.
(Oh shame!)
The awkward facts of human life
embarrass the earnest old platteland.
The complexity of life itself
confuses the quaint old platteland.
("We have decided that it would be more patriotic **not** to survive after all.")

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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This South Africa

The Minister of Information, Dr. Connie Mulder, has suggested that we should all suspend judgment on security Police methods until the detainees are brought to court.

Will Ahmed Timol be brought to court, Dr. Mulder?

"Sunday Times" – 21/11/71

After two policemen had said in evidence that a man sustained injuries after falling from a window, a court inspection of the building failed to show a window out of which the man could have fallen.

Kevin Colin Naylor (24), who pleaded not guilty to charges of obstructing the police, refusing to give his name and address, and escaping arrest, told a Durban magistrate yesterday that his injuries were caused by a baton attack on him by a City policeman.

Dr. C.E. Hall told Mr. F.J. Poolman that Naylor's injuries were completely consistent with a baton attack, and that there was no medical evidence to support allegations of a fall from a window. He said he examined Naylor on August 28 and found a "sausage-like" bruise on his abdomen, and bruises on other parts of his body. He said that had Naylor jumped from a height there would have been bruises to his legs or wrists.

On returning from the inspection of the building yesterday, Mr. Poolman announced that Constable Smith of the City Police had been unable to point out the window from which he earlier said he saw Naylor jump. Constable Storm of the South African Police had also testified that Naylor jumped from a window.

ABUSIVE

The charges against Naylor arose from an incident at the Burger Ranch in Point Road on August 27. Mr. C.D. Thompson told the court that a City Police car drew up alongside him when he was parked at the Burger Ranch. He said the driver was abusive and aggressive, and wanted to charge him for driving a car with garage number plates.

He said Naylor then approached and made a "civil" intervention on his behalf. Naylor was told he had no right to interfere, but when he persisted he was "pushed" to the police car and struck several times with a batton by Constable van der Merwe of the City Police.

"I could not believe my eyes when I saw the police acting in this manner," Mr. Thompson said. "I feel the public should be protected against offences of this kind."

Giving evidence Naylor said he was not asked to give his name and address, and ran away to avoid further assault.

SUSPECT

Passing judgement, Mr. Poolman said he did not accept a defence submission that, because the police evidence was highly suspect in some respects, it should be totally rejected. Naylor had interfered, even after being warned off, and was therefore guilty on this count. On the secound count it was a "very ordinary request" that the police should ask for his name and address, and Naylor's evidence here was not accepted. He was found guilty on this count.

Regarding the last count of attempting to escape arrest, there might be some measure of sympathy if Naylor had in fact been assaulted. But even if there was an assault, he was not entitled to run away. Also he admitted he ran away after, not during, the alleged assault.

Mr. Poolman said he was "left in a large amount of doubt" as to the alleged assault and was not prepared to comment on this.

On each of the first two counts, Naylor was fined R15 (or 15 days). On the third count he was given a suspended sentence of one month's imprisonment.

Mr. A. Dumas defended Naylor. Mr. P. du Toit appeared for the State.

"Daily News" – 16/11/71

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