

reality

SEPTEMBER, 1971

A JOURNAL OF LIBERAL OPINION

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EDITORIAL

THE BLIND SIDE

There are of course many ways in which life is or seems to be unjust; but there are, also, certain subtle laws of justice, laws implicit it would seem in the very constitution of the universe and of the human mind, which have an uncanny habit of coming into play sooner or later. One such law is that cynicism is apt to recoil upon the cynic — that a calculated contempt for human nature often turns out to have involved an uncalculated underestimation of human nature's potentialities. Or to put it more succinctly, meanness means blindness.

A classic instance of the working of this law is the rise and fall of Adolf Hitler. His cynicism was exhibited not only in his treatment of the Jews and of his political and military opponents but in his earlier assumption that the rest of the world — or the part of it that he was interested in — would accommodate itself to what he had done as soon as it realised how powerful he was.

This same law seems to be in operation in several sectors of the Nationalist Government's "relations" with South Africa's black and brown citizens. Apartheid, separate development — call it what you will — is obviously in many respects an expression of cynicism: it is a heartless scheme, whatever the protestations which accompany it, and it grows from a low view of a large proportion of the country's population. (The fact that Nationalist cynicism is of a rather desperate sort, is indeed a forlorn cynicism of supposed self-defence, does not unfortunately have any effect upon its essential nature; and besides, perhaps all man's cynical tendencies are self-defensive in origin.) What we have been seeing in the last year or two, however, is the sheer miscalculation that often attends dark

calculation. And no one has made the world more aware of this miscalculation — in fact, no one has done more to gently convert calculation into miscalculation (though this may not have been his way of viewing the whole question) — than Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.

The Nationalist Government seems always to have assumed that, when dealing with Africans, especially Africans of the "homelands", it was dealing with an inferior species — a species of human being that could, in most cases, be smothered in a cloud of words and then given the fifth-best, the tenth-best or even the worst, the whole procedure being possible not only because this species deserved no better but because it was in general almost incapable of telling the difference between best and worst. The Government found room in its philosophy for a recognition that discernment might occur among the Africans from time to time; but whenever that happened, or showed signs of happening, the outbreak of insight could (it was thought) be quelled by financial persuasion or police coercion. Needless to say, this view of the situation was a very mistaken one; Africans, no matter how rural or illiterate some

of them may be, know quite as well as the rest of the human race when they are free, happy and fulfilled and when they are captive, miserable and frustrated. And of course a large number of Africans have found ways and still do find ways of showing their complete rejection of the Government's vision.

But Chief Buthelezi is the first person to pursue with any success a completely different approach. He doesn't reject; he accepts. He allows himself apparently to be fobbed off with large impressive-sounding promises. And then, having had a weight of words deposited upon him, he picks up the words and phrases, one by one, and treats them as real vehicles of human meaning and feeling. He takes the Government at its word, and looks forward to the freedoms, the opportunities, that it offers.

NO BITTER MACHIAVELLI

It isn't easy to describe Chief Buthelezi's mode of operation. If one puts too heavy an emphasis upon his gentleness and his hopefulness, one makes him sound innocent, naive; if one stresses his perceptiveness, his quiet toughness and his sense of timing, one makes him appear bitterly Machiavellian. In fact, though he might well be justified in being Machiavellian, he isn't so, or he isn't simply so: his actions and statements seem somehow to combine innocence and irony, charity and challenge. The Government is unable to criticise his performance: he is always courteous, and indeed no leading African has ever hung upon Nationalist words as Chief Buthelezi does. And Africans, on the whole, are very far from being critical of him, for, as he said in a recent interview on British television, "most of my people understand exactly what I am doing". The Government has consistently insulted the humanity and the intelligence of Africans. Chief Buthelezi's

way of accepting the insult and then transmuting it is a triumph of intelligence and humanity.

Some opponents of the Government remain unhappy about Chief Buthelezi's approach: he is, after all, playing ball with the Government. That is true. But he has clearly judged, in his kindly and cunning way, that there can surely be no serious objection from anyone if he beats the Government at its own game. For many years now the Government team has been quite happy to allow the Homelands to heel the ball out of the scrum from time to time: it has known that before their three-quarter line could get going it would be stopped by some characteristically low tackling. But fly-half Gatsha has caught them on the wrong foot: he has darted beautifully round their blind side, close to the touch-line, and it's not going to be easy to prevent him from scoring a try. And there is a very large crowd in the grandstand.

"Reality" hopes that Chief Gatsha Buthelezi will score many tries, many victories. But what will be the nature of these victories if they materialize? And besides, what does Chief Buthelezi want?

We cannot see into the future, and we must of course beware of being too optimistic. We cannot speak for Chief Buthelezi, and perhaps he would be embarrassed to find "Reality" attempting to do so. But we are unable to refrain from noting that Chief Buthelezi's concern for the rights and freedoms of Zulus is very obviously but a part of his strong and Christian and humane feeling for all Africans and indeed for all South Africans, and that — to convert the rugby image into a military one — a break-through on the Zulu front is pretty certain to mean successful engagements on other fronts and ultimately a large advance in the campaign as a whole.

EDITORIAL

SPROCAS AND THE FUTURE

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"REALITY" has more than once referred in its columns to Sprocas (the Study Project on Christianity in an Apartheid Society.) As the time draws near for the publication of its Reports, we are moved to wish it success and express our hope that it will indeed give us good directions for the future. The documents already reviewed in "Reality" are working papers reflecting at this stage only the opinions of their writers. It is by the Reports of the various Committees and ultimately the Report of Sprocas as a whole that the work of this great study project will be judged.

We express the hope that Sprocas will remember the nature of its reading public. Probably three quarters of the readers of the Reports will be White South Africans. The temptation will be very strong to word the Reports in such a way as to bring the benevolently-disposed but rather woolly white man across the line which leads from benevolence to action. This is a right and good aim, but it is not all.

The framers of the Reports must remember the black South Africans who will read them, approaching them with a mixture of cynicism and hope. To make that hope real and living would be a major victory. Too much softening down for white ears would impede that victory.

The Reports will also be read by Christian leaders in all parts of the world. They are aware that the project is inspired by

the Christian Institute, and will expect the Reports to express the opinion of the best thinkers in the South African community. An ambiguous or toned down presentation will almost destroy any confidence in our own Christian leadership. A clear and courageous set of Reports will strengthen our position in the Christian world. Overseas readers will know that the Reports express only a minority section of white opinion but they will realise that this minority is active and unafraid.

After the Reports is to come, we understand, a programme of action, to work out the implementation of both its short-term and long-term recommendations for change. "Reality" will be proud to support by every means in its power this programme of action.

GRASS ROOTS AND LIBERALS

by MARY LEE



Mary Lee

"Grass roots" is going to be mishandled in this article. Its original, American significance will be extended, adjusted, touched up here and there, distorted, to allow of its application to the South African electoral scene. Yet there seems to be argument for the retention of the term: it is intrinsically so meaningful and so evocative that it can probably survive a mauling anyway; and, more compellingly, it appears to have no just South African equivalent.

Chambers' Dictionary, ascribing the phrase to the United States, defines it as follows: "The rural areas of a country the dwellers there, regarded as representing the true character of a people."

The second part of the definition reveals at once the difficulty of applying the term in this country. For if we take South Africa as a whole — as the sum of its population — it is immediately apparent that, as "a" people, we have no character at all. As Mr. Calpin pointed out to "South Africans" many years ago, there are precisely none of us. We are still only Africans, Asiatics, Coloured persons, and Afrikaans- or English-speaking "Europeans", in the land in which the overwhelming mass of us were born.

Moreover, "grass roots" is, by definition, no mere synonym for the countryside or its inhabitants: it also enshrines a value, or a set of values. It contains somewhere the idea that man is at his "truest" (and perhaps his best) when he lives near to nature, his soul clear of the complex corruptions of the city. It hints nostalgically at the worth of simplicity of life and outlook. It implies that, if anywhere there is a clue to the "real" American (or Britisher, or Frenchman, or what-have-you), it will be found in the outback or the backblocks of his land. In this country, up to some twenty-five or thirty years ago, the Afrikaner might properly have thought of his grass roots in some such fashion. Today, it is probably only the African who — whatever his personal degree of urbanisation — can feel that his "real", his essential, self is somehow explicable in terms of the veld and of his rustic kin.

'TRUE CHARACTER'

When we restrict the reference of "grass roots" to the electoral scene, which is perhaps its best-known application in the United States, we are still not in the clear. True, the South African electorate is composed solely of white persons and might therefore be expected to constitute, in some sort, "a people", with a definable measure of "true character". But the notion is largely illusory. Certainly, white South Africans have much in common with one another. We have a group-reputation for hospitality; a group-addiction to sport, which, we tend to feel, is closely bound up with our (sectional) nationhood. We share a zealous regard for white privilege; and our politicians, at least, are convinced that we have a "traditional way of life". These things would appear, however, to belong in the realm of behavioural characteristics rather than of solid character; and even after sixty-one years of union the differences within the white group are the differences between two diverse peoples. The Afrikaans—"English" cleavage still cuts deep and tends to split us even as an electoral body.

In any case, electorally speaking, just where are our grass roots? In our rural areas, as per dictionary definition? Does our platteland electorate in fact hold any vital clue to our over-all, "real" modes of outlook as voting persons?

Again one is tempted to conclude that only within an African electorate, such as the Transkei, can there be grass roots in this sense. **For it is doubtful whether, today, the typical white voter of the platteland differs, in any basic or effective fashion, from his counterpart in the cities.** His thought-processes may be somewhat simpler; his relative nearness to nature may have given him a more literal love of the land; but while these things may affect his approach to politics and his specific expectations from his parliamentary representative, his actual vote is decided by virtually the same influences as determine that of the city-voter. The separate national identities within the white group; the differing histories which have made them such uneasy yoke-mates; the deliberate exploitation of this unease for political purposes; steady indoctrination in "laager" thinking — these are the factors which have formed, of rural and urbanised white South Africans alike, an electorate which tends to vote by long-past happenings, by habit, by family tradition, by zest for white privilege, by national descent — by anything, in fact, but individual character or independent thought.

CLASS INTERESTS

These, naturally, are not the only considerations which may dictate our votes: we share with electors the world over a tendency to look out for our personal, financial or class interests: nor are we alone in habit-voting or the naivete of our mass electoral thinking. The argument is merely that such "true character" as might once have distinguished the rural from the urban voter's outlook in South Africa has been pretty well wiped out by conditioning influences which apply equally in town and country.

Electorally, then, we have no grass roots either: no reason to feel that if we go to the country (in the rustic sense) we shall there find some inerrant clue as to what, as a people (or sub-people, or two peoples), we "really" want or need. We shall find only that both townsman and countryman have come, by and large, to believe that whiteness of skin and a spurious kind of nationalism are over-riding issues, and that in relation to these things they have an identity or interest.

For the rest of this article we shall accordingly use "grass roots" — and this will be its ultimate distortion — to signify the rank-and-file of the electorate in white South Africa, whether based on the countryside or in the cities: the "average" voter, too busy about his own affairs to cultivate political awareness; too long indoctrinated with the views of "government" to judge for himself what really are the issues of supreme importance and what moral values should determine the way in which he casts his vote.

This lack of veritable grass roots in the white electorate was perhaps a main factor in the failure of the now-disbanded Liberal Party to make impact on the mass of voters. In the cities, certain flash-point issues and a greater degree of social awareness gave the Liberal some chance. On the platteland, he was, to all intents and purposes, an irrelevance. In neither "white" sphere did his principles find acceptance by any but the tiniest fraction of his hearers — themselves the tiniest fraction of the voting public.

There was a striking difference when he moved among grass roots of the more genuine variety. Among Africans, for instance, not only his principles and projects, but even his ideals, were comprehended and accepted. Nor was this fact a mere expression of self-interest, though such concepts as equality of opportunity, such policies as one-man-one-vote, must appeal powerfully to hosts of Africans in this country. Rather, it was that the ideals of justice, of a wider patriotism, and of human brotherhood were truly grasped, and seen to have practical bearing on the civic life. **So thorough, indeed, was this comprehension by African Liberals that, in this regard, they often put to shame their white fellows, whose approach to liberalism had followed more "intellectual" and sophisticated lines.** Any white Liberal who was privileged to attend a "country meeting" in the old Party days — a meeting, that is, with rural African Liberals — will recall with gratitude (and not without emotion) the inspiration he himself derived from the encounter.

But to return to the electorate. Just what is there about even small-1 liberalism which renders it apparently so offensive to the majority of our white citizens?

There are dozens, if not hundreds, of part-answers ready to hand. They can be summed up very briefly: most voters see in the liberal the foe of their own interests. For example, his advocacy of compulsory education and higher wages for Non-Europeans is seen as a menace to white prestige and pocket; his call for over-all acknowledgement of human rights and freedoms, as an incitement to general permissiveness and a dangerous relaxation of "white" control. And so on. But these are hardly "real" answers: they do not explain what virtually prevents the white voter from seeing things the liberal way. The gap between mass and liberal thinking comes from deeper causes.

BREEDING

By derivation, "liberal" means "befitting a freeman"; and "generous", which is one of its synonyms, means "of noble birth." Though these words have undergone historical change, both of them still tie up, somewhere, with breeding. ("The lower the breeding", a doyen of later South African liberalism once truthfully observed, "the greater the sense of the colour-bar".) But before we appear to identify breeding with caste, let us hastily note that this word, too, has experienced considerable change of meaning. The factors of cultivation and environment have played on it, till it has come to mean — at least in customary use — something more like a code of manners and a mode of thought pertaining to an élite: an elect of sorts, distinguished not necessarily (if at all) by aristocratic, or even upper-middle-class, lineage, but by opportunity to think. Such opportunity usually implies a fair degree of education, a fair degree of leisure: requirements which, in their turn, are commonly associated with a fair degree of affluence.

Education, freedom from financial anxiety — above all, leisure — are not the distinguishing marks of any mass electorate. (When the mass voter says he has "no time for liberalism" he speaks the truth more literally than perhaps he knows). So



Rural 'grass roots' voters. (Dr. Verwoerd's Commando escort, 50th anniversary of Nationalist Party)

the gap between the leisured liberal thinker and the average voter may be viewed, in this sense, as natural enough.

It prevails, of course, in most countries; but the relationship is bedeviled in South Africa, as in the United States, by the issue of racial plurality. For the liberal, by and large, is further removed than is the rank-and-file voter from the level at which inter-racial "incidents" tend to occur. Unless he chooses to involve himself, the ordinary colour-clash seldom comes his way: at more "average" levels, a colour-clash of some sort is part of every day's potential. The South African liberal tends to survey the non-white races in this land and find in them an oppressed, exploited section of the population, denied its basic dignities and cheated of human rights: the white mine-worker, the artisan, the clerk, see in them so-many challengers for position, so-many people trying to push past them in the rat-race.

THE LAW

It might seem that the United States, wrestling more sophisticatedly than we with a black-white problem, could offer liberal thinkers in this country some ideas on how to cope with our own situation. Actually, there seems little to be hoped for from this quarter: there is too great a variation in set-up. For in the United States **the law is on the side of liberalisation**: in South Africa the statute book enshrines some of the most

illiberal (and anti-liberal) legislation in the world. The liberal thinker who would be the liberal *doer* finds himself heading for a trap at every turn, since the South African government, insisting on separateness between the "colours", and as much division between the two white sections as may be compatible with lip-service to "unity", is in a position to penalise, and even preclude, most kinds of effective liberal action. Moreover, it directs an unremitting stream of anti-liberal propaganda at the electorate, designed to destroy at every point such few inter-racial or intra-electoral "bridges" as may have been established.

Under the three-fold handicap of missing grass roots, "natural" intra-electoral "gap", and government smear-campaigns, the liberal thinker in this country labours heavily. It would be wrong, however, to suppose that these three largely extraneous circumstances are all that prevents his making effective contact with the average voter. The fault, it is possible, lies more in the liberal thinkers, as a group, than in their stars. As a handbook for liberal self-examination, Peter Strauss's article on Norman Mailer and the Value of Protest (Reality, March, 1971) will repay re-reading and re-study. Here come the distasteful phrases, pounding on the liberal conscience everywhere: ". all that tends to be bloodless and life-draining in liberal politics" "the abstraction of problems to fit principles" "the priggish arrogance and mental clannishness" "the tendency to surrender the concrete edge of their sense of life"

Over against these things Mr. Strauss sets "the immense spirit" of the (unofficial) America surveyed by Mailer; "its defiance, exuberance, individualism, inventiveness and courage", all which qualities, he tells us, "seem to come to the surface in a left-wing American protest."

He concedes, of course, that in South Africa "most left-wing parties have been banned or driven out of existence" and that "everything conspires to thrust us into unreality"; but he notes for our warning the important difference between "feeling good" and "being obliged to feel 'good'" in protest.

Here indeed is matter for liberal meditation.

JUST AND RIGHT

Because (virtually by definition) liberals have time for thinking, and because we are less likely than the average voter to be on the spot where the problems are being worked (or fought) out, do we in fact abstract these issues, wresting them to conform with our pre-judgements? Is it this, rather than government oppression, that may incline us to unreality? Have we been forced into some sort of priggishness and feeling "good" simply because we have so often been called on to defend what

we deemed to be just and right? (One recalls the anguished cry of a middle-of-the-roader, roused by a moralising left-winger: "You liberals! You think you're GOD! ")

In a general milieu in which we are so heavily outnumbered, does the sheer relief of meeting the like-minded tend to make us mentally clannish? Does the average man think us merely ponderous when we describe in terms of Good and Evil the situations which to him are an unsurprising part of his way of life? Is he oppressed, rather than enlightened, by our habits of moral judgement; alienated by our rejection of his pragmatic values? How on earth does one avoid a certain desiccation of soul, or retain gusto and ebullience, when emotive thinking cannot find an outlet?

These are only a few of the questions-for-liberals suggested by Peter Strauss's article. They need not be enlarged on here; for liberals are, in general, introspective types, who can do plenty of their own askings and answerings. The present rather random series of reflections has been meant only to indicate the impact of these questions on one left-wing thinker. It seems likely, however, that until South African liberalism has examined, and possibly adjusted, its approach in the light of some of these suggestions, it must blame itself — and not only the somewhat speculative nature of its grass roots — for a potentially disastrous lack of contact.

OBITUARY

Early in July, very soon after completing this article, Mary Lee died — rather suddenly, although her health had been precarious for several years. The profound and informed commitment to liberal values, which the article reveals, derived mainly from her devout Christian beliefs; but it was strengthened too by her familiar appreciation of classical ideals and traditions. (She was an excellent scholar and teacher, and lectured in Classics at the University of Natal for some years). She was a founder member of the Liberal Party and an outspoken, uncompromising, but always pleasant-mannered apologist for its principles and policies. REALITY is pleased to print this article as itself the most appropriate tribute to Mary Lee's humane, enquiring and generous spirit.

SASO AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA

by ADRIAN CREWE

Since Sharpeville, the South African political scene has been afflicted by a kind of living rigor mortis. Only recently within the last year or so, has it been possible to feel the faint stirrings of fresh life beneath the dead growth of the apartheid of the sixties. All agree that something is in the wind.

The paralysis of fear which settled on Whites after Sharpeville, making liberal opposition of any kind an act of blasphemy, has begun to loose its hold to the extend where it is once more possible to think of the government as a government rather than some sort of Apostolic Succession.

The Verkramptes were the first to notice this. Cunningly set on by the "Sunday Times" they launched (what only a South African could possibly comprehend) an attack on the government from the right. The resulting excesses of the verkrampteverligte brawl were perhaps responsible for the "significant" swing to the United Party in the general election of 1970. The English-speaking Nationalist wanted apartheid at least to look like cricket.

"DIALOGUE"

Since the election the government has had many uneasy moments. It has had financial scandals at "high" level. It has had to try to explain away the exposure of the horrors of "removals". It has faced repeated warnings from the business sector on the likely economic consequences of apartheid as practised at present. It has been confronted with the undeniable success of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in barring racially selected teams from competition in international sporting events. Sonorously as the pious have declaimed about the need for "contact" and "dialogue" as the only effective means of bringing about a change in the status quo, it has proved otherwise. Only the verkramptes have shown themselves consistent enough to accept the inevitable consequences of baasskap. Elsewhere compromise has been the keynote. With Mr. Vorster and Mr. Waring leading the way in a series of bewildering jinkings we now have (at a rough guess) about eight different sports policies. Indeed, the principle seems to have



become "the formulation of the policy according to the occasion."

ISOLATION

Morality, seldom the strong point of any government until a particular brand of it becomes fashionable, has never given the Nationalists much trouble. The liberals, students, and some churchmen have steadily pegged away at their old themes: the fundamental immorality of the apartheid scheme and the diverse immorality inherent in its practical application. (They have tried, with difficulty, to conceal their dispiritedness). But it takes the threat of economic instability and the reality of sporting isolation really to touch something at the core of the White elector. It is of little consequence that people are kicked off land they have lived on for years into barren wastes without food, water or sanitation; it hardly matters if well over half the Black population of South Africa lives below the poverty datum line; who cares if a Black man is forced to live apart from his wife and children, and may not seek whatever kind of work he wishes wherever he wishes; if the old and indigent are described as "redundant labour units"; if a Black man is so stripped of his manhood by the system that he feels a sense of inadequacy amounting almost to nausea at the thought of a deep and lasting relationship with a woman? All must be accepted in order to keep Communism at bay — for Communism, as we all know, means suffering and the loss of freedom.

Still, no matter for the reason — we have the fact of shifting attitudes within the White electorate. And in some few instances (most notably from Cape Afrikaners) opposition to the status quo has of late been genuinely grounded in moral indignation at some of the consequences of apartheid.

The government is finally being forced at least to look as if it is taking "separate development" seriously. This is a response not only to the nagging pressure of world opinion and to prodding from within White South Africa; it is also, and more significantly, an indication that the machinery of apartheid is beginning to run independently of its operators. The Black Beast of the Bantustans is beginning to buck.

CONFIDENCE TRICK

What has really made the last year or so of South African politics interesting in an altogether new way has been the mood of what one might call careful defiance amongst Blacks, both from within the government's own creations (the Coloured Representatives' Council and the Zululand Territorial Authority) and outside them, from the year-old Black students' organisation, SASO.

Mr. Sonny Leon of the Coloured Labour Party has been able to articulate for the first time the attitude of the great majority of Coloured people towards the manifest hypocrisy of the government's intentions regarding the effectiveness of the Council in particular, and Coloured "self-determination" in general. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, on the other hand, has become one of the country's hottest news-makers by the brilliance with which he has "accepted" and worked within the apartheid system. In a word, he has taken it on appro. He has challenged the government, by means of a patient, scrupulously polite series of irreproachably logical requests, to make Zululand independence a reality or reveal separate development (on which the Prime Minister has put all his money) as a massive confidence trick. Unwilling to be left out, the sporadically outspoken Chief Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei has stepped up his demands.

SASO is left in a different, and very difficult position. It rejects on principle the creation of "self-governing national units." As a writer in the SASO newsletter saw it recently:

"The Transkei, the CRC, Zululand and all those other apartheid institutions are modern-type laagers behind which the Whites in this country are going to hide themselves for a long time to come. Slowly the ground is being swept from under our feet and soon we, as Blacks, will believe that our political rights are in our own areas. These apartheid institutions are swallowing too many good people who could be useful in a meaningful programme of emancipation of the Black people." 1.

BLACK UNITY

The points the writer makes are extremely good ones. From our experience of 23 years of Nationalist rule it is hardly possible to see the whole separate development scheme as anything other than an elaborately-camouflaged laager. The writer is also very much alive to the danger, psychologically speaking, of the Black man's allowing himself to become so pleased with the small embarrassments which Buthelezi and Leon are creating that he lets slip his claim to a full and equal share in the political, social and economic life of his country. The final point made in the letter shows a real concern for the meaning of Black unity, and the importance of marshalling every available ounce of Black energy and skill — so that the Black man may develop the kind of bargaining power effectively able to present a challenge to White supremacy.

BUT — and a very large but is raised when we read of the swallowing up of "too many good people who would be useful in a meaningful programme of emancipation of the Black people" How does he propose to go about implementing such a programme ?

LIBERATION

SASO spent a lot of time at its congress in July trying to work out a framework for future action. One thing on which the students were absolutely clear was the fundamental need for the development of a new "Black consciousness". The ultimate goal of SASO was defined as "the liberation of the Black man from physical oppression." But there could be no hope of attaining this end until he was prepared to accept "the concept of Black consciousness and the drive towards Black awareness as the most logical means of ridding ourselves of the shackles that bind us to perpetual servitude." 2.

The manifesto containing these words went on to say that in all matters relating towards the realisation of Black aspirations Whites must be excluded, but added that this must not be interpreted by Blacks to imply "anti-Whitism" but "merely a positive way of attaining a normal situation in South Africa." 3.

SASO's contention here is that White groups supposedly working for integration in South Africa — the Progressive Party is specifically named — are not working for the kind of integration acceptable to the Black man.

"Their attempts are directed merely at relaxing certain oppressive legislation and allowing Blacks into a White-type society." 4.
(i.e. To take the sting out of Black revolt and ensure White economic domination for many years to come.)

WHO'S BEHIND THE BUSH?

Perhaps the most striking features of the congress (as far as can be gathered from collated press statements and releases) were

the skill with which the delegates diagnosed South Africa's racial sicknesses and the determination with which they resolved to fight them without compromising their moral position, and without relying on anyone else for aid. (It is significant — for those who see a Communist lurking behind every bush — to note that SASO, and Blacks in general, cherish no expectation by Russia, China, or even the freedom fighters, at present. Mr. David Thebehalo of the Soweto Urban Council, addressing the NUSAS Winterschool, made this attitude plain:

Acknowledgement to 'Classic' — David Goldblatt



Master/Servant; or 'One day my Boy, all this will be yours'

"The onus is on us Blacks to start doing something for ourselves and not to rely on anyone to help us.") 5.

Admirable as SASO's hard line on self-help and independence may have been, the nagging question remained unanswered, however: How were Blacks, rejecting apartheid, yet trapped within it, to "help themselves" in any really effective way? Not much seems to have been forthcoming on this point. And here SASO's dilemma was glaringly illuminated.

THORNY QUESTIONS

The escape from White liberal patronisation and the development of "Black consciousness" got under way last year with SASO's dramatic breakaway from NUSAS. But the very fact of this breach raises two very thorny questions:

First: When SASO speaks of "Black consciousness" is it speaking for all the Blacks in South Africa?

Second: Isn't it possible that "Black consciousness", SASO-style, may become a kind of prolonged torture to those who have developed it?

On the first point: SASO represents the Black intellectual elite of the country as far as any organisation can be said to. But how far is that? None of the campuses under the control

of the Departments of Indian and Coloured Affairs may affiliate to SASO. More important still, the nature of the pressure placed upon so many young Blacks by virtue of their subordination to the White economy is such as to make it impossible for vast numbers of potential graduates to attend the "Black Universities". Too many simply can't afford the luxury of education, however much it may be desired. And then, how much scope is there for really creative political thought in the Tribal Colleges, where interchange of opinion, discussion and debate, are restricted to the barest minimum by the Headmasters of the Colleges? SASO may get the publicity, but is it the place "where the action is?" Which is more significant as a pointer to the likely direction of Black radical thought — the dialectics of SASO congress or the mood of Soweto? Having cut itself off from NUSAS and other multiracial liberal organisations, there seems to be a tragic possibility that the artificiality of the tribal college existence may leave SASO high and dry — rejected in its turn by the grass roots urban Black community.

WHAT DIRECTION?

The danger of SASO's being cut adrift intellectually from the rank-and-file Black man leads us on to the second difficulty which faces the organisation. With "Black consciousness" as your starting-point (together with total rejection of apartheid), where do you go? Let me illustrate in practice what I mean. Mr. Barney Pityana, SASO president, commenting on the refusal of the Departments of Indian and Coloured Affairs to allow campuses under their jurisdiction to affiliate to SASO, had this to say:

"This undermines the mentality of the black folks considerably, where they are virtually told which organisations to belong to. We must make up our minds here and now whether we shall allow such interferences in the affairs of the Black people."

6.

One understands Mr. Pityana's anger in the face of another blatant example of government bullying, designed to maintain division and a sense of inferiority between Black man and Black man. But his concluding sentence is shrill and pointless. The congress could make up its mind "here and now" not to allow such interference until the sky rained ten Rand notes, but it wouldn't make much difference. The Departments' decision is a fait accompli — it exists — and no amount of bandying of words like "allow" is going to conceal the fact that SASO is, effectively speaking, powerless. It is SASO, at present anyhow, which is on sufferance, not the government.

TRAPPED IN ITS OWN LOGIC

This, I think, brings SASO's greatest problem into sharp focus. Is it going to allow itself to be beguiled by its present lack of real power into building castles in the air, and so throw away whatever chances it may have? (And, incidentally, make itself look ridiculous into the bargain). What it must avoid at all costs is the danger confronting all radical movements — that of all too easily becoming trapped in what Norman Mailer calls the "solid-as-brickwork-logic-of-the-next-step." To think in this way demands one essential prerequisite — the power to follow your logic up. If SASO ensnares itself it could turn "Black consciousness" into a very sour joke, a kind of hollow and mocking spectre of the possible evoked for Black eyes, yet unreal, unattainable. In its understandable desire to have done with the false lure of compromise, SASO runs the terrible risk of arguing itself into a position so uncompromising as to be, on paper at any rate, revolutionary.

REVOLUTION

What then? The tribal colleges are hardly the ideal places from which to start revolutions. They are already under constant surveillance by the security police. And on the assumption that to both the majority of the police and the military the only good kaffir is a dead one, but the best dead Kaffir is a cheeky one, they would be well advised not to try it on. Yet, having reached such a position, how can one re-

treat and maintain one's self-respect? What would be the fate of "Black consciousness" after such a dismal withdrawal? The only alternatives would have become despairing and abject capitulation on the one hand, and despairing and suicidal revolt on the other. Either direction seems hopeless.

BLACK PANTHERS

It must be said at once that SASO's statements to date have been, almost without exception, extremely carefully and undramatically phrased. There is at present no resemblance to Black Panther rhetoric, though of course the situation of the Black man in South Africa makes this not difficult to understand. Perhaps one might ironically comment that the very lack of freedom in South African society is the best guarantee that SASO will maintain a non-suicidal course and avoid the ignominious and unseemly end of the late Panther Party. If some of SASO's statements reflect an intense imaginative sympathy with Negro militancy then it should be added that they have so far remained free of the more crippling delusions of Black Power. They have instructive precedents to work from.

What is significant, though perhaps not surprising, is that it is the struggle of the American Black man which has caught the imagination of his South African counterpart — rather than the affairs of the African states north of the Zambesi. Obviously Black Americans and Black South Africans can understand a great deal about each other from shared experiences of second-class citizenship in White supremacist societies.

CULTURAL NATIONALISM

But the resemblances should not be pushed too far. "Black consciousness" doesn't and can't mean to a Black South African what it does to a Negro. For the Negro the search for an identity separate from that imposed on him by his society is no more and no less important than it is for the Black South African. But it is his American-ness, the constant reminder that he is part of a "free and democratic" society which denies him both freedom and constitutional rights, which is his burden. His fight is against *de facto* rather than *de jure* discrimination. His weaknesses are numerical and economic; his strength lies in the fact that the constitution is on his side. Until he can break the stranglehold of privilege and prejudice which deny him equality there can be no pride in the present for him, so the cultural nationalist seeks for it in the mists of a romanticised tribal past. He wears a dashiki, an afro hairstyle and a goatee beard, and speaks of his "Black brothers in Africa."

The South African Black has other problems. For a start, there is no such thing as a "Black" South African. The only effective definition of such a person is the hated White-imposed term, "Non-European". There is no live tradition of unity between African, Asian and Coloured in this country to give the term "Black" a really positive significance. A considerable psychological distance has yet to be travelled before men of colour think of themselves as "Black" first, rather than African, Indian or Coloured.

TRIBALISM AND TECHNOCRACY

Then, the tribal past (which is potentially important only to the African) has a very different meaning for the man who is still relatively close to it chronologically than it does for the man 300 years away from it. Whether he regrets the loss of the honesty, simplicity and heroic virtues associated with his forbears or not, the African knows from first-hand experience that tribalism is helpless before the manifold wiles of technological society; and that the very simplicity of its assumptions makes it vulnerable to every kind of exploitation by South Africa's rulers. **He has been told too often that he is inferior by virtue of his Blackness — and legislation tells him afresh every day — it is the stigma of that Blackness that he must escape, and since the past brings no comfort, he must overcome it in the present. His Blackness and his tribal background remain painful and ineradicable symbols of degradation for him, offering no psychological relief.**

Black pride **does not exist** as a living reality, nor can it until the Black man has carved out the kind of place for himself in South African society which offers fulfilment to all, proportionate to individual capacity. You can't speak of "Black consciousness" seriously while the only thing you know about your blackness for a fact is that it guarantees you daily humiliation in almost every aspect of your life. "Black consciousness" as anything other than a slow torture can never become a reality unless it is preceded by giant increases in political, social and economic power and responsibility. And no-one needs to be told how much more difficult and dangerous political activism is in South Africa, as compared with the United States.

SASO AND NUSAS

Still, the question has not been answered. What direction can SASO take in practice? It remains at present a little too obsessed with triumphantly underlining its break from NUSAS. (It certainly can't be denied that its attitude towards NUSAS has been clearly defined.) Mr. Pityana stated at the congress that SASO would continue to exchange notes with NUSAS (as the only form of contact between the two bodies) and to defend its right to "express dissatisfaction with the status quo, and . . . put to the White electorate a radical alternative to the politics of baasskap." 7. SASO would initiate and maintain its own fieldwork projects independently of NUSAS.

All very well. But there is little else said of what SASO constructively intends to do. And for constructive suggestions we have to turn to Mr. Thebehalu of Soweto, who is in favour of the idea of accepting apartheid institutions and manipulating them to Black advantage. Ironically, it begins to appear that the kind of fieldwork envisaged by SASO is of very much the same kind already conducted by NUSAS, while the only way effectively open for the development of "black consciousness" as something meaningful is through the kind of action suggested by Mr. Thebehalu at the congress. SASO rejects NUSAS because it is inevitably compromised by apartheid, yet seems unable to do anything significant except in a direction, theoretically at least, even more compromised by apartheid. This is not to point out paradoxes with a knowing smile. SASO is



Gatsha Buthelezi

in an almost impossible position. The politics of the present time appear to be forcing compromise relentlessly on everyone.

COMPLICATED ISSUES

Mr. Thebehalu's suggestions are as follows :—

1. Blacks must "get out fast from those non-Black churches, so that Christianity as related to the Black man's culture can have true meaning." 8.
2. Blacks must go to the homelands "using the money and expertise we have acquired in the cities and develop them ourselves." 8.
3. If Blacks need assistance "let us call on the Black Americans to help us. "Black doctors and Black dentists should be asked to come from the U.S. to work in the homelands. "Let us get Black economic experts to assist us to develop this 13 percent of land." 8.

Mr. Thebehalu's second point raises some complicated issues basic to the whole structure of apartheid. Firstly, the money he speaks of Blacks acquiring in the White areas won't go far in the homelands. Nor will the expertise go all the way. Even if it were as simple as this, however, it is difficult to imagine the South African government, Bantustans or not, contemplating with equanimity the mass exodus of Blacks from major industrial areas. (This, of course, raises the unanswered question of how the White economy will ultimately be able to stand the logical development of the Bantustan scheme — a question which immigration is hardly likely to be able to solve.)



New York Panther, 1968 – SASO 19 – ?

Presumably, however, once the Bantustans are independent there will be nothing to stop Blacks seeking political asylum in the 'independent homelands' and leaving White South Africa stranded; unless the government feels itself constrained to attempt forcible restraint – one imagines a Transvaal model of the Berlin wall. I make no apology for this wild speculation; the point being that in this sort of situation (which, logically, should arise) the consequences are anyone's guess.

TRUE INDEPENDENCE

Mr. Thebehalu's last point also exercises the imagination. In the event of Black doctors, dentists, economists etc. being invited to the homelands, assuming a significant number would wish to come, how would they get in? This once again raises the question of just how much a Bantustan needs before it can be said to be truly independent. To make them a reality, as Chief Buthelezi has said, they need not only complete autonomy over their own affairs, but also free access to the outside world. This means that the Zulus must (at least) get Richard's Bay, and landlocked homelands must have international-scale airports built for them. (The onus to build them is not on the homelands, since they did not choose to become homelands.) It also means that foreign investors must be free to bring their capital to the newly independent states. The Bantustans must be free to join the United Nations, to have their own police and defence forces (as Chief Buthelezi has stressed), free to conclude defensive and offensive alliances with whomsoever they please, free to accept foreign aid (of whatever kind) etc., etc. The prospect, one need hardly say, does not inspire hope of a tranquil future for White South Africa.

GAMBLING ON THE FUTURE

Clearly SASO must recognise the potential advantages of playing the apartheid game. Their stand on principle is all the more to be admired. Yet perhaps it is at the same time not without its shrewdness. Is it possible, by any stretch of the imagination, to conceive of the present government's allowing the development of the Bantustans to reach such a dangerous pitch? Will it not surely have to withdraw from its headlong and potentially disastrous rush into separate development, and clamp down as never before? By such time it will either have lost the confidence of the White electorate and been replaced by a more moderate government offering SASO more scope within which to be politically active; or, alternatively, losing the confidence of the majority of the electorate may prove unacceptable to a government so long accustomed to power and lead to the establishment of a military dictatorship (perhaps along the lines indicated by Alan Paton in his article suggesting that South Africa may already be in the hands of a Cabal); or finally, the white electorate may rediscover its former terror and dutifully creep back into the laager – in all of which cases SASO would remain politically uncompromised and in a position to take on the rôle of revolutionary spearhead. Its position, practically speaking, has to be seen as based on the ultimate unworkability of the Bantustans. Yet even in the event of such a failure and the emergence of a situation something like one of those described above, it still remains a matter of speculation what SASO might be able to achieve.

COUNTING THE COST

The possibility of concerted United Nations action might, by such time, become much more real than at present; or a great power might intervene, which raises the possibility of a second Vietnam-situation in South Africa. What really does seem unlikely is that the laager can hold out all that much longer. And however things turn out a great deal of suffering, for both Black and White, is guaranteed. We haven't even begun to feel the pinch of the real cost of apartheid yet.

And while there is still time – is there? – the white electorate would do well to heed the words of Mr. C.M.C. Ndamse, addressing the SASO congress :

"We make no apology for our colour – all elements of beauty and perfection are ours and we envy no other. To uphold this we choose to rule in Hell rather than sweep the streets in Heaven."

9.

NOTES:—

1. "The Daily News" – 7/7/71.
2. *ibid.*
3. *ibid.*
4. *ibid.*
5. "Daily News" – 5/7/71.
6. "Rand Daily Mail" – 7/7/71.
7. *ibid.*
8. "Daily News" – 6/7/71.
9. "Rand Daily Mail" – 5/7/71.

A CLOSE LOOK AT BANTU EDUCATION

by W. G. McCONKEY

Officially, Bantu Education is one of the great success stories of Nationalist administration. As one honourable member put it in the recent debate on the Bantu Education vote (House of Assembly Debates 1971, 15, col. 7233): "Without fear of contradiction I want to claim that in no country in the world has so much been achieved in a sphere of education and so comprehensive and revolutionary an educational programme been established as in Bantu Education in South Africa during the past decade." And all the organs of official propaganda proclaim: Bantu Education is a striking, a remarkable, a major, an exceptional, a unique, an un-paralleled achievement.

Preposterously at variance with the facts as such claims may appear to be, it would be a mistake to brand them all as wilful misrepresentation. The more unsophisticated champions of Bantu Education may quite honestly mean what they say. Bantu Education may be providing for "the Bantu" just the sort of education which they think "the Bantu" ought to have. The honourable member quoted above went on to put the shortage of teachers in our African schools into Nationalist perspective. "Let us", he said, "not compare this picture with the Whites in South Africa, which is a Western country and has already been engaged in education for 300 years. Let us compare it to Africa, because the people we are talking about are natives of Africa. If one looks at the (teacher-training) picture in Africa, our picture is very rosy." And he quotes some statements about teacher shortages in Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya and Liberia in such general terms that it does not clearly emerge whether our picture is really rosy or not. But our "homeland-orientated" Bantu Education is "halting the process of denationalisation of the Bantu" and "engaged in the enormous task of nation-building."

Any small hope of betterment that existed in 1953 when the Bantu Education Act was adopted was dissipated when the financial arrangements were later announced. It had been decided that an amount of R13m. should be paid each year from general revenue, leaving the rest of expenditure on Bantu Education to be met from specifically African taxation. All expansion would therefore have to be financed by the Africans themselves.

While certain deviations from the financial programme have been made from time to time, financial provision has remained consistently inadequate, with inevitably deplorable effects on the quality of the education provided.

Unit costs in White and African Education

Year	Cost for White pupil	Cost for African pupil, S.A.
1910	R 19,30 (S.A.)	R 2,47
1945	R 76,58 (S.A.)	R 7,78
1953-1954	R 126,11 (Natal)	R 17,08
1959-1960	R 158,15 (Natal)	R 13,80
1968-1969	R 228 (S.A.)*	R 14,48
1969-1970	not available	R 16,90

Sources: Bulletin of Educ. Statistics for the Union, 1947; Reports, Natal Provincial Auditor; Information Service Fact Paper 88, 1961; Debates of the House

of Assembly 1970 col. 1529 and 1971 col. 817.

*Note: The 1968 figure for Whites is an estimated average. The figures for the Cape, for Natal and for the O.F.S. are higher; that for the Transvaal is lower.

It will be observed that while unit expenditure on White unit education has risen since 1954 by 81 percent, unit expenditure on African education, despite a steadily depreciating Rand, was less in 1969 than in 1954.

Expressed as a fraction of public expenditure per White pupil, public expenditure for African pupil was lower in 1968/9 than at any time since 1910. Figures for later comparison are not available.

Inevitably, such financial policies restricted the recruitment of teachers.

Teacher: pupil ratios, African Schools

Year	No. of pupils	No. of teachers	Teacher: pupil Ratio
1953	858 079	21 148	1:41
1956	1 103 243	22 557	1:49
1960	1 506 034	27 767	1:54
1965	1 957 836	34 810*	1:56
1968	2 397 152	41 011	1:58
1969	2 552 807	43 638	1:59
1971	2 841 000	48 083	1:59

Sources: For 1953-69, Report of Department of Bantu Education for 1969 p.33.

For 1971, Debates 1971, 15 Col. 9208.

In the debate on the Bantu Education vote, 1971, the Deputy Minister also gave the following approximate figures for certain groups or areas:

Group	Pupils	Teachers	Pupils per teacher
Tswane	250 000	4 000	62
N. Sotho	260 000	4 000	65
Transkei	420 000	7 400	57
Ciskei	156 000	2 500	62
Zulu	398 000	6 500	61
	<u>1 484 000</u>	<u>24 400</u>	<u>±</u>
			<u>61</u>

Allowing for the rounded figures, and for the groups not mentioned, one may assume a ratio outside the Transkei of about 1:60.

These figures flatter the official provision in that the numbers of teachers shown include "privately paid teachers." Among the payments made by African children in Community Schools — the typical Bantu Education school type — is a regular donation to the Private Teachers Fund. In all official schools (i.e. excluding Church and other private schools which receive no subsidy of any kind) outside the Transkei in 1969 there were 2 063 145 pupils and 34 305 teachers, of whom 28 099 were subsidised. The ratio of subsidised teachers to pupils was thus 1:73. Only the supplementary services of 6 206 privately paid teachers brought the ratio to 1:60. (**Debates**, 1970 col. 1196). The typical privately paid teacher is without professional training and has enjoyed little, if any, secondary education.

The deterioration in the teacher:pupil ratio in African Schools contrasts with the tendency towards improvement in White state schools where all teachers are, of course, Government paid.

Teacher:pupil ratios, White State Schools

Pupils	Teachers	Pupils per teacher.
1953	536 058	21 635
1968	789 279	37 056

Source for 1953, **Statistical Yearbook**; for 1968 **Debates** 1970, cols. 1197-8. 590 part-time teachers are excluded from the 1968 count.

A teacher pupil ratio of 1:21 in White state schools does not mean, of course, that no class of more than 21 pupils is to be found. Classes of between 30 and 40 are usual. Teachers have "free periods" for corrections and preparation. Teachers go on leave. Principals and some other senior teachers have administrative duties which limit their time for active teaching. Other teachers must fill the gap.

Acknowledgement to 'Race Relations News'

Similarly, a ratio of 1:60 in African schools does not mean that no class of more than 60 pupils is to be found. Classes of 70 in the primary standards are common. Classes of 80-90 are less frequent. Classes of over 100 are to be found. But basically, the burden is borne in the lower primary school with its double-session day.

The double-session system makes the teachers affected responsible for teaching a class of, typically, 90 to 110 pupils in the two sub-standards. Sometimes double-sessions are used with Standard I pupils; sometimes also with Std. II; rarely with III and IV. The system, said the Transkeian Commission (R.P. 22/1963), had been introduced as an interim measure, but looked like becoming a permanent feature. In 1971 it still looks like a permanent feature.

The official specimen time-table for double sessions shows a first session of $2\frac{1}{4}$ hours (8 to 10.30, less a fifteen minute break) followed by a joint session of 50 minutes attended by both first-session and second-session children. After this, at 11.20, the first-session children go home and the second-session children remain until 1.50, when school closes. Each session thus has only $2\frac{1}{4}$ hours of instruction in something approaching normal class conditions. The joint session packs 100 children into a classroom designed for 50 for instruction in Music, Health Education and Religious Education. More obviously than the other subjects, the prescribing of Health Education as a subject to be taught in such classroom conditions invites rude comment.

As African children are admitted to school only after the age of seven years ("84 completed months"), which is later than the age of admission for White children, and will leave school much earlier, the short school day, as compared with the White sub-standard pupil's 4 hours, is the more to be regretted. The loss is, of course, much greater where the double-session system persists into the standards and the short school day takes the place of the normal school day at that level of 5 to $5\frac{1}{2}$ hours.



This picture, published in 'The World' recently under the heading 'the veld their classroom, the sky their roof', tells its own story. It shows a group of 137 children from Sub-A to Std. 2 squatting in the veld, without shelter, to receive their schooling because they had no classroom. The picture was taken by 'World' photographer Sam Nzima on a farm near Potchefstroom

DETERIORATED

Qualitatively also, the staffing position has deteriorated. The Eiselen Commission found that only 45% of the teachers in African secondary schools in 1948 were university graduates. This, they said very properly, was unsatisfactory. In 1969 only 591 out of 2 680 state-paid secondary teachers, or 22 per cent, were graduates.

There are, of course, schools fit to show visiting V.I.P.'s, primary schools with ratios better than 1 to 50, high schools with ratios of 1 to 20, and as high a proportion of graduates as in Eiselen's days — but they are not fairly representative.

Accommodation: Financial starvation has also led to grossly inadequate classroom provision. Over-crowding is a normal feature in most schools. The position would seem to be particularly bad in rural areas where the pay of labourers is very low. As a classroom cannot be erected (approved Bantu education type with brick or cement block walls, no ceilings and cement floors) until the parents have deposited their half of the ± R1 400 cost, the school too often has to make shift with deplorable wattle-and-daub hovels. Some classes, indeed, would seem to be held normally in the open air for lack of indoor accommodation. And where poverty-stricken parents have to find money for books, for the privately paid teachers fund, and for the building fund, toilet accommodation is liable to come low in the order of priorities. For schooling one must have more teachers than the 1:70 official establishment; one must have books; and one must, if at all possible, have a weather-proof roof. Then, if there is any money left, one can think of latrines. So one finds schools of over 1 000 pupils without any such provision whatever. The Government, which might not care, in view of possible publicity, to provide such an educational environment directly, is content to see it provided indirectly through its "democratic" creation, the fund-raising community school board.

Cost of Bantu Education to Parents:

a) **School books:** Apart from building fund and private-teachers fund contributions (say R2 per annum) and school fund contributions (say R1 to R4 per annum) parents of children at all levels have to meet most of the cost of books and stationery. Average payments by parents for these items are in the following range per annum:

Sub — A	50c — 75c.	Std. VI	R4,50 — R5,50
Sub — B	R1 — R1,50	Form I	R20
Std. I	R1,50 — R3	Form II	R30
Std. II	R3 — R3,50	Form III	R12
Std. III	R3 — R4,00	Form Pre-IV	R12
Std. IV	R3,50 — R4,50	Form IV	R40
Std. V	R4,20 — R5,00	Form V	R15

Primary figures are averages, secondary from a Government high school prospectus.

Particularly where there are several children at school, the costs at all levels can be a heavy burden at the beginning of the year when there are normally school clothing requirements as well, and often a child who could benefit from further schooling has to leave because the money cannot be found. Secondary books at Form II and Form IV levels represent in many cases more than the father's monthly pay.

Critical reference is often made to the fact that White children have "free books", books issued to them without their making any payment for them, while much poorer Black children have

to pay. Black children do receive a very limited issue, per class, not per child of certain books which the Department particularly wishes them to have. Rejecting indignantly the idea that, unlike White children, African children do not receive free books, the Deputy Minister said in the 1971 debate on his vote: "Indeed, in this financial year — and it is very important to note this — no less than R1 024 000 will be spent on reading books in three languages, graded class books and library books for Bantu schools. Therefore these are books which the Bantu received free in that way." As the amount, divided by the enrolment, might amount to 40 cents per pupil, no taxpayer need feel unduly big-hearted about it.

b) **Boarding-school fees:** The "Homeland-orientated" policy retards the development of secondary education by directing new high-school development away from the cities and into the homelands. Children may therefore find no high-school places available in their home towns and must go off to distant "homeland" high schools or abandon their school careers. This restricts the educational opportunities of the children of the most educated and culturally advanced African parents who are generally to be found in the urban areas.

c) **Maintenance costs:** The major expense of keeping a child at school is his maintenance and, at secondary level, the forgoing of his possible earnings if he had gone to work to supplement the meagre family income. African parents are variously at a disadvantage under this heading.

- i) African children used to be admitted to school, in Natal at least, at the age of six years. Under Bantu Education the age of admission is 7 years, described as "84 completed months". This ruling involves, an extra year of maintenance before any particular standard is reached.
- ii) The Bantu Education course extends over 13 regular years — eight primary and five secondary — unlike the 12 years course taken by children of other races.
- iii) A disquieting new feature of many Bantu high schools is the Special Form, or Form Pre-IV. This consists of intelligent children who have passed Junior Certificate well, but at poorly equipped and poorly staffed junior secondary schools where there was no teacher able to teach Mathematics, or Commercial subjects, and who now in order to take Matric in due course with Mathematics and Science, or with Commercial subjects, have to give up a year to the intensive study of these subjects before proceeding, if all goes well, to Form IV in the following year.

The Bantu Education Budget in perspective: Advanced countries spend up to 6 or 7 per cent, or more, of their Gross National Product on the education of their people. Of our growing G.N.P.,

R 9 758 million in 1968
R10 889 million in 1969
R11 937 million in 1970

we have been spending barely half of one per cent on the education of approximately 70 per cent of our people. Another comparison: In terms of the votes recently passed, we propose to spend from state funds this year about 1½ times as much on the Police as on the education of that approximately 70 per cent of our people. By any standard, these are remarkable allocations.

Are we indeed thinking in terms of Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya and Nigeria when we plan the education of the mass of South Africa's population?

THE SOUTH AFRICA DIASPORA

by E. H. BROOKES

"REALITY" has already considered the "brain drain" and the complacent apartheid with which the Government has seen many of its most brilliant opponents leave the land of their birth. I make no apology for returning to this subject which needs examination from a somewhat different angle.

Among all the ambitious young men and women at our Universities, is there not one who would undertake the great and rewarding task of enumerating those who have left South Africa and recording what they have done in the wider world? It would make a magnificent Doctoral thesis, and the work involved in it would merit a Doctor's degree.

Political exiles are of very different types. History shows many instances of the "exile mentality" — bitterness coupled with an optimism without sound foundations. For some exiles it is hard to realise that their country does not long for them as much as they long for their country. Fortunately the history of political refugees in general and the experience of our own South African exiles show that this particular "exile mentality" is found only among the few.

Of the majority some work in hope, but not unduly exuberant hope, of returning to a different South Africa to serve its people. Others are absorbed in the work which they are doing in their new homes.

The history of the political refugees shows that the proportion of the last mentioned group is high. Napoleon's Marshal Macdonald, Frederick the Great's Marshall Keith do not seem to have had any desire to return to the Scotland of their Jacobite fathers. MacMahon in France, O'Donnell in Spain,



Edgar Brookes

O'Higgins in Chile, showed no sign of planning a return to an altered Ireland. But this does not mean that the world did not benefit by the work of these exiled Irishmen and Scotsmen.

THE GREAT DISPERSION

We get the term "Diaspora" from the history of the Jews. How much the Jews of the Great Dispersion made the Jewish people famous all over the world during the long centuries between the Roman destruction of Jerusalem and the Balfour Declaration! Even now, when there is a State of Israel to return to, outstanding Jews of great intellectual and spiritual distinction are prepared to work as makers of the Diaspora. Looking back over the centuries would one not consider that Muimonider and Spinoza, Heine and Rothschild, Epstein and Einstein, have in their very different ways added to the glory of the children of Israel? It may be that when the roll of South Africans in exile comes to be examined we shall also find reasons for perhaps less justified, but certainly very real, pride.

For in the last resort humanity is one. We are all ultimately citizens of the world. Our lot is cast together. The hopes and fears of the human race affect us all. None can plumb the treasures contained in the minds and hearts of the most "primitive" people. Perish the thought that our "enlightened" should cut us off from the toiling masses of our human

race. Every real achievement is the achievement of that nameless but all-pervading country of Mankind to which, ultimately, we belong. We often think of the loss to South Africa caused by the "Brain drain": let us think also of the gain to the world.

THE SAME SPIRITUAL CITY

We rejoice in the fidelity to principle, the courage and the integrity, of so many of our exiled sons and daughters. We rejoice that so many remember and care for their country, some wisely, a few unwisely, but all with fervour and hope. But if they forget us, do not let us forget them. We still belong to the same spiritual City. Their deeds will benefit mankind, our fellow citizens. They may well play a glorious part when the achievements of South Africans are remembered in the future.

There is one thought which must be much in our minds as we consider our Diaspora. It is the extent to which the human intellect depends on freedom. If the South African exile has not achieved full liberation in his own land, the experience of meeting men of different colour naturally and on equal terms will help to give it to him. If he has experienced that

liberation (and perhaps been exiled as a result) what new access of freedom will come to him as he realises that he need never measure his words, that he will not harm any of his dear ones by saying what he thinks, that the knock at the front door may mean anyone else, but will not mean the "special branch."

Yet let us be thankful too for those who have remained behind. In the first Jewish Diaspora, after the conquest of Nebuchadnezzar, the Babylonians left behind them "the lowest of the people" and with them the prophet Jeremiah whose great book of Prophecies might well have been called "Cry, the Beloved Country." When they tried to take Jeremiah with them to join the Diaspora he resisted and when they forced him into Egypt he died there. In Ireland there were many who did not join the "wild geese" in France, but it was those who remained under the heel of alien landlords whose children provided the men destined to wring the freedom of Eire from English rule. In Germany men like Hellmuth von Moltke and Dietrich Bonhoeffer did as much service to their country and its reputation as those who went into exile. So let us who remain take heart. We too have our duty, and the ability to do it.

This South Africa

DURBAN — The first South African public meeting of the anti-Hain campaigner, Mr. Francis Bennion, almost started in chaos in the Durban City Hall last night when heckling students and the public came to blows.

As soon as the meeting was opened by Mr. Vause Raw, United Party MP for Durban Point, students in the upper gallery started to boo. Mr. Raw pointed out that he would not need to keep order from the chair, but would leave that to others.

"Rand Daily Mail" — 5/7/71

THE RECTOR of the University of Port Elizabeth has banned members of the Students' Representative Council from attending a multiracial conference of students of Southern African universities.

There has been disagreement between students and the rector over the issue. The SRC initially voted unanimously to attend the conference, after which the rector told it to reconsider. In a second vote a unanimous vote of approval was again passed. The rector instructed the SRC to discuss the matter

again, and to "re-consider very seriously". On a third vote the SRC still decided to attend, by a majority of 13-2. The rector then ordered it not to attend.

"Rand Daily Mail" — 12/7/71.

At the ASB congress which started in Pretoria yesterday a resolution was passed in which the antecedents of the Coloureds were named as Hottentots, Bushmen, Orientals and other Non-Whites who might have touched at the Cape during colonial days.

Racial mixing with Whites was described as insignificant.

Mr. Gielie Smit, of Stellenbosch asked the students to consider seriously the wisdom of discussing one of the resolutions on today's agenda. This wants the ASB to state categorically that Coloureds live on a lower plane of civilisation than Whites.

Mr. Smit said it was the duty of the ASB to try to remove any remaining feelings of antipathy towards the Coloureds, especially since they were fast developing a marked anti-Afrikaner feeling. He blamed the liberal Press for fostering this attitude.

"Rand Daily Mail" — 29/6/71.

A BITTER clash involving an American Negro, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and two top Nationalists took place at a United States-South African Leader Exchange Programme symposium here three days after it started.

Involved in the altercation were Dr. Piet Riekert, economic adviser to the Prime Minister, Mr. Dawid de Villiers, head of the Nasionale Pers group and leader of the South African legal team at the World Court, Mr. Ulric Haynes, American delegate to the USSALEP symposium, and Chief Buthelezi.

The row flared after a highly critical reply by Mr. Haynes to a paper by Dr. Riekert on the economic situation in South Africa.

Mr. Haynes said the paper had given him "a sickening feeling of unreality. It was written by a person living in a fairyland where all is sugar and spice."

He added: "What is a fairyland to them is a nightmare to me."

He attacked Dr. Riekert for not being prepared to acknowledge in his paper that South Africa's "abhorrent and oppressive race policies" have any important effect on economic development in the country.

He accused Dr. Riekert of concentrating in his paper on "a shallow history of past events . . . and on an oversimplified description of socio-economic conditions.

"There is no acknowledgement in the paper that the economic development of South Africa was, and is, based on the systematic exploitation and oppression of a non-White labour force."

Mr. Haynes bluntly challenged Dr. Riekert to explain "honestly, exactly how the Nationalist policies could ever achieve political and economic viability for the homelands."

He said Dr. Riekert and the Government were "living in a dream world of homelands". If, as Dr. Riekert had said, a stronger economy was the only goal, then his own argument was the strongest argument against separate development.

As Mr. Haynes finished, Dr. Riekert, visibly angry, rose and launched a heated attack on Mr. Haynes and the United States. His attack, which lasted for more than 20 minutes, was seen by the American delegates as "a personal insult to our country and to us as delegates," one of them told me later.

Dr. Riekert took up the treatment of the Red Indians in America and told Mr. Haynes that he had no right to criticise the South African Government's policies.

The example he used to illustrate his statements was the case of the Red Indians on Alcatraz Island.

Most of Dr. Riekert's retort was highly emotional and based on the assumption that all racial groups are antagonistic towards each other and that only the policy of separate development could keep them from indulging in a war against each other, was told by a delegate.

While Dr. Riekert was speaking, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi interrupted him and said that he was becoming emotional and had not answered Mr. Haynes's questions.

Dr. Riekert then attacked the English Press for giving too much publicity to Bantustan chiefs who opposed Government policy.

Chief Buthelezi again interrupted him and told him that he was trying to fight the Boer War all over again.

The atmosphere after this stormy session was for a while very tense and the organisers, I am told, feared that several people would leave the conference.

"Sunday Tribune" — 18/7/71.

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LIFE ON THE POVERTY DATUM LINE

A factor of basic importance which has been raised in current discussions on wages and living standards is the secondary poverty datum line (P.D.L.) This includes costs of transport, rent, food, clothing, fuel and lighting materials and cleansing materials. It assumes the most stringent budgeting.

To maintain a decent standard of living over a period, the family income should be 1½ times the secondary P.D.L. — the minimum effective level. As the average family in urban areas varies from 5 to 6 people, the P.D.L. and minimum effective levels have been calculated for families of 5 and 6 persons:

	<i>Family of 5 per month</i>	<i>Family of 6 per month</i>
Secondary Poverty		
Datum Line	R 67,65	R 77,90
Minimum Effective Level	R101,47	R116,84

The figures in the table below are taken from Department of Statistics News Sheets, and are average monthly earnings for the twelve months of 1969 and the last quarter of 1970, respectively.

With acknowledgement to.

RACE RELATIONS, JULY 1971

MONTHLY CASH AVERAGE EARNINGS BY RACIAL GROUPS

	<i>1969 R</i>	<i>1970 R</i>	<i>Percentage increase 1969/70 R</i>
<i>Mining</i>			
White	316	360,8	14
Coloured	62	75,2	21
Asian	78	98,9	27
African	18	18,3	1
<i>Manufacturing</i>			
White	278	307,2	10
Coloured	65	73,6	14
Asian	67	77,4	15
African	48	52,3	8
<i>Construction</i>			
White	294	325,3	11
Coloured	107	109,6	3
Asian	143	150,4	5
African	48	49,9	4
<i>Electricity</i>			
White	299	369,1	23
Coloured	47	76,7	43
African	51	55,3	8
<i>Banks and Building Societies</i>			
White	219	298,2	36
Coloured	61	80,4	31
Asian	83	106,8	29
African	55	66,9	22
<i>Central Government</i>			
White	225	282,1	25
Coloured	96	114,3	19
Asian	136	114,7	15
African	41	44,8	10
<i>Provincial Administration</i>			
White	221	224,3	10
Coloured	47	59,2	26
Asian	70	73,5	4
African	33	35,9	9
<i>Local Authorities</i>			
White	258	293,6	14
Coloured	80	85,9	8
Asian	59	60,2	1
African	42	45,0	7
<i>S.A. Railways</i>			
White	—	295,3	—
Coloured	—	70,6	—
Asian	—	53,8	—
African	—	52,3	—