Political conflict
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OPPOSITION POLITICS IN VENDA AND GAZENKULU.

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Opposition Leadership in Venda and Gazankulu

— petty bourgeois frustrations and response

by D.S. Dison

" But political rights in the white areas, no. These will be exercised in their own homelands. And it should be pointed out that many of the homeland leaders are urban blacks."

B.J. Vorster, interview in Time magazine, March 7 1977.

"In several homelands candidates from the white urban areas who were also well known in the homelands, were succesful in the elections. Succesful candidates from urban areas were invariably occupied as professional people or in administrative positions."

Kotze D.A., African Politics in South Africa 1964 to 1974.

It is certainly true that a number of the men who have sat in homeland representative councils live in white areas. Apartheid idealogues draw two inferences from this observation. Firstly, that as the policiy of separate development unfolds, urban representation in homeland councils will be a continuing trend. Secondly, that the political aspirations of urban blacks can be fulfilled in the homeland political arena. (1) Both of these conclusions can be refuted at the empirical level alone.

With regard to the first, Kotze himself inadvertently provides us with evidence to the contrary. Of the seven representatives " from white urban areas" whom he mentions, four of these men were forced out of the homeland political arena. in 1975 alone. Collins Ramusi and Mageza, having become "interior ministers" for their homelands (Lebowa and Gazankulu respectively) were forced to leave their positions towards the beginning of that year, and Barney Dladla, Executive Councillor for Community Affairs in Buthelezi's KwaZulu cabinet, was ousted as well. Baldwin Mudau's Venda Independence People's party suffered continual harassment and was thwarted in its attempts to hold elections in Venda. It was decided to examine the cases of Mudau and Mageza in greater depth to explain how the demise in their roles as 'homeland politicians' occurred.

This examination revealed the fallaciousness of the second and central inference mentioned earlier. It was shown that although these men lived and worked in the city, their electoral support did not come from the urban areas. Once it was established that their electoral base was in fact a predominantly rural one, the refutation of this second theme became complete. On a purely empirical level then, the contentions of Kotze et al were refuted. But to merely refute these

/Ideological ....

ideological statements by providing evidence to the contrary does not answer the questions that have arisen as a result of the investigation.

These questions revolve around the following paradox. Mudau and Mageza, and their compatriots who serve with them on the various boards, committees, ministries, and movements which they formed or helped to form, claim at various times to represent black workers who reside permanently in the city, migrant workers and permanent rural dwellers from their respective homelands. During their years of service, as the demands on behalf of these people are rejected, they come to admit that they can do nothing to improve the lot of these groupings. But their response at this stage is a passive one, a series of cynical admissions which are made while they continue to work within the institutions of apartheid. However, when their demands concerning trading and business rights are not met, and when they perceive that as state functionaries they will not be able to effect change in this particular sphere, their response is an active, revolutionary one. They resign their respective positions, and begin to look to alternate forms of organisation.

It was found therefore that although these men claimed to represent the general interest, they represented a sectional one. This sectional interest was masked by use of ideology, for ideology "has an essentially imaginary aspect explaining the interest of partial or special groups as the general interest. " (2) It is submitted that this special or partial group whose interest Mageza, Mudau et al really represent is the petty bourgeoisie or, more specifically, their respective ethnic fractions of the petty bourgeoisie. In classical Marxian literature, this class refers to those strata who exist "in the middle ranks and interstices of a developed capitalist society and cannot be included in the bourgeoisie or proletariat. These term usually includes such people as small property owners, shopkeepers and small traders, lower ranks of the intelligentsia and liberal professions, etc." (3) Although the South African petty bourgeoisie is not that of a developed capitalist society and although the layers and fractions (4) comprising this class differ to a degree in their function and composition, the adoption of this framework has helped to unravel material which appears contradictory and confusing at first reading. It becomes clear in the following two sections that the initiaves of Mudau and Mageza are not those of "urban based representatives" who wish to facilitate the exercising of urban blacks' "political rights in their own homelands" as apartheid idealogues would have us believe. Neither are these initiatives those of men seeking to "help the soul of their people"(cf) as Mudau and Mageza would have us believe. They ultimately represent the interests of small traders, shopkeepers, property owners, the intelligentsia and liberal professions, in fact, the petty bourgeoisie. The final section of the paper will examine the nature of the relationship between the petty bourgeoisie and its representatives, and the representatives' response to their failure on behalf on this class.

1. Baldwin Mudau and the Venda Independence Peoples Party

After the war, Baldwin Mudau, a Venda speaking man in his twenties, who had been born and bred in the townships of the Witwatersrand, became a secretary at the Bantu Mens Social Centre in Johannesburg. This organisation was run under the aegis of the Chamber of Commerce. It employed a multiracial staff who did welfare work amongst Africans of the Townships on the Rand. Mudau spent seven years with the organisation, and in the process came to be in charge of it. Thereafter he became a lecturer at the newly opened University College of the North, Turfloop (near Petersburg in the Northern Transvaal). Mudau imagined that these universities would allow for Blacks to learn about themselves and for themselves in a free and unrestricted way. But "after many months I realised that it was nothing more than a glorified high school", he says. He marks this time as the beginning of his frustration with the apartheid system.

/ Mudau ...

Mudau thereafter became a social worker in Alexandria township. Because of his participation in an ANC boycott in 1961, Mudau was fired from his job in the township; he then became a research assistant to his friend John Blacking of the Wits. Department of Anthropology, but later found that he could not support his family on his salary; he joined Lever Brother (Public Relations section) so that he could live "more comfortably". While he was working for this company, the Venda government was given 'Territorial Authority' status. Representatives of the Venda government approached Mudau:

> " They said to me, "Why do you waste your time working for a soap company, instead of helping your people, the soul of your people?" I said, "What do I do there?" They said, "You are educated, you are a teacher, a social worker, a graduate. We can't see you wasted in industry. You better come and work here." I said, "What is my work?"

An 'Afrikaner from Pretoria' was sent to him to tell him what his work would entail. He explained to Mudau that he would "be his own boss". He should merely draw up a report based on what he wanted to do for 'his people' who were living in the urban areas. He drew up the report; "it was applauded in Pretoria". His plan covered education, employment, housing and business rights, burial facilities and a host of other services.

So, working under the umbrella of the Venda Territorial Authority, Mudau set up advisory boards to carry out his envisioned plan. These were set up in townships throughout the Transvaal; during the sixties then, twenty of thes boards were established; however the boards' free hand was of course mythical. The Bantu Education Department complained that Mudau and his boards were "frustrating the programme of the department" by recommending that men who live in the township should bring their families from the reserves to live with them so that, amongst other things, "Venda children could receive their education in the city". Of course influx control measures and Bantu Education policy run counter to such recommendations, and Mudau's scheme was thwarted.

In fact, nearly all his major proposals were unable to be carried out; he wanted people who had accumulated capital in the urban areas to be able to get business rights in the homelands. His scheme was met with opposition by the Bantu Investment Corporation. In one case a number of Venda speaking men had gathered R45,000 together in order to form a company that would operate in the homeland. Encouraged by Mudau, they applied for a licence to start a business in Venda. They were told by the authorities, "All business rights in Venda are under B.I.C." Eventually it transpired that if these men wished to run a business in the homeland, they must be 'selected' by the B.I.C. as 'partners' in an operation controlled by the Corporation. Of the struggles over business rights, licences and shareholding regulations Mudau says,

> " It (B.I.C.) is an institution of Afrikaners operating in the homelands They got in when the homeland was created. They kicked out the English and Indian businessmen. They said to Vendas of their own choice, "We are loaning you money from the B.I.C." and yet they were employing the men and furthering the aims of Afrikaner business."

The clarity with which Mudau perceives the role of the B.I.C. in the homeland, reflects the intensity of his involvement in the promotion of business scheme. That this was in fact his and the board members' predominant interest, is shown by the nature of their response to the failure of this scheme. In what was intended to be a show-piece meeting between government officials (including Vorster and Koornhof) and the board members, they exposed the way in which attempts to 'promote business' had been thwarted by B.I.C., knowing that such an expose would result in their dismissal. Thus we see how a passive accepting response was elicited by the failure of 'democratic' demands to be recognised, whereas the realisation that petty bourgeoise demands would not be met by the central government, elicited an active response, i.e. a decision to expose apartheid

/ ideology ...

ideology for wh it is which would result in certain dismissal. Mudau and the members of his boards were immediately fired. A further development lent coherence to this active response when the members of the boards formed the Venda Independence Peoples party (it does not stand for homeland independence, however) to fight in the Venda general election of August that year, with Mudau as their leader. It is clear that the formation of this party was not seen by its leadership merely as a means wherby its leaders could gain control of the Venda 'state apparatus'. A new form of rhetoric was adopted to legitimise and gain support for the party. This was contained in V.I.P. leaders' statements to the effect that they had formed a homeland political party because there was no other political platform from which they could talk without getting arrested. (5) Mudau sees this as a similar rationale to that of Sonny Leon's Labour Party standing for seats in the C.R.C. elections.

It was put to Mudau that there were Venda speaking people who had been spoken to who had implicit faith in the V.I.P.' ability to govern; who in fact said that they would return to live in Venda if the V.I.P. came to power. In response Mudau differentiated between an urban person 'proper' and those who have homes and families in the 'homeland'. He acknowledges that the latter grouping, the major component of the party's support, believe the V.I.P. to be powerful; but its leadership, he maintains, would be 'sterile' if they controlled the government. In an ironic if not fitting sense, them, it suited the party leadership when, after they had won the election in August by thirteen seats to five, the traditionalist Mphephu faction invoked a 'nomination clause' flooding the legislative assembly with chiefs as ex-officio members, thus gaining a majority of 42 seats to 18. (This is of course similar to they way in which TNIP came to power in the Transkei.)

How did the V.I.P. mobilize popular support? Mudau recognised that he could not have the ex-members of the boards as candidates; the majority of the voters were not permanent urban dwellers and should vote for people who were based in the homeland. (Although he himself stood as leader of the party - he has a seat in the Venda assembly today.) Instead homeland based shopkeepers who were "not happy with the B.I.C.'s interferences in the trading sector" were used as V.I.P. candidates. The members of the old advisory boards transformed the boards into an efficient branch structure for the V.I.P. on the townships. The representatives of the petty bourgeoisie became skilful at capitalizing on grievances, but, more importantly, at using existing structures to help mobilize support. The party was now 'double-fisted' - with its trader-cum-candidates in the reserve and its ex-officials-cum-party organisers in the townships on the reef. There were advantageous spinoff effects from such a relationship too. The campaign could be run cheaply for the trader-candidates put up the money to finance the campaign out of their own pockets; the urban leadership because they had access to things which could not be produced by the rural areas, provided strategic inputs. For example, on week before the election, V.I.P. posters (flames of freedom, etc.) and pamphlets, printed in Johannesburg, went out all over Venda, together with various other electioneering devices. The Mphephu faction and the South African government were caught completely off guard by the V.I.P.'s gains.

However, the victory was a hollow one. Not only in the sense that it was countered by state intervention, but, more profoundly, in that Mudau and the V.I.P. had forced themselves into an inescapably contradictory position. On the one hand, they had proved that separate development could not accomodate socio-political aspirations of 'permanent urban dwellers of Venda origin'. The strata within this category (and here it must be noted that it is highly questionable to use the classification 'urban dwellers of Venda origin - one if forced to use the term because of the nature of political association that have developed as a response to institutionalised apartheid) had each been shown how clearly the apartheid structure could not accommodate the. 'Petty bourgeois' elements had been refused trading licences and had been unable to make the advisory

/ boards ...

boards workable; they had been denied an election victory through pseudo-legal and repressive means. (Even today when the V.I.P. holds a meeting it has to be underground because of harassment from police and officials). When they attempt to use the 'parliamentary sessions' as a sounding board for grievances, they are silenced by the agenda which is always based on "instructions from Pretoria". Workers within this category too, had been shown how farcial the apartheid institutions were, by the impotence of the advisory boards and the V.I.P. with regard to improvements of taxing, educational and employment measures. Today Mudau has "difficulty in getting up to speak without urban people doubting (him)."

On the other hand, they had mobilized support for the V.I.P. futiley amongst homeland dwellers and migrant workers. Even if they had been the ruling party, Mudau acknowledges their 'potential sterility'; the relations of domination - subservience between core and periphery would remain. The cynicism which has been engendered in the party leadership as a result of seeing such abject proof of structural inhibition has not been fully communicated down the ranks. Many migrant workers from Venda believe today that the V.I.P. could make Venda "a beautiful place to live in". One of my informants had reasoned this way after the election in which he saw that the "V.I.P. was making it possible for a commoner to tell the chief to sit down." A local party organiser in the Sibasa district has gone so far as placing his life in danger for the V.I.P. He is involved in regular confrontations with chiefs, police and other officials and his work as a builder is affected by such involvement.

The party leaders' attitude towards involvement in Venda politics is not entirely cynical however. They would regard the consciousness which has resulted from V.I.P. participation in the elections as the positive aspect of the party's formation and its activities, and are attempting to feel out channels through which that consciousness can be directed.

2. Mageza and the Gazankulu Interior Ministry

Mageza is a member of one of the most and influential families in the North Eastern Transvaal reserves. His grandmother belonged to the Shangaan royal family; he was born in what is today called Lebowa, near the famous mission hospital at Elim, but under the present homeland structure he is termed 'a citizen of the Shangaan homeland, Gazankulu'. His father was attached to the Swiss mission, which has been working in the reserves in that area for generations. This Mageza, through his relatively priveleged position, received an education which very few Blacks of his generation could.

From the time that he qualified with a senior degree in education from Fort Hare Mageza has lived in Soweto. At first he taught at schools in the township; he eventually became headmaster of Orlando High School. But he became aware of the discriminatory nature of Bantu Education, "there is a vast difference between schooling and education", he notes. This, and his desire to become an 'entrepeneur' prompted him to leave teaching. He bought a truck and became a coal transporter. He found far more fulfilment in such activity, "even though it forced me to get my hands dirty, something which our more educated people are scared to do, I was doing a man's job." His job also enabled him to increase his influence within the township which was already considerable due to his educational activities. As the township's coal supplier, he "met people in all walks of life", and he believed that he was fulfilling a public service. In the sixties, he helped form and become chairman of the Mashangana Urban Movement. He describes this movement not as one which promotes ethnic consciousness but as a "social one, it enables Tsonga speakers to come together in the city;" Mageza sees it very much as on the same level as Jewish forms of association in South Africa. In 1968 he was elected on to the newly formed Urban Bantu Council

/ (UBC) ...

(UBC) as its "Shangaan representative". He very quickly became disillusioned with it, as did the people of Soweto who he recalls, mocked UBC members as being "Bulldogs with no teeth". But he stood as a candidate in the first general election of Gazankulu (the newly designated Shangaan homeland). Here it must be remembered that the 'formation' of Gazankulu was unique in that the creation of the institutional structure did not develop out of a formalised territorial authority, owing to the fact that a separate Shangaan entity was not envisioned in the original balkanization plan; so here traditional authorities did not act as collaborators in the setting up of the institutional framework. Instead, its formation was mediated through a group of Shangaan intellectuals, teachers, businessmen, etc. under the leadership of Prof. Hudson Ntsanwisi of the University of the North. Party formation in the classic homeland mould did therefore not occur, i.e. a 'traditionalist' party of chiefs and their supporters and one or two parties representing the 'non-traditionalist' electorate (for example, TNIP - DP in the Transkei, and VNP - VIP in Venda).

Over ten thousand people voted for Mageza in the election as Soweto representative - even though there was no candidate opposing him. This can be attributed to his contact with so many urban people through his educational and business activities and his position in the Mashangana Urban Movement, his contact with migrant workers through his manifest desire to help them, and the prominence of his family name in the rural areas.

Over the next year or so (1974) Mageza's proposals on equal education and equal taxing for blacks met with little success. But for him the most important area of conflict was over the granting of business rights for Tsonga-speaking people. "I found B.I.C. giving loans to people to put up businesses. These people came to me and moaned that they never became independent." He spoke to local officials of the B.I.C. and told them that the people felt that B.I.C. was exploiting them and not assisting them for "they can never get out of your clutches" Mageza pressed the issue. He asked B.I.C. officials if a man who wished to buy "a whole shop itself" could do so; the officials said, "Yes, if he has the money".

So Mageza put them to the test. He knew a trader, in partnership with B.I.C. who had the capital to buy out the B.I.C.-held shares in his business. This man had been led to believe that he could not buy out the B.I.C. shareholding. Mageza told him of the official's assertion that this could be done. Now the trader in question did not have all his money banked with the B.I.C.'s saving bank. The B.I.C. official who dealt with his subsequent application did not know this, and quoted the man a price beyond the value of the money he had saved with the Corporation's bank. He declared to the trader that "unfortunately he would not be able to make the transaction as they (the B.I.C') would not accept surety for the remaining shares". The trader thereafter produced the remainder of the money, which he had banked at Trust Bank "across the road". The B.I.C. were forced to hand over the shares - but realised that they had been caught in a trap. Thereafter, Mageza was regarded with suspicion by the B.I.C. for they realised that he had "put the trader up to the deal". Since that time they attempted to bypass the office of the Minister of the Interior in their licensing activity, on numerous occasions.

How were they able to bypass him? In Gazankulu, the secretaries of the ministries i.e. the top-ranking civil service officials, are white men appointed by the South African central government. These people "were not my secretariat, they were my bosses", says Mageza.

By this time Mageza was becoming increasingly frustrated by his ineffectiveness in the business sphere, and by Ntswanisi's move to a more compromisory relationship with the central government. The assembly was not becoming the platform that had been envisioned, but a mere rubber stamp for policy which originated in Pretoria. Mageza came into conflict again over the administration of the "industrial growth point" set up by the central government and B.I.C. in

/ Letaba ...

Letaba. This time he became involved at the "personal economic interest level" in order that his initiatives could have more thrust. He wanted the "growth points to enable black men to become industrialists". The fact that the land at Letaba was not owned by the Gazankulu government enabled him to apply to Pretoria for the right of entrepeneurs to the private ownership of industrial sites. (Private ownership of land is prohibited inside Gazankulu.) He even persuaded Ntswanisi to buy a piece of land there, so that "he could feel what it was like to be an industrialist or businessman." (Mageza acknowledges that this operation did help the Chief Minister's perception - but not "atogether", when he remembers that Ntsanwisi has just been instrumental in allowing 'Checkers' to operate in the capital, Giyani.)

For all his endeavours, the B.I.C. are doing everything in their power to prevent potential Black industrialists from utilizing opportunities at the growth points, in their overt preference for extractive industry which they will supervise. He himself applied for a licence to go "into business" at Letaba, in partnership with a Johannesburg industrialist. This application was refused. A more important example of B.I.C. interference as opposed to assistance is that of an application made by BUSAF to the interior ministry. The company makes bus bodies (ultimately used to transport migrants, no doubt) and wished to set up a training scheme in Letaba; their application to set up a training scheme for workers was never forwarded to Mageza and was left unanswered by his secretariat. Mageza's resignation from the cabinet in 1975 was tacit recognition on his part that his endeavours were futile.

3. Conclusion

It is extremely difficult to draw conclusions from very bare and thin research. If this study is to be continued, the information garnered so far, merely points to the kinds of questions that need to be asked. In comparing the evidence for the two areas studied one is of course struck by the similarity in the lives and activities of the two key figures and their compatriots. However, these are similarities that are obvious from a reading of the text and need not be noted here. The question has to be asked as to whether these similarities are coincidental or whether they result from a common structural position.

In "The Eighteenth Brumaire" Marx writes:

> "One must not form the narrow-minded notion that the petty bourgeoisie, on principle, wish to enforce an egoistic class interest. Rather it believes that the special conditions of its emancipation are the general conditions within the frame of which alone modern society can be saved and the class struggle avoided. Just as little must one imagine that the democratic representatives are indeed all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According to their education and their individual position they may be as far apart as heaven from earth. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, and that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is in general the relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent." (6)

The "special conditions" of Mudau's and Mageza's emancipation coincide in general terms. "I was brought up and educated to believe in a common South Africa and that is what I am fighting for," says Mudau. Magaza enunciates the same sentiments. These men strove to become educated only to find that their

/professional status ...

professional s[illegible]s did not qualify them for positions that others with similar qualifications, [illegible]t with a different colour skin, could attain. So they left their 'unequal education' posts at a tribal college and a Bantu Education school respectively with a desire to fight for the "special conditions of their emancipation";after they had left their teaching posts, both men attained a series of jobs in the townships which involved them more directly with production. Admittedly this was done in a supervisory / managerial capacity, but they "got their hands dirty", to use Mageza's phrase. (7)

This move enabled them to reinforce their urban connections and to establish their links with a far broader spectrum of the township petty bourgeoisie. They became 'fully-fledged members' of what Shivji has termed the 'upper layer' of the petty bourgeoisie (8), which comprises intellectuals, teachers, higher civil servants, prosperous traders and professionals, the layer which in fact provides the class as a whole with its representatives. The organisations which they joined and came to lead, reflect this movement on their part: Mudau as a social worker in Alexandria and Mageza as Chairman of the Mashangana Urban Movement and Shangaan representative on the UBC.

When the opportunity arose for them to take part in the new institutions of apartheid (Mudau - Venda urban boards, Mageza - Gazankulu legislature) they did so. It became clear that within these institutions they could not represent the fully proletarianised fraction of the black working class. But they felt that partaking in them would have a three-fold effect. Firstly, they could push for the granting of more rights for migrant workers in the city, and in the reserve. The Venda boards, we have seen, proposed employment, housing and educational reforms for these people. Mageza too, made such proposals, on equal education and taxing on numerous occassions in the Gazankulu house of assembly. This had the reciprocal effect and advantage of giving them a power base. Secondly, they could use the boards and the Gazankulu assembly as platforms to protest against inequality. One could perhaps note here that these two aims reflect their role as "literary" representatives of the class, in the sense that Marx is using it. They are in fact using the rhetoric of social democracy, the content of which "is the transformation of society in a democratic way, but transformation within the bounds of the petty bourgeoisie". (9) Thirdly, they would attempt to break down the "class colour bar" between black and white petty bourgeoisie, by attempting to channel African capital from rural and urban areas into the setting up of productive and trading enterprises in the homeland. In this instance they were acting as the "political" representatives of their class. They were able to act as both political and literary representatives, because of the multiplex nature of their careers. Both had moved from teaching posts to managerial ones; this multiplexity (10) was reflected in their later statements and actions as representatives of their class. Consequently, they were succesful in mobilizing the support of the major portion of their particular "ethnic" class fraction.

They may have been succesful in mobilizing electoral support, but failed in achieving their political and literary ends. They soon came to see that the boards and the Gazankulu government respectively could not facilitate equal education, equal taxing, reforms in influx control, or any of the platforms upon which they had secured their base. So they strove to achieve their third aim fervently, for this was the one which mattered most in both cases. Mudau's and Mageza's struggle against B.I.C., the monopoly capitalist instrument of economic domination over the reserves, was largely in vain. Mageza was perhaps more sucessful in that he managed to salvage the right of private ownership of land at the industrial growth point in Letaba; but their outrage at the B.I.C.'s role of 'selection board and licensing officer par excellence' met with a flexing instead of a loosening of the central government's muscle.

How did they respond to such failure? I think that the petty bourgeoisies of

/the respective ...

the respective 'ethnic groups' are still structuring their response. Mudau and his compatriots were forced to make a decision before the 1973 elections whereas Mageza only after, and thus the former grouping's response is perhaps, to date, more coherent. The transformation of the advisory boards into a party leadership structure marks the move from political-cum-literary association to that of the dominantly political. Thus Mudau and his fellow advisory board members now push their rhetoric into the background and become what may be termed representatives of an 'active' petty bourgeoisie. The improvisory form of political organisation was not only strategic but also 'political'. It conjures up visions of the link between Mau-Mau and KANU in pre-independence Kenya. Furedi (11) tells us of the social composition of the Mau-Mau movement; the 'active' fraction of the movement were traders and rich peasants (living amongst the squatters) and who were also involved in a close relationship, within Mau-Mau, with the mass of squatters; this 'active' fraction were in communication with the KANU leadership in Nairobi as well. The V.I.P. with its rural trader-urban trader link is analogous here to a certain extent, but more work must be done on this aspect before any conclusions can be drawn.

Mageza's response has also been to join the ranks of the 'active' petty bourgeoisie. He could easily, at the point when he realised the extent of central government coercion and control, have closed his eyes and remained a well-paid state functionary. But he left his position and today continued to harass B.I.C. officials and to promote African industrialists.

It would be premature and perhaps incorrect at this stage to conclude that those representatives who remain serving in the assemblies of the various homelands, because they do not speak for an active and therefore progressive petty bourgeoisie, represent the 'reactionary' fraction of this class. Those who remain serving within these institutions represent a variety of interests. If they represent bourgeois interests one could speculate that they are those of the rapidly consolidating homeland 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. (12). As Shivji points out, until the state "has gone into the economy in a major way this group, strictly speaking, still constitutes a bureaucratic stratum of the petty bourgeoisie", so we cannot as yet call this group a class. But, as was shown for the Tanzanian bureaucratic bourgeoisie, one could perhaps say that this stratum in the homelands contains both 'reactionary' and 'progressive' elements. In Gazankulu, the development of such a stratum is much more defined than that in Venda, where traditionalist collaborators (Mphephu faction) have maintained control of the state apparatus.

So many questions which spring from this study still have to be answered. The links between the petty bourgeoisie and their mass base also need greater explication. What can definitely be drawn out of this study at this stage is that an important element of apartheid ideology was exposed by means of practice rather than theory. Those who exposed it, exposed themselves and their ideology, in turn, during this process.

(1) Kotze, D.A., African Politics in South Africa: 1964 - 1974, London 1975, Hurst and Co.

(2) Legassick, M., Legislation, Ideology and Economy in post-1948 South Africa, in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 1, No.1, Oct. 1974.

(3) Shivji, I., Class Struggles in Tanzania, Dar Es Salaam Publishing House, Dar Es Salaam, 1975.

(4) Shivji, op cit.

/ (5) See Sonny ...

(5) See Sonny L[illegible]d's statements in this regard.

(6) Marx, K., The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Surveys from Exile, Penguin, London, 1973.

(7) Mudau - Public Relations Officer for Lever Brothers;
Mageza - owner / manager of coal transport business.

(8) Shivji, op cit.

(9) Marx, op cit.

(10) Ronald Rathbone, on his lecture tour to South Africa noticed this multiplex nature of the petty bourgeoisie in pre-independence Ghana during a period of intense capital formation coupled with the existence of few opportunities for investment. In fact, he gives examples of teacher / tradesmen figures.

(11) Furedi, F., Social Composition of the Mau-Mau in the White Highlands.

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