

CONFERENCE ON THE HISTORY OF OPPOSITION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

CLASS FORMATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE AREAS: INKATHA - A STUDY.

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Inkatha.

Political opposition.

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27th - 30th January, 1978.

(Students') Development Studies Group, Johannesburg.

Introduction

The Inkatha movement has received large publicity over the few years since its revival and especially recently with the formation of an alliance between Inkatha, the ("Coloured") Labour Party and the ("Indian") Reform Party. This paper was done to suggest a possible approach, for discussion, to the analysis of current political, ideological and economic developments in the reserve areas of the South African social formation. More specifically the paper hopes to provide information that could be relevant to an analysis of developments in the kwaZulu region. An elaboration of the hints at an approach, integration of factors relating to the stage of capitalism in the South African social formation and class struggle would have made this a more satisfactory paper for discussion.

The approach adopted has to be extremely tentative at this stage, both because of the immediate and obvious problems associated with contemporary research and analysis (It is even less possible to approach the subject with "objectivity", to "distance oneself from it", than is the case with topics that can more properly be called "history") but also because of the dearth of material available on the reserve/"homeland" areas and the difficulty of doing research in these areas. (Wages Commission research into conditions on wattle plantations, Cosmas Dosmund and others and their work on resettlement etc., and subsequent responses to these investigations, give some idea of the sensitivity of this work)

In the first section I will introduce certain concepts relating to an analysis of the "homelands" through some recent writing on these areas. References will be to the kwaZulu region. The second section deals specifically with the Inkatha movement. Information relating to this movement is provided and one issue is presented in greater detail, but no rigorous attempt is made to apply the mode of analysis of the first section to the issues around the position of Inkatha. Indicators exist but with so many dynamics operative they can be no more than that. However, I do not believe

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that it is possible to understand the political, economic and ideological developments in the "homelands" without keeping the questions raised in the first section in mind - and definitely impossible to come to an adequate understanding if these areas are looked at in isolation, ie if apparently "internal" events and processes are not situated within a context broadly defined by the specific stage of the development of capitalism in South Africa (monopoly dominance), and without keeping in mind the history of class struggle within the social formation.

Section One - Aspects of Class Formation in the South African "Homelands".

Class formation has to be looked at in the complexity of an "historically determined system of social production" (see definition of class quoted in Shivji, 1976: 19). The configuration of classes in the South African social formation and, more specifically, in the "homelands" can only be understood if the analysis takes into account South Africa's position on the periphery of the world capitalist system; the way in which proletarianisation took place, and is still taking place; the specific history of class struggle, etc.

It is not possible to do justice to even a summary of the background necessary to an analysis of class alliances and struggle as it involves the "homeland" regions. A few points need to be stressed though.

Initial penetration in South Africa was done by merchant capital making biased demands on the pre-capitalist modes of production. In other words, because the exploitative mechanisms of merchant capital operate in the sphere of exchange, it was not necessary to alter the relations of production in these pre-capitalist modes of production fundamentally. The forces of production had to be revolutionised because of the increased demand for commodities to be exchanged. I am not suggesting that it is possible to alter the one set of relations without disruptive effects on the other - "A mode of production is an articulated combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of the relations of production" (Hindess & Hirst, 1975: 9) (my emphasis). But no attempt was, and probably could be made to institute capitalist relations of appropriation of surplus value. Du

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During this period, limited demands for wage, or tenant, labour were made. However, with the discovery of first diamonds and then gold, this demand for labour grew rapidly and the South African system of compound control and migratory labour slowly developed - some aspects consciously instituted, while others developed "naturally". Motivated by the needs of expanded reproduction of capital, the control and reproduction of labour power function of the reserve areas became institutionalised - control over political developments and over labour flows. Proletarianisation proceeded rapidly and labour was, and is, absorbed not only from the South African population but also from the whole of Southern Africa. A specific aspect of this process of primitive accumulation in South Africa was the maintenance of pre-capitalist economic forms. (I would argue that it is not possible to speak of pre-capitalist modes of production co-existing with a dominant capitalist mode of production, other than in a period of transition, but rather of forms of production). Dominance of the capitalist mode of production has the "predominant tendency" of dissolution of other modes of production (cf. Bettelheim, 1972). Even when, as in the case of South Africa, as Wolpe (1975: 248-9) argues "the dominant tendency has been inhibited by the secondary tendency of 'conservation-dissolution'", there occurs such a restructuring of the relations and forces of production that the most important aspect to these becomes their subordinated articulation with the relations and forces of the capitalist mode of production. Conservation-dissolution has been necessary in South Africa in order to maintain the rate of profit. 'Conservation' has meant that certain direct and indirect reproductive functions of labour power, e.g. subsistence agriculture and social security, could be left to the pre-capitalist farms. 'Dissolution' is the 'predominant tendency'.

Conservation of pre-capitalist forms, in various ways essential to exploitation in South Africa, "tend to be expressed not in terms of the relations of class exploitation they must sustain, but in racial, ethnic, national terms" (Wolpe, 1975: 244).

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I would agree with this observation, and it is then necessary to see what the implications of conservation and mode of expression are both in terms of class formation within the "maintained" areas of South African social formation (the reserves/"homelands"), and also in terms of perception and nature of class struggle. It could be expected that class struggle/opposition could be perceived and expressed in terms in which exploitation is expressed, ie in racial, and ethnic terms. Also that the competition for the (meagre) benefits to be derived from "maintenance" of the reserve areas could occur. (These are points to be examined in section 2 below).

Wolpe, in a later paper (1976: 5), said that political involvement of classes and class fractions in black society "can only be determined through an analysis of the concrete economic, political and ideological conditions". A convergence of interests may occur (but) the crucial question here relates to the conditions which produce such a convergence (my emphasis). In this paper, Wolpe is replying to Slovo's contribution to a book on Southern Africa (1976). Slovo argues that "objectively speaking ... the immediate fate of the black middle sections is linked much more with that of the black workers and peasants than with their equivalents across the colour line" (1976: I26), and that it is only in the Bantustans that administrators and a growing commercial class are "being offered a vested interest in the fragmentation of South Africa" (1976: I43).

Wolpe rejects this argument on the grounds that it is an over-simplification to attribute positions in possible alliances to the petit-bourgeoisie without analysing the conjuncture. Wolpe then draws a distinction between the "new petit-bourgeoisie" ("those who occupy places in the division of labour outside of industrial production in what is commonly referred to as the tertiary sector" (1976: I2), eg. those employed in commerce, education, state departments) and the "traditional petit-bourgeoisie ... defined simply as including small-scale producers where the owner of the means of production is also the direct producer; owners of small-scale businesses, particularly in the retail trade, and the self-employed (eg. professionals etc.)" (1976: 13. cf Innes and O'Meara 1976: 77).

A further distinction is introduced between the petit-bourgeoisie in the "homelands" and those in "white areas", "because the political structure of the Bantustans places the latter in a quite different position" (1976: 13).

While agreeing with Wolpe in making these distinctions and stressing the necessity of a conjunctural analysis, I feel that a full understanding of class formation in black areas (urban and rural) is not satisfactory without looking at the "marginal pole of the economy" and the rapidly growing economic activities situated therein *. However, the political implications of the existence of this rapidly growing group is not directly relevant to this paper. Another question that needs to be discussed is that of the extent to which the concept of a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (cf Shivji, 1976: 63-66) is relevant to the analysis of political developments in the "homelands". Is it possible to talk of a "weak bureaucratic bourgeoisie", and how useful is this as against an undifferentiated categorisation of a "new petit-bourgeoisie"?

But, to return to the Wolpe analysis - he concludes on the new petit bourgeoisie that "there is no reason to suppose that the different components which go to make up this class constitute a political unity" (1976: 29). In kwaZulu this conclusion is largely borne out. (The new petit bourgeoisie is further fragmented by the presence of a largely Indian section of this class.) Among civil servants, for example, despite the obvious control exercised by the upper levels, dissatisfaction is expressed regularly over the matter of salaries (cf Debates, Aug 1974 & 1975, vol 5: 311-2; Debates 21-30/4/75, vol 6: 350-1). At the University of Zululand opposition to "homeland" politics has been expressed frequently, but here too pressure can be applied: "The kwaZulu government is to ban students at the University of Zululand from gaining practical experience in kwaZulu schools - unless they apologise for staging a demonstration against Chief Gatsha Buthelezi..." (Daily News, 14/5/76). This is not to say that civil servant... and student

*The marginal pole cannot have its interest protected through an alliance with the traditional petit bourgeoisie with whom it is in conflict over redistribution of profits. Some of the members of this group could sympathise quite closely with the proletariat from which they have been forced and/or to which they hope to return.

and student opposition reflect a similar political position -the former are calling for a larger share of "homeland" benefits (supplemented by compensation for manipulating the bureaucratic power wielded, eg. payment of pensions) (see also *The Nation*, Jan 1977), while the students have been riding with the black consciousness opponents of apartheid and those functioning within this framework.

Wolpe argues (1976: 29) that the traditional petit bourgeoisie in the "white areas" is being tied "more firmly than ever to established power". This is not always clearly the case as is argued below in the example of the tripcoos (tripartite companies), and may be in defence against monopoly capital intrusion rather than because of "the possibilities of rapid economic advancement".

Those members operating in the "homeland" areas seem to be successfully, at least for the moment, incorporated into the Inkatha structure, many occupying leadership positions. This is not to deny Wolpe's point that further benefits can be offered to the petit bourgeoisie within the policy of "separate development" if, in this case, Inkatha is seen as a threat to the state. Attempts to mobilise opposition to tripcoos (agreements supported by Buthelezi and Inkatha) through kwaZulu opposition political parties have failed miserably in the past. Possibly, with the growth of the organisation, it will become more difficult for the members of the traditional petit bourgeoisie (at least in kwaZulu) to take up a position that would lead to conflict with a mass organisation, despite the pressure that could be exerted on, for example, traders through the BIC.

Wolpe does foresee this possibility when he says that "there seems to be little reason for a shift in the allegiance of this class, particularly in the absence of an organised and powerful opposition force" (Wolpe, 1976: 32). What is important is "the place they occupy in the historically determined system of social production", and this includes political, ideological as well as economic factors.

Section Two - Introduction

As has been mentioned above, this section will deal specifically with the Inkatha movement, but no rigorous attempt will be made to relate section one to section two (for the reasons mentioned above).

Under A some information on the structure and history of the organisation will be provided and also a look at the organisation through the speeches of Chief Buthelezi, president of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (National Cultural Liberation movement: Inkatha) and the Chief Minister of kwaZulu. This does not mean that I take the many statements, speeches and letters made and written by Buthelezi as reflecting the functioning and interests represented by Inkatha, but they do indicate (if only through repetition) the attitudes of a co-founder and the wishes for the organisation of a very prominent member. Certain recurring themes will be examined, viz the strategy for Inkatha - in relation to "homedland politics", unity of the oppressed, and relations with the ANC and PAC and other groups - and also the Chief's and therefore the National Council's attitude for "free enterprise".

Sub-section 5 is a short examination of one of the few concrete issues around which individuals and organisations (representing economic interests) have taken positions. This is the tripartite agreement controversy that has, at the time of writing, still not been completely resolved. Another such issue, on which I unfortunately do not have enough information, is that of changes in the land tenure system in kwaZulu.

A: 1-Background

The Inkatha organisation claims to represent more than 120 000 paid-up members (cf SAIRR 1977: 2; Daily News, 25/4/77; NM, 27/5/77) and Buthelezi probably has the support of several times that number of Zulus, if not among other races and ethnic groups. How efficiently this vast number of people are being tied into the organisational and decision-making structure is difficult to say. The structure makes provision for many levels of participation, eg. branch-constituency-region-...-National Council-General Conference. A Central Committee, consisting of 25 members who are kwaZulu

citizens, implements policy ("a member of the Movement shall not be qualified to be a candidate for the office of President of the Movement unless he is a citizen of kwaZulu who under the kwaZulu Constitution qualified for election to the office of Chief Minister" - Constitution, chIII, 8(4)(i)). A series of sub-committees deal with specific issues, e.g. Defence and Security; Elections, Publicity and Strategy; Economics and Finance.

The kwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) is directly drawn into the movement in that members of the KLA serve on the National Council (cf. Constitution, ch VI, 29(1)b).

Furthermore, the Inkatha Constitution was presented to the KLA for acceptance in April 1975 (SAIRR, 1977:1; KLA Debates) Buthelezi has often said that Inkatha will prevent the KLA from accepting "independence" for kwaZulu, as Inkatha is a much truer reflection of the wishes of the people.

Membership fees range from a R3 joining fee and R2 annual fee for members (the Youth Brigade pay 50c) to a higher fee for professional people and chiefs, and an annual amount of about R100 to be paid by organisations.

Inkatha runs a newspaper (The Nation) published by Isizwe-Sechaba (Pty) Ltd. Some 40 000 copies are printed monthly (SAIRR, 1977: 4). A Women's Brigade and Youth Brigade have been formed. These brigades have their chairpersons appointed by the Inkatha president in consultation with their councils. (Constitution, ch iv, 18 (3) a; ch iv, 19 (3) a).

The first Inkatha (ka Zulu) was founded in 1928 by King Solomon ka DiniZulu (late uncle to Chief Buthelezi), and was revived in 1975 when a new constitution was drawn up at a meeting held at kwaNzimela. There were references to the movement much earlier than 1975 (cf BS, 1973: 7; BS, II/8/73: 5) when Buthelezi, after referring to the massive industrial strikes in Natal during 1973 and what could be achieved through united effort, said: "That is why we in kwaZulu have thought of reviving the ideas of Inkatha kwaZulu as this was machinery that was meant to do this for the Zulu people" (BS, II/8/73: 5; also BS, 1973: 7).

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Inkatha has just recently been in the news in connection with the alliance between the "Coloured" Labour Party, the "Indian" Reform Party and Inkatha. This follows similar moves in the past between Inkatha and the Progressive Party. These unity moves have drawn the wrath of the Afrikaans Press (accusations of Zulu "imperialism") and guarded support from the English-language newspapers (see eg. editorial comment Rapport, 15/1/78; ST, 15/1/78; Star 12/1/ 78)

What practical co-operation, beyond the obvious and important symbolic value, is going to come from the alliance remains to be seen. The issue of "black unity" will be returned to below.

A: 2-The Rhetoric of Mobilisation: "populism"; "nationalism"; "unity"; and a "tradition of opposition".

"..(It) is important to note that whatever the weaknesses of the populist framework as a description of reality, ideas that may be called populist serve wide-ranging purposes as political rallying-cries, both for those in power and for those in pursuit of power. The major aspect of such 'populisms' ... is the stress upon solidarity and the unity of vast sections of the populace that it provides: a 'populism' is thus a creed most attractive to leaders. In very many cases the stress upon solidarity will represent neither the real situation of the mass of the people, nor their views of that situation ... Rather it will represent an aspiration to make a particular view as to the characteristics that unite people prevail over any continuing elements that divide. Instead of assuming solidarity to be the actual norm therefore, it is wise to look to the tensions between the various elements and various perspectives as defining the dynamic of any so-called 'populist' movement"(my emphasis) (Saul, 1970: 143-4).

Saul points out that there are weaknesses in the concept of 'populism'. It is, however, an accurate description of the rhetoric employed "as political rallying-cries". I feel that an analysis that starts off with the descriptive framework of populism (describing a presentation of reality for political purposes) needs to move beyond it to analyse the "tensions between various elements and various perspectives". This would uncover a reality that could possibly throw more light

on the interests being served by those appealing to a populist unity. Some of these tensions have been mentioned in Section One.

Buthelezi has repeatedly, over the years, come out with an appeal that specifically denies divisions or, positively, called for groups to unite in the interests of "the struggle of the black man in Southern Africa" (BS, 22/6/75: 2). "It (Inkatha) is not meant to be a political faction since its constitution rejects all partisanship in our struggle for self-realisation. We do not want to have divisive factions at this crucial time ..." (BS, 22/6/75: 2). Possibly the clearest statement on this issue repeated later in the same words more than a year later is that on 'black nationalism': "The bricks of black nationalism are many and varied. There are ethnic groups, there are tribes, there are trade unions, drama societies, black church groups, student organisations, cultural groups and many others" (BS, 14/3/76: 17; also 16/2/77: 3). This unity also bridges generation gaps (cf 13/11/77: 8).

Two months later, in 1976, the call for unity was repeated, motivated in terms of all blacks being "fellow victims of apartheid" with the need for "co-ordinating all our joint efforts to fight our common enemy, who is the oppressor responsible for our common plight" (BS, 8/5/76: 18-19). The cause for division does not lie in the different interests of black groups but is caused by oppression - African nationalism feeds on itself because of oppression, aided by the policy of 'divide and rule'.

Addressing migrant workers in the S J Smith Hostel in Durban, Buthelezi had this to say: "It is true that I believe in trade unions. I believe that workers can only have machinery for negotiation between themselves and management through trade unions. Having said this, let me emphasise that we are however not oppressed only as workers in South Africa. We are not oppressed only as peasants. Nor are we oppressed as an educated elite... We are oppressed in South Africa on the basis of our black skins. We have therefore to unite as blacks if we intend dealing with our problem decisively" (BS, 28/8/76: 2; also 28/8/77: 10).

This theme is repeated regularly in speeches. I will give one of them for example. In his opening address to the Women's Brigade Annual General Conference, Buthelezi speaks about "an organisation which embraces all sections of our black community without any distinction of class ... or any other distinction". And, "There should be no room for fights between slaves. The priority for slaves is to break the chains of their bondage" (BS, 29/10/77: 8-9; also 27/5/77: 3).

While there is no doubt that blacks suffer a common discrimination in South Africa, making the populist appeal close to reality, the differences in the relations of exploitation as it affects different classes do ultimately lead to conflicting interests. The reality of continuing exploitation in a post independence situation has led to class conflict within black society despite the rhetoric of a unifying racial oppression.

But how is this unity seen within a strategy of liberation, and how is 'cultural' liberation defined? At the second ordinary session of the Inkatha National Council, Buthelezi quoted Amilcar Cabral on 'cultural liberation' as "an attempt ... to assert the cultural personality of the oppressed people in an act of rejection of that of the oppressor ... whatever may be the state of subjection of a nation to foreign rule and the influence of economic, political and social factors in the furtherance of this domination, it is generally in culture that the need of protest, leading to the emergence and development of the liberation movement, is found" (BS, 8/7/76: 15-16).

Professor S M E Bengu, secretary-general of Inkatha, in a series of lectures published in 1977, said that: "Cultural liberation as a philosophy can only be adopted by people who, after analysing their situation, have realised that their domination is not only a political one - but that it covers the various aspects of culture such as the educational, economic, political and spiritual areas. It is at such a point that the oppressed people decide to bring about a cultural liberation of their country on various fronts" (Bengu 1977: 5).

It is a strategy of "various fronts" or a "multi-strategy" that is the topic in many of Buthelezi's more recent speeches. This goes along with the stated policy of using "homeland" structure as a base from which to operate. The first two public references to Inkatha in 1973 (referred to above) stress the need for united mass action (BS, 1973: 7 and II/8/73: 5). There is, however, some conflict over the extent of black unity. At times Buthelezi stresses a national approach - "There is no Zulu freedom that is distinct from the black man's freedom in South Africa" (BS, 14/3/76: 27. Also 8/5/76; 23/8/76: 4; 10/73) - and argues that "homeland" politics provide the base from which to act ("We regard kwaZulu as a base for regional administration and local development" (BS, 8/7/76: 3; 18/5/73:4))

At other times a national strategy is qualified by reference to the Zulu 'nation' and its existence long before apartheid policies. Buthelezi does, for example, repeatedly point out his traditional position of authority to counter accusations that he owes his position to "homeland" structures (eg BS, 8/5/76: 37; 12/5/76: 3; 20/9/74: 6; 30/4/76: 57-8; 13/II/77: 5)

The "multi-strategy" approach was spelt out in greatest detail in a speech at Fortland University (1/3/77) and is worth quoting at some length:

"Realism demands that we do not think simplistically in military terms and that we recognise that a strategy which can be shared by all is necessary if we want to bring about liberation in the foreseeable future. If no single movement will bring about the collapse of apartheid, no single strategy will do so either ... If progressive forces have to be mustered, we will need to employ a multitude of strategies ... (gives the example of trade unions). The government has taken steps to purge black trade unionism of people who bring political considerations into union activity. If left, the union movement will not become a factor of importance in the struggle for liberation. Trade unionism needs to have a broadly based responsibility towards the community it serves and it needs to develop a sense of commitment within the overall strategy which has been adopted by a wide range of organisations. Forces of change working against each other are not progressive. They do

.../not lead to

not lead to a step-by-step preparation of society for co-ordination and total change..." (BS, I/3/ 77: 10-11; also I2/3/77: 2; 14/7/77: 34)

What that "total change" is, has never been closely defined - a shortcoming that Buthelezi himself is aware of, hence his call for a national convention. The one aspect that he has gone on record on repeatedly is that of the 'free enterprise' system, and the danger inherent in the exclusion of blacks from the full benefits offered by this economic system. Buthelezi seems to argue for participation, and greater sharing, on a number of levels:

- a) worker participation, sharing of benefits through trade unions, benefits equal to those "enjoyed by the white man" (BS, 28/10/73: 5; 19-22/5/76: 3-4);
- b) trading and trades: "Each occasion when a black man manages to be in a position to establish any business is an auspicious occasion, not only for himself or his family, but also for the entire black community ... (striking) a blow for us in the liberation struggle now being waged by blacks" (BS, 5/8/77: 2). Because of Buthelezi's (and Inkatha's) stand on the tripos issue, his support for traders is not as clear as it is on the other levels of participation (see below);
- c) kwaZulu and under-developed areas, towards which "white South Africa is morally bound to channel our share of the wealth" (BS, 9-II/2/72: 3; 19/6/73). It is on this level that tripos are frequently justified, eg. through the advantages to consumers and retention of profits within kwaZulu;
- d) sharing by all black people. This would involve balancing the system of "unfettered capitalism" by introducing "a pinch of African communalism", "So long as your free enterprise system as it operates here is a game in which only whites can participate and reap benefits, it contains the seeds of its own destruction" (BS, 8/4/76: 6). Those words, and this warning, have been repeated many times (eg. BS, I2/5/76: 36-7; 10/9/76: 4; 19-22/5/76: 20/5/77: 9; 11/6/77: 12; II/III/77: 2&6; 24/11/77: 2). This wording is not always presented as simplistically as this. In the speech

at Portland University, for example, Buthelezi argued that stability under capitalism could be achieved through both a distribution of wealth, or through repression. In Southern Africa, he went on, "pressures from within capitalist states ... necessitate repressive regimes which are self-destructive" (BS, I/3/77: 5).

It is the "in-between" position of the petit-bourgeoisie that leads to the confusion as to the nature of exploitation. The fears of proletarianisation are balanced by the lure of becoming part of the bourgeoisie proper. Because of this position, the "petit bourgeoisie firstly tends to see the solution to its problems in purely political terms - reform in the political structure rather than changes in the relations of production. Secondly, the petit bourgeoisie is notoriously timid in the presentation of its demands and eager to abandon these when offered concessions. Its aim is not the overthrow of capitalism, but a fairer share in its product and changes in its political structure" (Innes & O'Meara, 1976: 83). This seems to be a reasonable reflection of the present Inkatha position, although the movement may not be so "eager to abandon (demands) when offered concessions" as Innes and O'Meara's Transkei paper suggests. There may well exist a feeling that the demands for participation and redistribution can only be achieved through the Inkatha movement. The tripco analysis (below) shows the ambivalent attitude towards the sentiments expressed by Buthelezi and the attitude taken by the movement.

It would be possible to select several other issues, e.g. Buthelezi's situation of Inkatha within a tradition of opposition that did, and still does, include the ANC, PAC, NIC (the Inkatha colours are green, gold and black), but analysis of the movement will have to be done through examining class formation, alliances and struggle. (Only one such issue will be examined briefly below). As Wolpe (1975: 238) put it: "Therefore what is needed is, on the one hand, a description of the ideological and political practices of the ethnic, racial and national groups and, on the other, an analysis of how they relate to the mode of production and social formation in which they are located" (-leaving aside the difficulties with this use of the concepts "mode of production" and "social formation", see Moss, 1977).

B - Tripartite-Companies (Tripcos)

The manner in which Inkatha, or the threat of mobilisation, can be used, is fairly clearly illustrated by the issue of tripartite-companies (tricpos). This section will look at the conflict around the issue in some detail. Some introductory remarks are necessary.

The conflict was basically between Buthelezi, supporting and acting on behalf of capital involved mainly in the circulation of commodities on the one hand, and on the other the urban-based 'stratum' of the traditional petty bourgeoisie. They were, and are, directly threatened by the benefits offered by the enormous scale of operation of the chainstores (in many cases linked to productive monopoly capital). Even if, in some cases, the traders involved are operating on a large scale it is not comparable with say Greaternans and OK Bazaars.

There occurred a split in the class of small-scale owners, in keeping with their 'in-between' position, between that section (apparently mainly operating in rural areas - an African can only obtain a site in a residential area if he/she has no trading interests outside the residential area) supporting Buthelezi and Inkatha and therefore tripcos, and those (mainly urban members of Inyanda - the Natal and Zululand African Chamber of Commerce) opposing tripcos and later also Buthelezi and Inkatha.

The conflict, a fight against proletarianisation, was also marked by the initial attempt to maintain it on the level of the economic. At least this was the case with the Inyanda members (or rather, while opposition was organised through Inyanda). Buthelezi, on the other hand, immediately 'escalated' the conflict to include issues of 'benefit to the masses' and support for the KLA and Inkatha - in other words a political struggle through political organisations. By the time the 'opposition' attempted political organisation they had lost the fight and had to rally round previously defeated and discredited political figures (the King and the former Councillor for Community Affairs, Barney Dladla).

"I am not exaggerating when I state that this is one of those occasions, when I feel that the problems we encountered in bringing about this project was really worth our while. Before birth there is pain and suffering. It can be truthfully said that some pain and suffering also heralded the birth of this project" - Chief Buthelezi at the Madadeni Opening of Checkers-KwaZulu (ES, 24/11/77:1)

During October 1974 the Prime Minister announced that "the Time had arrived" for 'homeland' governments to decide for themselves on the specifics of outside investment, in other words on the terms under which 'white' capital would be allowed into the areas under their control. This statement was welcomed by Assocom, the Afrikaanse Handels-Instituut and the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) (NM, 4/10/74).

Initially it appeared that blacks had taken up this invitation and decided on the most satisfactory way in which ('white') capital was to be admitted to the 'homeland' areas. It was reported (NM, 20/5/75) in May 1975 that the Greaternans Group would be operating in kwaZulu as Checkers, if the support of the KLA and organised African trade could be obtained. At this early stage of the 'tricpos affair' it appears that the chain group (Greaternans) would have 51% of the shareholding (to be reduced to 25% after 10 years) while 49% would be held by kwaZulu citizens and the kwaZulu

Development Corporation.

Two further aspects of this initial news release need to be mentioned. 1. The plans were revealed by Mr Zazi Kuzwayo, who quoted from a Bantu Investment Corporation letter. This letter stated that the expansion of chainstores into the 'homelands' through tripco agreements had the support of the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. (Kuzwayo had by late 1973 received loans to the value of R187 000 from the BIC (NM, 25/6/73), and made the news at this time for attacking opponents of the BIC, especially those in Inyanda. Amongst other properties, Kuzwayo owned at that time, 6 shops in Clermont outside Pinetown, a shop at KwaMashu and a bottlestore at Mapumulo).

2. It was reported at this stage that the tripco idea had originated from the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCUC), "and this resolution was believed to have flowed out of the favourable impression made on African traders when Checkers helped Mr Winnington Sabelo, an Umlazi businessman, set up his own supermarket" (NM, 20/5/75). (Sabelo was given a loan of R187 000 by the BIC early in 1974 to build a shopping centre, and commented: "I want to bring West Street (Durban's main shopping street) to Umlazi township").

By the end of June, 1975, the battlelines had been fairly clearly drawn. On the 24th June Chief Gatsha Buthelezi came out strongly in support of tripcos, and at the same time issued a warning to Inyanda "not to attempt to create a split between his Government and African traders" (NM, 25/6/75). Inyanda, representing about a quarter of kwaZulu's 1600 traders in 1974, had rejected the tripco moves. Mr Patrick Gumede, President of Inyanda and member of a liaison committee between the KLA and Zulu commerce, was accused by Buthelezi of leading the opposition to tripcos. This point of view was given some support by the rejection by the Madadeni Town Council during June of plans by Checkers to establish a supermarket there. It was argued that it would be to the detriment of "already established Black entrepreneurs as well as those still to be established". Gumede is involved in commercial activity in Madadeni (outside the industrial centre of Newcastle).

Buthelezi was making the conflict over tripcos an issue that affected the KLA, the Zulu "masses" (cf. NM, 15/5/76; STRIB, 18/7/76), and later Inkatha. On the other hand the opponents to the scheme were still fighting it as an economic issue. It was, therefore, not inconsistent at this stage for Gumede to offer to resign if he was seen to be responsible for a politically disruptive move, creating disunity between the KLA and traders in kwaZulu. Gumede said: "Our chamber has always given Chief Buthelezi its wholehearted support".

Further attempts were made at the end of June to resolve the KLA-Inyanda split. Although no resolution on the issue of the establishment of tripcos was reached, both parties "pledged themselves to work together in the interests of the entire Zulu nation" (NM, 1/7/75).

The issue remained in the news. The financial editor of the Sunday Tribune discussed the issues involved (3/8/75) and concluded that the obstacle to establishment of tripcos was Inyanda opposition, "led by millionaire Zazi Kuzwayo,

who claims he has the support of all Zulu traders". Turning to the motivation behind the Checkers moves he makes some interesting statements on the interests involved. I will quote at some length: "Homeland trading is the obvious plum for the large chains, particularly Checkers, which is having to seek new trading areas in the face of the Pick 'n Pay and OK hypermarket developments.

Moving quickly in the supermarket race for the homelands, Checkers submitted a series of proposals to KwaZulu ... (The broad outline of the tripeco agreement is then given - see above - but one new aspect is mentioned)

That no similar ventures unless wholly owned by Africans, be allowed to operate near Checkers KwaZulu outlet for 10 years."

No wonder then that Zazi Khuzwayo appeals to the "terms of the Government's separate development policy" to allow "African traders in Natal and Zululand ... to develop progressively on their own." Checkers would destroy "all the small African traders. We must build our own retail organisations and while this is being done - it could take 20 years to have fully developed African trading - the African consumer must suffer." In other words, the traditional petty bourgeoisie (and under the racially discriminatory effects of apartheid also a possible commercial bourgeoisie) are attempting to stem the effects of "the tendency for the petty bourgeoisie to be undermined and eliminated in a capitalist formation: Lenin described it as a 'transitional class'" (Poulantzas in Fascism and Dictatorship, 1974:238).

Buthlezi denied that the Checkers agreement would "destroy all the small African traders" - quite correctly, as the agreements were at that stage for outlets at Umlazi, KwaMashu and Madadeni. The wholesale facilities to be offered by Checkers would aid traders operating in areas outside those covered by the store's retail operations. This split in the interests of the traders was later used by Buthlezi. He also defended the tripecos in terms of his Cabinet's "development policy".

Two new developments, to increase in importance, were now mentioned (August, 1975): it was reported that "the tri-company scheme has become part of KwaZulu development policy and also found instant acceptance with the Zulu liberation movement, Inkatha, at its conference in Nongoma recently" and; Zazi Khuzwayo suggested that Zulus would like him to lead in "all spheres, not just business" (NM, 6/8/75).

On the 10th August Inyanda rejected tripecos, and eleven days later the kwaZulu government decided to accept the Greatermans proposal. A few days later NAFCOC, meeting in Umtata, rejected the kwaZulu cabinet decision. This goes against the reported earlier support by NAFCOC, and even that the partnership agreement had been suggested by NAFCOC. It could have been that NAFCOC had expressed support for aid directly to traders, as in the example cited of Winnington Sabelo. In May, 1976, Patrick Gumede (then vice-President of NAFCOC) denied that the tripeco proposals had originated from this body - he claimed that "the tri-company concept was infused into the minds of the homeland governments by the Bantu Investment Corporation" (NM, 24/5/76). This seems to be the most likely explanation as the BIC has such extensive control over economic activity in the "homelands".

Further developments during 1975 were the reported acceptance by Inyanda of the tripeco proposals and a vote of confidence in the kwaZulu government at the same meeting. A statement was also made that Inyanda had not "solicited the help of the opponents of the KwaZulu Government". Later Khuzwayo reiterated his opposition to the tripeco deals but reaffirmed his support for the kwaZulu Government. In November it was

reported (NM, 18/11/75) that Inyanda "angrily rejected the tripartite concept two weeks earlier" and that "Zulu consumers (had) bought R186 000 worth of shares in the scheme" (this aspect was not followed up - who the "consumers" were was not stated).

In December Buthelezi moved the conflict into the party political arena once more. He claimed that he was "testing public opinion" through Inkatha meetings. The opposition to tripos was being organised into a political party (at this stage unnamed, but later to be exposed as the Inala Party), he said. Several traders, including Mr Gogo, a Hammarsdale trader and member of Inyanda, and King Goodwill were said to be involved.

Barney Dladla, former kwaZulu Councillor for Community Affairs, and strong opponent to the scale and manner in which the BIC was involved in kwaZulu economic activity, supported the Inyanda - "If we allow these big boys in, the Black man will be wiped off the business map" (NM, 20/12/75). During May, 1976, Dladla came under attack in the KIA for having introduced an Inyanda motion that month opposing tripos. It was claimed by the Councillor for Roads and Works that Gumedze had attacked Inkatha at the meeting and had hinted that he would have to enter opposition politics.

More information on the Inala party was released in 1976. Tension immediately existed around the name of the party (Inala being the name of the King's first regiment), but it is not my intention to examine the strain between Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill. Nor, with the information available to me, is it possible to examine the accusations and denials of Bureau for State Security/Department of Information involvement in kwaZulu politics, and especially in the formation of the Inala party. In the KIA the party and tripos opposition was directly linked when Gogo spoke on the issue. His comments are most revealing of the ambivalent position that the petty bourgeoisie in "homelands" find themselves in. On the one hand they are aware of the relative disadvantage with regards to the situation of other races as "nobody with hair like mine or yours could establish a business in a White or Indian area"; on the other hand "Black traders had been 'incited to jealousy' because the Black areas were the only crumbs they possessed, having been ejected from White areas. It was not easy, he said, to have only those few areas and then have them taken away." (NM, 15/5/76)

In June Buthelezi played the card that he had been threatening to use. The influence that Inkatha had with traders in kwaZulu was tested at a meeting called at Ulundi. As was mentioned above, Inyanda, in 1974, had a membership of 413 out of the 1600 African businessmen in kwaZulu (DN, 25/9/74). These members would probably be situated in the townships around the main urban areas in Natal. The meeting was called in Ulundi, situated far from the urban areas. The Inyanda "was called upon by KwaZulu traders to cooperate with the national liberation movement, Inkatha, failing which the KwaZulu Government would have no dealings with it." (NM, 14/6/76). It is significant that discipline was imposed not directly, but through the Inkatha movement. Inyanda was advised "to avoid politics and concentrate on the economy".

On 26th July, 1976, the first tripartite agreements were signed in Pretoria between the KIA, BIC and Greatermans (Checkers), Sasko Maize Milling (to be known as Umlazi Bakery), and Aidec (African Insurance Development Company). The signatories said that under the scheme "an agreement is usually entered into between the White party, the Black interests if available, and the development body of a

particular homeland ... (T)he shares acquired by the BIC in the three concerns would eventually be transferred to the KwaZulu Development Corporation" (DN, 26/7/76).

The Sunday Tribune (22/8/76), under the headline "KwaZulu and Inyanda Bury Hatchet" reported that the 18-month dispute had been settled in that Inyanda had "given its blessing" to the building of an international hotel at Ulundi, and had also joined Inkatha. But this is a development that is peripheral to the real issue involved, namely the survival of traders in the larger urban areas. An hotel at Ulundi would fill a gap that no trader was going to move into. So it comes as no surprise that just before the opening of the first Checkers retail and wholesale outlet at Madadeni Patrick Gumedo should once more express the Inyanda opposition to the scheme, "because it meant a radical threat to Madadeni traders whose business would without doubt face drastic losses" (DN, 21/11/77). This statement was made after the security police had been to warn Gumedo that he and other traders would be held responsible if anything happened to the supermarket. Threats of arson had reportedly been received.

Chief Buthelezi performed the opening of the Checkers supermarket on 24th November, 1977. He said that that was stage one - phase two would include Midgars, Saleshouse, Jet, Pep, kwaZulu Furniture Store, Beares, Standard Bank and Bata. Despite Buthelezi's claim that the tripeco development would keep money in kwaZulu, the firms on his list seem to be well geared to recapture wages remitted from "white" areas to the rural dependents of urban workers. Dr M Olivier, Natal manager of the Corporation for Economic Development commented on opposition to tripecos. After dismissing the fears of traders as unfounded he said that dividends on shares sold to traders after the 10 year period could "according to CED viability studies ... , give traders the same or an even higher return on investment as most of them were realising on their existing investments. 'I am not implying ... that traders should now abandon their undertakings, but I suggest strongly that they start taking part, by way of shareholding, in the tri-company schemes'" (NM, 30/11/77).

The petty bourgeoisie, as a transitional class, has a tendency under capitalism to either join the proletariat or the commercial bourgeoisie. I have tried to show that the political position of this class cannot be deduced other than through an analysis of a range of factors. It is not even possible to group the whole of the "homeland" traditional petty bourgeoisie together. This has implications for an evaluation of an organisation such as Inkatha.

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