


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AN EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY / KAGISO TRUST CIVIC AND ADVICE CENTRE PROGRAMME

Final report
(March 1993)

by

Jeremy Seekings
(Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town)

Khehla Shubane
(Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg)

and

David Simon
(Department of Geography, Royal Holloway College, University of London)

PREFACE

This report evaluates the Civic and Advice Centres Programme (CACP) administered by Kagiso Trust (KT) with funds from, primarily, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC). Between 1987 and 1992 over R 13 mn was disbursed through this programme. The authors of this report were appointed by the CEC and KT as consultants in November 1992. This is our final report.

This report is the product of an evaluation conducted by the consultants in accordance with Terms of Reference defined by the CEC and KT. As such the report does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of either the CEC or KT.

It is important to indicate clearly what this report is and is not. It is a report for the funding organizations - KT and the CEC - on their funding of civics and advice centres. It is not a study of civics and advice centres *per se*. There are important aspects of the civic movement which are not examined here. Our recommendations are offered to the funding organizations. Neither our analysis nor our recommendations are intended to be prescriptive of or for civics and advice centres. It is up to civics and advice centres to assess their own experiences and to choose their own routes into the post-apartheid future. Our concern here in this report has merely been to point out to the funders how their funds have been used, and how funds might be constructively used in future to further the democratisation of governmental and developmental processes.

The consultants are grateful to all of the individuals and organizations who were able to spare time to discuss with us their experiences and perceptions of the CACP. They are too many to name here, but they are listed in Annex B. Our role as consultants has been in part to collate the many incisive comments made to us in our many discussions around the country. There are few suggestions here which have not been made by one or other of our interviewees.

We are grateful to the CEC and KT for the assistance they provided. At KT's head office we have been extensively assisted by Spencer Malongete, Pam Hameise and Muzwandile Lumka. We are grateful also to the staff of the KT regional offices who met with us and helped to schedule appointments with projects. Kagiso Trust organised a reference group for the consultants which on two occasions generously criticised early drafts of the report.

It has not been easy to co-ordinate the work of three consultants based in Cape Town, London and Johannesburg. Our research was originally divided on a geographical basis. Jeremy Seekings examined the CACP in Cape Town, the Eastern Cape and Border, and parts of the Orange Free State. Khehla Shubane examined the CACP in the Transvaal and Natal. David Simon conducted research in parts of the Transvaal, Southern Cape, and Cape Town. Most of the sections of the report were drafted by one or other of the consultants, and revised in light of comments from one or both of the other consultants. Jeremy Seekings was primarily responsible for sections 2.4, 3, 4, 5, 7.1 and 8. David Simon was primarily responsible for sections 1, 2.2 and 2.3, 6.6, 7.2 and 7.3, and 10. Jeremy Seekings and David Simon drafted the rest of section 6. Khehla Shubane was primarily responsible for section 9 and the executive summary, and made extensive inputs into sections 3.3 and 5.

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ACRONYMS

AIC	Arbetarrerelsens Internationella Centrum (International Centre of the Swedish Labour Movement)
ANC	African National Congress
ATP	Administrative Training Programme
AZAPO	Azanian Peoples Organisation
BC	Black Consciousness
BESG	Built Environment Support Group
BOCCO	Border Civics Congress
CACP	Civic and Advice Centre Programme
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CAHAC	Cape Areas Housing Action Committee
CAJ	Civic Association of Johannesburg
CAST	Centre for Community and Labour Studies
CEC	Commission of the European Communities
CEI	Community Education and Information
CETCA	Central Transvaal Civics Association
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
Cradora	Cradock Residents Association
CRIC	Community Resource and Information Centre
DAG	Development Action Group
DVRA	Duncan Village Residents Association
EC	European Community
ECCO	Eastern Cape Civics Organisation
FCCA	Federation of Cape Civic Associations
FCR	Foundation for Contemporary Research
HAP	Human Awareness Programme
JORAC	Joint Rent Action Committee

ACRONYMS

KT	Kagiso Trust
LEAP	Legal Education Action Programme
NACA	Natal Advice Centres Association
NDF	National Development Forum
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NIM	Network of Independent Monitors
PEBCO/PEPCO	Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (later People's Civic Organization)
PLTP	Para-Legal Training Project
RAT	Rural Advice Training Group
SACBC	Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SANAM	South Africa / Namibia Standing Committee for NGOs
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisation
SCA	Soweto Civic Association
SCAT	Social Change Assistance Trust
SCLC	Southern Cape Land Committee
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SPD	Soweto People's Delegation
SPP	Surplus Peoples Project
TOACA	Trans-Orange Advice Centre Association
TRAC	Transvaal Rural Action Committee
UDF	United Democratic Front
USN	Urban Sector Network
WCCA	Western Cape Civic Association

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1. This report evaluates the Civics and Advice Centre Programme (CACP), funded primarily by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC), and administered through the Kagiso Trust (KT) over the period 1987-92. The report also offers recommendations for the future development of the CACP.

Background to the CACP

2.1. The Kagiso Trust was founded in 1985 to channel funds from the CEC's Special Programme for the Victims of Apartheid to appropriate organisations and projects within South Africa. The Special Programme's objective was 'the complete abolition of apartheid as a whole, not just certain components of the system.'

2.2. The objective of the CACP was to support advice centres and civic associations ('civics'). This included some support for training organisations and technical service groups which assisted advice centres and civic associations.

2.3. A total of over R 13 mn was disbursed through the CACP. The Transvaal and Natal have accounted for the largest shares of CACP funds.

2.4. Kagiso Trust has itself undergone major changes since the mid-1980s, reflecting many of the broader changes in South Africa. From a small organisation, with a staff of two, it has grown into a significant development agency employing over sixty people with offices throughout the country.

2.5. The CACP has also undergone major changes. In the late 1980s, KT relied on informal evaluation procedures, and did not require stringent accounting from advice centres and civics funded through the CACP. In the early 1990s, KT has implemented a more formal set of procedures, with regard to both its evaluation of applications for funding and projects' accounting for funds.

Historical Background

3.1. The organisations assisted through the CACP have themselves also evolved with the ever changing context over the last fifteen years. Section 3 of this report provides an overview of the historical development of civics, advice centres, and training and technical support organisations.

3.2. Civic organisations in South Africa have always comprised a diverse category. They have differed in terms of origins, organisational structure, leadership and support bases, strategies and tactics, and general character. But they have shared a number of important features.

3.3. Since the 1980s many civics have shifted from primarily protest-oriented activities to more development-focused work.

3.4. Civics have achieved remarkable successes over certain issues and have promoted political change, particularly in the urban sector where they have existed for the longest. In the early to mid-1980s, for instance, civics mobilised large numbers of people around civic issues, thereby re-establishing a tradition of civic activism outside of and in

opposition to state structures. In the 1990s, civics have pioneered new forms of community participation in urban development.

3.5. At the same time, however, most civics have had important weaknesses. Many have remained dependent on a handful of activist leaders; when these leaders were detained or otherwise distracted, civics often lapsed into inactivity. Whilst civics have claimed to represent the 'community', their support has not been evenly spread across township populations. Civics have also rarely escaped their identification with Chartist politics.

3.6. Advice centres have also comprised a heterogeneous grouping, differing in terms of their origins, subsequent development, operating styles and concerns, and management structures. Regional variations are particularly striking. In Cape Town, the P.W.V. and Natal, advice centres proliferated in the 1980s. Since 1990 they have proliferated in small towns (especially in the Eastern Cape and Border).

3.7. Training and technical service organisations grew at the end of the 1980s and especially the early 1990s in response to the changing concerns of civics and advice centres. Besides providing training, service organisations have 'serviced' new skill, research and informational needs.

3.8. There are currently about twenty such organisations in the country, the largest of which is Planact (based in Johannesburg). They have generally been regionally-based (but have recently developed national networks).

3.9. The relationship between service organisations and their 'clients' (civics and advice centres) have varied. Some developed as an integral part of the civic and advice centre movement, whilst others remained organisationally independent.

The funding of civics

4.1. Civics received a total of almost R 4 mn through the CACP. The largest share went to Natal, followed by the Western Cape. The major recipients were umbrella organisations (at either regional or metropolitan levels), and inner-city civics.

4.2. Civics in the metropolitan areas seem to have benefited the most. It is difficult to be exact, however, because most of the umbrella civic structures did employ organisers for the small towns.

4.3. Civics have received substantial sums from diverse other sources besides the CACP.

4.4. The funding of civics (as well as advice centres and training and technical service organisations) under the CACP has been marked by controversy. Recipients of funds have complained about: delays in KT's processing of applications; the size of grants from KT; and KT's growing insistence on reporting for funds.

4.5. Few civics have adequately accounted for funds received under the CACP. Expenditure has been overly-concentrated in personnel costs, with too few resources expended on educational and similar activities.

4.6. External funding enabled civics to participate in a range of activities, particularly those specialist activities, such as negotiations, which grew in importance after 1990.

But the effect of funding on organisational development has been ambiguous. Organisational procedures and strategic planning generally remained inadequate. In some cases, external funding has led to a reduced level of voluntary participation and, consequently, a weakening of local level organisation.

The funding of advice centres

5.1. The CACP has been one of the major sources of funds for advice centres. Between 1987 and 1992 over R8 mn was disbursed through the CACP to 89 advice centres country-wide and five advice centre umbrella organisations.

5.2. The largest concentration of funds has been in the metropolitan areas of the P.W.V. and Natal. These have accounted for almost half of the total CACP funds to advice centres. Since 1990 expenditure has been reoriented towards small towns, especially in the Eastern Cape.

5.3. Advice centres have received substantial funds through other channels, especially the Social Change Assistance Trust (SCAT) which has disbursed about as much funding as KT. SCAT has provided more regular funding for advice centres than KT.

5.4. The quality of accounting and reporting by most advice centres has been very poor. We are even aware of a few instances of apparent corruption. The quality of the management of advice centres varies enormously. The best managed advice centres were generally those with access to skilled personnel willing to work for low salaries. Civic-run advice centres have generally been characterised by very poor management.

5.5. The bulk of funding has been expended on personnel costs. Most advice centres have had a low volume of casework, and have undertaken little educational work in the community.

The funding of training and service organisations

6.1. Little emphasis was placed on training and technical support during the early stages of the CACP, when the primary objective was to sustain civics and advice centres in the face of state repression. However, the experience of the problems encountered by these organisations, coupled with the changing situation within South Africa, generated greater awareness of the need for such support.

6.2. A total of under R 2 mn was disbursed to training and service organisations through the CACP. KT also channeled a further R 17 mn to such organisations under other programmes.

6.3. This funding has assisted para-legal training courses, organisational and strategic planning training, and technical service organisations (especially involved in urban planning and development).

6.4. Whilst training activities have mushroomed since 1990, there is still inadequate provision of training. This is especially true with respect to organisational training, strategic planning activities, and the transfer of professional skills through technical service organisations. Furthermore, much training activity has not produced the intended benefits to individuals or organisations.

Assessment of the CACP

7.1. Funding under the CACP contributed significantly to processes of political change in South Africa, at the national level in the late 1980s particularly, and at the local level in the early 1990s especially. It also contributed to the achievement of tangible improvements in living conditions, through both successful civic campaigns focused on collective problems and the casework of advice centres dealing with individuals' problems.

7.2. In the post-1990 period, funding under the CACP has helped civics and advice centres in the reconceptualisation and transformation of their roles. The activities of civics and advice centres have also helped build or maintain the foundations of mass participation in the future institutions of a democratic post-apartheid South Africa.

7.3. The funding of civics and advice centres also involved major problems. There has been inadequate accounting for funds. Funds were overly concentrated in personnel costs, with too little spent on public education and workshops. This has fostered organisational dependence on external funding, and undermined voluntary efforts. There is little evidence that direct grants to civics have enhanced their organisational capacity at the local level.

7.4. Civics and advice centres have benefited from the various forms of training. It should be noted, however, that concerted training efforts for civics are a relatively recent phenomenon, having begun in earnest only with the greater emphasis on development work since 1990. The scale of need is extremely large. Also, the majority of courses and training workshops for civics have been too general and conducted at too basic a level.

7.5. The administration of the CACP by Kagiso Trust has improved significantly since 1990. This seems to be broadly true with regard to KT's processing of applications, monitoring the performance of projects, record-keeping, and general communication between KT and projects. KT's administration nonetheless still suffers from several weaknesses.

Recommendations on funding civics

8.1. Civics will continue to play an important role in South Africa. But their future role will probably be more limited than some people are boldly claiming now. Any future funding for civics should be aimed at enhancing civics' capacity to perform those tasks which they are best suited for, and are most likely to score successes.

8.2. The opportunities and constraints facing civics will soon change. Whilst there will continue to be important opportunities for civic action - in terms of taking up local grievances, and participating in local government and development - there will be new constraints. The most important of these will result from the democratisation of local government. Legitimate and democratically-elected non-racial local government will play some of the roles currently claimed by civics, as well as luring away many experienced civic leaders.

8.3. We recommend that future funding to civics should help civics become self-sustaining in financial and administrative terms. It is unlikely that many civics at the local level will be able to raise significant sums through their own, internal,

fund-raising (for example, through membership dues). The future of external funding is very uncertain. Civics should therefore be encouraged to rely more on skilled, voluntary personnel than on paid employees. There is a general need to improve civics' organisational capacity, developing a more efficient managerial organisation and culture.

8.4. The general emphasis of funding should therefore be on training and appropriate support. Only in the transitional period should funders consider financing personnel, and then only in connection with negotiations over local government and development.

Recommendations on funding advice centres

9.1. Advice centres in metropolitan areas have generally been less than impressive. It is in remoter small towns that advice centres seem to have made more of an impact, and where there will clearly continue to be a need for advice centres in future. We recommend that any future funding to advice centres should be concentrated in small towns and rural areas.

9.2. But even in small towns advice centres must also try to wean themselves away from foreign funding. Alternative local sources of funding need to be explored. More use should be made of volunteer personnel.

9.3. Advice centres need to develop more dynamic and effective management structures. We believe that funders should encourage advice centres to establish broad-based management committees, with civic representatives but not subordinate to civics. Special effort should be made to include people with managerial and financial skills.

Recommendations on funding training and technical support organisations

10.1. There is a clear need for continued efforts in the field of training and technical support. Indeed, we recommend that the bulk of outside funding to civics and advice centres should be channeled into training activities, to enhance the organisational capacity and reduce the dependence of civics and advice centres.

10.2. Training needs to be more clearly focused, intensive and sustained, to address the various specific needs of civic and advice centre personnel. The scale of training activities needs to be increased, and should include more on-the-spot and placement training.

10.3. There is a need for greater co-ordination between training organisations, more planning, and more follow-up and support.

10.4. Overall, we conclude that current and future circumstances warrant a more clearly focussed CACP than in the past. It should target specific gaps and weaknesses among civics and advice centres, concentrating on small towns and rural areas. The objective of the CACP in future should be to enable civics and advice centres to become self-sustaining.

1. INTRODUCTION

This report provides an evaluation of the Civics and Advice Centre Programme (CACP), funded primarily by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC), and administered through the Kagiso Trust (KT) over the period 1987-92. A total of over R13 mn has been disbursed to civic organisations, advice centres, and para-legal training programmes countrywide. This report also analyses the present condition and future prospects for civic organisations and advice centres, in the light of which it offers recommendations for the future development of the CACP.

During the life of the CACP, the situation in South Africa has changed dramatically. Since the unbanning of all political movements in February 1990 and the repeal of the key apartheid legislation, negotiations about the nature and substance of the 'new' South Africa have been underway. Over the same period politically related violence has reached unprecedented levels. This changing context has posed major challenges to civic organisations, advice offices and other community-based organisations in shifting their focus from the politics of resistance against state structures at least partially towards reconstruction and more development-oriented activities. These processes have, in turn, strained their capacities and resources and precipitated considerable debate about the entire future role of the civics and advice offices. Perhaps the central question now is how they will relate to future non-racial local and regional government structures.

Against this background, the Commission of the European Communities and Kagiso Trust commissioned this evaluation with the following terms of reference:

- to describe, briefly, the political and social context within which the Civics have developed;
- to evaluate the implementation of the European Community's support to the Civics movement and the extent to which these programmes have met their objectives; and
- to advise on how best the European Community, together with other donors both local and external might assist the development of civic and local government structures which are responsive to the needs of the communities which they serve.

It is necessary at the outset to clarify the scope of this study, i.e. what we understand the CACP to encompass, and what we mean by civic organisations and advice centres. The CACP, as administered by KT, involves funding from the CEC (a total of almost R9 mn in three phases) and from Scandinavian churches (almost R3 mn). An additional R1.7 mn has been made available by the CEC to civics and related organisations, outside of the CACP. Together with very limited funds from other sources, these total R13.6 mn. Since these various amounts have all been utilised to support essentially the same activities undertaken by the same recipient organisations, it is impracticable to isolate the impact of CEC funds through the CACP from other funds and this evaluation therefore covers the utilisation of all these sums.

The CEC has also provided a further R15 mn through KT to technical service organisations to fund their activities in support of civics (besides still further funding to service organisations involved in training, other than for para-legals). This report comments on one aspect of this, namely the relationship between civic organisations and technical service organisations.

Given their great diversity of form, role, effectiveness and prominence, the question ‘What is a civic?’ frequently arises. For the sake of analytical clarity, it is important to attempt a definition, although for purposes of this report we are concerned only with an already defined subset, namely those civics (and advice offices) funded under the CACP.

In general terms, civics may be defined as non-governmental, community-based organisations seeking to represent their constituency in civic affairs and to assert their rights to more adequate infrastructure and services. South Africa has had a long history of civic organisations in its African locations and townships and its coloured and Indian areas, as well as its white suburbs. These have been variously called residents’, ratepayers’ or civic associations, and in the past vigilance associations as well. In some white suburbs they now tellingly call themselves property-rights associations.

In contemporary South Africa, however, the term ‘civic organisation’ or ‘civic’ has taken on a more specific meaning, referring to the large and diverse number of ‘radical’ civics which were established from the late 1970s and particularly during the 1980s. These civics were based in African, coloured and Indian areas, i.e. among those South Africans excluded from full or all participation in the institutions of government. The ‘radical’ civics combined a concern with civic issues with a commitment to fundamental political change, and their formation and growth were in part a response to the state’s suppression of most other forms of extra-parliamentary opposition. Most of these civics saw themselves as aligned with the banned liberation movements, and especially with the African National Congress. The term ‘civic’ has thus taken on a specific meaning in the shadow of apartheid.

The commitment of civics to national political change has helped to shape their character at the local level in very concrete ways. Township-based civics have thus not only been outside of government, as have their counterparts in white residential areas for example, but have generally been deeply opposed to existing local (as well as central) government structures! In practice, some township-based civics had a more ambiguous relationship with the local state than is often thought, but even these retained their underlying objective of abolishing segregated local government structures and building more democratic institutions in their place.

Civics exist at different geographical scales, from the individual township, hostel or shack area, through sub-regional (zonal) and regional to national umbrella structures. These structures together are referred to as the ‘civic movement’. The roots and main strength of the civic movement lay at the grassroots, where civics organised around local grievances or problems. More recently the need for liaison and united action has stimulated the formation of sub-regional, regional and national umbrella organisations. This process culminated in the establishment in March 1992 of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), to which most existing and new regional and zonal civics have affiliated within a unitary structure. It is sometimes said that the strength of the civic movement has shifted from the grassroots to these higher levels in some regions.

Civics also differ in terms of their organisational structures, and their ambitions or concerns. Most civics at the local level originated as groups of energetic activists who articulated widely-held grievances, thus representing the ‘community’ in an indirect sense. These lobbied, in a range of ways, local government, and can be termed

'lobbying civics'. Increased participation led to some civics developing, especially in the mid-1980s, into what we can term 'mass-participatory civics'. In some cases mass participation was formalised through street and area committees in the different parts of the township where the civic was based. Such civics claimed to represent the 'community' in a very direct way. Other civics were formed or developed as umbrella bodies or fora for local organisations concerned with different issues or sectors of the township population such as students or workers. The structure of civics thus varied considerably.

Just as civics comprise a diverse category, so a wide variety of advice offices exists in South Africa also. Besides citizens advice bureaux which historically were concerned primarily with the welfare problems of poor white people, over the last twenty-odd years a widespread movement has grown of advice centres based in African, coloured or Indian areas. Like civics, these have combined a concern with welfare issues (such as pensions and rent payments) and a concern with more clearly political issues such as police brutality and detention without trial. Indeed many of these advice offices have been linked to civic organisations.

The CACP and this report are concerned with these latter advice offices, which were based in townships or rural areas and were concerned with problems, whether affecting individuals or the whole community, whose root causes lay in the politics of apartheid.

The structure of the report reflects the terms of reference. Part A involves an evaluation of the CACP over the past six years. Section 2 provides some background on the Kagiso Trust and an overview of the nature and scope of the CACP. It provides some analysis of the patterns of disbursement of grants under the CACP. Section 3 sketches the history and evolution of civics, advice centres and related organisations against the political and social context within which they evolved. Sections 4 to 6 examine the utilisation of financial assistance by the civics, advice offices, and technical service or training organisations respectively.

In Section 7 we evaluate the CACP as a whole in relation both to the programme's objectives and to the current state of the civics and advice centre movement. Naturally, explicit account has to be taken of the dramatic changes undergone by the movement and the country at large over the period in question. The CACP began as a semi-clandestine package of financial sustenance to Victims of Apartheid facing state repression (for which KT was established). It has since evolved into a large, above ground programme geared increasingly to local community-centered development initiatives. The KT, too, has grown into a sizeable and formal development agency. Consequently, the level of record keeping, transparency and accountability now rightly required at all levels of the programme is a relatively recent innovation, and one to which not all beneficiaries have adapted with uniform ease. Conventional quantitative cost-benefit or rate of return criteria are therefore perforce inapplicable and our analysis is fundamentally qualitative.

Part B of this report further examines the current strengths and weaknesses of and delineates the future prospects for civics and advice centres. Each of sections 8, 9 and 10 provides guidelines, criteria and recommendations for further funding - of civics, advice offices and service or training organisations respectively. We conclude that current circumstances warrant a more clearly focussed programme than in the past, targeting specific gaps and weaknesses in the context of a sober and realistic assessment

of potential in each context. Since external funding cannot be expected to continue indefinitely, and this would be undesirable anyway, the principal objective of such assistance should be to enable these organisations to become increasingly self-sustaining. In other words, the assistance should be seen as a selective investment rather than an ongoing subsidy.

Increased importance needs to be attached to organisational and other skills within civics and advice centres, i.e. to their capacity to perform whatever tasks they are to take on board. A new organisational culture needs to be nurtured. Hence, for example, not only should greater emphasis be placed on training programmes and courses, but these need to be more flexible and contextualised to the needs of specific organisations and individual officials. Networking and information dissemination must take greater account of the particular problems facing rural and the more marginal areas (such as poor resources, isolation, skill attraction and retention). Responsiveness and accountability should be enhanced. KT could usefully adopt a more pro-active role with regard to the recipients of its funds.

This report argues that civics are unlikely to fulfil the idealistic and utopian dreams of some activists during the 1980s. But the role and nature of civics will continue to evolve in the light of changing circumstances, and their diversity will remain as much of a strength as a weakness. They, and the individuals within them, will respond differently to new challenges. With enhanced capacity, skills, and support, they can make a noteworthy contribution to the building of a stronger and more democratic civil society as well as a more representative and responsive state.

The second part of our study is intended to provide guidance to funders on how the opportunities and constraints facing civics and advice centres are likely to change, and on how funders can usefully provide assistance so as to promote democratic governmental and developmental processes. This study does not purport to be an in-depth analysis of the civic movement *per se*, and is certainly not intended to be a prescriptive analysis of or for the civic movement.

The strengths and weaknesses of our evaluation of the CACP reflect in part the available sources on which we have drawn. These include:

- extensive interviews with a representative sample of CACP recipients as well as CEC and KT staff and a range of other individuals and organisations involved with civics, advice centres or service organisations;
- project records, supporting documentation and reports;
- the available secondary literature.

Unfortunately, the secondary literature is very limited. Indeed, we have not been able to find **any** prior studies of advice offices, notwithstanding the large sums of money channelled to them through Kagiso Trust and other funding agencies. Furthermore, the diversity of civics and advice centres means that inevitably there will be many whose particular experiences, strengths and weaknesses are inadequately addressed in this study.

The issues discussed in this report are of great importance to the civic movement, advice centres and service organisations in South Africa. They warrant much wider public debate than hitherto. We have been particularly struck by the apparent lack of

major analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of civics and advice centres, and of the varied experiences of funding these. We hope that Kagiso Trust and the European Community will make the final report of this evaluation as widely available as is appropriate to promote and facilitate constructive public debate.

PART B:

EVALUATION OF THE CIVIC AND ADVICE CENTRE PROGRAMME, 1987-1992

PART A:

EVALUATION OF THE CIVIC AND ADVICE CENTRE PROGRAMME, 1987-1992

2. THE CIVIC AND ADVICE CENTRE PROGRAMME

2.1 Background: the Kagiso Trust

The Kagiso Trust (KT) was established by the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC) in May 1985 for the express purposes of channeling funds from the European Community's Special Programme for the Victims of Apartheid to appropriate organizations and projects within South Africa. The Programme's objective was 'the complete abolition of apartheid as a whole, not just certain components of the system'.

The atmosphere in South Africa at the time was extremely repressive, with a state of emergency in force over the next few years. Many leading SACC and SACBC figures, as well as community activists were either in prison or hiding, and the basis of KT's operations had to be highly confidential. Records and documentation were kept to a minimum, with briefcases serving as mobile filing cabinets.

KT commenced with just two staff, working out of the SACC head office in Johannesburg. The 1986 budget comprised R 10 mn for thirty projects, and it grew steadily over the following years. 1990 proved a watershed for KT as for South Africa as a whole, in view of the dramatic changes occurring under President F.W. de Klerk, especially following the unbanning of the proscribed organisations and freeing of political prisoners in February that year. Hence KT began a deliberate process of evolution from being a covert funder of victims of apartheid to becoming a non-governmental development agency. It was perceived as important to shift the emphasis away from dependence on external financial support to the promotion of community-based initiatives and empowerment.

Additional staff were recruited and five regional offices were opened. The offices in Johannesburg (covering the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Northern Cape), Cape Town (Western Cape), and Durban (Natal) were opened in 1987. The Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape) office was opened the following year, and the King William's Town (Border) office was only opened in early 1991. The rationale behind this regional division remains unclear, but the Transvaal regional office struggles under a disproportionate share of the national workload. By 1992, a total of 62 staff were employed and the annual budget had risen to R 300 mn. The organization has accordingly adopted formal, open operating procedures appropriate to transparency and accountability as required by external donors. The same characteristics are now required of organizations and projects funded by KT. In evaluating KT or any of the specific programmes administered by it, due sensitivity to this historical context and operating environment is essential.

Although the EC remains the largest source of KT funds, money has been received from several other donors, including Scandinavian churches, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Rockefeller Foundation, and the governments of Finland, France and Japan.

2.2 Outline of the CACP

The Civic and Advice Centre Programme is a programme for funding advice centres and civic organisations in South Africa. The programme has been administered by Kagiso Trust, with funding from the European Community's Special Programme on South Africa.

KT has administered European Community funds through three projects. Project 107 was in operation during 1987-88. It was followed by Project 185, which ran from January 1989 to June 1990. Finally, Project 295 operated during 1991-92. In addition, the CACP has received funds from Scandinavian churches through Kagiso Trust's Projects 274 and 306. Other funds from the CEC have been disbursed to civics and advice centres, but technically not through the CACP. To complicate the picture still further, some funds from other donors have also been disbursed to civics and advice centres. For convenience we refer to the combined total of these expenditures as the CACP. This report comprises an evaluation of this entire CACP as there is no sensible way of separating out the different components. Furthermore, the CEC and other donors have disbursed funds through KT to technical service and training organisations which have supported civics and advice centres.

The operation of the CACP has comprised two broad phases which might be considered as protest-oriented and development-oriented respectively. During the 1987-89 period the CACP seems to have funded civics and advice centres with little regard to the ways in which these actually operated or needed to operate. The concern seems to have been as much to ensure the continued operation of civic activists as to promote effective civic struggles and advice provision. There was little critical assessment of the Programme during this period, reflecting KT's staff constraints and the need for secrecy in the face of direct state repression.

In 1990 the CACP shifted to a more developmental approach, which involved a broader role for civics. A key moment in this shift was a conference convened by KT in January 1990 on the theme of 'From Opposing to Governing - How Ready is the Opposition?' During 1990 Kagiso Trust grappled with the challenge of reformulating its role along developmental lines. This was reflected in the documentation on the CACP. Reports became more critical, exploring the weaknesses as well as the successes of civics and advice centres. Increased emphasis was placed on training.

More recently thinking about civics has again shifted. It is widely believed that most civics lack the capacity at present to perform a broad developmental role. The question has become: is it realistic to expect that the civic movement can increase its capacity, particularly in light of expected developments in national and local politics? This evaluation represents a contribution to this debate.

2.3 Objectives of the CACP

The initial objective of the CACP was set out in vague terms as 'to improve the legal and social position of the local population by supporting Advice Centres and Civic Associations all over the country'. In 1990 the objectives were clarified and extended. The original objectives were reformulated as:

“1. to sustain and improve the capacities of local organisations providing advice to citizens on their rights as tenants, employees, pensioners, or those in litigation.

2. to sustain and improve the capacities of local and civic organisations of citizens and residents to consult each other and articulate their concerns to appropriate authorities.”

Two further objectives were added:

“3. to strengthen the capacities of umbrella and service bodies offering training, advice and a networking service with [civic] organisations (and advice centres).

4. to support the processes of research, planning and policy generation in order to underpin a major shift towards developmental needs in a rapidly changing South Africa.”

The developmental focus was thus incorporated, although not explicitly in terms of the activities of civic organisations themselves.

2.4 Funds disbursed under the CACP

The European Community allocated a total of over ECU 3 million, which converted to a total of about R 9 mn disbursed through the CACP (i.e. through projects 107, 185 and 295). The contribution of the Scandinavian churches to the CACP under projects 274 and 307 amounted to a total of just over R3 mn. Other funding from the CEC and other sources for civics and advice centres totalled over R1 mn. A total of over R 13 mn was thus disbursed.

2.4.1 Patterns of disbursement

A complete breakdown of projects funded under the CACP (including closely related programmes) is provided in Annex A. It must be noted that it has been difficult to obtain complete financial data concerning disbursements to projects, and the figures used in this report should not be viewed as definitive. Annexes A and E include some discussion of our problems in precisely determining disbursements under the CACP and related programmes. In this section we shall identify the major patterns in the disbursement of funds.

Table 2.1 overleaf provides a breakdown of disbursements by region and by category. Of the total disbursements of about R 13.6 mn, advice offices (and their umbrella organizations) received 60 percent, civic or residents organizations (and their umbrella organizations) about 29 percent, training programmes a further 9 percent, with other projects accounting for the remaining 2 percent.

In terms of regions, the Transvaal and Natal accounted for the largest shares, with about 25 percent of the total each. The Western Cape accounted for 20 percent, with 11 percent and 10 percent of the disbursements going to projects in the Border and Eastern Cape respectively. The Orange Free State accounted for only 7 percent, and the Northern Cape for a lowly 2 percent.

TABLE 2.1: DISBURSEMENTS BY REGION

Region	Total	Advice centres	Residents organisations	Training programmes	Others
Border	R'000	R'000	R'000	R'000	R'000
E.Cape	1489	1142	125	222	
Natal	1327	724	442		161
W.Cape	3243	1962	1281		
OFS	2772	697	999	997	79
N.Cape	962	537	425		
PWV	232	157	75		
Other Tvl	1832	1573	259		
Tvl/N.Cp/OFS rgn	1146	1023	123		
National	377	377			
Total	186		186		
	13566	8191	3920	1219	240

Note: 1. 'Tvl/N.Cp/OFS rgn' includes umbrella organisations covering the whole region.

Table 2.2 overleaf provides a breakdown of disbursements to advice centres and civics - the major categories within the CACP - by area, distinguishing between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. The metropolitan areas are here considered to include the PWV, Durban/Pietermaritzburg, East London, P.E./Uitenhage, and greater Cape Town. All OFS townships (including Botshabelo and Mangaung) have been categorised as non-metropolitan.

This breakdown is discussed further in sections 4 and 5. In summary, umbrella civic organisations accounted for as much as 34 percent of the total funds dispersed to civics. Umbrella advice centre organisations accounted for just 12 percent of the total funds disbursed to advice centres. Of the funds disbursed to individual advice centres, 46 percent went to a total of 41 advice centres in metropolitan areas and 54 percent to 48 advice centres in non-metropolitan areas. Of the funds disbursed to individual civics, 66 percent went to 16 civics in metropolitan areas, and 34 percent to 24 civics in non-metropolitan areas. In other words, funds to advice centres went to non-metropolitan areas slightly more than to metropolitan areas, whilst most funds to civics went to umbrella organisations and to individual civics in metropolitan areas. Small town civics were not funded substantially.

TABLE 2.2: DISBURSEMENTS TO ADVICE CENTRES AND CIVICS BY AREA

	Total funds	Metro		Non-metro		Umbrella structures funds
		no.	funds	no.	funds	
Advice centres		R'000		R'000		R'000
Border	1142	2	283	8	859	
E.Cape	724	3	141	18	583	
Natal	1962	8	1093	3	405	464
W.Cape	697	6	234	4	309	153
OFS	537			5	537	
N.Cape	157			1	157	
PWV	1573	22	1573			
Other Tvl	1023			9	1023	
Tvl/N.Cp/OFS rgn	377					377
Total advice centres	8191	41	3324	48	3873	994
Civics						
Border	125					125
E.Cape	442	3	163	1	42	238
Natal	1281	6	836	1	16	429
W.Cape	999	4	326	2	143	529
OFS	425			15	425	
N.Cape	75			2	75	
PWV	259	3	259			
Other Tvl	123			3	123	
Tvl rgn	15					15
National	186					
Total civics	3930	16	1584	24	824	1336

Notes:

1. Some of the funds to umbrella advice office structures were passed on to individual advice offices (this was especially true of NACA); the total number of advice offices funded was therefore higher than 89.
2. See page 10 for our definition of metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.
3. 'Tvl/N.Cp/OFS rgn' includes umbrella organisations covering the whole KT administrative region, which includes the Transvaal, OFS and Northern Cape. 'Tvl rgn' includes umbrella organisations in the Transvaal only.
4. 12 civics are involved in the OFS Civic Programme; 4 projects in the OFS therefore cover a total of fifteen civics.
5. Whilst the umbrella civic structures were based in metropolitan areas, they also covered non-metropolitan areas. This was, to a lesser extent, true of the advice office umbrella structures.

2.4.2 Funding Criteria

Initially the funding criteria were essentially political, in that potential recipient organizations had to subscribe to the principles of non-racialism and (ostensibly) non-partisanship. KT staff report that it has always been a principle to fund only bodies which are broadly representative of their community. In other words, no funding should be made available where two or more rival bodies are contesting a particular terrain (even if they subscribe to different political principles and have different agendas) until they have united.

In practice, however, these criteria have been applied pragmatically, with a persistent bias in favour of the mainstream of broadly Chartist-oriented organizations, including both civics and advice centres. The great majority of active civics and advice centres have been Chartist-inclined. But several non-Chartist civics and advice centres would arguably have met KT's formal criteria, and it is to be regretted that they do not seem to have applied for funds.

In line with the transformation in South Africa and the evolution of KT as a development agency, the funding criteria for all projects and organisations have now been formalised as follows:

- they should promote and practice non-racialism;
- they should foster unity among people of different racial, ethnic and cultural backgrounds;
- they should contribute to peaceful and fundamental change towards a democratic South Africa;
- they must be community-based, i.e. communities and representative community organisations must participate meaningfully at policy and decision-making levels, and wide ranging community consultation must take place at each stage;
- they must help to develop the understanding, skills and values needed by a democratic South African society;
- they should benefit disadvantaged groups, and people most likely to serve the community;
- they must draw upon community-based resources (including local fundraising, donated labour services, and subscriptions) as well as external assistance.

Moreover, projects and organizations able to attract funding from governmental sources have not been supported. KT also has not funded political activities or parties (although it should be noted that many of the employees of civics and advice centres were activists in the so-called mass democratic movement).

In 1992 the following additional screening criteria were added, reflecting the changing context and developing objectives of the CACP:

- cost effectiveness;
- funds cannot be used to generate profits or benefits for individuals, either directly or indirectly;
- administration costs are usually avoided; where exceptions are made such costs may not exceed six to eight percent of the total project costs;

- the erection of buildings is not normally funded;
- meetings, conferences, publications or research by individuals for the attainment of university degrees, and research not beneficial to the majority of the population are also not funded (Kagiso Trust, 1992a, 1992b).

Sections 4 to 7 below provide some commentary on the application of these criteria in practice.

2.4.3 KT Appraisal Procedures

During the early years of the CACP, limitations of staff and staff time, coupled with the need to maintain secrecy, meant that appraisal procedures were brief and informal. Once applications had been approved, KT relied very heavily on the European-based South Africa/Namibia Standing Committee for NGOs (SANAM), a grouping of progressive European NGOs, to secure funds for recipient organizations and to evaluate progress. KT staff could perforce offer little support or assistance in the field.

In principle, KT-approved project applications were forwarded to the SANAM Secretariat, where they were examined and divided among European NGOs as appropriate. These NGOs then rewrote the applications into suitable format for submission to DG VIII of the CEC in Brussels. The Commission then steered proposals through the formal approval procedures, including the Expert Group - a consultative mechanism which provides an opportunity for member states to express an opinion on projects. Once proposals have been approved, the relevant NGO then administered them.

In practice, three distinct channels seem to have operated: SANAM dealt with a group of secular NGOs, while the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC) directed other projects to the Catholic agency network in Europe (including for example CAFOD), and the South African Council of Churches fed applications to Protestant church organisations in Europe such as the Danish NGO Danchurchaid. These channels also handled other KT projects outside the CACP.

Once KT began evolving into a development agency and project staff had been employed in its various regional offices, the organisation became far more active in the appraisal of funding applications and the monitoring of CACP recipients. Direct contact between SANAM members and recipient organisations appears to have ceased. Since we have not been able to examine the contract between KT and CAFOD (or other SANAM members), it is unclear whether any formal changes were made to give effect to this. After 1990, KT procedures further changed and evolved as the organisation expanded.

Initially this task was undertaken by the National Projects Committee, comprising the National Administrator (Spencer Malongete), Projects Director (Vincent Mogane) and several Projects Officers. A Projects Officer would assess each application, referring it back for amendment or improvement if necessary. The track record of the applicant organisation or project was also checked against KT records on its computerised database. If the Committee approved the application, it was then sent for final approval by the regional KT trustees before the disbursement of funds.

Since the beginning of 1992, KT has devolved much of the appraisal and monitoring onto its five regional offices. Applications coming from individual communities or local organisations are now sent direct to the appropriate regional office, where they are

assigned to a Projects Officer for checking (and amendment if necessary) in conjunction with the Regional Director. The applications are then screened by the relevant Regional Projects Committee and the regional Trustees. Each regional committee comprises the National Projects Director, the National Projects Administrator, the Regional Director and the Regional Projects Officers. These regional committees have replaced the National Projects Committee, and make recommendations to the National Directorate and/or Board of Trustees. Applications for national projects are screened by the National Technical Committee and/or the National Directorate at KT Head Office. One or more of the National Directorate, National Technical Committee and Board of Trustees must approve each application prior to it being forwarded to foreign funders for final ratification and financing.

Project appraisal is based on the soundness of the proposal (alterations can be requested) and evidence of the applicant organisation's ability to keep at least basic records and accounts. Recipients of KT funds must undertake to submit regular (at least six-monthly) narrative reports on their activities and summary financial accounts for the sums received.

Regional Projects Officers are also supposed to visit recipient organisations in the field on a regular basis in order to assess progress and discuss any problems which may have arisen. It is often necessary to chase up overdue reports or financial statements from recipients. Officers are expected to spend 80 per cent of their time in the field and to write reports on each field visit for the respective project file. The Regional Directors supervise and bear ultimate responsibility for all facets of the work undertaken by their staff.

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3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Civic organisations, advice centres and service organisations have operated in an ever-changing context over the last ten to fifteen years. This section provides some background and brief analysis of the historical development of the organisations targeted by the CACP. It should be noted that there is still little documentation on civics, whether by outside scholars or participants; interpretations of the civic movement as a whole therefore often need to be refined or even substantially revised in the light of new research, especially from hitherto neglected areas.

3.1 The civic movement

Civic organisations of one kind or another have a long history in South Africa. From the first decades of the twentieth century, if not earlier, urbanisation has been accompanied by the formation of non-governmental organisations which have taken up urban problems such as housing, municipal services and crime. The exclusion of black South Africans from those government structures which have controlled significant resources has provided further impetus to organisations operating outside of state structures.

The civic organisations which are a familiar feature of the political landscape in South Africa today are, however, of comparatively recent origin. Very few contemporary civic organisations in historically black-populated areas predate 1979, and most date from either the early and mid-1980s or 1990-91. Like their predecessors, these civics represented an organisational response to apartheid, dealing with problems rooted in or exacerbated by apartheid policies. But these civics were in important respects the product of conditions specific to the last fifteen or so years. Some of these conditions are, in turn, the result of the struggles waged by the civic movement.

In general terms the conditions facing civic organisations have remained constant: inadequate or expensive housing, urban infrastructure and municipal services; largely illegitimate and powerless local government structures; and exclusion from the heart of central government. In detail, however, the conditions have changed significantly. The recent history of civic organisations can be divided into six broad periods, notwithstanding regional and sub-regional variations. Both the context within which civics operated and the activities of the civic movement varied between these periods.

Between 1977 and 1983 civic organisations were established or revitalised in their present form, in response to changes in terms of housing and urban development, local government, and the political strategies employed in the struggle for liberation. Many if not most civic organisations at this time were based in coloured and Indian areas, with relatively few in African townships. During 1983-84 civics were formed in more African townships around more political concerns, especially boycotts of township council elections in late 1983. But it was during the township revolt of 1984-1986 that civics proliferated in African townships. Many township councils collapsed, civics entered wide-ranging negotiations with state institutions and business groups, and in some cases began to set up alternative governing structures of 'people's power'. At the same time, however, many civics in coloured and Indian areas began a long process of decline.

Repression under the State of Emergency paralysed most civics, but continued struggles over rent and other civic issues led to their re-appearance at the end of the decade. Since 1989 many new civics have been formed, including in hitherto largely quiescent areas, although few civics in coloured or Indian areas have regained their former prominence. Old and new civics alike have been involved in extensive negotiations over rent boycotts and local government restructuring, and in debate over their role in the transitional and later post-apartheid South Africa. In the year since early 1992 the civic movement has travelled further down this path; progress has been both facilitated and somewhat confused by the formation of a national civic structure, the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO).

3.1.1 1979-83

Radical civics emerged during the period 1979-83, mostly in the major metropolitan areas. The first to be launched was the Soweto Civic Association, in September 1979. Other notable civic structures formed in this period included: the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO); the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC), Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA) and Federation of Cape Civic Associations (FCCA), all based in Cape Town; the Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation and Cradock Residents Association (CRADORA) in the Eastern Cape; and the Durban Housing Action Committee and Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) in Natal. Most of these were umbrella bodies, incorporating more locally-based civics or residents associations.

The formation of civic organisations reflected several factors which can be broadly traced to the 1976-77 uprisings. For radical opponents of apartheid, the state's successful repression of the 1976-77 protests emphasised the need for more thorough organisation. This lesson was learnt both within the country and outside by the exiled African National Congress. Civics formed part of a growing network of organisations which were to mobilise and radicalise opposition. Secondly, the state's post-Soweto reform of urban and local government policies generated new grievances around which civic organisations could mobilise. Foremost among these were increases in rents and service charges, coupled with discontent with local government structures.

Civics represented alternatives to the increasingly discredited local government structures, whether these were community councils in the townships or management committees or local affairs committees in coloured and Indian areas. They provided an alternative channel for the expression of discontent and for mediation between residents and the state, served as a watchdog over councils, and contested local government's claim to represent the 'community'. At this stage civics varied in their degree of opposition to the councils; a growing number boycotted state structures, but some important civic leaders were still prepared to work with councils, and even to stand against them in elections. Civic organisations also became centres of opposition to the central state, to bantustan authorities, and to parties such as the coloured Labour Party which participated in central and local state structures.

Although most of these civics saw themselves in permanent terms, as mouthpieces for the 'community' and watchdogs over local government, their activities were generally limited to intermittent campaigns against rent increases, with long periods of passivity in between. At this stage simply keeping the organisation going was a challenge, as few areas had yet developed a deep-rooted culture of activism and defiance. The major achievement of civics was thus to revive a tradition of civic protest and organisation,

and reassert the possibility of defying the state. Civics were sometimes successful in postponing rent increases but were unable to challenge the underlying state policies which linked development to rent increases.

3.1.2 1983-1985

Between 1983 and mid-1985 the importance and role of civics were transformed. From leading intermittent and unevenly successful campaigns against rent increases, civics became pivotal organisations in many townships. The context for this shift was one of mounting political protest and conflict, together with the intensification of key socio-economic grievances. In 1983 the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed to co-ordinate opposition to the proposed Tricameral Parliament and the new urban policies included in the 'Koornhof Bills'. In mid-1984 large numbers of people protested against elections to the Tricameral Parliament, whilst growing numbers of students protested against inadequate education. In late 1984 protests against rent increases provided the spark for violent confrontation.

Local government elections provided further impetus for the formation of new township civics such as the Vaal Civic Association. Most civics campaigned against the elections, calling for boycotts on both national grounds (because the councils were a substitute for national political rights) and local grounds (because councils were corrupt, lacked resources, and were responsible for rent increases and the lack of development). In a few townships, particularly Cradock, civic leaders began to build hierarchies of street and area committees within the township.

The period 1983-1984 was characterised by high profile campaigns over national political issues, especially against elections to township councils and the Tricameral Parliament, as well as widespread struggles at the local level over rent increases and school grievances. Civic activists sought to mobilise civic protests as part of the national liberation struggle as well as in pursuit of socio-economic demands.

Increased national and regional coordination and direction were provided through the United Democratic Front together with more informal networks. But although some UDF leaders actively promoted the formation of civics, and improved coordination served as a general encouragement, the UDF and other national political organisations generally prioritised more overtly political struggles and neglected civic issues. The rising prominence of civics was the result of changes at the township level as much as of national strategies and co-ordination. As opposition to township councils grew and many councillors resigned, support rose for civics as alternatives.

3.1.3 1985-1986

The period 1985-86 was characterised by escalating repression, confrontation, and revolt. The state called a partial and later a nationwide State of Emergency in attempts to contain the spreading insurrection. Township-based civics played an important part in these struggles, but their growing importance was in part due to changing local conditions over which the civics themselves rarely had much control.

Civics played an important role in escalating opposition in the townships to municipal councillors, who were widely regarded as government stooges. Many councillors resigned, and councils became inquorate. Rent boycotts put increased pressure on local state structures, and consumer boycotts put pressure on local businessmen to support

political and economic change. Through such boycotts civics became widely involved in negotiations with local businessmen and state officials. Several white municipalities, including Port Alfred and East London, proposed taking over the administration of local townships in conjunction with local civics. These early local level negotiations were scuppered by the central state.

In a few townships civics developed loosely subordinate hierarchies of area and street committees, which performed many local government functions. These included the provision of services such as refuse collection and (more controversially) policing and dispute settlement (in "people's courts"). Even during the period of "people's power", the prominence of civics exceeded their direct importance. The grand rhetoric concerning "people's power" involved unrealisable ambitions, as the state proved more robust and the democratic opposition more fragile than imagined. Civics were unable to maintain their authority against the coercive force employed by the state.

A major impetus to change during this period came from the militancy of the youth. This posed problems for civics as well as opening up new opportunities for them. In many areas civics maintained an uneasy relationship with the local youth congresses (and it was unclear how much authority even the youth congresses had over many of the township youth). During 1985-86 many civics' activities were shaped by the need to restore some kind of order within townships in response to the militancy of the youth as much as to the vacuum created by the widening collapse of local government. "People's power" was thus a response to both the breakdown of formal local state structures and the lack of discipline among the militant youth and "comtsotsis".

Civics experienced increasing repression during this period. Civic leaders were detained; meetings and other activities were widely prohibited. In mid-1985 Cradock civic leaders, including Matthew Goniwe, disappeared, almost certainly the victims of covert policing. In late 1985 and early 1986 state-sponsored vigilantes disrupted civic activities in a number of townships.

3.1.4 1986-1989

Civics were among the primary targets of state repression under the successive nationwide States of Emergency from June 1986. Large numbers of activists were detained, including almost everyone involved at the street committee level in townships such as Duncan Village (East London). Civic leaders from a number of townships were charged in court with treason, sedition or subversion. Detentions and trials drove other activists underground and often into inactivity. Disappearances and assassinations continued. The state attempted to forcibly suppress those protests which continued, especially rent boycotts. Five civics – in Soweto, Port Elizabeth, Cradock, the Vaal Triangle and Western Cape – were among the organisations which the state effectively banned in February 1988.

The major forms of protest which persisted during the States of Emergency were stayaways, organised primarily through the trade union movement, and rent boycotts. The state sought to end rent boycotts through repression, although, perversely, repression sometimes served to strengthen civic organisation. In Soweto, where civic organisation had always been uneven and thin on the ground, the state's attempts to evict rent boycotters prompted the formation of street committees in certain areas. In general, however, repression had the desired effect of paralysing civic and other organisation, at least in the short-term. During 1987-89 some civics were deeply

divided, as former detainees clashed with leaders who had escaped detention to live in relative luxury in Johannesburg or elsewhere.

Most civics ended the decade in disarray, but some civics had begun to respond to state repression slowly but successfully. Responses involved local organisation-building as well as high-profile initiatives. The most prominent of the latter occurred in Soweto, with the formation of the Soweto People's Delegation in December 1988 (i.e. whilst the Civic Association was restricted). The Delegation took up the grievances underlying the rent boycott, commissioning research on urban issues and starting negotiations with state officials. Some of the policy positions developed or negotiated by the SPD (most obviously the demand for one tax base for the whole city) have since become adopted by the civic movement in general.

3.1.5 1989-1991

In mid and late 1989 opposition politics in South Africa was revitalised, and in 1990 was transformed with the release of key political prisoners and the unbanning of the ANC and other political organisations. This period has proved to be one of revival and transformation for civics. From mid-1989 civic organisations were revived, and many new civics were formed, including in hitherto unorganised metropolitan and bantustan areas (except KwaZulu). This organisational revival was accompanied by an upsurge in protests, including stayaways, consumer boycotts, and rent protests, and civics became involved in an unprecedentedly wide range of negotiations with state and other structures. In late 1990 the first regional civic structures were formed.

The prominence of civics in this period was in large part due to the deepening institutional and financial crisis of local government, which could in turn be attributed in part to the struggles led by civics in the past. The partial breakdown of township councils in the mid-1980s was overshadowed by their collapse in 1989-91. Having previously tried to end rent boycotts through repression, the state turned to negotiations with civics, as the only possible representative bodies who could persuade township residents to resume payment. Civics were themselves under growing pressure to negotiate when the state cut off services, including electricity and water, to townships where rents were generally boycotted. The most important agreement was the Soweto Accord signed in September 1990 between the Transvaal Provincial Administration, the various township councils in Soweto, and the Soweto People's Delegation.

From 1990 many civics became increasingly involved in development-related activities as well as political protests. Negotiations over rents or consumer boycotts widely led to negotiations over the more fundamental issue of local government restructuring. In a few townships civics were persuaded to participate directly in existing administrative structures, but for the most part this was rejected and civics demanded instead that they participate in negotiations over restructuring.

The unbanning of the ANC raised the question of the future of the UDF, of civics, and of their relationship with the ANC or other political parties. A broad consensus emerged that civics should continue to play a key role in a post-apartheid South Africa. The model of trade unions and their federation, COSATU, was widely cited: civics would look after township residents' civic grievances, ostensibly regardless of residents' party political loyalties, but would not participate in the electoral arena. In practice, however, there was often confusion and even conflict over the demarcation of roles between the ANC and civics. In some areas civics (such as the Reef) participated in local

government negotiations, whilst in others this role was performed by political parties (as in Port Elizabeth, not always to civics' satisfaction). Some dissenting views were raised about the role of civics in principle, primarily from Natal. They argued that political parties should take up civic issues, whether individually or in alliance, and that the efforts put into civic organisation would weaken parties, especially the ANC.

3.1.6 1992-1993

In March 1992, after almost ten years of intermittent planning, a national civic coordinating structure was formed. The immediate origins of SANCO lie in the dissolution of the UDF in August 1991. In its last year the UDF had nurtured the formation of regional civic structures in preparation for the formation of a national civic body. The most prominent of these was CAST (Civic Associations of the Southern Transvaal) formed in September 1990, although the Eastern Cape Civics Organisation (ECCO) was formed one month earlier. But in several other regions civic structures were fragmented or otherwise weak, and only formed regional organisations in 1991-92. A National Interim Civic Committee was formed in February 1991 to prepare for a national civic organisation.

In March 1992 the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) was finally launched, at a conference in Uitenhage. SANCO adopted a unitary structure, which has involved civics at the local and regional levels transforming themselves into branches of SANCO. The unitary structure has therefore attracted considerable criticism. Considerable resources have been invested in building the national office, in Bloemfontein, but most of the regional offices remain weak. With notable exceptions (such as the Civic Association of Johannesburg, CAJ) zonal structures are very weak and in some regions virtually non-existent.

The formation of SANCO has facilitated the involvement of civics in national level negotiations, whether over housing and other developmental issues or local government restructuring. It remains unclear, however, what impact SANCO has had on civics on the ground. Civics continue to vary considerably in strength, and hence in prominence. Whilse some continue to operate effectively, others are still struggling to reorient their focus away from local protest actions or are being undermined by internal struggles.

At the local level many civics have become involved in developmental processes. The Independent Development Trust (IDT, or 'Steyn Fund') and Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) have come to view 'community-participation' as an essential element in developmental projects, and have widely negotiated with or otherwise involved civics to achieve this goal. In some cases, civics have demanded that they be centrally involved in both public and private sector developmental projects.

A recent study discusses several such initiatives (Atkinson 1992). For example, the Jouberton Civic Association is the key participant in the local Klerksdorp Community Development Trust, which is administering a range of development activities in Jouberton township. The Port Elizabeth People's Civic Organisation (Pepco) is centrally involved with private sector companies in the development of the huge Soweto-by-Sea shack settlement. This development is also administered through a Development Trust. Technical service organisations have played an essential advisory role in support of civics.

The number of training courses aimed at civics has spiralled in recognition of civic activists' need for new skills, including negotiating and developmental skills, and even governmental skills in anticipation or preparation for election or appointment to local state office. Some civic structures have organised their own courses; others have been organised for civics.

3.2 The character and structure of civic organisations

Civic organisations have varied enormously in terms of organisational structure, leadership and support bases, strategies and tactics, and general character. Even the radical civics which have predominated in the post-1979 period, some of which have been funded under the CACP, have been very diverse. This section provides a brief survey of this diversity.

3.2.1 The levels of civic organisation

Civic structures exist at several levels. Most civics have been rooted at the **local** level, i.e. corresponding to the individual township (or part thereof in the case of larger townships such as Khayelitsha or Guguletu in Cape Town; Soweto is itself a cluster of townships). It is at the local level that the membership is maintained, and most programmes are carried out. In metropolitan areas, however, umbrella civics have been more prominent. These include the Soweto Civic, which has branches in each of Soweto's constituent townships, PEBCO (now renamed PEPCO) in Port Elizabeth, and the WCCA and CAHAC in the Western Cape.

In 1990 the first **regional** civic coordinating structures were formed, and in 1992 SANCO was launched at the **national** level. SANCO has sought to rationalise civics into four levels: the national, regional, zonal, and local. The **zonal** level includes civics in neighbouring small towns, for example in the Albany region of the Eastern Cape. These levels provide coordinating roles. Not the least of these has been redistributing organisational and financial resources away from the major metropolitan areas to promote or strengthen new and weaker civics. Through their access to media and financial resources, and their involvement in high-profile negotiations and alternative policy formulation, the regional and national levels have recently taken on a prominence which sometimes seems to obscure local civics.

Fitting existing umbrella civics into this hierarchy has not been straightforward, and there remains some confusion and uncertainty. PEPCO is seen as a zonal structure, for example, although civics in Port Elizabeth's northern areas, which were historically coloured group areas, have an independent umbrella organisation. In the Western Cape, the WCCA dissolved in order to make way for a SANCO regional structure; the WCCA organised too widely to simply transform itself into a SANCO zonal structure, as PEPCO did. The Soweto Civic Association remains as an umbrella body poised between the local and the zonal levels, with the latter covering the whole Johannesburg area (through the Civic Association of Johannesburg, CAJ). In the Pretoria area it is unclear whether the Central Transvaal Civics Association (CETCA) should exist at the zonal, regional, or some other level.

The recent establishment of new levels of civic structures, combined with the assumption of new and diverse roles for the civic movement as a whole, has produced some confusion and even tension with regard to the division of roles and responsibilities between different levels. The leadership of local civics not only had to lead civics into

new directions, but also to manage relations with the other levels of the civic movement. Processes of accountability, decision-making, and so on have yet to be clarified fully.

This confusion seems to have been compounded with SANCO's decision, at its launch in March 1992, to adopt a unitary structure. Local civics should, according to SANCO policy, relaunch themselves as SANCO branches, with coordinating structures at zonal and regional levels converting themselves into SANCO structures at these levels. There has been considerable dissent over this, and several local, zonal and other umbrella groupings have been reluctant to participate fully. Dissenters generally support the idea of a federal structure, in which it is clear both that local civics do not lose their autonomy and that higher level structures are accountable downwards. There seems to be some understanding between the regional and national civic leadership over how SANCO's unitary structure should operate, and there has been little friction between these two levels.

3.2.2 The structure of civic organisations

The diversity of civic organisations is reflected in the different forms of structure at the local level. These different structural forms are appropriate to different roles, conditions and ambitions. We can identify three predominant forms, although in practice most civics have in fact involved a combination of these.

The **forum-type civic** serves as an umbrella organisation or forum for a range of local organisations and groups. It is thus indirectly representative of local residents, i.e. through other organisations. In the mid-1980s the Port Alfred Civic was structured like this, as an umbrella for the local students, women, youth, worker, and other organisations. Forum-type civics could potentially draw in groups as varied as burial societies, churches, sports groups and other voluntary associations.

The **mass-participatory civic** directly represents all residents, possibly through its own internal structures of street, yard, block or area committees. Through mass participation in elections, this kind of civic claims a far-ranging mandate, which extends beyond lobbying to decision-making and aspects of local administration. It thus directly competes with elected government structures in the sense that both claim a democratic mandate.

The **lobbying civic** is the kind of civic found in white, and many Indian and coloured areas in South Africa. It claims to be representative of the 'community' in the sense of presenting widely-held views on particular issues, but not in the sense of having a mandate derived from mass elections. This kind of civic has only a few unusually motivated residents as members, and serves as a lobbying organisation rather than a directly representative or decision-making structure.

South African township-based civics have generally claimed or aspired to be mass-participatory civics. Few civics actually provide residents with the opportunity to formally join as members; instead, residents have generally been considered to be members automatically by virtue of being 'members' of the 'community'. In important cases, some civics have indeed developed structures through which very large numbers of township residents participated. For the most part, however, township-based civics have been a combination of this kind of civic with aspects of the other two kinds. As civics have themselves repeatedly acknowledged, this has reflected the enormous

difficulties of translating their strong popular support into active participation in grass-roots organisation.

There were a number of reasons for the difficulties in building strong organisation. A major factor was state repression, or at least the understandable fear of such repression, which disrupted and constrained activity and inhibited prospective participants. Civic leaders were detained, jailed, and even assassinated; civic organisations were restricted, and meetings often banned. But the weakness of grass-roots organisation also reflected factors inherent in the civic movement (and which are likely to continue in future, as we discuss in section 8 of this report). Many civic activists understandably if impatiently prioritised national issues and a strategy of mobilisation over local issues and organisation-building. Mass meetings were often seen as a sufficient form of public participation, competitive leadership elections were generally regarded as a divisive and a luxury, and educational work (including the extension of leadership skills and experience) was often neglected.

Many civics remained dependent on the enthusiasm of a small number of activist leaders. Many residents expected civic leaders to take up issues without sustained involvement from residents themselves. The success of many radical civics in building up support and campaigning resulted in part from the broad range, high quality, and enormous energy of people involved in leadership. But when key leaders were distracted or detained then civics often lapsed into inactivity. These problems were often identified by civic leaders themselves, but rarely did leaders have the time and freedom to prioritise dealing with them. The growth in financial assistance and training provided by external organisations, including through the CACP, reflected widespread acknowledgement of the organisational problems many civics hitherto faced and the need for what became known as 'capacity-building'.

The more successful civics did engage in organisation-building and grass-roots campaigning. During the period of "people's power" in 1985-1986, and again since 1989, there was more extensive participation in street committees, meetings, and civic activity (although some of the better known examples involve atypical conditions). But the prominence and even effectiveness of many other civics belied their organisational weaknesses. The effect of external funding and training on civics will be assessed in subsequent sections of this report.

Civics claimed to represent the 'community', but their support was not evenly spread across township populations. Townships never comprised homogeneous and unfractured 'communities', and the potential for political division was accentuated by processes of development and class formation in the 1980s. Support for civics was often concentrated in the old municipal housing areas, built in the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1980s support was generally weak in shack settlements and among backyard shacks, and in hostels. Support varied greatly in the newly developed 'middle-class' extensions to townships. In the early 1990s the pattern has become more blurred: civics have built up significant support in some shack settlements and in new housing areas.

Two final points about civic organisations need to be noted: Unity was rarely forged across the racial divisions entrenched by residential and other segregation under apartheid. Grievances have differed, and different state structures have been held responsible. In small towns the different group areas have generally had separate civic structures; in metropolitan areas civics have generally been organised into separate

umbrella bodies. Only recently, through structures such as the Civic Association of Johannesburg, has close and routine cooperation really developed. Finally, civics have generally presented themselves as supra-partisan, but have rarely succeeded in converting their rhetoric into reality. Most civics have been clearly ANC-aligned. Non-Charterists have generally avoided participating in organisations which sought to promote Charterism; civic leaders have for their part sometimes discouraged or even excluded non-Charterists from leadership positions. Since 1991 there has been an encouraging trend towards supra-partisanship, but this trend is still young and fragile.

3.2.3 The achievements of civic organisations

Civics combined political and civic concerns in the 1980s and early 1990s. Mobilising popular protest around civic issues was seen as contributing to the struggle for national liberation as well as ameliorating living conditions in the short-term. Indeed, political change was seen as a prerequisite for any long-term solutions to the pressing socio-economic grievances. Through integrating short-term pragmatism and sensitivity with a more programmatic long-term vision, civics have achieved remarkable successes over civic issues and have promoted political change. It is important to consider some of the broad achievements of civics over the last fifteen years:

- in the early and mid-1980s civics mobilised very large numbers of people around civic issues, thereby reestablishing a tradition of civic activism outside of and in opposition to state structures;
- a range of people were drawn into leadership positions, and often radicalised;
- civics thereby contributed to the revival of political defiance, and political change more broadly;
- struggles over rent increases, evictions, influx control, and other local issues often resulted in some short-term amelioration of living conditions;
- civics articulated popular grievances at a time when the community had no other legitimate mouthpiece;
- civics played a key role in the isolation, marginalisation, and breakdown of elected local government structures (especially community councils and the Black Local Authorities) in the townships; they were thereby central to the collapse of the National Party's strategy of building racially-segregated, indirect rule;
- in the 1990s the civic movement has helped frustrate the state's attempts at establishing neo-apartheid local government under the Interim Measures Act;
- civic struggles have led to widespread acceptance of the need for non-racial local government;
- through protests (especially consumer boycotts) and negotiations civics contributed to changing the perceptions of business groups;
- through protests (especially rent boycotts) and negotiations civics played a central role in transforming state urban policy, in particular with respect to external subsidisation of township development; civics have ensured widespread acceptance of the principle of 'one city one tax base';
- civics have forced the state and private sector developers to involve community representatives in decision-making, and have become essential partners in negotiations over local government restructuring and development;

- civics have pressurised the state and private sector to orient development around the needs of the community;
- through both grass-roots activities and campaigns, and negotiations civics have opened up space for 'civil society' which, it is widely believed, will continue to thrive after the democratisation of South Africa's political institutions.

The extent to which these achievements were due to factors exogenous or internal to civics will be examined in section 8 below, as part of a broader assessment of the strengths, weaknesses and future prospects of the civic movement.

3.3 Advice Centres

Advice centres are, like civics, a heterogeneous grouping. In different parts of the country advice centres have been formed at different times and have developed along different paths. Their forms of operation and management vary. Regional variations are particularly striking.

The early history of advice centres remains unclear. Citizens Advice Bureaux seem to have been introduced into South Africa from Britain in the 1940s, if not earlier. They seem to have been concerned primarily if not only with the problems of white South Africans. It is reported that they were not used by black South Africans either because the bureaux would simply tell them what oppressive laws 'required' of them or because the bureaux were wary of assisting black South Africans under apartheid. The South African Institute of Race Relations seems to have been running some kind of advice centres for black South Africans by the late 1950s.

In the late 1950s the newly-formed Black Sash began its long involvement in advice office work. The specific impetus to this seems to have come from an otherwise routine incident in Elsies River (Cape Town) in March 1958, when twenty black women were arrested for alleged pass offences. A further twenty-six friends and relatives were arrested when they tried to bring food, clothes and money to the jail. Most, unable to pay for bail, spent five days in jail; most were later shown to be innocent. The Black Sash in Cape Town set up a fund to raise bail money and collect food for the children left behind, and also began to monitor proceedings in the Langa Commissioner's Court. In April 1959 the Black Sash opened an office, initially called the Bail Advice Office, to assist women with bail and advice on influx control matters specifically. Black Sash members opened similar offices in other major cities. The Bail Advice Office later became the Athlone Advice Office, and still later was renamed the Black Sash Advice Office, now sited in Mowbray (Cape Town).

During the repression of the 1960s several of the Black Sash advice centres closed. They began to open up again during the early and mid-1970s. There were offices in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Pretoria. An office in East London experienced problems due to the small numbers of Black Sash members, and operated intermittently. The central concern of the Black Sash advice offices remained the pass laws.

The political revival of the 1970s, and the influence of Black Consciousness thought, led to the formation of advice centres in some townships. Most of these seem to have been linked to the churches, many of which provided advice as part of their ministry. In Kagiso on the West Rand, for example, the local Apostolic Faith Mission priest initiated

a number of community projects including an information office which developed into a small advice office. This priest was Frank Chikane, who later became general-secretary of the South African Council of Churches. Activists in the Black Consciousness movement also formed a number of small advice centres. These small advice centres linked up to the SACC and the Legal Resources Centre (established in Johannesburg in 1979).

In 1978 the SACC requested the help of the Black Sash in dealing with the large numbers of people bringing a range of problems to parish priests in the various churches. The then secretary-general, Bishop Tutu, was concerned about the scale of priests' involvement in dealing with problems, many of which arose from the state denying people rights which could be legally enforced. One pressing set of problems concerned the forced removal of rural communities from 'black spots'. The Black Sash took up such problems, opposing removals and running occasional mini-advice centres in places like Driefontein. The Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC), formed by the Black Sash and SACC in Johannesburg, and the Cape Town-based Surplus People's Project (SPP), played a pivotal role in this.

In coloured and Indian areas there was a stronger move towards forming advice centres in the early 1980s. They were formed as part of a clear political strategy of mobilising around civic issues. Most of these advice centres were in Cape Town or Durban, and were closely linked to Chartist civics. In Cape Town, for example, the advice centres were closely linked to the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC).

The spread of advice centres in African townships occurred later, in response to problems arising during the township revolt of 1984-86. Much of the work concerned detention and other forms of state repression. In contrast to earlier advice centres, these were much less involved with problems of influx control and much more with human rights and political issues. Some advice offices served as offices for political activists as much as, if not more than, general advice centres. But most were, like the Black Sash, very involved in issues concerning housing, rents, pensions, retrenchments and unemployment benefits (UIF) as they affected individual members of the community.

The Detainee Parents Support Committee (DPSC) and detainee support committees (Descoms) played an important role in the formation of advice centres in various areas of the Transvaal. The DPSC itself was formed in response to a wave of detentions by the state in 1981. Descoms (or similar organisations) were formed soon after as a channel through which people concerned about detention could provide assistance even if they were not themselves related to individual detainees. In Soweto the Detainee Aid Movement (DAM) was established to advise families of detainees on their rights with regards to issues such as visiting detainees. DAM soon developed into more than just a detainee movement, taking up other issues. DAM later affiliated to the United Democratic Front.

In the townships of the Vaal Triangle, where the first major confrontations occurred in late 1984, the formation of the Vaal Information Centre constituted a crucial step in the development of advice centre work. The Vaal Information Centre was formed to respond to residents' queries in the very confusing situation following the 'Vaal Uprising' and the following repression, including the detention of most local civic leaders (and the flight of others into exile). For some time the Vaal Information Centre

focused primarily on the detention and later trial of local civic leaders (in the so-called Delmas Treason Trial), but later grew into the more wide-ranging Vaal Advice Centre.

It was only in the late 1980s that advice centres really proliferated in townships across the country. This was made possible by assistance from several sources. The Black Sash provided training courses for civic activists who would staff the new advice centres. In August 1986 the Black Sash organised the first ever national workshop for advice offices, in Port Elizabeth. Funding for advice offices became available from initially the SACC, and later (and in much larger amounts) from the CEC through the CACP, and also other donors (especially Norwegian Churches and Oxfam). Kagiso Trust project officers promoted the development of advice offices.

A second source of support, and indeed initiative, was the United Democratic Front. In the mid-1980s the question of advice centres was discussed within the UDF. Whilst advice centres were often seen as 'reformist', they were also thought to play an important role in increasing popular awareness of the 'mass approach'. Many of the problems of individual residents could not be solved individually, it was argued, but rather required action against the whole apartheid system, hence the need for mass organisations. The UDF accelerated its strategy of promoting advice centres amidst increasing repression, especially under the States of Emergency (in some areas from mid-1985, nationally from mid-1986). UDF-affiliated civics in particular were beneficiaries of this strategy. In Natal the UDF regional secretary, a lawyer who was also one of the regional trustees of Kagiso Trust, was central to the proliferation of advice centres in Indian and later African areas, and to the formation of a regional umbrella structure.

Advice centres were also assisted by umbrella bodies formed in several regions in the mid-1980s (generally with the encouragement of the United Democratic Front). The Advice Office Forum was formed in Cape Town in July 1984 with two volunteer workers. Its role was to facilitate contact and coordination between its members. This included enabling advice centres to share resources. It had grown to five full-time staff by 1990-91. Similar structures were formed in Natal in 1986 (the Natal Advice Centres Association, NACA) and in 1988 in the Transvaal and Orange Free State (the Trans-Orange Advice Centres Association, TOACA). There was also a Southern Cape Advice Forum. The sequence in which these were formed reflected the broad sequence of growth of advice offices: first in coloured areas in Cape Town, then in Natal, and later in the mostly African townships of the Transvaal. Advice offices were formed even later in the Eastern Cape, and so no umbrella structure was formed in that region.

The umbrella bodies all provided training and served as centralised fund-raising bodies. NACA also performed additional (and controversial) roles. It played a direct role in civic struggles in some areas, with the resultant blurring of the boundary between it and local civic co-ordinating structures. NACA's two organisers spent much time helping to form civics in the region. NACA also acted as a conduit for funds to weaker advice centres in Natal, most of which were in African townships.

By the late 1980s there was therefore a wide range of advice offices in operation. Some were church-linked, whilst others were projects of the local civic. AZAPO activists were generally involved in separate advice centres to their Chartist counterparts. In Soweto, for example, Black Consciousness activists had long run an advice centre in

Zola. In 1988 Black Consciousness-oriented advice centres in the Transvaal broke away from the fledgling TOACA and formed a separate Advice Centres Association.

The development of advice centres can usefully be illustrated with some examples. The Uitenhage Inter-Church Advice Office was established in 1985 in response to the Langa Massacre (when thirty-odd people were shot dead by security forces) and the removal of Langa to the new township of KwaNobuhle. As its name implies it was set up as a project of several churches, with the participation of civic leaders. The Botshabelo Advice Office was also started by churches, in 1987. Two prominent youth activists were trained by the Black Sash in Johannesburg, after which the advice office began operating out of the Anglican Church.

The Daliwe Advice Centre in Cathcart (Border) opened in early 1988. The idea arose the previous year from lawyers from the Legal Resources Centre in Grahamstown, and other outside professionals, who could not cope with the volume of problems facing them when they visited the township. The establishment of an advice centre allowed para-legal workers to deal with a range of problems locally, with only the most difficult cases having to go to professional lawyers. This Advice Centre operated as a project of the local civic, the Cathcart Residents Association; the civic's most prominent leader became one of the first advice centre employees, and the advice centre started operations in the front room of his house.

In the early 1990s there has been a further proliferation of advice centres, particularly in remoter small towns and even rural areas. In the 1980s the only advice service in most rural areas was provided by organisations like TRAC, which operated primarily in settlements threatened with forced removal to bantustans. In the early 1990s advice centres were formed in some remote areas, such as the Eastern Cape interior and the North-Eastern Cape. There does not seem to be any composite list of advice centres in the country, but we can count a total of well over one hundred in the Cape alone (see Annex D). But in 1993 there are still large parts of the country without, it seems, many advice centres - for example, the Northern Transvaal.

The changing context since 1990 has involved major changes for advice centres as it has for civics. Repression-related cases have declined in importance (although politics continues to intrude in the form of violence and other issues). Economic and legal problems have not abated. The changing context has raised problems with regard to the management of advice centres. As civics became more development-oriented, their work increasingly seemed to overlap with the work of advice centres. Furthermore, tensions arose when civics expected advice centres to account to them, but often used advice centre resources for their administrative needs. This became a particular concern to Kagiso Trust, as we shall examine in section 5 below. One further aspect of the changing context was the formation of regional civic structures, which seem to have been the key reason for the dissolution of the regional umbrella bodies for advice offices. It was felt that the need for umbrella structures to mediate between advice centres and funders was declining, and NACA in particular was also compromised through the bitter disputes plaguing the Charterist movement in Natal. In 1990 NACA disbanded, and the following year the Advice Office Forum and TOACA did likewise.

3.4 Training and technical service organisations

A variety of training and technical service organisations were formed in the 1980s and early 1990s with the aim of 'servicing' the skill, research and informational needs of advice centres, civics and other community-based organisations. Service organisations involved, for the most part, skilled white South Africans committed to democratic change. They sought to make available to anti-apartheid groupings some of the skills, research and knowledge which the state or 'establishment' always had access to and used to good effect, but which were largely denied to black South Africans as a result of Bantu Education and other forms of discrimination.

Service organisations arose first in relation to the independent trade union movement, and played an important part in that movement's growth. Township or civic-linked service organisations were a product of the mid-1980s. The first service organisations were generally concerned with running workshops, producing educational resources, and undertaking limited research. They had very close links to the Charterist political movement as well as the nascent civic movement, and involved university students and graduates without specific professional skills or qualifications. These organisations included, for example, CRIC (Community Resource and Information Centre) and CEI (Community Education and Information) in Johannesburg, and Afesis (established in 1984-85) in East London.

The changing roles and concerns of civics in the late 1980s led to the establishment of technical service organisations in the major metropolitan areas. These drew upon the skills of people with professional qualifications and experience, especially as planners, architects, engineers and attorneys. Most of these started as voluntary groups, with progressive professionals and academics providing technical advice and assistance to civics and other community-based organisations involved in planning and developmental work. The rising volume of work, together with the availability of funds (not least through the CACP), led to these service organisations employing full-time staff. In the early 1990s these service organisations have grown rapidly, in terms of influence as well as of personnel and workload. This growth has not occurred without tensions, both within the service organisations and between them and their clients, the civics.

The pioneer among these technical service organisations was the Durban-based Built Environment Support Group (BESG). Planact was formed in Johannesburg in 1985, and the Development Action Group (DAG) in Cape Town the following year. Planact soon transformed itself from being a volunteer-based group, employing full-time staff in 1987. DAG only began to employ full-time staff in late 1989 (and opened an office in early 1990), and volunteers are still involved in some of DAG's activities in 1993. The post-1990 shift of emphasis among civics to developmental work, together with the formation of regional civic groupings, led to the rapid growth of existing technical service organisations as well as the formation of further organisations in other regions. Among these were Corplan, established in East London in early 1991, and the Urban Services Group, established in Port Elizabeth later the same year. The Soweto Civic Association has recently moved to enhance its own internal technical capacity, setting up a research department which (it is intended) will employ full-time professional staff.

The largest and most influential of the technical service organisations is Planact, which now employs over twenty-five professional staff as well as administrative staff and outside consultants whenever necessary. Planact operates primarily in the Southern and Eastern Transvaal, but has major projects as far away as the Northern Cape and in the Orange Free State also. It also undertakes some national level work, for example for SANCO. A key episode in the growth of Planact was the Soweto rent boycott. In December 1988 Planact was commissioned by the Soweto People's Delegation (SPD - this was at a time when the Soweto Civic Association was banned, and many of its key leaders were in detention) to undertake research into Soweto's housing, services and finances. Planact's research provided the basis for the SPD's negotiations with the state, leading to the signing of the Soweto Accord in 1990. The research, the relationship between civic and service organisation, and the eventual agreement reached with the state, were all influential far beyond the boundaries of Soweto itself.

Several of the service organisations which were very closely linked to civics and political groups have since become more professionally-based. These include the Foundation for Contemporary Research in Cape Town, and the Centre for Community and Labour Studies (CCLS) in Durban. In all, there are around twenty technical and related service organisations at present. Most of these operate within specific regions rather than nationally. Civics and other community-based organisations in most regions now have access to technical support (although, as usual, the Orange Free State and Northern Cape still rely on organisations based as far away as Johannesburg, Cape Town or Port Elizabeth).

In the early 1990s the proliferation of service organisations and their ever-growing and diversifying workload emphasised the need for improved co-ordination. A number of co-ordinating networks have been established by service organisations, each concerned with a different area of activity. For example, the Urban Sector Network (USN) co-ordinates technical service organisations with regard to urban planning and developmental issues. Similar networks exist among training-oriented service organisations. The networks hold meetings to keep the service organisations informed about their respective activities, areas of specialization, and the scope for exchanging information, educational material and the like. There is currently - in early 1993 - a proposal to form a National Institute for Local Government and Urban Development which would provide co-ordination of research, policy formulation and training in preparation for (and later the sustaining of) the democratisation of local government.

4. FUNDING OF CIVIC ORGANISATIONS

4.1 External sources of funds

Civics have received considerable amounts of external funding, especially since 1990. Funding through the CACP accounts for a significant share of the total sums involved. Direct funding for civics under the CACP amounted to a total of almost R4 mn. This was divided between the regions as shown in Table 4.1:

TABLE 4.1 FUNDING TO CIVICS UNDER CACP, BY REGION

	Funds R'000	%
Transvaal	395	10
OFS	425	11
Northern Cape	75	2
Western Cape	999	25
Eastern Cape	442	11
Border	125	3
Natal	1281	33
National	186	5
Total	3930	100

It should be noted that some grants to civics were destined for advice centres which were administered by civics.

Civics in Cape Town, Durban and (to a much lesser extent) Johannesburg were funded throughout the course of the CACP. Civics in the Eastern Cape, Border and O.F.S. were only given substantial grants in the early 1990s.

There is a hint of metropolitan bias in the allocations. We cannot be specific because a high proportion of total funding to civics through the CACP went to umbrella organisations which, although metropolitan-based, spent at least some of their grants on employing 'rural' organisers to promote civics in small towns (this was true of ECCO, BOCCO, WCCA and CAHAC). It is therefore almost impossible to divide the total between metropolitan areas and small towns. Some smaller grants were given directly to civics in small towns, however. These included civics in: Ikageng (Potchefstroom), Ekangala and Moutse (north-east of Pretoria), Nelspruit, Grahamstown and a number in the Orange Free State (although the bulk of the funds committed to civics in the O.F.S. are yet to be disbursed, under the Civics Development Programme).

The major recipients were umbrella organisations at either metropolitan or regional levels. These included:

Natal Civics	R376 000
Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC)	326 000
Eastern Cape Civics Congress (ECCO)	238 000
Western Cape Civics Association (WCCA)	202 000
Border Civics Congress (BOCCO)	125 000

Actstop, the Atlantis Residents Association and the Durban Central Residents Association were the only very large non-umbrella recipients. These received R214 000, R199 000 and R270 000 respectively. Smaller but still substantial grants were also made to the Port Elizabeth People's Civic Organisation (PEPCO) and Uitenhage Residents Civic Organisation (Ureco).

KT was not the sole source of or channel for external funds for civic organisations. Indeed, there is some confusion as to whether KT expected civics to apply to other funders (see further Section 4.2.2 below). Some civic organisations received funds from a range of donors whilst others relied solely on KT. Individual local civic organisations also received funds from:

- foreign embassies: in both rands and in the form of donated computing or other office equipment;
- the South African Council of Churches or its regional structures;
- USAID (from c.1990): to cover minor expenses;
- international donors such as SIDA (recently): for development programmes, in which civics are involved;
- the Swedish labour movement (AIC);
- the South African corporate sector (since c.1990): mostly from businesses involved in housing and other urban development.

The AIC has begun, and USAID is beginning, to channel considerable funds into the civics sector. The corporate sector became a significant source of funds in the early 1990s. For example, the Uitenhage Residents Civic Organisation received funds from SA Perm and other companies to subsidise the salaries of workers at the civic's Housing Advice Centre; rent and bills such as electricity and water were paid by the Urban Foundation. The Cradock Advice Centre and Civic Association both operate, rent-free, out of an excellent resource centre built by the Urban Foundation. PEPCO is currently negotiating financial deals with developers (as we shall further examine in Section 8).

The establishment of regional and national civic structures has led to considerable funds being directed at these levels, especially since the demise of the United Democratic Front in 1991. SANCO's national office has received the following funds (by the end of November 1992):

AIC	R208 555
USAID	105 620
Canadian Embassy	50 000
Liberty Life Foundation	70 050

small donors (businesses)	4 000
KT (through CACP)	72 000

SANCO's total income up to the end of November amounted to just over half a million rand. This apparently excludes other very large grants which covered SANCO's national launch, for example, but which were not paid to or through SANCO itself. Furthermore, and prior to the formation of SANCO, the National Interim Civic Committee received resources from the United Democratic Front and elsewhere.

SANCO's regional structures (and their predecessors) have also received funds from a variety of sources. There is some confusion as to what the official SANCO policy is on this. Sources of funds include (besides SANCO head-office and, up to 1991, the UDF):

- USAID: USAID reportedly has R2.1m available, for which several SANCO regions have applied; it is still unclear what grants will be made, when, and to whom;
- foreign NGOs: to facilitate developmental work;
- SCAT: very limited funds for development-related activity (SCAT's criteria have excluded most civics).

SANCO's regional structures are financially very weak: some regions have no offices, and their officials are owed backpay from the time of the launch.

It is very difficult to estimate how much funding local and regional civic structures have received from other sources besides Kagiso Trust over the period 1986-1992. Without a better idea of the total volume of funds which have flowed into the civics sector it is difficult to assess the relative importance of KT funding through the CACP.

It is important to note that civics have not received funds from South African state structures, and not much from the South African corporate sector (although assistance with particular activities is now increasing).

4.2 The funding process

In Section 2 we outlined the procedures supposedly followed by KT in its processing of funding applications. In practice, procedures have not operated as smoothly as intended, although there seems to have been some improvement over time. Most of the civics funded through KT have voiced a range of complaints about the way in which KT has administered funding. The complaints generally concern three key issues: delays in the handling of funding applications; the sums involved; and accounting for funds. Since 1990-91 there have also been disputes between regional civic structures and KT over the appropriate relationship between KT and local civics and advice centres. Most of these comments apply to funding to advice centres and service organisations through the CACP, as well as to civics; the funding of advice centres and service organisations is further discussed in sections 5 and 6.

4.2.1 Disputes over KT's handling of applications

Many civics, advice centres and service organisations complain that KT's handling of their applications for funding was characterised by (1) unreasonable delays and (2) inadequate liaison whilst the application was slowly proceeding through KT's channels. Many of these complaints seem legitimate, especially before 1991, although it is unclear whether the responsibility lies in KT's relationship with the CEC or within KT (see

further section 7 below). Civics and advice centres themselves must also take a major share of the responsibility for the irregularity of their grant income: funding applications were often submitted at the last moment, with inadequate supporting documentation, and without adequate accounting for previous funds received. Nonetheless, KT does not seem to have developed procedures to ensure that applications are handled smoothly, nor to maintain regular and courteous communication.

These problems can be illustrated from any one of a number of civics. An extreme case is that of the Port Elizabeth People's Civic Organisation (PEPCO). The accounts of events given by PEPCO and KT's Port Elizabeth office differ. Whilst we are inclined to attach much greater weight to the latter, the two accounts clearly reveal serious communication problems. According to PEPCO, they submitted a total of five funding applications between July 1990 and July 1992: the first two solicited no response from KT, the fourth was the first to apparently reach KT head-office, and the fifth eventually led to a grant being made. KT's view is somewhat different: whilst the fate of the first two alleged applications is unclear, subsequent applications were held up for very good reasons. Firstly, PEPCO failed to account for a small grant (of R2 500) made in 1991 to cover the cost of a key PEPCO meeting; secondly, PEPCO was wracked by leadership struggles during this period; and thirdly, PEPCO's applications were unrealistic in scale and unappealing in detail. The point here is not to arbitrate between the two versions, but rather to highlight the perception among civic leaders (whether correct or not) that KT abused their control over funding, and to point out that this perception (or misperception) was rooted in KT's valid concerns about applicants as much as in inadequate procedures.

Financial constraints on KT led to problems for many civics (and advice centres) in 1991-92. The problems of delay and poor communication by KT are well illustrated by a letter sent to recipients of Phase II (Project 295) funds by KT's Transvaal regional office. Recipients were advised that there was excess demand for funds and KT therefore could not fund the entire budget or application of any organisation. One example, dated 10 December 1991, continues thus:

'Your organisation has been allocated R43 200.00 as part of funds for April 1990 to March 1991. The funds have been disbursed as follows: Your organisation has, therefore, been allocated a total of R88 200.00 for the period April 1990 to March 1991. Funds are not enough to make any 1991/92 allocations. The Trust regrets to inform you that there will therefore be no allocation for April 1991 to March 1992 as there are no funds available.'

'You are therefore requested to use the money knowing that there is no chance of receiving funds in immediate future. You are requested to use the money for essential purposes.'

(It then continued by outlining the new appraisal criteria KT would be using as from 1992). Apart from difficulties the recipients may have had understanding the first paragraph above, the implications for that organisation's current and planned activities of the letter's date relative to the funding periods concerned, must have been serious, to say the least.

The delays in approving funding applications and then making payments meant that civics and advice centres often had a very unsteady flow of income. Organisers would

often remain unpaid for several months. When a grant was made, much of it would often be absorbed into paying organisers their outstanding salaries even though the grant was supposed to cover the civic's running costs for the next six months. The civic would soon run out of funds, and non-salary expenses would be squeezed first and most severely.

4.2.2 Disputes over the size of grants

Many civic leaders and advice centre personnel seem to have believed that KT controlled enormous funds, earmarked for their organisations but held up by KT's interference. One senior civic activist alleged that KT was keeping, for its own unspecified purposes, money given by foreign donors for civic organisations. Such misperceptions about KT's funds had very real consequences besides straining the relationship between KT and disgruntled civic leaders. Many civics submitted hugely inflated funding proposals, and then acted as if paralysed when their applications were only part-funded.

The case of CAHAC provides a striking example of this. CAHAC received over R326 000 between 1987 and 1991, making it easily the best-funded civic structure in the Cape. Its monthly expenditure was, for most of this period, about R5 000. But in 1990 it applied for R243 000 for just one year, and in 1991 for R325 000 for one year also. CAHAC actually employed an administrator and three organisers in anticipation of massive funding from KT in 1990-91. KT's grant only covered two salaries.

Fortunately, two of these staff members had left by the time the KT grant was approved, and the civic thereby avoided running into complete financial crisis or having to dismiss employees. The boldest budget application of all came from PEPCO, which in June 1992 applied for a total of R755 000 for 1992-93 (KT granted R60 000 only!).

Faced with only partly-funded budget proposals, civics generally maintained as high a staff complement as possible, and cut down on other expenses. Easily (and probably rightly) cut out was capital expenditure, especially on motor vehicles. But media and educational workshops were all too often cut out of the programme, and this was routinely 'justified' on the grounds that the civic lacked resources. CAHAC - and most other civics funded through the CACP - routinely identify 'inadequate' funding as the major constraint on the range and level of their activities.

Discontent with the size of KT grants was compounded, in some cases, by confusion over whether KT expected civics and advice centres to apply to other funding organisations also. KT stated in 1990 that its grants should only cover part of recipients expenses: 'applicants are expected to obtain the balance of funds from other sources'. But, in the late 1980s at least, individual KT personnel sometimes and mistakenly gave civic leaders or advice office personnel the impression that they should only apply to KT, which would act as broker for all foreign funding. This was never KT policy, and since 1989 it has been more clearly understood that KT preferred to co-finance projects. But it is understandable that, with the uneven and sometimes misleading communication between KT and projects prior to 1989, civics and advice centres were sometimes disgruntled when their budgets were only funded in part.

4.2.3 Disputes over accounting for funds

A very common reason for delays in the approval of grants was the inability or unwillingness of civics to account satisfactorily for previous funds received. Initially

KT permitted fund to be disbursed to civics even when the civics had failed to submit the written 'narrative' and financial reports as stipulated in their contracts. In the early 1990s, however, KT demanded better reports and a higher quality of financial accounting. Provision was generally made in budgets for the independent auditing of the accounts (such as they were) of civics and advice centres. In some cases (such as PEPCO) further funding was held up until the civic provided adequate explanation for previous funding.

Civics sometimes complain that KT would 'judge them on their paperwork', and not actually see what work was being done on the ground. Civics often felt that they needed more support and training, and (after the event, at least) bemoaned KT's non-provision of this. Civics also complain that conditionality makes them 'donor-driven', rather than community-driven. This complaint reflects badly on the general attitudes as well as the poor level of financial administration and strategic planning of the civics themselves.

Delays in the approving and disbursing of funds often exacerbated problems of accounting in that the applications and disbursements would fall within different financial reporting periods.

4.2.4 Other comments on the funding process

One final comment needs to be made about the funding process. There are indications that KT's monitoring and support of civics was of very uneven quality, although there was a marked improvement over time (personnel constraints were initially very severe). Some of KT's project officers were (and are) clearly excellent, but others seem to have been (and unfortunately, perhaps still are) very weak. Project files in KT regional offices are often filled with blank "project officer's report" forms. Several civics complained of a lack of support from project officers.

Project officers clearly suffered under a heavy workload. But it is unclear whether the hierarchy within KT's regional offices facilitated effective administration. Project officers have been considered superior in rank to the regional administrators, inhibiting the administrators' authority when it comes to chasing up project officers who were slow to liaise with projects or did not follow procedures (for example, in completing these "project officer's report" forms). Time constraints often prevented the regional directors from supervising the day-to-day administration, leaving a gap in the office.

4.3 Internal sources of funds

Civic organisations have relied on external funding, from KT and other sources, for the bulk of their funds in recent years. Prior to 1987, however, the only funds available were the very limited funds raised by the civics themselves. Several civics continued to raise funds internally or locally in the late 1980s, and recently there has been a revival of thinking around the issue of internal funding through membership subscriptions or agreements with local developers.

In the early 1980s most civic structures relied on voluntary donations. CAHAC, for example, raised funds through a variety of fundraising activities as well as donations. Some members regularly donated 10% of their salaries. Fundraising activities included raffles and dances. This would cover the limited expenses incurred in hiring halls, printing pamphlets (especially if there was some assistance from student organisations at local universities, or similar groups).

Several civics have in the past experimented with issuing membership cards and collecting subscriptions, and the experience has rarely been successful. Typically, few cards have been issued in terms of the total number of households in the area, subscriptions have been raised erratically, there has been no record-keeping, and funds have not been passed onto head-office by local structures or activists. Smaller towns seem in general to have had better experiences in membership-based fund-raising than civics in the larger metropolitan townships, with the greater cohesion of the 'community' presumably compensating for their greater poverty. Several civics have claimed large numbers of paid-up members, but income from membership subscriptions rarely shows up in the civics' accounts.

In 1992 Kagiso Trust began to actively encourage some civics to raise funds through membership subscriptions, largely because it was clear that KT's limited funds could cover only a part of the budgets proposed by civics. KT started one experiment in Port Elizabeth, providing a grant to PEPCO to enable it to set up the organisation necessary to tap into its claimed support and set itself up as financially self-sufficient. A more ambitious experiment has been designed, but not yet implemented, in the O.F.S.. The O.F.S. Civics Development Programme aims at providing civics with the skills and resources to equip them to administer membership recruitment and subscription-based financial self-sufficiency. Participants from twelve civics and the two SANCO regions would be trained in financial, administrative and computing skills. Funds would be provided for purchasing computers, printing membership cards, and one salary. The question of internal financing is considered in detail in section 8.3.

Civics' standing in urban politics has begun to provide them with considerable leverage, in some cases at least, over township developers. This has opened up another source of income. PEPCO, for example, is negotiating deals with the developers participating in the huge Soweto-by-Sea upgrading project. Each of the seven developers involved in the upgrading project have been asked to pay PEPCO R800 monthly in return for PEPCO's availability and assistance in solving any problems that might arise.

4.4 Accounting for funds by civics

The repressive context of the late 1980s made it difficult for civics to keep financial records or draft regular accounts or reports. But the low standard of accounting and reporting continued past 1990. Not only was there generally very inadequate accounting by civics to KT (or other funders), but there was often also poor accounting by paid civic employees to elected civic leaders, and by civic leadership to the 'community' at large. In neither the late 1980s nor the early 1990s has a culture of reporting and accountability been common among civics.

The contract signed between Kagiso Trust and civics receiving funds stipulate that 'narrative' and financial reports must be submitted by specified deadlines. Very few organisations fulfil the terms of their contracts in this respect. The Border Civics Congress (BOCCO, now the SANCO Border region) is a typical example of this. In April 1992 BOCCO signed a contract with KT, which would pay R125 000 in two instalments, the second of which was supposedly conditional on BOCCO submitting the first of two reports. By the end of November 1992 (when KT and BOCCO were visited during the research for this evaluation), KT had not yet received any report (although both instalments of the grant had been disbursed).

Very few funded organisations seem to prepare written reports for their general membership, even for annual general meetings. If this had been done it would have been easy to send reports to KT. Few civics have established effective internal reporting procedures with regard to funds. The treasurer often wields untrammelled control, and not even other executive members feel free to challenge him over his accounting (or lack thereof). Remarkably, perhaps, senior officials of a number of civics funded heavily under the CACP had no idea how much income their civic had received.

Treasurers were often elected as a political office rather than because of any financial skills. When auditors examined civics' accounts they were rarely able to endorse the audit without major qualifications. (SANCO has recognised this with its current emphasis on instituting proper financial control mechanisms at the regional level; SANCO's national treasurer does, unusually, have financial qualifications and experience).

Many civics complain that they are inexperienced in report-writing and have received no assistance from outside organisations (including Kagiso Trust) despite requests.

4.5 The use of funds by civics

Inadequate reporting and accounting by civics makes it difficult to identify precisely how funds disbursed under the CACP have been spent by civics. The major item of expenditure was clearly, and invariably, salaries. This has generally accounted for about one half, and often more, of total expenditure. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that many civics treated external funds as an opportunity to maintain the employment of activists (particularly in difficult economic conditions). Only secondly did civics consider what precisely might be done with the resources in order to most effectively achieve their objectives.

Salaries have varied considerably, with low salaries of under R1,000 per month still paid in some small towns. By contrast, the SANCO Eastern Cape region decided in 1982 to pay its organisers R3,400 per month, allegedly to prevent poaching by the private sector.

Other major categories of expenditure are: office expenses, including rent and other bills; transport; and workshops and meetings. Over time civics' expenses have risen considerably. Transport costs, for example, rose as civics became more involved in regional and even national activities. When CAHAC first employed an organiser in 1987 he used a Vespa scooter, which had the advantages of being cheap and (as the organiser points out) being inappropriate for 'galivanting about'. Scooters might be appropriate for local transport, but not for travelling greater distances or transporting people to meetings.

The cost of workshops and meetings has also risen as civics have shifted from using cheap church halls, providing their own accommodation and paying for their own transport, to using hotels or conference venues, and expecting transport to be provided.

Mismanagement has often led to wasted expenditure. Numerous motor vehicles were written off in accidents, and then found to have been uninsured. Likewise, furniture and other assets were stolen from civic offices, and found to be uninsured. Furthermore, the accounts of a number of civics show that fines incurred by employees were paid, and

loans were extended to staff members (and rarely, it seems, repaid). There is, however, little evidence of corruption in the finances of civics.

In many cases civics have 'squeezed' non-staff costs because of a 'lack of funds', i.e. because funders have only part-funded proposed budgets. This 'lack of funds' has been used to explain why annual general meetings and proposed educational workshops have not been held. Unfortunately it is such activities which should have been civics' priority.

4.6 Assessment

What has funding actually achieved? This is a very difficult question, as we must not only identify and assess what civics have done or achieved, but also identify and assess the role of external funding in this. Thus whilst it is clear that many civics have marked up some notable successes, through campaigns, protests or negotiations, and have played a very important role in processes of political change and popular representation, we should be wary of accrediting this to external funding in particular.

In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we outlined the historical development of the civic movement and identified a range of achievements which can be attributed, in whole or in part, to civics. In summary, civics have contributed to democratisation through playing a key role in the liberation struggles of the 1980s and in current struggles over the form of post-apartheid democracy; they have also, and much more tangibly, influenced patterns of expenditure on development and services by both the state and the private sector.

But these achievements, and these roles more generally, have been the reason why civics have been targeted for funding and have not simply been the results of funding. For the effects of funding we must pay much closer attention to the ways in which funds have been spent, what paid organisers have actually done, and the indirect consequences of these. In particular we must focus on the relationship between funding and the organisational development of civics at local and regional levels.

The bulk of funding has been used in paying the salaries of paid organisers or administrators. This has been true of civics at both local and regional levels. What have employees actually done? Unfortunately the reports produced by civics do not provide good answers to this question. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess the contribution of civic employees to civic activity in relation to the contributions of voluntary members of the organisation (at least at the local level - at the regional level the picture is clearer). And, as must be repeatedly emphasised, civics have comprised a very heterogeneous category, with very different experiences ranging from the impressive to the disastrous. But certain patterns seem to emerge, with important differences between local and regional civics in terms of the uses and effects of funding.

At the regional level funding has enabled civics to establish offices and operate on a day-to-day basis. Without funding it would probably have been almost impossible to have done this, and regional structures would have only been able to play a looser co-ordinating role (which some people would argue is a better role). In some cases, such as CAHAC and WCCA, funding enabled semi-regional bodies to employ organisers who assisted the formation or the strengthening of civics structures in areas where they did not exist or were weak, and to a lesser extent organised protests and other campaigns. In other cases, such as PEPCO and ECCO, funding seems to have

been primarily absorbed in central or office administration, with little being used for organising purposes. This partly reflects the changing times and contexts: the late 1980s was a period of organisation-building after repression under the State of Emergency had peaked, whilst the early 1990s were a period in which civics performed many new roles, which involved considerable attendance at meetings and other activities which were more administrative or related to civics' demands than to organisation-building. In other words, funding facilitated directly organising activities in the late 1980s and more goal-oriented activities in the early 1990s.

To some extent this was true at the local level also. Funding has enabled primary civics to employ organisers on a full-time basis, to run the civic's office (relieving committee members of this onerous task) and helping to organise in some areas. More recently, funding has facilitated involvement in negotiations, with both state and private sector and over local government restructuring and development. Paid employers, who have almost always been former voluntary civic activists, have also been involved in other civic activities, including: solving the problems of individual residents; participating in negotiations; and attending workshops and other meetings.

It is unclear just how much time is spent in each activity, however. Few civics can provide clear job descriptions for their employees, who therefore tended to do a bit of everything in largely unstructured ways. The inadequacy of job descriptions is probably one reason why civics have generally failed to report what particular paid employees have done or achieved.

In terms of output, however, there is little evidence in the Cape that funding civics at the local or metropolitan levels in the early 1990s resulted in any strengthening of civic organisation on the ground. Rather, civics were assisted in participating in the wider political arena, including negotiations. This might have strengthened civic organisation indirectly, through delivering benefits to the community at large, but not directly. The picture in other regions is unclear.

In important ways the provision of funding to civics has in fact weakened their local level organisation. Grassroots organisational work has been undertaken primarily by voluntary activists: the number of paid activists has always been very low by comparison. But the expansion of paid employment has often had wider ramifications on voluntary participation in civics. This needs to be understood in terms of a broader decline in voluntarism over the last decade.

CAHAC and UDF activist Trevor Manuel raised some pertinent points on this question, in his keynote address to Kagiso Trust's conference on 'From Opposing to Governing' in January 1990.

'My own experiences in civics, in the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC), was that we only generated money when we were running campaigns paid for by the affected people and local shopkeepers. And we usually generated enough money to carry us through to the next campaign. There was never an area that put people onto a bus to a CAHAC mass meeting that received a penny from CAHAC. The people were prepared to pay for it. What is very sad eight years later [is that] we seem to have forgotten those lessons of self-sufficiency.'

The ‘wanton injection of funding’ could have adverse consequences, he warned. This was a view shared by many in the late 1980s, as the inflow of external funds into the UDF and civic organisation seemed to be accompanied by rising corruption and declining democratic accountability.

In terms of paid employment in local civics, paying organisers can lead to a drop in the level of voluntary work. Volunteers complain that tasks should be done by the paid organisers. This has been the experience of many civics. External funding can therefore lead to a decline in voluntary activity, which generally entails a decline in grass-roots organisation. This needs to be seen in the context of changing demands on civics, with the expansion in negotiations placing increased importance on regular and almost full-time negotiators, in contrast to the role of part-time civic activists ten years before.

Regional (and some other) civic structures have also spent substantial amounts on workshops and other meetings. The costs of transporting representatives to meetings, accommodating and feeding them, and paying for an appropriate venue, grew as civic activists understandably demanded better and more comfortable facilities. The contribution of the ‘community’ to such expenses generally declined, as Trevor Manuel noted above. Meetings all too often became seen as some kind of an entitlement than as a goal-oriented activity.

Few civics at either the local or regional levels used external funding to organise educational campaigns. This is perhaps the most important weakness of civics and of the funding of civics. The absence of educational campaigns and workshops combined, in too many instances, with inadequate accountability by civic leaders to the community at large to lead to a situation where popular involvement in civics declined. The danger of local civics becoming somewhat distanced from the grass-roots because of their growing involvement in negotiations and regional or even national level activities, was too rarely countered through educational and organisational activities targeted at the local level.

In summary, external funding enabled civics to participate more effectively in a range of activities, especially those specialist activities such as negotiations which grew in importance after 1990. In some cases external funding in the late 1980s enabled umbrella civic bodies to organise in areas where local civics were weak or non-existent. In the early 1990s, however, substantial outside funding to regional civic structures has rarely been reflected in organisational development. Throughout the period civics generally lacked efficient organisational procedures and strategic planning, and the availability of funding does not seem to have led to any marked improvement. In fact, in some cases external funding has led, at a time when the context and hence demands on civics have been changing, to a reduced level of voluntary participation in civics and hence a weakening of local level organisation.

5. FUNDING OF ADVICE CENTRES

5.1 Sources of funds

Advice centres have been largely dependent on external sources of funds, primarily from foreign donors. The very role of the advice office precludes charging the consumers for the service, as the consumers are generally drawn from the poorer sections of the population. Some advice centres have kept expenditure low through reliance on voluntary labour, and some (particularly in the early and mid-1980s) raised very limited funds through donations from shopkeepers and other better off members of the local population. Unlike civics, advice centres cannot even contemplate raising funds through membership subscriptions. It has also been suggested that South African law precludes advice centres charging for para-legal advice, as it is illegal for anyone but a qualified attorney to levy a charge for legal services.

So dependent have advice centres been on external funding that it was only when large amounts of funds became available from overseas in the mid-1980s that advice centres could be formed on a very widespread basis. Small amounts of funding were available through church networks in the early 1980s, but from 1985-87 substantial funds were channelled from abroad to advice centres, primarily through the Kagiso Trust's CACP and the Social Change Assistance Trust (SCAT).

The CACP has been one of the major sources of funding for advice centres in South Africa. In the period 1987-92 Kagiso Trust provided a total of approximately R 8.2 mn to 89 advice centres and 5 umbrella organisations throughout the country under the CACP and other programmes. The advice centres were distributed as follows:

TABLE 5.1: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF KT-FUNDED ACS

	No. of Indiv ACs	Total funds R'000	% of funds
Western Cape	10	543	7
Eastern Cape	21	724	9
Border/Transkei	10	1142	14
Northern Cape	1	157	2
Orange Free State	5	537	7
PWV	22	1573	19
Other Transvaal	9	1023	12
Natal	11	1498	18
Umbrella bodies	5	994	12
Total	94	8191	100

The Natal Advice Centres Association (NACA), a regional umbrella structure, acted as a conduit for funds to local advice centres. Furthermore, a number of grants made by KT to civics included provision for civic-run advice centres. The actual number of advice centres funded under the CACP was therefore over one hundred. Other advice centres were indirectly assisted through support for para-legal training institutions.

The largest concentration of funding was in the PWV and Natal. If their share of funding through or to the regional umbrella structures is included, advice centres in the metropolitan areas of the PWV, Durban and Pietermaritzburg together accounted for almost half of the total CACP funds to advice centres.

Excepting the Eastern Cape and Border regions, the majority of advice offices were in the major metropolitan centres (i.e. the PWV, Durban and Pietermaritzburg, and Greater Cape Town). 36 advice centres were located in the metropolitan areas, against 22 in small towns. In the Eastern Cape and Border regions only 5 out of 31 were in metropolitan areas (i.e. East London, P.E./Uitenhage). The overall figures (including the Eastern Cape and Border) are presented in Table 5.2:

TABLE 5.2: METROPOLITAN/NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRIBUTION OF KT-FUNDED ACS

	No.	Funds	
		R'000	%
Metropolitan areas			
PWV	22	1573	19
Cape Town	6	234	3
Durban/Pietermaritzburg	8	1093	13
PE/East London	5	424	5
total	41	3324	41
Small towns/rural			
E.Cape/Bdr	26	1442	18
OFS	5	537	7
other	17	1894	23
total	48	3873	47
Umbrella organisations			
	5	994	12
Total	94	8191	100

Overall, more non-metropolitan than metropolitan advice centres were funded through the CACP (48 compared to 41). A larger sum was disbursed to individual advice centres in non-metropolitan than in metropolitan areas (almost R 3.9 mn compared to just over R 3.2 mn). But the umbrella organisations were all based in the metropolitan areas, and the bulk of their funds was expended in these areas. The total division of funds between non-metropolitan and metropolitan areas was therefore probably about equal.

During the course of the CACP there was a shift away from the metropolitan areas to small towns. This was really only reflected in the Eastern Cape, however, as this was the only region to have extensively funded advice centres in the 1991-92 period. In the other regions funding was concentrated in earlier years, hence the strong metropolitan bias in their figures.

The average total grant through the CACP to advice centres comes to about R 80 000. There was virtually no difference between the average total grant to metropolitan and non-metropolitan advice centres. There was some variation between the different regions. The average total grant to advice centres in Natal was over four times as large as the average total grant to advice centres in the Eastern Cape (R 136 000 compared to just R 34 000). This was primarily due to the fact that advice centres in Natal were much older, and had therefore been funded for longer than the recently-formed advice centres in the small towns of the Eastern Cape.

Advice centres were also funded by other donors. The most important of these was the Social Change Assistance Trust (SCAT). SCAT operated, like KT itself, as a conduit for foreign funding, in its case almost all from the Church of Norway. SCAT was established in 1985. Based in Cape Town, it funded advice centres, service organisations and certain other community-based projects, mostly in the Cape although there were a handful of projects in Natal and the Southern Orange Free State. Initially most of the advice centres supported by SCAT were in Greater Cape Town, but since 1990 SCAT has concentrated its funding on advice centres in small towns in remoter, essentially rural areas.

SCAT disbursed about as much funding to advice centres as did KT. Each year since 1990, for example, it has allocated about R 1.5 mn to between thirty and forty-five advice centres. Its average grant is about R 40 000 p.a.. During 1990-93 it has or will have funded a total of 57 advice centres, of which only two have been outside of the Cape or Transkei. Whilst KT has funded more advice centres, they have been distributed more widely; in the Cape/Transkei alone, SCAT has funded more. Moreover, SCAT's annual grants have been larger and more regular than KT's. KT has in the past claimed to fund a majority of advice centres in the country. This is an exaggeration.

There are many advice centres which have not been funded through either KT or SCAT. In the Cape we have counted a total of 115 advice centres, of which fifty-one have been funded by SCAT and forty-one by KT (at one time or another); of these ten have received funding from both Trusts, leaving over thirty which have never received funds from either KT or SCAT (and this excludes those advice centres of which we are unaware). In the Orange Free State, SCAT have funded one advice centre (Rouxville) and KT a total of five (Tumahole, Thabong, Mangaung, Maokeng, and Botshabelo), but there are reported to be other advice centres in Qwa-Qwa, Senekal, Bethlehem, Clarens, Trompsburg, Reitz, Petrus Steyn, Harrismith and Frankfort - none of which has been funded through either of the two Trusts.

Many of these other advice centres have received funds through church networks, especially the regional Councils of Churches and the South African Council of Churches. This is particularly the case for those advice centres which were started by the churches. Funds have also been received through the Black Sash, foreign embassies, the Energos Foundation, and foreign NGOs such as Oxfam. It is unclear what sums

have been distributed through these channels. Individual advice centre personnel have sometimes been funded by the World University Service (as part of its programme to employ returnees or former political prisoners).

Many of the comments on the funding process included in section 4.2 are applicable to advice centres as well as for civics, and do not need to be repeated here. Several specific observations are appropriate, however. Consider the renewal rate of funding through KT to advice centres:

TABLE 5.3: NUMBER OF GRANTS MADE BY KT TO ACS IN SELECTED REGIONS

Number of grants made to the AC	Numbers of ACs			
	Ntl	Tvl	ECp	Total
1	1	11	17	29
2	5	7	3	15
3	1	6	1	8
4	2	10		12
5	1	3		4
6	1			1
Total	11	37	21	69

Notes

1. This table is calculated on the basis of grants disbursed to projects in each financial year, using data provided by KT.
2. The 'Tvl' region here refers to KT's 'Transvaal' region, which includes the Northern Cape and OFS as well as the PWV, Northern, Western and Eastern Transvaal.
3. Data from Border and Western Cape is not used in this table.

Only one project out of 69 was funded in each of the six years between 1987 and 1992; 17 were funded for at least four years. One important reason for these figures is that the Eastern Cape advice centres were only set up recently, and could not therefore have been funded for more than one or two years. But even in the Eastern Cape, several advice centres were funded in 1991-92 but not 1992-93.

Compare this with some figures from SCAT. Out of 27 advice centres funded in 1991, seventeen were given funds in every one of the four years up to and including 1993 (in the case of the 1993 year, they were provided for in SCAT's provisional budget). 27 advice centres in all have received funds for three out of these four years. The high renewal rate is clearly indicated in the following table:

TABLE 5.4: RENEWAL RATES OF SCAT-FUNDED ACS

	1991	1992	1993
ACs funded before but not renewed	?	9	5
ACs funded before and renewed	27	30	28
ACs funded for the first time	12	3	15
Total ACs funded	39	33	43

Funding through KT to advice centres has not been as regular as funding through SCAT. (We are not aware of the position of other donors in this respect). One of the reasons for this has been the way in which CACP funding has been organised between the CEC, SANAM NGOs, and KT.

One further aspect of SCAT's experience with advice centres is worth considering. Whilst advice centres cannot raise substantial funds locally, there are limited potential sources. SCAT emphasise the importance of local fund-raising, even if for limited sums only, to promote a sense of local investment in 'their' advice centre. Some SCAT-funded advice centres have raised as much as 10 percent of their budget locally. Some of the CACP-funded advice centres registered some local fund-raising in their accounts. There is no evidence as to what effect this had on local attitudes to the advice centres concerned.

5.2 Accounting for funds

The quality of accounting and reporting by advice centres to KT has generally been very poor. There are various reasons for this:

- inadequate record-keeping, report-writing and financial skills;
- poor management;
- police harassment (in the 1980s);
- fear of linking donors to political activity;
- low prioritisation within the advice centre;
- lack of financial control by or support from outside organisations (including KT, at least until 1990-91);
- corruption.

Under these circumstances it is well-nigh impossible to ascertain precisely to what uses funds were put by several advice centres, primarily ones based in African townships. In several cases we have had to rely on information from the very people who managed (or mismanaged) the funds, without keeping proper records.

The extent of corruption is difficult to ascertain. Our impression is that the other factors have been far more important, and corruption has been relatively rare. Perhaps the most important factor has been the low priority attached to record-keeping and report-writing by some advice centre personnel. There has generally been some record-keeping, not

least because of the importance rightly attached to this in training courses run by the Black Sash and other organisations. The quality of record-keeping seems to have improved markedly since 1990. But **report-writing** has always been and generally remains very inadequate. To some extent this reflects factors beyond the control of advice centre personnel, such as the lack of skills and police harassment. But many advice centre personnel, like their civic counterparts, have taken it as a self-evident truth that their general civic activism warrants funding, and reporting on their activities represents an unnecessary distraction from the struggle.

The perception that it was not necessary to account for funds was strengthened by the (mis-)understanding among some activists of Kagiso Trust's mission and role. KT emphasise that it was never its policy to fund even covertly political activities. But under the unfavourable circumstances of the late 1980s, some advice office personnel mistakenly believed that funds received from KT were for, or at least could be used for, covertly political activities. Normal accounting procedures were therefore often thought to be irrelevant because secrecy was clearly paramount. To some extent secrecy was indeed necessary, even for purely advisory work, to ensure continued operation under the watchful gaze of the police. But once people grew accustomed to secrecy it became a ready screen behind which all sorts of self-serving or otherwise clandestine activity could proceed. Secrecy facilitated manipulation. The situation has improved greatly since 1990, but even in the early 1990s few civic-linked advice centres have got into the habit of routinely submitting reports to civic meetings (including even to their civic's annual general meeting).

All KT-funded projects are contractually committed to submitting regular narrative reports as well as financial statements (generally audited). But some advice centres still submit minutes of meetings in lieu of narrative reports. The Daliwe Advice Centre is an example of an advice office which, by contrast, sends regular (two-monthly) reports. These provide a fascinating account of what has been taking place in Daliwe and a numerical breakdown of the cases brought to the Advice Centre. But these reports provide little indication of the workings of the advice centre itself; they are rather a report on civic affairs in Daliwe in general. In late 1992 the Daliwe Advice Centre was preparing its first ever composite annual report!

Advice centres vary considerably in terms of the quality of their **management**. The quality of management generally, although not invariably, coincides with the racial composition of the advice centres' management. Advice centres managed by Indian, coloured or white activists have generally been better run than those run by African personnel. This reflects several factors:

- Firstly, non-African-run advice centres have enjoyed better **access to reasonably good managerial skills**, generally through university-trained personnel working on either a full or part-time basis. Some, indeed, have benefitted from the voluntary involvement of people with managerial or professional experience (including church ministers);
- secondly, African-run advice centres have tended to **collapse para-legal work into more overtly political work**: advice centre employees have often been activists who have used the advice centre as a base for organising the civic or youth congress; and
- thirdly (and as a result of the previous factor), African-run advice centres have experienced **higher levels of police harassment and repression**; the police would

frequently visit; and trained personnel would suffer extended periods of detention (or, alternatively, disappear into hiding).

The second and third of these factors also had implications for the accountability of the advice centre, both in financial and organisational terms. In short, therefore, the worst-run advice centres were generally those run by township-based civics, without involvement from the churches. Most of these were located in metropolitan townships where there were active civics who did not seek managerial assistance from outsiders. In smaller towns civic leaders were generally more eager to enlist the support of outsiders such as church ministers, with the result that advice offices were generally better run.

The best managed advice centres (in terms of casework) were typically those with access to professional personnel willing to work for salaries below the rates they could get elsewhere. The Black Sash has been the outstanding example of this, but several local advice centres have been in a similar position. For example, the Stellenbosch and Helderberg Advice Offices (neither of which was funded through the CACP, but rather through SCAT) were able to use white professional staff; and coloured and Indian professionals worked in several advice centres in Cape Town and Durban. But in small towns away from the metropolitan areas there were rarely any professional personnel who were willing to do this work. Even East London, a large city, has had few such human resources available (the Black Sash advice office in East London has always struggled, and someone was brought from Cape Town to start Afesis in 1984).

Part of the problem here has lain in the forms of training which have been available to advice office workers and volunteers. Training has generally concentrated on para-legal issues, including the current state of legislation in different areas, procedures, etc. There has been little training in organisational management and development for advice office workers. Kagiso Trust, for its part, provided little assistance in this respect until recently, when it funded courses through, for example, PLTP which involved clear organisational components.

Police harassment, particularly of the more overtly politically-oriented advice centres run by African activists in townships, adversely affected reporting and accounting. The suspicion that police spies were planted in many organisations, and the fear of police raids, led to little or no reporting and record-keeping. It was feared that records might be incriminating, and so even when records were kept they were rarely stored in the advice centre, and were therefore difficult to access in case of need. These fears may not have always been warranted, but were widely-held all the same. The detention of trained personnel also clearly disrupted organisational procedures.

The above factors have accounted for most of the problem of poor accounting, but the CACP has involved several clear-cut instances of corruption, particularly during the State of Emergency. In some cases individuals abused positions of trust, using the prevailing political climate as cover or excuse. It was all too easy for individuals to secure sole control over funds and avoid accounting to anybody else in the mid- and late 1980s. Committees were sometimes set up by such prominent individuals, and did little to challenge their authority; if a committee member asked pointed questions they could easily and speedily be dropped from the committee.

Cases of corruption in advice centres funded under the CACP include the following:

- Two employees of an advice centre on the Orange Free State were dismissed in 1990 after being found to be responsible for fraudulently withdrawing R 3 400 from the advice centre's account.
- The chairperson of the management committee of an advice centre in the Western Cape was alleged to have used R 10 000 of the advice centre's money for his own purposes (this happened whilst the advice centre's treasurer was in detention under the State of Emergency). In a separate incident a cheque was stolen and cashed for R 5 000. Legal charges were not pressed because the cost would probably have exceeded the amounts involved. Funding to the advice centre was discontinued.
- R 30 000 is believed to have been stolen through another advice centre in the Western Cape.

Other examples could be drawn from other regions. Corruption is a serious problem, not only because of the abuse of funds but also because it gives advice centres a bad reputation and undermines the good work of honest and committed people. But general mismanagement seems to have been a much more serious problem than corruption, both in terms of the mis-use of funds and the effects on public perceptions of advice centres. Furthermore, there seems to have been a marked decline in instances of corruption in the 1990s, as both the general context has changed and KT and other funders have demanded a higher standard of accounting.

5.3 Uses of funds

Most advice centres have spent their income in very much the same ways, but their output (in terms of the services they provide) has differed widely. The differences in service involve two key issues. Firstly, whether the advice centre has been primarily involved in the provision of para-legal and related advice, or whether it has served instead as a civic organising office. An earlier study usefully distinguished between 'para-professional' advice offices and 'activist offices' (Sogge, undated), although most advice centres involve at least some elements of each in practice. The second key source of difference concerns the quality of management. Often these two differences have overlapped: poorly-managed advice centres have been more involved in political or civic work at the expense of their advisory roles. This section first considers how advice centres have spent grants, and then examines what their expenditures have produced. The following section examines the question of management more closely.

5.3.1 Expenditures

The bulk of funds disbursed to advice centres were paid out as salaries to advice office workers. The typical advice centre employed a co-ordinator, a fieldworker, and an office administrator.

The employment of full-time workers has not always expanded the capacity of an advice office as much as expected, as it has led to a decline in the level of voluntary work done by other members of the community. Many of the advice offices established in the early 1980s relied primarily or solely on volunteers; these advice offices were generally only open for one or two mornings a week, however. The volunteers included local people giving up their spare time, and often local university or other students. The Black Sash has always made extensive use of volunteers, including even volunteers

from abroad. But the combination of increased funding and workload in the mid-1980s led to both existing and new advice offices becoming more dependent on paid employees; only the Black Sash seems to have escaped this retreat from voluntarism. A culture of voluntarism has unfortunately been lost in many areas.

In poor areas, however, it is difficult for advice centres to survive without salaries being paid to employees. Small towns and rural areas face a constant exodus of skilled people to the larger cities; paying some salaries is often the only way of preventing this. How large the salaries need to be is questionable. In one case, Matatiele in the Transkei, the Advice Office has chosen to employ a larger number of workers on very low salaries, i.e. to share the salaries out among more people. Most advice offices choose to pay smaller staff higher salaries.

Small sums were often spent on running expenses such as rent on premises and telephone bills. Transport costs accounted for greatly varying sums. Clearly advice centres in remote towns inevitably incur costs in getting to and from towns to consult with professional lawyers or other help, but it is unclear what is the more economical way of organising such transport. Reliance on public transport can be time-consuming; purchasing a vehicle allows greater flexibility and capacity, but involves a substantial initial outlay and often high running costs as well. Investment in a vehicle raises other financial problems as well. There is considerable potential for abuse, i.e. for uses unconnected with the advice centre, and the running costs of a vehicle can easily escalate. Furthermore, there have been several cases of vehicles being written off in motor accidents without any apparent insurance payout.

5.3.2. Casework

The ostensible objective of advice centres has been to provide assistance to members of disadvantaged communities in their dealings with the law, state bureaucracies, and other institutions or individuals. The range of cases dealt with is broadly similar among advice centres. These involve problems concerning: labour issues (farmworkers, domestic workers, unfair labour practices), housing and living conditions; government bureaucracies (pensions, unemployment grants or UIF), human rights problems (police brutality, detention) and social problems (including local disputes, divorce settlements, paternity claims and so on). Most of these problems have been unaffected by the political changes of the last three years, and will continue even after a democratic constitution is implemented in South Africa.

Many cases are referred to other institutions, including lawyers where necessary. But repetitive cases, such as problems with pension or UIF payments, are taken up with the relevant state department directly. Para-legals working in advice centres are thus locally and easily accessible to people, and thereby encourage people to do something about their problems, whilst at the same time they serve to 'screen' the volume of cases which needs to come before a qualified, expensive or overworked lawyer.

The typical KT-funded advice centre deals with only about twenty or thirty cases per month. Some deal with even fewer cases, and some days pass without a single case being brought to the advice centre. In remoter areas where there is no strong trade union presence, such as Aliwal North, a high proportion of these cases will involve unfair labour practices, especially dismissals. In areas where there are strong trade unions much less use seems to be made of the advice offices. As trade unions are generally weak or even non-existent in smaller towns, advice offices take on a particular

importance there. In major urban areas the majority of cases until the mid-1980s concerned influx control and urban residence rights, but this set of problems has since diminished in importance. Pensions remain a major problem in most areas.

Few KT-funded advice centres deal with more than five hundred or so cases per annum. Afesis, in East London, handled over two thousand cases in 1987-88, but this was very unusual in that the local Black Sash advice office only operated intermittently. There is little comparison between most KT-funded advice centres and Black Sash advice centres in terms of the volume of cases handled. As early as 1976, for example, over 4 400 people came to the Johannesburg Black Sash advice office; in 1977 over 3 100 people came to the Cape Town office; the number of interviews was still higher, as many people came more than once. In 1979 nearly eight thousand interviews were conducted in the Johannesburg office. In 1985 the Black Sash's seven advice centres together opened eleven thousand new files. Whereas some advice centres receive at most a handful of enquiries each day, people have to queue for hours to get into the Black Sash advice office in P.E., which sometimes sees hundreds of people in a morning.

It is difficult to tell what proportion of cases were concluded satisfactorily. Few advice centres kept composite records that might provide this information. In principle most advice offices opened a new file for each case (indicating addresses and details of the case), and separately recorded the key aspects of each case in a book. But often the details from the case files were not copied, even in the summary form intended, into the book, and follow-ups were rarely noted there. Short of looking through every case file (which would probably reveal the unevenness of record-keeping more than anything else), it is impossible to estimate how many cases are successfully closed.

The performance of some advice centres has led observers to question whether it might not be preferable to fund professional lawyers, for example through Legal Resource Centres, rather than para-legals in advice centres. Professional lawyers may cost considerably more, but they also generally handle many more cases, and probably with more successful outcomes (in terms of the individual complainants). Unless more use is made of local para-legal services, the funding of advice centres must be questioned. There are, however, other advantages of advice centres. Most importantly, they are local, whilst lawyers are often located in other, larger urban areas.

Relatively few cases are brought to most advice centres, and it is unclear how many of these are dealt with satisfactorily. It is also unclear what impact the case-work undertaken by advice offices actually has beyond the individual assisted. Is the community in any significant way empowered, or is the advice office a mere drop in the ocean? Without detailed case-studies of individual advice offices and communities this question cannot be adequately answered, and we have not come across any such studies.

It is possible to point out a few important cases in which advice offices have been involved, where the case has formed a precedent, in that either the solution can be routinely duplicated later or that the problem itself does not recur. One example of this was the stopping of police brutality in a Border township. In many of these, more important individual cases, however, the leading role was played by outside lawyers rather than the advice centre itself.

We can also reasonably conclude that the work of advice centres has compelled many state officials to act in ways that benefit many people which they would not have done

otherwise. This would probably be true of pension payments, and certainly true of particular categories of pension payments. The knowledge that they are being watched over, however imperfectly, no doubt spurs some state officials to behave more reasonably.

5.3.3 Educational work

The rationale for establishing and funding advice offices was not simply to provide a service to assist individual problems, but also to contribute towards a broader empowerment of the community. Because advice offices rarely handled large numbers of cases, and very few of these were of general consequence, empowerment boiled down to educational activity, i.e. building a consciousness of rights and the law in a largely unschooled community. It was thus particularly unfortunate that very few advice centres engaged in much educational work outside of the advice office itself.

One of the few exceptions to this was the Uitenhage Inter-Church Advice Centre. This advice office, like many others, handled many problems with pension payments. The advice office worker decided to be pro-active, and went to pension payout points to explain to the large numbers of pensions gathered there what their rights were and how procedures should work. The advice office also organised a number of social trips for pensioners, including to the harbour at Port Elizabeth. Retired nurses and teachers in the townships were encouraged to become involved in assisting other pensioners. A Committee of Pensioners was set up, which included representatives of the local civic, to look after pension problems. This Committee meets with the Cape Provincial Administration monthly to discuss any problems which have arisen. The whole initiative reflects the energy and concerns of the advice office worker in question, but could easily be replicated elsewhere.

It is our impression that few advice office workers had the skills (or at least the confidence), the inclination or the time to become involved in much educational work outside the office. There does not seem to have been much training and support in this area. How important a constraint this was is unclear, however. Few advice office workers seem to have prioritised educational activity, and many had little or no spare time after conducting their other tasks (casework, attending meetings, etc). This lack of prioritisation on the part of advice office workers is worrying: pro-active educational work not only expands the impact of the advice office and empowers the community in a very real way, but also enables some cases to be resolved before they are brought to the advice office. Advice offices need to attach greater priority to this activity, even at the cost of attending fewer meetings locally!

Another important aspect of extra-office work is simply expanding public knowledge of the advice office and its role. It remains unclear just how well-known advice centres are. A survey done in three urban areas of Cape Town in 1986 found surprisingly high levels of ignorance of the local advice offices. Many respondents in the survey said that they experienced a range of problems in their lives, and often sought assistance. But few turned to or even knew about the local advice centres (most took their problems to the institutions already involved such as local authorities, or to trade unions in the case of labour-related issues) (Louw, 1986). It is likely that advice offices are much better known in smaller towns, especially where there are fewer alternative sources of advice. In urban areas they are probably less well known. But even in small towns it should not be assumed that people know what the role of the advice office is. Another likely reason

for uncertainty, i.e. besides the lack of educational work in the past, is the association of many advice offices with civic and even political struggles in the past.

5.3.4 Political or civic work

Many advice centres, particularly in African townships, have served as civic offices and have thus been extensively involved in what would usually be considered civic or even political activity. Often, but not always, this has been closely linked to the issues raised in casework.

In the late 1980s many civic activists believed that KT funded advice centres in order to financially support civic activists' involvement in civic struggles (most of which were themselves profoundly political). In other words, many civic activists saw casework in the advice office as just one of the activities which KT was funding. KT emphasise that this was never their policy: funding for advice centres was supposed to fund casework and related work. But KT rarely scrutinised advice centres' activities, and tolerated the involvement of many advice centre personnel in civic and even political activity. Most township-based advice centres served as civic offices, providing advice to people (particularly on political or human rights problems such as police brutality), but also providing civic activists with a telephone and a place to meet. This occurred less often after 1990, but has certainly not entirely stopped in some areas.

In so far as financial assistance contributed to organisational development and general political change, this should be welcomed. But in political as in other aspects of life, the influx of vast funds in the late 1980s had mixed effects. Whilst enabling capacity to be built in some ways, it undermined it in others, notably through eroding voluntarism.

One consequence of this was that many township-based advice centres were linked to particular political traditions. The political posters which adorned the walls of many advice offices belied their claims to be non-partisan. It should be noted that in many small towns there was little tolerance of rival political traditions and parties. Charterist and AZAPO sympathisers, for example, rarely forged good working relationships. One advice centre in the Border region dismissed an office-worker who worked poorly and was sympathetic to AZAPO; it is likely that her poor work was linked to political differences in the office. Advice centres have rarely stood above party politics despite the obvious need for them to set a clear example in this respect.

The changing context since 1990 has meant that advice offices now very rarely serve as political offices. But many continue to double up as civic offices, if only because the advice office workers are very often leading members of the civic. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many advice office workers were heavily involved in a range of developmental work in the township. For example, the Daliwe Advice Centre co-ordinator (who is also chairperson of the local civic) has been involved in knitting and sewing projects, fence-making and brick-making projects, a vegetable and fruit garden, and an Operation Hunger-funded soup kitchen. He has also been extensively involved in negotiations with state officials over local government restructuring as well as township upgrading schemes, as well as civic-led campaigns (including, in 1992, over schools, pensioners and farmworkers). These activities were all praiseworthy, but it is unclear whether they should continue to be undertaken by an advice office worker as part of his paid work.

5.4 Relations between advice centres and civics

Advice centres had very diverse origins, as we saw in Section 3.3, and consequently developed different types of management structure and different relationships with the local civic organisation. The relationship between civics and advice centres has often been fruitful, with both being strengthened by their complementary roles dealing with general campaigns and individual problems respectively. But the relationship has also given rise to tensions, especially since 1990.

Many township-based advice centres were established independently of civic organisations, usually by church ministers as an expansion of their pastoral role. Advice offices were sometimes formed at a time when there was no civic in the area. Such advice offices have since had to build working relationships with whatever civics were locally active. Other advice offices were formed by civics, or at least with close links with civics. These had to develop practical working and managerial relations in a rapidly changing political context. Most advice centres have, therefore, struggled to define their relationship with civics.

Advice centres which had been independently formed and were independently funded were able to retain their autonomy. They were generally more involved in casework, and less in civic and political activity. They were also generally better managed and accounted better for their funds. Many advice centres formed by civics experienced chronic problems, especially in the larger urban townships, for the reasons identified above. The advice centre formed in Guguletu (Cape Town) by the Western Cape Civics Association provides a possibly extreme example. The history of this advice office, which was initially called the Community Advice Office and later changed its name to the People's Advice Office, seems to be a catalogue of managerial ineptitude (if not corruption). In September 1990 it closed down temporarily, and early in 1991 it was evicted from its offices for not paying its rent. It had no efficient recording system for the cases it handled, and never submitted adequate narrative reports on its activities. Nor did it account for its funds. According to one auditor's report, only 17 percent of its expenses were supported by invoices, and a remarkable R 26 000 had been spent as cash cheques (a further R 4 000 was spent by cheque with no explanation provided as to what they were for). It seems remarkable that this project was funded under the CACP as recently as July 1991 for the 1991 calendar year (although KT is currently trying to recover this money which should never have been used).

The problem with the Guguletu advice office was an apparent lack of any managerial control from the management committee appointed by the Western Cape Civic Association. The committee never defined its role or powers, and no individual on the committee ever took responsibility for pulling the advice office staff into line. The office seems to have provided sheltered employment for certain civic activists. It does not seem to have even provided much of an office for the WCCA. Former WCCA leaders now acknowledge these problems. A 'fortune' was sunk into a disaster, they say; staff did much as they pleased. (It should be pointed out that this experience seems to have contributed to a more cautious approach to advice offices by SANCO in the Western Cape than in other regions).

Whilst the Guguletu example may be extreme in degree, the problems raised were widespread among civic-formed advice centres in metropolitan townships. Either the civic leadership provided little careful guidance and direction, or they were

over-involved, using the advice centre as little more than a civic office. In small towns the situation seems to have been much better. In Indian and coloured group areas, also, civics generally provided better supervision of advice centres. A further problem with a close relationship between civics and advice centres was that any negative perceptions of the civic would affect the working of the advice centre. In some parts of Cape Town, for example, civics became associated with the Chartist movement in particular, and local wariness or even hostility to Chartist politics led to a marked decline in people's use of advice centres.

The relationship between advice centres and civics became very much of a problem after 1990, when civics turned their attention more to developmental and other everyday issues. This increased the overlap between their activities and those of advice centres, particularly as many civics at local and regional levels sought to subordinate all other community-based structures to them. Civics claimed that they represented the whole community, and community-based organisations like advice offices should therefore be accountable to the civic. One of the consequences of this was the dissolution of the umbrella bodies for advice centres (such as the Advice Office Forum in Cape Town). Another common consequence was increased tensions at the local level.

In August 1991 Kagiso Trust convened a workshop for advice centres and civics in the Border region. As the workshop report (prepared by KT) explained:

'This workshop was called to sort out the relationship between Advice Offices and Civic Associations, which have experienced conflicts and misunderstandings in the past. Advice Offices complained that Civic members abused their resources. Civics on the other hand, felt themselves entitled to use Advice Office resources as, in their view, Advice Offices were accountable to Civics.'

The workshop concluded (according to KT's report) with the following agreement on the relationship between advice centres and civics:

'[Advice centres] should be accountable to a joint Management Board, comprising Civic and Advice Office representatives, which is ultimately accountable to the community. ... [Advice centres] should see [themselves] acting as a particular department of the Civics, with a specific task to fulfil. ... Instead of working together, the two bodies were sometimes at loggerheads. The workshop hoped to sort out the differences...'

Civics were exhorted to clarify their membership structures and raise funds through membership subscriptions; the community and local advice centres should be involved in drafting budgets, and 'clear financial procedures should be laid down, for both Civics and Advice Offices.' These were important suggestions for improving the performance and accountability of civics. But the central message was clear: advice centres should be subordinate to civics, albeit through some sort of 'joint management committee'. KT thereafter urged advice centres in the Border region to merge with or transform themselves into the legal departments of civic organisations.

This view was also expressed at a workshop convened in November 1991 by KT in Johannesburg, to which all KT-funded civics and advice centres in the Transvaal and Orange Free State were invited. This workshop also resolved that advice centres should

fall under the overall control of civics. By 1992 it was KT policy not to fund advice centres where a civic existed: funding would only be provided if the advice centre and civic merged, i.e. the advice centre became subordinate to the civic. One of KT's concerns, at least in some regions, was to strengthen the civic movement through giving them control over advice offices. Through its financial leverage KT thus became a mechanism for recasting the relationship between advice centres and civics.

In practice KT has not always followed this policy. In the Eastern Cape, for example, a pragmatic line has been followed. The impressively successful Uitenhage Inter-Church Advice Office has been funded by KT at the same time as the Uitenhage Residents Community Organisation (which incidentally runs its own advice centre in a different part of Uitenhage!).

Where KT has implemented the policy the results have sometimes been disastrous. The clearest example of this is Botshabelo. The advice office was established by church ministers in 1987, operating initially out of the Anglican Church. The office employed two dedicated youth activists who had been trained by the Black Sash in Johannesburg. Funding came through the CACP. In most years the Advice Office underspent its budget, using the balance to tide it over in the periods not covered by KT grants (generally because of delays in the KT funding procedure). In 1988-89 subsidiary advice offices were set up in new areas of the rapidly growing township.

In 1990 a civic was formed in Botshabelo. The civic and the advice office both applied for funding to KT for 1990. KT 'encouraged' the civic and advice centre to merge, and it implied if not stated outright that funding would be conditional on a merger. In 1991 the civic and advice centre merged, with the advice centre formally becoming a substructure of the civic. KT then made a grant to cover advice office and civic expenses. The funds were seriously mismanaged amidst considerable tension between civic and advice centre. The advice office staff claimed they were owed back-pay, which the civic was reluctant to pay because it wanted to use the funds for its own purposes. Although the advice office staff eventually received the back-pay, the rest of the money disappeared. The civic leaders could not account for it and it is apparently widely believed that they simply paid themselves salaries. KT has suspended funding to this project, but in the meantime the advice office without funds, has collapsed. The weakness and incapacity of the civic leadership ended up dragging the advice office into the quagmire.

The lessons of the Botshabelo experience are clear: Donors should only give money if there are clear lines of responsibility within the management structure, if there is a proper accounting system, and if the people responsible for administering funds are suitably skilled. If civics cannot provide this kind of leadership then they should accept a backseat in the management of advice centres.

Recently tensions and problems have been reported from the Eastern Cape, where the regional civic structure has repeatedly sought to ensure that advice offices (as well as other local community-based structures) are brought under the control of the local civics. In other regions some advice offices have refused to merge with civics, for example in King William's Town in the Border.

KT's policy with regard to the relationship between advice centres and civics was well-meant but seriously misguided. Few civics had the capacity to successfully oversee

the workings of an advice office; many were likely to give in to the temptation to plunder the advice office's resources for their own uses (whether worthy or otherwise). Civics may have wanted to set themselves up as 'gatekeepers' over resources coming into the community, but control all too easily became over-centralised in structures which were in fact barely accountable to the community at large. Furthermore, few civics had financial control mechanisms which are adequate for the task of supervising the funds required for an advice centre.

The most successful management structures seem to have been committees which involved broadly qualified or otherwise concerned people from a variety of walks of life. For example, the Uitenhage Inter-Church Advice Office management committee comprises church ministers and experienced Black Sash workers, as well as civic representatives. Management committees elected at public annual general meetings of the advice centre tend to have worked adequately, but could usefully have been supplemented with invited outsiders. The experience of managing advice centres thus confirms a point made earlier in other respects: civics and civic leaders have rarely had the skills required to tackle the roles they have sought to play. External assistance is needed in management as in other areas.

5.5 Assessment

Any assessment of the experience of funding advice centres must start with a reiteration of the diversity of that experience. The type of activity undertaken by advice centres, and the quality of the work done, varied from one advice centre to another. Advice centres ranged from the very good to the very weak, with some offering good advice and empowering the community and others providing bad or no advice and thereby even undermining collective action.

Many advice centres have performed an invaluable role in assisting individuals and, to a small but nonetheless significant extent, empowering the community. An earlier study of advice centres concluded the following:

'By coming into contact with an advice office, the worker or housewife should gain an awareness of the limited freedom that existing legislation allows them, should become aware of their statutory rights and that political and economic power is not unlimited. ... In the final analysis advice offices can suggest to people that there are also remedies and not only problems. For many a visit to an advice office is the first time that they become aware that something can be done about a seemingly insurmountable problem, and that a fatalistic and passive acceptance of their problems is not the only option open to them. Seen in this context the advice office infrastructure is an important force within the struggle for democracy in South Africa. (Louw 1986, p.95).

We would broadly concur with this assessment. People with problems could receive advice from somewhere, and did not need to 'suffer in silence'.

But in a world of scarce resources it is necessary to ask further questions: Has investment in advice offices been the most effective use of resources in the struggle to strengthen democracy? And what activities should advice offices have prioritised to

maximise their contribution to this struggle? These questions will be further examined in Section 9.

The weaknesses of advice centres funded under the CACP have been most pronounced in the cases of civic-run advice offices in metropolitan townships. This has reflected both external factors, including state repression and harassment, and factors specific to the management provided and objectives set by the civics. These civic-run advice centres have provided useful resources to civic leaders for use in civic and political struggles, but have been less successful in terms of dealing with individuals' problems. Civics have rarely had the skills and capacity to effectively run advice-oriented advice offices! It should be emphasised that there are important exceptions to this. In small towns the boundaries between civic and advice centre work have been very blurred, but management has generally been of a higher standard.

Most advice centres have achieved striking successes in their casework, i.e. in solving individuals' problems effectively. Successful interventions with respect to pension payments or service charges have materially improved the position of many township residents besides those whose cases have been dealt with in the advice office. To some extent individual casework has underpinned collective empowerment and action.

Most advice centres have, however, failed to run educational activities outside of the advice office itself. Many advice office personnel are still not sufficiently focused on welfare or developmental problems, and retain their former political perspective; they therefore lack creativity in dealing with people's everyday welfare problems. Again, there are clear exceptions to this, generally where advice office workers are older and more sensitive to the everyday problems and situation of pensioners, for example.

The weaknesses of advice centres in terms of management and creativity are clearly linked to the absence, until recently, of organisational development training in para-legal courses. This will be explored further in Section 6 below. Advice offices have also often received inadequate support and back-up from funding and other service organisations.

6. TRAINING AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND ORGANISATIONS

Little emphasis was placed on training and technical support during the early stages of the CACP, when the primary objective was to sustain civics and advice offices in the face of state repression. However, the experience of the problems encountered by these organizations, coupled with the changing situation within South Africa, generated greater awareness of the need for such support. From 1990 onwards, training and technical support were prioritised in response to the perceived weaknesses of civic associations and advice offices especially in terms of their performing the new and enlarged roles that it was envisaged they should play in the evolving new dispensation.

As outlined below, a range of training schemes with different objectives and target groups has been financed through the CACP, which has become a principal source of funding for such activities among civics and advice offices. The classification adopted here reflects the primary focus of various provider organizations and courses, although in reality many address a variety of issues and concerns.

This section includes some comments on training and technical support organisations which have not been funded through the CACP but are directly relevant to the Programme's objectives. Most of these have been funded by the CEC (through KT) but outside of the CACP. About R 1.7 mn has been disbursed to service organisations through the CACP, and a further R 17 mn to service organisations independently of the CACP. It should be noted that the largest recipient of funds through the CACP and related expenditure was LEAP, which was not intended to fall under the CACP at all.

It should also be noted that some of the comments made with regard to the funding process in general, in section 4.2, are applicable here as well.

6.1 Para-legal training courses

Most funding for training services under the CACP has been for para-legal training, especially for advice centre personnel (or for people intending to form advice offices in their townships). Para-legal staff are community workers or volunteers trained in basic legal principles and procedures and associated human rights issues in order to improve access to justice and legal services by their communities. Their work complements that of qualified lawyers in a similar way to para-medical staff vis-a-vis professional doctors.

Funding has been provided to the Black Sash, the Para-Legal Training Project (PLTP, initially based in Grahamstown, but later relocated to East London), the Legal Education Action Programme (LEAP, based at the University of Cape Town), and to the umbrella organisations for advice centres which have provided some training to their members, including the Cape Town-based Advice Office Forum, the Trans-Orange Advice Centre Association (TOACA) and the Natal Advice Centres Association (NACA). Grants to the Black Sash, PLTP and LEAP under the CACP came to a total of over R 1.4 mn. (Grants to the umbrella organisations covered a range of activities besides training, making it difficult to specify how much was allocated to or spent on para-legal training specifically).

The Black Sash have been at the forefront of training for advice centres in the country since the mid-1980s. The Johannesburg office has provided three-month training courses for advice centre staff from the Transvaal, O.F.S. and Northern Cape. The Port Elizabeth office provides intensive three-week courses for Eastern Cape advice centres. Other Black Sash offices do the same in their respective regions. The courses run in Port Elizabeth take about fourteen or sixteen people at a time, including two per advice centre. They are highly structured, and involve both discussions around presentations by specialists such as Legal Resource Centre lawyers, and practical experience in counselling in the Black Sash's own advice office. The Black Sash training courses have a very good reputation, which former participants working in advice centres told us is well deserved. Considering their extensive use of voluntary workers, immense experience and commitment, the Black Sash must be considered an invaluable player in the training field.

The Black Sash emphasises the importance of **not** providing training in isolation from other support. The P.E. Black Sash, for example, try to spend time in the area where students come from both before and after training courses. They are also sensitive to the importance of the relationship between trained advice centre personnel and the broader community. Advice centres are encouraged to send older people for training. The Black Sash in P.E., and Sached also, provide some workshops for members of the management committees of advice centres. This helps to counter the problem of having highly trained advice centre employees who can easily intimidate the committee which is supposed to supervise them.

The Para-Legal Training Project has provided training for advice centres, mostly in the Border region, the Albany area of the Eastern Cape, and the North-Eastern Cape (i.e. to the east of Aliwal North/Queenstown), since its formation in 1991. In April/May 1992 it ran a two-week course for fifty-two para-legals from twenty-four towns, and twenty-six management committee members from ten towns. Of these towns, fifteen already had established advice centres, whilst it was hoped to establish advice centres in the other eleven (mostly in the North-Eastern Cape) after personnel had been trained. The PLTP also ran short courses and workshops in small towns. The PLTP training is also highly spoken of by participants.

Since 1990, the Legal Education Action Project (LEAP) has focused on capacity building, the propagation of para-legal skills and the training of trainers in this field. Unpaid para-legal volunteers are seen as crucial, especially in small towns and rural areas without advice offices. In order to maximise local effectiveness, LEAP requires that its trainees be mandated by their local civic or community-based body. After completion of their training, they are expected to set up para-legal units as specific resource centres, usually in the room of a suitable house. Elsewhere, para-legal volunteers also provide back-up to existing advice offices. LEAP courses cover three areas, namely service skills (advice, referrals, etc), development skills (rural needs, workshopping and educational methods), and human rights (monitoring, mediating and negotiating skills, and community knowledge).

Geographically, LEAP operated in Namaqualand, the Karoo and southern Cape until 1992 when its area was expanded to include the Cape West Coast and Boland for purposes of a needs assessment of para-legal training and necessary voter educational work ahead of the forthcoming general election. Once the assessment has been completed in March 1993, a decision will be made on where to deploy LEAP

fieldworkers and how the work can be divided among other members of the Rural Advice Training Group (RAT). This is a network of service organizations providing specific, detailed para-legal training on particular issues. Other members include the Black Sash, Legal Resources Centre and the Transport and General Workers' Union. LEAP is also able to exploit specific skills, resources and linkages through three other fora to which it belongs, namely the Network of Independent Monitors (NIM), National Development Forum (NDF) and Education for Democracy.

The umbrella organisations for advice centres which existed in some regions between 1984 and 1991 organised some training workshops for their members. These covered both administrative topics such as office administration and financial management, and para-legal training. The Trans-Orange Advice Centre Association (TOACA), for example, ran workshops in association with specialist training organisations such as the Administrative Training Programme (ATP) and Human Awareness Programme (HAP). The Cape Town-based Advice Office Forum employed a training officer, and ran weekly training sessions and more intensive courses for rural advice centres. Organisations like the Black Sash and LEAP have encountered a far greater need for such work since the demise of these umbrella bodies.

It needs to be noted that these training programmes have aimed at improving networking among advice centres as well as providing administrative and para-legal training.

6.2 Organisational training courses

Organisational training has not been funded under the CACP to the same extent as para-legal training. Para-legal training courses have generally involved basic administrative training as well. Only recently has increased importance been attached to training courses for civic organisations. This has been in response to the wider role identified for them from 1990, the difficulties of these new roles in development, negotiations, and local government, and the growing perception that most civics have severe problems in terms of their existing organisational capacity.

In the 1980s training courses were run by a range of organisations for officials of civics and other organisations in the Mass Democratic Movement. These included, for example, CEI in Johannesburg and Afesis in East London. Other organisations provided assistance of a more educational nature. In East London, for example, Afesis ran a range of workshops for civics, providing information which was not otherwise easily available.

Since 1991-92 organisational training has been extended to cover the skills needed by civics in the transitional period in terms of their involvement in negotiations, and later developmental and local government institutions. Much of the training available is in the form of one-off workshops run by service organisations such as the Development Action Group in Cape Town, Urban Services Group in P.E. and Corplan in East London. Workshops have covered topics such as new legislation and local government financing, for example.

Recently a number of courses have been developed to address these needs more fully. The Civic Associations of Johannesburg (CAJ) - a SANCO zonal structure - has initiated a specific capacity-building programme for civic organisations. Planact, the

large Johannesburg-based technical support organisation, had experienced problems in working with civics which lacked the capacity to use Planact in a purely advisory or supporting role. With encouragement from Planact, CAJ launched an innovative five month (96 day) training course in November 1992, in conjunction with Khanya College (in Johannesburg). The 36 participants included executive committee members, officials and volunteers, selected by CAJ-affiliated civics; the participants in the course are directly accountable to their civics rather than to CAJ. The scope of the course, which is designed at a basic level, includes one-day and week-long sessions on:

- negotiation skills
- organisational, administrative and accounting skills
- the role of civics in the current context
- relations between civics and political organisations.

The course will also help to identify suitable participants for subsequent, more specialised courses. At this stage, the course is experimental; following a preliminary internal assessment during February 1993, decisions are expected about repeating the programme and/or offering alternative forms of training. Civics' direct control over this training programme is apparently unprecedented.

In the Western Cape the civic movement is weaker and more fragmented. There a comparable training course for civics is run by the Foundation for Contemporary Research (FCR). A pilot course was run in 1991, for twenty-three trainees, and a full course in 1992 for forty trainees (of whom thirty completed the course). The full course focused on local government and development. The goal was to equip civic leaders with the skills to participate in the current transition. The course therefore involved exposure to policy debates (about local government, for example) and training in assessing community needs, community research, developing strategic plans, and developing a programme of action. In assessing the full 1992 course, FCR felt that insufficient attention had been paid to simple organisational skills. The trainees on the FCR course met weekly for five months, starting with a residential weekend and proceeding with half-day sessions. The trainees completed a series of assignments involving community research and planning.

Other service organisations provide training elsewhere. In East London Afesis and Corplan jointly run a training programme and employ a full-time civic education officer. The programme provides basic organisational skills as well as education on development. Commercial organisations have also moved into this field. In mid-1992 Damelin College in Johannesburg advertised a course on local government, which it describes as a 'revolutionary' course, 'developed to open doors in exciting new career opportunities for you'. Who should attend? 'Community government officials at the early stages of their careers; newly elected councillors and people's representatives; and all those who wish to enter this field.' The course was scheduled to run on Saturday mornings for three months.

In its funding of civic organisations in 1992 Kagiso Trust attached great importance to civic officials attending courses on organisational development. Civics (and advice offices) in the Eastern Cape were encouraged to attend a proposed course which was being negotiated at the Port Elizabeth Technikon. The Port Elizabeth campus of Vista University is also establishing a course leading to a Certificate in Public Affairs aimed

at civic leaders. Civics in the O.F.S. were to attend a training course as part of the O.F.S. Civic Development Programme. Funding from Kagiso Trust provided for such courses.

6.3 Strategic planning training

Their changing role amidst rapidly changing conditions has increased the importance of strategic thinking and planning within civics. In the early 1980s civic organisations, especially in coloured and Indian group areas in Cape Town and Durban respectively, engaged in extensive strategic planning, with a key role played by strategists such as Pravin Gordhan of the Durban Housing Action Committee. In the mid- and late 1980s, however, few civics strategised beyond the short-term. This was due to the high level of state repression (including especially the detention of key leaders), the rapid pace of change, and a widespread concern among civic activists to simply escalate all resistance without too much thinking about the merits and demerits of alternative forms of resistance.

During 1992 a range of organisations became involved in preliminary strategic planning activities with or for civics. The Development Bank of South Africa ran such an exercise for SANCO's national office. The Urban Foundation has run several strategic planning workshops in different regions. In August 1992, for example, the Urban Foundation ran a weekend workshop in conjunction with the Civic Association of Johannesburg. The workshop reviewed the challenges facing civics, and in particular the problems of community-based development, and the importance and nature of strategic planning.

The involvement of institutions such as the Development Bank and Urban Foundation reflects their perception that a range of developmental activities require 'community' participation, but that civic organisations currently lack both the organisational and strategic capacity to play this role effectively.

6.4 Other training

There are numerous service organisations offering various training courses for civics and advice offices at the local or zonal level. Inevitably, much of this training is relatively basic; more specific and advanced training is exceptional and almost invariably involves professional legal, human rights or rural development staff brought in from other organisations. The Kagiso Trust has been an important funder of such exercises as part of their allocations to training/service organisations. The scale of such activities is, however, perforce limited - and certainly inadequate relative to the scale of need - on account of the paucity of appropriate staff within the service organisations.

For example, the George-based Southern Cape Land Committee (SCLC), an affiliate of the National Land Committee, is dedicated to organisational building and development, facilitating development work and undertaking research. In common with other organisations, it has sought to become more pro-active since 1990, concentrating its activities increasingly on local government and land claim issues. In April 1991 it organized a successful three-day workshop on land reforms following the government's publication of a White Paper on this topic. Other workshops have dealt with local government reform, and housing issues in relation to local government. Participants have been drawn from the seventeen or so representative community organisations

which the SCLC serves. SCLC had a hand in the selection of participants, in the belief that selecting appropriate people and promoting attendance would maximise the benefits of the workshops. SCLC also produce booklets and other educational materials on these and related issues. Until the beginning of 1993, when a KT-funded Education and Publicity Officer was recruited to promote this sphere of work, SCLC had just four staff, this figure in turn representing an improvement on the previous position. Quite apart from other problems and challenges, therefore, the scale of SCLC activities, especially in training has perforce been limited. The same is true of most comparable organisations.

6.5 Technical Service organisations

The organisations in this category have provided the lion's share of professional advisory and advocacy planning services for civics and advice offices. As such, their role in support of civics negotiating with local government and other state structures has been vital. The terms of reference for this report did not encompass an examination of technical service organisations, which have been funded outside of the CACP, but it is appropriate to consider the relationship between them and their clients, i.e. civics or other community-based organisations.

Planact has received more funds - over R 10 mn - through Kagiso Trust than all other technical service organisations together. The Built Environment Support Group (BESG) in Durban has received over R 3 mn. The Cpe Town-based Development Action Group (DAG) and Foundation for Contemporary Research (FCR) have received over R 400 000 and R 150 000 respectively. The Durban-based Centre for Community and Labour Studies received over R 430 000, and Corplan in East London almost R 200 000. Details are provided in Annex A.

The relationship between technical service organisations and civics has been very successful in most respects, but has also involved some tension. The successes lie in terms of the advice and expertise provided by service organisations, which has enabled civics to negotiate a series of important agreements with state, parastatal and private sector institutions. The most famous agreements have been the Soweto Accord and agreements between certain civics and Escom, but in very many townships agreements have been reached on matters ranging from the maintenance of housing to the development of shack settlements.

Planact, for example, has been involved in research and advice with regard to local negotiations and the reorganisation of local government; physical development, upgrading and integration of townships; local economic development; land, housing and general urban policy; gender issues in relation to the environment; and education and training. As with other technical service organisations, Planact undertakes work only

'... on request for mass-based democratic organisations committed to urban development. Planact accepts projects on the understanding that there is a clear mandate from the organisation making the request, and in turn undertakes to be accountable to that organisation... The central aim of the organisation is to produce the knowledge and generate the skills required by grassroots organisations committed to empowerment, urban transformation and development. The meaningful transfer of knowledge and skills is seen

as a prerequisite for successful development work.' (Planact Annual Report 1991/2, p.3).

Service organisations have often talked about their role as 'empowering community groups' as well as 'passing on skills to disadvantaged groups'.

Tensions have arisen over the issue of 'the meaningful transfer of knowledge and skills' and the 'empowerment' of civics. Many civic activists, whilst grateful for the considerable assistance provided by dedicated staff in service organisations, are unhappy about the slow speed of skill transfer in practice. Some civic activists understood the claims made by service organisations about empowerment literally, and have been disappointed when, up to five years later, they do not feel empowered. The service organisations, they say, have provided advice but have done little to diminish their own (convenient) monopoly over key skills. Some civic activists go further, accusing service organisations of 'hijacking' negotiations. Service organisations, for their part, say that civics are passing the buck onto service organisations for their own mistakes in negotiations.

There is without doubt truth in this. Although committed, *inter alia*, to skills transfer and training activities, the bulk of the work of service organisations like Planact has been in the more 'traditional' spheres of providing advice, preparing formal documents for civics to take to the negotiating table, and some technical planning work. These service organisations have employed people who can perform these tasks; they have not prioritised the education and training side. The little training that has been provided has generally been done by staff in between their main, project-related work.

The problem of skills is particularly fraught because of the racial element: service organisations are predominantly staffed by white professionals (and in Natal, by Indian professionals also), reflecting the historical biases of the educational system in South Africa. Their failure to transfer skills can all too easily be interpreted as self-serving. In the context of apartheid it is not surprising that suspicions based on racial grounds arise from time to time. Some (white or Indian) service organisation personnel may hold or unwittingly express apartheid-style assumptions about the black-run organisations. And even if service organisations had successfully transferred research and related skills onto many civic activists, suspicions would no doubt have arisen among some of the (black) activists, causing animosity. This is not the place to examine further the issues involved or extent of the problem.

Civics must also bear some of the responsibility for their almost complete reliance on service organisations for policy-related work. Civics have sometimes themselves employed professionals from within the local community. But the experience has rarely been successful, generally due to the poor management style of the civic leadership concerned. If civics are to employ professionals successfully, they must make sure that they are organisations within which professionals can work productively.

The Soweto Civic Association has recently sought to establish its own, internal, research and technical advice unit. This operates as a department within the SCA.

It is unclear whether it should be the role of technical service organisations to establish programmes specifically concerned with the transfer of skills. As professional planners, lawyers or whatever, most of the personnel are best equipped - and most effectively used - in their respective fields for the preparation of position papers, technical studies

and the like for client civics. Although certain skills can undoubtably be imparted to clients, e.g. through assisting the conduct of community research rather than using outside researchers, formal training is usually required for higher level skills. Moreover, the time pressure under which most service organisations work, militates against effective 'shadowing' of professionals in many cases. It is quite clear however that service organisation personnel should not claim to be performing roles, including an unqualified 'empowerment' of the community, which they patently are not.

Planact is nevertheless devoting attention to increasing its training activities and promoting skills transfer. It is involved in the current five-month CAJ/Khanya College training course for civics (see Section 6.2 above), which it regards as the most comprehensive such programme it has participated in to date. It has employed growing numbers of black staff. But the historical imbalances in terms of education cannot be rectified by service organisations alone. The current collapse of schooling for black South Africans will worsen the situation; it will be some time before service organisations can hope to attract appropriately trained black professionals in significant numbers.

Another potential source of tension between civics and service organisations lies in the procedures for distributing funds. The service organisations have supposed to provide a service for civics, but the CEC and other donors have channelled more funds directly into the service organisations than into the civics. Whilst the civics are supposed to control the whole process, they have not controlled the resources. It is unclear whether this has yet raised actual problems.

There are several proposals afoot with regard to what is being termed 'demand-side' funding. Funds would be granted to the civic, which would then commission particular services from service organisations (or commercial competitors) on a contract basis. Funds would only be granted with strict conditions, but civics would have greater control over the process than at present. One 'demand-side' funding experiment is underway in Duncan Village (East London). The Dutch NGO Novib has allocated funds to the Duncan Village Residents Association to commission a plan for the upgrading of the location. It is likely that the DVRA will commission Corplan to prepare this plan, especially as Corplan were instrumental in setting up the whole funding arrangement! It must be expected that demand-side funding would be accompanied by considerable tensions of its own: civics might resent the strict conditionality of funding, and might also resent the relatively high salaries paid to many professionals in service organisations.

Notwithstanding these problems in the relationship between service organisations and civics, it must be emphasised that the former have played a pivotal role in many of the changes in urban development and government which are now unfolding. Service organisations have been instrumental in the preparation of policy positions by civics for use in negotiations, and have thereby underpinned whatever pluralism currently exists with respect to policy options. The prospects for democracy in South Africa have been improved by the existence of competing policy options. Negotiations between civics and either state or private sector groups would not have been as successful as they have without the involvement of technical service organisations; state officials and private sector negotiators have been unable to use their access to information to ride roughshod over civics' criticisms.

6.6 Assessment

Training activities have mushroomed in the changed context since 1990. On the one hand there has been a growth in the number of advice centres around the country, with a corresponding growth in the need for training para-legal workers and volunteers. On the other hand increased importance has been attached to providing community-based organisations with some of the skills required for their new, more pro-active, developmental roles.

Whilst there have been some useful, even innovative workshops and courses provided by committed and sincere staff, there appears to be a growing consensus among both civics and advice offices that in general;

- training activities to date have been inadequate;
- that most such activities have not produced the intended benefits to the recipients, either as individuals or organisations.

Para-legal training has benefited from the experience acquired in the 1980s, especially by the Black Sash. But other training activities have been forced to start from scratch. Partly as a result, the relationship between civics and some service organisations has sometimes become strained. The ascribed causes of these perceived problems vary but each of these merits some discussion, especially since they are closely related.

6.6.1 The quantity of training

Whilst it is necessary to distinguish between para-legal training and other forms of training, most forms of training are insufficient in terms of the need they are trying to address. Take the case of the Border and North-Eastern Cape regions, where the bulk of para-legal training is provided by the Para-Legal Training Project. In 1991 under three hundred people attended the workshops and courses run by the PLTP, which varied in length between a weekend and two weeks. Even if nobody attended more than one course, this averaged only six people from each of the fifty-odd towns in the region. The problem of para-legal skills in remote rural communities is only being dented.

The situation is particularly bad with respect to technical service organisations. Concern is increasingly being expressed by civics that many technical service organisations emphasise skills transfer and training in their stated aims and objectives, yet little has occurred in these areas. In this specific sense, the criticism may be fair and improvement could no doubt be made. Indeed, Planact, DAG and others are endeavouring to expand this aspect of their work. However, ultimately there is a serious capacity constraint within the system. Altogether, the twenty-odd technical service organisations (with perhaps 200 professional staff) and other service/training organisations face a plethora of calls on their staff and time, of which training is only one, and probably not the most appropriate one either.

Consequently, any training programmes undertaken by these organisations inevitably form rather a drop in the ocean of need. Within each of the larger metropolitan areas, for example, there may be up to 2,000 or more civic and advice office staff, executive committee members and volunteer workers, the vast majority of whom lack even basic training relevant to their activities. The scale of required training is thus far beyond the capacity of the existing network of service organisations, even if all courses were effectively designed and delivered.

It is not clear, moreover, that educational work in this area should be the concern of technical service organisations. At least, educational work should not be left to technical staff, but should be the sole responsibility and concern of staff employed specifically to implement educational programmes. This is particularly the case given the prospect of civic activists being elected or appointed into local government in the near future (see section 8).

This raises the important question of balance. Technical service organisations employ larger numbers of professional staff, and absorb much larger budgets, than the training programmes concerned with civics and advice centres. It is not clear that this balance is appropriate. Technical service organisations are providing a very important service, but a greater emphasis on educational work (whether within or outside these organisations) could enable more of the work currently done by service organisations to be done by civic leaders themselves.

The civic movement itself must accept some responsibility for the inadequate level of training provided hitherto. Civic activists have generally not prioritised educational activity within their organisations with the important exception of political education. In the 1990s the need for political education has diminished relative to the need for more development and management-oriented training, yet little of the latter has been organised within the civic movement itself. As we noted in Section 4, civics operating on tight budgets have generally allowed personnel expenses to squeeze expenditure on education and workshops. This has been true of civics at regional and local levels.

The formation of SANCO was supposed to enable streamlined coordination and provision of organisational and other training within the civic movement. To date, however, regional SANCO education officers have not made an impression. Organisational training is only beginning to enhance the organisational capacity of the civic movement. There remains an almost complete absence of strategic planning training.

6.6.2 The nature and quality of training

There are two general aspects to this problem, one of which follows directly from the previous point. In general terms, the greatest need for training and capacity-building lies within those civics and advice centres staffed entirely by Africans. Moreover, rural organisations tend to have greater capacity deficiencies than many urban-based ones. This is primarily a reflection of the inequities and inadequacies of the Bantu Education system. It is therefore unrealistic to expect the small number of service organisations to be capable of tackling this vast backlog alone.

The second aspect of this problem relates to how training activities are conceived and undertaken. Too often, training is seen as a discrete package, to be acquired or imparted in isolation from the particular context in which it is subsequently to be utilised. Sometimes, too, it is seen as a fashionable 'shopping list item' with which to attract external funding because training and capacity-building have become catchwords among donors. Consequently, many recipients of training have felt it to be too general for practical purposes, even though it might have been very interesting in itself.

At least seven related possible reasons for this can be distinguished:

- Many trainers lack experience in this particular arena and courses have been devised at short notice within the last couple of years, often on an experimental basis. Some improvement can therefore be expected through trial and error.
- Participants are often drawn from diverse organisations and have very different levels of formal education and technical training.
- Such courses usually involve participants with very different tasks and portfolios, for which different skills are required. Trying to find a common denominator under such circumstances quite understandably leads to the content being pitched at a relatively low level. The training required by a treasurer is different from that most essential to other tasks such as administration or negotiation skills. Even carefully designed courses may have this drawback. For example, early feedback from participants undertaking the five-month CAJ/Khanya College course apparently suggests that more specific, in-depth training would be preferred. One possible reason is that the course was designed for full-time officials and executive members, but apparently only 40 percent of the participants fall into these categories.
- Much training to date has taken the form of one- or two-day workshops, which are insufficient to impart specialist knowledge or provide practice in skills being learnt.
- There has rarely been follow-up to such one-off training exercises, either in the workplace or by means of other workshops. As a result, acquired information and skills may easily be applied inappropriately or lost, rather than being consolidated.
- There has been inadequate co-ordination between organisations indirectly or indirectly involved in training.
- The low priority attached to training by civics themselves.

Many of these points have been identified by one or other of the organisations involved in training activities. Furthermore, para-legal training organisations are generally more advanced than organisations involved in other training in tackling these problems.

The issue of co-ordination has figured prominently in meetings of the various networks of service organisations. The formation of SANCO seemed to herald improved co-ordination on the part of the civic movement itself (although there is little evidence of this yet). The dissolution of umbrella organisations for advice centres is the only obvious setback in this respect, and it is unclear how much co-ordination of training they provided in any case. It has recently been proposed that a National Institute for Local Government and Urban Development be formed, *inter alia* to improve the co-ordination of training in preparation for participation in local government. Co-ordinating initiatives should be welcomed, although it remains important that coordination should not be achieved at the cost of overcentralisation (pluralism must be nurtured in training as in other fields).

In sum, most training to date has suffered from the drawbacks of being decontextualised from strategic planning, too general for the immediate work environment facing individuals within the civic movement or advice offices, and too small-scale to have a substantial impact (especially within more impoverished and remoter townships and rural areas). At the same time, the lack of independent technical and training capacity within most civics has led them to become heavily dependent on service organisations. There have been some attempts, notably by CAJ, to develop civics' own capacity in

these areas, but it has often proved difficult to retain appropriate staff on account of resource constraints and lack of management skills. In many cases, financial constraints are currently becoming greater rather than smaller, for reasons associated with high unemployment and the changing situation in South Africa. Future external assistance and training activities will have to take account of these experiences and prevailing conditions, providing greater differentiation, relevance and follow-up.

7. SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE CACP

7.1 Civics and Advice Offices

Direct funding to civics and advice offices accounted for the lion's share of the CACP. Grants through the CACP enabled many civics and advice centres to employ full-time personnel and thereby provide residents of South Africa's black townships (and in some cases rural areas) with enhanced services in a number of ways. Whereas most advice centres which were staffed by volunteers only opened on a few mornings per week, CACP-funded advice centres were able to open regularly and every day. Advice office workers were also able to take up more civic and political issues. Funding enabled umbrella civic structures to employ organisers to promote civics in small towns.

Funding from sources such as the CACP was a major factor in the proliferation of civics and advice centres in small towns, in the Eastern and North-Eastern Cape, for example, in 1990-91. External funding also enabled civic personnel to engage more fully in negotiations with the state and the private sector.

Funding under the CACP thereby contributed significantly to processes of political change in South Africa, at the national level in the late 1980s particularly and at the local level in the early 1990s especially. It also contributed to the achievement of tangible improvements in living conditions, through both successful civic campaigns focused on collective problems and the casework of advice centres dealing with individuals' problems (although it should be noted that the success of advice offices in individual cases often set precedents which subsequently affected large numbers of people, such as when systems of pension payments were successfully challenged).

The activities of civics and advice centres have also helped build or maintain the foundations of mass participation in the future institutions of a democratic post-apartheid South Africa. 'Civil society', as it is generally labelled, has been nurtured during repressive conditions. One aspect of this to which we should draw attention is the maintenance, at some level, of a belief in the efficacy of both collective civic action and the use of the law by individual citizens. The CACP has therefore contributed to both the passage into the future of civic activism and the strengthening of the rule of law. These are important achievements.

In the post-1990 period funding under the CACP has helped civics and advice centres in the reconceptualisation and transformation of their roles. Civics have been helped to move into more development-oriented activities, and the formation of a wider network of non-political advice centres has been assisted. The CACP has prompted and facilitated the development of organisational procedures and accounting in many civics and advice centres.

The funding of civics and advice centres under the CACP involved, however, a number of substantial problems. These problems also occurred unevenly, reflecting the diversity of civics and advice centres. Civics and advice centres developed from different origins and in response to varied challenges thereafter. But some problems were widespread or recurrent. Many of these were probably unavoidable, as they were rooted in the character of the civic movement and of advice offices, on the one hand, and of the CACP on the other. But others were at the very least exacerbated by the actions and inaction of participants in the CACP. Whilst their actions are understandable, each of

the participants in the CACP - CEC, European NGOs, KT and recipient civics and advice centres - could have done more to address these various problems.

A culture of reporting and accountability has been very slow to take root among civics and advice offices. Recipients of CACP funding have failed to adequately account for funds and report on their activities to KT. Whilst this was to some extent understandable during the late 1980s, when the repressive context made it difficult, it is less excusable in the early 1990s. Few projects have fulfilled the terms of their contracts with regard to regular and prompt reporting. When accounts have been independently audited (which only became common in the early 1990s), the auditors have rarely been able to vouch for the accuracy of the audited accounts because the projects were unable to present vouchers for many or most expenses. Large sums were disbursed through cash cheques, and cannot be adequately accounted for. As far as we can tell this reflects mismanagement for the most part, although there are a number of clear-cut cases of corruption. Few treasurers of civics were qualified to oversee large sums of money. KT, for its part, failed to insist on higher standards of accounting and reporting until very recently, and even in 1992 there are cases of instalments being disbursed before the requisite interim reports or accounts have been submitted.

CACP funds were generally utilised to cover personnel costs. Salaried employees have rarely been well-managed. Personnel have rarely had clearly-defined and understood job descriptions, but have rather muddled along performing a wide range of tasks. Many of these tasks were important and of benefit to the community, but the lack of responsibility for specific activities meant that a number of important activities were left undone. Too little was spent on public education and workshops, which enhance organisational accountability and help to keep the civic or advice centre in contact with their constituents.

Both advice offices and civic organisations' offices have rarely been well-managed in other respects also. In too many cases substantial sums were spent on assets such as motor vehicles or office equipment which were not insured; when vehicles were written off in road accidents, or equipment was stolen, large sums of money were in effect just thrown away. Only recently have training organizations begun to make any impression on the management practices of civics and advice centres. Throughout the CACP, therefore, the quality of management was generally dependent on the integrity of leadership and the skills they had developed elsewhere. Advice centres which drew on the skills of professionals or church ministers were therefore generally better managed than those managed by local civic leaders.

There is little evidence that grants paid directly to civic organizations under the CACP have enhanced civics' organisational capacity at the local level. Funding enabled regional civic structure to open offices in 1990-92, but it is unclear whether, by the end of 1992, any benefits had accrued to local level civics in terms of organisational development. Funding rather enabled civics, at both local and regional levels, to participate more fully in broader political, and to some extent developmental, processes.

In some ways external funding has weakened civic organisation at the local level. The accountability of leadership to membership has been reduced, as the former in practice control resources. In many areas there has been a decline in voluntary participation in civics. The decline in a culture and practice of voluntarism has other causes, of course,

including notably the rising importance of regional and national liaison, and of negotiations at all levels.

The limited success in building the organisational capacity of civics was an important factor in the poor performance of civics in managing advice centres. Civic-run advice centres have provided useful resources to civic leaders for use in civic and political struggles, but have been less successful in terms of handling everyday casework of individuals' problems. The disastrous experience of the Botshabelo Advice Office illustrates the dangers in allocating roles to civics which they were not ready or suitably skilled to perform.

7.2 Training and Technical Support

In view of the diverse nature of these activities funded through the CACP, it is necessary to distinguish between training and technical support in this summary. It is also necessary to distinguish between para-legal training and the comparatively recent organisational training. Notwithstanding these points, there are important inadequacies in terms both of the overall quantity and the nature or quality of many **training activities** for civics and advice offices.

Concerted training efforts for civics are a relatively recent phenomenon, having begun in earnest only with the greater emphasis on development work since the unbanning of proscribed organisations and release of political prisoners in 1990. The scale of need is extremely large, given conditions in the townships and the often low levels of formal education of people subjected to 'Bantu Education'. Conversely, the resources available to the service and specialist training organisations have been small relative to this scale of need. Moreover, many of the training efforts provided to date have been experimental.

That said, there is a large measure of agreement that the majority of courses and training workshops for civics have been too general and conducted at too basic a level. Training has too often been decontextualised from both strategic planning for the movement as a whole and from the concrete situation in which individuals are required to apply the knowledge or skills gained.

In Section 6, seven reasons for this situation were distinguished:

- lack of experience on the part of trainers and training organisations;
- the diverse backgrounds of course participants, in terms of both the organisations from which they are drawn and their levels of formal education;
- the diversity of portfolios and specific tasks undertaken by course participants, for which different training should be provided;
- the brevity of most training activities, which is often inadequate for the acquisition of relevant skills;
- the general lack of follow-up to initial courses, either in terms of further courses or work-place visits;
- inadequate co-ordination of training;
- the low priority attached to training by civics themselves.

These conclusions apply to training activities for civics in general as well as to those specific elements supported by the CACP. The training and service organisations concerned are increasingly aware of their own limitations and the relative inefficacy of skills transfer and capacity building efforts to date. Some of the deficiencies can be addressed within the ambit of existing resources and programmes, eg providing more specific and clearly targeted courses with enhanced feedback and monitoring procedures. Many of the others, however, reflect the scale of resources available and also the wider structural constraints facing the civic movement. Strategies and resources of a different order of magnitude would be required to remedy these.

Much of this assessment holds true of training for advice offices as well. Para-legal training has benefited from the experience acquired by the Black Sash, and more recently LEAP. Para-legal training is generally impressive. Organisational training for para-legals, however, is also a recent development.

Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to highlight only negative conclusions about the use of CACP funds for training, despite the formidable structural problems and obstacles. Credit must be given in several important respects. During the course of the research for this report, evidence of well organised and relevant course and workshops was found in various contexts. Sometimes these formed specific items in the budgets of training and service organisations approved for funding within the CACP. This seems appropriate. With greater continuity of training, together with follow-up, the impact could often have been enhanced. In this regard, the trend during 1991-92 for KT to direct CACP funds increasingly away from 'block grants' in support of the overall work of individual organisations towards more specifically targeted training oriented activities is to be welcomed. In several instances, this has involved covering part or all of the costs of employing fieldworkers, trainers, education and/or publicity officers. Although it is still too early to evaluate their contributions, they should provide sustained inputs and at least some of the continuity and follow-up lacking in the past.

Technical support provided by service organisations has been a vital ingredient in the successes achieved in numerous cases where civics have had to engage local authorities and utility corporations on behalf of their memberships, and where community-based upgrading and development activities have been undertaken. Sometimes, CACP resources provided to individual civics have been used to purchase this support but the bulk of the necessary funding has been channelled direct to the technical service organisations. With a few exceptions, this has involved additional resources outside the scope of the CACP.

Technical service organisations have claimed to be involved in the transfer of skills as well as community 'empowerment'. This has given rise to discontent as civic activists feel that this has not happened, and the predominantly white service organisation staff are seen as protecting their monopoly over the relevant skills. Technical service organisations have been seriously overstretched, and cannot adequately deal with the demand for their skills and services. Their strengths generally lie in their core activities, namely service provision and advocacy planning, and not in educational activity. Commitments to active training and skills transfer during the course of such activities have been disappointing in practice, a situation attributable to pressures on time and resources rather than a lack of sincerity in most cases. But service organizations have too often been preoccupied with short-term crisis-management (during a period of rapid change in many areas), and not stepped back sufficiently to assess how their

relationship with civics should develop in future. Recently some technical service organisations have become involved in specific training activities, which have been included in the discussion of training above.

7.3 The role of European NGOs

The European NGOs in SANAM played an important role in the administration of the CACP. It is clear that communication and feedback between KT and the European NGOs were generally inadequate, being restricted essentially to formal administrative exchanges for the purposes of progress reports and financial disbursements. Although NOVIB was regarded as the most helpful, KT staff feel that rather more could have been done by the European NGOs to support them and to keep them abreast of developments. For example, there was no feedback to or discussion with KT of the annual reports apparently prepared by the representatives of the SANAM NGOs for the CEC. To wit, copies of these reports were apparently not even sent to KT for information; none could be traced during this study, and it is unclear whether these reports included any detailed or critical evaluation. This seems to be an extraordinary lapse, especially as the NGOs took an administrative levy from CEC funding (our sources differed as to whether the levy was set at 5 or 6 percent).

If communications between Europe and KT were so deficient, the situation with respect to individual organizations funded under the CACP must have been far worse still.

None of the sample visited for this study acknowledged receiving any feedback on such visits and evaluations, a shortcoming which is often claimed still to persist with respect to KT staff, even under the post-1990 arrangements (see below).

Although the CEC opened a South African office in Pretoria in March 1991, this had no direct effect on the administrative or contractual responsibilities regarding the CACP. Thus, although the European NGOs lost their role as the exclusive conduit for CEC funds to South Africa, they continued to act as before. For example, the London-based Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD) administered Phase III of the CACP (i.e. Project 295) under contract no. 91.03.222, signed in late 1990. CAFOD was thus still responsible for submitting the KT interim and final reports on this Phase to Brussels during 1992. This contract was signed before the CEC's Pretoria office opened, but given the history and changing context of the CACP, it seems remarkable that this office played no direct role in overseeing the programme and was not consulted on the interim or final reports of Phase III. Hence the long delays during 1991-92 in the disbursement of approved project funds to recipient organisations by KT (see below) cannot be explained in terms of changing arrangements consequent upon the opening of the CEC's Pretoria office. The only involvement of this office has been to initiate and maintain discussions, since August 1991, on the need for an external evaluation of the CACP to date - of which this report is the product.

7.4 The role of KT and its relationship with civics and advice offices

As outlined in Section 2, KT has undergone tremendous change and development since its inception as a two-person conduit for external funds under the European Community's Special Programme for the Victims of Apartheid. During the period up to 1990, operations, although growing in scale and scope, were necessarily semi-covert. Record-keeping and other documentation was therefore kept to a minimum and the

principal objective was to sustain civics and advice offices during a period of often intense state repression. Since 1990, KT's growth has continued and the organisation has consciously sought to transform itself into a major non-governmental development agency. Today it has a formal structure, employs sixty-two people in its Johannesburg national headquarters and five regional offices, and is required to operate openly and accountably according to explicit performance criteria. The stimuli for such change have come both from within and from external donors, in particular the European Community, which remains KT's principal partner and source of funds.

Accordingly, the role of KT with respect to the various organisations funded under the CACP and other programmes has also changed. There was inevitably a fair amount of 'blank cheque writing' until 1990, in the sense that little control over the use of disbursed funds was possible. However, the different circumstances pertaining since then have necessitated the evolution of formal appraisal, monitoring, and evaluation procedures within a short period of time. These procedures were detailed in Section 2. In this sub-section, we attempt to assess how effectively KT has administered the CACP and the nature of KT's relationships with individual organisations funded through the programme. This is based on examination of KT documentation and project files, discussions with KT staff at both national and regional levels, and interviews with a sample of civics, advice offices and service organisations. Inevitably, it is difficult to say much about the pre-1990 situation, and our findings deal essentially with the period 1990-92.

Administration of the CACP over this period has generally been sound, and there is much evidence that KT staff have genuinely sought to establish the programme on a formal and accountable basis under far from easy circumstances. The current programme co-ordinator and his colleagues deserve considerable credit for establishing a computerised financial spreadsheet system for the CACP and associated programmes, for enhancing and systematising record-keeping and project files, and for formalising project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation procedures within Head Office and the regional offices.

Some of the recipient organisations have found the transition to accountability difficult to understand and accept, especially when the conditions under which they operate on the ground remain tense or openly conflictual. This has introduced tension and ambivalence into the relationship in several cases. The KT staff have been accused of interference and high-handedness on occasion, when having to chase up overdue reports and accounts, or insist on compliance on contractual conditions. With very few exceptions, such problems have been relatively minor and nothing more than would have been expected under the circumstances. KT field or office staff have been able to resolve misunderstandings, to explain the need for formal procedures, and to encourage the submission of reports.

The quality and submission record of such documentation, as specified in each organisation's contract with KT, has been very variable. Full-time and/or trained staff often produce exemplary and punctual reports and statements of account, supplemented with additional information on their activities and publications. Problems have been experienced most often where formal administrative skills and capacity are limited or lacking, a situation pertaining particularly in African-run township and rural organisations, for reasons spelled out earlier in this report.

In several cases of which we are aware, relationships between CACP-funded organisations and KT became problematic, and in some the issues of contention remain unresolved. Most organisations interviewed stated that they have cordial relations with KT and valued the link highly, even if there had been problems in the past.

Nevertheless, there was a widely-held view that KT could provide more active liaison and support, especially to weaker organisations, an issue to which we address specific recommendations in Part B, especially Section 11.

A number of interviewees also complained about administrative delays within KT, especially with respect to the disbursement of monies once applications had been approved. In several cases, this had put the recipients under financial strain, necessitating the postponement of certain activities and/or the incurring of large debts. Perusal of KT project files confirmed this problem, which appeared to have been most serious during 1991-92. In one extreme case, an important technical and training service organisation experienced a delay of at least ten months following approval of their large allocation (some R 189 000) on 26 July 1991. A written query dated 28 March 1992 was sent to the local KT regional office; confirmation of the approval was sent from KT Head Office only on 18 May 1992, and actual payment followed some time thereafter. CEC and KT staff have confirmed these delays which, it is claimed, were due to the late receipt by KT of the funds in question. We have, however, been unable to ascertain the specific reason(s) for these delays or the problems which caused them.

Examination of KT project files revealed some deficiencies in monitoring and associated financial administration. Although, formally, subsequent disbursements to organisations should not be made unless and until the requisite accounts and reports covering the use of monies previously paid over have been received, this condition was not adhered to in a number of cases. The relevant files contained no notes or specific justifications or authorisations for further payments under these circumstances. If we accept the integrity of KT personnel, then it must be assumed that one of the following occurred in each case:

- that the lack of reporting went unnoticed through inadequate monitoring;
- that liaison between the programme administration and the financial department was deficient;
- that a blind eye was turned to the formal requirement.

In fairness, the files also provide evidence that such occurrences have declined markedly over the last year or so. Two other specific problems in relation to financial administrative procedures were detected. In one case, an organisation was paid its 1991-92 allocation of some R 43 000 twice in error. Fortunately, this lapse was detected and repayment secured in full in April 1992. The second case was more difficult and has never been satisfactorily resolved. Project funds for a particular organisation had been suspended due to use of a previous allocation for unauthorised purposes.

Nevertheless, a further R 21 000 was paid. Alleged irregularities on the part of the recipients, including the changing of bank accounts without notifying KT and rapid cash withdrawal of the entire amount directly after payment, meant that the money could not be recovered despite prolonged efforts. To its credit, KT Head Office engaged in lengthy correspondence with the banks concerned and instructed a firm of attorneys to pursue the matter. The case was closed and the money thereby written off in November 1992 once the high cost of further legal action, with uncertain outcome, became apparent.

While 1991-92 was hopefully exceptional in respect of the delay in receiving EC programme funds, and there is certainly evidence that the efficiency of KT's internal project monitoring and financial administration has been enhanced over the last year or two, further improvements may well be possible. Certainly, any repetition of the specific errors just outlined needs to be prevented.

Two more general observations are also warranted. First, project files are frequently more complete and up to date in regional offices than in Head Office. Given that most correspondence and face-to-face interaction between recipient organisations and KT occurs with project officers from the appropriate regional office, this is unsurprising. A short administrative delay in sending on information is inevitable, given the pressures on staff, especially some project officers (who are required to spend 80 percent of their time in the field). In some cases, however, Head Office files were more out of date than expected on these grounds. The failure on the part of organisations to submit reports clearly accounts for many such gaps and delays, but it appears that the speed and vigour with which Head Office and regional project officers liaise over such problems and then pursue the organisation concerned, varies considerably.

This leads to the second general point, namely that there is evidently unevenness in the workload and efficiency of the various KT regions. The reasons for the current geographical boundaries between regions are unclear, but these should be re-examined with an eye to either equalising the load somewhat or to establishing at least one additional regional office. At present, all regional offices have virtually the same number of staff, which, given the distribution of organisations being supported through CACP and other KT programmes, imposes a disproportionately heavy burden on the Transvaal office. There would appear to be a good case for reconsidering its responsibility for the Orange Free State and Northern Cape. A small office in Bloemfontein would be well-placed to serve these regions, as well as some of the remoter parts of the Eastern Cape. Notwithstanding this issues, examination of project files reveals significant variation in the regularity of field visits and the writing of field reports by project officers, as well as in the quality of such reports and other documents from the regional offices, and even individual project officers within regions. Attention should be given to in-house measures to enhance quality where appropriate and harmonise these aspects throughout the country.

PART B:

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CIVIC ORGANISATIONS AND ADVICE CENTRES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CACP

8. CIVIC ORGANISATIONS

There has recently been wide debate and controversy over the future role of civic organisations. Most of this debate focuses on the **need** for civics, as identified by civic leaders and observers concerned about the future of civil society. The need for civics is generally seen in terms of ensuring that public participation in developmental and governmental decision-making continues, so that the state remains responsive to the interests of historically discriminated against sections and classes of society. The existing debate has not adequately considered how the **concrete opportunities and constraints** on civics will change, affecting their ability to meet the 'need' identified. Nor does the public debate pay much attention to the existing **capacity**, i.e. strengths and weaknesses, of the civic movement. This section starts with an assessment of the capacity of civics, and continues with a discussion of the changing conditions facing civics in the near future. This provides the basis for a set of recommendations regarding outside funding for civics.

8.1 Strengths and weaknesses of civics

This report has emphasised the diversity of civics in South Africa. Each civic has its own strengths and weaknesses, depending on its history and leadership and the particular local context within which the civic operates. The balance of strengths and weaknesses varies considerably also, with some civics almost incomparably stronger than others. Many civics, however, share some common strengths and weaknesses.

The prominence of civics is sometimes taken as an indication of their strength. In the post-1989 period civics have certainly been prominent in a variety of different contexts. Having successfully led the struggle against the Black Local Authorities system, which has effectively collapsed, civics are drawn into any situation where public participation from townships is deemed desirable or necessary (with the exception of national or regional level negotiations between political parties). These include the following:

- negotiations with state structures over the payment of rents and service charges (and hence rent boycotts) and the provision of municipal services;
- negotiations with parastatals (especially ESCOM) over the provision of services such as electricity;
- negotiations with the state over the state's involvement in housing provision and ownership, and the upgrading or development of townships and shack settlements;
- negotiations with banks, building societies and developers over the private sector's involvement in the provision of housing and the upgrading or development of townships and shack settlements;
- negotiations with state structures at different levels over the restructuring of local government;
- negotiations with the police over the maintenance of law and order.

In short, many civics are involved in a range of highly visible negotiations (although it should be noted that it is unclear precisely how many civics are involved in negotiations, how often or extensively, and with whom). In addition, civics have been involved in new development-oriented activities such as liaising with service

organisations over research into alternative policies with regard to housing, urban development and planning, and local government.

Their involvement in these various forms of negotiation belies the organisational capacity of many civics. Prominence does not necessarily reflect strength; in many cases it reflects instead the absence of alternative structures capable of mediating between the township population and outside bodies (whether state or private sector). The civic movement is indispensable at present, but (with notable exceptions) it cannot be considered as strong.

The prominence of township-based civics in the past and present has been underpinned by five aspects of the prevailing context:

- mass discontent with inadequate and/or expensive housing, urban infrastructure and municipal services;
- the illegitimacy and powerlessness of local government institutions, i.e. the formal channels for representing township residents and mediating between them and other state structures;
- the illegitimacy and inadequacy of state policing and judicial structures (involvement in informal justice and dispute settlement has long been one of the most important activities undertaken by civics at the very local level);
- the exclusion of township residents from democratic representation in central state structures; and
- the absence from civic affairs of credible political parties, which were banned in the 1980s and largely preoccupied with other concerns since 1990.

These factors have provided a persistent impetus to the existence of civics: in the absence of legitimate governmental or party political channels, civics have been the primary means for raising popular grievances and otherwise representing residents in meetings with state structures and urban developers. But these factors have not created conditions necessarily favourable to the construction of strong organisation and sustained activity at the local level.

In the 1980s many civics had many of the features of lobbying civics (see section 3.2). Unlike lobbying civics in many other contexts their role was greatly enhanced by fundamental political factors such as the illegitimacy and powerlessness of local government, and disenfranchisement at the national level. But like lobbying civics elsewhere, many civics were only intermittently active, and most of their activity involved single-issue campaigns in response to things the state had done (such as rent increases). There was little sustained public participation in many civics, which relapsed into small groups of activists when there were no pressing issues to mobilise around. The social basis for civic organisation was weak and fragile (not least because of state repression).

Civics developed strong organisation and acted pro-actively only when they have been able to move beyond the role of watchdog into the role of alternative institutions of local government, i.e. when they have developed from a lobbying form to a mass-participatory form of civic. This generally involved strong grass-roots structures such as street committees which provided a range of administrative, representative, decision-making, policing and judicial functions. During 1984-86 some civics provided

a framework for the development of "people's power". But the phenomenon of "people's power" was the result of temporary conditions: polarisation and confrontation accentuated each of the aspects of the context identified above.

Since 1989-90 many civics have been involved in a range of negotiations as if they were representative or elected local councils. Some civics have been able to develop strong grass-roots and other structures. But the prominence of many civics has reflected outsiders need to negotiate with the 'community' more than any organisational strength of the civics themselves. Of course, the fact of negotiations represents a major victory for civic and other organisations which have struggled for political and developmental changes. It reflects the strength of popular resistance in the past. But it does not necessarily reflect any organisational strength on the part of civics in particular: popular resistance and civic capacity are not synonymous.

In section 4 we assessed the effects of outside funding on civic organisations. The assessment concluded that outside funding had helped civics continue to operate in the adverse political climate of the late 1980s, and had assisted civics in making the transition from protest-oriented to more development-oriented work since 1990. But civics have rarely succeeded in using funding to enhance their overall organisational capacity, and certainly not on a sustainable basis. Funding has all too often been absorbed in salaries and meetings, with little regard for the quality of work done by paid employees or for what meetings have actually achieved. Few civics are in a strong position to tackle the varied and immense challenges now facing them.

The **leaders** of most civics have recently been drawn into a wide range of activities. Few (and very few outside of the major metropolitan centres) have the skills to engage effectively with state or private sector officials in negotiations, or even with those service organisations supposedly advising and supporting the civics. Civics may wield a potential veto over developmental or other activity in the townships, through the threat of foreclosing access. But most civics are a long way behind their counterparts in the trade unions, for example, in terms of negotiation and related skills.

Few civics are well-managed and administered. Reporting and especially report-writing, financial accounting, and more basic office skills are all too often lacking. There is rarely any managerial culture in the sense of a culture of managing civics as organisations involved in ongoing developmental work rather than mobilising protesters and 'protest politics'. These weaknesses were raised in section 4. Most of them have been widely acknowledged by national and regional civic leaders, who, for example, have sought to bolster local civic negotiating teams through the presence of regional advisors.

The strength of many civics' **internal structures** needs to be assessed in terms of both accountability and management efficiency. The impetus to and channels for popular participation remain weak, and there are rarely adequate institutional mechanisms for leadership accountability. This is one factor underlying the bitter leadership conflicts which have wracked a number of civics, including PEPCO, in the last three years. Recriminous allegations of corruption and mismanagement abound in civic circles. Ironically, civics have been at their strongest when they have performed many of the functions of local government or local state, but have generally done so without the forms of accountability which compare with electoral competition in more institutional contexts.

The influence of civics within the communities they represent remains very contingent on the issue in question. The most important strength of civics remains their legitimacy, and the authority they derive from this. Civics have derived considerable legitimacy from their successes in securing improvements in living conditions and in isolating illegitimate local government structures. Civic leaders enjoy considerable support for articulating popular grievances and demands, even in cases where the civic leaders have not consulted widely in the community concerned. But legitimacy rests on fragile bases. Grass-roots organisation is often weak, and civic leaders can all too easily become associated with sectional demands or even self-interest. This has been reflected in civics' negotiations with the state over rent boycotts. Whilst civics were generally indispensable, they often were unable to 'deliver' their constituencies. In the PWV area alone, rent boycotts were continuing in twenty-two townships in mid-1991, including seven where civics and the state were reported to have negotiated agreements ending boycotts.

The organisational strength of civics at the local level is unclear. In some areas civics convene regular and frequent meetings at the street and area levels. In others, occasional public meetings are held where civic leaders report back to their constituents, and seek a fresh mandate. In many townships, however, meetings are irregular or infrequent. Whether civics have solid organisation at the local level often depends on the issues with which they are engaging. In townships with continuing rent boycotts and intermittent suspension of municipal services, civics seem to have developed better linkages between the leadership (negotiating with state officials) and their constituencies at the grass-roots. Civics have also built stronger organisation in shack settlements or other areas which are being upgraded through the installation of urban infrastructure.

Involvement in a wider range of activities has strengthened civics in some ways but at the same time has stretched civics' organisational resources thinly, often at the cost of grass-roots organisation. It is unclear how many civics have continued to play their more 'traditional' roles at the local level, for example participating in informal justice and dispute settlement, running formal or informal advisory services, and mediating between residents and local state officials with respect to individual problems. The overall impression is one of a civic movement which has not taken full advantage of the liberalised political climate to strengthen its organisation. Most civics thus suffer from severe problems in terms of capacity. Past efforts at capacity-building, including through the CACP, have achieved some significant results but these have only begun to dent the overall problem. In many areas civic organisation is still in disarray.

Civic structures at national and regional levels have their own particular strengths and weaknesses. Some of these were identified in sections 3 and 4 above. The most often raised issue within the civic movement is the degree of centralisation and accountability in regional and national structures. Strong criticisms have been voiced of SANCO, including in print in a pseudonymous contribution to the magazine **Work in Progress**, of SANCO's adoption of a unitary structure. SANCO's confusing position over membership subscriptions (discussed below in Section 8.3) illustrates further problems: poor communication, inadequate debate and a lack of strategic or financial planning.

An additional point is that some SANCO regions are yet to make much of an impression in terms of organising educational or other activities. The pre-SANCO regional structures were often criticised for being too focused on national issues, and

neglecting some of the more local concerns of their affiliated civics. It seems that SANCO regions are performing in much the same way.

8.2 Future prospects for civic organisations

It is widely envisaged that civics will play an important role in the 'new South Africa'. There has been extensive and public debate about what this role will be, and apparent consensus has emerged that civics will continue to serve as watchdogs over local government, even after a democratic system of local government has been implemented and elections held. Civic leaders who decide to stand as candidates for election will do so as individuals, and will resign from the civic if elected. Civics will thereby remain autonomous of the state. They may, however, facilitate public participation in local government decision-making, promoting forms of direct democracy as well as watching over the institutions of representative democracy (although earlier proposals regarding civic-based popular assemblies which would serve almost as rival local government structures seem to have fallen by the wayside for the time being). The national civic movement will also serve as a watchdog over central government with respect to those central government policies affecting urban issues. This, at least, is the official or mainstream orthodoxy within the civic movement.

This orthodoxy is based on an assessment more of the **need** for civic organisations in a post-apartheid society than of the **opportunities and spaces** that will be open to civics. The need for civics is derived from the perceived importance of 'civil society'. The experience of other post-colonial states as well as liberal democracies is understood as illustrating the need to protect civil society against the state, which is prone to compromising the interests of the poorer sections of society. Civics are widely seen as the key institutions in civil society.

The centrality of civics to civil society can easily be exaggerated. **Civil** society is not reducible to **civic** organisation, and political parties are as integral a component as any non-electoral organisation. In the transitional period civics will play an important role -- primarily whilst parties are preoccupied with other tasks, but also because of their potential as rival power bases. But in the post-transitional South Africa, some of the roles played by civics will inevitably be claimed by political parties or other organizations, not least new forms of local government structure.

More importantly, there has been little or no discussion of how imminent political changes are going to affect the civic movement. Whether or not there is a strong need for civics, there may not be opportunities or spaces for civics to perform their allotted roles. This has not been debated within most regional and local civic structures, and hardly seems to have been considered even within SANCO's national leadership.

The mainstream view of the future role of civics ignores the following likely developments which are likely to follow from the establishment of and elections to democratic local government. These changes will have fundamental consequences for local civics.

- local government will have substantial legitimacy, almost certainly being non-racial in form and managed by democratically-elected councillors; local government will therefore be able to claim a democratic mandate to represent citizens, and to organise or supervise development; councillors will be able to claim that their mandate is superior (in democratic terms) to whatever mandate civics enjoy;

- many popular civic leaders will successfully stand for election as councillors, whilst other civic activists will secure important jobs in the local government bureaucracy (this will underscore the legitimacy of the newly elected and implemented local government structures); civic activists will also be elected or appointed at the regional and national levels; if these activists resign from their civics then the civics will be deprived of leading personnel; if they do not resign, then civics will become involved in local government, losing their ability to perform an autonomous or watchdog role;
- in many areas political parties will play the role of critics of and watchdogs over each other, both within and outside of elected local government structures; the space for civics to perform either a legitimate mediating role or a watchdog role will diminish;
- reform of the legal and policing system will remove much of the impetus behind informal justice (which has always been a leading area of civic activity);
- local government will no doubt suffer from severe resource constraints, and there may also be constraints on redistribution which have been negotiated at the national level, but local government will be far less powerless than in the past;
- township residents will be represented in central as well as local state institutions, albeit in institutions which remain imperfectly democratic as a result of the negotiated nature of the constitutional settlement.

In these changed local conditions civics will have to reconceptualise their roles and rethink their appropriate organisational structures. There is very little evidence that they have begun to do so yet.

The major reason for the absence of thinking over these issues has been the limits of tangible change at the local level. In most small towns the conservatism of white local authorities and residents has impeded negotiated change. The National Party is only now beginning to retreat from the anti-democratic local government strategy represented in the Thornhill Commission Reports and the Interim Measures for Local Government Act. Moreover, many local authorities in the Transvaal are controlled by the Conservative Party. Violent conflict remains a key feature of life in many Transvaal and Natal townships. Most civics assume that the prospect of genuinely democratic local government elections remains remote.

The timetable for the democratic restructuring of local government remains uncertain, but it is not inconceivable that at least interim arrangements would follow soon after elections had been held for a national constituent assembly. The logistic problems of local government elections would be minor after national elections had been held, and there seems to be growing agreement that genuinely non-racial local authorities are inevitable. If this is the case, the context within which civics are operating could be substantially transformed within two or three years. The Metropolitan Chamber is seen as a model for the transition in many people's eyes.

How would these changes concretely affect civics? The first aspect of this concerns the elections themselves. Recent debate within SANCO's national and regional structures over SANCO's role in **national** elections (for a constituent assembly) begins to illustrate the complexities of the issue: What should SANCO do if leading members are invited to participate on party political tickets in elections? Should SANCO express its

support for any particular movements or parties? There does not yet appear to be a clear or agreed view within SANCO on these issues.

At the local level the situation is even more complex. Indeed, the appearance of consensus over the future role of civics masks considerable ambiguity at the local level. Whilst the rhetoric about civics' watchdog role is all-pervasive, in reality some civics plan to engage more fully in local government elections and institutions than the orthodoxy suggests. For example, a leading figure in one Western Cape civic says that his civic will cooperate with the ANC and COSATU in putting forward a joint slate of candidates in any democratic local government elections.

It is more likely that individual civic leaders will stand for local government elections. They will draw upon the support of networks of civic activists in their campaigns to get elected. Even though civics may remain formally uninvolved in elections, informally the civic will be drawn in. Many civic activists are likely to be elected as councillors, to become advisors to councillors, or to be appointed as local government officials. The leadership of many civics, already once depleted by the exodus of activists into party branches, will be further decimated. This was made clear to us in interviews around the country.

The establishment of democratic local government will inevitably reduce the range of roles which civics are currently playing. Elected councillors will take over much of the mediation between township residents and the state, as well as the supervision of development projects.

The transformation of local and central government will inevitably bring major changes to civics in South Africa. There will continue, however, to be a strong developmental impetus which will involve a continuing role for civics even in the post-transitional period. Civics are currently involved in Development Trusts, together with state institutions and private sector enterprises, in the design, planning and implementation of urban development. They are currently involved primarily because they are often the most representative local groupings, allowing for some 'community' participation in the project. This role will certainly be reduced when legitimate and democratically-elected councillors take office. But it is likely that independent groupings such as civics will continue to remain as important participants. With (in many cases) grass-roots structures, civics will complement elected councillors in the developmental process.

The changing context will also have important implications for the kinds of structure which civics are likely to be able to sustain. Township-based civics generally see themselves as mass-participatory civics, even though they have often operated and been structured more as lobbying civics. In a late transitional and post-transitional South Africa civics will face growing difficulties in maintaining a mass-participatory character. It is likely that civics will only be able to survive as civics with more of the features of lobbying civics, albeit with a sizeable membership and broader popular participation than exists in, for example, ratepayers' associations in former white group areas. Township residents will lend more and more of their support to local parties and to individual councillors (and critics). It is unlikely that civics, except possibly in small towns, will be able to recruit and sustain a large membership.

The structure adopted by civics has financial implications with respect to both internally-raised income as well as expenditure, as we shall see further below. A

forum-type civic would depend on subscriptions from participating organisations. A mass-participation civic could, in principle, raise funds through its extensive membership. The lobbying civic could raise limited funds through its limited membership, and might expect to raise extra funds from donations. In terms of expenses, the forum-type civic would incur expenses arising from running a secretariat. The lobbying-type civic would incur far fewer expenses. The mass-participation civic would involve extensive personnel, and if these were paid the expenses could be considerable.

Many civics will continue to play a key role in the unfolding transitional period. But it remains unclear what role they will be able to play in a post-apartheid South Africa. What space will be left for civics to operate in? There is little reason why civics will not come to resemble existing ratepayers or civic groups in white areas, i.e. playing a very limited role lobbying local government councillors. Their roles might be most extensive in areas where they serve as loyal opponents in a local one-party system. Thus where the ANC is dominant, for example, pro-ANC civic leaders will watch over and criticise local ANC councillors -- but without wielding the threat of electoral defeat. It is unclear, however, how many areas will be like this: the formation of non-racial local authorities is likely to ensure that there are both progressive and conservative political groupings or parties in most local authorities.

It is necessary to note, however, that there will undoubtedly be regional variations. The situation in parts of Natal and the Western Cape will differ from other areas, although not in the same ways. The nature of relations between the central state, regional government and local government will vary, affecting the role of civics.

8.3 Potential for local fund-raising

Since the mid-1980s most civic organisations have relied on external funding, from KT and other sources. Some persisted in raising funds locally, and recently there has emerged some discussion of the potential for internal or local fund-raising, i.e. for civics to become largely self-sufficient. But the experience of internal fund-raising in the past has not been promising.

Membership subscriptions possibly provide the best prospect for large-scale and sustainable local fund-raising. Fund-raising is of course only one of the benefits of introducing a paid-up membership: paid-up membership provides an indication of the level of support for a civic, which can enhance the civic's credibility and bargaining power, and also raises the likelihood of grassroots demands for improved accountability of leadership. It also provides the possibility of rebuilding grass-roots organisation and recruiting new generations of activists. However, there are also clear disadvantages. Civics might find that large amounts of effort are invested, with little return as even supportive residents cannot afford or choose not to pay for membership. This might undermine their credibility as well as sapping their organisational effort.

Several civics have in the past experimented with issuing membership cards and collecting subscriptions, and the experience has rarely been successful. Typically, few cards have been issued in terms of the total number of households in the area, subscriptions have been raised erratically, there has been no record-keeping, and funds have not been passed onto head-office by the local structures or activists who have collected them from residents.

The WCCA, for example, printed and issued membership cards in 1988-89. In April 1989 the WCCA claimed one thousand paid-up members, and later that year claimed ten thousand members but did not specify whether these were paid-up. It seems that only twenty thousand cards were printed and distributed to branches, and not all of these were issued. The WCCA treasurer clearly exaggerated when he told KT in January 1992 that the WCCA's membership had 'grown from 20 000 card-carrying members to 50 000'. The subscription was R1 p.a., of which 25c was supposed to be passed onto head-office (the local structure kept the rest). This would have brought head-office R 5 000 p.a., and local structures three times that, if all twenty thousand cards were issued and all card-carrying members were fully paid-up. But branches failed to account for either the cards they had received or the funds they should have raised. Some money trickled in to head office, but was rarely recorded at head-office and generally spent immediately on expenses. The WCCA itself probably did not even cover the cost of printing the cards.

Certain civics in the northern OFS are reported to have had rather better experience. The Thabong Civic, for example, is said to have raised as much as R 50 000 from its membership in 1991, although it is difficult to monitor (they apparently record details about membership in a book - presumably a very thick book!). Other towns in both the northern and southern Orange Free State are also said to have membership-funded civics. Smaller towns seem in general to have had better experiences in membership-based fund-raising than civics in the larger metropolitan townships, with the heightened cohesion of the 'community' presumably compensating for their greater poverty. Some small towns in the Eastern Cape and Karoo are also reported to have experienced greater enthusiasm for membership cards and subscriptions. The Cathcart Residents Association in the Border Corridor issued six hundred membership cards in 1990, at R 5 each, in a township with a population of perhaps ten thousand people. Civic organisations have generally been more stretched on the ground in the metropolitan townships, with the notable exception of shack-based civics, which have routinely collected dues from households: households pay up or risk being expelled from the area.

The SCA ran into a different problem when it embarked on a new membership drive in 1990-91. Whilst the SCA had always had a card-carrying membership, the new context after 1990 favoured an open membership drive. But the SCA found that it was seen as competing with political parties, especially the ANC, which were trying to recruit members. This caused confusion and tensions. The SCA has proceeded cautiously with increasing its membership, and has continued to debate the issue extensively.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, SANCO resolved in July 1992 to implement paid-up membership. The system of membership would be handled at the national level to ensure uniformity. The decision has not been implemented, however, with SANCO leaders explaining that the regions needed to be consulted on the design of membership cards, that money was needed to print the cards, and proper financial control systems needed to be put in place in the regions first. There also seems to be some confusion over whether the publicity secretary, national treasurer, or national and regional organisers who are responsible for overseeing the process.

There is very considerable confusion within SANCO structures as to the details of SANCO's policy. We were given the following versions by SANCO regional or zonal leaders:

- R 8 p.a., household-based membership; of which 25% each to national, regional, zonal (or metropolitan), and local (i.e. primary) civics;
- R 6 p.a., individual-based membership; of which R 2 each to national, regional and local civics;
- R 2 joining fee + R4 p.a.; both to be divided, 25% to each of the national, regional, zonal and local civics;
- R 2 p.a., of which 50% goes to national, and 25% each to regional and local civics.

SANCO head-office say that the decision taken was:

- R2 joining fee + R6 p.a., individual-based membership!

Confusion is clearly the order of the day.

SANCO structures are very short of funds, yet there is a complete lack of urgency in the way in which SANCO is proceeding with the membership card scheme. The SANCO national treasurer has made no estimate of the income which SANCO will derive from membership subscriptions in the coming year (or subsequent years). Given that two million paid-up members would generate a total of R 500 000 to the SANCO national structure and an average of R 36 000 to each of SANCO's fourteen regions, this lack of financial planning might seem remarkable.

The delay, confusion, and lack of financial planning all stem from the fact that SANCO has not prioritised the implementation of this decision. This is in turn, I believe, because SANCO made this decision not primarily to raise funds but rather to respond to widespread criticisms that civics' support was unproven (or worse, was small). SANCO national leaders gave this impression in an interview in December 1992.

There are several major problems with implementing a fund-raising scheme through membership subscriptions.

- **Administrative difficulties and costs:** In contrast to trade unions (which can set up stoporder facilities), civics need strong organisation at all levels to recruit members and collect subscriptions.
- **Accountability:** Few if any civics currently have administrative structures capable of accounting for large numbers of subscriptions.
- **Poverty:** Does the community have the resources? When the issue was debated nationally, SANCO Border opposed suggestions that the membership fee should be R 10 p.a. because this was too high; they suggested R 4 p.a. (in addition to a R 2 joining fee).
- **Competition with fund-raising by other organisations:** The ANC, and now other parties also, are signing up members; will they be competing for the same limited resources?
- **Confusion:** How easily will civics communicate with residents about the objectives of membership cards and subscriptions, as well as avoid the appearance of competition, and the suspicion of corruption?
- **Free riders:** How many people would choose to be free riders, enjoying the benefits of an effective civic, but without joining?

- The limits of support: How many people would choose not to join because they are critical or unsupportive of the civic? In many townships civics have come to be associated with particular areas, and are seen as distant from others.

The costs to civics of seeking to recruit a paid-up membership might therefore include high administrative costs and a drain of energy as well as diminished credibility if only small numbers of residents or households are signed up.

If civics do opt to raise membership subscriptions, what sums can realistically be raised? This seems not to have been thought about. Of a range of civic leaders interviewed on this, only one (from CAJ, in the Transvaal) gave any indication of having thought about this. Almost all civic leaders readily claim that their civics could sign-up a paid-up membership of half or more of the households in the area.

For example, PEPCO's general-secretary boldly claimed that membership would reach 500 000. When asked how many people might be signed up per quarter, however, he more modestly suggested twenty thousand. ECCO/SANCO E.Cape officials said that in places like P.E. 'we expect 100% membership', and cited the experience of the Karoo town of De Aar where 'the people are patiently awaiting membership cards'. A former WCCA and current SANCO/Western Cape leader estimated that a realistic target membership for SANCO in the Western Cape was over two hundred thousand members within one year. SANCO Border officials told me that 800 000 members was a realistic target by the end of 1993!

The sums raised from paid-up membership could be enormous. Half a million members in the Eastern Cape or Border would mean R125 000 to the SANCO region, R 20 000 to 30 000 to each zonal structure, and several thousand rand to even small civics.

But the experience of political parties suggests limits to this. The membership of the ANC in mid-1991 was only 700 000. Notwithstanding civics' claims to be non-partisan, are they likely to sign up more members than the ANC, especially in regions where townships overwhelmingly support the ANC? Are supporters of other parties likely to sign and pay up in large numbers?

The ANC, moreover, has found it increasingly difficult to maintain its paid-up membership as many members fall into arrears on their R 12 annual dues. In some regions the proportion of members who are fully paid-up is very small. This is especially true in the poorer regions. In the Border region the ANC has reportedly ceased distinguishing between paid-up and signed-up members because so few members are fully paid-up. The ANC has also experienced major administrative problems in administering its membership records and subscriptions. The Southern O.F.S. region, for example, reports problems of inadequate financial records and (mis)management.

It is likely that civics could recruit membership better in small towns. But it is often the small towns which are most impoverished. In Cathcart, in the Border, the chairperson of the Residents Association warns that it would now be very difficult to collect a membership fee of six or eight rand. Similar views have been expressed by civic leaders in the Eastern Cape town of Cradock.

Nonetheless, many civics remain publicly confident of their support base. They argue that the constraint on them raising funds through membership is organisational. They

need to develop an organisational infrastructure **prior** to recruiting membership and collecting subscriptions. Without full-time, paid employees to administer membership subscriptions, voluntary civic activists will be preoccupied with it and neglect civic struggles, and may well 'burn out' altogether. It is argued that local civic activists will need to be 'serviced' by regional and zonal structures.

Kagiso Trust has recently encouraged civics to raise funds through membership subscriptions, providing financial assistance for the necessary prior organisational development. The first such experiment is based in Port Elizabeth. As we saw above, PEPCO had submitted grand budget proposals to KT. KT declined to meet PEPCO's proposals, but offered R 57 000 for the specific task of building PEPCO's financial and administrative capacity, promoting financial self-sufficiency through membership subscriptions. The contract was signed in August 1992. The grant would cover the salaries of three employees (organiser, administrator and general-secretary), some equipment and some running expenses.

PEPCO claimed the strong support of most households in the area. The goal of the KT funding was to enable PEPCO to tap into this support and set itself up financially. The agreed aim was to sign-up 250 000 households, i.e. half of the households in P.E.'s townships, at R 4 p.a.. This would raise a total of R 1 million, more than enough to cover PEPCO's grand budget proposal. It is unclear whether any progress has been made in this respect. In November 1992 PEPCO claimed that its membership-drive was being held up by SANCO's inertia in introducing its standardised membership card system.

A comparable but bolder initiative has been designed, but not yet implemented, in the O.F.S.. The O.F.S. Civics Development Programme aims at providing civics with the skills and resources to equip them to administer membership recruitment and subscription-based financial self-sufficiency. It arose from KT's inability to meet the requests submitted by the burgeoning civic movement in the O.F.S., together with the apparently successful experience of some civics in the Northern O.F.S. with membership-based funding.

The O.F.S. Civics Development Programme involves twelve civics, six from each of the SANCO Northern and Southern O.F.S. regions. Two participants from each civic, together with two from each SANCO regional office, would be trained in financial, administrative and computing skills. Funds would be provided for purchasing computers, printing membership cards, and one salary. (The Canadian Embassy were considering funding the training component). The Bronville Civic Association has been funded separately by KT to set up a similar administrative and fund-raising system. The Southern O.F.S. SANCO region has meanwhile established a Financial Capacity-Building Trust to assist with fund-raising, developing financial skills, and instituting effective financial control and accounting procedures.

A more sober assessment is provided by a civic activists in the Civic Associations of Johannesburg (CAJ). Civics are unlikely to sign up more than 5% of households as members. Membership subscriptions would then provide a useful but not a major source of funds (as is the case for most political parties, which cannot come close to supporting themselves out of membership subscriptions; the ANC's budget, for example, is about ten times the income it would receive if all of its members were fully paid-up!).

Civics also have growing access to other local sources of income. PEPCO, for example, is negotiating deals with the developers participating in the huge Soweto-by-Sea upgrading project. Seven developers are involved in upgrading this huge shack settlement. Initially PEPCO requested funds from developers to fund two special General Council meetings which was to discuss development issues and particular problems encountered by developers. More recently PEPCO has been negotiating with the developers a deal whereby each developer pays PEPCO R 800 monthly in return for PEPCO's availability and assistance in solving any problems that might arise. This would provide PEPCO with a monthly income of R 5 600. By the end of November 1992, PEPCO claimed to have secured the participation of three of the developers.

This form of fund-raising involves the risk of 'co-option', i.e. of serving as an agent for the funder rather than for the civic's supposed constituency, the 'community'. It is also a form of fund-raising which will be affected by the establishment of democratic and legitimate local government, as we shall see further below.

Internal or other local sources of funding are unlikely to provide many civics with the level of funding required to employ full-time officials and run an office. Membership subscriptions represent a possible source of funding that will be long-term (i.e. will survive the current transition) but is unlikely to generate substantial funds. Only a small proportion of residents are likely to pay membership dues regularly. Deals with developers may provide some funds for some civics, but at a cost.

The exceptions to this will be particularly well-organised and strong civics, most of which will probably be in small towns. If a civic already has strong organisation and popular credibility, then raising funds from residents through membership subscriptions might be a viable means of financing an ambitious civic budget. But if a civic does not already have strong grass-roots organisation, then the organisational as well as financial costs of building the necessary grass-roots structures will be too high. Unfortunately, few civics currently have adequate grass-roots structures.

Under these conditions most civics will have to slim down their expenses unless they raise external funding. This is particularly likely given that personnel costs are rising rapidly as a result of the changing context. In the early 1990s skilled civic activists are becoming much sought after by the private sector, in particular the housing and development industry as well as reformist business organisations (such as the Consultative Business Movement and the Urban Foundation). Without considerable funds, civics may lose their more skilled organisers to the private sector. Some civics are already offering high salaries to employees on the grounds that they have to compete with private sector employers. In short, therefore, civics require ever increasing funds if they are to pay their employees competitive salaries. This raises the question: should civics not perhaps revert to the largely voluntary workforce of the early 1980s?

8.4 Recommendations

1. Civics will continue to play an important role in South Africa, and certain forms of funding can usefully be continued. The context within which civics operate is rapidly changing, however, with profound implications for the roles which civics can and should play, and the kinds of organisational structure which are appropriate for these. The single most important aspect of the changing context is

going to be the establishment of legitimate, non-racial, and democratically elected local government structures. These will take over many of the functions played by civics in the apartheid and transitional periods, and will absorb many civic leaders.

2. Funding therefore needs to distinguish between (a) assisting civics in the **transitional** period (i.e. up to the installation of democratically-elected non-racial local government) and (b) assisting them in the **post-transitional** period. The roles which civics can play, and the needs associated with these, differ between the two periods.
3. The objective of funding should be to help civics at the local level become **self-sustaining in financial and administrative terms**. Whilst not wanting to seem prescriptive, we believe that civics can only become self-sustaining if they accept the need to develop in certain directions. Funding can and should help them move in these directions. We suggest, therefore, that funding be guided by two specific concerns: (a) to facilitate largely **voluntary** local-level civic organisation and activity, and (b) to promote a **more efficient managerial organisation and culture**. Civics should therefore be encouraged to reduce and end their dependence on external funding and to develop internal sources of funding. Labour costs should be kept to a minimum and greater emphasis restored to volunteer personnel.
4. In the transitional period, however, civics will continue to require assistance in negotiations with both the state and the private sector, in preparing for local government restructuring, and in helping to oversee or manage development projects. This will involve: (a) technical support (through, for example, technical support organisations); (b) training for acquiring new skills; and possibly (c) salaries or allowances for participants in negotiations and training (but see points 10 to 13 below).
5. In both the transitional and post-transitional periods civics need to be assisted in enhancing their organisational capacity. This will involve: (a) training in financial and organisational management; and possibly (b) salaries or allowances for key managerial personnel (but see points 10 to 13 below).
6. The general emphasis of any funding initiatives should therefore be on **training and appropriate support**. Training courses and programmes should be provided with respect to para-legal, organisational and media skills, for example. We propose that credits be allocated to civics who can choose where to commission training courses from. Our recommendations with regard to training as well as technical support are spelt out in detail in Section 10 of this report.
7. Financial assistance should also be available to civics to undertake specific activities which require resources beyond labour time and which strengthen and democratise civil society. One example of this might be the production of community-based newsletters: it would be appropriate for funders to assist with limited production costs (but not labour costs). Another example might be civic-run public workshops or educational activities.
8. Only limited financial assistance should be provided for management running costs, such as telephone bills and stationery etc. Civics rarely require the volume of equipment (such as photocopiers) they have sometimes grown accustomed to.

Civics should rather be encouraged to negotiate access to computing (and even photocopying) equipment in local state institutions.

9. Financial assistance should only be provided for transport costs when the transport is to attend training and educational workshops or programmes. Transport costs to attend meetings should be covered out of internally-raised funds.
10. We have mixed feelings with regard to the payment of salaries to civic employees. If civics choose to spend locally-raised funds on salaries, that is their prerogative. But we feel that outside funders should only pay salaries under exceptional circumstances. This is especially true as there is a rapidly growing demand for experienced civic leaders, and civics would have to pay high salaries to compete with political parties, private sector employers, and (in future) local government.
11. It can be argued that the need for civics to deploy regular negotiating teams in the transitional period means that salaries should be paid to those civic leaders who are engaged in negotiations on an almost full-time basis. Funders should be sympathetic to such requests. On balance, however, we believe that **at most** part-time allowances should be paid (comparable in concept to the allowances paid to municipal councillors).
12. We also believe that other sources of funding are more appropriate to cover any personnel costs associated with negotiations and development management in an interim period. For example, private sector developers might finance civic advisors, and other participants in negotiations over government restructuring and service provision might finance allowances (and even training) for civic negotiators. These other parties may contribute financially as it is increasingly in their interests to secure negotiated agreements. This is an issue which national and regional as well as local civic bodies should take up with state structures and the private sector.
13. Funders should encourage civics to draft clear job descriptions for all office-holders; funders should require civics to draft very clear job descriptions for all employees. Job descriptions should specify precisely what each person is expected to do - for example, running workshops, and how many. Staff who fail to satisfy their job descriptions should be expected to explain why; the absence of any satisfactory explanation should result in the initiation of disciplinary procedures (leading, if necessary, to the termination of employment). In the transitional period it will be necessary to beware drafting job descriptions which prevent employees responding to unexpected circumstances in what will inevitably be a highly fluid situation.
14. We further believe that civics should generally avoid trying to take on too wide a range of tasks and functions in this transitional period. Only a few civics have, or will acquire in time, the necessary organisational capacity. Most civics might be better advised, and supported, to participate in other types of structure, such as the development forums run under Ecdaff in the Eastern Cape.
15. All funding must be unambiguously conditional on recipient civics meeting a predetermined and agreed standard of:
 - (a) financial accounting and

- (b) general reporting to the funding body, as well as
- (c) regular reporting to their constituents through general meetings.

It is essential that civics accept full public accountability for funds.

16. Appropriate support should be made available to civics with regard to report-writing, financial control mechanisms, etc. In other words, civics should have access to the kinds of training and support which will enable them to meet the conditions attached to grants. KT should provide and the CACP fund such support activities in conjunction with other institutions and organisations as appropriate. This is examined further in Section 10 of this report.
17. If civics fail to submit reports on a regular (probably quarterly) basis, then funding should be suspended; if the problem persists despite the availability of training and other support, then funding should be terminated. To ensure that this disciplinary procedure is effective, grant payments should be made on a quarterly basis (we believe that the additional administrative costs to Kagiso Trust would be justified).
18. Kagiso Trust must maintain regular and frequent contact with civics, so that problems can be addressed earlier rather than later. This may require rethinking the job descriptions of KT employees, in particular the relationship between project officers and administrators, to ensure more effective lines of accountability within KT regional offices.
19. We believe that these general recommendations are broadly in line with the views which several KT staff have themselves been developing over the past eighteen months or so.

9. ADVICE CENTRES

The discussion of advice centres in this section should be read in conjunction with sections 5 and 8 of the report.

9.1 Strengths and weaknesses of advice centres

In assessing the strengths and weaknesses of advice centres it is necessary to situate them in the context of the period in which they emerged. The 1980s was a period of intense political polarization in South Africa. The conventional political wisdom among civic activists involved in running advice centres then was that such advice centres were a component of the political struggle against apartheid. Indeed, the perceived relationship between advice centres and the anti-apartheid struggle was similar to that between civics themselves and 'the struggle'. They were explicitly **in opposition** to apartheid, and adopted the same **radical approaches** as many civic organisations.

The oppositionist position adopted by advice centres in relation to the state had certain implications. The state's repressive assault on civics and other anti-apartheid groups in the mid-1980s covered advice centres as well. The imposition of successive States of Emergency affected many advice centres in almost the same way as they did the civics.

In addition, the general political environment of rising levels of resistance and repression pushed anti-apartheid groups, including some advice centres, to adopt semi-underground styles of work. This resulted in low levels of accountability. The nature of advice centres made them ill-suited to semi-underground styles of work. Advice centre personnel needed to operate from known offices which could be visited by people requiring assistance when they required that assistance. They also needed to maintain records on their premises for their own use. This proved impossible when advice centres adopted semi-underground methods of conducting their work. High levels of repression occurred even in areas where there was no large-scale detention of leaders or activists.

The prevailing political problems in the late 1980s, however, explain only part of the general weakness of most advice centres. There was also, for example, a general lack of skills in some of the communities in which advice centres were operating. This problem was particularly acute in African townships. Advice centres which operated in non-African areas were generally better prepared for their tasks. The most important reason for the successes of the Black Sash advice offices was the high levels and variety of skills brought in by Black Sash members. It is the Black Sash advice centres which today set the standards against which the performance of other advice centres must be viewed.

The lack of skills in the local community combined with the prevailing political circumstances to provide fertile ground in which other problems proliferated. It would have been surprising, indeed, if corruption, for example, had not occurred in this context. Not only was there a general lack of financial and other management skills, but also the lack of accountability had been 'justified' on the grounds of the pervasive repression. The attention of the security police was normally regarded and accepted as a reason why records should not be kept. It would have taken a super-human effort to monitor or prevent corruption.

Those advice centres which incorporated any 'political' (including civic) activity within their work were most prone to repression, and their advisory work suffered severely. Report-backs were rarely given to either funding organisations, the local community, or even whoever was involved in advice centre management. Financial and general administration both suffered.

These factors applied to those advice centres which emerged in the mid-1980s and were closely linked to their local civics. They do not apply to advice centres run, for example, by the Black Sash, or by church-linked management structures which remained independent of local civics. Nor do they apply as much to advice centres run by Black Consciousness groups (such as the Wilgespruit and Zola advice centres), which were often closely linked to church structures and operated from church premises.

The BC-run Zola advice centre (in Soweto), in which the churches were prominently involved, continued to operate and render services even under adverse political conditions. This centre performed better than civic-linked advice centres. The Phiri advice centre (also in Soweto), started by the church and for some time run by Chris Langeveldt, a local Catholic priest, also continued to operate under repressive conditions. These advice centres were also subject to police attention, but they responded differently. Only after Langeveldt's departure from the parish, and the consequent decline in the church's influence, did the Phiri advice centre experience the problems typical of township-based advice centres.

Arguably, one of the successes of advice centres in the mid- and late 1980s was their contribution to the high level of resistance which propelled South Africa towards negotiations. In other words, in so far as apartheid had to be challenged, advice centres' role in resistance should be acknowledged and accepted as a positive thing. But it is also true that advice centres' involvement in political issues in the 1980s was at the same time a drawback. Those advice centres which did not get politically involved survived and performed better, with less or little interference from the state.

Since 1990 the former resistance organisations have had to adjust to rapidly changing conditions. For advice centres it became possible to render advice without the limitations of the political environment of the 1980s. Many of these resistance groups - including some advice centres - were unable to adjust swiftly away from their oppositionist strategies. This failure to adjust was in part due to disagreements among civics and advice centres about the nature of the new environment, and in part to the impact of the changes introduced by the government.

We must also bear in mind the diversity which exists among advice centres, including even among those which were close to or run by civics. Some civic-linked advice centres, for example, were run and managed very well. Their record keeping was excellent, comparing well with any similar structure in South Africa. The Bayview advice centre (in the Durban area) is one such example. In many of the small towns of the Eastern Cape, well-managed advice centres apparently proliferated after 1990, notwithstanding their close working relationship with civics. Often the problems of management by civic leaders have been muted through establishing management committees in which local civics participate (but do not formally control).

9.2 Some general trends among advice centres

It became clear early in our researches that many township-based advice centres in the metropolitan areas performed poorly in terms of organisational management and accountability procedures. It is not unheard of, for example, that some advice offices do not open till late in the day. The case load of some advice centres is sufficiently low to allow advice centre workers to arrive at work late, with nothing being done about this. In one case, we visited an advice office in the PWV which was still locked and empty at 9.30 am. Of course, if the office is only intermittently open then there will inevitably be fewer enquiries.

The poor management of such advice centres could be a result of the initially high wages paid to employees. When the township-based advice centres were established in the mid-1980s, workers were generally paid better salaries than were paid elsewhere to people with broadly similar qualifications. This combined with the fact that political or civic activists generally monopolised employment, so that the advice centres became prized activist employment. Most of the advice office workers in the metropolitan areas were former student activists, who had just left school. Employment in advice centres offered them the opportunity to continue being political activists. Advice office employment was also prized because there was no management to be fought, in contrast to employment in commerce and industry at the time, and advice office employees were protected from racism in the workplace. It is probable that with time there emerged a group of people with a real interest in protecting their positions as employees in advice centres. The notion of protected employment might have arisen in this context.

The proximity of Black Sash advice centres in the metropolitan areas might have provided, unintentionally, some protection for poor management in township-based advice centres. If people urgently required assistance from an advice centre, they could go to the Black Sash, which in any case generally had a better reputation for their work. Township-based advice offices might, therefore, have been 'let off the hook'.

In contrast, advice centres in small towns or rural areas generally performed better. Even though many of them did not produce regular, coherent or adequately structured reports, it is clear from their documentation and from our interviews that they often provided a valuable service. This could be explained by the value attached by the community to an advice centre in remoter small towns and rural areas. Often the advice centre was the only service institution linking that particular community with the outside world. In some instances in the Eastern Cape the advice centre replaced the local store as the hub of activity for the community. Not only did people come to the office for advice but to collect their letters, and post them as well.

The political environment caused a range of problems for advice centres. In some regions political developments impacted directly on advice centres, which were unable to escape their semi-political roots and origins. In Natal, for example, advice centres functioned within a political environment which was fraught with problems. A major problem concerned racial tensions within the democratic movement. The first advice centres in Natal were formed in Indian areas in the early 1980s (see section 3.3), as part of a strategic approach which sought to build civics in these areas. When advice centres were established in African areas in the mid-1980s, they were often seen as institutions based or originating in Indian areas. It was widely believed in political circles in African townships that control over the advice centre movement remained in Indian

hands. In the late 1980s the democratic movement in Natal became polarised along lines which often overlapped with racial tensions, with township leaders becoming increasingly critical of influential Indian activists in the Natal Indian Congress and United Democratic Front. The collapse of the UDF in Natal was thus followed by the weakening if not collapse of the advice centre movement in the region.

In the Transvaal, paradoxically, the lifting of the State of Emergency and the beginning of the normalisation of the political environment in 1989-90 led to growing tensions between some civics and advice centres. During the repression of the late 1980s advice centres had been harassed, but most continued to operate and in many cases assisted local civics which had been driven to operate secretly. When civic leaders resurfaced openly, in many cases they were unable to re-establish their former authority over the advice centres. Furthermore, both civics and advice centres were slow to adjust to the broad changes of the early 1990s.

Increasingly, the work of advice centres and civics converged. This was reflected in the applications submitted to KT. In Thabong, for instance, the civic and two advice centres (aligned with the UDF and the BC movement respectively) applied to KT for funding to do more or less the same thing, including assisting residents on issues like reading electricity meters and other municipal issues. KT put pressure on the two advice centres to merge, and to subordinate themselves to the local civic. This was done, but the result has not been successful, and the advice centres are reported to have split apart again.

Intervention by KT has become a characteristic feature of the post-1990 period, particularly in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. KT has argued that funds for advice centres must be related to the centres using their resources for broader developmental purposes. For example, a wider range of groups as well as individuals in the community were expected to benefit from advice centre resources. The physical premises occupied by advice centres could be used for other community purposes as well. The Transvaal KT regional office approvingly cited the case of the Newclare Advice Office whose premises were used by local women in a knitting group. KT are also encouraging advice centres to be involved in, and share resources with, local development trusts. The case of the Vaal is approvingly cited in this respect, since two separate advice centres merged to form the basis of the local development trust (which is apparently performing very well).

9.3 The future of advice centres

There is a clear need for advice centres in the present transitional and future post-apartheid periods. Human rights continue to be violated, and the effects of past violations persist also. Furthermore, advice centres in small towns and rural areas perform a range of functions besides providing advice to individual residents. In the absence of other community facilities they often serve as community centres, where local people come for information on a various issues. In these circumstances, advice centres are performing the valuable function of keeping remote communities in touch with information from and about, and developments in the outside world.

But advice centres cannot expect to indefinitely receive funding from foreign sources - on which they have almost exclusively depended until now. Funding cutbacks are likely to affect even those advice centres which have operated well in the past. Advice centres

must therefore seek out alternative local sources of funds. Such funds are likely to be limited. But there are several possible sources.

Schemes like VIVA and Ithuba raise funds expressly for purposes of assisting people who might otherwise not easily find help, represent one possible source of funding for advice centres. Local or central government represents one possible source of funding for apolitical advice centres in future. Local businesses, either through their social responsibility departments or through rotary and lions clubs might be tapped for funding. The NSL once a year donates money to "needy" causes. Advice centres will have to argue the case for receiving funds ahead of other causes. In so doing advice centres will have to bear in mind that politically 'soft' funding to the 'victims of apartheid', which was often available in the past, will not continue. Future funding will be directed to advice centres only in so far as they demonstrate that they are effectively assisting poor people.

In general terms, advice centres will continue to operate in one way or another. The Black Sash advice centres and those which continue to operate from churches will probably remain active, responding to the needs and problems of many people, for some time. But the future of civic-run or civic-linked advice centres is less secure; they will need to find new sources of funding and end their complete dependence on foreign funding, or they will cease to operate (as some already have). The Phiri advice office has in the past operated intermittently according to the availability of funds; when funds have run out, the office has closed, until further funds became available. Their track record has also, in general, not been problem-free.

In the changing macro environment advice centres might, however, be as subject to changes as other institutions. It seems civics will battle to continue to exist in the form in which they currently exist. It seems certain they will undergo the changes referred to elsewhere in this report. Certainly the political aspect of advice centre work is inappropriate. Advice centres will have to secure new sources of funds if they are to continue to exist.

9.4 Recommendations

Many of the recommendations in section 8.4 also apply to advice centres.

1. The large number of advice centres currently existing in South Africa should be viewed as a temporary phenomenon. In future, many of the functions of advice centres will and should be located within state institutions. Some of their current functions will remain in private organisations. Many more organisations should be encouraged to play a role in advice work.
2. Employment in advice offices should be limited. A larger share of the workload should be undertaken by volunteers.
3. Funds should only be made available to advice centres which can demonstrate a capacity to manage funds adequately.
4. Funding to poorly administered advice centres in African townships should not simply be discontinued. Rather, ways should be sought to enhance the organisational and capacity and management of such advice centres. Part of the

reconstruction programme for South Africa as a whole will need to focus on rebuilding institutions in this specific sector of the population.

5. We anticipate that problems may occur if funds to advice centres in African townships are directed primarily towards those which are managed by white or Indian people, to the apparent exclusion of advice centres run by black people. This is a further reason why efforts need to be made to develop the organisational capacity of African managers for advice centres.
6. In the long term, advice centres must work towards weaning themselves away from foreign funding. Local sources of funding must be identified and tapped.
7. Also in the long term, advice centres must seek to raise funds from the state fiscus. But any state funding must not be used as a basis for the government to control advice centres. Advice centres must retain some independence.
8. Advice centres must maintain a high level of accountability, especially to the local community through regular meetings. Advice centres must account for all funds to the local community (as well as to funders).
9. Advice centres' resources - such as their premises - should be made available wherever possible to other community-based organisations and groups. Such organisations and groups should contribute to the advice centre's expenses with regard to rent, for example.
10. In view of past managerial problems (as discussed in sections 5 and 9), we believe that funders should encourage advice centres to consider what management structures are most appropriate and effective. Funders should encourage broadly-based management committees, and advise against advice centres being run as sub-committees of civics or any other institution. We recommend that advice centres should be managed by management committees which include representatives of different views, groups and organisations in the community. These would include church, civic, and teacher groups, as well as political parties. Special effort should be made to include people with financial and managerial skills, from within or outside of the community. There are also good reasons for including outside people on committees.
11. Funders must insist that advice centres meet the terms of the contract to be the letter. Advice centres must account fully to funders for their use of funds. The current standard contracts in terms of which KT funds advice centres must be strictly adhered to.
12. Funders must develop ways to ensure that problems of accountability and financial administration are picked up and corrected timeously.
13. We recommend that funds are concentrated in small towns and rural areas. Such advice centres should be encouraged to become more than just centres where advice is given. For example, they might also serve as community centres or double up as resource centres. In the major metropolitan areas people have better access to well run Black Sash advice centres as well as to professional lawyers and other sources of assistance.

10. TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

As argued throughout this report, the provision of significant training initiatives geared to both civic associations and advice offices has occurred only within the last two to three years. Prior to 1990, civics were geared essentially to the politics of local protest and resistance, while little attention was devoted to administration, accountability, capacity-building and development-oriented activities. On the other hand, the advice offices which sprang up in many townships were designed explicitly to deal with the problems of individual people affected by poverty, repression, eviction, unfair dismissal or the denial of rightful entitlements. Sustained and effective training programmes for advice office staff, run most notably by the Black Sash, have operated since the mid-1980s. Several other specific training initiatives e.g. for para-legal staff, were also established around that time and have catered for advice office staff and other community workers.

In terms of technical support, there are now over twenty specialised organisations countrywide geared principally to the provision of professional legal, planning and other development services to civics and communities in general. Many of these organisations are also committed to skill transfer, capacity-building and the provision of training.

As argued earlier in this report, both training and technical support activities have become increasingly controversial. There has been growing concern about both the quantitative and certain qualitative aspects centered around questions of effectiveness and dependence. It is our contention that greater strategic consideration needs to be given to the provision of these activities, especially in an evolving situation of changing needs. These qualitative considerations and recommendations would hold, irrespective of the precise role that civics and advice centres carve out for themselves in the future. The principal differences would be in terms of the scale of training activities required and the extent to which donors consider it appropriate to fund staff within these organisations.

10.1 Strengths and weaknesses of training and technical support

10.1.1 Training

It is essential to evaluate the contribution of these activities within the context of the times. Until very recently few civics identified training as a priority, given the level of state repression and their preoccupation with protest and resistance. The only aspect of education which was addressed was political education. This atmosphere was, in any case, inimical to the undertaking of any significant development activities or of taking over former local government functions as some have done in the last few years.

In terms of the CACP, the principal objectives seem to have been to channel resources to grassroots organisations so as to ensure their survival and continued role in resistance. The entire programme was geared to the support of victims of apartheid, both individually and collectively. The Kagiso Trust was established for this purpose and, given its tiny staff and the repressive environment in which they operated, little substantive monitoring and management of funded organisations was possible until

about 1900. Funds from the CEC in Brussels were administered through European NGOs, which undertook annual evaluation visits to South Africa, but neither KT nor individual organisations appear to have gained much direct feedback or capacity-building through these 'fraternal' links. As early as 1988, reference was made in some of these reports to the importance of training, but with the exception of the specific programmes for advice office and para-legal staff just referred to, there is little evidence of general training activities during this period.

Since 1990 a rather wider range of organisations became involved. In Sections 6 and 7 of this report, several principal features of this training were identified:

- the scale of training provided has been inadequate in relation to the need and actual or potential demand;
- much training has been decontextualised both from the strategic needs of the movement as a whole and from the concrete situations in which individuals have to try to apply the knowledge gained;
- many of these courses were offered piecemeal or on a crisis management basis. At least initially they were inevitably experimental and, for various reasons often one-off;
- the content may have been interesting to participants, but was often too general or broad-ranging for their specific needs;
- whether designed that way or not, courses have usually been attended by people of widely differing levels of formal education, technical training and relevant experience;
- participants have often been drawn from diverse organisations, in which they fill very different portfolios and have different responsibilities;
- courses and workshops have often been too short to enable the acquisition of specialised skills;
- there has been little if any follow-up, with the result that the rate of forgetting has been high and participants have received little assistance in applying the concepts to their concrete workplace situations.

The principal exceptions here have been sustained and well focused courses or programmes for advice office and para-legal staff, for example. These have often proved very effective over a much longer time period.

As a result of the above situation, some civics and advice offices have become increasingly concerned over, on the one hand, the inadequacy of training and capacity-building provided by technical service organisations which express commitments to such activities, and on the other, their own continuing dependency on technical service and training organisations. Hence there have been several recent initiatives to provide concerted training for civics, led by the FCR and most recently by CAJ and Khanya College. The latter is significant as the first such course where a civic structure, in this case at the zonal level, has provided much of the momentum. However, early feedback suggests that even this innovative course has very diverse participants and is providing only basic level training.

KT in general and the CACP in particular, have placed increasing emphasis on training over the last year or two. Funding has sometimes been devoted to specific training

components, e.g. workshops run by local or regional service organisations, or to the employment of staff to fill training or educational portfolios within such organisations. This trend away from 'block grants' to cover the full range of an organisation's activities, although driven in part by a shortage of funds, is welcome and should be continued, together with other measures designed to enhance selectivity and careful targeting of resources.

10.1.2 Technical Support

Most of the technical service organisations have impressive records in their specialist fields, often having undertaken essential and pioneering tasks under difficult conditions and with tremendous pressure on their own resources, not least of staff. It would be no exaggeration to say that many of the achievements of the civics in negotiations with state structures and parastatal bodies, or in carrying out upgrading projects, has been due to the assistance of these organisations. The relevant strengths and weaknesses of civics were set out in Section 8.

Again, however, the effectiveness of many technical support activities, taken together with the poor capacity of most civics, has caused some concern and even resentment amongst the latter at their dependency on such outside technical service organisations. These feelings have been strengthened in cases where the organisations profess a commitment to capacity-building and skills transfer, but have been unable to deliver sufficiently on this score. In seeking to overcome this situation, some civics have attempted to employ their own specialists, usually with external funds, but have had difficulty in retaining these staff for reasons to do with internal resentment, poor management and/or inadequate resources.

At the same time, most technical service organisations have until very recently been operating on a crisis management basis in the sense of their activities being largely demand driven. As a result, they have often been stretched too widely in terms of the range as well as number of projects undertaken, with suboptimal consequences. Greater rationalisation and specialisation would seem to be warranted and initiatives in this direction, such as the creation of the Urban Sector Network, should be encouraged.

10.2 Future prospects for training and technical support

In global terms, the need and demand for training and technical support will continue in the foreseeable future. Moreover, demand will continue to outstrip supply, with the result that current pressures on existing organisations will in all likelihood increase. Depending on the nature of future local government restructuring and the future role of parastatals, civics and advice centres may need or be able to relinquish some of the activities which have been important over recent years. The need for independent technical support to civics (and more generally, to communities) with respect, for example, to township upgrading schemes, may thus be reduced. On the other hand, some new local authorities will lack adequate in-house skills and they may therefore require the assistance of technical service organisations. Equally, it may be desirable in some areas or under certain circumstances for civics to continue their existing independent roles even if suitable state structures are established.

Insofar as the CACP is concerned, the future requirements in this field are intimately bound up with the nature of change during the current transition in South Africa and the likely future roles of civics and advice offices as set out in Sections 8 and 9 above. In

particular, local authorities and/or private sector organisations may be expected to assume responsibility for the provision of some basic skills training and community facilities. The recommendations below are shaped in this light.

10.3 Recommendations

10.3.1. General recommendations

1. The need for most categories of training and technical assistance will continue. Given the shortcomings identified above, the first requirement is for these activities to be more clearly focused and targetted within a strategic appreciation of the context within which they are being provided. This applies both to training and technical support.
2. Within this framework, training needs to be more clearly focused on the needs of specific groups of people - determined on the basis of educational level, type of organisation and/or the practical responsibilities for which training is required. In other words, training requires more preparation and planning.
3. In order to enhance its effectiveness, such training should also be more intensive and sustained, the duration, nature and orientation of courses being determined by the nature of people's needs and the skills to be imparted.
4. There is a growing need for more local (on the spot) training, especially in remoter areas, rather than the current practice of bringing trainees to metropolitan centres. These should draw in a larger number and wider range of people into training activities.
5. Current political changes are opening up the possibility of arranging placements for civic officials in local government departments. They would shadow local government officials, learning about their role.unding for training courses should be sought from local government structures. Such placements should be incorporated into broader training programmes.
6. Given the problems encountered with one-off courses, far greater follow-up would provide substantial benefits. This should take two forms:
 - workplace visits and/or workshops to ensure that trainees are adequately able to apply their newly acquired knowledge and skills to their particular context; and
 - periodic refresher or upgrading courses. A good example (from beyond this sector) is First Aid courses provided by organisations such as the St. John's Ambulance: requalification at three-yearly intervals is legally required in order to be aware of changes to recommended practice, ensure the maintenance of necessary skills and an adequate level of knowledge.
7. The scale of training activities needs to be increased so as to reach a far larger proportion of those requiring it than has been the case hitherto. In order to maximise effectiveness, this should occur in concert with the greater specialisation and follow-up advocated in Recommendations 2 to 4. Simply providing more of the same general courses will not be effective in either narrow cost or wider social terms. Instead, the increase in scale should be undertaken in such a manner as to

facilitate specialisation and more sustained training by providers. In this sense, there are real economies of scale and specialisation to be gained.

8. Following directly from the above, is an urgent need for greater planning and co-ordination between training organisations. Training networks would be an appropriate first step particularly during the transition to a more democratic, non-racial regime. The Organisational Development and Training Sector Network of the National Development Forum (NDF) provides an example of an initiative in this area. As new state structures are developed, such networks should co-operate directly with them to enhance overall co-ordination. As explained in Section 8, local authorities may assume or share responsibility for certain training activities previously available only through NGOs.
9. There is also a need for greater networking, strategic thinking and specialisation among technical service organisations. The recently established Urban Sector Network, for example, should provide an important vehicle for the reduction of overlap or duplication, and for the sharing of skills and material resources e.g. training materials.
10. Individual technical service organisations also need to take a more strategic view of their activities and plans so as to ensure greater returns to specialisation and also their continuing relevance in a changing macro context. Generally, the strengths of these organisations lie in their core activities. Commitments to community training may be sincere but have generally been difficult to fulfil. This is an example of activities which need to be re-examined. Also, some aspects of their technical work may in future be undertaken rather more with/for new local government structures than for individual civics.
11. From the analysis presented in this report, there is a specific need to emphasise certain types of training for civics, advice office and some service organisation personnel. These are activity-based and geared to the objectives of capacity enhancement, the promotion of self-reliance and ultimately a far greater self-sustaining ability. External funding should prioritise the provision of these skills through appropriate channels:
 - suitable training for officials and the relevant office bearers in budgeting, budget management, book-keeping, report-writing, negotiation skills and other aspects of what is generally referred to as organisational management and development (OD);
 - fund-raising skills, methods and sources;
 - principles of organisational accountability, including public consultation, feedback procedures and mechanisms, and the conduct of elections;
 - more specialised training for education and publicity officials in educational and extension work as well as resource development. While some aspects of this work may be undertaken through or in conjunction with local government in future, the need for such activities will continue in many independent organisations. At present, few personnel trained in these methods are employed within civics and even service organisations, yet these skills are vital to the exploitation of available resources, to their interpretation and application to the

specific needs of individual organisations or groups of organisations, to effective networking between organisations, and to the training of other staff;

- the continuation (and expansion where necessary) of existing training programmes for advice office and para-legal staff.

12. In order to overcome the shortage of appropriately qualified and experienced personnel capable of providing these types of training in a flexible manner that caters to the needs of specific trainee groups, priority should be accorded to the training of trainers in the above fields. Some existing programmes do already include this as one element of their activities, but this is not happening on a widespread or adequate scale.

13. Although some larger civics, especially at the zonal or regional level, may choose to employ their own trainers or run in-house courses for members, this is unlikely to be an option for any but the largest grassroots/local organisations. It would also not be compatible with the objectives and recommendations outlined in Section 8. Hence, in many cases, continuing use will need to be made of outside courses, whether provided through existing training and service organisations or through future local government facilities. Care will therefore need to be exercised in the selection of appropriate courses and the attainment of value for money in the broad sense. Networking will prove important here.

10.3.2 Recommendations on donor funding in general

14. In view of the above, it will become necessary to ensure that feelings of dependency on the part of client organisations are minimised. One way to achieve this would be to identify the training needs of individual organisations or groups of organisations by mutual consultation and to provide them with the necessary funds (or credits/vouchers) to enable them to purchase the inputs from the source of their choice within a pool of approved or accredited individuals and organisations. Hitherto, there has been a strong tendency for funders to pay training and service organisations direct to undertake courses. Of course, core funding for, or the payment of certain salaries within, training and service organisations should not be affected by this shift.

15. Consideration might also be given to requiring at least a token contribution from recipient organisations for courses attended, as another means of getting away from the dependency syndrome or feelings that they have a 'right' to free training.

16. Both in general terms and for reasons stated in Recommendations 10 and 11, greater attention than hitherto will need to be given to the question of accountability at all stages of the process, i.e. between funders, providers and client organisations or individuals with respect to the design, delivery and application of training. This will help to ensure appropriateness, flexibility and the effective use of funds. Importantly, it should also contribute significantly to the reduction of feelings of dependency on the part of client civics and advice offices. Many aspects of this process will flow from the implementation of Recommendations 1-10, in the sense of enhanced clarity of focus, purpose, level, content and effectiveness of training. Appropriate consultation and feedback mechanisms will also need to be developed, including for example, the use of end-of-course evaluation questionnaires and follow-up visits/workshops. Funders like KT might usefully become more actively engaged in such discussions and negotiations.

17. If donors wish to continue funding staff within service and technical or training organisations, this support should focus on specific portfolios requiring trained staff, such as education/resource development or para-legals, who will also carry out training activities as a major part of their duties. If, however, civics and advice centres continue to play roles similar in nature and scope to their present ones, donors may also deem it necessary to fund other categories of staff. However, the criteria used should still follow the guidelines given here.
18. In deciding whether to fund national or regional bodies, institutions or units which aim to provide training or build capacity in community organisations as part of their activities, external donors should consider carefully:
 - whether to provide core funding or only to support specific activities;
 - how cost effective and responsive these will be in relation to dedicated training and service organisations or emergent local government facilities;
 - the extent to which such efforts comply with the objectives, procedures and criteria outlined above.

10.3.3 Recommendations on KT and the CACP

19. KT should give serious consideration to the level of assistance and training it provides to civics and advice centres funded through the CACP and other programmes. Pressures on staff time notwithstanding, there is a good case for more direct feedback and consultation with organisations, especially with respect to the preparation and modification of funding proposals, and other requirements of KT contracts with which recipients must comply. In time, some aspects of this should be provided by more specialised training activities along the lines set out above, but in the short to medium term, at least, KT should be more proactive in this sphere. An appropriate and costeffective way forward would be to hold consultation meetings or workshops in selected districts. Interim help and follow-up should then be made a part of the regular work of regional project officers during their field visits.
18. There also appears to be a clear need to ensure greater uniformity of training and capability of KT staff especially in the regions. This study has revealed considerable variation in a number of respects. Appropriate measures should include training or refresher courses, and the improvement of internal procedures and reporting structures.

Annex A: Disbursements under the CACP

The following tables, providing an indication of financial disbursements under the CACP, were compiled by Kagiso Trust. They should not, however, be regarded as definitive. Kagiso Trust's head-office staff have recently computerised the records of disbursements under the CACP since 1987. This is a remarkable achievement, given the complex arrangements and poor record-keeping which characterised Kagiso Trust in the late 1980s, when KT had few staff and the political context was very repressive. But there remain a few problems with the data. For a long time it proved impossible to produce consistent aggregate data. Certain minor categories of disbursement have been difficult to trace. It has also proved difficult to match apparent income (i.e grants from the CEC and other sources) with disbursements under the CACP.

The tables are organised by region and by category of project. The categories (and categorisation of projects) used here have been drawn up by KT. It should be noted that KT's Transvaal region comprises not only the province of Transvaal, but also the Orange Free State and the Northern Cape.

The data is also disaggregated by source of funding. The first column of data includes disbursements funded by the CEC through what is narrowly defined as the CACP (see section 2.2). The second column includes disbursements funded by Scandinavian churches through the CACP. The third column includes disbursements funded by the CEC but outside of the CACP (as narrowly defined). The fourth column includes disbursements funded by other sources through KT to the projects which have received some funds from the CEC and Scandinavian churches. The fifth column provides a total for funds disbursed through KT to each project.

Civic and Advice Programme
Financial Status January, 1987 to December, 1992

NO	PROJECT NAME	TOTAL PAID EC-C&A	TOTAL PAID SCAND-C&A	TOTAL PAID EC NON-C&A	TOTAL PAID NON EC & NON C&A	TOTAL PAID TO PRJ	REG	CATEGORY
1	BUTTERWORTH C ADV CENTRE	R89,000.00	R20,000.00			R109,000.00	BDR	ADV OFF
2	ALIWAL NORTH ADV CENTRE	R169,170.00	R31,700.00			R200,870.00	BDR	ADV OFF
3	QUEENSTOWN ADV OFF		R10,396.00			R10,396.00	BDR	ADV OFF
4	TSHATSHU ADV OFF	R31,000.00				R31,000.00	BDR	ADV OFF
5	F/BEAUFORT ADV OFF	R52,000.00	R20,000.00			R72,000.00	BDR	ADV OFF
6	KING WILLIAMSTOWN ADV OFF	R25,892.00	R20,000.00			R45,892.00	BDR	ADV OFF
7	BDR RES CENTRE	R140,550.00		R22,000.00	R45,000.00	R207,550.00	BDR	ADV OFF
8	UMTATA ADV OFF	R30,000.00	R30,000.00	R144,165.00		R204,165.00	BDR	ADV OFF
9	DALIWE ADV CENTRE	R137,498.00	R48,606.00			R186,104.00	BDR	ADV OFF
10	AFESIS	R75,000.00				R75,000.00	BDR	ADV OFF
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R1,141,977.00		ADVICE OFFICES
								BORDER REGION
11	BOCCO	R125,400.00				R125,400.00	BDR	RES ORG
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R125,400.00		RESIDENTS ORGANISATIONS
								BORDER REGION
12	PARA-LEGAL TRAINING PRJ		R221,810.00			R221,810.00	BDR	TRAINING PROG
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R221,810.00	BDR	TRAINING PROGRAMMES
								BORDER REGION
TOTAL (BORDER REGION)						R1,489,187.00	BDR	

NO	PROJECT NAME	TOTAL PAID EC-C&A	TOTAL PAID SCAND-C&A	TOTAL PAID EC NON-C&A	TOTAL PAID NON EC & NON C&A	TOTAL PAID TO PRJ	REG	CATEGORY
13	LENASIA COMM ADV CENTRE	R70,000.00	R23,000.00			R93,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
14	IKAGENG ADV OFF	R10,000.00				R10,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
15	THUOSONG ADV CENTRE	R170,450.00	R56,850.00		R10,000.00	R227,100.00	TVL	ADV OFF
16	NOORDGESIG ADV OFF	R24,600.00				R34,600.00	TVL	ADV OFF
17	THOKOZA ADV CENTRE	R42,800.00	R38,000.00			R80,800.00	TVL	ADV OFF
18	BOTSHABELO ADV OFF	R93,530.00	R10,000.00			R103,530.00	TVL	ADV OFF
19	TOACA	R266,000.00	R62,000.00		R26,200.00	R354,200.00	TVL	ADV OFF
20	IPELEGENG ADV OFF	R16,000.00				R16,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
21	TERELENG ADV OFF	R1,370.00				R1,370.00	TVL	ADV OFF
22	WORKERS AID CENTRE	R25,000.00				R25,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
23	DENNILTON ADV CENTRE	R80,130.00	R36,000.00	R15,000.00		R131,130.00	TVL	ADV OFF
24	ADV CENTRES ASS	R22,000.00				R22,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
25	K/DORP ADV & SELF HELP	R105,365.00				R105,365.00	TVL	ADV OFF
26	THUSANONG ADV OFF	R101,052.00	R66,286.61			R167,338.61	TVL	ADV OFF
27	INDUSTRIAL AID BUREAU	R90,520.00				R90,520.00	TVL	ADV OFF
28	BENONI ADV CENTRE	R110,900.00	R20,000.00			R130,900.00	TVL	ADV OFF
29	PHIRI ADV CENTRE	R150,485.00	R31,000.00	R11,200.00		R192,685.00	TVL	ADV OFF
30	KATLEHONG L ADV CENTRE	R10,000.00				R10,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
31	KGAKALA ADV CENTRE	R30,000.00				R30,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
32	MAOKENG ADV OFF	R52,760.00	R40,000.00			R92,760.00	TVL	ADV OFF
33	MANGAUNG ADV CENTRE	R72,447.00	R47,000.00			R119,447.00	TVL	ADV OFF
34	SIZANANI ADV OFF	R24,865.00	R35,000.00			R59,865.00	TVL	ADV OFF
35	THOLULWAZI ADV OFF	R73,707.95	R6,000.00			R79,707.95	TVL	ADV OFF
36	TUMAHOLE ADV CENTRE	R71,100.00	R35,000.00			R106,100.00	TVL	ADV OFF
37	WINTERVELDT ADV OFF	R20,000.00				R20,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
38	BRITS OUKASIE ADV CENTRE	R13,500.00	R2,261.00			R15,761.00	TVL	ADV OFF
39	MULWELI C C	R152,738.00	R35,000.00	R216,974.50		R404,712.50	TVL	ADV OFF
40	LOWVELD COMM ADV SERV	R105,075.00		R15,000.00		R120,075.00	TVL	ADV OFF
41	NEIGHBOURHOOD ADV CENTRE	R101,200.00	R25,000.00	R7,500.00		R133,700.00	TVL	ADV OFF
42	ER CAB	R73,747.00	R31,000.00			R104,747.00	TVL	ADV OFF
43	ST PETER'S ADV OFF	R39,345.00	R12,000.00			R51,345.00	TVL	ADV OFF
44	THABONG ADV OFF	R73,810.00	R41,000.00			R114,810.00	TVL	ADV OFF
45	ERACA	R25,000.00				R25,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
46	JHB CENTRAL ADV CENTRE	R28,000.00				R28,000.00	TVL	ADV OFF
47	E/TVL RES COUNCIL	R21,650.00				R21,650.00	TVL	ADV OFF
48	RIVERLEA RES CENTRE	R29,100.00		R23,700.00		R52,800.00	TVL	ADV OFF
49	ELDO'S ADV CENTRE	R29,433.34		R10,000.00		R39,433.34	TVL	ADV OFF
50	LAUDIUM ADV CENTRE	R75,940.00	R20,000.00			R95,940.00	TVL	ADV OFF
51	LESEDI COMM ADV CENTRE	R107,400.00	R50,000.00			R157,400.00	TVL	ADV OFF
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R3,668,792.40	TVL	ADVICE OFFICES
								TRANSVAAL

52	VCDT	R50,000.00				R50,000.00	TVL	COMM B DEV ORG
	TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION					R50,000.00	TVL	COMMUNITY BASED ORG
								TRANSVAAL

53	TEMBISA RES ASS	R15,000.00				R15,000.00	TVL	RES ORG
54	KIMBERLEY CIVIC ASS	R25,000.00				R25,000.00	TVL	RES ORG
55	EKANGALA CIVIC	R21,000.00	R35,000.00			R56,000.00	TVL	RES ORG
56	ACTSTOP	R168,900.00	R45,000.00			R213,900.00	TVL	RES ORG
57	IKAGENG CIVIC ASS	R29,500.00				R29,500.00	TVL	RES ORG
58	MAOKENG CIVIC	R31,690.00	R30,000.00			R61,690.00	TVL	RES ORG
59	OFS CIVIC PROG	R242,500.00				R242,500.00	TVL	RES ORG
60	MOUTSE CIVIC	R27,000.00		R10,000.00		R37,000.00	TVL	RES ORG
61	ENNERDALE CIV ASS	R30,000.00				R30,000.00	TVL	RES ORG
62	BOTSHABELO CIVIC	R39,570.00	R50,000.00			R89,570.00	TVL	RES ORG
63	BRONVILLE CIV ASS	R31,472.00				R31,472.00	TVL	RES ORG
64	CIVIC ASS FED	R17,000.00				R17,000.00	TVL	RES ORG
65	N/W CAPE RES CENTRE	R50,000.00				R50,000.00	TVL	SERV ORG
	TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION					R888,832.00	TVL	RESIDENTS ORGANISATIONS
								TRANSVAAL

66	BLACK SASH	R140,000.00	R60,000.00			R200,000.00	TVL	TRAINING PROG
67	CAJ-KHANYA COLLEGE TRAIN PROG	R48,000.00				R48,000.00	TVL	TRAINING PROG
	TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION					R248,000.00	TVL	TRAINING PROGRAMMES
								TRANSVAAL
	TOTAL (TRANSVAAL)					R4,865,424.40	TVL	

NO	PROJECT NAME	TOTAL PAID EC -C&A	TOTAL PAID SCAND -C&A	TOTAL PAID EC NON -C&A	TOTAL PAID NON EC & NON C&A	TOTAL PAID TO PRJ	REG	CATEGORY
68	SHALLCROSS ADV OFF	R28,670.00	R39,500.00			R68,170.00	NTL	ADV OFF
69	NACA	R200,000.00		R125,000.00	R32,600.00	R357,600.00	NTL	ADV OFF
70	NORTHDALE ADV OFF	R60,000.00	R35,800.00			R95,800.00	NTL	ADV OFF
71	FEMAC	R106,600.00				R106,600.00	NTL	ADV OFF
72	MPUMALANGA ADV OFF	R154,260.00	R93,150.00			R247,410.00	NTL	ADV OFF
73	PHOENIX ADV OFF	R125,870.00	R28,600.00	R20,000.00		R174,470.00	NTL	ADV OFF
74	ISIPINGO ADV OFF	R60,300.00				R60,300.00	NTL	ADV OFF
75	MELMOTH ADV OFF	R145,395.00	R62,375.00			R207,770.00	NTL	ADV OFF
76	NORTH COAST ADV OFF	R117,780.00	R11,320.00			R129,100.00	NTL	ADV OFF
77	WENTWORTH ADV OFF	R128,745.00	R77,384.00	R17,650.00		R223,779.00	NTL	ADV OFF
78	BAYVIEW ADV OFF	R81,360.00	R81,360.00			R162,720.00	NTL	ADV OFF
79	TONGAAT ADV OFF	R48,290.00	R20,000.00			R68,290.00	NTL	ADV OFF
80	ASHDOWN ADV OFF	R60,140.00				R60,140.00	NTL	ADV OFF
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R1,981,949.00	NTL	ADVICE OFFICES
								NATAL
81	NATAL CIVIC	R278,760.00	R97,000.00			R375,760.00	NTL	RES ORG
82	NEWLANDS EAST RES ASS	R27,650.00				R27,650.00	NTL	RES ORG
83	CHESTER RES ASS	R21,934.00		R20,000.00		R41,934.00	NTL	RES ORG
84	P/mburg C RATE RES ASS	R31,000.00				R31,000.00	NTL	RES ORG
85	DHAC	R98,205.00	R22,000.00	R30,000.00		R150,205.00	NTL	RES ORG
86	CATO MANOR RES ASS	R82,050.00	R85,400.64			R167,450.64	NTL	RES ORG
87	MONTFORD RES ASS	R75,210.00	R73,000.00			R148,210.00	NTL	RES ORG
88	TONGAAT CIVIC	R16,020.00				R16,020.00	NTL	RES ORG
89	DCRA	R154,429.00	R80,000.00	R36,000.00		R270,429.00	NTL	RES ORG
90	NTL CTF		R40,000.00			R40,000.00	NTL	RES ORG
91	CO-ORD OF RES OF CIV ORG	R12,700.00				R12,700.00	NTL	RES ORG
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R1,261,358.64	NTL	RESIDENTS ORGANISATIONS
								NATAL
TOTAL (NATAL)						R3,243,307.64	NTL	

NO	PROJECT NAME	TOTAL PAID EC-C&A	TOTAL PAID SCAND-C&A	TOTAL PAID EC NON-C&A	TOTAL PAID NON EC & NON C&A	TOTAL PAID TO PRJ	REG	CATEGORY
92	JANSENVILLE COMM ADV CENTRE	R26,500.00				R26,500.00	EC	ADV OFF
93	INTERCHURCH ADV OFF	R51,878.00	R15,000.00			R66,878.00	EC	ADV OFF
94	MURRAYSBURG COMM ADV OFF	R36,500.00				R36,500.00	EC	ADV OFF
95	GREINETTE ADV OFF	R18,300.00				R18,300.00	EC	ADV OFF
96	CRADOCK ADV OFF	R31,710.00				R31,710.00	EC	ADV OFF
97	REIBEECK E ADV OFF		R19,000.00			R19,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
98	DE AAR ADVICE OFF	R67,000.00				R67,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
99	ADELAIDE ADV OFF		R23,000.00			R23,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
100	NOUP ADV OFF	R50,000.00				R50,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
101	BEDFORD ADV OFF	R20,500.00	R10,000.00			R30,500.00	EC	ADV OFF
102	HOFMEYER ADV OFF		R15,000.00			R15,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
103	BATHURST ADV OFF		R20,000.00			R20,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
104	SOMERSET E ADV OFF		R15,000.00			R15,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
105	KLIPPLAAT ADV OFF		R35,000.00			R35,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
106	COOKHOUSE ADV AND RES CENTRE	R52,030.00				R52,030.00	EC	ADV OFF
107	HELLENVALE ADVICE OFFICE	R35,000.00				R35,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
108	STEYTERVILLE A.O.	R45,600.00				R45,600.00	EC	ADV OFF
109	ABERDEEN ADV CENTRE	R38,000.00				R38,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
110	KENTON-ON-SEA ADV OFFICE	R45,000.00				R45,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
111	ALEX ADV OFF		R15,000.00			R15,000.00	EC	ADV OFF
112	MISSION ADVICE OFFICE	R39,084.00				R39,084.00	EC	ADV OFF
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R724,102.00	EC	ADVICE OFFICES
								EASTERN CAPE
113	MASIPHAKAMENI COMM PROJ	R31,000.00				R31,000.00	EC	COMM B DEV ORG
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R31,000.00	EC	COMMUNITY BASED ORG
								EASTERN CAPE
114	UITENHAGE RES CIVIC ORG	R75,000.00				R75,000.00	EC	RES ORG
115	MALABAR RES ASS		R24,000.00			R24,000.00	EC	RES ORG
116	GRAHAMSTOWN CIVIC		R42,000.00			R42,000.00	EC	RES ORG
117	ECCO	R237,559.00				R237,559.00	EC	RES ORG
118	PEPCO	R63,780.00				R63,780.00	EC	RES ORG
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R442,339.00	EC	RESIDENTS ORGANISATIONS
								EASTERN CAPE
119	URBAN SERVICE GROUP	R100,000.00		R30,000.00		R130,000.00	EC	SERVICE ORG
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R130,000.00	EC	SERVICE ORGANISATIONS
								EASTERN CAPE
TOTAL (EASTERN CAPE)						R1,327,441.00	EC	

NO	PROJECT NAME	TOTAL PAID EC-C&A	TOTAL PAID SCAND-C&A	TOTAL PAID EC NON-C&A	TOTAL PAID NON EC & NON C&A	TOTAL PAID TO PRJ	REG	CATEGORY
120	COMMUNITY/PEOPLE'S ADV OFF	R50,916.00	R48,540.00			R99,456.00	WC	ADV OFF
121	SALDANHA ADV OFF	R30,000.00				R30,000.00	WC	ADV OFF
122	WORCESTER PEOPLE'S ADV OFF	R49,000.00				R49,000.00	WC	ADV OFF
123	ADVICE OFFICE FORUM	R131,350.00	R21,480.00			R152,830.00	WC	ADV OFF
124	STELLENBOSCH RES CENTRE	R50,000.00	R39,974.00			R89,974.00	WC	ADV OFF
125	GEORGE ADV OFF	R62,990.41	R77,440.00			R140,430.41	WC	ADV OFF
126	BONTHEUWEL UNEMPLOY WORK OFF	R5,600.00				R5,600.00	WC	ADV OFF
127	KHAYELITSHA ADV OFF	R13,180.00				R13,180.00	WC	ADV OFF
128	BELHAR RES CENTRE	R22,000.00				R22,000.00	WC	ADV OFF
129	BELLVILLE ADV OFF	R7,995.58				R7,995.58	WC	ADV OFF
130	KLEINVLEI ADV OFF	R51,550.00	R35,000.00			R86,550.00	WC	ADV OFF
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R667,015.99	WC	ADVICE OFFICES WESTERN CAPE
131	GRAAFWATER COMM ORG	R37,950.00	R29,180.00	R20,746.00		R87,876.00	WC	RES ORG
132	ORAC	R29,336.00		R64,705.00		R94,041.00	WC	RES ORG
133	EERSTE RIVER HOUSING FORUM	R15,300.00				R15,300.00	WC	RES ORG
134	V/WEST RATE PAYERS ASS	R49,811.25				R49,811.25	WC	RES ORG
135	STEINKPF COMM ORG	R24,870.00				R24,870.00	WC	RES ORG
136	ATLANTIS RES ASS		R57,000.00	R141,520.84		R198,520.84	WC	RES ORG
137	WCCA	R103,278.00	R69,300.00	R29,905.00		R202,483.00	WC	RES ORG
138	CAHAC	R128,654.00	R106,431.00	R91,275.00		R326,360.00	WC	RES ORG
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R999,282.09	WC	RESIDENTS ORGANISATIONS WESTERN CAPE
139	BOLAND LAND COMMITTEE	R49,300.00				R49,300.00	WC	SERVICE ORG
140	SOUTH CAPE LAND COMM	R30,000.00				R30,000.00	WC	SERVICE ORG
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R79,300.00	WC	SERVICE ORGANISATIONS WESTERN CAPE
141	LEAP	R167,811.67		R828,818.33		R996,630.00	WC	TRAINING PROG
TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION						R996,630.00	WC	TRAINING PROGRAMMES WESTERN CAPE
TOTAL (WESTERN CAPE)						R2,772,208.08	WC	

NO	PROJECT NAME	TOTAL PAID EC-C&A	TOTAL PAID SCAND-C&A	TOTAL PAID EC NON-C&A	TOTAL PAID NON EC & NON C&A	TOTAL PAID TO PRJ	REG	CATEGORY
142	SANCO	R75,000.00	R69,777.74			R144,777.74	NAT	RES ORG
143	OMHLE	R40,800.00				R40,800.00	NAT	RES ORG
	TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION					R185,577.74	NAT	RESIDENTS ORGANISATIONS
								NATIONAL
144	COMM B HOUS ADV CENTRE STUDY	R50,000.00				R50,000.00	NAT	STUDY
	TOTAL PER CATEGORY PER REGION					R50,000.00	NAT	STUDY
								NATIONAL
	TOTAL (NATIONAL)					R235,577.74	NAT	

GRAND TOTAL NATIONALLY	R8,909,664.20	R2,978,521.99	R1,941,159.67	R103,800.00	R13,933,145.86
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SERVICE ORGANISATIONS FUNDED BY THE CEC NON C&A

NO	PROJECT NAME	AMOUNT PAID	TOTAL PAID NON EC
1	PLANACT	R10,031,585.00	
2	BUILD ENVIRONMENT SUPP GROUP	R3,081,777.00	
3	DEVELOPMENT ACTION GROUP	R412,251.60	
4	CORPLAN	R198,804.40	
5	NATIONAL LAND COMMITTEE	R1,545,790.00	R30,000.00
6	Foundation for Contemporary Research	R150,525.00	
7	MANAGEMENT NETWORK	R350,000.00	
8	ERIP	R961,936.50	
9	HUMAN AWARENESS PROGRAMME	R29,000.00	
10	DEVELOPMENT RESOURCE CENTRE	R400,000.00	
11	COMMUNITY LAW CENTRE	R300,000.00	
12	Centre for Community & Labour Studies	R432,600.00	
13	LAWYERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS	R61,686.00	
	TOTAL	R17,955,955.50	R30,000.00
			R17,985,955.50

ADMISTRATION, EVALUATION & OTHER COSTS FROM C&A

NO	PROJECT NAME	TOTAL PAID-EC C&A	TOTAL PAID SCAND-C&A
1	KT COORDINATING COSTS 185	R65,000.00	
2	KT COORDINATING COSTS 295	R123,166.38	
3	EVALUATION 295	R60,182.14	
5	AUDIT BUDGET 295	R20,000.00	
6	KT COORDINATING COSTS 306		R74,000.00
	TOTAL UNCOMMITTED 295		R57,306.41
	TOTAL	R268,348.52	R74,000.00
			R342,348.52

INCOME RECEIVED FOR CIVIC & ADVICE PROGRAMME

JAN 1987 TO DECEMBER 1992

No	CEC	SWEDEN	KAGISO TRUST PROJECT No
1	R2,310,041.51		PROJECT 107
2	R2,785,981.12		PROJECT 185
3	R4,139,296.50		PROJECT 295
4		R376,414.35	PROJECT 274
5		R2,676,107.64	PROJECT 306
	R9,235,319.13	R3,052,521.99	R12,287,841.12

Annex B: List of people and organisations consulted

The three consultants met with the following projects, organisations and individuals during the preparation of this report. (The consultant concerned in each case is identified by his initials).

(a) CACP-funded projects

Advice centres and related projects:

AFESIS (East London) [JS]
Bayview Advice Office (Durban) [KS]
Botshabelo Advice Office [JS]
Community/People's Advice Office (Cape Town) [JS]
Cookhouse Advice and Resource Centre [JS]
Cradock Advice Office [JS]
Daliwe Advice Centre (Cathcart) [JS]
George Advice Office and Masakhane Community Building Project [DS]
Legal Education Action Project (LEAP) [DS]
Natal Advice Centres Association (NACA) [KS]
Phiri Advice Centre (Soweto) [KS]
Saldanha Advice Office [JS]
Tongaat Advice Office [KS]
Trans-Orange Advice Centres Association (TOACA) [KS]
Uitenhage Inter-Church Advice Office [JS]

Civic organisations:

Atlantis Residents Association [JS]
Border Civics Congress (BOCCO, now SANCO Border) [JS]
Botshabelo Civic Association [JS]
Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC) [JS]
Eastern Cape Civic Organisation (ECCO, now SANCO Eastern Cape) [JS]
Ekangala Civic Association [KS & DS]
Port Elizabeth People's Civic Association [JS]
Southern Cape Land Committee [DS]
Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA, now part of SANCO Western Cape) [JS]

In addition, KT documentation on the following additional projects was examined:

Mangaung Advice Centre [JS];
Maokeng Advice Office [JS];
Maokeng Civic Association [JS];
OFS Civic Programme [JS];
para-legal Training Project [JS];
Tembisa Residents Association [KS];
Thabong Advice Office [JS];
Thusong Advice Centre (Ratanda, Heidelberg) [KS].
Uitenhage Residents Civic Organisation [JS];

(b) other individuals and organisations

Black Sash, Johannesburg - Sheena Duncan [KS]
Black Sash, Port Elizabeth - Judy Chalmers [JS]
Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD) [DS]
Civic Association of Johannesburg (CAJ) - Cas Coovadia [JS, KS & DS]
Civic Associations of the Southern Transvaal (CAST) - Matthew Petla [DS & KS]
Centre for Community and Labour Studies, Durban (CCLS) - Karin Pearce [KS]
Cookhouse Civic Association [JS]
Cradock Civic Association [JS]
Eastern Cape Development and Funding Forum (Ecdaff) - Gugile Nkwinti & Hilde van Waenderen [JS]
Foundation for Contemporary Research (Cape Town) - Cameron Dugmore [JS]
Yunus Mohamed (Durban) [KS]
National Land Committee - Joanne Yawitch [KS]
Sbu Ndebele, formerly Umlazi Civic Association [KS]
Planact - Rick de Satge [DS & KS]
SANCO head-office (Bloemfontein) - Dan Sandi, Lechesa Tsenoli and T.Gidigidi [KS & JS]
SANCO Southern Orange Free State - Benny Kotswane [JS]
SANCO Southern Natal - Lechesa Tsenoli [KS]
Social Change Awareness Trust (SCAT) - Mpho Ndebele, Nyame Goniwe, Erika Oosthuysen [JS]
Soweto Civic Association - Pat Lephunya [JS]
Urban Services Group - Ronnie van Wyk [JS]

(c) KT staff

L.Huno (Western Cape, regional director) [JS, DS]

S.Luthuli (Western Cape, projects officer) [DS]

S.Malongete (head-office) [JS, DS, KS]

O.Mareletse (Transvaal, projects officer) [JS]

N.Mzamane (Border, administrator) [JS]

T.Ratsomo (Transvaal, regional director) [KS]

V.Simmers (Western Cape, administrator) [JS]

S.Sizani (Eastern Cape, regional director) [JS]

N.Williams (Western Cape, projects officer) [JS]

(d) EC staff

T.Sheehy

P.Zille

Annex C: References and select bibliography

D. Atkinson, 'State and civil society in flux: parameters of a changing debate', **Theoria** (May 1992), pp.57-74.

'Negotiated urban development: Lessons from the coalface', Centre for Policy Studies Research Report no 26 (Nov 1992).

T. Botha, 'Civic associations as autonomous organs of grassroots' participation', **Theoria** (May 1992), pp.1-28.

C. Butcher, **Planning and Management Training Needs Assessment of Community Based Organisations Involved in Shelter Related Issues, South Africa** (Harare: USAID report, 1992).

C. Coovadia, 'The role of the civic movement', in M. Swilling, R. Humphries & K. Shubane (eds), **Apartheid City in Transition** (Cape Town: OUP, 1991), pp.334-349.

D. Fine, 'Community Advice Services and para-legals', **Developing Justice Series No. 3** (Cape Town: Social Justice Research Project and Legal Education Action Project, Institute of Criminology, UCT, 1992).

B. Jacobs, 'SANCO: Heading for disaster?', **WIP** 86 (Dec 1992) pp.23-5.

Kagiso Trust, 'Advice offices and civic associations in a changing South Africa: workshop report', of workshop held in King William's Town, August 1991 (King William's Town: Kagiso Trust?, not dated).

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'Interim report on the Civic and Advice Centres Programme: Phase III' (Johannesburg: Kagiso Trust, 1992c).

'Community Capacity Building Programme' (Johannesburg: Kagiso Trust, unpublished paper, 1992d).

Legal Education Action Programme and Black Sash, **Working for Justice: The Role of para-legals in South Africa** (Cape Town: LEAP and Black Sash, 1990).

W. Louw, Financial Advice Resources: A Feasibility Study in the Greater Cape Town Area, report (Cape Town: University of the Western Cape, Institute of Social Development, 1986).

M. Mayekiso, 'Hands of the civics and civil society!', **WIP** 81 (April 1992), p.21.

G. Nkwinti, 'The role and location of the civic associations during and after the transition period', discussion document (Aug 1991).

B. Nzimande & M. Sikhosana, 'Civics are part of the national democratic revolution', **Mayibuye** (June 1991), pp.37-39.

Planact, **Annual Report 1991/2** (Johannesburg: Planact, 1992).

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J.Seekings, 'Civic organisations in South African townships', **South African Review** 6 (1992).

'The slow growth of South Africa's national civic movement, 1979-1992', draft paper (Jan 1993).

K.Shubane, 'Civil society in South Africa', **Journal of Democracy** 2,3 (Summer 1991), pp.53-5.

'Civil society in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa', **Theoria** (May 1992), pp.33-42.

& P.Madiba, 'The Struggle Continues: Civic associations in the transition', Centre for Policy Studies Research Report no 25 (Oct 1992).

D.Sogge, 'KT CBO Strategy Paper' (Johannesburg: Kagiso Trust, unpublished paper, not dated).

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G.Webster, 'What the advice office files reveal', **Sash** (August 1986), pp.20-23.

Annex D: Advice centres in the Cape

This annex was compiled from KT and SCAT documentation, together with miscellaneous other sources. The letter in brackets following the location of the advice centre indicates whether it received any funding from SCAT (since 1990) or Kagiso Trust. The statistics for SCAT do not include funding prior to 1990. The letter S or K indicates that some funds were received; they do not mean that the advice centre concerned was necessarily funded on a regular basis or even more than once.

Please also note the following:

- The sub-regional breakdowns are approximate.
- It is not always clear whether there is more than one advice centre in one place.
- Some of these advice centres have closed down; others have only recently been formed.

Cape Town:

Belhar (K,S), Bellville (K), Black Sash C.T., Bo-Kaap (-), Bonteheuwel (S,K?), Elsies River (S), Guguletu (People's/Community Advice Centre - K), Hanover Park (S), Heideveld (S), Hout Bay (-), Khayelitsha (K,S), Kleinvlei (K), Kraaifontein (-), Langa (-), Lavendar Hill (-), Lotus River/Grassy Park (Logra - S), Manenberg (S), Mitchell's Plain (S), Ravensmead (S), Salt River (-), Silverton (-), Woodstock (S).

Cape Town periphery:

Eerste Rivier (K), Graafwater (K), Helderberg (S), Stellenbosch (S).

Boland:

Grabouw (S), Montagu-Aston (-), Paarl (S), Tulbagh (S), Villiersdorp (S), Worcester (K).

West Coast:

Clanwilliam (-), Klawer (S), Saldanha (K), Vredendal (S).

Southern Cape:

Bot River (S), Bredasdorp (S), George (K), Great Brak (S), Haarlem (S), Hermanus (Zwelihle - S), Knysna (-), Mossel Bay (-), Plettenberg Bay (Bossiesgif - S), Steynsberg (-), Uniondale (S).

Karoo:

Calitzdorp (S), Oudtshoorn (K,S), Prince Albert (S), Richmond (S), Zoar (S).

Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage:

Black Sash P.E. (-), Hellenvale (K), Human Rights Commission P.E. (-), KwaNobuhle (-), Missionvale (K), PECIC (-), Uitenhage Inter-Church (K).

Other Eastern Cape:	Aberdeen (K), Adelaide, Alexandria (K), Alice (-), Aicedale (S), Bathurst (K), Bedford (K), Colesberg (Karoo Law Clinic, -), Cookhouse (K), Cradock (K), De Aar (K,S), Fort Beaufort (K), Graaf-Reinet (K), Black Sash Grahamstown (Black Sash, -), Hofmeyr (K,S), Humansdorp (Masiphakameni - K), Jansenville (K), Kenton-on-Sea (K), Klipplaat (K), Middelburg (-), Murraysberg (K), Noupoort (K,S), Paterson (S), Reibeeck East (K,S), Somerset East (-), Steytlerville (K), Venterstat (-).
North-Eastern Cape:	Aliwal North (K,S), Barclay East (S), Burgersdorp (S), Dordrecht (S), Elliot (-), Herschel (-), Jamestown (S), Maclear (S), Molteno (S), Tshatshu (K,S), Ugie (-).
East London:	Afesis (K,S), Black Sash E.L. (-), Kwelera (-), Lawyers for Human Rights E.L. (-).
Other Border:	Cathcart (Daliwe - K), King William's Town, Queenstown (Masifundisane and Q.Community Centre, both S), Stutterheim (-).
Transkei:	Butterworth (K), Indwe (-), Lawyers for Human Rights Umtata (-), Matatiele (S), Umtata (-).
Northern Cape:	Kimberley (North-Western Cape Resource Centre - K), Vryburg (Lesedi - K), Warrenton (Tshedimos^tso - S).

TOTAL: 114.

Of which 51 received funds from SCAT (at one time or another since 1990), and 41 from Kagiso Trust (at one time or another since 1987). 10 received some funds from both SCAT and Kagiso Trust.