


Work In Progress

8

MAY '79



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The nature of WIP, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views, ensures that the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors.

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This issue of Work In Progress edited and published by an editorial collective, and printed by Central Print Unit, all of University of Witwatersrand, 1 Jan Smuts Avenue, JOHANNESBURG. 2001.

Acknowledgement to A SEVENTH MAN (Penguin 1975) by John Berger and Jean Mohr for certain photographs.

Thanks to Paul for illustration, and to contributors for articles.

EDITORIAL

WHAT IS apartheid/separate development - the policy followed by the National Party government and enforced through the state apparatuses since 1948? It is a specific option adopted by capitalism to structure production and reproduction in South Africa.

Why was this option taken? Because it reflected certain political and economic power relationships during the mid 1940's, namely an alliance between an aspirant Afrikaner bourgeoisie, a privileged white working class, and an agricultural sector moving from semi-feudal relations to capitalist production. But this alliance and its actions in shaping the future of South Africa was in turn acting within an historical reality of dependent development within an international capitalist context, reliance on mining and agriculture for economic strength, racial division of the working class (in economic, political and ideological terms), geographical division of races, etc.

What are the main characteristics of the apartheid option? The most important point to make is that it is capitalist - despite all the cries of "creeping socialism"; state "interference"; free market foundations and the Sunday Times business editor. Apartheid is an intense form of labour allocation, control and repression of the working class. It relies primarily on directly repressive measures to ensure the reproduction and maintenance of the capitalist way of producing.

The apartheid option has institutionalised divisions in a range of areas - divisions

which are once more essential for the reproduction and maintenance of society in its present form. These divisive tactics manipulate existing antagonisms and create new ones in the society - antagonisms which revolve around ethnicity, nationalism, class conflict, urban-rural divisions, etc.

While this process of reproducing the society in its present form has been (and remains) a largely repressive process, it is now taking on an increasingly ideological form.

To repeat: the point is that apartheid is not antagonistic to capitalism; it is not, fundamentally, antagonistic to the demands of foreign capital investment and of modern imperialism, despite some political disagreements. And the latest moves in the fields of industrial relations, living conditions and commercial opportunities for blacks have made the policy more easy to sell to those who want to believe in the moral correctness of exploitation of the working class in South Africa.

After the events of the past seven years or so, capitalism, through the apartheid state, is making another concerted effort to reestablish its grip and total dominance in a variety of fields - areas that reflect the struggles and victories of the dominated classes over the past few years.

Let us look at some of these events a bit more closely, and attempt to draw some of the connections between apparently disparate elements of the South African state's response.

In 1971-2 the Ovambo strike occurred in Namibia, showing up the vulnerability of

even such an industrially backward country to working class action. This was in part due to the overwhelming reliance on the exploitation of mineral resources by international capital.

At this stage, the war in Namibia has intensified to such an extent that it has been alleged that South Africa has more than 20,000 troops there, and SWAPO are operating, albeit in small groups, close to Windhoek.

In Rhodesia, with large parts justifiably claiming to be parts of a future Zimbabwe, the Smith regime has been brought down, with an interim 'black' government to fight the last phase of a war the white Rhodesians could not win either.

Mozambique is an independent country following a Marxist-Leninist policy of social organisation, and supporting the forces of the Patriotic Front despite the viciousness of Rhodesian attacks on its territory, military personnel, civilians and infrastructure. In Angola the South African army lost a war (if not militarily then politically) - they could not achieve the objective of installing and maintaining UNITA in power.

To move to South Africa and the internal struggle that has also been marked by intensification in all areas, we can list such events as:

- the Durban strikes in 1973, characterised by the involvement of tens of thousands of workers across racial lines;
- continued strike action since then, despite the recession in South Africa, growing unemployment, and direct state repression;

-the ideological and practical (in various community projects) effects of black consciousness organisations, especially in placing 'homeland' and urban stooge politics in perspective, and giving a confidence and experience to many black people. We can only now start thinking of making an objective and critical evaluation of the impact of black consciousness on South African society.

-ever increasing repression of political opposition within the reserves/'homelands' indicates the extent of non-acceptance of this aspect of the divisive policy of apartheid. A catalogue of legislation and other repressive measures could be drawn up for all 'homelands', whether it be KwaZulu with its more effective, because more subtle policy and strategy, the Ciskei with Sebe's army, the Matanzima brothers, or the Venda electoral farce;

-June 16th, 1976 has become the most important political commemoration date of the 1970's, and justifiably so. It reflected the bitterness of black, and especially African, youth to the humiliation and control of the apartheid policy, and their complete rejection of the 'homelands', CRC, UBC/Community Councils and other state sponsored options offered them;

-the civil war in South Africa has increased in intensity and frequency of attacks, involving primarily the African National Congress and its military wing, but also the PAC and ideological and political activity by the SACP.

-capitalism, as an economic, but also political and ideological, system appears to have failed in winning acceptance from Africans living in urban areas - if a recent much-publicised survey is correct.

To summarise: the attacks on the power structures of white-controlled capitalism in southern Africa, which have involved all levels of society and many groups, have intensified during the 1970's. This situation is forcing the apartheid state, and capital itself, to re-examine its strategies and the nature of its responses to ensure continued capitalist production in the southern African region.

What is important to note about the state's response, and capital's involvement in reproduction, is that the many aspects are interlinked, if only in the object of the exercises. This response covers such actions as:

-a series of military ventures on the sub-continent that can only escalate. Examples would be South Africa's involvement in Angola (both during the civil war and repeatedly since then, including the Cassinga massacre), reported (but denied) air support for the Rhodesian attacks on Angolan, Zambian and Mozambican bases of the Patriotic Front, and in Namibia. The latter can be expected to escalate, and already has done so with the recent declaration of what amounts to martial law in large areas. The possibility of military reinvolvement in Rhodesia to support Muzorewa is also not ruled out. The South African war is dealt with in an article in this issue - but once again it can only

escalate from the already vicious repression of the revolts of 1976 and 1977. Bannings are continuing, and trials reflect the political turmoil;

-on the economic level, the most important developments have undoubtedly been the inadequate, and failed, response of the state to the strikes in Durban during 1973 (liaison and works committees); the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions, and especially their recommendations relating to the exclusion of migrants from trade union rights are an example of this. So is the other side of the coin, namely the improvement of some conditions in urban areas, which will assist the African petty bourgeoisie in making up its collective mind as to where its interests lie. Those who can afford it will be able to become 99 year lease-hold landlords, or move into common business areas with whites. Already, Dr. Nthato Motlana of the Committee of Ten, along with Committee member L.M. Mathabathe, are on the board of directors of a 'newly formed construction company to improve housing in Soweto'. The state's obvious strategy is to increase the existing contradictions between urban and rural areas, within classes (migrant and urban workers), and between classes; Codes of Conduct also play an important part in this strategy (see article in WIP 6).

Politically a similar policy of incorporation of some, and division of other groups is occurring, both nationally and within the southern African region. Muzorewa is more acceptable to incorporation within a

southern African bloc of states under the leadership of apartheid South Africa than Smith could be.

-Similarly, Shipanga of the SWAPO -D, and elements within the NNF would give credibility to the sordid spectacle of what has been presented as leadership in Namibia. Internally the 'homeland' policy is going ahead with involvement in a southern African bloc no doubt the next carrot to be dangled.


For 'Coloureds' and 'Indians' there are the new constitutional proposals that are apparently already dividing members of the Natal Indian Congress, and will continue to haunt the partially incorporated Labour Party.

-the ideological onslaught by capitalism and the apartheid state refers to aspects of most of what has been mentioned above. The most blatant examples are the name changes that occur in departments which control and 'administer' Africans, or the working class; radio and television; education; publications aimed at the 'black market', etc.

We could carry on for a long time, but the main point being made is that the apartheid policy, being an option, is no doubt in conflict with certain of the demands made by capital, especially contemporary monopoly capital. However, this conflict is non-fundamental as shown by the barely concealed euphoria with which 'incorporational changes of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions have been met by the commercial English language press and the opposition white parties.

The state is attempting to give enough to allow foreign capital and the black petty bourgeoisie to participate freely in the fruits of exploitation, while at the same time maintaining the central features of capitalism in its apartheid variant.

This issue of Work In Progress aims to explore a number of issues outlined above, to elaborate some aspects, and to present information relating to others. One of the central aims of the issue is to show that all the major trends and issues currently occupying the southern African stage are not isolated, or accidental. It is in their mutual interaction, and in terms of a totality, that we aim to understand the events which are now shaping our material existence.



TOTAL WAR

THE RECENT ANC guerilla attack on the Moroka police station in Soweto serves to highlight the new phase conflict in South Africa appears to be entering - that of actual civil war. The facts of the incident are reasonably well-known, at least in as much as 3 guerillas attacked the police station, killing one black policeman, wounding others, and blowing up the archives section of the station.

According to the Afrikaans daily newspaper, *Die Vaderland*, pamphlets left at the scene of the attack stated that the exercise was a retaliatory one, in response to the recent execution of ANC activist Solomon Mahlangu. (of interest is the fact that none of the so-called 'opposition' newspapers catering for a largely white audience have presented this allegation to their readership to ponder on).

At the time of writing, it does not appear as if police have made any arrests in connection with the attack, and according to an eye-witness report the guerillas appeared to be well-trained and in complete control of the situation during the attack. This contrasts markedly with another recent incident involving ANC guerillas where people were killed, namely the Goch Street shooting of June 13th 1977. Here it seems as if the ANC group panicked when their presence was detected in Johannesburg. The subsequent shootings and death were more a result of that panic than a planned strategy.

Indeed, many witnesses in political trials, testifying on ANC strategy, have confirmed

that the general policy of the organisation is to attack strategic and symbolic installations rather than to kill or injure those who are not involved. with the exception of the killing of police informers and ex ANC members who have actively assisted police, most incidents which have led to court cases have born out this general policy.

The Moroka attack, coming as it did after the state had symbolically escalated the intensity of the struggle by hanging Mahlangu, seems to indicate that both the organisations involved in struggle, and the state, are moving towards strategies which will culminate in a full scale civil war in South Africa. (It must be remembered that every large scale guerilla war is, of its nature, at the same time a civil war. This is the other side of the much publicised, and often propagandistically exploited 'external' involvement and influence of Russia and Cuba in the unfolding conflict in Southern Africa.

Of course, the indications of a growing military conflict in South Africa have been present for some time now. While the urban and rural revolts of 1976 and 1977, and the response of the state to them, obviously increased the tempo of conflict, the signs had been there for some time prior to June 1976. Security trials between 1970 and 1976 - which are one indication of the nature of the struggle - largely involved groups and organisations attempting educational, propagandistic and 'agitational' work. There were, however, instances of men and women recruiting others for military training, some cases of people attempting to leave South Africa to join the military wing of the ANC,

and a few cases of guerillas returning to South Africa with specific tasks to undertake. The large-scale ANC network uncovered by the police, and resulting in the trial of the 'Pretoria 11' (state vs Sexwale and others), involved military activity on the part of some of the accused which pre-dated the events of June 1976.

But in general it would be correct to say that conflict in all its manifestations, including the operation and activities of urban and rural guerillas, increased markedly after the nation-wide revolts of 1976.

A brief (and incomplete) chronology of some of the more important incidents to have occurred since November 1976 serves to illustrate this point well.

30.11.76: 2 policemen were injured when 4 ANC guerillas they had apprehended in the eastern Transvaal escaped by throwing a hand grenade into the cab of a police vehicle.

1.01.77: A bomb exploded in a 'bomb factory' in Soweto, killing one person and injuring 5.

7.01.77: A bomb exploded on a railway line near Soweto.

18.01.77: A bomb killed a railway worker and injured another near Krugersdorp.

28.01.77: Police discover an explosives cache in Soweto.

17.02.77: Police discover a large arms cache in Graaff Reinet.

7.03.77: A Pretoria restaurant was destroyed in a bomb blast.

13.06.77: Two whites were killed in the Goch Street shooting incident.

14.06.77: Arms and pamphlets seized by police in Soweto.

15.06.77: The railway line between Umlazi and Durban blown up.

27.06.77: Police captured 3 guerillas with arms and explosives when a truck overturned in the Transvaal.

26.07.77: 2 policemen were wounded in a shoot-out with an ANC guerilla in a house in Dobsonville. The guerilla was killed.

9.09.77: Leonard Nkosi, ANC member turned security policeman, killed in what was believed to be an ANC death contract.

27.09.77: Arms and grenades found by police near Swaziland border. 2 guerillas arrested.

28.09.77: 2 guerillas captured near Mafekeng. Large arms cache uncovered in the vicinity.

2.11.77: In a police clash with an ANC group near Pongola a policeman was injured and a guerilla killed.

25.11.77: Bomb explodes at Carlton Centre, Johannesburg.

30.11.77: Bomb explodes on board a Pretoria-bound train.

12.12.77: Bomb explodes at the Germiston police station.

14.12.77: Bomb explodes in a parking lot next to the Benoni railway station.

22.12.77: Unexploded bomb found in the Roodepoort O.K. Bazaars.


2.02.78: Bomb explodes at the Daveyton police station, near Benoni.

Feb. 1978: Police and guerillas clash near Swaziland border. 2 police killed. Police minister Kruger says that there have been other undisclosed battles like this in the Eastern Transvaal.

Feb. 1978: Unexploded bomb capable of destroying a 22 story building found in Johannesburg office block.

9.03.78: Bomb explodes in Port Elizabeth, killing the man carrying it when it detonated prematurely.

10.03.78: Bomb explodes outside the Port Elizabeth Bantu Affairs Administration Board, killing a woman.



1.08.78: Running gun battle between at least 3 guerillas and police in Witkleigat area. Police discover arms cache nearby.

27.10.78: 3 guerillas clash with security forces in BophuthaTswana. 2 insurgents killed, 1 escapes. Police find a large arms cache nearby.

30.10.78: In a clash between 3 guerillas and police about 50km west of Louis Trichard, a police sergeant was seriously wounded while the guerillas escaped.

22.11.78: A farm in the Tshipise area attacked by an armed man, and the owner of the farm wounded.

5.12.78: Alleged PAC member Kenneth Mwanazi shot dead by police when he attempts to detonate a hand grenade during police raid on a house in Soweto.

7.12.78: Bomb blast at old Urban Bantu Council Chambers in Soweto, which currently houses the Soweto Community Council.

16.12.78: Railway line between Berlin and Fort Jackson in the Eastern Cape sabotaged by bomb blast.

27.12.78: Police find small arms cache in Bochabella township, near Bloemfontein.

13.01.79: Gun battle between police and guerillas in the Cederpoort area. One member

of the insurgent group killed, one captured, while a third escaped. After the battle, police find a large arms cache nearby.

22.01.79: Bomb explodes near New Canada Station on rail route to Johannesburg.

24.01.79: Unexploded bomb found near Pierie Station in Eastern Cape.


23.04.79: Unexploded bomb on railway line between Vereeniging and Johannesburg.

3.05.79: 3 ANC guerillas attack Moroka police station in Soweto, killing one policeman, wounding others, and destroying the police records.

The events outlined above are contextualised by the following further factors:

- a). Between November 1977 and March 1978 there were at least 20 incidents involving bomb blasts;
- b). During the first eleven months of 1977, 144 people were convicted under security laws, and sentenced to a total of 898 years imprisonment;
- c). In May 1978 police minister Kruger announced that during the previous year there had been 31 cases of sabotage; 91 trained guerilla fighters had been arrested, while 594 untrained guerillas (presumably recruits) had been apprehended by the police;
- d). In June 1978 security police estimated that there were at least 4,000 black South Africans in guerilla training camps, of whom about seventy five percent were ANC recruits.

These incidents and factors, mentioned above, reflect an increasing intensity of military and semi-military conflict in South Africa. This is further confirmed by the number of ANC 'pamphlet bombs' which have exploded in



a number of centres in the past 2 years, and the even greater number of arms caches found by police, secreted away in both rural and urban areas.

It is not suggested that the level of military conflict has as yet reached the proportions of the civil war in Zimbabwe, or in the Northern areas of Namibia. However, as suggested above, the indications point in this direction.

Yet another indication of a society involved in a low intensity civil war is the question of the 'depopulation' of border farms, especially in the Northern and Western Transvaal. (By 'depopulation', farmers and state departments imply that there are no whites, or an insufficient number of whites, permanently resident along border areas). These sorts of farms are often the 'first line of defence' for the state at the beginnings of a civil war based around guerilla strategies; the reaction of farmers and their organisations is an interesting

indication of the perceived or potential level of conflict in certain border areas.

As early as March 1978, Defence Minister P.W. Botha introduced an amendment to the Defence Act which empowered the Defence Force to enter private property within a 10km zone of borders and to demolish or erect buildings or structures without consent of the owner. During the debate on the amendment, Botha claimed that work to safeguard the borders had already been done along more than 600km.

Then, in May 1978 the director of the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) said that farmers were leaving their farms in the North-Eastern Transvaal, but that this was because of lack of economic viability, not for security reasons. However, he said that twenty five percent of the beef farmers on the South African side of the Limpopo River had left their farms, and that this left vast areas open, increasing security risks. The SAAU also said that it intended approaching the government for financial aid in erecting fences around farms in 'vulnerable areas.'

In August 1978 it was reported that farmers along the banks of the Limpopo were arming themselves against guerilla attacks, and had dogs trained to kill. Farmers in the area repeated a call for white occupancy of depopulated farms, and one claimed that 'In places there is up to 20km into South Africa where there is nothing'.

Shortly thereafter it was reported that a security fence had been erected along the South African bank of the Limpopo River, and a wide strip of sisal had been planted

along the border but would take several years before it became fully effective.

In November 1978 the government appointed a committee to investigate ways to stop the depopulation of border areas in the Transvaal. The Commission included representatives from the Departments of Defence and Agriculture, the police, and the SAAU. Schoeman, the Minister of Agriculture said that inter alia the fencing of farm houses, the right to sub-divide farms, and the creation of a radio network would be investigated as ways to keep farmers in border areas.

On 1.03.79 the first phase of a multi-million rand military telecommunications system, designed to keep farmers in border areas in contact with the Defence Force was opened. The system is known as Military Area Radio Network (Marnet), and will enable farmers to summon help in the event of a guerilla attack, as well as being the eyes and ears of the military in border areas.

In November 1978, P.W. Botha told a group of farmers at Ellisras that people living in border areas played a vital role in defending South Africa. A conference had already been held to discuss farmers' problems in this regard, and attention was being given to strengthening the commando system in these areas.

Shortly after this speech, Major General G.J. J. Boshoff, chief of army staff logistics, called for a law to enforce owners of border farms to ensure that they are occupied. He complained that city dwellers bought farms for hunting purposes, or to avoid taxation. They then neglected to staff the farmers, and this


led to an ideal situation for guerilla infiltration.

At the end of April 1979, Agriculture minister Schoeman told Parliament that the government was introducing a scheme of financial incentives to persuade farmers to settle on farms along South Africa's borders. He said that the scheme would cost between R65 million and R85 million over a 6 year period.

The fact that the state has responded so seriously to the problem of 'depopulation' of border farms is indicative of its overall concern about the escalating military conflict. It is in this context that the notion of 'total war' has been developed as a response by the ruling military fraction in the state structures. Initially brought into prominence by a defence white paper published in 1977, the concept of 'total war' has taken on an even greater importance with the rise to power of the group gathered around defence minister P.W. Botha, and Chief of the Defence Force, Magnus Malan.

As early as September 1977, Work In Progress drew attention to the defence white paper, and the approach of Magnus Malan to the 'total war' notion. Over the past year and a half, the notion has been used more and more frequently by military leaders in describing how they believe South African society should respond to the growing threat of a civil war. (Implicit in their reasoning is the pre-supposition that the war is not a civil one, but waged by hostile 'foreign' forces).

Reproduced below is an interview with General Malan, as well as certain extracts from the Defence White paper. This appeared previously in Work In Progress no. 1.



SUNDAY TIMES 13/3/77: GENERAL MAGNUS MALAN SPEAKS WITH BRUTAL FRANKNESS.

(extracts)

A: All my answers must be seen within the framework of the concept of total war. In this I refer to the Mao Tse-tung interpretation which has become the essential character of revolutionary strategy since the end of World War II.

Q: Has any attempt been made to devise such a total strategy for South Africa - to work out a game plan whereby all the different elements are coordinated to meet the continuing challenge to our security?

A: Yes, there are, of course, two characteristic snags with which we are constantly confronted: the conflicting requirements of a total strategy and a democratic system of government.

The fact that strategy is dynamic and requires constant and continued adaptation. A 'game plan' is, of course, the theoretical ideal. We are working towards something like it within the restrictions inherent in our democratic institutions.

Q: Would this (coordination with commerce and industry) not require continual forward planning, involving some sort of superbody and coordinated command structures at national, regional and local level?

A: I would balk at the term 'superbody' but otherwise I agree. I would refer you once again to the problem of reconciling democratic principles with total strategy within the framework of our existing Constitution.

Q: At what point would this (coordinated planning at all levels) require a total rethink of all our national resources, including, as you suggest, manpower?

A: The time for a 'rethink' of all our national resources is now...

This 'rethink' definitely does not mean changes in the Constitution or social system, but it aims at a reorientation of activities within the framework of the prevailing order... For whites, moderate blacks and uncooperative tribal leaders the issue at stake is survival...

We must satisfy the country's military needs while at the same time expanding our peacetime economy. It demands an unprecedented economic flexibility to shift back and forth along a sliding scale between a war and a peace economy according to prevailing priorities.

This demand, on which our survival may well depend, means that the economy must be able to handle at the same time: conflict and development; survival and growth; central guidance, free enterprise.

WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE - 1977 (extracts).
Preface (PW Botha, 29/3/77):

"In my preface to the White Paper tabled in 1975, I stressed the growing need for a 'total strategy' which requires every country of the Free World to muster all its resources for survival. The passage of time has confirmed the validity of this assertion and has also illustrated that a credible defence capability is an indispensable element of these resources."

Section 1: General Review

1. The process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of a state's authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from a purely military to an integrated national action... The resolution of a conflict in the times in

which we now live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields - military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc. Germany had already realised this before World War II, and Russia has maintained a multi-dimensional campaign against the West since this war. Consequently we are today involved in a war, whether we wish to accept it or not.

3. ...The striving for specific aims cannot, however, take place in isolation. It must be co-ordinated with all the means available to the state.

5. The RSA has already recognised this need by the establishment of the State Security Council having the following functions:

- Upon request by the Prime Minister, to advise the Government regarding the formulation of national policy and strategy in connection with the security of the Republic, the manner in which this policy or strategy must be carried out, and a policy to combat any particular threat against the security of the Republic; and
- to determine an intelligence priority.


6. As already indicated, one of the functions of the State Security Council is to formulate the total national strategy for the RSA. Total strategy is, however, a complex subject. It can perhaps be described as the comprehensive plan to utilise all means available to the state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable to all levels and to all functions of the state structure.

10. The aspects of national security require attention on an inter-departmental basis are the following:

- Political action.
- Military/para military action.
- Economic action.
- Psychological action.
- Scientific and technological action.
- Religious-cultural action.
- Manpower services.
- Intelligence services.
- Security services.
- National supplies, resources and production services.

- Transport and distribution services.
- Financial services.
- Community services.
- Communication services.

Together the above fields cover the whole spectrum of national security.



It is in the context of the growing civil war in South Africa, and the state's response of a 'total war' strategy, that many of the dynamics in contemporary South Africa can be viewed. The militarisation of certain aspects of society, the sorts of recommendations of the Wishahn and Riekert Commissions, the centralisation of control over teachers, social workers, welfare work and fundraising, can all be seen as part of the dominant strategy for survival which the ruling fraction of the South African state is following.

Clearly related to this strategy is the current debate on the possible creation of a 'moderate bloc of Southern African states', under the leadership of South Africa. This aspect commits South Africa to assisting in the setting up of neo-colonial regimes in Namibia and Zimbabwe, and if necessary assisting those regimes in all spheres (especially militarily).

It is in the light of the above that the civil war in South Africa threatens to

articulate with the wars in Namibia and Zimbabwe, and extend what are presently national conflicts into a lengthy and destructive Southern African war.

In the event of this happening, and should the major imperialist powers intervene in such a conflict, Southern Africa becomes the likely stage for the next phase of the international clash of progressive and reactionary forces.



(The above photographs appeared in Farmer's Weekly on March 21, 1979.)

The Wiehahn Commission

"Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce" - Karl Marx "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte".

SOON AFTER it came to power in 1948 the Nationalist Government appointed a commission of enquiry (Botha Commission) to investigate industrial relations in South Africa, which subsequently tabled its report in 1951. Last week a second commission of enquiry (Wiehahn Commission) into industrial relations presented its report. It is interesting to compare these two commissions, as the question obviously emerges as to what it is that makes the state investigate industrial relations in the late 1940s and then again thirty years later. The state did not implement the recommendations of the Botha Commission and there is still a great deal of confusion as to the fate of the Wiehahn Commissions recommendations - nevertheless both commissions are indicative of periods in which changes in the strategy of the state become necessary, and there are some interesting similarities in both the recommendations of the two commissions and the historical circumstances in which they were established. The Botha Commission's recommendations were aimed primarily at the control of the emerging black trade union movement, and it has been said that the

failure of the state to implement them and to rather adopt a strategy of repression was a "tragedy". Today the Wiehahn Commission is similarly recommending a strategy of control and the perception of those recommendations as 'liberalisation' by the English language press and the Progressive-Federal Party can indeed be said to be "farcical".

The Botha Commission emerged after a period of dramatic social and economic upheaval. The late 1930s and the 1940s saw a severe decline in the ability of the reserves to provide subsistence and, coupled with the boom in secondary industry, especially during the Second Imperialist War, caused a sharp increase in African urban migration. The African Trade Union movement was particularly active and CNETU (Congress of Non-European Trade Unions) had been providing an organisational base for the urban work force. CNETU had a close relationship with the ANC and adopted a policy, which has been termed by conservative academics¹, of "political" trade unionism. It refused to artificially divide its activities into 'political' and economic, realising that whilst opposition to pass laws, for example, could be narrowly defined as solely a political issue, nevertheless such issues directly reduced the wages and work opportunities of its members. Thus, in the 1940s, there existed a larger, better organised and more politically conscious African work force than the state had previously to deal with. This working class had proved its militancy by 1951; the 1946 mineworkers' strike of 76 000 workers being the most spectacular example.

It is clear from the evidence presented to the Commission that the captains of industry feared this development. The Federated Chambers of Industries expressed alarm "at the development of Native trade unions free from any form of control"². Of particular concern was the inability of existing state machinery to cope with these African trade unions which had developed free of any form of state control or supervision. The Transvaal Chamber of Commerce argued that leaders of unions were inexperienced and that "if the unions were left to drift haphazardly they would become fertile soil for indoctrination with pernicious philosophies"³. Thus, acknowledging that African trade unions were a fait accompli, it was felt that some form of statutory recognition should be accorded them. By recognition was meant:

Recognition means bringing them under control, making them comply with certain qualifications⁴ before they can exist as a trade union.

Thus Welcher⁵ has argued that

From the evidence it is clear that the fear of uncontrolled unions weighed heavily on employers at the time and seems to have been the main reason for arguing in favour of statutory recognition... Unions would have to submit to tutelage and guidance from government officials, their funds would be subject to regulation and all their meetings would be controlled... Clearly employers were by no means in favour of African unions per se but felt that as they were already in existence some form of de jure recognition should be given to ensure they would be guided in the right channels. Employers were convinced that no form of outlawing African trade unions would be successful... as this would drive them underground.

The Botha Commission findings basically accorded with the evidence presented to it by

industry; statutory recognition with mechanisms for close control of the direction adopted by the unions. A strict check was to be kept on their financial affairs and no 'political' activity was allowed.

Despite the very severe restrictions on union activity contained in the recommendations of the Botha Commission, and the potentially handicapping effect of them, were they enforced, the state rejected them. Instead of adopting a policy of control the state followed a policy of direct repression of African trade unions. The Suppression of Communism Act was passed, aimed largely at a number of effective union organisers, rather than at the SACP itself, as well as the Industrial Conciliation Act and the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act, which resulted in the prohibition of mixed trade unions. Further the Industrial Conciliation Act did not define 'Africans as employees, and thus whilst all "employees" were granted trade union rights, Africans were not granted access to the Industrial Councils - the mechanism established by the state to provide a government sponsored channel for negotiation between employers and employees. The reasons for the state's rejection of the Botha Commission's recommendations is the subject of much debate⁶. However, it is generally agreed that the state's dominant interests were those of mining capital, which had specifically argued against trade union rights for African workers, and agricultural capital, which was suffering from a severe shortage of cheap labour⁷. For these two sectors, vital to the maintenance of SA's balance of payments, and thus capital

accumulation in general, African trade unions, which would improve the bargaining position of the urban work force, were clearly undesirable. CNETU's affiliation to the ANC resistance campaigns after the Botha Commission had collected its evidence also played a part in persuading the government that African trade unions were a dangerous political threat. Thus the state adopted a policy of repression of African unions.

Thirty years later the state once again faced similar pressures. As in the 40s the SA economy had once again expanded in the late 1960s, foreign capital had flowed in and urban Africans were now playing a central role in the economy, as workers and potentially as consumers. However, the exact nature of this economic expansion is significant when attempting to understand likely government responses to the Wiehahn Commission. Typical of SA's subordinate place in the imperialist chain, and the nature of the articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production in SA, concentration and centralisation of capital occurred resulting in the "generalisation of the monopolistic form as dominant in productive sectors in turn dominant in the overall structure"⁸. This means that the major sectors of the economy in SA have been characterised by the insertion of technology and mechanisms of financial and commercial organisation, appropriate to advanced capitalist countries. Thus the nature of the development of the economy, especially in the last three decades, was such that it requires expanded markets (not necessarily wider markets and, therefore, not necessarily comprising the bulk of the

population but rather the high and middle income groups), constant increase, and sophistication of technology, thus facilitating greater productivity of labour, but also a reduction in the need for labour (hence the emergence of the phenomenon of structural unemployment in SA⁹), and finally, new techniques of organisation of labour relations¹⁰. Thus there were profound structural changes in the economy since the previous commission of enquiry.

On the political level, as in the 40s, the number of African worker strikes increased, with exceptionally large strikes occurring in Namibia in 1971 and Durban in 1973. The strikes were generally suppressed by force, often with tragic consequences as at Anglo-American's Western Deep Levels Gold Mine in Carletonville. The SALB (4,5) has argued that at the same time "trade union organisation of African workers had again emerged and the state (found) itself in a similar position in the late 40s"¹¹. A significant difference between these new worker organisations and those of the 40s and early 50s is their strong rejection of overtly political activity. Thus whilst strike activity trailed off with the recession of the mid-70s worker organisation continued to steadily grow, despite continued harassment and bannings of leaders in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act. With the urban revolts of 1976-77 it became obvious that the state was facing a major political and structural crisis. Unemployment had reached alarming proportions and the continued repression of African discontent was not only extremely difficult but had become increasingly costly.

International pressure for sanctions was mounting and there was the continuous threat of withdrawal of foreign investment. The skilled manpower shortage was becoming acute and the demand for larger wealthy markets by the monopoly sector, particularly, was increasing. Worker productivity was remaining unsatisfactorily low as well. Thus it became clear that a new strategy, aimed at alleviating urban African discontent, which would then presumably reduce international pressure, as well as meeting the shortage of skilled labour and labour productivity problems, and provide the potential for increasing the size of a middle and high income market, was necessary. Thus the state established the Wiehahn Commission to investigate industrial relations. However, this commission must not be seen in isolation; it is merely a component of a new strategy being adopted by the South African state to meet the economic and political (with international and local aspects) crisis confronting it. Other parts of the strategy include the Riekert Commission, the Homeland Consolidation Commission, the new constitutional proposals, further 'homeland independence', the southern African states power bloc, and UDI in Namibia.

The final outcome of the Wiehahn Commission's activities is not yet clear and debate still continues around them and a government White Paper submitted to parliament. No legislation has emerged as yet. However, the main thrust of the debate has been a change in government policy from direct suppression to more covert control of the union movement, and it seems likely that the new dispensation for industrial relations

will show an acceptance of this new strategy by the state. There are a number of 'liberal' elements to it - the integrating of facilities as well as the removal of job reservation, and it is these that have been welcomed in white opposition circles. Yet they are not the major component of the recommendations and they are completely insignificant when compared to the major thrust of the report. Obviously white opposition desperately wants the government to make concessions and therefore ensure SA's international economic connections, but it is still surprising how little the government need concede for opposition approval. The mixing of facilities and removal of job reservation will be of little consequence to the union movement, whereas the other recommendations will severely curtail, if not eliminate altogether, the opportunity for independent African unions to exist. Like the Botha Commission the aim of the recommendations is more control of independent non-registered (because largely African and, therefore, unable to register under Industrial Conciliation Act) trade union movement. The conservative Trade Union Congress of SA (TUCSA) argued in evidence to the Wiehahn Commission that non-registered unions be prohibited, and this seems a likely course of action. Mention has also been made of legislation aimed at specifically invalidating any agreements arrived at between employers and non-registered unions. Thus, unless a union has the approval of the government and is registered, it will have no locus standi to enforce any agreement reached with an employer. The Commission has also recommended that 'political' activities of unions

be prohibited, no doubt leaving it to the discretion of the Repressive State Apparatus as to what constitutes 'political' activity. A further disturbing feature of the debate has been the reference that only workers with permanent jobs and houses would be granted trade union rights. This means that only those Africans with section 10 (1) (a + b) rights and a house can be union members. Despite the problem of the critical housing shortages in all urban areas it is government policy not to grant any section 10 (1) (a + b) rights to children of 'homeland citizens' resident and working in urban areas. Thus the government is attempting to reduce the number of Africans with these rights and to locate as many Africans as possible within the ambit of 'independent homelands'. The government, it seems, is then prepared to buy off those Africans who are still left in 'white' South Africa.

The skilled manpower shortage has also been a major influence on the Wiehahn Commission. The changing of the name of the Dept of Labour to the Dept of Manpower Development is not merely symbolical, and the Commission recommends the creation of a National Manpower Commission with wide powers. Thus it is clearly the aim of the recommendations that urban Africans not only be given trade union rights (other rights are not unlikely in the future) to improve their bargaining position, but also training, thus meeting the need for more skilled workers, higher productivity, and, as high wages could follow for these few fortunate urban Africans, increase the size of the middle income market. It is again noteworthy that the mining industry

(except Anglo American) argued that trade union rights not be granted to mine employees, and it is probable that this section will be specifically excluded from any subsequent dispensation. There has also been debate about prohibiting the closed-shop, and should this occur it would have severe consequences for the conservative white unions, especially on the mines, when coupled with the removal of job reservation.

Thus the state, thirty years after its first commission of enquiry in industrial relations, is adapting its policy to meet the changed political and economic circumstances of capitalist production in South Africa, and it is in this context that the Wiehann Commission must be viewed.

Richard de Villiers.

NOTES

- 1.
2. Industrial legislation 1948-1951 Evidence Botha Commission. Memo WO 169 page 50.
3. *Ibid*, page 56.
4. *Ibid*, page 12656.
5. Larry Welcher, "The Relationship Between the State and African Trade Unions in SA 1948-53" in SALB, 4,5, page 16 (September 1978).
6. See D Lewis, "African Trade Unions and the South African State 1947-53" (unpublished).
7. See Mike Morris' work on this period.
8. Anibal Quijano Obregon, "The Marginal Pole of the Economy and the Marginalised Labour Force", Economy and Society 3,4 (1974).
9. See SALB, 4,4 (July 1978), especially article by Alec Erwin.
10. *Ibid* ●

A Study of Strikes in the 1970s

(This is the third part of an article. The first and second parts appeared in WIP 6 & 7)

MINING

We are becoming little men
We're now becoming rats
The white men are going to make us rats
We're going to be made rats
Where we're going to be chased.

SINGING this song Basuto mine recruits cross the Mohokane river. By the end of 1975 there were 86 000 such men working on South African mines. They trek from one of the poorest countries in the world and they constitute a number four times that of Lesotho's industrial labour force. The money these men earn is twice that of their countries GDP (1).

The South African mining industry has always depended on migrants for its labour force. In 1970 out of a labour force of 591 726 Africans, only 31,4% were recruited from inside the Republic, the rest coming from Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Swaziland, Botswana, etc. The number of South Africans decreased to 24,14% in 1971, 22,4% in 1972, 21,04% in 1973, and to 20,42% in 1974.

For mining capitalists there are certain advantages in a migrant labour force (2). The low wages paid to miners has always been legitimised in terms of the sensitive cost structure of the industry. The average gold content of the ore is low, the internationally fixed price of gold prevents the mining companies from transferring any increases in working costs to the consumers and "consequently within this narrowly circumscribed

cost structure, the usual area of cost minimization has been wages. The task then of the mine owners has been to create and contain a vast supply of cheap African labour" (3). Another argument has been that African wages could not be raised because of the colour bar on the mines which locks Africans into lower paid, mostly unskilled, jobs. Thus, according to the mine owners, Africans cannot be trained for higher efficiency which would allow for gains in productivity to compensate for higher wage costs.

The publication of Francis Wilson's 'Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 1911-1969' (4) was a breakthrough in many ways. Dr Wilson pointed out that in real terms black cash wages in 1969 were no higher than in 1911, while real cash earnings of whites had increased by 70%. In 1889 the black:white cash earnings ratio was 1:7,5, in 1969 it was 1:20. He argued that underlying and cementing the monopoly power of the Chamber of Mines labour recruiting organization was the agreement not to pay wages above a specified wage level. The average monthly wage of an African miner in 1970 was R18,00 per month, in 1971 it rose to R19,00 per month, in 1972 to R21,00 and in 1973 to R24 (5). By 1975, however, with Anglo American doing much of the groundwork, drastic wage increases had been made. Between June 1972 and June 1975 black underground workers' wages had increased from R30,00 to R90,00 per month - an increase of 137,4%. However, in the same period the gold price had increased from R46,81 to R112,24, an increase of 139,8%. The 22 500 black surface workers,

however, are paid according to a different scale which begins at R1,40 per shift, as compared with R2,20 for underground work. Thus the average wages for underground workers is R84,00 per month, and for the surface workers R48,00 (6). The increase of black earnings for 1974 has been given as 83,4% while working profits increased by 107%, and shareholders earnings by 114% from R56m to R120m (7).

Labour unrest on the mines is characterised more than any other industry by its intensity of violence; the destruction of property; the so-called inter-tribal 'faction' fighting; and the demands for repatriation. It is only the naive researcher or the ideologically blind who will dismiss these phenomena as merely the manifestations of an illiterate labour force which is unable to cope with or understand the workings of a sophisticated industrial bargaining process, and which is immersed in age old tribal conflict and tension. The fact, however, that no sophisticated industrial bargaining procedure exists, (the Native Labour Relations Regulations Act, for what it is worth, does not cover the mining industry) and that trade unions are not recognized, goes only part of the way in explaining the problem. More importantly, the real reasons for this essentially violent form of labour action must be explained in terms of an essentially violent system of labour control.

Historically the mines have always been in a disadvantaged position as regards attracting labour. The low wages paid in this highly labour intensive industry, the unfavourable working conditions and the

dangers involved in underground mining have always prompted workseekers to look for alternative employment when it is available. In the early period the state's favouring of manufacturing and agriculture as witnessed in measures designed to establish secondary industry did not make this imperially linked monopolistic industry's road to expansion and high profitability an easy one. The mining capitalists in their turn had many answers to these problems and their labour force was at times tempted by the availability of liquor, the turning of a blind eye to such illegalities as dagga and prostitution, and in certain cases the control of these scarce resources by mining interests, and the operating of trading stores linked to the mines and offering vast credit thus ensuring that the labour force was always in debt and thus always in need of cash earnings which the mines could offer in return for labour-power. None of these factors, however, combined so well and favourably for the mining capitalists as they did in the compound system developed in Kimberley.

The compound has become the sine qua non of mining in South Africa. It provides free accommodation and food for workers but its purpose is one of control rather than one of ameliorating the workers' position. Structurally, the migrant worker is in a bad position anyway - he is separated from his family and familiar environment and has to compete with an established township population for what he lacks, especially women. The compounds further entrench these difficulties by physically separating the worker for most of his contracted period from the wider

social environment and confining him to an imposed one.

Labour control on the compound is both direct and indirect. Direct control takes the form of a hierarchy of officials who impose the rules and regulations set by top management and who are meant to deal with conflict when it arises. Such conflict, when it arises and is of a minor nature, falls within the jurisdiction of the management appointed induna whose function it is to deal with minor affairs and to maintain discipline in the hostel. The induna is seen by management as a tribal authority and as such he represents his specific ethnic group only, when dealing with management. It is a fair generalization to say that workers view the induna as an imposed puppet who is part of management. He is afforded little respect and is not trusted (8). Workers' hatred of the induna system is evidenced in the numerous occasions where militant and violent action is aimed firstly at the indunas as the representatives of an imposed and despised system.

The messisa (PA), the clerks, and the security guards are also viewed with the same degree of mistrust and their roles as management's functionaries is clearly comprehended.

The only truly representative leadership which manifests itself on the compound is the isibonda. The isibonda is elected by the roommates and is there to ensure order and maintain relations within the room. He is afforded a large degree of respect by the roommates and all decisions taken are collectively discussed beforehand. The effectiveness of the isibonda, however, is

clearly limited as his jurisdiction extends only over one room and there is little or no communication between him and the management.

Distinct from the specific structures which exist policing the compounds and ensuring its smooth operation, there exists other indirect forms of control which must be seen as a necessary part of the compound system. These center around scarce resources, the humiliation of the worker, the lack of privacy and the recreational facilities which are meant to fulfil basic human needs. Around every one of these factors an entire nexus of violence develops which envelops everyday compound life.

Dissatisfaction about the quality of food is common and the gripe that indunas, security guards, etc, receive better food is often reported. There is, however, no compulsion to eat this food as the mine cafe offers an alternative. The functions these cafes perform in either keeping the miners in debt or tempting them with consumerism is clearly understood by workers. "The whites take back the money they pay us." This refers to the money paid for drinks in the bars and the food bought from the mine cafe, ('forced because of the bad food provided by the kitchen').(9). In fact the temptations of consumerism confront the workers from their first days at work when they are given reference book covers in which are inserted adverts for radios and the places which offer 'easy' terms.


The use of alcohol as a measure of labour control in the early period has been briefly mentioned above. Nowadays, although alcohol may not be as important in playing this role

its availability in the compounds is a way of ensuring the 'contentment' of the workers. Its effects, however, are the same: that alcohol is an escape mechanism which releases the tensions which build up during the working day and that drunkenness is a form of resistance and a way of coping with the unfavourable living conditions has often been argued. Dagga, a scarce resource, fulfills a similar function and there is no evidence of any concern on the part of management to curb its consumption.

The most important scarce resource is women. Only 1,5% of the labour force live in married quarters and the visiting facilities for families and wives leave much to be desired, that is, providing one first gets through the administrative red tape. The alternatives then are prostitution and homosexuality. The first has been the cause of many a violent outbreak. The expensiveness of prostitution, their scarcity and the fact that in many cases one ethnic group can gain a virtual monopoly because of the numerical ethnic dominance of the nearest township has contributed to the flaring of tempers which at times can lead to the mass exodus of a portion of the labour force. The second, homosexuality, is common practice, and that tense and uneasy relationships form between the inmates of these single-sex hostels is hardly surprising.

The lack of privacy in the rooms, the open lavatories and showers all contribute in humiliating the worker whose privacy has been denied to him from the time of his first medical check-up, when he stands in a queue naked just to have his heart tested.

It is within this background of an essentially violent system of labour control that conflict on the mines is analysed. And it is the effects of such control that explain largely the violence which characterizes conflict on the mines.



Diary of Events: (10)

DATE	PLACE	DEAD	INJURED	AFRICANS EMPLOYED	AFRICANS INVOLVED	%
1972:						
Oct 27	Sover Mine, Windsor-ton, Cape	-	-			
1973:						
Sept 11	Western Deep Levels Carltonville	12	27	15 494		
Sept ?	West Rand Consol., Randfontein		30	10 050		
Oct 20-3	Burnacol Colliery, Cannhauser	<u>10</u> <u>22</u>	<u>93</u> <u>150</u>			
1974:						
Feb 3	East Rand Prop Mines, Boksburg	-	-	16 341		
Feb 9	Welkom Gold Mine	9	100	9 630		
Feb 16-23	Western Holdings, Free State Geduld, near Welkom	15	87	10 710		
April 5-8	Welkom Gold Mine	1	10	9 630		
April 16	Western Deep Levels Carltonville	3	30	15 494		
May 28	Lorraine Gold Mine, near Odendaalsrus	2	6	7 214		
June 9-10	Harmony Gold Mine, Virginia	1	19	20 251		
June 11-2	Merriespruit Gold Mine, Virginia	1	18			
June 25	Ressano Garcia, Mozambique	7	6			
Aug 8	Rustenburg Platinum	3	16			
Aug 31	Western Holdings	7	60	9 976		
Sept 29	Western Platinum	2	4	3 437	400	11
Oct 13-23	East Rand Prop. Mines, Boksburg	1	23	8 431	2 500	29
Oct 21-31	Western Deep Levels, Carltonville	1		12 310		
Oct 22-6	Hartbeesfontein, Klerksdorp	2	7	15 569	2 750	18
Nov 12-20	West Rand Consol., Randfontein	-	-	8 090	2 000	25
Nov 17	Western Deep Levels	1	15	12 310	100	

DATE	PLACE	DEAD	INJURED	AFRICANS EMPLOYED	AFRICANS INVOLVED	%
Nov 18	Durban Deep Mine, Roodepoort	-	-	7 910		
Nov 19	East Rand Prop. Mines	-	-	8 431	3 000	36
Dec 14	East Driefontein, Carletonville	2		5 797		
Dec 16-28	Impala Platinum Mine, Bafokeng	4	78	26 412	4 000	15
Dec 22-3	Crown Mines, Jhb	-	-	3 145		
Dec 22	Village Main, Jhb			3		
Dec 25	Spitzkop Colliery, Ermelo	1	1			
Dec 29 - Jan 3	Prieska Copper Mine, N Cape	<u>3</u>	<u>35</u>	3 200	700	22
		<u>76</u>	<u>552</u>			
1975:						
Jan 1-2	Free State Smaal- plaas, Gold Mine, Venterburg	-	-	3 534	3 500	99
Jan 3	Western Deep Levels	-	-	12 310	1 700	14
Jan 5-9	Vaal Reefs Gold Mine, Klerksdorp	10	34	29 421	11 800	40
Jan 7	Bracken Gold Mine, Kinross	-	-	2 932		
Jan 7-8	Blesbok Colliery, near Middelburg	-	-	1 447	500	35
Jan 7	New Largo Colliery, Witbank	-	-	1 300	220	16
Jan 14	Pres. Brand Gold Mine, Welkom	-	5	11 612	2 400	21
Mar 1-2	Northfield Colliery, near Dundee	31	13	1 500	1 200	80
Mar 2	Hlobane Colliery, Glencoe	1	4			
Mar 2-3	Western Deep Levels	2	7	12 310	5 000	41
Apr 15	Blyvooruitzicht Gold Mine, C'ville	1	7	7 900	300	4
Apr 20	Coretsi Mine, Kuruman	-	-			
May 18	SA Coal Estates, Witbank	1	20	1 483		
Jul 26	Stilfontein Gold	2	7	11 075		
Aug 13	Randfontein Estates	-	-	3 062	200	7

DATE	PLACE	DEAD	INJURED	AFRICANS EMPLOYED	AFRICANS INVOLVED	%
Aug 22-4	Blyvooruitzicht	4	19	8 498		
Sept 6-7	East Rand Prop.	-	15	12 560		
Sept 16	East Rand Prop.	1	12	12 560		
Oct 19	Buffelsfontein Gold Mine, near Klerksdorp	2	14	12 012	780+	7
Nov 4	East Rand Prop.	3	2	12 560		
Nov 7	Virginia Gold Mine	1	18		500	
Nov 16	Lorainne Gold Mine	-	-	7 097		
Nov 16	East Rand Prop.	-	-	12 560	3 500	28
Nov 22-6	Witwatersrand Nigel Gold Mine, Heidelberg	9	48+	1 800	400	22
Nov 28	Free State Saapiplaas	-	2	3 799		
Nov 29	Western Areas Gold	1	<u>24</u>	7 132		
		<u>69</u>	<u>251</u>			
1976:						
Feb 2-4	Western Platinum	-	-	3 714	230	6
Feb 16-7	Durban Deep Mine	-	45	8 010		
Feb 22-3	Lorainne Gold Mine	5	20	7 097	1 000	14
Apr 18-22	Buffelsfontein	6	25	12 012	2 500	20
Jun 2-3	Western Holdings	-		9 278	2 600	28
Jun 8	Pras. Brand Gold	-		11 560		
Jul 11	St Helena Mine, near Welkom		4	4 000		
Jul 12	St Helena	8	38	4 000		
Jul 19	Kinross Gold Mine	<u>6</u>	<u>14</u>	4 000	1 000	25
		<u>25</u>	<u>146</u>			
TOTAL for period						
(Oct, 1972 - Jul, 1976)						
		<u>192</u>	<u>848</u>			



The outbreak of conflict on the mines in the seventies can broadly speaking be defined between two parameters. On the one hand worker/management disputes arising out of the work situation, and on the other, conflict that arises out of the social conditions of compound life. This conflict has been violent, claiming the lives of 192 workers and injuring another 1 278 in the period between October 1972 to September 1976 (see breakdown of conflict above).

There is no doubt that the miner's life is dangerous - 2 993 workers died in the period of four years and another 110 169 were injured due to "danger inherent in the work or misadventure" or "defective plant or machinery" (11). It does not take a homeland leader to announce that "African life is cheap in South Africa" for the worker to understand his predicament. A workers' song goes something like this:

In crossing the river I become a new man,
Different from the one I was at home
At home I was secure
But now that I am on this side
I am in a place of danger,
Where I may lose my life at any time.
So prepare me for death! (12)

The Moodie report describes feelings of elation whenever workers finish their daily shift and make their way to the compound hostels; "Death is so real. You keep on praying and thanking God each time you come out alive" (13).

Workers have expressed themselves in a variety of ways in these violent years: they have confronted each other, they have confronted management, they were confronted by police bullets, and they have confronted their home governments. Violence as an outlet of

frustration and as bargaining power has become the sine qua non of mining.

The first rupture in terms of industrial action in our period was when 140 miners of the Sover mine at Windsordon in the Cape went on strike on 27 October, 1972, demanding higher wages. The result was that 20 Mozambican workers were arrested and charged with staging an illegal strike. Yet the pattern of extreme violence which was to characterise much of the unrest later, can be located in what took place at Western Deep Levels, Carltonville, in September, 1973. The salient factor leading to the confrontation between workers and management was discontent arising from new wage scales. The strong arm of the law here begins to play its prominent role. Twelve miners died, eleven shot by the police who opened fire after tear gas and baton charges failed to disperse the crowd. 27 miners and 13 policemen were injured.

Lorraine Gold Mine near Odendaalsrus witnessed a similar trend of discontent. Here two workers died, one shot by the police, and six were injured on the 28 May, 1974. The conflict broke out after pay negotiations broke down. The result was a pay increase of 33% (14). Violent action by the workers directed itself at the beerhall which was gutted by fire. A symbolic act perhaps, against an institutionalized recreational form which tempts their wages from them.

In the only South African and Merris-spruit Gold Mine, jointly administered by Rand Gold Mines, and 6km apart, were the focus of intense conflict claiming the lives of 5 workers and injuring 47. The conflict arose

out of a wage dispute centering around demands by senior men. The violence was explicitly directed against indunas who fled for their lives, and other symbols of authority such as the manager's offices. Finally 'Satan's House' (the acclimatization chamber) was also attacked. One report states that "workers at both mines were later to accept pay increases well in advance of 10%, but attempts to negotiate during the tense day of the 10th failed. Manager Honnet was shouted down while the workers are reported to have made claims for 500% increases. Reports were also received that Harmony workers were going into Virginia to spread the mood of their strike to municipal workers there" (15). The Chamber of Mines, in order to quell the unrest, announced wage increases ranging from 33% to 50%.

At the Hartbeesfontein Mine in Klerksdorp miners refused to go underground due to discontent over wage increases. The disturbances and unrest that followed claimed the lives of two miners and a further 7 were injured. Approximately 2 750 workers were on strike. Seven were arrested, 2 of whom were subsequently charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act. A further eight were charged with public violence

Wage grievances were again prominent in causing conflict and outbreaks of violence during 1975. For example, in November 500 workers at Virginia Gold Mine started setting fire to buildings after a wage dispute. One worker was shot dead by police and a further 18 were injured after police used tear gas and dogs to restore order. At ERPM in Boksburg 3 500 Mozambican miners refused to

start work because of a proposed new pay procedure. Negotiations with management led to the scrapping of the proposed new system.

This wage grievance conflict continued into 1976. At Western Platinum Mines, Rustenburg, 230 Basuto and Mozambican miners staged a two day strike. Although the police were called in no clash occurred. After the new wage scheme which caused the strike was explained to workers they returned to work. In June strikes at the Western Holdings and President Brand Gold Mine occurred where an unspecified number of workers were injured. At Western Holdings 2 600 workers refused to go underground and at President Brand approximately half the workforce took the same action and prevented a number of others. In both cases security officials in combination with the police quelled the unrest.

Economicistic strikes, however, have not only been caused by wage disputes and wage differential schemes. Seven strikes in January, 1975, had as their immediate cause the deferred pay scheme introduced by the Lesotho government. The crux of this scheme was to encourage workers to spend their earnings in their home country (16). The mines affected by the workers protests were: Free State Saaiplaas Gold Mine, Ventersburg; Western Deep Levels, Carltonville; Vaal Reefs Gold Mine, Klerksdorp; Bracken Gold Mine, Kinross; Blesbok Colliery near Middelburg; New Largo Colliery, Witbank; and President Brand Gold Mine in Welkom. The toll of the subsequent unrest which saw violence at Vaal Reefs (10 dead, 34 injured) and President Brand (5 injured), was 10 miners dead and 39 injured. A total of over

20 000 Basuto workers participated in these strikes, nearly 9 000 of whom were repatriated (some at their own request) (17).

Before proceeding into an analysis of strikes and more generally conflict on the mines, we would like to give a brief overview similar to the one above of the 'non-economic' type of strikes, ie those forms of conflict arising more generally out of the social conditions of compound life and the work situation. Broadly speaking these can be said to manifest themselves in two ways: those forms of conflict which express themselves in "tribal" clashes; and those in which "ethnic" differences play no part. However, it must be noted here that although ethnicity is the phenomenal form of much conflict, it cannot easily be ascribed as the cause.

In February, 1974, in Welkom Gold Mine and Western Holdings Free State Geduld one witnesses 24 deaths and 187 injuries arising out of conflict over a scarce resource, women. The Basotho workers who were numerically dominant on these mines had easier access to the nearby, predominantly Sotho speaking Thabong township. This created grievances and jealousy on the part of the minority Xhosa workers who took to attacking workers arriving back from the townships. As Kirkwood notes, the Sothos complained about the attack but "...embittered by the failure of the indunas and the mine management to intervene effectively, despite the Sothos having uttered proof of Xhosa attacks and having threatened that if they continued, they would leave the mine, the Sothos decided to take matters in their own hands. Mass reprisals followed" (18). This resulted

in the exodus of 8 150 Basuto workers and approximately 500 Xhosa workers who were repatriated (19).

Two months later, in April, there were two more confrontations claiming the lives of 11 workers and leaving 73 injured. These took place at Welkom Gold mine and Western Deep Levels, Carltonville. The clashes were between Xhosa and Sotho miners.

Violent clashes between different groups of workers also occurred in August at Rustenburg Platinum Mine and Western Holdings near Welkom, leaving 10 dead and 76 injured.

In October at ERPM, Boksburg, conflict over a scarce resource, bear, erupts into an acute clash between Malawian and Sotho workers. The only recorded death, however, results from the stabbing of a Tswana - 150 policemen are utilized to subdue the unrest which left 23 people injured. The Malawians withdrew their labour and demanded repatriation - their reasons being that they feared for their security. Could this be the fear of reprisals from the 100 strong Sotho force? (Malawians numbered 1 600). Although the Shangaans were not involved in this clash, on the day of the 20th they rioted and went on strike. They were in very militant mood and refused to appoint representatives. Management used tear gas and dogs when they presented themselves as a single body to voice their demands. The nature of these demands is not known. Management's aggressive reaction was used as the reason for their subsequent demands for repatriation.

The same month witnessed another strike by Malawians, this time at Western Deep Levels, which was sparked off by the stabbing and

death of a Malawian worker. The ensuing strike resulted in approximately 1 200 workers demanding repatriation. After negotiations 1 050 returned to work while 400 were repatriated.

The prominence of the Malawian workers continued into November. At West Rand Consolidated, Randfontein, on the 12th 20 Malawians refused to go underground. This mood escalated and at some stage 2000 workers were on strike and the police were on standby. "The workers said that they were tired of working and wanted to return to Malawi. They handed in their pass books and sat around in the sun" (20). By the 20th, however, all but 230 had returned to work.

On November the 19th 3 000 workers at ERPM stopped work and demanded repatriation. At Western Deep Levels, Carltonville, 100 workers rioted after a Mozambican miner was stabbed. The incident claimed the life of one worker and resulted in 15 injuries. 100 Mozambican miners were repatriated. Mozambican miners again rioted at Durban Deep Mine, Roodepoort, after another stabbing.

The year ended with a further 10 deaths and 117 injuries in December. The most violent clashes occurred at Impala Platinum Mine, Bafokeng, resulting in 4 deaths and 78 injuries. The unrest was caused by the attempted arrest of a Malawian worker by a Pondo induna. 2 000 Malawians refused to work and demanded repatriation. The strike lasted for two weeks involving some 4 000 workers at its peak (21). Another incident at Crown Mines in Johannesburg resulted in the repatriation of 650 Malawian miners.

On the 29th of December at Prieska Copper

Mine, Northern Cape, a fight between Xhosa and Tswana miners erupted. About 700 Tswana miners went on strike, 400 of whom finally broke their contracts and made their way home.

Between March 1975 and July 1976 strikes and labour action arising either out of conflict over scarce resources (liquor, women, etc), dissatisfaction with the work situation or with compound living conditions which were manifested in inter-tribal clashes, or simply violence between workers of one sort or another, resulted in 84 deaths and 356 injuries, in 22 disputes involving 18 mines (22). A few, however, are worth mentioning.

On March 1st, severe fighting between Basuto and Xhosa workers at the Northfield Colliery near Dundee which claimed the lives of 31 miners and left 13 injured, occurred. Police intervention eventually succeeded in subduing the clash. 400 Basuto miners requested repatriation and by the 5th March only 500 of the normal complement of 1 555 were working (23).

A violent clash between Xhosa and Basuto miners at Stilfontein Gold Mine on July 26 resulted in the arrest of 220 workers. 22 were subsequently charged. The death toll of this clash was 2, and there were 4 injuries.

A delay in hoisting of workers to the surface resulted in a violent protest by 200 miners who damaged mine property at Randfontein Estates on August 13. One report states that it is not unheard of for miners to spend the night underground because of hoisting inefficiencies (24).

On November 16th, refusals by 170 Mozambican workers to participate in the

acclimatization process at Lorraine Gold Mine resulted in their subsequent repatriation.

In introducing this section on mine conflict, we defined strikes as falling between two parameters. On the one hand worker/management disputes arising out of the work situation, and on the other conflict that arises out of the social conditions of compound life.

For easier categorization, however, we will deal here firstly with wage disputes and then with labour action arising out of dissatisfaction with working conditions, living conditions, conflict over scarce resources and clashes between workers, manifesting themselves in either tribal conflict or general violence and unrest. This separation, we feel, is also of some analytical value, the reason being that the analysis of wage disputes can be located within the broader framework of strikes in general in South Africa. In other words, the general low level of wages paid to African workers which has been the cause of many strikes in every sector, is only more intense in this lowest paying sector of the economy. It is the violence, however, which has become characteristic to strikes in this sector, which needs special attention. As was argued above, this violence is not to be located in either an inherent tendency of migrant labourers to be hostile to other ethnic groups, nor in lack of representation, industrial bargaining facilities and lack of communication. Although the latter may aggravate the situation violence must be explained in terms of the repressive and violent form of labour exploitative control and the dangers and dis-

comforts experienced by miners.

We argue that although there is a separation between violence in the productive process emanating from the intense dangers and discomfort of mining, the stratification arising out of the division of labour, and, that violence which is located in the recreational compound facilities which perform a reproductive function, this separation is of no explanatory value. It is both of these in unison that produce the explosive features of this sector of the economy. For example, it is easy to speak of conflict over a scarce resource and explain it away in terms of violence which encompasses the recreational time of the worker, but it is not conclusive. For the totality of the activities which constitute mining as a viable, profitable indulgence, includes both of these forms of violence. When workers react violently their reaction is to this configuration of violence governing their everyday life, both in working and leisure time. There is a counter-violence.

Wage disputes in our period have been caused by one of three reasons: a general demand for higher wages; the introduction of the deferred pay-scheme by the Lesotho government; and certain new differential pay schemes introduced by the mining companies. Figures available up to mid-1976 indicate that only 19 strikes were connected directly with money matters. Only three of these strikes were directly connected to demands for wage increases. It is perhaps difficult to explain why so few of these strikes occur in such a low-paid sector. The absence of any negotiating or bargaining bodies goes part of the

way in explaining this.

However, although wage-increase strikes do not play a prominent role, the low wages paid by mining perhaps explains why by 1974 only 20,42% of mining's labour requirements were recruited from inside South Africa. (At present, end-1978 figures, 24% of labour is local - eds). Closely connected to wage disputes were the eight strikes which had to do with new payment schemes. The reason why these should cause discontent must be explained in terms of the destruction of established norms of remuneration on the one hand, and on the other the failure of management to partake in any prior consultation or negotiation with workers. As has been argued: "The mineworkers at Western Deep Levels at Carltonville demonstrated that although job evaluation might be a scientific technique, the workers have subjective assessments which must be taken into account..." (25).

Conflicts over the Lesotho government's deferred pay-scheme has broader implications. Although the conflict emanated from a decision taken by the Lesotho government, the ambiguity is that the Lesotho workers' source of income is derived from labour in foreign country, and that decrees passed by the Jonathan regime, which regime most workers oppose (26), causes ruptures in the labour process of a foreign country. Yet this is the price South African mining interest have to pay for foreign labour which brings its own problems with it. Labour action with political manifestation fans out from this economic base to encompass a wider variety of issues. The political content of much of the conflict of Xhosa and Sotho is an

illustration here. Reciprocal exchanges between the two groups centres around political abuse, for example, the Sotho workers mocking the Xhosa's so-called "Independence" (27).

The rapid decline of the Mozambican workforce (eg 79 000 to 48 000 in less than one year) and the shaky position as regards future recruiting from that area requires some mention. As John Kane-Berman states: "The Chamber of Mines attributed the drop in intake to administrative problems connected with the issuing of passports in Mozambique, and was loth to say very much about what it regarded as a 'delicate' matter. Other sources, however, suggested that the decline in the number of men coming from Mozambique was the result of a deliberate action by the Frelimo government" (28). The implications of this set-up are not merely of an economic kind and that actions by Mozambican workers on South African soil could have wider political implications involving the two states, should be noted. It should also be noted that Mozambican workers were fairly prominent in demands for repatriation after strikes and violence on the mines.

The decision by the Malawian government to unilaterally stop all further recruitment from that country after an air crash in April 1974 in which 72 Malawian migrants returning home were killed (29), might in some way explain why more and more Malawians later that same year demanded repatriation. The intensification of demand for repatriation (not only by Malawian workers) must not only be explained in terms of a decision taken by a foreign government, but also in the

escalation of grievances in the work place. Most such demands occur after either a strike or a clash and the violence that this implies. The repressive and violent system of labour control outlined above leads not only to the withdrawal of labour (strikes) which implies only a temporary stoppage of work and some future settlement, but the actual exodus of labour.

Some of the most vicious clashes between ethnic groups and between workers escalating into strikes can be immediately attributed to conflict over scarce resources. There seems to be an interesting dialectic at play here between ethnicity and money. Take for example the conflict at Welkom - Western Holdings and Free State Geduld Mines mentioned above. One can clearly isolate women, as a scarce resource playing a prominent part in this situation. The prostitute becomes a commodity, and an impressionistic view leads one to believe that the Sotho's monopolization of this commodity was gained due to the predominance of Sothos in the nearby Thabong township and on the mine. The Xhosa workers took to attacking Sotho miners returning from the township. Thus it would seem that the conflict was merely an ethnic one. But the prostitute as a commodity is an expensive commodity (30), meaning that some form of buying power is needed before this commodity can be attained. If the 'Financial Mail' report that "Basuto mine workers are traditionally regarded as more industrious and tend to land better paid jobs on the mines" (31), is correct, then the aspect of buying power seems to shift the focus slightly from ethnicity as an explanatory factor. The same can be said about any

commodity and, more importantly, about any scarce resource. Now the issue of ethnic conflict must be looked at in a different light.

No one will deny that much of the conflict manifests itself on ethnic lines, but now a more satisfactory analysis into the why is required. The two issues involved in explaining this are job allocation and ethnic separation. Various studies of the mining industries and their compounds (32) indicate that management tends to form certain stereotypes and that jobs are allocated accordingly. The above 'Financial Mail' quote is an example of this. Also, ethnic separation on the compounds is imposed by management. Thus one finds a Xhosa hostel, a Sotho hostel, and a Malawi hostel, or, a Xhosa room, a Sotho room and a Malawi room, each under the jurisdiction of their specific ethnic induna. This, however, must be seen as a system of control rather than a natural extension of ethnic differences. The effects of this system are two-fold: on the one hand, it means that any conflict which arises is easily turned into an ethnic clash as each worker has as his reference point his ethnic group which is easily accessible as a distinct body. On the other hand, the employment of different ethnic groups and their separation on the compounds means that an added obstacle is placed in the way of worker solidarity. As the General Manager of Mine Labour Organisations has pointed out: "...if labour forces on individual mines were homogeneous mines would run the risk of strikes being total instead of partial" (33).

In trying to explain the intensity of

violence which is evidenced on the mines, one must not forget that although it would be difficult to establish a direct correlation between mining accidents and strikes, it must be noted that the tense and uneasy atmosphere which permeates the miners dangerous work is probably intensified if there has been an escalation of accidents (34).

It is in those factors (above) that the reasons for the highly violent strikes and forms of labour action and unrest must be sought.

The attitudes of management and of mining capitalists have not remained unchanged in our period. Management's problems, however, have not only arisen out of the conflict situations on the mines; they have had as their corollary political factors such as actions by the Malawian and Lesotho governments and public outcries concerning low wages. It was fortunate that a huge rise in the gold price allowed them to easily increase wages without affecting profitability (35). This, however, is only the one side of the coin, and the raising of wages must not be attributed to any philanthropic tendencies. The other side of the coin is that in 1974 the mining industry was faced with an acute labour shortage. Factors ranging from the Malawian government's cessation of all further recruitment and the mass exodus of workers during this period, saw the mines experiencing a huge manpower drainage which left gold mines with only 73% of their underground requirements by January 1975 (36).

The responses to this were threefold: Firstly, the increasing of wages in an attempt to compete more favourably for

labour with other sectors; secondly, an extensive internal recruiting campaign to attract workers from white urban areas, white owned farms and from the homelands; and, thirdly, an attempt to increase mechanization and thus cut down on labour requirements.

The second strategy proved highly successful due largely to the general rising level of unemployment. The function and ability of labour bureaux to allocate labour where it is needed must not be discounted as a contributing factor. The details of the mining industry's success here is inessential - suffice to say that by 1976 the underground requirements were up to 97,82% while surface strength was 107,92% of requirements. Although capital's labour requirements in this instance were fulfilled, those of labour were not. Conflict continues.

Commentary:

OUR primary concern has this far been to locate working class action at the level of the labour process. In 1976, however, we witness for the first time since the ANC campaign of the fifties and early sixties the participation of the working class in a challenge to Apartheid, centering around an issue that does not arise out of industrial relations. A discussion of the implications of this is important in any analysis which is concerned with labour action. For it was a conscious withdrawal of labour that was witnessed.

In 1976 the working class was called upon to participate in stay-aways three times in Soweto and once in Cape Town. The call was made by the students whose protest against Bantu education had turned many townships

into battlefields. The initial call for solidarity presented to the workers the choice of which side of the barricade they would be on.

The issue with which the students were concerned has a twofold implication. On the one hand the demand for the scrapping of Bantu education and the expressed desire for the education that whites receive is a reaction against discrimination. Yet on the other hand the often quoted Verwoerd policy merely serves to churn out units of labour to serve the white community, which was a rallying point around which student support was gained, carries with it implicitly the challenge to the Apartheid state. It does this insofar as it stands in opposition to one of the basic premises of the Apartheid state - namely that blacks' social mobility is to be fulfilled within the confines of separate development, and that their participation in white society is merely that of labourer.

Solidarity amongst blacks in townships was hampered by breakdowns in communication and by police intimidation. The first stay-away has been reported as having been observed by about 50-60% of the workers. Reports also indicate that by the third stay-away the observance rose to 90%, while the figure for the second has been given as 70% (37). So it seems that there was a cumulative participation in the students' struggle.

The reaction of the hostel workers was ambivalent. Initially their response was one of antagonism, witnessed by the violent backlash which they unleashed. The spontaneity of this backlash, however, is questionable in the light of fairly well substantiated

reports about the intervention of the police in creating conflict (38). It is noteworthy that after this initial response and after consultation with students and an address by Buthelezi the migrant workers' attitudes changed to one of active support in the third stay-away (39).

The degree to which workers identified with the educational demands of students is a reflection of the common experience of racial discrimination. The latter, however, as a rallying point, seems to blur the class divisions within black society - hence although workers did identify with the demands of the students, it cannot be said that these demands directly reflected working class interests, but rather the interests of an educational minority. "An end to discrimination would not necessarily mean an end to exploitation. It would not change the fact that there is a small group of exploiters and a large group of exploited. It might only mean that there would be equal competition between black and white for positions among the exploiters" (40).

The dichotomy between migrant workers, although not as stark as is expressed in the media, nevertheless demands some form of explanation. The ambivalence with which they have responded to the Soweto 'riots' is a reflection of their structural position. As opposed to the urban dweller they are exposed to two forms of political control, namely homeland government and urban control in white areas. Hence, when the migrant worker reacts to conditions in the urban areas he is constantly influenced by his relation to the homeland areas. For example, his participation

in events in urban areas might be minimized insofar as he sees his long-term interests lying within the homeland, but more importantly, the realization that this participation jeopardizes the security of his employment in the urban areas. This fear is reinforced by increasing unemployment and by the system of labour bureaux. Although his attitude to events in urban areas might be ambivalent, the degree to which he is willing to challenge the system in the work situation is unquestionable as shown by his active participation in strikes. The migrant's preparedness to challenge is obstructed by the organisational problems arising from his impermanent situation. It is this which makes him a part of a far more vulnerable sector of the working population.

The increasing labour action that we have noted after Durban, 1973, has not only confined itself to defensive action on the shop floor - it has also seen a growing reintrenchment of trade unionism as a challenge to management's intransigence and the state's three-tier system. The results have been limited and factors that make for weak trade unions are at play: heavy police persecution and the swelling of the reserve army of labour. Yet the weaknesses of trade unionism must not be attributed only to these factors, but also to an inherent inability, it would seem, to break from merely economic issues which pose no real threat to the system, because this economic struggle is the "collective struggle of the workers against their employers for better terms in the sale of their labour-power, for better living and working conditions. This struggle is necessarily a trade-union struggle, because

working conditions differ greatly in different trades, and, consequently, the struggle to improve them can only be conducted on the basis of trade".

Given the rising militancy of the working class in the seventies, as witnessed in strikes and the organizations and trade unions that have emerged, and the increasing political activity outside economic issues, what can be said about workers and possibilities of change? The worker is of course what can be said about the worker realising his objective class position and acting in his class interests. Fisher (41) concludes her study with the assertion that in terms of class-consciousness workers are at a situation where:

- 1) there is a set of beliefs shared in common with other members of the class;
- 2) there is an awareness of a common class interest,
- 3) of class identity,
- 4) of class opposition;
- 5) but it is not possible to say that there is a clear awareness of class totality, although there may well be some elements of this present;
- 6) there would also not appear to be any clear concept of an alternative society to be reached through struggle with one's opponent..."

Fisher's conclusions are useful insofar as they present some indication of the workers' perception of their situation. Fisher has also pointed out that one must not see the working class as one homogeneous entity but that stratification does exist between skilled and semi-skilled and white collar, etc. As we have pointed out above,

this stratification is further intensified by the political realities of the Apartheid state, the starker example being the migrant worker's two points of reference.

Although the working class has experienced small victories in the seventies, and although they have shown their willingness to participate on issues not arising out of the labour process, to challenge the system of racial domination, this is only a reaction to certain effects of what has been defined as serialisation. The strikes we have witnessed have been essentially defensive acts against oppression and exploitation. Offensive acts can only begin where serialisation of the workers ends.

C Joakimidis and A Sitas

Notes:

- 1) John Kane-Berman - "Labour supply of the Gold Mines in the '70's" in Another Blanket (June 1976, AIM)
- 2) See for example H Wolpe - "Capitalism and cheap labour power - from segregation to apartheid", in Economy and Society, 1,4 1972)
- 3) E Webster - "Background to supply and control of labour in the gold mines" in SALB, Nov-Dec, 1974.
- 4) F Wilson - Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 1911-1969 (CUP, 1972)
- 5) Compiled from Survey of Race Relations, 1970/71/72/73/74.
- 6) M Plaut in SALB, 2,8.
- 7) SALB, 2,3.
- 8) See Another Blanket, p 70, & "The perception and behaviour patterns of black mine workers on the gold mine", Prof D Moodie.
- 9) Another Blanket, p 19.
- 10) D Horner and A Kooy - "Conflict on SA Mines 1972-1976", SALDRU working paper 5.
- 11) Ibid, p 42.
- 12) Another Blanket, p 12.
- 13) D Moodie, op cit.
- 14) M Kirkwood - "Conflict on the Mines", SALB
- 15) Ibid
- 16) M Plaut, op cit.
- 17) Horner and Kooy, op cit; also Kirkwood, op cit.
- 18) Kirkwood, p 35.
- 19) Horner and Kooy, op cit.
- 20) Ibid, p 42.
- 21) Ibid
- 22) Compiled from Horner, op cit.
- 23) Horner and Kooy, op cit.
- 24) Plaut, op cit.
- 25) SALB, 2,3.
- 26) cf Moodie, op cit.
- 27) Kirkwood, op cit; also Moodie
- 28) Kane-Berman, op cit.
- 29) Ibid
- 30) Moodie, op cit
- 31) Financial Mail
- 32) C van Onselen - Chibaro; RJ Gordon - Mines, Masters and Migrants.
- 33) Horner and Kooy, op cit.
- 34) Ibid
- 35) RW Johnson - How Long will South Africa Survive.
- 36) Kane-Berman, op cit.
- 37) J Kane-Berman - "Pupils' Revolt" (unpub. seminar paper)
- 38) Ibid
- 39) Ibid
- 40) H Nxasana and F Fisher - "The labour situation in South Africa", in SALB, 2,2.
- 41) F Fisher - "Class consciousness amongst colonised workers in South Africa" (p 348) in T Adler (ed) - Perspectives on South Africa.



As work in Progress has developed and grown, the contributions to the publication have increasingly grappled with the difficult problem of terminology. The editors have always believed that, while on the one hand it is necessary to 'de-jargonise' and 'de-academicise' articles and issues, it is also difficult to express ideas about a complex reality in simple language. Most of the more recent contributions have been written bearing this tension and problem in mind.

The article produced below is something of an exception, in that it contains more complex terminology than is generally found in WIP these days. Nonetheless, the editors felt it worthwhile to run for two major reasons:

Firstly, the article in itself is a valuable and important piece of work, detailing and analysing important processes. Secondly, and specifically in terms of WIP, it describes the other side of the coin of migrant labour, so well set out in another article in this issue.

It deals with those geographical areas where migrants migrate from, concentrating particularly on one of South Africa's 'foreign' labour pools, Lesotho.

It is for these reasons that readers will find that the article is slightly out of keeping nonetheless an important contribution, well worth the extra effort needed to read and fully understand it.

RURAL DIFFERENTIATION IN LESOTHO

SOME COMMENTS ON ITS CYCLICAL NATURE.

PREFACE

THIS PAPER comprises a preliminary outline of a longer piece which I hope to complete fairly soon. All comments will thus be most welcome. In its final version I anticipate that the paper will remain very similar to what is presented here, but with a large body of ethnographic data included in section 4. For the moment that is in bare outline.

1. Introduction

THERE IS a growing debate on the nature of social differentiation in rural labour exporting areas of contemporary southern Africa. This paper is intended to enter and hopefully to contribute to that discussion. Its primary focus is on the people of two adjacent villages in south eastern Lesotho¹, a small mountainous country wholly encircled by territory internationally recognized as South African. Lesotho's economic dependence on her industrialized neighbour is reflected by the number of her citizens in wage labour in South Africa at any one time. Official South African records give a figure of 152 188 Lesotho nationals in South Africa in 1977 (Murray, 1977:210). Other estimates put the figure as high as 200 000 (Murray, 1978a:127 n2 - citing the Lesotho Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1976). These people are all subject to the influx control

legislation and regulations applying to blacks which prevail in South Africa.

Encompassing the debate over rural social differentiation is another concerned with the relationship between rural labour exporting communities and South African industry and the state. In section 2 of this paper I attempt to make some brief comments in this regard. These will help to explain my assertion, taken as starting point in the present essay, that we must regard the southern African rural black population at large as part of the sub-continental proletariat.

2. Proletariat or no? - one mode or two?

A POSITION which asserts that rural African populations are essentially proletarian is very similar to that attributed to Amselle (Van Sinsbergen and Meilink, 1978:12). He has reportedly argued that the capitalist mode of production (CMP) has penetrated so extensively into contemporary rural Africa that "it is capitalism which, mainly through migrants' transfers in kind and remittances, has become a major factor in the reproduction of the peripheral village societies" (*ibid*:9).

In saying that rural black southern Africa is of the regional proletariat I am not suggesting that social and economic differences do not exist either between or within rural communities. Indeed the differences within such communities are the primary concern of the present paper (see section 4). Nor am I suggesting that no social relations of an apparently non-capitalist nature are evident in such communities. But my field research in Lesotho

demonstrated that the remittances of oscillating migratory wage labourers form the primary subsistence (including reproductive) resource of rural communities of this kind (cf Murray, 1976:99-133; Turner, 1978:chap 2). Without these remittances these rural communities could not reproduce themselves; nor would those 'non-capitalist' social relationships which are the framework for the provision of social security be able any longer to continue functioning. These communities are thus virtually totally dependent on material inputs from industrial wage labour earnings. I would therefore argue that it is misleading to consider their existence as evidence that non-capitalist modes persist albeit in articulation with the dominant CMP.

Williams (1975:31) adopts the same position arguing that these communities cannot be regarded as representing a distinct non-CMP if they lack the means of their own reproduction². Webster (1978) argues otherwise when he considers the case of contemporary Mozambique, which, he points out, is vitally dependent on migratory wage earnings. "In present day Mozambique the 'pre-capitalist' sector is unable to reproduce itself without the intervention of the capitalist mode (especially in the form of migrant labourers' wages)" (Webster, 1978:168 n6 - his parentheses). Yet he insists on applying a concept of articulation between a CMP and a non-CMP for this situation despite his concern not "to perpetuate a dualist illusion" (ibid). He justifies such an analysis in terms which contradict his preceding statement, for he argues that "it is in this (pre/non-capitalist) sector that the social security needs, and

some of the subsistence costs, for the migrant and his family, are borne at little or no cost to the capitalist" (ibid - his emphasis). What he is saying then is that (a) at the economic level social security needs are provided from outside of the CMP while (b) reproduction is in fact borne by the CMP: surely this implies a contradiction?

There can be only one possible justification for pursuing such a dualist analysis. That is that at the superstructural level there is still a persistence of apparently non-capitalist social relations in the rural periphery; in other words that apparently 'traditional' political, religious and especially kinship relations still function in the rural communities. But these, as Webster (1978:168-9) himself points out, have been modified quite considerably in content over time while in structure they have only apparently remained unchanged.

The apparent persistence of non-capitalist superstructural relations may thus be used as a justification for arguing that a relic of a non-CMP still exists in articulation with a dominant CMP, although not at the economic (substructural) level. But there is another way of analyzing this situation.

Poulantzas (1973:35-6) has referred to the common necessity to distinguish strata in any one class - the example he uses is that of the labour aristocracy as a specific stratum of the working class. The criteria for such a distinction are not to be found at the economic level, but rather in differences at the political and ideological levels:

Differentiations within the working class do not purely and simply coincide with positions in the organisation of

labour. They depend rather on political and ideological criteria, on forms of struggle and of combative organisation and on tradition; and these criteria have their own autonomy (ibid:36 - his emphasis).

We may well apply this argument to a consideration of the working class in southern Africa which is clearly divided politically and ideologically. Frauenstein (1976) has argued that a distinction can be drawn between the white and black strata of the working class³. This, she says, is based on differences in their political and ideological alignment vis a vis the white capitalist class (ibid:46). I would be inclined to take her argument one step further and to suggest that the rural black population in southern Africa constitutes a distinct stratum of the working class distinguished from both the white and black urban strata. (There may, of course, be further (regional) divisions within that stratum.) The violence which erupted between 'hostel' dwellers and other Soweto residents during August 1976 are a stark reminder of the ideological and often political antagonisms between rural and urban black workers (see Peskin and Spiegel, 1976: 33 - and especially P Mayer's preface)⁴.

Another question now emerges: what is it that creates and maintains these political and ideological differences, and why? In other words, looking at the rural areas only, why and how do apparently non-capitalist superstructural relations persist in spite of large scale involvement in wage labour? (cf Van Binsbergen and Meilink, 1978:12-3, who have asked these questions about most of Africa). In the southern African context, it has been argued, segregationist and apartheid

strategies have attempted to reinforce these 'traditional' structures so that they may provide a subsidy to capital for the reproduction of labour power (Wolpe, 1972; Morris, 1977; and see Berger, nd, for a critique of Wolpe's thesis). But another view is that the ~~ant~~ustan strategy has been to transform the peripheral political structures in order to continue domination through proxy (Molteno, 1978). Such a position implies that the pre-capitalist superstructural relations have been replaced by essentially capitalist relations, at least in the political sphere. If we consider the changes in content which these relations have undergone this is by no means a far fetched position to hold.

There are other reasons also for at least starting from a viewpoint which considers that the CMP has penetrated sufficiently into rural southern Africa to allow us to regard the rural population as part of the proletariat. One of these is that one alternative is to examine the contemporary situation in terms of its representing an eroded remnant form of a 'traditional' structure. This would be an essentially negative enterprise (cf Murray, 1977:80), and one which, by definition, would demonstrate how 'traditional' the black rural areas still are, thus providing the grist for the mill of apartheid apologists/ideologues.

Another reason is that there is a need to test such a position as an hypothesis. A number of recent historical analyses have quite justifiably applied the concept of articulation of modes of production in examining earlier periods of southern African history. But precisely because these analyses

have been so successful for these earlier periods they tend to cloud perceptions of the present situation; they suggest a mode of analysis which is not necessarily transportable to the contemporary period. Whether these concepts can be applied to this period needs to be tested - and what better way is there of doing this than by hypothesizing that they are inapplicable?

3. Rural differentiation I - Some analytical tools

Of late there have been some attempts made to account for the very apparent material differences between rural households in southern African black communities. Following research during 1974 Leeuwenberg (1974; 1977) presented a picture of extensive differences in the material wealth of various categories of rural Transkeian households. His material has been subjected to further analysis by Innes and O'Meara (1976) who attempt to develop a more rigorous categorisation of the different rural household types described by Leeuwenberg (1974; 1977). Their concern is to discuss the problems of class determination of these various household types in a population which exports wage labour to the industrial centres of South Africa. The implicit presumption underlying their analysis is that rural differentiation represents a perspective on the process of regional class formation. Their use of phrases such as 'Peasantry subject to proletarianisation' (*ibid*) suggests an attempt to reflect the processual aspect and to infuse a diachronic element. The analysis is nonetheless quite static and synchronic. Innes and O'Meara's categorisation is based on the differing

relationships the various household types have to both local land as a means of production and to industrial capital from which they are alienated but through which wages are drawn. In other words they base their categorisation on the differing access households have to the means of local production, ie land, and to wage labour earnings⁵. Their analysis thus produces a series of categories, or apparent class determinations. But it fails to move back down to the empirical level and to examine the class positions households occupy. The result is that it is cyclically static and that the categories are mutually exclusive.

There are a number of other problems which Innes and O'Meara's (1976) paper suffers. I have discussed some of them in an earlier paper (Spiegel, 1977). For the present essay the most significant of these problems is that their analysis fails to recognize the cyclical nature of differences between rural households with regard to their access to land and their dependence on wage earnings (cf Murray, 1978a; 1978b). Innes and O'Meara (1976) were thus unable to recognize any correspondence between domestic development of the household and changing patterns of material wealth and dependence on a variety of resources. This they might have done had they introduced the idea of the domestic developmental cycle into their analysis.

The concept of the developmental cycle of domestic groups gained prominence in social anthropology with the work particularly of Fortes and Jack Goody (see Goody (ed), 1958). But the relationship between material wealth of a household and its phase in the domestic

developmental cycle had already been suggested by Chayanov in his studies of the Russian peasantry during the first third of the twentieth century (Chayanov, 1966). He argued that the output per worker in the Russian peasant family farm (and thus the family's whole output) was directly related to the ratio of all the family's members to the family's productive members, i.e. the ratio of consumers to workers in the family. He called this the c/w ratio (*ibid*:77ff). This in turn, was a function of the point the family had reached in its domestic development, which was cyclical (*ibid*:53ff). Thus Chayanov treated rural differentiation in demographic cyclical terms (Thorner, 1966:xxi), associating material differences with domestic development.

This type of analysis can quite valuably be applied to rural southern African differentiation, but only after modification. If we were to apply it blindly we would open ourselves to the kinds of criticisms which were levelled at Chayanov for seeing peasant production and social organisation in isolation from its wider socio-political environment. The result was his defence of the viability of the peasant family farm in the face of larger scale capitalist agricultural enterprise and communal industrial agriculture: If rural social differentiation is wholly cyclical, he argued, then it can hardly be associated with class formation.⁶

It is essential, therefore, to locate a developmental cycle analysis of rural differentiation within a macro analysis which examines class formation at that level. As Murray (1978a:13d) has pointed out, an analysis

of rural differentiation based on the concept of the developmental cycle can be pursued only within the limits set by an examination of the political economy of migrant labour in southern Africa (see also Murray, 1977:84). Thus, even if rural differentiation is cyclical, it is of little significance in attempting to establish the class determinations of the rural population. At large, that population stands in the particular relation to capital — the primary factor of production — and its class determination is in no way affected by cyclical rural differentiation. Such rural differentiation may, however, have repercussions in the class position/s adopted by the rural population (or portions of it). This is a point to which I return later.

A high degree of rural differentiation has been evident in black rural southern African communities since at least the end of the second world war. This has been established by most field research and rural surveys conducted and published since that time.⁷ But none of the earlier sources attempts to attribute such differentiation to any particular set of factors. They merely describe it.

My own fieldwork data bear out that in rural Lesotho, there are significant differentials between households in land- and stockholding, in direct access to migratory wage earnings and in material wealth in general. There are households in direct receipt of wage labour remittances from one or more absent wage earners, and others which have no direct source of wage income. A few households hold three (or more) arable fields and ten or more livestock units,⁸ most hold

lesser amounts and fewer livestock while a number of households have neither land nor livestock. There is, however, no necessary correspondence between land- and stockholding: a third of the households with three fields held five or fewer stock units.

Murray (1978a) has shown quite clearly the fallacy in the often cited idea that households without rural resources, the 'poorer' households, have a higher incidence of migrancy than do those which are relatively richer — in agricultural terms. If anything, the converse correspondence occurs, for much of a household's wealth derives from its continued access to wage labour income. Murray (1976:115-120) has demonstrated a significant correlation between crop yields and cash inputs into agricultural production.

But a household's wealth must be measured in terms of more than just its agricultural resources and output. Its ability to provide its own sustenance regularly (whether from domestic crops or through the purchase of foodstuffs), the size and the style of the houses comprising the homestead, the clothing its members wear and the household furniture and equipment it owns — these are an index not of the household's agricultural output but of its access to wage earned income, for that is the primary resource in the community. This is not to say that all households are in direct and regular receipt of remittances from wage labourers. There are many households who must gain access to these monies through indirect routes. Agricultural activity is often the channel through which remittances are diffused, but there are others such as bridewealth transfers (cf Murray, 1976:215-47),

petty trading and prostitution, and a certain amount of reciprocal and undirectional gift exchange, some of which has a further transactional significance. The point is, however, that the primary resource and source of subsistence for the whole rural community is wage earnings. These are then diffused through the community to the various households in it, although by no means equally.

But because wage labour is almost always associated with migration to and from South Africa, arable land and rural property retain a perceived significance in excess of their actual synchronic potential. Arable land especially is seen as a resource of last resort and ultimate security. This attitude to the land has its foundation in the insecurity of the migratory wage labour system which offers no social security benefits nor even a guarantee of continued employment. South African labour policy requires that foreign black contract labourers be repatriated and, if required, re-attested at least once every two years. Legislation prevents them from bringing their wives and families with them to their places of work and they may make no attempt to settle permanently in South Africa. Most Lesotho nationals employed in South Africa work on the gold mines where they are housed in single sex miners' hostels.

Rural differentiation can be categorized on the basis of the households' direct receipt of wage earnings as well as on their access to arable land. I thus distinguish both between households with and those without direct access to wage earnings and between households holding arable land and those without. But

both of these distinctions are related to the phase which respective households have reached in their domestic development. Chayanov (1966:56) aggregated the data with which he was working to develop the cyclical idea of "theoretically normal family development". If we follow a similar 'normal' cycle of household development for rural Lesotho we see that landlessness coupled with wage earning is associated with the earlier phases while landholding increases over time. Wage earning is characteristic of all phases until what might be termed a zenith is reached. Thereafter other sources of cash income must be found.

Households comprising young newly married couples are unlikely to hold arable land but they almost invariably receive a wage income earned by the absent young household head. In time, and through the exchange of remittances for local favours, these households can expect to be allocated fields. But they continue still to depend directly on wages while directing some of their remittances into hiring labour to work those fields. At a later phase we find households which have reached a developmental zenith. They can depend on wage income from adult sons while working their fields for themselves through the labour of the 'retired' household head himself. The next phase sees the decline from this peak as the wage earning sons establish homesteads of their own and the natal household loses their direct support. By this phase agriculture has taken on added importance. The household's own fields may provide a significant contribution to sustenance needs. And, more important, the house-

hold's labour, draught team and implements may open an avenue through which to tap others' remittances. The phase which follows is still less secure for it is during that time that the household's ability to draw off others' earnings may be limited by lack of labour, draught power or implements, all of which have become depleted. It is then that income through petty trading, especially in the sale of home brewed beer, may provide a significant share of the household's income. By this phase the household's fields will have to be worked by an outside contractor and this will reduce the amount of yield reaching the homestead itself.

The above represents the 'normal' cycle of household development. But there are households which fall by the wayside or jump phases. An example is the type of household headed by a young widow or deserted wife. Such a household is unlikely to ever reach the zenith. It may however have been allocated fields and thus have the material characteristics of the next phase. Another example is the type of household comprising a man and his family, all of whom have spent many years away from the village, and which has never been allocated fields. In spite of such a household's 'advanced' phase of demographic development it still has the material characteristics of an earlier phase household.

There is indeed a correspondence between landholding and phase reached in domestic development. But allocations of land depend also on the investment of wage earnings in the local community. Before a family is eligible for a field it must first be granted

a homestead site and build a house. And thereafter it will still have to transfer gifts and bribes and plan strategically to be granted a field. Land, as Hammet (1973) and others have pointed out, is in short supply and not all those who want fields are allocated them immediately. Those households which are able to muster the most influential local support for their claims to arable land are the households most likely to be allocated fields at a relatively early stage. Frequently a young household head's relative success in wage earning thus improves his household's chances of gaining access to arable land quite early on.

Other households which are quite readily able to gain access to rural resources, including arable land, are those with kin links with the more influential families in the community - the kin of the chief and the principal advisers. With the households of teachers and clerks these households represent part of a nascent class outside of the proletariat. Like most households their primary source of income comes from wage earnings but in non-productive labour. In this regard they differ from the majority of households. Their relationship to capital is thus different from that of the other households and they are characterized at this level by features of what Poulantzas (1973) calls the new petty bourgeoisie.

There is one other category of households which to a degree stands apart from the general pattern. This is the 'traditional petty bourgeoisie', including petty traders and cafe owners whose primary resource is not in wage labour. But this category too

constitutes only a nascent class fraction for like wage labourers its members are concerned with agricultural resources - for security. Moreover these households often include members who themselves are wage labourers and whose remittances provide a subsidy for continued tradition. Their trading activities thus depend doubly on wage earnings: they are subsidized by wage earned inputs and they rely for trade on remittances reaching home.

Like that of Innes and O'Meara (1976) my categorization which follows is based initially on relations to the two means of production: capital on the one hand and agriculture on the other. I do not see these categories necessarily as incipient classes or class fractions however. Rather, they are cyclical categories through which most households pass as they proceed through their domestic development.⁹ The only exceptions are the two categories of 'new' and 'traditional' petty bourgeoisie. And even they cannot be wholly isolated from the other categories for their members share an interest in the land and agriculture, and petty trading is becoming ever more popular as a means of livelihood after retirement from wage labour.

4. Rural differentiation II - the case of Ha Makhaola and Lithabeng¹⁰

This section is a bare outline of the categories into which I intend placing my material for discussion. But first let me recap the argument behind that structure.

We can distinguish, on a materialist basis, between different categories of rural households. Innes and O'Meara (1976) do just this on the basis of access to land, direct

access to wages and relationship to the means of capitalist production. But their categorisation is left hanging in the air in static form.

I retain their materialist basis of categorisation but associate it with the developmental cycle. This throws some light onto the avenues through which remittances are diffused. In the process of 'building a homestead' wage earnings must be expended locally - first on the bridewealth, then on bribes and gifts, homestead site clearing, house building, further bribes and agriculture. And when we look to the other side, at the households in decline, we see the avenues through which they gain indirect access to wages: being hired to work the land, participating in work parties which are no longer reciprocal, selling home-brewed beer, etc.

- (a) Landless wage dependent households
 - (i) Younger families starting to build up their homesteads
 - (ii) Absconders returning home to create a locus of social security
 - (iii) Households of single mothers who earn a wage
- (b) Landholding wage dependent households
 - (i) Younger families which have already been allocated fields but need still to build the homestead for security
 - (ii) Middle aged households dependent on wages but well established on the land, ie nearing the zenith
 - (iii) Older middle aged households with both wage earning members

and active agricultural contractor/s - ie tapping both resources; the zenith

(c) Cultivating households

Households having passed the zenith and which are now in decline. They must depend on indirect sources of wage income.

(i) Those of these households which have the resources to tap others' remittances through becoming agricultural contractors etc

(ii) Those of these households which lack these resources and struggle even to have their own fields worked. Their members participate as workers in non-reciprocal work parties

(d) Salary dependent households

What might also be termed the 'new' petty bourgeoisie. The primary difference between these households and the others is that their wage income is from 'non-productive' labour. But locally they do appear to have more influence and power over the allocation of resources than do the other households. There is clear correspondence between non-productive salary earning and local influence.

(e) Landless entrepreneurial traders

Primarily women headed households without land or a direct source of wage income. They depend on the sale of home brewed beer and prostitution.

(f) Landholding entrepreneurial traders

The few households running cafes instead of depending on wage earnings

ie the 'traditional' petty bourgeoisie. But noting the points raised earlier that (i) trading may be subsidized by wage earning members of the household; (ii) cafes are becoming an increasingly popular retirement resource.

3. Conclusion

An analysis of local peripheral differentiation must always be encapsulated within a political-economic analysis of the relations between centre and periphery. It is a moot point whether societies ever did exist in complete isolation. Today, however, there is no doubt that they cannot and that they thus do not.

Both Kitchings (1977) and Roseberry (1978) have stressed the fact that there are inevitably technical inputs from 'outside' which support apparent 'pre-capitalist' relations in remnant 'traditional' societies. Thus, items like implements, seed etc are imported to allow for cash crop production in many places where so called 'peasant' producers work the land. The argument is that one cannot talk of a persistence of a pre- or non-CMP (in articulation with the dominant CMP) if, at the level of factors of production, inputs from the CMP are required for the reproduction of the non-CMP sector. In the case of Kenya and Venezuela (Kitchings (1977) and Roseberry (1978) respectively) these factors are obtained through the exchange of produce through intermediaries with whom the producers are in a non-capitalist relation and who appropriate some of the producers' surplus product in the exchange.¹¹

The argument becomes that much more forceful if the means of reproducing the

apparently non-capitalist sector derive from the sale of wage labour to capitalism. For here the relation is one of exchange of labour and not of product; and what is appropriated by capital is not surplus product but surplus labour. This is the basic relation which determines the antagonism between capital and labour in the 'pure' CMP. In the ethnographic material which I have presented above I (intend to) have shown that it is the migrant labour remittances which are diffused through the community which provide the material means of reproduction of that community. These remittances reach the community only through the sale of wage labour, docked of the surplus labour appropriated by capital.

Because the rural differentiation which I have discussed is cyclical it is wrong to associate it with class formation. Indeed, it may be argued that class formation is taking place in the periphery if one examines the whole peripheral sector consisting of the homelands/black states. Within these peripheral 'units' we can see the reproduction of capitalist relations at all levels - and thus the formation of antagonistic classes. But in the rural communities alone differentiation is not an indication of class formation because of its cyclical nature.

Synchronously we can identify a series of apparent class determinations. But households and individuals will pass through these during their developmental and life cycles respectively. Thus they will occupy different class positions at different points in time. This has important political implications. If people expect and do go through a number of class positions serially the likelihood of

their allying themselves with those in the same class determination at any one time is minimized. Therein lies yet another 'benefit' of the apartheid strategy. Not only has it reproduced the political relations of domination in the periphery so as to rule by proxy (Molteno, 1978). It has also managed to undermine proletarian class consciousness through encouraging the persistence of apparent non-capitalist relations.

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FOOTNOTES

1. I conducted fieldwork between September 1976 and April 1977 and returned to the field briefly during December and January 1978/9. The first period of field work was during my employment as research officer in the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University. I am grateful to the members of that Institute and especially to Prof Philip Mayer for their encouragement and support. The return trip would not have been possible without a generous grant from the African

Studies Institute, University of Cape Town. I am particularly indebted to Colin Murray from whose work and in discussion with whom my ideas have gained greater clarity.

2. Berger (nd: 22-4) implicitly takes the argument one step further when he raises the essentially epistemological problem of whether the rural reproducers of labour power (women) are in a direct or indirect relationship of exploitation with capital.
3. Frauenstein uses the term 'fractions' instead of strata. This seems to be an incorrect usage at least if we are to follow Poulantzas (1973). For him fractions of a class are distinguished by differences at the economic level despite convergence at the political and ideological levels (*ibid*: 37-9).
4. It seems that the growing 'concern' of the white establishment over the plight of the urban blacks is playing on these differences and antagonisms. This is exemplified by the activities of the Urban Foundation. Most black nationalist groups attempt to underplay these differences. Here we must include also Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement and the Black Alliance.
5. Kitchings (1977) has suggested that instead of looking at relation to the means of production we should rather examine "the mode of appropriation of surplus product" in trying to analyze material differentiations in developing Africa. His discussion of 'Class Analysis' in Kenya (Kitchings, 1977:71-3) is not sufficiently detailed to be convincing; but I believe his ideas may have important value for analyses of rural and 'homeland' black southern Africa. Roseberry appears to be following a similar line of thought in his discussion referring to Venezuelan field data. Neither analyses can be transported to the southern African context willy nilly however, for the southern African situation is characterized by a very much higher rate of (migratory) wage labour than either of their examples. Both Kitchings and Roseberry are dealing with situations where appropriation is indirect through the sale of produce like cash crops. Berger (nd:22-4) raises the type of questions which might lead us to an analysis similar to that of Kitchings and Roseberry.

6. In Chayanov's defence it must be pointed out that he did not associate all rural differentiation with demographic factors although he gave these primary moment in his analyses of social differentiation. Thus the importance for him of the concept of demographic differentiation (1966:68).
7. The classic example is the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey; see Houghton and Dalton (1952). Also, for Lesotho specifically, see the decennial agricultural surveys especially Morojele (1962); Lesotho (1972) and Sheddick (1954); also unpublished material like Murray (1976); Turner (1978). Hamnett (1973) has examined the issue of differential landholding in Lesotho.
8. 1 livestock unit = 1 beast = 1 horse = 1 donkey = 5 sheep/goats. Pigs and poultry are not accounted for (cf Quirion, 1958:71).
9. In another (forthcoming) paper I try to turn this over and to use the phases of the domestic cycle as the basic criteria for categorization.
10. The names I have given the two villages in south eastern Lesotho where I conducted field work. All personal names cited in case studies are also pseudonyms.
11. The intermediaries lose a part of that surplus product to capital in their exchange relation with their suppliers of seeds, implements etc.
12. Berger (nd:22-4) is arguing that the appropriation of surplus labour may be seen as the appropriation of the surplus product of the reproducers of labour. But this leads us into the (feminist) debate over the concept of a domestic (housework) mode of production.



LABOUR RESISTANCE

As with the information and briefings that WIP supplies on political trials, this section can only give an adequate, if still incomplete picture, if readers participate and send information to us. What would be especially useful are briefings on specific strikes, drawing attention to the salient points and analysing dynamics involved. We have attempted this with the briefings on the Isithebe (WIP, 5) and Eveready (WIP, 7) strikes, and will carry a briefing on the mineworkers' strike in the next issue.

Ciskei Transport Corporation: The confusion relating to this strike that occurred in January this year, involving some 65 (?) bus drivers (see WIP, 7) has increased. A report appeared last month (*Post*, 79.04.26) to the effect that two men, Mr Joseph Koba and Mr Livingstone Malotana, had been banished from the Ciskei by Chief Zolile Njokweni (Ciskei 'minister of justice') - this despite the fact that both men were Ciskeian 'citizens', and a Grahamstown Supreme Court ruling in the case of Ms Beauty Lolwane that "the Ciskeian government could not banish its citizens (sic) from the homeland (sic) but could remove him (sic) from one area to another" (*Post*). The two men, "staunch supporters of the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party", had been detained for 70 days "shortly after the strike by the bus drivers in January."

National Tents and Sails: (Babelegi industrial area, BophuthaTswana) 138 workers at this factory did not report to work at the

beginning of January because of a pay dispute - the workers were earning a basic wage of R5,00 per week - this after years at the factory. NH Falkson, the manager, said, "Yes, I can try", when asked whether he could live on this amount. One of the workers who stayed away said: "I left this factory because it was hell trying to live on R5 a week, with cost of living so high. I might as well stay home" (Post, 79.01.11).

Batswana Gare Transport: (Mabopane) 200 bus drivers went on strike for a number of hours on 2 days in March (14th and 15th). The strike related to the firing of 10 drivers; the attitude of 4 "members of the management committee" (3 white and 1 black); wages (R42,00 a week); poor working conditions; having to drive unroadworthy busses.

The strike ended after Mmutle Kgomongwe, BophuthaTswana 'minister of internal affairs and labour relations' intervened. The bus company announced through their pro, FPU Kotzenberg, that a two-person committee would be appointed to investigate the strike. On 30th March it was announced that the report had been handed over to Kgomongwe (RDM), and since then we have not been able to find any further reference to the strike and its follow-up. (Post, 79.03.18; RDM, 79.03.19 and 79.03.30).

Nel's Dairy: (Victory Park, Johannesburg) This strike involved 200+ workers, and lasted part of the day (79.03.27). It occurred over dissatisfaction with working conditions, and the appointment of a five-member committee when the workers wanted to elect a works committee. Complaints related to pensions,

leave and over-time pay, and sick leave. More than 60 police were called in "to disperse the workers".

It was reported (Star, 79.03.27) that: "In January two housewives who had been approached by workers from Nel's Dairy asked the Dairy Trade Management Board to investigate various aspects of the dairy's administration and labour management". The board postponed such a discussion until a meeting set for the end of April, "as they do not have sufficient information".

Slaughtering Services Cooperative: the 500 white members and employees (slaughterers) of this cooperative stopped work at 5 abattoirs on the Reef and in Pretoria on the 2nd April. The complaints related to the take-over of the cooperative's functions by the semi-state Abattoir Corporation and the subsequent cancellation of contracts by the abattoirs with the Slaughtering Services Cooperative. (The cooperative also employed 300 white non-members and 200 blacks). Production was maintained at some abattoirs by bringing in outsiders, said Ben Kruger of the Abattoir Corporation, but meat prices to the consumer rose.

The next day meat retailers used the threat of higher prices and concern for the consumer to appeal to the Minister of Agriculture to intervene in the dispute.

The conclusion to the dispute is not clear, but it was reported on the 5th April that the Abattoir Corporation had government and SA Agricultural Union support, and would have nothing more to do with the Cooperative. Members of the cooperative had been invited to become employees of the Abattoir Corpora-

ation, and this seemed to offer a way out of the dispute. (Star, 79.04.02, 03, 05; RDM, 79.04.02, 04).

Lanko Co-op: (fruit packers' and distributors' co-op near Joubertina in the Langkloof). About 50 of 180 African workers resigned and returned to the Trans ei (it was not reported exactly when this occurred). This move followed the death of a fellow worker, Mr Pono Siselle, allegedly after he had been kicked and beaten by a white manager for wrongly switching on a machine and allegedly putting another man's life in danger. JP Terblanche, manager of Lanko Co-op, was reported to have said that workers were not dissatisfied and that "it was a 'normal thing' that blacks came and left the company" (Star, 79.05.02; Strib, 79.05.06).

Consolidated Diamond Mines: (Oranjerium) 5 200 workers brought the world's largest diamond mine to a standstill for 3 days from 17-19 April when they refused to work after an "empty container used for packing phosphine - a harmless grain disinfestation agent - was found in a bag of mealie-meal" (RDM, 79.04.20) Workers had felt that "an attempt had been made to poison them". They had been in touch with the SWAPO office in Windhoek in connection with this and other grievances.

Fattis and Monis: (Bellville, Cape Town) Because of inadequate information this strike can be no more than mentioned. It appears that 78 African workers supported 'Coloured' strikers late in April. Five had been dismissed, 5 'retrenched' (?), and 63 were being sent out of the western Cape for having broken their contracts (as migrants to a

'Coloured' preference area) with the Dept of Labour. Support for a union was also at issue (Daily Mercury, 79.04.27). MORE INFORMATION NEEDED.

Post Office: (engineering division) About 300 workers stopped work at Moberni (Durban) on 27th April until confusion about a wage increase had been resolved. The workers had heard of a 15% increase, but received only 10%. A 'spokesman' for the Post Office said: "Apparently information regarding their salary increases had been given to the workers - perhaps by people who want to cause trouble ... Although it was implied that there could be a 15 per cent increase for black workers, this was never stated in writing" (Daily News, 79.04.27; RDM, 79.04.28).

Naude's Hoek: (a farm near Alice) A very rare (or rarely reported) occurrence took place during March, 1978, and again in April, 1979, when labourers on the farm Naude's Hoek went on strike for higher wages. A two-person Ciskei commission of inquiry reported that the labourers had been earning R1,00 and R2,00 per month until a strike in 1978. Their pay was then raised to R20,00 per month. The workers went on strike again in April this year over a promised R10,00 increase, and were then fired and ordered to leave the farm - which they refused to do. (The commission members were Rev JT Hermanus and Mr A Tapa) (RDM, 79.04.24). MORE INFORMATION NEEDED.

South African Railways (container truck drive drivers): (City Deep container depot) About 130 African truck drivers stopped work after a driver had been assaulted by a white inspector. workers returned after a few hours

when they had been promised an investigation. The results of the investigation were to be made known on 10th April, but no further reports have appeared. MORE INFORMATION NEEDED.

Elandsrand Gold Mine: (near Carletonville) Extra security staff, 20 police from Carletonville and a circling helicopter were on hand when workers at this mine refused to go to work. Potchefstroom police had been placed on standby.

On the 9th April only 400 of the complement of 4 500 men at the 'single men's village' went to work, while 800 of the strikers demonstrated. The workers' action had started the night before when "mine security men and police, assisted by the mine helicopter, battled for two hours or more ... to end the rioting, vandalism and arson at the exemplary village for single men working at the Anglo American Corporation's newest gold mine" (There are no prizes to readers who attribute this piece of ideologically loaded writing to the Star, 79.04.09.) The report continues with the heartbreaking news that the mine was to have been opened by the honorary president of the Deutsche Bank, "who has come to South Africa specially for the occasion".

Post and RDM reported the next morning that only 100 workers had gone to work the previous day. Employees said that the grievances were about pay and too little meat at meals.

"The model hostel village was to have been visited by VIPs during today's (10th April) formal opening of the showcase mine. The opening will go ahead but the hostel will

be cut out of the itinerary" (RDM, 79.04.10).

Police stood by during the opening. Some 1 000 workers were signed off at the mine. Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of Anglo American, said that he had been disappointed by the lack of communication between management and workers. Anglo American said that they were still unaware of reasons for the worker action.

Seven workers "believed to have been the alleged ringleaders behind the riots" were arrested by Potchefstroom police.

No further information is available to us at this stage.

Eveready: (Port Elizabeth) This strike was discussed in WIP 7. Post (79.04.19 and 79.05.01) reported that the 198 women were still on strike, while management considered them to have been dismissed within 24 hours of the strike starting. The women are given R10,00 per week each from a strike fund. The boycott of Eveready products is said to be continuing in Port Elizabeth, but with little support from elsewhere. The National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers was said to have shown an irresponsible attitude by management at the firm. The company was still saying that they were waiting for the Wiehahn and Riskert Commission reports before deciding on union recognition. Undoubtedly they will find a tame union to recognise.



BABELEGI - EXPLOITERS' PARADISE

Ask for R6.90 petrol from your garage these days and they'll probably laugh you away from their Sasol pumps.

But R6.90 is no joke to some workers in Babelegi, a new industrial boom area in BophutaTswana with over 100 factories. There R6.90 was the weekly wage offered to women working at a factory in the newly 'independent' territory.

When 138 women from this factory, National Tent and Sail, failed to return to work, a *Post* reporter, Thami Mkhwanazi went to find out why.

At first it was believed that the women did not have legal citizenship, but then Mkhwanazi found out the women were not prepared to work for R6.90 per week.

This is not an isolated incident however. Workers from as many as 30 factories are being paid wages of between R5 and R7 a week.

Except for the women at National Tent and Sail Company, 9 124 other factory labourers had returned to their jobs in factories in the area.

Mkhwanazi decided to further his investigations into the working conditions in the entire area. He discovered that starvation level wages were rife in the area. It is near impossible for workers to support themselves and their families on that kind of income.

Although the BophutaTswana Government had announced its intention to investigate wages in the area, factories continued to employ people at pitiful wages.

When labour bureaux in Babelegi confirmed that workers at Springbok Clothing and Tiger Clothing were getting R5.00 a week, an employee of the bureau was ordered not to disclose any information on wages.

The chief magistrate of the area admitted that he had instructed the bureau not to release any information to the press, concerning wages. He warned Mkhwanazi and two of his *Post* colleagues that there 'would be trouble' if they attempted to gain information from civil servants.

And trouble did not take too long in coming. When the *Post* team persisted in their investigation, they were detained for three days by the BophutaTswana police.

intimidated and harassed. Eventually charges against the three men, Thami Mkhwanazi, Thomas Khosa and Walter Nkosi, were finally dropped.

How did conditions arise in this area where workers were placed in an ultra-exploitative situation?

Babelegi has a vast pool of people who cannot find work. These people have virtually no ties to the land and the workers are not able to produce for their own subsistence, but have to produce for their employers. Here, in the homeland area of BophutaTswana, people find themselves newly domiciled with forced citizenship and poor conditions of employment.

Exploitation facing factory workers is thus based on the living conditions of the people and the abundance of labour, as well as the lack of adequate representative organisations for Black workers. Thus, the workers cannot combine and use their power to negotiate for better wages and working conditions, since for every workers trying to win better conditions there are five others waiting to take his job.

During investigations conducted throughout the area, management invariably stated that worker representation through liaison or works committee was effective, though it was found that where committees existed, most workers either did not know of them, or else condemned them as being useless. The vast majority of workers were unaware of their rights to compensation after accidents, paid sick leave and annual leave and to form works committees. The evidence is that employers make no attempt to inform Black workers of their rights, and it is obvious that the factory management is able to take complete advantage of the widespread poverty and unemployment in the area.

The director of Tiger Clothing, Mr Martin Silver, says that his firm is 'doing a kind service by giving jobs to poor Black people coming from far and who never worked before'!

This partonising attitude hardly conceals the fact that those industrialists are taking advantage of a situation of such poverty and immigration, which enables them to extract huge profits from such poorly paid labour, which is in no position to resist. The attractiveness of this for investors is well realised by the 'Homeland' leaders: In appealing to foreign investors, Chief Minister of Lebowa, Dr Phatudi, claims that 'the Black proletariat in the homelands is ready, willing and able to do a decent day's work for a fair salary.' Just how fair are the R5—R6 weekly wages of the often sole breadwinners of a family where many of us students would expect such salaries for a mere morning's work?

Chief Wessels Mota's incentive of a 'nice, fat, highly profitable operation' seems a more fitting description of the situation.

The findings are having wide-spread reaction and more acutely affected is the BophutaTswana government.

The 'industrial showpiece' of BophutaTswana is being exposed for what it really is.

Mmabatho News has asked the government to undertake investigations of the wage discoveries, but it is highly unlikely that the situation will be substantially changed in view of the fact that some of the firms are partially owned by the government and the BophutaTswana National Development Corporation (BNDC). It is


government policy that foreign investors should own half the share of business in the country, while the remaining 50% of the shares are owned by the BNDC and interested Tswana investors. A *Post* reporter, however, told *Wits Student* that he estimated no private Tswana investors, as the investment is directly undertaken by the Bodupha Tswana regime.

The manager of Wellmax Pressing Tools, Mr Joshua Nkosi, and the manager of H J Henocheng Uniform Clothing, Mr F J Wentzel, said that they were paying labourers R5 a week and R2 bonus for good attendance, absenteeism obviously being a serious form of resistance to these atrocious working conditions. Managers complain of workers' 'bad behaviour' and penalise them for arriving late for work by deducting money from their wages. The frustrated resistance from silenced voices makes itself felt through sad actions of sabotage of machinery and theft. Though Trade Unions are legal, few managers would endorse these at their own factories.

Mr Wentzel, whose firm employed 344 labourers, admitted that his factory was in partnership with the BNDC.

A comparative study of wages and working conditions in the Babelegi area was carried out in 1974 by the Wages and Economic Research Commission of Wits SRC. Although this study was carried out five years ago, that study with the recent disclosures is that conditions in Babelegi have remained, in the absolute sense, virtually the same: The average basic wage for the area at the time was R7.68 and 70% of the workers in the area earned less than this. This, together with the information that was gathered about working conditions, overtime rates, sick leave, leave pay etc. is virtually identical to the information revealed in the recent *PUM* expose.

In 1974 the commission calculated the poverty datum line in Babelegi, based on premium requirements, namely food, clothing, rent, transport, cleaning material and fuel for a family of five to be R72-90 per month. A recent estimate for Babelegi put this figure at about R130. So although living costs have gone up virtually 100%, the wages remain at the same level. In this context the situation of workers in this area is obviously deteriorating rapidly.



You'll get the other half next week.

Some foreign investors in Africa have had their capital investment blocked. We assure you that this will not happen if you invest in a black homeland.

Invest in a black homeland

Chief Executive Councillor of Basotho **Qauqau**,
Chief **Wisehead**, Motsi, Chief Executive Councillor of **Kavasulu**,
Chief Executive Councillor of **Kavasulu**,
Mr. C. N. M. Pethi (Deputy of **Botswana**),
Mr. C. S. C. (African Rock) Mabuza,
Dr. K. D. Matshatwa, Chief Minister of **Lesotho**,
Unfortunately, foreign investors feel rather apprehensive about an African investment. They fear nationalisation of their capital investment, or some impairment to the windfall of their profits. This cannot happen in Black South Africa. South Africa has the most stable government in Africa. And it is a capitalistic government.

If you have a nice, fat, highly profitable business, create, invest in South Africa. If you have a small, medium-sized business, we do not need to tell you that the only people you help when you start your factory in our country are yourself and your workers.

First, and foremost, **Mr. Ed. Chisholm** Minister of **Labour** (part of white race are a few points) you should know about that too. He can tell you about the cost of black labour, about the cost of

industry (which you know to be) as 42%.

Secondly, you can be on the subject of **Minister of Labour**, part of white race are a few points, you should know about the cost of black labour, about the cost of

industry (which you know to be) as 42%.

Similarly, if you already own a subsidiary manufacturing operation of a white area in South Africa, move it out if we do not need to tell you that the only people you help when you start your factory in our country are yourself and your workers.

And in the militant trade unions in South Africa, the black proletariat in South Africa is black, proletarian, willing to strike, to go on a general day's work for the black homelands is ready to do it.

Each one set aside for a black nation with its own language and customs. Each one progressing towards full responsible use within the Republic of South Africa.

Each one offering you real or concessions in the form of tax rebates and low cost loans as an incentive to invest in Black South Africa.

The article above by
Wadine Hoffmann, is re-
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from WITS STUDENT, 20th
March, 1979.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEALTH

I have no formal medical training, let alone any specialist knowledge in the treatment of children's illness (paediatric knowledge). I am not a social worker, nor have I, despite the subject matter of this talk, any qualifications as either an economist or a sociologist. In fact, I can only justly describe myself as a dilettante, a dabbler in bits and pieces of human knowledge.

Sometimes, however, the perspective of the non-specialist, the view from the outside, as it were, can be a useful one. I hope to use this position to place the much-publicised 'Year of the Child' in an overall context, to give some words of warning about the way such a focus could be mis-used, or misunderstood, and to try to see what it could, and should, mean.

The first question then is: why an international year of the child? Even a superficial glance at the statistics, (and statistics seldom deserve anything better), will reveal the importance of examining the position of children on this earth.

There are well over one and a half thousand million children under the age of fifteen in the world. This age group constitutes about 40% of the population in the so-called 'Third world'. Over 10% of deaths in these under-developed countries occur amongst children under the age of 5 from a combination of malnutrition, parasitic infections, diarrhoeal diseases and other complicating infections.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) claims that in some areas this figure is as high as 80%.

It is children who suffer worst during the social upheavals of a world in transition. Africa and Latin America have spawned millions of refugees of one sort or another, and the children amongst them have little opportunity of leading a normal life.

There are children growing up in Vietnam today, whose growth has been marred by rickets: the cause of this was that they had to spend years of their life literally living underground during the war, with the result that they never got any sunlight at all.

The alienation, desperation and frustration bred by the injustice of the modern world have led to a plague of unwanted, abandoned or battered children.

Meanwhile, international babyfood companies, using modern marketing techniques in which (to say the least) truth is not the major motive, try to convince mothers around the world that their produce is better than breast milk. The consequences in terms of increased susceptibility to disease and malnutrition are incalculable....and the baby is the victim.

So there is obviously no harm done by calling 1979 'International Year of the Child'; there are lots of them, and the majority do not have an easy life.

That, then, is our task this year: to spell out clearly the plight of the children, to analyse the reasons for their plight, and to start doing something about it.

It is a truism that one deals with illness by looking at the symptoms, diagnosing the disease that is causing it, and then treating that disease. In a case of individual sickness, this is a relatively straightforward, if often difficult affair. In a situation where the entire social structure itself breeds disease, it becomes a complex and controversial matter. But, if we do not deal with the complexity, if we do not plunge into the controversy, then we are evading our responsibility to face up to the most important social issues of our time.

It is common cause that the diseases which afflict the majority of the world's children are directly related to the social, economic and physical environment in which they are born. Malnutrition, diarrhoeal diseases and the devastating effects of illnesses such as measles, are found where the web of poverty is most widely spun. Poor people cannot buy food for their children; landless people cannot grow food for their children. Where there is no sanitation, no clean water, where people live in overcrowded or inadequate housing - there you will find the diseases of poverty, the health problems which afflict the majority of children of this world.

It is also common cause that these conditions of existence dominate the lives of the majority of people in what is often termed the Third World. (This being roughly major parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America).

It is also true that during the early stages of the development of what is now called the developed world (England, Europe and North

America) very similar patterns of ill health existed. Malnutrition and infectious diseases were very much a part of the lives and deaths of the working classes in those parts of the world. This only ceased to be the case during the massive spurt of economic growth that these areas experienced during the second half of the nineteenth and early parts of the twentieth centuries. Even this growth was not in itself enough. It took extensive, and often very bitter political and economic struggle on the part of the working people to lift themselves out of the morass of poverty which enmeshed them after the industrial revolution.

A rather interesting fact emerges at this point. The period of increasing living standards, and therefore health in the industrialised, 'developed' world co-incides with the period in which the 'Third World' was being colonised: Africa was being partitioned out as bits of European private property. It fueled the economic growth of Europe with raw materials and markets. Slaves from the West Coast provided the free labour on which the plantation economy of the Southern United States depended; the industries of the far eastern countries were destroyed in order to allow the European industries to collar the market, and England fought a war against the rulers of China in order to force them to allow the Chinese to smoke opium, which they could only buy from the opium trade controlled by England.

The wealth, the health of the developed world was built on the pillage of the 'third world'.

At this stage I intend to discard the use of

that phrase 'Third World' as inaccurate and indicative of a colonial and Eurocentric mentality. Africa is the birthplace of the human race. It is the real first world. Asia and Latin America had great civilisations with technical and organisational expertise when the ancestors of the current Europeans were still painting themselves with mud.

Not only the health of the colonising powers, but many of the roots of the current pattern of ill-health in the colonised world are to be found in this process of territorial subjugation.

The local social structures were shattered. The local economies were re-directed to meet the needs of the colonial masters. Cash crops such as cotton took the place of food crops which had previously fed the population. Raw materials were taken to the Western countries, then sold back to the colonies as manufactured items, thus ensuring dependence on the industrialised world and inhibiting the growth of local industries.

Traditional systems of communal land ownership were destroyed. People were forced off the land and into the cities in order to survive. Old farming techniques were not competent to deal with the new realities, which included land shortage resulting from the best land being taken by colonial farmers. Overstocking and other forms of over-use resulted, leading to the destruction of the agricultural environment.

The result of all this: economic exploitation, poor pay and massive overcrowding and unemployment in the cities; soil erosion and falling levels of production in the rural

areas. The organic and caring social fabric was destroyed. Insanitary living conditions and malnutrition became a way of life.

These conditions, as we all know, are the causes of ill health. These are the factors that have bred generations of starving, and often uncared-for children.

The formal decolonisation of the past thirty years has made little difference. In many cases local elites, thoroughly westernised, have taken over the political role of their formal colonial masters. The economic structures of these countries remain much the same. They are still totally dependent on the international economic order. They are dictated to by the needs of the most powerful elements in this international order, the advanced western countries and the multi-national corporations. This leads to instability, weakness and the inability to meet local needs from local resources. In most respects, the structure of the colonial world remains unchanged.

This is the political economy of health and ill-health. The health of the developed world does not merely exist side by side with the ill-health of the underdeveloped world. It is built on it.

It is of course also true that the lives and health of the children of the developed world give some cause for concern. There is the inhuman face of the big cities, typified by Los Angeles where all the playgrounds are so bad that children are not allowed outside to play. That of course is assuming that there is anywhere left to play once the construction men have finished building all the highways

to carry the cars that produce the pollution. There is the whole sick nature of the consumer society where children are brought up with aspirations of accumulating vast wealth and marrying a film-star; where they are fed on refined poison and junk food. From the age of two the children of the rich start to dig their own graves with their teeth. All this they inherit before they can begin to think for themselves; and they inherit it from a society where profit is god and the drive for growth at any cost (be it human or environmental) is poisoning not only the land, the air and the sea, but also the values which the young receive. It can hardly be said that the average American child, addicted to trash food and television, comic books and coke, is a healthy and well-rounded human being.

This then is the two-sided problem which faces the Year of the Child: gross consumerism and dire poverty. It is not simply a problem of charity, a problem of 'helping the poor'. It is not really even a 'child problem'. It is simply that children are the most helpless and important victims of national and international political and economic systems which need to be changed.

I have dwelt at some length on the international scene for two reasons: The first is obvious. Year of the Child is an international venture and needs to be seen in that context. The second reason is equally important: South Africa tends to be seen as a special case with special problems. This is, to some extent, true, but I think that it is also important to highlight the similarities between health

problems in South Africa and those elsewhere.

The same gap exists here between rich and poor. It is true that in South Africa this gap largely coincides with racial differences, but I would argue that it is not enough to see the problem in purely racial terms. If every law which separates black from white, if every social practice which segregates us into our different compartments, were done away with tomorrow, it would make little immediate difference to the economic and environmental factors which determine the health of our people. This too is similar to many other parts of the underdeveloped world, where the simple fact of political decolonisation has not made a significant impact on the levels of poverty and disease.

Of course, for South Africa to become in any sense a healthy country, racism and its institutions must be done away with. But in a sense the damage has already been done, and a lengthy period of social and economic reconstruction will also be necessary.

With this in mind, let us look briefly at the health conditions of children in South Africa. Despite the limited usefulness of health statistics, infant mortality rates do provide one of the most readily available yardsticks by which we can measure child health. The picture in South Africa is more than somewhat grim.

In the Transkei, Westcott and Stott

have reported that in a typical area, 30% of children born alive die before the age of 2. There are studies indicating that in some rural areas up to 50% of children die before reaching the age of 5. In 1970, the infant mortality rate of that section of the population classified as coloured was 133 per 1000. This can be startlingly compared with a white rate of 21 per 1000.

These statistics, of course, do not tell what proportion of the survivors are condemned to a life of hunger, stunted physical growth and possibly stunted mental growth. They do not tell the tale of children living as child labourers, or as victims of homes broken apart by migrant labour, or as victims of resettlement camps and squatter evictions. To understand the quality of life of children in South Africa, it is not enough to look only at the statistics of those who die. We must also look at the conditions of those who don't.

The conditions of life and death of children in South Africa do not differ markedly from those of children in many other parts of the world, and the root causes are similar. They are to be found in the social, economic and political environment into which the children have the misfortune to be delivered.

It is true that white children are largely healthy, the sick and dying largely black. But this racial distinction can be blurred.

Those black people who, despite the barriers in their way, have achieved a position of economic power, show a similar health pattern to the white group. When a large number of whites lived in poverty during the depression of the 20's and 30's, their health status was more like that of blacks today than of whites today.

The real reasons for the existing picture of child ill-health and misery in South Africa must be sought in the political and economic history of our country.

The first European settlers in this country did not find a local black population that was unable to feed their children. They did not find that they were agriculturally incompetent, nor that they suffered from rampant malnutrition.

This being the case, the poverty, and in some cases, the extremely severe malnutrition found in parts of the country cannot be explained by an original state of backwardness. Rather it must be sought in an historical process of underdevelopment. This process was brought about by the conflict between an indigenous economy in which the surplus produced was redistributed to the community, and the intruding colonial cash economy, backed, in the final instance, by the guns of the settlers. The reasons for the poverty can be sought in the driving of people from their land by a combination of guns, taxes and treaties, thus compelling them to seek work in the mines and factories of the city. It is

this which has led to the degeneration of the so-called 'homeland' areas and to the breakdown of their economies which were unable to cope with the strains that were put upon them. Too little land leads to overgrazing, soil erosion, reduced productivity and hunger.

The roots of poverty and disease can be seen in the destruction of life by the migrant labour system, and the removal from the towns of what are called 'unwanted economic units' (this phrase means people) who are dumped in desolate and remote places.

An example of what this process of destruction has meant can be found by looking at the Nqutu area in Zululand - the area around the Charles Johnson memorial hospital. A traveller in this area many years ago described the diet of the local people as follows: it consisted of "meat from periodic feasts, quantities of amasi, vegetables including sorghum, millet, pumpkins, melons, yams, various tubers similar to the potato, and many green herbs and plants." One does not need to be a nutritionist to know that this was a healthy diet.

The situation is rather different today, with various forms of porridge making up almost the total diet of many of the inhabitants. This is not because the people have become too stupid to know what to eat, but because they have no option.

In 1956 the Tomlinson Commission estimated that the region could support 13,000 people. Today the population is 100,000 and more people are still being resettled there. In one survey, 30% of the householders had no land at all. 70% of the families earned less

than forty Rand a month, although it was calculated that they needed R120 per month in order to survive. With no land and little money, it is not really surprising that people are starving. It is also not surprising that 62% of mothers with children suffering from malnutrition knew what would be an adequate diet for their children. They simply were unable to provide it.

There is no point in repeating other examples. They can be read, and at any rate the evidence is available for all to see who have not shut their eyes.

This brings me to the most important question. What do we do? How can we help to make children's lives easier, their future more hopeful?

People give many answers to this question. I want to look at some of these answers and show why they are wrong, or at least inadequate.

There are many people who say: If the masses are hungry it is because there are too many of them. So, they say, population control and family planning are the answer. This is rather like saying that if there are too many people then we should do away with people rather than do away with poverty.

Other people will say: The people do not know how to feed their children. Let us teach them about nutrition. But those people in Zululand, with the varied diet that I spoke about earlier, did not need to be taught about nutrition. Very few rich people are taught about nutrition. If you can get enough food, you eat it. It is as simple as that. People starve when they don't have enough to eat,

not because they do not know about protein, vitamins and carbohydrates.

A third argument goes that people do not have enough to eat because they don't know how to grow food properly. So, let us teach them

culture. Also, we must discover new types of fertiliser, new types of grain so that they can grow more food on limited amounts of land. This is what I have called the 'Green Revolution Solution'. But the problem with it is that many people don't have any land, so they cannot grow anything at all. In India, the 'Green Revolution' only helped the rich farmers. The poor could not afford all the tools and seeds and fertiliser that were necessary, and they actually ended up worse off than before.

There is plenty of food in South Africa. It is just that people cannot afford to buy it. Further, people will only be able to grow food if they are given back the land that has been taken from them.

The last solution that people often put forward can be described as the 'self-help solution'. This solution argues: the people are poor, apathetic and uneducated. Through a process of community development local organisations can be created, and the people can be motivated to help themselves. Then they can be taught about nutrition and agriculture, about sanitation and the need for clean water and so on.

There is a lot to this argument and it cannot be lightly dismissed. If people are down and out, if people are without decent housing and sanitation, if their children are dying

out like flies, how can one say that such people cannot be helped to help themselves.

But one must ask the question: where people have been driven off the land, crowded into urban ghettos and rural slums, deprived of their economic and political rights, in this situation, how can people help?

It can so easily mean teaching people to live off crumbs instead of having a fair slice of the cake. It can so easily mean that what you are saying to people is: "Look, we know that you are exploited, oppressed and poor. There is nothing we or you can do about that. But we can teach you to survive the exploitation. We can teach you to feed your children despite your poverty."

I am not, of course, opposed to self-help programmes. I am not opposed to teaching people how to grow vegetables, or to boil water before drinking it. I am not opposed to nutrition education. In the present circumstances in South Africa they may well be very necessary.

If someone has toothache you give them an aspirin. It kills the pain, but it does not take away the cause of the trouble. Similarly, it is right in the short term to help people survive. But in the long run it is more important to remove all those economic and social injustices which make it difficult for people to survive.

What I am saying is that the plight of children throughout the world and in South Africa is only a symptom of a deeper disease, the disease of poverty. And I have tried to show that poverty is not a result of ignorance,

laziness or stupidity. People are poor because of economic and political injustice.

What then is the task facing us during this Year of the Child? It is to focus on the desperate situation of children. It is to concentrate on what is rooted in the criminal unequal rules which allow the few to get rich at the expense of the many. It is to channel our outrage into determined efforts to change this.

Only when people are free; only when they participate as equals in the political and economic processes which govern their lives; only then will people truly be able to help themselves.

And only then will we be able to build a better world for our children: a world without hunger, a world without poverty and misery, a world in which it will be a joy for all, both young and old, to live.

-Cedric de Beer.
This article was the basis of a paper presented by the author to a symposium on the 'International Year of the Child', held in Durban and organised by the Medical Students' Representative Council of the University of Natal Medical School.



LETTER

The Rhodesia killings

AFTER ALL the emotional outbursts and angry reaction from all corners of white Southern Africa following the recent killings in Rhodesia, I would like to air my opinion — one which I am sure is shared with the majority of blacks in this part of our continent.

There is no denying the fact that the killing in Rhodesia of innocent and helpless air-crash survivors is really bad and must be condemned with all the force it deserves, not because the barbaric spilling of blood was carried out by freedom fighters (sorry, terrorists), but because any cold-blooded killing of a human being by another is barbaric and abhorrent.

However, I was appalled at the manner in which certain sectors of the white population — both here and in Rhodesia — reacted to this calamity, treating it as the worst barbaric action ever perpetrated on human beings this side of the Zambezi.

As far as I am concerned the killings in Rhodesia "left me cold" (if I may borrow that phrase). I didn't know whether to cry or rejoice. To me what happened there was but one drop in the ocean compared to what happened right here at home.

What's happening to blacks right here at home in South Africa is ten times more barbaric than what

Mr Nkomo's soldiers did to the air-crash victims. What happened in Rhodesia is no worse than:

- What happens to the many blacks who die in prison without their kin ever knowing.

- The conditions under which Steve Biko was transported from Port Elizabeth to Pretoria — on a winter's night, in a Landrover, naked and suffering from a serious brain injury, until he died. This was more cruel than the killing of the air-crash survivors by men who were known to be fighting for their country.

- The selfish banishment, through the homeland system and other methods, of many blacks from their places of birth to poor and remote corners of the country where they die of hunger and poverty.

- The tyrannical arrests, detentions without trial, bannings and house arrests of black moderates by people who are not ashamed to tell the world that they are Christians.

- The imprisonment of under-age children on Robben Island.

This, then, is how I feel towards the whole Rhodesian issue. The pro-government mass media has exaggerated the whole thing. It was not an isolated incident — there have been worse atrocities than that one committed right here. — NOT IMPRESSED, Katlehong.

ZIMBABWE AND THE PRESS

THE WAR in Zimbabwe is entering its 7th year. The military struggle going on barely 300 miles from Johannesburg is not the only form which the conflict over Zimbabwe has taken. Indeed, tied up with the military struggle and proceeding hand in hand with it, we have witnessed an ideological struggle in which the main parties to the conflict have accused each other of committing various atrocities and crimes against each other and against unarmed civilians. Ideologically, this takes the form of portraying oneself on the one hand as the 'liberator' or 'defender of civilisation', and the enemy on the other hand as the 'sadistic oppressor' or 'barbarian'.

The Smith regime, and now the so-called transitional government too, has conducted a campaign of allegedly showing the forces of the Patriotic Front (PF) as forces of barbarism: as men who commit the worst of atrocities not only against whites but also against blacks (ie, 'against their own people' — the neo-colonialist syndrome!).

To a large extent the liberal press in South Africa has aided and abetted Smith and the transitional government in portraying the PF and their leaders in this light. However, due to the fact that most of the country is at war, certain conditions prevail which make difficult an objective assessment of the truth value of these reports in the media:

... law has been extended to over 80% of the country with court sessions being held in secret (Cape Times, 26/9/78); the censorship of local Rhodesian press reporting of the PF and its activities (Cape Times,

28/8/78); and the monopoly wielded by Combined Operations Headquarters over dissemination of news of the war.

In any situation approximating this one it is undoubtedly very difficult to assess what is going on: who has been committing what against whom, and for what reasons. Clearly we can accept that many unarmed civilians are being maimed, tortured and killed every day in Zimbabwe. The question therefore arises: by whom and for what reason? For the accusations currently being thrown to and fro could be smear campaigns as part of an ideological struggle between two hostile camps.

It is the limited aim of this paper to show that the situation in this respect is confusing to say the least. Clearly it is not merely a case of barbarism (as represented by the forces of the PF, according to the liberal media) versus Civilisation. In an attempt to achieve this limited aim I have drawn on all those reports on the Zimbabwean War which are given little or no prominence at all in the liberal media.

It is interesting to note that the liberal press gradually started portraying the guerrillas of the PF as guerrillas and no longer as just a group of bloodthirsty terrorists, when such a change of attitude was conducive to the success of the negotiated settlement which the imperial powers have attempted to bring about. The role of the liberal press can therefore be seen as linked with the interests of imperialism. To attempt to establish the concrete nature of this relationship between the liberal media and imperialism is beyond the scope of this paper.

However, it is mentioned here as an important issue.

Another interesting phenomenon is the role of the so-called 'Black' press in South Africa: clearly, the reporting of the Zimbabwean War in 'The Voice' (sponsored by overseas, mainly German, aid, and the mouth-piece of the SACC) and 'Post' (owned by the Argus Group) has been far more sympathetic to the guerrilla forces than their white counterparts. This is in part due to the interests of imperialism, which are tied up with the future of a liberated Azania and the mass consciousness of the 'black' people. By adopting a 'pro-Black' stance.

Imperialism attempts to mystify a deeper conflict which can threaten the very foundations of exploitation in the regional economic system.

An analysis of the complexities of the role being played by the liberal media is beyond the scope of this essay and will not be attempted. If the immediate consequence of this paper is to induce confusion then hopefully in the long term it will play some part (albeit small) in the lifting of this confusion, and the 'correcting' of the official history of this period we now find ourselves in.

As the war has progressed the credibility of the Combined Forces Headquarters view things to a certain extent. By the middle of July 1978 there seems already to have occurred a definite doubt by the Western media as to the reliability of COH as a source of information. 'The Argus' (19/7/78), for example, reports that: 'French opinion about

who is responsible for massacres of both whites and blacks in Rhodesia has hardened against the internal government ... L'Aurore, for example, reported the latest massacre of civilians in a way that made sure that readers would realise that those to blame were guerrillas "according to Salisbury".

'Le Matin, the newspaper which ran the original Young interview, was even more equivocal. Under a large photo of 4 dead children, the newspaper headline stated that nationalists and Salisbury were "mutually accusing each other of the Makanza killings."

'It commented: "It was still impossible to know last night if the responsibility for Friday's massacre (ie, of Elim Missionaries at Eagle School) fell upon the 'moderate' nationalists who cooperate with the government, or the guerrillas, or on the Rhodesian armed forces." The newspaper reiterated further in its report that the killing was done by a group of armed men "whose origin and political tendencies" were still unknown.'

By 1978, in certain sections of the media, there appeared a growing awareness of the extent to which so-called factual information from COH could serve as the content for propaganda. Charles Rukundi, of 'The Voice', writes (11/11/78) that 'it is a common feeling in Rhodesia that when Whites are killed there is an outcry and foreign journalists are invited by the government: are transported to the scene of the incident and are allowed to take pictures of the bodies.

'On the other hand, when Blacks are killed there is always an excuse for the government: It is either the Blacks are to

blame for harbouring "terrorists", or they are "accidentally" caught in a crossfire.' Later in the same article he adds, unequivocally, that: 'The controversial Selous Scouts (who usually pose as freedom fighters), members of the Guard Force, and the Special Branch, however, have no mercy and are responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians ...

'No matter what the authorities may say to the contrary, this is an undeniable fact of life in Rhodesia, and inhuman treatment meted out to political prisoners has been witnessed by priests and missionaries who were arrested, detained and later deported, and by the Catholic Institute for International Relations in its publications: The Man in the Middle, Civil War in Rhodesia, and Propaganda War, which unfortunately were banned in Rhodesia before they had even had a chance to circulate.' On the 2/12/78, Rukundi continued his article saying of the clampdown on information about what is going on in Tribal Trust Lands currently under martial law: 'Linked with this secrecy was the fact that church connected lawyers who were previously able to make enquiries about people missing in the rural areas and get satisfactory results can no longer do so.' He then goes on to quote the Rt Rev Paul Burrough, the Anglican Bishop of Mashonaland, as saying that 'we are in danger of shrugging off much too high a number of people "killed in crossfire", ... and shrugging off vindictiveness by security forces against suspects and terrified tribesmen who do not cooperate with them.'

As to the type of image of the leadership of the PF - more and more there is slowly emerging the notion that they are also

people fighting for a cause, and not just brigands. Mothobi Mutloaste writing in 'The Voice' (26/8/78) said that Mugabe, who has been described as a monster in the Western press - though US ambassador to the United Nations, Mr Andy Young has tried in vain to refute this - is a very articulate man readers will agree.

In fact what is remarkable about Zimbabwean leaders is that most of them have a string of university degrees, despite coming from very poor and large families!

Son of a labourer, Mugabe was born at the Catholic Kutama Mission, in the district of Zrimba, in 1928 ... Chris Freimond in Salisbury reports in 'The Cape Times' (18/8/78) that Ruth Chinamano, the then 'secretary for women's affairs on the central executive of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union ... is appalled by the violence and death regardless of who the victims are.'

1. Atrocities allegedly committed by the Rhodesian Security Forces.

(a) Curfew Deaths:

According to the J of Southern African Studies (3,2); 'The World' (newspaper) during the first half of 1977; and all issues of 'Africa' during the period Jan-July 1977, thousands of innocent peasants had (by that juncture) been shot since curfews were introduced in Rhodesian rural areas in 1973.

out of these had been water carriers who had not reached the so-called "protected villages" in time, from their daily tasks in the fields.

(b) Resettlement Deaths:

More than a quarter million peasants

living in the border regions had by mid-1977 been forcibly resettled in "protection" or "consolidated" villages since 1972, with consequent deaths and malnutrition. (The J of Southern African Studies, 3,2).

(c) Mass Killings by the Military:

In mid-1977 hundreds of men, women and children were killed in Mapai, a Mocambican town miles away from the war zone, with no strategic value either as a guerrilla base or supply depot (Financial Mail, 3/6/77).

From the daily press ('Cape Times' and 'Argus' - May 1977) it was reported that in Rhodesia itself shootings of children had taken place - specifically at a school in the north where two children died as a result of troop fire. Troops claimed that they were shooting at guerrillas and the children were caught in crossfire ... Witnesses saw no guerrillas and saw two wounded children.

According to the 'Cape Times' (22/5/78) (AFP report), Muzorewa is reported as having said that the blame for the massacre of 105 black tribal people 100 km north-east of Fort Victoria 'lay with the Rhodesian security forces - a charge already made by another black party in the transitional government, the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)'. 'His figure directly contradicts the total issued by the military command which said that the number killed was 52'. 'The military command said that the victims died when caught in crossfire between the patrol and guerrillas'.

(d) The Massacre of Missionaries:

According to 'The Guardian' (2/7/78): 'Mr Robert Mugabe, President of ZANU, said

his guerrillas were not responsible for the killings (of the Elim missionaries). He claimed to have reports from eye witnesses that Rhodesian security forces posing as nationalist guerrillas carried out the massacre as a diversion from a raid into Mozambique by the Rhodesian army. Mozambique authorities claim 17 refugees recently arrived from Rhodesia and two Belgian nationals working in Mozambique for the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation were killed by helicopter borne raiders.

'He said: "We deplore these brutal and callous acts" and that "Smith and the three puppets (Mr Chirau, Rev Sithole, and Bishop Muzorewa) who are his accomplices, must be made to bear the full blame and responsibility"'. Both the 'Cape Times' and the 'Argus' failed to mention this side of the story at the time. The 'Sunday Times' merely announced (26/6/78) that 'The attack came shortly after a Mozambique report - since denied by the Salisbury authorities - alleging an invasion by Rhodesian troops'. 'The Guardian' continues: 'Mr Mugabe said: "ZANU has been operating for years in the country. Its operations cover 80% of the total land of the country. It has maintained excellent working relations with the missionaries and their establishments which have supported our just cause and given fighters assistance in a variety of ways" ... Students at Elim Mission said that the attackers had identified themselves as "soldiers of Mr Mugabe ...". On the same, in another article (in 'The Guardian') Ian Mills wrote: 'White Rhodesians are incensed by claims that the security forces committed the atrocity.'

Many of them have to serve in the Territorials and Police Reserves and know what a well disciplined force it is. They argue that even the elite and "secret" scouts do not have carte blanche and are responsible to officers trained in British Army tradition.

'The sole survivor of the massacre, Miss Mary Fisher, is in a critical condition after her ordeal and has yet to say what happened. Even if she asserts that the attackers were nationalist guerrillas, her statements will undoubtedly be countered by assertions that some Rhodesian Army Units have not been above masquerading as insurgents.

'At this stage the word of the black students at Elim Mission has to suffice. They said the attackers claimed to be "soldiers" loyal to the Patriotic Front co-leader, Mr Robert Mugabe. The guerrillas also harangued the students against supporting the internal settlement, and went on to say that the school would be closed ...

'Mr Mugabe has denied that his forces were responsible and blamed Rhodesian troops. He said it was a "diversionary" tactic in the wake of an alleged Rhodesian raid into Mozambique and an attempt to discredit the guerrillas...

'It is argued here that given the discipline within the Rhodesian forces and the aims of the internal settlement leaders, massacres are neither feasible nor helpful to the Rhodesian cause.

'Contrary to what Mr Mugabe says it would be difficult to find anyone in Rhodesia who would believe it worth the lives of 12 people to stage a diversion from a raid into Mozambique which the army Supreme Commander,

General Peter Wall, denies ever took place.

'It is equally conceivable that a man of Mr Mugabe's education and political skill would methodically sanction the killing of 12 innocent people and the rape of women and children merely to force the closure of one school'. Simon Hoggart wrote in the same issue of 'The Guardian' that Dr Owen 'had carefully declined to pin the blame on the followers of Mr Robert Mugabe, the co-leader of the Patriotic Front. He said that Mr Mugabe, who had not previously denied his involvement in incidents, had specifically denied any responsibility for the massacre. "I am not aware that he has changed his position on being prepared to come to round table talks".

'Conservatives were almost beside themselves with rage when a labour backbencher, Mr Andrew Faulds, claimed that the massacre had actually been ordered by the Smith regime'.

Further reporting as regards the massacre of missionaries: On 28/6/78 the 'Cape Times' reported that 'black MPs accused the government of being responsible for the same kind of atrocities as the terrorists. They also said the interim government was in large part responsible for the massacre (of 12 missionaries at Eagle school, 25 km south of Umtali). Mr WB Chimpan said: "They (the transitional government) are to blame. They sit in their easy chairs and neglect the loss of their people. Their exclusiveness is the total enemy".

According to a report in the 'Rand Daily Mail' (13/1/79) 'a Rhodesian-born mission priest, Father Kennedy, ... admitted his

mission hospital treated anyone - including black guerrillas'. This has certain implications for the Elim massacre, if Father Kennedy's situation is not merely exceptional.

(e) Strikes on Refugees:

In the 'Cape Times' (21/10/78) it was reported that 'Joshua Nkomo said yesterday that 226 unarmed refugees were killed in Thursday's Rhodesian air strike against one of his nationalist camps...', and later (23/10/78) he is reported ('Argus') to have claimed that 'Rhodesians attacked a girls' camp at Mkushi in their Zambian raid and that about 100 girls were killed'.

(f) Abduction:

There has been too, the abduction and probable murder of members of the political opposition groups in Rhodesia. The most notable example was the disappearance of Dr Edson Sithole, publicity secretary of the internal ANC - blamed on opposition guerrilla abductors by the Rhodesian government. It was later discovered that he was in fact abducted by members of the Rhodesian Security Police ('Africa', Feb 1976).

2. Atrocities allegedly committed by the so-called "Auxiliary Armies".

(The 'Cape Times', 30/9/78): 'claims that the "private armies" of some of the members of Rhodesia's supreme four man Executive Council were intimidating people in rural areas have been made at the African Farmers' Union of Rhodesia annual conference'.

Chris Freimond writes the following about the "auxiliary" forces ('Rand Daily Mail', 16/1/79): 'In the tribal areas, never visited by tourists, the people are caught in

the middle. Firstly it was between the guerrillas and the soldiers but now a third and vastly more evil element has been introduced - private armies; armed gangs using murder and torture to drum up support for their leaders in the transitional government.

... were ... abducted and raped. Husbands are killed trying to protect their wives...

Officially there are no private armies, only auxiliary forces made up of returned guerrillas now supporting the internal settlement. Alleged atrocities are hushed up or ignored. But they are happening. People are fleeing the tribal areas because of them and their tales of murder and torture are frightening'. Note that these so-called "auxiliaries" owe their allegiance to Muzorewa and Sithole, members of the transitional government. In 'Post' on 21/1/79 appeared the following comments on the auxiliaries: '(from the report of the Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice) "The seriousness of the situation created by the existence of private political armies and the serious disregard these men have for life, morality, or human decency, makes it vital for some strong reaction to be forthcoming from the church", the report said.

'Quoting witnesses who attested to crimes, rape, theft and brutality alleged to have been carried out by members of the militia, it called on the church to show "courage in standing against blatant and gross injustice" where this occurred'. (reports by Agence France Press). Similar reports appeared in 'Post' of 15/2/79.

The 'Rand Daily Mail', 13/1/79: '... the Thames Television team also filmed a young ex-guerrilla who said that he was given an ultimatum to join the Rhodesian army or face execution'. If this is in fact true as a rule and not as an exception, then it has certain implications for understanding the genesis of the so-called "auxiliaries" ●

The Johannesburg newspaper, 'The Star', ran a report under the headline 'Labour oversupply, so slow-down in increases paid to black workers' (79.04.19), that must surely stand all on its own in the stakes for the prize for euphemistic mystification of the year. The report dealt with statements made by Jan Cole, 'manager of the influential P-E Consulting Group Salary Survey', and starts as follows:

"The massive oversupply of labour and an increasingly pragmatic approach to wage hikes has led to a significant fall-off in wage increases paid to black workers says Mr Jan Cole..." And so it continues.

Translated it means that the capitalists are making full use of the ever growing reserve army of the unemployed and consequent competition for jobs by the unemployed, to depress wages as far as possible.

The editors would appreciate other such items.

THE COURTS

and Sebezile Madikana (19).

Charge: Arson. The state alleged that, in October 1976 the accused set fire to the Renst Skosana and Tamsanga schools in KwaZakhele township, outside Port Elizabeth. During the course of the trial a 14 year old girl told the court that while under police interrogation a black security policeman, Constable Naphtalie Likwe, broke her knee while assaulting her.

An alleged confession made by one of the accused while in police custody was not accepted by the presiding magistrate, as it had not been made freely and voluntarily.

Verdict: Not guilty. (Port Elizabeth Regional Court, last week of April 1979).

Mandla Gxanyana, Khaya Myoli, Bonisile Tulumu and Suyisile Maphisa.

Charge: Taking part in the activities of a banned organisation, namely BPC, SASO or Asseca. These three organisations were among those declared unlawful in the October 19 clampdown on black consciousness organisations. As far as it is known, this was the first major trial relating to alleged activities of any of those organisations banned on October 19.

The most notable feature of the trial was the attitude of certain witnesses called by the state to testify, against the accused. Rev. Philip Sizwe Diko was immediately re-detained by security police after testifying; Mzwandile Msaki was jailed for 6 months after refusing to give evidence; Mbulelo Christopher

Ceko, Alfred Netele and Mthunzi Noima were also jailed after refusing to testify against the accused. Mpumelalo Gogwana was arrested after giving evidence for the state, and charged with perjury.

Verdict: Not guilty. (East London Regional Court, 1.05.79).

Nicholas 'Fink' Haysom - appeal.

As previously reported, Haysom refused to answer certain questions put to him by a magistrate in relation to the case against SWAPO supporter Peter Manning. He was then sentenced to 12 months in the Cape Town magistrates court.

Haysom appealed against both conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court. The appeal on conviction was turned down, but sentence was reduced to 3 months, totally suspended. (Cape Town Supreme Court, 30.03.79).

Simon Mampuru (19) and John Peta (18) - appeal.

On 14.08.78 both accused were found guilty of arson in the Pretoria Regional Court, and sentenced to 5 years each. The charges related to the burning of the Phatogeng Higher Primary School in Atteridgeville, outside Pretoria.

Both appealed against conviction and sentence, and after hearing argument, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal, and conviction and sentence were set aside. (Pretoria Supreme Court, 24.04.79).

Augustine Sithole (28) - appeal.

As previously reported, Sithole was found guilty in the Durban Regional Court of making a bomb threat to 2 employees of Lever Brothers, Durban. He was sentenced to 3 years.

On appeal, conviction and sentence were set aside. (Natal Supreme Court, 1.03.79).

Sachareus Alfeus - appeal.

On 24.05.78 Alfeus, a CDA member, was found guilty of Terrorism, and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in the Windhoek Supreme Court. As a shopkeeper, he was found to have supplied provisions to a group of people, knowing that they were SWAPO guerrilla fighters.

Alfeus appealed against both conviction and sentence, and the appeal was upheld by the Appellate Division, which ordered that sentence and conviction be set aside. (Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 22.03.79).

Motsidisi Kate Serokolo (29), Martha Matsheliso Legcabe (57), and Elizabeth Gumede (57).

Charge: Terrorism. The accused are alleged by the state to have rendered material assistance (accommodation, food and information) to a number of trained guerrilla fighters operating in South Africa. It appears as if this trial is related to alleged PAC activity. The trial is due to begin on 18.06.79.

Norman Vusi Thusi (21), Shunzi Columbus Mazibuko (25), and Prince Lube (20).

Charge: Terrorism. The state claims that the 3 accused, being members of the PAC, underwent military and ideological training in China; the state further alleges that, on their arrest, Thusi and Mazibuko were in possession of certain arms and explosives. The trial, set down to be heard in a specially convened Supreme Court in Bloemfontein, is due to begin towards the end of May.

Juma ennis Makake (22).

Charge: Terrorism. The state alleged that Makake assisted a number of people to leave South Africa and undergo military training.

Verdict: Guilty of assisting 3 people to undergo military training.

Sentence: 5 years. (Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 28.04.79).

Deon du Plessis (28).

Charge: Defence Act and Official Secrets Act. The accused, a journalist of the Star's Africa Service, is alleged by the state to have researched and written a manuscript on the civil war in Rhodesia, and South Africa's military involvement therein. At the time of writing, a trial date had not been set.

Tandisizwe Mazibuko.

Charge: Contravention of his banning order. Mazibuko, former section 10 detainee, was until his banning a member of the Soweto 'Committee of Ten'.

Tom Tsotetsi (24)

Charge: Terrorism. The accused, who appeared in the Vanderbijlpark Regional Court on 4.04.79., is charged with threatening to burn down the house of a member of the Vaal Community Council unless he resigned from that body.

Seeld Newspaper.

Charge: Internal Security Act. The representatives of this Afrikaans newspaper were charged with publishing a speech prepared by W.W. Vorster at the time he was under a banning order.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: Editor and reporter responsible - cautioned and discharged.

Publisher: R100. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 8.03.79)

and Asaka (27), Simon Thethwa (27), Zephania Zwane (32), Sueden Boqo (32), and Ephraim Ngcule (33).

Charge: Unlawful possession of arms and ammunition (pistols and 9 mm cartridges). Thusfar, the accused have made only one remand court appearance. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 15.03.79).

Lazarus Lebelwane (18), Mokgotle Marumo (18), Ezekiel Seakgwa (19), Molefi Nhlapo (19), and two 16 year-old youths.

Charge: Sabotage, alternatively arson. The state alleges that, on 7.12.78 the accused petrol-bombed the house of a security policeman, Jeremiah Matsolo, in Sebokeng near Vereeniging. The trial is due to begin in the Vereeniging Regional Court on 25.06.79. (Vereeniging Regional Court, 22.03.79).

Norman Velaphi Ngwenya (24).

Charge: 5 counts of Terrorism, and one count of possessing unlawful publications. The state claimed that the accused was involved in placing a bomb on the railway line between Apex and Dunsward in November 1977, placing a bomb in a parking lot in Benoni in December 1977, possession of explosives, arms and ammunition, and that he underwent military training at the hands of the ANC between October 1977 and January 1978. The state also alleged that Ngwenya was part of a group which attempted to plant a bomb at Dunsward station in January 1978, and that on his arrest he was in possession of certain illegal literature.

According to evidence led in court, the

group which attempted to plant a bomb at the Dunsward station in January 1978 was disturbed by a policeman. One of the group then shot the policeman.

As has happened on a number of occasions in cases of this nature, the accused was taken directly to court from detention and there, without having any legal representation, he made certain admissions which amounted to a plea of guilty on all counts. The case was then transferred to the Supreme Court, where it proceeded on the basis that the accused had already pleaded guilty.

Verdict: Guilty on all counts.

Sentence: A total of 40 years imprisonment. Because certain sentences are to run concurrently, the effective sentence is 12 years. (Specially convened Supreme Court, Benoni, 22.03.79).

Churchill Luvuno (22).

Charge: Terrorism. The accused gave evidence for the defence in the Bethal PAC trial, and was immediately thereafter arrested and charged with perjury on the basis that his evidence contradicted a previous statement which he had made to police while in detention. Shortly thereafter, he was re-detained, and charged under the Terrorism Act. According to the state, Luvuno left the country to undergo military training, and formed a PAC cell in South Africa called 'Triangle Battlefield Organisation'. While awaiting trial, the accused was seriously ill, and was admitted to hospital, and examined by a neurologist. Police spokesman said that he was on a hunger strike. However, one of the accused in the Bethal PAC trial, John Ganya,

claimed in evidence that it was untrue that Luvuno was on a hunger strike in prison.

The trial is due to take place in the Bethal Regional Court.

Mziwamadoda Kalako (22), Miss Kholeka Foley (26), Sizwe Tini (22), Mrs. Josephine Bookolane (40), Eric Ngeleza (40) and Weaver Magcail (38).

Charge: Terrorism and Internal Security Acts. The state alleged that the accused, as members or active supporters of the ANC, recruited 75 people to leave South Africa and undergo military training.

Verdict: Kalako, Ngeleza and Bookolane - guilty of Terrorism.

Foley guilty under Internal Security Act. Magcail and Tini - not guilty.

Sentence: Ngeleza - 10 years.

Kalako - 9 years.

Bookolane - 8 years.

Foley - 3 years, 2 of them suspended for 5 years.

(Humansdorp Regional Court, 5.04.79).

Ezekiel Molefe (22).

Charge: Perjury. In November 1978 Molefe, an ex Soweto student, was called by the state to give evidence in the trial of the 11 Soweto students charged with Sedition. After giving evidence, he was discredited by the state, and charged with perjury. In his evidence in the Kempton Park trial, Molefe claimed the police had tortured him by electrically shocking him to say certain things in his statement which were not true.

Molefe is appearing in the Kempton Park Regional Court.

Mrs. Nto Mitta Maphike (43).

Charge: Terrorism. The state claimed that Maphike recruited certain people for military training. During a remand appearance, the presiding magistrate criticised the security police for showing a 'remarkable lack of co-operation' regarding arrangements for the defence of the accused.

Verdict: Guilty. The presiding magistrate found that Maphike had recruited 5 people to undergo military training in Swaziland, and that her activities spanned the month of February 1978.

Sentence: 5 years. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 30.03.79)

Ethel Wauchope (52) and Washington Mlauzi (36). Charge: Terrorism. The state alleges that, between the period January 1st to August 31st 1978, the accused assisted 8 people to leave South Africa to undergo military training. Witnesses for the state have included a woman serving a 5 year sentence for Terrorism, who has given evidence in a number of trials recently, and a former member of the now banned South African Students Movement (SASM), who told the court that she had been arrested in Bophuthatswana together with ex SSRC leader Issie Oxuluwe. She further told the court that, together with other students, she had joined the ANC in Botswana, and when arrested was on her way back to South Africa.

The trial, which is being heard in the Johannesburg Regional Court, has been postponed until July 9th.

Jusumzi Mcongo (10).

Charge: Murder, Sabotage, public violence and malicious damage to property.

As was previously reported, the state alleged that Mcongo was part of a group which, while returning from a funeral, chased and killed an alleged police informer.

Work In Progress is not in possession of any information as to the result of this case, which was heard in the Cape Elizabeth Supreme Court during August 1978. The editors would appreciate information on the outcome of the trial.

However, a recent press report, stating that a group of Robben Island prisoners have been charged with attempted murder of a prison official, includes Mcongo as one of the accused. It is accordingly assumed that he was found guilty of one of the charges, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

Steven Khanawitz (22).

Charge: Possession of unlawful publications, namely 'The riot police and the suppression of the truth'; 'South Africa - a police state?'; 'National Student no.1, 1978'; and 'Political imprisonment in South Africa'. Khanawitz, a past president of the University of Cape Town Students' Representative Council, claimed in evidence that he had not been aware that certain of the publications were in his possession, and had not known that another was banned for possession.

Verdict: Guilty of possessing 'The riot police' and 'South Africa - a police state?'

Sentence: R100 or 100 days, suspended for 5 years. (Cape Town Regional Court, 26.04.79).

Fatima Meer and Baptiste Marie.

Charge: Contravention of their respective banning orders by attending a social function.

This trial, which has been heard in the Durban Regional Court over a period of more than a year because of frequent adjournments, is due to continue on 12.06.79.

At the close of the state case a defence application for the discharge of both accused was refused by the presiding magistrate.

Sheila Weinberg - appeal.

As previously reported, Weinberg was originally charged in the Johannesburg Regional Court with contravening her banning order by having lunch with a friend. She was found guilty and sentenced to 9 months, suspended for 3 years. She appealed against conviction and sentence to the Transvaal Supreme Court, claiming inter alia that 2 people meeting together could not be a prohibited gathering in terms of a banning order. This appeal was turned down, the presiding judges finding that 2 could constitute a gathering. Sentence was reduced, however, to 3 months, suspended. Because of the enormous implications of this decision for all South Africa's banned, Weinberg appealed further on this matter, arguing the merits of it in the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein.

The presiding judges found that, while two people could constitute a gathering in terms of the Internal Security Act, Weinberg's banning order was not framed in that particular way, and accordingly her luncheon date with a friend was not an offence. Conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside.

Rex Gibson, editor of the Sunday Express, and Jennifer Hyman, senior reporter.

Charge: Criminal defamation, and contempt of court. The charges arose from an article written by Ms. Hyman in the Sunday Express, dealing with certain problems of defence representation in political trials. In the article, it was suggested that when certain people were brought to court from detention, their duly instructed lawyers were not informed; that pro deo counsel were often then appointed to defend people charged with serious offences under the Terrorism and Sabotage Acts, and that pro deo counsel were in general not equipped to handle such cases.

In a Supreme Court trial which canvassed a number of issues relating to police administration of political detainees when they were first brought to court and charged, a series of allegations which the Sunday Express had made against the security police seem to have been proved. In particular, it seems to have been put by the defence that on a number of occasions security police brought accused people to court from detention without informing their duly instructed defence lawyers.

Verdict: Not guilty on both counts.

(Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, 30.04.79).

Zephania Mothopeng (65), John Ganya (48), Mark Shinners (37), Bennie Ntsoele (38), Hamilton Keke (42), Michael Khala (24), Alfred Ntshali-Tshali (47), Julius Landringwe (30), Zolile Ndindwa (26), Moffat Zungu (28), Goodwell Moni (24), Jerome Kouisang (26), Michael Matsobane (36), Johnson Nyathi (32), Themba Hlatshwayo (21),

Mothlagegi Thlale (22), Rodney Tsoletsane (20), and Daniel Matsobane (31).

Charge: Terrorism, alternatively furthering the aims of the PAC. This lengthy trial of 18 alleged members or supporters of the PAC, being heard in the Eastern Transvaal town of Mthatha, seems to be coming to an end. The charges involve allegations of recruitment for military training, conspiracy on Robben Island and elsewhere to revive the PAC, utilisation of 'front organisations' to further the aims of the PAC, involvement in the urban revolt in Kagiso near Krugersdorp, and various other matters.

The defence has now closed its case, and the trial begins again on 21.05.79 when the state will present its argument on the merits of the case.

Chief Twala (18), Daniel Sechaba Montsitsi (23), Seth Mazibuko (19), Mafison Morobe (22), Jefferson Lengane (21), Sibongile Mthembu (22), Thabo Ndabeni (21), Kennedy Mogami (19), Reginald Teboho Mngomezulu (21), Michael Khiba (20), and George Twala (23).

Charge: Sedition, alternatively Terrorism. This lengthy and important trial, heard in Kempton Park, related in the main to the urban revolt in Soweto in 1976 and 1977, and the role of the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC) and the South African Students Movement (SASM) in those events.

At the conclusion of the trial the presiding judge found that the various gatherings and demonstrations organised by the SSRC and SASM were seditious in nature, and accordingly all 11 accused were found guilty on the main count of sedition.

Sentence: Chief Twala, Jefferson Lengane,

Thabo Ndabeni, Kennedy Mogami, Reginald Mngomezulu, Michael Khiba and George Twala: 5 years, suspended for 5 years.

Daniel Sechaba Montsitsi: 3 years, 4 of which are suspended.

Seth Mazibuko: 6 years, 4 of which are suspended.

Mafison Morobe: 7 years, 4 suspended.

Sibongile Mthembu: 6 years, 4 suspended.

(It should be noted that Montsitsi is suing the Minister of Police for assaults allegedly committed on him during his detention).

Thami Mazwai - appeal.

As previously reported, Mazwai (33) was convicted in the Johannesburg Regional Court last year, the presiding magistrate having found that he had made two conflicting statements under oath. He had given evidence for the state in the trial of two officials of the banned Union of Black Journalists (UBJ), Phil Mtshali and Juby Mayet, who were subsequently both acquitted. Mazwai was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment.

He appealed against conviction and sentence, and while the Supreme Court confirmed conviction, sentence was altered to 12 months, conditionally suspended. (Pretoria Supreme Court, 7.05.79).

Lawrence Mvula - appeal.

As previously reported, Mvula was convicted of Sabotage, and then arson, in two of the 'Hermanus trials' held in the Cape last year. He was found guilty in the Hermanus Regional Court of helping to set fire to a classroom of the I.D. Mkhize High School on September 11th, 1977, and sentenced to 5 years on the

Sabotage count, and 3 years on the arson count (a total of 8 years).

We appealed to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was turned down. However, the presiding judges did rule that the 3 year sentence should run concurrently with the 5 years, reducing the effective sentence to one of 5 years. (Cape Town Supreme Court, 3.05.79).

Vusumzi Mcongo (19), Zuko Camagu (18), Mncedisi Siswana (22), Jeffrey Klaas (22), Khumbalele Mnikina (29) and Lawrence Mvula (20).

Charge: Attempted murder. All the accused are political prisoners, serving terms on Robben Island. They are now charged with attempting to kill the second-in-command of the prison, Captain Harding, on February 9th, 1979. The trial is to be heard in the Cape Town Regional Court on June 18th.

The government's new constitutional proposals, which crucially affect the Indian and Coloured communities, have precipitated a major storm in progressive Indian circles. Reports reaching the editors indicate that the Natal Indian Congress is split on whether to boycott the new proposed Indian body, or to participate in the proposed elections. Within the Transvaal, it is also believed that a fierce debate is raging over which of the ~~two~~ ^{two} parties is the more progressive. The editors are keen to run an article in a future issue of WIP dealing with the various perspectives on this issue, and would welcome any contributions.

On the Sunday following the execution of Solomon Mahlangu, a memorial service was held at a Church in Soweto. According to an eye witness account, Dr. Lethoto Motlana, chairman of Soweto's Committee of Ten, attempted to speak at the meeting, but was forced to leave the hall because of the hostile response of many of the youth present.

Amongst other things, Motlana was accused of 'trying to turn Soweto into a Bantustan' through his committee's demand for municipal autonomy, and of neglecting the interests of rural blacks in South Africa.

Of interest is the fact that although reporters from both the Rand Daily Mail and Post were present, this dramatic incident was not reported in the press.

