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POLITICS

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ALAN PATON ON "KATRINA"

EDITORIAL

IN PEACE FOR ALL MANKIND

We have just lived through one of the most stupendous weeks in the history of mankind, the journey of man to the moon, his walking on its surface, his safe return to the earth. No event in history has ever been known to be happening by so many human beings. No event in history has ever been watched, nor any account of any event listened to, by so many people.

The men who performed this stupendous feat are Americans. There is no doubt that this fact was of great importance to the rulers of the Russians and the mainland Chinese, none of whom was permitted to watch it, and some of whom (the Chinese it is said) were not even permitted to know it. We may assume also that to some citizens of the United States the fact was also of great importance. But to the rest of us it was of no importance at all. This was the journey of men to the moon. Admittedly they planted the Stars and Stripes on the lunar surface, but this may be pardoned as an understandable piece of boasting. Their other actions and the plaque they left behind, were proofs that the United States itself regarded this as a great achievement by man.

WAR

Is this venture into space going to draw the people of the earth closer together? One thing is certain, and that is that man will never be quite the same again. What the psychological effects will be, and how long they will take to show themselves, no one can predict. Will the waging of war be seen more and more as a grotesque human activity, as many of our younger people are already seeing it? It is possible (though no one knows) that the waging of war to extend national possessions will never occur again, but will the waging of war to extend national security be seen as grotesque also? No one can say. All that one can risk saying is that it appears more likely than ever before in man's history, that he

will see all men as joint-possessors of the earth, all holding the earth jointly in trust, and that because of this, the waging of war will become more and more unthinkable.

The responsibility of the United States of America for the future and security of mankind is quite incalculable. So are the responsibilities of Russia and China. And now we are beginning to see that none of these responsibilities will be carried out unless they are recognised to be one and the same responsibility. Yet it is hard for us in South Africa to write authoritatively about the ways in which Russia and China see their responsibilities. We can write much more authoritatively about the responsibility of the United States, partly because we belong to the same kind of world and partly because the Americans speak and write so freely and honestly about it.

THE U.S.A. — OUR WORLD

The kind of world that the United States of America belongs to, and leads in a kind of way, a world which includes Western Europe, and amongst many other countries, our own South Africa, faces a number of tremendous problems the solution, or part-solution, of which is vital to the future of mankind. If the United States fails to solve these problems, humanity will never solve them either, and if humanity does not solve them, the future of the race, and the future of human purpose and happiness will be in peril. It makes no difference whether we like America or do not, whether we recoil from American permissiveness or not, we have no future apart from her, because for better or for worse, she is our world.

One of these tremendous problems is that which stems from the intellectual and technological dominance of the white world, the world of Europe, over the rest of mankind. This resulted in colonialism, the conquest and exploitation of non-European countries, the slave trade, the assumption of white superiority that has so wounded other peoples, the colour bar and other forms of race discrimination, and finally, the ever-growing affluence of the countries of the west. This resulted in a growing alienation, which is now seen to be one of mankind's most urgent problems. Moreover we have learned that political independence without economic strength is worthless, and the removal of legal disabilities equally so. This is to be seen nowhere more clearly than in the United States, and what she does is going to affect powerfully all the countries of the western world.

The hardest lesson to be learned is that just as colonialism had catastrophic effects, so the undoing of colonialism has catastrophic effects also; but that the undoing cannot on those grounds be delayed. That is why there is in the United States a profound struggle between those who uphold law and order in the attempt to preserve the status quo, and those who see the need for change of a kind that might almost be described as fundamental.

Another of the tremendous problems that face mankind is closely akin to the first. It is the problem of poverty. In general white nations are rich, and the others are poor. In general white people are rich, and the others are poor. This disparity naturally exacerbates the race conflict. And what exacerbates it further is the fact that the rich nations and the rich people grow richer, and the poor nations and the poor people grow poorer. It almost appears that if you are poor, you cannot catch up.

No nation is more desperately confronted by this problem than the United States. She is the richest of the rich nations in a poor and hungry world.

And at home her civil rights programme, her school integration, her striking down of restrictions on negro voters, have not solved the problems of poverty. How is the problem of the hungry world going to be solved? Certainly not by charity. Is the human race not being forced to a greater recognition of its oneness? Is the American nation not being forced to a recognition of its own oneness? She is only now beginning to understand fully the breath-taking assumptions of her own Constitution, which were hidden from her because she did not foresee the day when slaves and the descendants of slaves would have to be regarded as citizens of the United States of America.

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

Let us consider one more problem, that of the liberty of the individual under the authority of the State. So vast are the challenges that confront mankind, and the nations of mankind, so great are the powers required by governments, that it is easy to fall prey to the belief that man must sacrifice his liberty to authority if he wishes to be happy and secure. No country faces this temptation more than the United States of America. Many citizens are tempted to believe that the Constitution went too far, or that it is not adapted to the exigencies of the modern world. No

Her whole account of the organization of this meeting is irresistibly reminiscent of episodes in the early history of the Black Sash.

> We longed to protest, and it occurred to me that women, at least, might make a public protest without arousing undue criticism. The idea came to me at a small dinner party . . . We formed, of course, branches throughout London with excellent workers . . . The result was a magnificent assemblage of women, representative not only of London but of the whole country.[4]

South Africans who are made angry and ashamed before the world at the oppressive injustice of their country's policies, can well understand the feelings in this letter to Smuts, written in 1903:

> You think it bad to be an Afrikander at this moment — believe me it is **far** worse to be an English person. Your defeat may be bad but it is material; **ours** is moral.[5]

FAMILIAR REACTION

The concentration camp affair itself, seen as an attempt to expose and remedy official abuses, strikes notes all too familiar in South Africa now. There was an immediate reaction of smears and insults in some sections of the press; and it was largely asserted that the illness and deaths in the camps were the results of the Boer's own primitive and insanitary habits. (However, Emily Hobhouse was done the — to us — unfamiliar honour of having a Commission of Enquiry set up to investigate her allegations; and her angry reference to this Ladies' Committee as a whitewashing Commission simply shows that she did not know how lucky she was). Official vengeance was, however, taken on her through her arrest and deportation — under martial law — in Table Bay in October, 1901. Her reactions to this experience surely represent some of the first acts of passive resistance on our (literal) shores.

She writes in her autobiography:

> The shock was to find oneself — a law-abiding, free English woman — arrested and imprisoned. Brought up as we were in strict obedience to law and enjoying freedom as the breath of life — this illegality stunned me.[6]

She was by no means, however, stunned into submission, as the letters written to England during her several days' detention on the ship clearly reveal:

> I began to see my way and brace myself to the battle . . . I shall be very polite, very dignified, but in every way I possibly can a thorn in the flesh to them . . . For instance **they** don't want it much talked of in Cape Town, and I mean it should be . . . I shall at once demand a guard . . . because I undermean to refuse to return to England . . . unless of course they send me under force of arms . . . I shall refuse to pay my keep on this ship. It is ten shillings a day . . . Also if they send me home, Government must pay my passage . . .[7]

stand they don't want to do it because of making it conspicuous . . . I also

PROVOCATIVE DEFIANCE

In the event she **did** refuse to board the returning ship, and had to be forcibly carried on to it by stretcher-bearers. Surely any good Nationalist Minister of Justice, whatever attitudes to Emily Hobhouse he may have learned at his mother's knee, must feel his official hackles rise at all these instances of deliberate and provocative defiance of authority in a time of national emergency.

Gandhi himself obviously gave attention to accounts of this or other of Emily Hobhouse's exploits. In 1913, when a dangerous deadlock seemed to have been reached between Smuts and the indignant Indians of the Transvaal, it was she to whom Gandhi appealed, to act as mediator. Accordingly she wrote to Smuts on 29th December:

> We women, you know, **are** developing public consciences at a surprising pace . . . I should not presume (since you are a Minister) to write to you, had it not been that Gandhi has **asked** me to do so . . . You see January 15 is the date now proposed for another march. **Before then** some way must be found of giving private assurance to the leaders that satisfaction is coming to them. Their grievance is really **moral** not material and so, having all the power of the spiritual behind him, he (Gandhi) and you are like Mrs. Pankhurst and McKenna and **never, never, never** will governmental physical force prevail against a great moral and spiritual upheaval. Wasted time and wasted energy dear Oom Jannie . . .[8]

Perhaps because of these representations Smuts and Gandhi met and the march was called off.

"BE MERCIFUL . . ."

Emily Hobhouse's awareness of these and other tensions in South Africa no doubt prompted her to add these optimistic words to her address for the unveiling of the Monument:

> In your hands and those of your children lie the power and freedom won; you must not merely maintain but increase the sacred gift. Be merciful towards the weak, the downtrodden, the stranger. Do not open your gates to those worst foes of freedom — tyranny and selfishness. Are not those the withholding from others in your control the very liberties and rights which you have valued for yourselves? So will the Monument speak to you.[9].

Partly because of her bitter experience in the Boer War of the inevitable collapse of human and civilized sanctions and standards in wartime, Emily Hobhouse came to be a determined and increasingly militant pacifist. She objected also to Britain's participation in the First World War, and even wrote with despairing anger to her old friend Smuts about his own part in it:

> We (women) have to try and undo all that you and those like you have done, the woe, the ruin, the misery you have wrought . . . We believe, not in narrow Nationalism, but in Internationalism, the Brotherhood of Man, and we recognise **no** enemies, all humanity are our friends and our interests everywhere are one and the same . . .[10].

SUPPORT FOR REBELS

Her support for General Beyers and his rebels was qualified by her disapproval of their having actually taken up arms. She wrote a sympathetic letter to Beyers's cousin, Mrs. Deborah Hofmeyr, after his death, but expressed her regret that they had not 'offered passive resistance and stayed at home to be shot in cold blood!'[11] She attended the Women's Peace Conference in Holland in 1915, and, as a gesture of total dissociation from national hostilities, and perhaps also with a vain hope of appealing for peace to the better feelings of the German leaders, contrived also to visit Belgium and Germany in the next year. After the war she flung herself into activities to aid its civilian victims, organizing a Russian Babies' Fund, a Fund to Aid Swiss Relief (for starving children) and a fund for the children of Leipzig. She worked in Leipzig herself for some months, despite increasing ill-health, helping to provide, among other services, an annual total of '3,444,929 portions of warm dinner.'

She set out her considered judgements of war in many speeches and writings, of which this is representative:

> Holding, as I do, that a war is not only wrong in itself, but a crude mistake, I stand wholly outside its passions, and feel, while it lasts, a spectator of a scene I deplore, but with which I am in no sense a part. I give, have given, and will give nothing to any fund to aid war or warriors . . .[12]

She was not in a position to comment, however, in 1969, when her name was given to a South African submarine. Surely no more egregious evidence of historical obtuseness can be imagined than naming a vessel of war in honour of a pacifist. Posterity has been unkind to Emily Hobhouse. She was attacked so violently in England by jingoes and conventional patriots in two wars that much of the mud has stuck and she is remembered there, if at all, rather vaguely as a renegade or a crank. In South Africa she is enthusiastically commemorated, but in ways that associate her with militarism, racial prejudice and oppressive nationalism: the very qualities which she spent her active life in combating.

1 Fry, A. Ruth: **Emily Hobhouse:** J. Cape, 1929, p. 86.
2 Fry, p. 65.
3 Fry, p. 72.
4 Fry, p. 68.
5 Hancock, W. K.: **Smuts — The Sanguine Years, 1870—1919:** Camb. U.P. 1962, p. 185.
6 Fry, p. 173.
7 Fry, pp. 171 f.
8 Hancock, p. 344.
9 Fry, p. 264.
10 Hancock, p. 406.
11 Paton, Alan: **Hofmeyr:** O.U.P. 1964, p. 58.
12 Fry, p. 267.

SOME NOTES ON LIBERALISM

by C. O. Gardner

First, some disclaimers.

I am going to say a little about POLITICAL liberalism: in philosophy, in morals, in law and in theology — each with its own specific commitments, problems and complexities — the word "liberalism" has somewhat varying meanings and implications. A good deal of confusion has been caused by vague bandying about of the word "liberal", without definition or context.

Then, what I offer **are notes,** not a whole account or a fully-fledged argument. I make no attempt to answer all of the many objections that may be, and frequently are, brought against political liberalism. (It is one of the characteristics of liberalism that, representing — as I believe it does — the central tradition of civilization, it finds itself attacked from every side.)

Finally, these notes are my own. Probably most political liberals would agree with many of the things I say; but I don't want to seem to involve anyone else in my own responses and hunches.

* * * *

WHAT IS LIBERALISM?

Any political attitude, any set of general views about the way men should be governed, is an expression of a fundamental attitude towards men and towards life itself — a disposition of soul. What then lies behind liberalism?

Essentially, I believe, all that is most humane and civilized — tolerance and kindliness, going hand-in-hand with a firm grasp of all truly human values; an ardent desire to improve the lot of mankind, together with a strong allegiance to all that is good in the past; a love of freedom coupled with a dislike of anarchy. Not the status quo, then (or not so far; the status quo in some countries is, of course, far less outrageous than in others). Nor revolution (on the whole: there are of course situations — Hungary in 1956, for example — where liberals would see a revolution as perhaps the best way of gaining the future while retaining the best of the past). Not, on the whole, these things; but, in general, a living evolution.

What could be more sensible, more sane, more wise? And yet that last paragraph of mine — crude as it is — expresses in its complications and its qualifications not only something of the complexity of the liberal attitude but the painful and awkward tensions within it. Where does one draw the dividing line between freedom and anarchy? At what points might tolerance conflict with a regard for human values? How does one strike a balance between hopes for the future and allegiance to the past?

There is nothing simple and straightforward about liberalism. This is to its credit. Simple solutions are almost always false solutions — incorrect, or dishonest, or both. Political liberalism is one of the finest achievements of civilization.

Many different emphases are possible within liberalism. Most western states and several others (I do not include South Africa) are fundamentally liberal; most of the political parties within these states are liberal in their axioms. And this is not surprising: the chief tenets of liberalism — the worth and the freedom of the individual, the dissemination in free interplay of the most valuable ideas and insights — turn out to be perhaps the chief notions lying behind western and all other civilization.

PRACTICAL POLTICS

But when it comes to practical politics, liberalism seems to provide not so much the best basis for governing as merely the least bad. Life is a tragically difficult business; situations are unpredictable; people are awkward; moreover ideas do not easily translate themselves into practice. It is not easy for any government to know when to be tolerant, when to be stern, when to be adventurous, when to be cautious. All political decisions are apt to be, to some extent, leaps in the dark. But a liberal government, in practice, seems likely to be more open-minded, more flexible, more educated and civilized, than any other sort of government.

What are the temptations of the liberal attitude? Being calm and sane, it is in danger of becoming complacent and sluggish. Being essentially kindly, it is sometimes sentimental or naive. Being idealistic often, it is apt occa-

sionally to be unreal. Sometimes it is too radical, sometimes too conservative; and so on. Poised as it is on a delicate point in civilized balance, there may be fallings-off in many directions. Yet these temptations cannot disqualify liberalism itself. The temptations of other political attitudes, indeed the very **essences** of other attitudes — the nationalistic, the reactionary, the revolutionary — are clearly far more dangerous.

SOUTH AFRICA

When liberalism confronts white South African nationalism, one realizes of course how radical liberalism can be. Yet its radicalism is humane rather than fierce (though humane views sometimes need to be expressed with a certain fierceness). Many things are to be abolished, many things completely or partly reconstructed, for there are numerous fundamental injustices in the land. But the past is not utterly rejected; continuities are to be maintained wherever they are valid and possible.

It would be foolish to pretend that the South African political situation is not unusually difficult and perilous. One would sympathize with the white nationalists in their desire to maintain civilized values if it were not that they have either a very hazy or a totally unacceptable idea of what such values are. One can sympathize with their desire to retain some sort of traditional corporate identity. What it is impossible to sympathize with is the nationalists' way of formulating and then imposing their desires.

Any liberal would agree that when South Africa's time of change comes various kinds of safeguard and control will have to be exercised. What a liberal cannot tolerate is an aggressive-defensive fierceness which amounts to a denial of change — especially when change is so vitally necessary.

NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM

At root, the difference between the nationalist and the liberal seems to be this: the former, deeply and fanatically attached to his group and his past and his own narrow notion of civilization, has little energy left for a genuinely sympathetic consideration of other people and other ideas. The liberal, on the other hand, unable to give himself over to an exclusive group loyalty or to circumscribed thoughts, remains aware of humanity as a whole and indeed of the whole of life. Moreover the nationalist **fears** the human heart — the hearts of the people who lie outside his group, but his own heart too. Whereas the liberal, without (if he is wise) being naively optimistic, trusts that the chances are that civilization, if one keeps an eye on it, and if one tries to embody it oneself as far as possible, will in the end prevail.

Nationalism relies ultimately on force, liberalism on a reasonable faith. Liberalism has nothing to be ashamed of in this: many of the greatest human achievements have been, in one way or another, achievements of faith — faith in man, and perhaps, in some sense, faith in God. But man cannot live by faith alone. In order to succeed in all the vicissitudes of human existence, liberalism requires intelligence and energy and creative and flexible leadership — and, when it is in power, the ability to be stern.

LIBERALISM AND RADICALISM

When liberalism is placed beside neo-Marxist radicalism (of the sort to be found, say, in "activist" student followers of Marcuse, in Europe and America), one is struck by the conservative nature of liberalism. The charge made by the people of the far left against liberalism — which they hate quite as bitterly as white South African nationalists do — is that, by refusing to reject utterly both the past and the whole western political-social-economic "system", it is allying itself wittingly or unwittingly with the privileged powers-that-be, with the so-called "military-industrial complex", and thus proving — because of its **apparent** benevolence and progressiveness — more of a menace to the cause of justice than out-and-out reactionism. Liberalism is seen as refusing to face up to the fundamental problems of society because of its attachment to such bourgeois notions as "freedom of individual choice" and "freedom of thought and discussion". (This last accusation — if one were to remove the word "bourgeois" — is one that white nationalism would endorse.)

It is true, as I have said earlier, that liberals are sometimes complacent — and I think it is an undeniable sociological fact that, in any society, liberalism is apt to be strongest among those people who do not have to worry very much about either salary or status. And it is perhaps true that many a useful cause has been initiated dramatically and effectively (though often rather violently) by people who are more fanatical and single-minded than liberals can easily allow themselves to be.

NO APOLOGY

And yet liberalism makes no apology for itself. Liberals are or should be alert to social needs; they must pay close attention to the

neo-Marxist critique of western society and indeed to all important critiques. At the same time, however (I am thinking particularly of Europe and America), liberals are alert to the virtues of the status quo, and they refuse to believe — unless they are offered powerful and incontrovertible evidence — that society needs to be turned upside down before it can be made tolerable. Nor are they convinced that a theoretical and forcible rearrangement of society which would supposedly eliminate every slightest form of inequality (any more than a theoretical and forcible apartheid which would supposedly eliminate every kind of racial rivalry) is worth trying for at the cost of the freedoms, the mobilities and the comparative relaxedness of traditional western-type society. As for the argument that liberal thinking is merely the product of social and financial security, it is not difficult to find the answer: liberals possess, perhaps partly because of their (usually fairly modest) status in society, the broad-mindedness and the sympathetic and sane objectivity which, when society has improved in the ways liberals want it to, all thoughtful people will be capable of.

The representatives of the far left, it seems to me, for all the value of their critique at certain points, focus their attention too intensely and too exclusively upon certain aspects of man and society; liberals have a better sense of man in his wholeness. Again, people of the left are the more theoretical and doctrinaire; liberals, unwilling to impose simple formulae on human complexity, are rather more pragmatic. Neo-marxists are apt to think from textbooks, whereas liberals (ideally speaking) work from intuition — a hopeful but disenchanted intuition nourished by a wide experience, both in everyday reality and in reading, of human life.

A SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION

I have praised liberalism, largely because I believe that, especially at this present time, both in South Africa and in Europe and America, political liberalism deserves and needs to be praised. But I wish now to pose a South African question which may seem to have the effect of annihilating much of the praise: certainly it may serve to dispel whatever new stores of complacency may have been gathering in the hearts of my liberal readers.

Has this country reached a point where for various reasons very few people are capable of taking up or even of recognizing a really humane attitude? Are South African liberals living in a situation where their views, simply because so few people seem to find them acceptable, are no longer really relevant? Has political libralism any real part to play at the moment?

Probably most of the liberals who have left the country found themselves unable to give a confidently affirmative answer to this last question. And those who remain do not find it easy to be hopeful. Yet they feel that they owe a multiple allegiance — to their beliefs, and to their friends of various races, and to the country which is so much in need of the liberal leaven. But what can they do?

It is not the purpose of these notes to suggest a full answer. I am not going to expatiate upon specific plans of action and methods of persuasion — but I believe that there **are** things that can be done. This much, however, I will say: liberalism is partly an attitude — an attitude that is by no means wholly dead in South Africa — and every idea or thought or insight or action which serves in any way to promote the liberal frame of mind is valuable.

Indeed all true thought, all real education — every single attempt to see man in his wholeness, and to relate, thoughtfully and sensitively, the present to the past and to the future — is, in a sense that is closely related to the one I have been using, **liberal.**

PETER BROWN — REBANNED

by Alan Paton

(A speech delivered in Pietermaritzburg on 8th August.)

"SOUTH AFRICA IS A LAND OF FEAR, BUT IT'S A LAND OF COURAGE ALSO."

Not one of us who has come here to protest against this second five-year ban on Mr. Peter Brown knows the reasons why he has been banned. I myself do not know, yet I was more intimately associated with him in politics than anyone else. He was the National Chairman of the Liberal Party, and I was its National President. He never took any action that caused me any disquiet. He never concealed any action from me. He never lied. He never intrigued. Any kind of underground dealing was foreign — and is foreign — to his nature. Why then has he been banned again? is the question that we are asking. But before I try to answer it, let me say a few words about the meaning of banning.

It is the Minister who bans, and he bans persons because unrestricted they are a danger to the security of the State. Mr. Peter Brown has been banned because in the view of the Minister he is a danger to the security of the State. If that means that he would, if he were freed, make plans to overthrow the government by violence, or incite others to do so, or behave violently, then it is a nonsensical allegation. It cannot be challenged except in the way that we challenge it today. It cannot be challenged in a court of law, because banning, although it is a legalized process, is beyond legal challenge.

A KIND OF IMPRISONMENT

We have condemned before today this supra-legal process of banning, and we do it again today. Another five years of a kind of imprisonment have been imposed on Mr. Peter Brown. Yet his offence is unknown. He has not been charged with any offence. He has not been brought before any court and proved to be guilty. Yet a sentence of great severity has been imposed upon him.

One of the most inhuman requirements of this sentence is that he shall not attend any gathering, and this has been interpretated by the courts to mean that he shall virtually abstain from social life.

One of the consequences of this is that the friends of banned persons begin to avoid them lest they cause trouble for them. It so happens that Mr. Peter Brown likes people and their company, though I must admit that he likes some people and some company better than he likes others, a characteristic that he shares with most of us. Therefore when I heard that the ban had been renewed, I experienced — as many of you did too — a feeling of grief as well as of anger.

One feels grief, not only because the whole pattern of a man's life, and his wife's life, and his children's lives, is being changed, but because the power that does it is a cruel power, seemingy inflexible, august in its majesty because it is the power of the State. Yet one feels anger also, because this power is puerile as well, in that it cannot abide opposition, it cannot abide those who criticise its policies. It reacts, not with gravity and dignity, but with a viciousness that ill befits so august an authority. The trouble is that the august power of the State is in the custody of a human government, whose representatives are not gods, but humans. One of them has described the wives and families of African men as "appendages". Another has threatened the representatives of the South African Council of Churches that their cloth will not save them from his wrath. Another described a retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Africa as a mischief-maker.

NO SLAVISH OBEDIENCE

Every free man is required to respect the lawfully constituted authority. Every free man recognises that there can be no freedom without order. But no free man gives a slavish obedience to authority, nor can he respect an order that does not respect the claims of justice. It is because Mr. Peter Brown does not give a slavish obedience to authority, and because he does not respect an order that permits injustice, that he has again been silenced and restricted. We are not allowed by law to tell you what he has said, or to repeat or publish his words. But luckily we do not need to.

What we are saying here tonight are the things he would have said.

And he would say here unequivocally that he helped to found the Liberal Party because to him Apartheid was a cruel and repressive policy, because Separate Development was to him only a new name for an old authoritarianism, because the existing order was unjust, because husbands working in our towns and cities (where their work was indispensable), were separated by law from their wives and children, because profits counted more than persons, because the working people of South Africa were denied a fair share of the wealth they helped to create.

Mr. Brown sees clearly that the essence of separate development is not that it provides separate freedoms — that is the dream. In essence it is something done by people who have power to people who have none — that is the reality. (Some climb on the bandwagon so that they too can enjoy this power.)

NOT EASY TO CRITICIZE

It is not easy to criticize the lawfully constituted authority, nor to reject its policies. It is even less easy if one is law-abiding, if one has been brought up to be obedient, and to have respect for authority. It may be easy for an anarchist, who does not believe in authority anyway. But it is not easy for a liberal, I mean a liberal spelt with a small "l".

And especially is it not easy, if for the first time in one's life one is kept under surveillance, and one's telephone is tapped, and one's mail is opened, and one's name is taken. One is accused (or one's party is accused, which is safer, but is really the same thing) of furthering the aims of Communism. And then perhaps there is the threat of a day of reckoning, and perhaps one can see that day coming, and one has to decide whether to stop protesting and criticizing, and to stop making common cause with those of one's fellow-countrymen who are of different race and colour from oneself, and to be good and be quiet and be nothing at all, so that the coming of the day may be staved off.

But perhaps one decides that one must not stop protesting and criticizing, perhaps one decides it would be better to lie down and die than to yield one's meaning as a man, perhaps one decides that to be good and be quiet and be nothing is to betray those of one's fellow-countrymen who had made common cause, very often in the face of threats and loss and intimidation, perhaps one decides that that is what life is, not a time in which to be good and be quiet and be nothing, but a time in which to be true to the things one believes and to be true to those who also believe in them, even though it is going to change one's life, and the life of one's wife and children.

FEAR AND COURAGE

So if we grieve for Peter Brown and his wife and children, let us not grieve inordinately. There is no other way in which he could have lived his life. We may grieve for him, but would we have had him be something else? If he had been something else, then we would all have been impoverished.

There are those who ask, what good has it done? It has done a lot of good. It enables us to say, South Africa is a land of fear, but it is a land of courage also. Yet nevertheless, whatever evil, whatever good, has come of this, we are here to make our protest against this act of tyranny and inhumanity. Why can not the Government say to a person whose ban is about to expire, "Your ban is not to be renewed, but we can impose a new one on the day we believe that your words and actions are a danger to the security of the State"? Why cannot they say that? Is there any reason, can there be any reason, for them not to say that? It at least allows some measure of freedom to the person whose ban is about to expire, to decide how he will live his life in the future. Who is the danger to racial peace, Mr. Brown or Dr. Ras Beyers? And which one walks free?

Let me say in conclusion that the onus for making South Africa a land of courage does not rest on Peter Brown alone. It rests on all of us, on those who know and respect him, on those of us who followed him when he was National Chairman of the Liberal Party. It rests on any one of us who loves South Africa, and wants to see her right not wrong, just not cruel, so confident in her cause that she need not deprive one of her best citizens of his freedom to try to make her cause better still.

THE AMERICAN CAMPUS SCENE

by A. S. Mathews

One of the phenomena of present-day America which I found continuously, though often grimly, fascinating during an eight-month visit was the student revolt. I became a very close observer of one of the major events in the progress of this 'revolution' when, towards the end of my working term at Harvard University, radical students seized University Hall, an administration building designed by Bullfinch and situated in the enchanting Harvard 'yard', to emphasize their demands for changes in the university.

In commenting upon a social and cultural phenomenon of this magnitude I must begin with the confession that my proximity to it was more physical than anything else, there having been little time for one engaged in academic work, and subject to all the contrary pulls of New England life, to engage in a profound exploration into the meaning and significance of that movement. The lack of acquaintance with the great body of literature, varying from the serious to the trivial, the eternal to the ephemeral, may perhaps be counterbalanced by the advantages of fresh and disinterested observation. I must make it clear, however, that my sources are not very respectable if judged by academic criteria.

CONTRAST TO SOUTH AFRICA

In contrast to the authoritarian tradition of rule in South Africa, there is not in the United States the same degree of preoccupation with the symptoms of social maladies and their repression. Of course there are fringe groups who, in a tone and style that is strongly reminiscent of local power politics, write off the whole movement as communist agitation to which the only proper response is an iron-fisted repression. Advancing their views under the law and ORDER banner, they are inclined, to the extent that they acknowledge that there are social roots to student unrest, to focus exclusively on the permissiveness of modern American living. This perception only triggers further demands for coercion, as any aberration in the family might have induced a Victorian father to sharpen the severity of his regimen. It was heartening to find that this response, which is the rule in South Africa, was the exception in the United States where people at almost all levels of authority, whilst recognising the need to control the wilder manifestations of the unrest, earnestly sought to understand the underlying causes of discontent.

The attempt to discern the legitimate questionings and new social currents running beneath the surface clamour and strife is indeed a difficult task which has prompted a variey of responses. There are some factors of obvious importance which any serious analysis must take in account: The enormous growth in the student population, the earlier maturity of young people in the universities, coupled with anachronistic restrictions on their freedom, and the role of university performance as the principal determinant of achievement in the outside world. Factors such as these, whilst undoubtedly relevant, merely explain the new status and power of students in society; they do not pinpoint the sources of disaffection.

THE VIETNAM WAR

It is common for commentators on the American student scene to isolate the Vietnam war as the national malady which, above all others, explains turmoil now reigning in the universities. My own limited experience demonstrated quite conclusively that the war, even where it was not an explicit issue between the opposing camps, lay not far below the surface expression of student alienation and rebellion.

But I felt, too, that the war was only the most acute and tangible manifestation of a more permanent and pervasive malaise in that great Western Society. However inarticulately expressed, the complaint is a general one against inhuman policies (including war policies) and the dehumanizing conditions of life in the great military-industrial societies. The development of industry and technology on a giant scale, and increasing power of centralized bureaucratic rule, diminish the significance of individual man and submerge

the specifically human values. A production of The Bacchae by Euripides which I saw whilst in Boston, represented Pentheus as a modern bureaucrat ruling with the aid of baton-wielding riot police, and when Bacchus revealed himself at the end he appeared in Nehru jacket to symbolize modern youth. The interpretation was a crude attempt to make Euripides 'relevant' but it strikingly underlined the attitude of young Americans toward their society and government.

CAPITALISM

Other forces at work in contemporary American life are also seen by thoughtful young people as destructive of all that is good, natural and spontaneous in human relationships.

Many students would agree with Elridge Cleaver that capitalism, which the 'power-elite' tend to represent as a fair policy affording an equal opportunity to all with initiative and ability, is in reality a 'dog-eat-dog' system which is weighted in favour of those who already have power and influence. The American economic system with its underlying materialistic philosophy is therefore seen as involving man in a fiercely competitive and unequal strife in which human values are bound to be debased. This view of the economic system is related to another which presents wealthy men or groups as the real power in the society, operating behind the democratic forms and procedures. When one includes in the reckoning the protest against manipulations and outright abuses of the democratic rules and procedures, especially those perpetrated against the black people of America, it becomes clear that students in the United States are calling into question, and even holding up as myths, its most sacred beliefs and assumptions. If there is a single word which sums up their attitude to the disparity between proclaimed belief and reality, it is the word hyprocrisy.

AGENTS OF THE CORRUPT

If, as I have suggested, the student rebellion has grown out of ills in the national life, why is the attack directed primarily against the universities? Contrary to the frequently reiterated argument of President Abrams of Brandeis University that the universities are by no means the worst, and probably the best, institutions in an imperfect world, many students see them as the covert agents of the corrupt and hypocritical leaders of the establishment.

As conclusive proof of this connection students stress the involvement of universities in military training and research, much of which is directly aiding the American military mission in Vietnam. But once again the war connection is seen as direct and visible evidence of a much deeper and subtler involvement with the evil powers in society. The universities are frequently depicted as the instruments of government, especially of the 'power-elite' in control of government, and their function is to condition their members into acceptance of the false assumptions underlying national aspirations and policy. The image which the university has in the eye of the American radical student explains their attempt to blow up the significance of correspondence seized during the sit-in at Harvard as evidence of a link between the University and the C.I.A.

DESTRUCTION NOT REFORM

Given the tendency of radical students to see the world they live in in such absolutist terms, their programme of action and tactics become explicable. A society so degenerate as to be utterly beyond redemption cannot be reformed but only destroyed; and the universities must be forced to free themselves of their corrupt involvement and to become instead instruments of the revolution designed to break down the existing order. It is this root and branch rejection of the 'system' which explains the irrationalism of the radical groups for many of whom the words 'compromise' and 'dialogue' have no meaning at all, even in the context of University life.

The temptation to counter the radical's uncompromising demands with an equally intransigent repudiation of what they stand for (when that can be known) is one to which the average citizen easily succumbs. Is there any obligation at all to treat with the vociferous, long-haired and frequently unwashed representatives of the 'new left'? (Incidentally, the rejection of conventional values in dress and behaviour is perfectly comprehensible within the framework of radical thinking; the conventional modes are seen as a facade behind which the establishment conceals its true viciousness.)

One of the main thrusts of this article is that the open societies, and, *a fortiori*, authoriatarian societies, are being confronted by a disaffection so profound and total as to make reappraisal and adjustment an absolute imperative. If that is accepted, one is led straight into the most difficult question of all:

What does a true reappraisal reveal about the shortcomings of the democratic tradition, the legitimacy of the radical view and the changes to be implemented. I shall try to answer these questions for the liberal-democrat from whose point of view this article is written. My conclusions will obviously be groping and tentative, and are offered with great diffidence and trepidation.

FLAWS UNCOVERED

The critique implicit in the student rebellion against the conditions of modern society has uncovered flaws in the system which are far from illusory and which transcend the American scene in their importance and general significance. One conclusion that seems to emerge with special sharpness is that the taming of political power, a traditional liberal preoccupation, is only one step in the direction of social justice; attention must equally be given to the taming of money power. Moreover, the guarantee of the political and civil liberties in which all liberals believe may not be effective in preventing a capture of power behind the constitutional forms and the manipulation of the entire governmental framework of the democratic society. The legal and political forms may only serve to conceal the real sources of power.

A corollary to that observation is that social justice in the modern state is not simply a by-product of government according to the liberal democratic tradition; it may (and possibly will) require positive action by organized society in the nature of the constructive programmes launched in the last decade in America. It has also become obvious that the traditional liberties go only a small way towards giving man a sense of freedom and significance in the conditions of the modern industrial state.

NOT FASCIST

But to make all these concessions is not to yield the whole case to the disaffected radical and to accept his sweeping condemnation of the open society. It is not, as he often claims, a fascist society: it is the least oppressive of all known societies. Whilst it may be true that the individual may suffer random and indiscriminate maulings in "free" societies, it does not follow that the democratic system should be replaced by one which aims at a thoroughgoing and systematic conditioning of the individual according ti his alleged higher interests.

In the first place some hurts are implicit in organized communal life and it is only in the dreams of the anarchists and utopian Marxists that coercion can be entirely dispensed with. Secondly, the logic of the radical leads directly to the horrific world of Kafka's The Trial in which the human spirit is not merely cramped and confined but utterly crushed. Finally, the dream of a rational control of humanity assumes agreement on the purposes and ends of social life — an agreement which we are as far from attaining as ever before. For all its imperfections, the free society does at least keep the options open.

In an objective analysis, the universities also do not come out unscathed and uncensured. Many ostensibly autonomous institutions have entanglements with government and power groups which obstruct their function of free and independent enquiry. At the same time the administrative policies of the universities are frequently out of touch with the drastically altered conditions in which they now operate. The case for reform involving both disengagement from undesirable ties with outside groups (which make the claim of independence seem hypocritical) and recognition that the students of today must be integrated in some measure into the government of universities, is clearly very strong. However, the demand that universities should spearhead the attack against the establishment is preposterous since this would be a greater submission to external compulsion and would make them less free than they now are. The university cannot put itself into the service of the establishment or of its enemies and at the same time remain true to its mission.

HOW TO REACT

The question of the correct attitude in the open society toward radical tactics and programmes of action is at first sight a simple one. The open society is by definition responsive to persuasion and pressure for change; coercive measures are therefore excluded in principle. Upon deeper examination, however, the case takes on an unexpected complexity. I have already suggested that powerful groups may so manipulate the forms and procedures of the open society that they serve only to conceal the real sources of power in the community. Familiarity with the American scene brings another complicating feature into the foreground. Even free societies may respond very sluggishly to just claims of the people, or to certain sections of the people, on account of an inertia, indifference or myopia inherent

in the best of governments. In facing these problems, it seems useful to distinguish between militant and violent programmes of opposition. As the experience of the American Negro demonstrates, militant action may be needed in democratic societies as a stimulus to social reform. But (and this qualification serves to distinguish men like Martin Luther-King from some present-day radicals) the only legitimate purpose of militant action is to stir the sluggish processes of democracy into life, not to obliterate them. Violence, on the other hand, is incompatible with the deepest assumptions of the open society. It will not only destroy the democratic processes but also, by provoking counter-violence, defeat the realization of the ends it was intended to achieve. The argument that strife, cruelty and intolerance will take us to a haven of peace, tolerance and justice (an argument which unites the extreme radical and the reactionary) is entirely refutable. That kind of irrationalism has no place in the free society and, above all, in the University.

There seem to be some hard lessons in my tentative conclusions for believers in the free society. The chief of these is that the achievement of social justice is a never-ending and changing task which is fraught with more difficulties and agonies than we recognized in our earlier assumptions. But the lesson for authoritarian rulers who set out to arrest social change and imprison the human spirit, is tougher still.

"KATRINA"

Alan Paton Comments

As one grows older, one becomes more critical of films, plays, and books. One is less easily moved by them, less ready to bestow high praise, to use the adjectives "great", "superb", "epoch-making". This does not necessarily mean that one has developed a mature and impeccable taste; it may also mean that one has grown emotionally dry, that one has become impatient with grief, passion, enthusiasm, idealism, because one no longer feels them, or because one is suspicious of them, having been hurt by them in one's earlier life. I do not belong to this second category, and I cannot claim to belong to the first, that of mature impeccable taste.

I went to see "Katrina" yesterday with an open mind, and an open heart too, I believe. Today it is much in my thoughts, which yesterday's films seldom are. I have no doubt it is the best film we have so far made. It is a production of high standard; Mr. Emil Nofal is to be congratulated on it, and so are his actors. So are the script writers, though I have two criticisms to make of their story. The Rev. Mr. Makele is an intrusion, and should have never been allowed in. It is true that his presence enabled Adam September to say dramatically "Goodnight white man, goodnight, black man" and then cuttingly to his sister who passes for white, "Goodnight Mrs. Winters". It is true that the presence of Mr. Makele introduced yet another dimension, but the dimension was unexplorable, both for reasons of time, and more important, for reasons of art. It is said that the censor cut this scene, but if he had not, it would simply have meant that the intrusion would have been longer.

My second criticism is that the story should have ended when Catherine Winters walked into the sea. There was nothing more to be said. After all "Katrina" is her tragedy more than anyone else's. Her return, dead, to the village she would not return to alive, was a work of supererogation.

These two criticisms made, and a few minor ones unmade, I take off my hat to Mr. Nofal. Much deeper, much more disturbing, are some other questions posed by the film.

A PHILOSOPHER TOO

Mr. Nofal has said that he is an entertainer, and that that is his primary function. This is not true. No maker of serious films can be only an entertainer, even if we use the word in a deep and serious sense. Mr. Nofal is also a philosopher; a man who is primarily an entertainer cannot write "people must walk towards an identity".

And what does this mean, to walk towards an identity? I could not help feeling

that in "Katrina" it meant that the Afrikaner must find himself as an Afrikaner, and the coloured South African as a coloured person, and the rest of us as the rest of us. That is why Katrina is the tragedy of Catherine Winters, who would not walk towards her identity as a coloured person. And why should she? Was she not trying to break out of the poverty, the frustration, the humiliation, of being a coloured person? The implication of the film, of Adam September and Kimberley Jacobs, is that if only all coloured people who pass for white would return to their own, what a glorious future there would be. But is that true? What material living is there for them outside the only industrial and commercial world that there is? What material future is there for the coloured people's village that figures so prominently in the film? And indeed, as one looks at its people, who are so clearly presented to us for our inspection, one cannot but feel that these are the throw-outs and the discards of the white rulers, that many of them are our relatives by blood, that they are the humble and the patient, for all their Adam Septembers. In what way are they a people? Were they not in part created by those, who while no doubt clinging to their own identity, were quite indifferent to the achievemnt of identity by their offspring? Mr. Nofal appears to know this, for he makes Adam September say (I quote from memory), "we are a bit of white and a bit of black and a bit of nothing".

RACE ANGER

Mr. Nofal says that Adam speaks very strongly for him. He spoke strongly for me too, not because he wanted coloured people to stick to their own, not because he was proud of being coloured, but because he rejected so fiercely and uncompromisingly the people who had made him what he was. He is not filled with race pride (as the film appears to suggest) but with race anger (which the film certainly suggests also). And his anger is not because he has an identity, but because he has none.

Has the film any message? It has, so far as I can see, and that is that the young doctor must return to his coloured "own", and that Alida Brink must give thanks for her deliverance from disaster, and that Catherine Winters must walk into the sea, and that the craven English priest must go off and have craven children like himself, for it is safer for them to be craven than coloured.

It is this, I am sure, which made the film so acceptable to the censors, for it can be regarded as a parable of the unhappiness caused by the crossing of the colour-line, and the wickedness (or perhaps the stupidity) of trying to re-cross it. It also perpetuates the myth that there is a coloured people, and that their future is great and glorious if only people would not desert to those who are not their sort, only their progenitors.

Is it perhaps true that Mr. Nofal has made the only kind of film that it is possible to make in our present circumstances? Is it perhaps true that he is portraying South Africa as it is, that Mr. Brink has no option but to spew out his aspirant son-in-law, that Alida Brink has no option but to give up her lover once he discovers that he has coloured blood, that Adam September would resent his sister's passing for white and want her son to own his ancestry, that Kimberley Jacobs would plead for her to return so that her son can return to his own? I think it possible that Mr. Nofal had no option, and that optionless, he made a good picture. I wish only we could have been spared the words of the craven priest, asking whether it was wrong for him to want his children to look like himself, because, whatever Mr. Nofal intended, it sounded like a horrible imprimatur.

TAGIC OR ABSURD?

I suppose that it is only a film of stature than can give rise to such a multitude of reflections, but I suppose that it is also because for a time we have been looking at ourselves and at our own country. I read that the film will be screened world-wide in eleven languages. To many of us in South Africa it portrays a tragedy. Will the outside world think it tragic, or incomprehensibly and cruelly absurd? Time will show.

I close with a personal impression. I was touched by the gentle face, the gentle eyes, of the young doctor who fell in love with the young Afrikaner girl, and who brought sorrow to her and fear and bewilderment to her father, and turned her brother into a thug. A whole world is turned upside down, pure love is destroyed, a woman chooses death, and all because this gentle white-looking boy is discovered to have had other blood in his veins. What a monstrosity!

I am prepared to accept that it was not Mr. Nofal's duty to say it is a monstrosity. I am prepared to accept that Mr. Nofal did successfully portray it as a tragedy. What troubles me is the implication of the film that it is not a monstrosity at all.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT —

A COMMENT by M. Nuttall

I was interested to read Mr. David Welsh's article entitled "The Futility of Hanging" in the July issue of "REALITY". Historians may well look back upon 1969 as an important year in the history of capital punishment in this country. It is true that only two and a half hours could be spared, but for the first time the issue of the death penalty has been specifically debated in our Parliament, as the result of a private motion introduced by Mrs. Helen Suzman. Mrs. Suzman said at the beginning of her speech: ". . . It seems to me extraordinary that this subject has never been debated before in our Parliament, although it has been the cause of much heated controversy in other parliaments all over the world." (col. 2570-71).[1] The tragedy for abolitionists was that no one rose to support Mrs. Suzman's motion (which simply asked the Government to consider appointing a commission of enquiry into the desirability of abolition), while five members, representing both Government and Opposition, opposed it.

There is one aspect of the debate that Mr. Welch does not touch on in his article: namely, the existence in South African law of the 'extenuating circumstances' clause. Mrs. Suzman herself, in her speech, made only the briefest reference to this provision in our law, and left the way open to her opponents to make full use of it in their arguments. This would seem to be an issue which abolitionists must face, and I for one would be grateful for further discussion of it.

SOLEMN FARCE

Dr. C. W. H. Lansdown, who had been a judge of the South African Supreme Court, gave evidence on this subject before the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1947-1953) (See pp.481-483). He said that a major reason for the introduction of the 'extenuating circumstances' clause in 1935 was that it would eliminate the need for a judge "to go through the solemn farce of pronouncing the death sentence" when he knew that a reprieve would be certain; unnecessary suffering for the condemned man would also be removed. In other words the principle of reprieve was, as it were, brought into the decision-making processes of the courts. But no definition of an extenuating circumstance was given. According to Dr. Lansdown, a consensus of judicial opinion has emerged in this country whereby an extenuating circumstance is considered to be "a fact associated with the crime which serves, in the minds of reasonable men, to diminish, morally albeit not legally, the degree of the prisoner's guilt".

Now all this was adduced as important argument in the Parliamentary debate in support of the retention of capital punishment. Mr. W. W. B. Havemann (Odendaalsrus) referred to the operation of the 'extenuating circumstances' clause as one of "a very large number of safety valves in our law". Mr. M. L. Mitchell (Durban North) argued that "our system . . . has no peer in the world so far as this sieving process is concerned." Only in the very **worst** cases, so the argument ran, was a man in South Africa actually hanged. "Of all the people who received a mandatory death sentence in Great Britain I would say that something like — I am going to be conservative — 80% of them would not have been sentenced to death in South Africa." (col. 2593).

A BURDEN

But the 'extenuating circumstance' clause can surely be turned to good account by the abolitionist in South Africa. (1) It is a major stepping-stone in our law in the direction of real diminution if not abolition of the death penalty. (2) To argue that the main reason for the death penalty is its deterrent value loses much of its force if in the majority of cases where the death penalty could apply it is not imposed. Between 1935 and 1946 64% of those found guilty of murder were allowed extenuating circumstances. (3) It is significant that no definition of an extenuating circumstance was given in the 1935 law. Does the judge bear too heavy a burden of discretion in having to decide whether there are extenuating circumstances in a particular case or not? Mr. Mitchell, in the Parliamentary debate, did not think so: ". . . they have carried this burden and they have carried it with distinction" (col. 2593). But, echoing the view expressed in the British Royal Commission Report, he did admit that "a very grave burden rests upon our Judges" (col. 2593). Moreover,

Mr. Mitchell did ask that there ought to be an **automatic** right of appeal to the higher court, because "a judge is placed in an impossible position when he has to decide" (col. 2594) whether to allow an appeal when he and his two assessors have conscientiously made their decision. He referred to the classic Nzimandi case in the Bergville dagga murder trial, where application for leave to appeal was refused, a stay of execution was secured on the day before Nzimandi was due to be executed, and when the matter finally came before the Appellate Division he was found not guilty and discharged. If a decision about leave of appeal can put a judge in "an impossible position", surely the same is true very often of his obligation to decide on the question of extenuating circumstances?

Mr. J. A. L. Basson(Sea Point) said in his speech: "Nobody likes the death penalty. I will definitely have made a bad Judge, because it will tear me virtually in two to condemn somebody to the gallows. But fortunately we have Judges who are probably more courageous than I am in the execution of their duties . . ." (col. 2600). It did not seem to occur to Mr. Basson that the abolition of the death penalty might be a better alternative to imposing on our judges decisions more excruciating than any human being ought to be made to bear.

1 All references to Hansard are to the Weekly Edition for the period 10th March—14th March, 1969.

SOME OF OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Marie Dyer is a housewife and part-time lecturer in English at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. She was last year awarded an M.A. degree for her thesis on Byron.

* * * *

Prof. A. S. Mathews, head of the Department of Law at the University of Natal, has recently returned from America where he worked for six months at Harvard University under a Carnegie grant.

Colin Gardner is senior lecturer in English at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. He has also returned recently from some weeks overseas, spent mainly in Britain.

* * * *

Michael Nuttall lectured in History at Rhodes University but later went to Theological College in Grahamstown where he took a London B.D. Honours Degree. He was ordained and served as a chaplain at Grahamstown Cathedral. Since the beginning of this year he has been a lecturer in Ecclesiastical History at Rhodes University.

This South Africa

Tretchikoff has sold nearly R30.000 worth of his paintings and reproductions since his exhibition opened in Durban . . .

"Although Durban is supposed to be the dead-end of art, I am always most successful here," said Tretchikoff today.

Daily News report.

When Afrikaans churches hold services in English, they are merely providing a 'spiritual home' for immigrants . . . when the Anglican church holds services in Afrikaans it is part of an insidious campaign to lure Afrikaners away from the Afrikaans churches.

Herbert, regular columnist of 'Die Kerkbode', official organ of the Nederlandse Gereformeerder Kerk, as reported in the Daily News.

The only people who can be careless and liberal are the rich and intellectuals.

The Minister of the Interior, Mr. S. L. Muller.

Sir De Villiers had on another occasion said that the United Party did not want to know whether a man was Afrikaans or English speaking but whether he was a South African.



Such a policy would only amount to the total assimilation of the Afrikaners by the English-speaking section. The National Party was not in favour of such a policy.

Mr. Ben Schoeman in the House of Assembly.

Dr. Ras Beyers, a right-wing extremist, has recently been expelled from Botswana:

"Dr. Beyers said he was completely taken aback when he heard that the President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, had decided to expel him 'without a hearing'."

Sunday Tribune report.

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