
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GONIWE

G. EXHIBITS.



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(English Branch of the Educational Work of the Grahamstown Sisters.)

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EXHIBITS - GONIWE

G1 Diagram: Die Nasionale Veiligheidsbestuurstelsel (NBVS)

G2 Opsomende diagrammatiese uiteensetting van die NBVS tot met die 1985 - noodtoestand.

G3 Declaration of destruction of classified documents/material.

G4 Fraser: Lessons learnt from past revolutionary wars

G5 Kol J Jonker: Photo album - Strand Street

G6 Memorandum of the South West Africa Bar Council

G7 Jacques Pauw" In the Heart of the Whore, p113

G8 Accountability in Namibia (Africa Watch)

G9 Goniwe's Cradock File (pp1 - 53)
Aansoek vir 'n tamatie (p54)
Extract from file (p55 - 58)

G10 Goniwe's telephone transcripts 1985/06/21 - 1985/06/28

G11 Affidavit of Henri Fouche

G12 Annexures A - F: Fouche

G13 Race Relations Survey 1983, pp608 - 609

G14 Race Relations Survey 1985 pp482 - 483

G15 Race Relations Survey 1992/1993, p28

G16 Record and reasons for finding: S v Hamakali

G17 Faku Inquest: Docket

G18 Faku Inquest: Photo's

G19 EP Herald: 16 December 1989

G20 Faku Inquest: Investigation Diary

G21 Description: Jetta Rear Axle

G22 Beskadingsverslag: Staatsvoertuig

G23 Map: Scene of explosion

G24 Minutes: Inspection in loco

G25 Photo's: Inspection in loco

G26 Registration of Jetta

G27 Back of Faku investigation docket

G28 Faku docket: Name en addresse van getuies

G29 Druktelegram

GONIWE EXHIBITS: FILE 2

G30 Letter from Wagenaar to Col Du Plessis, dated 5 February 1993

G31 Letter from Wagenaar to Col Du Plessis, dated 2 March 1993

G32 McCuen mimeo

G33 Joubert affidavit and CCB document

G34 Original damaged Katzen documents

G35 Katzen: Glossary

G36 Katzen: List of names

G37

G38 Letter from Col Du Plessis to commanding officer, EP Command

G39 Note regarding Du Plessis' absence

G40 Luus affidavit

G41 Du Plessis evidence before commission

G42 Letter from Maj-Gen Holomisa to State President

G43 Du Plessis statement to New Nation

G44 New Nation 8 - 14 May

G45 Bank account: Du Plessis

G46 'Verwyder' documents

G47 Diagram: Rewo oorlog

G48 Bank document: Du Plessis

G49 Letter from Col Du Plessis to Cyril Ramaphosa

G50 Bevelskrif: Van der Westhuizen (Pligstaat)

G51 Curriculum vitae: Van der Westhuizen

G52 Plan: offices of EP Command

G53 Verslag deur Botha Marais dated 3 February 1985

G54 Pauw: Heart of the whore extract

G55 OPGBS minutes: 23 February 1984

G56 Dictionary of military terms

G57 Heitman - article (Militaria)

G58 Kort kursus in strategie vir amptenare


G59 Lesing 10

G60 Minutes of PE GIS meeting: 1985-05-30


G61 New Nation 30 April - 7 May 1985, page 1

[GBS]: DIE NASIONALE GEÏNTEGREERDE BESTUURSTELSEL (NGBS)

GT




OPSOMMENDE SKEMATIESE UITEENSETTING VAN DIE NASIONALE VEILIGHEIDBESTUURSTELSEL (NBVS) TOT MET DIE 1985 – NOODTOESTAND



Verklaring : ——→ Nasionale Veiligheidsbeleid- en Strategiebeplanning

——→ Lynfunksionarisse se Uitvoerende Beplanning en Optredes

—·—·→ Koördinering, fasilitering en stelselmonitering van veilig = heidsbeplanning en -optredes


NATIONAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
STATE
PRESIDENT
CABINET
STA
COUNCIL (SSC)
CABINET COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS
CABINET COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
CABINET COMMITTEE FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS
WORK COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL (SSSC)
INT
COMMITEES
•Manpower
•Security
•Constitutional Affairs
•Security Forces
•Science & Technology
•Economic Affairs
•Cultural Affairs
•National Supplies & Resources
•Transport
•Civil Defence
•Community Services
•Telecommunications & Eskom
JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES (11)
SUB-JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES (± 60)
MINI-JOINT MANAGEMENT CENTRES (± 350)
LOCAL MANAGEMENT CENTRES

43

NASIONALE INTELLIGENSIEDIENS
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

NI 21(a)

Sertifikaat Nr.
Certificate No.

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Division/Regional Office. _____

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Custodian

Handtekening
Signature .....

Naam
Name .....

Afdeling/Streekkantoor
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We, the undersigned, declare that :-

(a)
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(b)
the documents/material listed overleaf have been completely destroyed in our presence by means

of.....(1)

(c)
the entries i.r.o. the final disposal of the documents/material listed overleaf, have been completed by the CUSTODIAN in the REGISTER.

(d)
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Onafhanklike getuie
Independant witness

Handtekening
Signature .....

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Naam .....

Afdeling/Streekkantoor
Division/Regional Office .....

Datum
Date .....

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2. Indien 'n wysiging/modifikasie nie reeds in die dokument/materiaal aangebring is nie moet dit as 'n afsonderlike item op die keersy noteer word.

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LESSONS LEARNT FROM PAST REVOLUTIONARY WARS

by

BRIGADIER C.A. FRASER, CBE

COMMANDER, 12 COMBAT GROUP

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
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LESSONS LEARNT FROM PAST REVOLUTIONARY WARS

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BY

BRIGADIER C.A. FRASER, SM
COMMANDER : 12 COMBAT GROUP

APPENDIX "A" ..... Summary of Lessons Learnt.

APPENDIX "B" ..... Bibliography.

"Those who will not learn from history
are doomed to repeat it."
George Santayana

INTRODUCTION

1. The author has attempted to distil from the literature he has read the basic principles to be applied by a government in counter-insurgency. No criticism of the Government of the Republic of South Africa or its departments is implied, nor, indeed, should any criticism be inferred.

2. The nature of warfare has changed throughout the ages. It has changed again in our time, or rather, a new form of warfare has evolved in our time. This new form of warfare, that is symptomatic of our age, has crystallised very rapidly since the end of World War II. Called by various names, warfare to achieve national liberation, cold warfare, people's warfare, revolutionary warfare, etc, it differs fundamentally from the wars of the past in that victory does not come from the clash of two armies on a field of battle. Military operations, as combat actions carried out against opposing forces are, in fact, of limited importance and are never the total conflict. Instead, the government in power has to conduct a revolutionary war as an interlocking system of actions, political, economic, administrative, psychological, police and military. The aim of this new form of warfare is to subvert and overthrow by force the established regime and to replace it with another. To achieve this end the aggressor's primary task is to gain the support of the people. This he sets out to achieve by establishing a clandestine organisation whose role is to impose its will upon the population. The basic element of a revolutionary war is political infiltration through the

weak spots .../2

weak spots of a State's social structure. Victory can be obtained by a government only by recapturing the support of the masses, and by the complete destruction of that organisation and the eradication of its influence upon the people.

3. During the past twenty-five years numerous revolutionary wars have been waged throughout the world. Most, but not all of them, have been Communist inspired: this being the chief means of achieving the aims of international Communism. The author feels that the reason why Communists have been able to exercise such a dynamic influence in many revolutionary wars is because the creators of Communism did not concern themselves solely with political and social questions, but were also skilled strategists who paid much attention to military problems, that Communist parties possess not only a wide and varied experience of revolutionary wars but deep rooted traditions of revolutions which date back into the last century. Revolutionary wars have occurred in China, Malaya, Greece, Cyprus, Indonesia, Algeria, Angola, Vietnam, etc, etc. In all of them propaganda, terrorism and guerillas have been the insurgents' main weapons.

4. The great majority of past revolutionary wars have been won by the insurgents. In only one have the insurgents been completely defeated - Malaya. In others there have been partial successes by government forces, but these have been of a temporary nature only. Vietnam is an example of this. In some revolutionary wars the military campaigns have been won by government troops or nearly so, but the wars have finally been lost politically. Indochina and Algeria are classic examples of this. A Frenchman has said about these two wars that they lost with bad politics and worse propaganda what they had won with good fighting.

5. Revolutionary war has its own special rules or principles, different from those of conventional war. Whereas in conventional war the principles of war hold equally true for both sides, in revolutionary war most of the rules applicable to one side do not work for the other. There are two distinct types of warfare - insurgency and counter-insurgency. That is why so many books and treatises on revolutionary war are misleading. For instance what Mao Tse-Tung calls the "rules of revolutionary war" are, in fact, those of the revolutionary side. The one who directs a war against a revolutionary movement will not find in Mao, Chè Guevara or many other

revolutionary .../3

revolutionary theorists the answers to his problems. He will, indeed, find useful information on how the insurgent acts, and he may perhaps infer the answers he is looking for, but nowhere there will he find them explicitly stated. There is a dearth of literature for the counter-insurgent. However, the best books that have been written, in the author's opinion, are by Frenchmen - paradoxically enough, as they lost both their revolutionary wars - Indochina and Algeria The British who are the only people to have won against insurgents have been typically reticent about the reasons for their success. Only recently have they laid down a definite policy to be followed by their armed forces in counter-insurgency. Until now they stated that to enunciate formulae or to dogmatise about counter-insurgency would be dangerous. Ingenuity, inspiration, expediency, flexibility, resolution and boldness were their golden rules.

6. While one or two of the revolutionary wars of the last quarter century had some similarities, no two such wars have been identical. Nevertheless there have been certain factors common to them all. From the point of view of the insurgent perhaps the basic ingredients of successful revolution are:-

(a) a popular cause;

(b) a dedicated leader;

(c) time to develop;

(d) support of the population;

(e) a population with a need, a determination and an ability to wage a prolonged struggle;

(f) outside support.

The basic principles to be applied, on the other hand, by a government are set out in this paper. They are not exhaustive nor do they purport to provide the complete answer to all the problems of counter-insurgency. For this, further detailed studies both of revolutionary techniques and of military counter-tactics must be made from case histories. Such further studies are of the greatest importance.

7. It must be stressed that the ideas and lessons set out in this paper are a distillation of the works listed in the bibliography. Some of the material has been copied from these works, and particularly from

Colonels .../4

Colonels David Galula, Roger Trinquier and Miksche, Osanka and the books by the Special Operations Research Office of the American University, Washington.

8. It is necessary to standardise on terms. There are numerous words describing anti-government elements meaning practically the same thing, eg bandits, revolutionaries, rioters, terrorists, rebels, insurgents, etc. In this paper one side will be called "insurgents" and their actions "insurgency"; on the opposite side will be "government forces" and their action "counter-insurgency". Since insurgency and counter-insurgency are two different aspects of the same conflict the expression "revolutionary warfare" will cover the whole.

AIM

9. The aim of this paper is to attempt to enunciate the basic general lessons to be learnt by government leaders and senior government servants from past revolutionary wars.

LESSONS

10. A Revolutionary War is a Political War

(a) "A revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political" is a formula enunciated by Colonel David Galula of the French Army, that reflects the truth.

(b) The basic motive behind revolution is to eliminate the old political order and establish a new government more desirable to the revolutionary rulers and the people whom they persuade to side with them. The basic tenet of the exercise of political power is that there is always an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority and an active minority against the cause. For ultimate victory it is necessary to obtain the support of the neutral or uncommitted majority. The objective for both sides in a revolutionary war is, thus, the population itself and the operations designed to win it over for the insurgents, or to keep it at least submissive to the dictates of the government is essentially of a political nature. Consequently political action remains paramount throughout the war. That the political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of both principle and practicality. What is at stake is the

country's .../5

country's political regime, and to defend it is a political affair. Even if this requires military action, the action is constantly directed towards the political goal. Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.

(c) "The Times" (of London) of 31 July 1963 stated the following about the United States Special Warfare Centre: "The whole emphasis of training at Fort Bragg is on the realisation, frustrating as it may be to a great military power, that armed force alone is virtually powerless against organised guerilla troops in revolutionary war". Yet it is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is applicable, or what civil administration and propaganda methods will be adopted: politics and the administration of the government's political policies become an active and a primary instrument of operations. And so intricate is the interplay between it and military actions that they cannot be tidily separated. On the contrary, every military and administrative move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects and vice versa.

(d) The armed forces are but one of the many instruments in the hands of the government. It is the function of the political power to harness the non-military instruments, to see that appropriations come at the right time to consolidate the military work, that political and social reforms follow through, etc. Military tactics and hardware are all well and good but they are really quite useless if the government has lost the confidence of the people among whom it is fighting. And by the time their confidence has been lost the more armed force that is used the more antagonistic does the population become.

(e) The inescapable conclusion is that the overall responsibility should stay with the civilian power at every possible level.

11. The objective .../6

11. <u>The objective, for both sides, in a revolutionary war is to gain the support of the mass of the population, their approval, sympathy and active participation.</u>

(The majority of the "lessons" that follow are directed to this end)

(a) A government must get the majority of the indigenous population on its side.

(b) When a revolutionary situation or a potential revolutionary situation already exists, it means that the insurgents have already gained a head start: the population being their objective too. But it must be remembered that for either side, support from the population is conditional on the confidence of the population being retained.

(c) Typical of the insurgents' methods of gaining the support of the people are a dynamic cause, promises (that, because the insurgents have not yet acquired any responsibility for government, may be quite impossible of fulfilment), threats and terrorism.

(d) The support of the population for a government is gained through the favourable minority. The strategic problem of a government may be defined as follows: "To find the favourable minority and to organise it in order to mobilise the rest of the population against the insurgent minority". Every operation, whether in the military field or in the political, social, economic or psychological fields must be geared to that end. It is necessary to show that the government's cause is better and its strength and ability greater than the insurgents'. This underlines the necessity for the government to come out with an acceptable counter-cause. (See para 12 below)

(e) Once the insurgent has established his hold over the population, the minority that was hostile to him become invisible. Some have been eliminated physically, thereby providing an example to the others; others have escaped; most have been intimidated into hiding their true feelings and have thus melted into the majority of the population; a few are even making a show of their support for the insurgency. The bulk of the population, watched by the active supporters of the insurgency, lives under the threat of denunciation to the political cells and of prompt punishment by the insurgents.

(f) The minority .../7

(f) The minority, hostile to the insurgent, will not and cannot emerge as long as the threat has not been lifted to a reasonable extent. Furthermore even after the threat has been lifted, the emerging government supporters will not be able to rally the bulk of the population as long as the population is not convinced that the government has the will, the means and the ability to win.

(g) Four important points are:-

i. Effective political action on the population must be preceded by police and/or military operations against the guerilla units and the insurgent political organisations.

ii. Political, social, economic and other reforms, however popular and necessary they might be, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population.

iii. The reigning government needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that it has the will, the means and the ability to win.

iv. The government cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a position of strength or its potential supporters will flock to the insurgents' side.

(h) It would be a mistake to believe that a government cannot get the population's support unless it concedes political reforms. There are means of keeping the population submissive to government dictates. However unpopular the government may be, if it is sufficiently strongwilled and powerful, and if it can rely on a small but active core of supporters who remain loyal to it because they would lose everything including their lives if the insurgent wins, it can maintain itself in power. It may very well withdraw whatever benefits the population receives from the mere existence of its regime - a measure of law and order, a more-or-less running economy, functioning public works and services, etc., and restore them gradually as a premium for the population's co-operation. It may, for instance, ration food and see that only those who co-operate receive ration cards. It may, at the same time, utilise to the utmost those who are willing to support the government actively, giving them increased privileges and power, and ruling through them, however disliked they may be.

This .../8

This is the way the Kadar regime in Hungary and others no doubt, keep themselves in power. But such a policy of force could bring, at best, a precarious return to the 'status ante quo' of perpetual tension, not a lasting peace.

12. A government must gain the political initiative over the insurgents by having a cause even more attractive than that inspiring them.

(a) By definition a cause must "attract the largest number of supporters among the neutral majority and repel the minimum number of opponents". The insurgent's cause is always dynamic and he invariably wrests the political initiative with it. The government's first task is to regain the political initiative, and keep it. An even more dynamic and acceptable counter-cause is the quickest way to achieve this.

(b) Wisdom and expediency demand that a government equip itself with a counter-cause designed to take as much wind as possible out of the insurgents' sails. There are immense difficulties in fighting a revolutionary war from an adverse political background, as the Americans are finding in Vietnam. When looking for a counter-cause, a government is often left with a narrow choice of secondary issues that appeal almost invariably to reason at a time when passion is the prime mover. And how far it can go in the way of reforms without endangering its power, which, after all, is what - right or wrong - it is fighting to retain, is a matter that calls for very skilful political manoeuvre. When the insurgents' cause is an all-or-nothing proposition, as in most anti-colonial or communist-led insurgencies, the margin for political manoeuvre is extremely limited. The insurgent wants independence today, speaks of revolution, promotes class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. His opponent can offer only internal autonomy or some variation of it and insist on evolution in the calm of a peaceful situation.

(c) Yet, knowing that its programme will have no or little immediate appeal, a government must somehow find a set of reforms, even if secondary, even if minor. It has to gamble that reason, in the long run, will prevail over passion. A government in power would be wise, however, to ascertain whether what it offers is really wanted by the people. Reforms conceived in the abstract at a

high level .../9

high level may often sound promising on paper but do not always correspond to the popular wish. A practical method, therefore, would consist in investigating objectively the people's demands, making a list of them, crossing out those that cannot be granted safely and promoting the rest: being particularly careful not to give an impression of weakness.

(d) A government must also decide when to publicize its reforms. If it does this too early it could be taken as a sign of weakness, raise the insurgent's demands, even encourage the population into supporting the insurgent in the hope of more concessions: and, as the war lasts, the impact of the reforms would blur. If the announcement was unduly delayed, the task of winning the support of the population would become more difficult. Appreciating the right time is a matter of judgment based on circumstances, and no solution can be suggested in advance. The reforms, since they are meaningless unless they can safely be implemented, could be publicized locally as soon as the preliminary military operations have been concluded; they should be publicized nationally when local experience has shown their value. In any case nothing could be worse than promising reforms and being unwilling or unable to implement them.

(e) There are cases in recent history where governments in power during revolutionary wars have relied upon their publicized reforms alone to gain them the political initiative without having a really good counter-cause. They have always failed. A counter-cause is essential for taking the political initiative. Their reforms, while helpful and possibly necessary, can never replace a good counter-cause.

(f) Frequently the insurgents' cause publicized for world consumption differs considerably from that enunciated for local acceptance. This is so because often the broader cause is neither understood nor generally wanted by the people themselves. The cause enunciated for the people, therefore, usually consists of a number of less worthy objects aimed at fanning the flames of racialism, superstition or of real or imaginary grievances.

(g) For government .../10

(g) For government success in a revolutionary war a catalyst is needed to amalgamate all the competing ideas in the country - Western democracy, socialism, religious mysticism, traditional tribal customs, etc., and to create a cause truly representative of the needs of the whole population.

13. It is essential to create an environment that is not conducive to a successful revolution.

(a) There are numerous well prepared case histories and other documents dealing with revolutions and revolutionary wars. It is important that a detailed study be made from them of the factors inducing revolutionary wars. Such a study will enable a government to create such an environment.

(b) As long as the problems, the legitimate grievances that gave rise to the insurgency have not been eliminated, the danger of revolutionary wars will persist, and will necessitate a varying degree of vigilance from the government.

(c) For political and racial reasons European rule has proved unacceptable in other parts of Africa. The elements of democracy that are alien to African people have not been properly assimilated by them. Western rule often appeared as a slow erosion of everything that was traditional while, in their eyes, offering little to replace traditional values. It is said that African intelligentsia developed a feeling of inferiority as the inevitable result of the humiliation of being ruled by a foreign power, and this was "intensified by the tactless behaviour of some Europeans who were persuaded that their position was due not to an accident of history, but to an innate racial superiority". It is also said that the colonial "exploitation" of the people often differed little from previous "exploitation" by the indigenous elites.

(d) Full employment, a high standard of living, property ownership somewhere and the friendly recognition of the dignity of the individual are strong deterrents to revolutionary movements.

14. The government ../11

14. The government must be strong parliamentarily.

(a) At all costs the predicament of the French under the Fourth Republic must be avoided. The French government then in power, because of the tremendously powerful opposition parties, was practically ineffectual. The resultant lack of firm decisions and resolutions were the principle causes of the early failures in the Algerian war.

(b) An insurgency does not grow suddenly into a national danger and the people's reaction against it is slow. A strong government during this period has a greater chance of success than a weak one.

15. Time is on the side of the insurgents.

(a) More than anything it must be realised that to Communist-inspired revolutionaries time is unimportant. The Communist doctrine states that revolution is perpetual. Revolutionary war, more often than not is a war of attrition. This is where guerillas demonstrate their enormous power. Mao Tse-Tung believes that time can be made to defeat technology and that unlimited time (in war) depends primarily on unlimited space. Mao does not concentrate on the problem of ending a war quickly. His problem is to keep it going. He believes also that space in Africa could be made to yield time, and time, revolutionary organisations, political cohesion and victory - for Communism.

(b) In war the Communists have a monopoly of patience. The anti-Communist front is committed to quick victory and therefore cannot and will not underwrite a long drawn-out war.

16. It is essential to identify the enemy exactly - and then to isolate him from the population.

(a) This condition must be fulfilled so that the government forces' shots will strike home.

(b) Those who are not with the government must either be capable of persuasion that the government plans to counter the revolution are necessary, or they must be publicly declared "enemy". Formerly this was a simple task. The enemy

had his war .../12

had his war aims, simple and precise, as we had ours. It would have been useless to attempt to convert him to our cause or to hope to make him give up the fight without having defeated him. To gain a victory the nation and its army put to work all material and moral resources. Any person who dealt with the enemy or who favoured his objectives in any way was considered a traitor and was treated as such.

(c) In modern warfare the enemy is far more difficult to identify. No physical frontier separates the two camps. The line of demarcation between friend and foe passes through the very heart of the nation, through the same village, and sometimes divides the same family. It is a non-physical, often ideological boundary which must, however, be expressly delineated if a government wants to reach the adversary and defeat him.

(d) Victory for a government consists in the destruction of the insurgents' forces and his political organisations and in the permanent isolation of the insurgents from the people; isolation not forced upon them but maintained by the people themselves.

(e) In totalitarian countries, ideological boundaries are extended to the country's geographic limits, so that there may be no doubt as to the enemy to be struck. All enemies of the established power are eliminated or driven out of the national territory. Although these extreme measures which are unquestionably incompatible with the ideals of liberty should be avoided, a government cannot, obviously, defeat an enemy it has not clearly identified.

(f) The enemy consists not of a few armed bands fighting on the ground, but of an organisation that directs him, feeds him, informs him and sustains his morale. This is a state of affairs that democracy tolerates within a nation, but it enables the enemy to act secretly or openly in such a way that measures which might deal him a decisive blow are either never taken or are indefinitely delayed.

(g) To contain the underground and prevent the expansion of its activities, the government forces must deny it both the human and the physical (material) resources which it requires to expand.

17. A government .../13

17. A government must not allow to go unheeded any signs of a developing pattern of revolution or spontantous uprising.

(a) At the beginning of a revolutionary war the insurgents usually select one or two areas in which to begin their campaign. There they organise riots, sabotage, terrorism and sometimes even guerilla activities, and then stop. They then evaluate government reaction and re-organise. It may be a year or more before they start again. Early, prompt and decisive reaction to these symptoms are essential on the part of a government.

(b) In the past revolutions have usually been well under way before control measures were applied. Insurgency, even in its infancy, is war. A government must recognise danger when it first emerges and act at once - and decisively.

18. The danger of complacency (i.e. refusal to recognise the true situation) before and during revolutionary war must be avoided.

This is particularly difficult in a society where freedom of speech and freedom of the press is allowed. The insurgents will play upon the susceptibilities of a gullible public and do all in their power to lull them into a false sense of security; many apparently harmless slogans will be bandied about to cover their true intentions. All leaders, political, administrative and service, however, must be kept fully posted with the situation and the dangers both actual and potential. This is really only possible if they all are educated as to the scope and ramifications of revolutionary warfare. The government's information service must enlighten the population about the true situation.

19. The judicial system must be adapted to each stage of the threat.

(a) In the early stages of the threat the insurgent movement will not have gained an impetus of its own and its continued growth depends almost entirely on the efforts of its leaders. The insurgency may well be extinguished in this stage by effective action against the leaders, e.g. by arresting them, restricting their movements and banning their organisations.

(b) To this end .../14

(b) To this end it is essential that the police and the courts should have the legal powers to act. The public may be reluctant to accept what might be branded as arbitrary laws at a stage when the apparent danger is slight, but experience has taught that in order not to hamstring the police at a vital stage, it is far better to ensure that the necessary legislation to enable effective action to be taken is in operation at the very outset, than to pass such laws under the pressure of the rapidly developing threat.

20. A declaration of a state of emergency at the earliest opportune moment is imperative.

(a) As the insurgent movement gains in strength and progressively more severe suppressive measures become necessary, the law must be continuously adapted, by means of emergency regulations, to allow the government forces the required freedom of action. A measure designed to restrict the activities of the insurgent or to confer additional powers on the government must be promulgated when the necessity therefor is anticipated rather than when it has in fact arisen. A government has many factors to consider apart from the purely operational ones, but by the time the first symptoms of the struggle are revealed in political assassination, terrorism, guerilla activities, etc., a state of emergency must have been declared.

(b) The period of preparation before the opening of hostilities in other countries has been known to have been spent by the insurgents under the cover of a legally established political party. By doing this they establish themselves within the country and have the protection of the country's laws. Covered by legality they then strive to create a climate favourable to their cause within the country and abroad, and to establish in the territory the essential elements of their warfare organisation.

(c) In several other parts of the world where revolutionary wars have been fought the fact that a state of emergency was not generally proclaimed permitted the insurgent to continue to take advantage of peacetime legislation, to pursue his activities both openly and secretly. He strives by every means to preserve the fiction of peace

which is .../15

which is so essential to the pursuit of his designs. Therefore, the surest means of countering this is to declare a state of emergency at the earliest moment.

(d) At this stage the preparation of the opponent will be quite well advanced and the danger very great; to minimise this would be a disastrous mistake.

21. The life of the people under the government must be made perceptibly better than that offered by the insurgents or that in areas infested or controlled by insurgents.

(a) "Revolutionary warfare affects the entire population of a country calamitously". War has always been a calamity for the people. Formerly only those who found themselves in the path of the armies had to suffer the calamity. Today, in revolutionary warfare the entire population is affected. The more severely they suffer, either from the insurgents or as a result of necessary counter-measures taken by the government, the more sympathetic understanding and generous help they will need from the government in order to gain and retain their hearts, minds, loyalty and affection for the government's cause. Refugees, for example, from areas contaminated by insurgents must by all means at the disposal of the government be resettled in safe areas, helped financially, fed, administered and encouraged. Unless this is done, the desperation of their plight might turn them to the insurgents whose propaganda inevitably will be enticing them all the time.

(b) A major role of the government must be to lessen the miseries revolutionary war engenders.

(c) Co-operative, sympathetic and understanding administration based on Christian principles is essential.

22. Since the stake in revolutionary warfare is the control of the populace, the first essential is to assure the people of their protection by active measures and by giving them the means of defending themselves, especially against terrorism.

(a) A population must be able to see or be convinced that active steps are being taken to protect them against acts of terrorism. In the early part of

the conflict .../16

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the conflict the ideology of the insurgent's cause works for him. In the middle stages, however, the population's attitude is dictated not so much by the relative popularity of the causes as by the primary concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is likely to win; these are the criteria governing the population's stand. So much the better if popularity and effectiveness are combined.

(b) The British and the French view that it requires twenty to twenty-four security troops to one insurgent, to defeat him finally, must be accepted. Most countries that have fought insurgents, and especially the British and the French who were faced with a grave manpower deficit, organised Home Guards among the indigenous populations, which were trained by the police to defend their people against terrorists and to give information about the enemy's clandestine penetration of their territories.

23. Revolutionary war will tax to the utmost the full resources of any State.

(a) The operations needed to relieve the population from the insurgents' threat or domination and to convince it that the government will ultimately win, are necessarily of an intensive nature and of long duration. They require an exorbitant concentration of effort, resources and personnel. This invariably means that operations (military, political, economic, administrative, etc.) have to be applied successively area by area. Staying power is an attribute that is vital for eventual government success. Operations in Malaya took 12 years and Algeria 8 years to be concluded.

(b) How to achieve the government's aim is where the major problems and frustrations begin.

i. A typical hypothetical example of the plight of government officials would be that of an administrative official who in peacetime pleads for an inexpensive reform which is turned down and then, when revolutionary war has started is ordered to implement an extremely costly programme - being now no longer in control of the situation in his district.

ii. Another .../17

ii. Another example would be that of a junior officer in the field who, after days and weeks of endless tracking, has at last destroyed a dozen guerillas - only to see them replaced by another dozen from the same population group.

iii. Then again there is the frustrated information official who cannot satisfactorily explain to a restive public why, after so many decisive defeats, the rebels are still vigorous and expanding.

24. It is essential that the normal functions of government be continued.

This inevitably necessitates the strengthening of the machinery of civil administration and reinforcing the police and the fighting forces.

25. A government must have an efficient, imaginative and effective information and psychological operations service.

(a) The government's aim is to win the hearts and minds of the population. To do this against the flood tide of the insurgents' propaganda demands that the government's information agencies go over at once to positive propaganda. Only by doing this can the government seize the psychological initiative which is one of the vital factors for victory in revolutionary war.

(b) A disability of a democracy is that before a state of war or emergency is declared money is not easily found for effective counter-measures. Before a revolution, and, of course, during it, radio propaganda hostile to the reigning government is directed continuously to the major target audience in the country concerned. The effects of these broadcasts are profound and lasting. They have been found to be of greater danger than has been generally realised by the government at the time. Steps must be taken early through the various media at the disposal of a government to eradicate their diabolical influence upon the people whose support is going to be needed so vitally. In terms of the rules of psychological operations, however, counter propaganda must be very carefully and subtly arranged.

(c) In psychological .../18

(c) In psychological operations it is important to realise that only the insurgent with no responsibility of government can afford to use every trick of cheating, lying and exaggerating in his propaganda. For the counter-insurgent, tied as he is to his responsibilities, and to his traditions, is judged by what he does, not by what he says. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates and does not prove, he may achieve some temporary successes, but at the price of being discredited for good later. He must also be careful lest his legitimate parliamentary opposition should discover and disclose his psychological manoeuvres. Propaganda is only a secondary weapon for the government and is valuable only if it is intended to inform and not to bamboozle. No one can cover a bad or non-existent policy with propaganda.

(d) When a man's life is at stake it takes more than propaganda to budge him.

26. The morale of the population must be kept high.

Without a high morale not only is there a chance of the economy of the country being impaired, but there is the grave danger of the population siding with the insurgents, in desperation.

27. A government's aim must be not only to annihilate the insurgent but especially to eradicate his influence upon the population.

In Algeria the strength of the insurgency forces at the peak of their operations in 1956 and 1957 was 40,000 men. The official estimate of the number of the armed rebels left in the whole of Algeria by the end of 1959 was between 10,000 and 12,000 operating in small groups. This constituted a temporary military victory for the French, but the political influence of the insurgents had not been eradicated and it did not prevent the separation of Algeria from Franch in later negotiations.

28. The population must be educated as to what revolutionary war means and what steps a government has to take to counter it.

(a) Operations, especially those of a police nature in a large city, take place in the very midst of the

populace .../19

populace, almost in public, whereas formerly they occurred on a battlefield, to which only armed forces had access. Police action in revolutionary warfare, like military action, is actual operational warfare. It must be methodically pursued until the insurgent and his whole organisation have been entirely annihilated. Certain harsh actions can easily pass for brutalities in the eyes of a sensitive public. It is a fact that, in the process of extirpating the terrorist organisation from their midst, the people will be manhandled, lined up, interrogated, searched. Day and night, armed police will make unexpected intrusions into the homes of peaceful citizens to carry out necessary arrests. Fighting may occur in which the inhabitants will suffer. People who know the nature of the threat will not protest in submitting to inconveniences they know to be necessary for the recovery of their liberty. But the insurgents will not fail to exploit the situation for their propaganda needs. This is especially so if unnecessary harshness accompanies security actions.

(b) Nevertheless, even if some brutality is inevitable, rigorous discipline must always be enforced to prevent wanton acts. The fighting services and the police have the means of demanding and maintaining firm discipline. They have at their disposal their own system of justice, precisely created to check quickly misdeeds or crimes committed by their personnel in the exercise of their duties. These forces must apply their laws without hesitation. All other departments must be equally vigilant. Under no pretext, however, can a government permit itself to become engaged in a polemic against the forces of order in this respect, a situation that can benefit only adversaries.

(c) The government's war aims must be clearly known by the people. They will have to be convinced that if they are called upon to fight on the side of the government, it can only be in defence of a just cause. They should not be deceived. The surest means of gaining their confidence will be to crush those who want to oppress them. When the insurgents have been placed out of harm's way, the problem of pacification will be quickly resolved. As long as a government has not arrived at such a point, any propaganda, any solution however skilful, will be ineffective on a populace infected by the insurgents' clandestine

organisms .../20

organisms that penetrate like a cancer into its midst and terrorise it. It is only when the people have been delivered from this evil that it will freely listen, think and express itself. A just peace will only then be possible.

(d) During the period of active operations, the role of propaganda action on the masses will have little effect. It will usually be limited to making the people understand that the frequently severe measures taken have no purpose other than to cause the rapid destruction of the enemy. With the gradual return to peace, however, propaganda will play an important part in causing the sometimes impatient masses to understand the variety of problems that must be resolved before a return to normal existence is possible. The inhabitants' organisation will be the most effective instrument of propaganda, contact and dissemination.

(e) The people know instinctively what is correct. It is only substantive measures that will lead them to judge the validity of government action.

29. Effective government control of the education of the indigenous population is imperative.

(a) This is essentially a counter-measure to the factors inducing a revolutionary situation. However, it must be remembered that control of education can be used as a remedy as well as a prevention, but care must be taken not to antagonise the population by over-organisation.

(b) General Giroult, Divisional Commander in Kybelia (Algeria), rated the pacification and administration of the populace as his most important mission. In his sector in addition to many other additional administrators there were 750 schools with 1,000 soldiers employed as teachers.

30. A government must establish joint control machinery (political, civil administration, police and armed forces) under single command at all levels, for the implementation of the strategy laid down by the Cabinet.

(a) The insurgent, because of his lack of means, has to remain fluid. Only he can afford to accept or refuse battle: he has to wage continuous hit-and-run operations. His object is to promote disorder in any and every way. His method of control is

relatively .../21

relatively simple. The government on the other hand has a highly complicated task because it has to take into account so many conflicting demands (protection of the population, winning their support, the economy of the country, offensive action against the insurgent, etc.) It has to co-ordinate all the components of its forces - the administrator, the policeman, the soldier, the airman, the information officer, the social worker and the man in the street (who is the lifeblood of the society). The insurgent, therefore, can afford a loose, primitive organisation and can delegate a wide margin of initiative. The government cannot. It has to organise and maintain a highly complicated and effective joint control structure on which all major departments are represented, and to ensure their synchronised functioning.

(b) Military and political action cannot be separated and military action - essential though it is - cannot be the main form of action.

(c) The success of the government's plans to win the people is the joint responsibility of a widely mixed group of politicians, civil servants, economists, social workers, information officers, policemen and soldiers. They must be co-ordinated under a single command to channel their various efforts in a single direction. There is always a temptation to let the military direct the entire process but this must be resisted by all means.

(d) Giving the soldier authority over the civilian would contradict the major characteristics of this type of war, i.e. that it is a political war. In practice it would inevitably tend to reverse the relative importance of military versus political action and move the counter-insurgent's warfare closer to a conventional one. It would also be self-defeating, for it would mean that the government had acknowledged a signal defeat: unable to cope with the insurgency through normal government structures, it would have abdicated in favour of the military who, at once, become the prime and easy target of the insurgent propaganda. It would be a miracle if, under these circumstances, the insurgent did not succeed in divorcing the soldier from the nation.

(e) Single command is essential. This means command by one man at each level of the command structure, over units of the fighting forces, the police and even over the civil authorities.

(f) Counter- .../22

(f) Counter-insurgency plans will comprise measures that are political, economic, psychological, administrative and military and they must be prepared at a very high level of command. The man who is appointed to carry out these plans must not only be well advised by senior people from each component, but must be capable of manipulating the various components both civil and military to ensure ultimate political victory.

i. Destroying or expelling from an area the main body of the guerilla forces, preventing their return, installing garrisons to protect the population, tracking the guerilla remnants - these are predominantly military operations.

ii. Identifying, arresting, interrogating the insurgent political agents, judging them, rehabilitating those who can be won over - these are police and judicial tasks.

iii. Establishing contact with the population, imposing and enforcing control measures, organising local elections, testing the new leaders, organising them into a party, doing all the constructive work needed to win the wholehearted support of the population - these are primarily political operations carried out through the various agencies of civil administration.

iv. The expected result - final defeat of the insurgents - is not an addition but a multiplication of these various operations; they are all essential and if one is nil, the product will be zero. Clearly, more than any other kind of warfare, counter-insurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from the beginning until the end.

(g) The government leader at each level of command, whom we now assume to be a civilian (or a soldier, a policeman or a civil servant selected personally for his special abilities and wearing a civilian hat), has to take into account the problems of the various civilian and military components of his forces before reaching a decision, especially when their actions interrelate intricately and when their demands often conflict with each other. He has also to co-ordinate and to channel their efforts in a single direction. How he can do this most

effectively .../23

Malaya
Algeria
Philippines

effectively has still to be solved. Among the theoretical solutions in terms of organisation two are obvious: (1) the committee, as in Malaya for example, where control of an area at district level was vested in a committee under the chairmanship of the district officer with the members drawn from the police, local civilians (European planters and representative Chinese and Malayans), and the soldiers; (2) or the integrated civilian-military staff where the soldier is directly subordinated to the local civil authority (the author knows of no example of this setup, but the opposite case - with the civil authority directly subordinated to the local military one - is easy to find, as in the Philippines where army officers took the place of a non-existent civil administration, or in Algeria where all powers were vested in the military for a brief period in 1958-59).

(h) Each formula has its merits and its defects. A committee (after the above stress on the necessity for a boss at every level in counter-insurgency warfare, a committee must be seen in this case not as an organisation where decisions are reached by vote but merely as a convenient place to air problems for the benefit of the boss) is flexible, affords more freedom to its members and can be kept small, but it may be slow. An integrated staff allows a more direct line of command and is speedier, but it is more rigid and prone to bureaucratism. There seems to be room for both in counter-insurgency warfare. The committee is better for the higher echelons concerned with long- and medium-range affairs., the integrated staff for the lower echelons where speed is so essential, because counter-insurgency, at the bottom levels, is a very small-scale war with small-scale and fugitive opportunities that must be seized upon instantly.

(j) At the higher echelons where the committee system prevails and where the civilian and military components retain their separate structures, they should each be organised in such a way as to promote their co-operation still more. In conventional warfare the staff of a large military formation is composed roughly of two main branches - "operations/intelligence" and "logistics". In counter-insurgency warfare there is a desperate need for a third branch - the "political" one - which would have the same weight as the others. The officer

in charge .../24

in charge of it would follow the developments in all matters pertaining to political and civic action, advise his chief, make his voice heard when operations are in the planning stage and not have to wait until they are too advanced to be altered. Similarly, the civilian staff, which in conventional warfare usually has little to do with military affairs, should have its military branch with a corresponding role towards the civilian chief. With these two organic branches working closely together the danger of divergent efforts by the civilian and the military might be reduced.

(k) Whatever system is chosen, however, the best organisation is only as good as its members. Even with the best conceivable organisation personality conflicts are more than likely to be the order of the day. Although the offending member can sometimes be fired and replaced, this will not solve the problem for all committees or integrated staffs. The essential is that all members must be trained in their joint and several responsibilities.

(l) The question then, is how to make these mixed organisations work at their maximum effectiveness in counter-insurgency, regardless of the personality factors. Assuming that each of these organisations works more or less with its own overall personality, the disjointed, mosaic effect of their operations must be avoided somehow. If the individual members of the organisation were of the same mind, if every organisation worked according to a standard pattern, the problem would be solved. This is precisely what a coherent, well understood and accepted doctrine would tend to achieve. More than anything else, a doctrine appears to be the practical answer to the problem of how to channel efforts in a single direction. For the fighting forces this "maintenance of the aim" is one of the principles of war.

31. <u>There must be a first class intelligence organisation that is fully representative of all information agencies, properly integrated and able to collate, evaluate and disseminate to leaders on the spot day to day tactical information that will enable them to fight their battles successfully. It must also collate, evaluate and disseminate to the appropriate leaders all other types of intelligence. The opinions of this co-ordinated intelligence organisation must be accepted and acted upon.</u>

(a) Information .../25

(a) Information is nothing in itself, particularly during a crisis, if it is not quickly exploited. Therefore a government must create a joint intelligence-action service capable of exploiting its own information in the shortest possible time.

(b) Information is the principle source of intelligence on insurgents and it has to come from the population. The population will not talk, however, unless it feels safe and it does not feel safe until the insurgents' power has been broken in their area. Intelligence must be gathered both for the success of the security forces' tactical battles and also to enable the police to eliminate the insurgents' political cells.

(c) No one can expect the populace to denounce agents unless they can do so without risk. Fear of reprisals will always prevent them from communicating the information they possess.

(d) A government cannot hope to transform all the inhabitants into agents. But since revolutionary warfare affects the totality of the population the government must be everywhere informed. Therefore it must have a vast co-ordinated intelligence network which ought to be set up before the opening of hostilities.

(e) Without really efficient, up-to-the-minute intelligence, soldiers become like men floundering in the dark.

(f) Intelligence and its co-ordination must be the government's number one priority.

32. The highest possible standard of security, particularly in government departments, the police and the fighting forces is imperative.

This is applicable as much in normal peace times as it is during revolutionary war. It is dangerous to be niggardly about the money, time and effort spent on securing secrets, vital stores, industries, etc., etc. They are as vital before and during revolutionary war as is the "security of the home base" in conventional warfare.

33. Reprisals .../26

33 Reprisals, as a long term policy that might harm possible innocent persons, are to be avoided at all costs.

(a) Indiscriminate reprisals against people because some within their community aid the insurgents by harbouring or supplying guerillas, by being terrorists etc., are to be avoided. Terrorism is self defeating for the government forces, since terrorism is a source of disorder which is precisely what the insurgent aims to achieve.

(b) Although, as has been seen, a government must avoid being goaded into reprisals, counter terror, whether instituted individually or by the security forces must be avoided equally strenuously because lack of discrimination between passive civilians and rebels tends to alienate the population and drives them into the enemy camp. This suits the insurgents admirably for these tactics make co-operation between the people and the government impossible. It silences most of the rational opposition to lawlessness and commits a large segment of the population to support the insurgents. Thus can the war for the support of the population be won within the first few weeks of the campaign.

(c) Terrorism is a weapon of revolutionary warfare. It is the weapon that all revolutionary wars studied have permitted the insurgents to fight effectively with few resources and even to defeat traditional armies. Terrorism is a veritable weapon that can neither be ignored nor minimised. - As the goal of modern warfare is the control of the populace, terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon since it aims directly at the inhabitant. In the

street .../ 27

street, in the location, the kraal (particularly at night) the indigenous population lives continually under the threat of violence. In the presence of this permanent danger surrounding him he has the depressing feeling of being isolated and defenceless. The fact that public authority and the police are not capable all the time of ensuring his security adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety. He is more and more forced to the side of the terrorists who alone are able to protect him. The intended objective which is to cause the population to vacillate is thus attained.

(d) Judiciously used forceful persuasion imposed upon a group will be very tempting when government troops are trying to break the hold insurgents have in areas controlled by them. But the eventual psychological effect of leniency as applied so successfully by Mao Tse-Tung must be weighed very carefully against the immediate apparent advantages of force before it is used. This indicates that the use of terrorism by government forces must be decided upon at the highest level, and it must be so applied as to avoid it boomeranging.

34 A government must re-establish authority over the population by following a firm and demonstrably resolute policy through all its agencies.

The four instruments of control of the population available to a government are the political structure, the civil administration, the police and the armed forces. But as stated in paragraph 28 above, their action must be co-ordinated, though the firmness and resolution with which they tackle their respective tasks must be demonstrated by every member of each service and by politicians alike.

35 Conservatism or text-book wisdom are fatal whether in battle, civil administration, psychological operations or political direction. Initiative and ingenuity are vital.

(a) Always the insurgent seems to have the advantage of the element of surprise. Yet the brilliant ingenuity of such famous military leaders as Marshal Jean De Lattre De Tassigny, Generals Briggs and Templer are excellent examples of how the effects of surprise can be parried.

(b) As far as .../28

(b) As far as the soldier is concerned the successful commander of anti-guerilla operations is one who has the brain to think up and the courage and ability to carry out new strategems, new devices, new organisations, new forms of ambush even, with the originality and subtlety of a flexible mind. The orthodox and the stereotyped will be anathema to him, conservatism will be disastrous. So must it be in all other departments.

36 Bureaucratic delays and inactivities caused by long established departmental and interdepartmental procedures are frustrating enough in normal times, but are as dangerous in revolutionary war as is subversion itself.

As fighting forces throughout the world have found, financial and accounting procedures particularly have to be streamlined to eliminate such dangers altogether. In revolutionary warfare this is a vital requirement for all government departments.

37 In the fight against insurgents territorial borders must be possible of being disregarded by government forces, preferably by previous international arrangements. Internal boundaries within the country, administrative, police and fighting forces, must coincide.

A country's borders are a constant source of weakness for the counter-insurgency forces, and the advantage is usually exploited by the insurgents. This applies both to territorial borders and internal boundaries of provinces, districts, etc. By moving from one side of the border to another the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or at least to complicate operations for his opponent.

38 The government must be ready to conscript, direct and control labour.

It is essential that sufficient manpower be made available to the crucial government departments, the police and the armed forces for the efficient administration of the government's counter-insurgency policies and plans. The danger of the government's counter-cause failing due to under-administration or through lack of trained manpower is very real. It is important, too, that the country's vital industries be kept going.

39. Propaganda .../29

39 . Propaganda, terrorism and guerillas are only one stage of modern warfare, designed to create a situation favourable to the build-up of conventional forces for the purpose, eventually, of confronting government forces on the battlefield and defeating them.

(a) In China and at Dien Bien Phu guerillas were used to supplement conventional forces, which is their classical employment in international war and which, according to Mao Tse-Tung, is their proper employment in revolutionary war, i.e. they must be followed up by conventional forces, although only he in China and General Giap in French Indo-china have used guerillas in this way in revolutionary warfare. In view of the increasing influence being created by Red China throughout the world, it is reasonable to expect that future revolutionary wars will be followed by conventional forces in typically Mao Tse-Tung campaigns. For this reason it is imperative that a government's conventional warfare potential be not dissipated for counter-insurgency operations. They must remain in being. Equally important is it that counter-insurgency forces be capable quickly of resuming the conventional role. If a country's manpower is not enough for both counter-insurgency and conventional commitments, then at least the fire power of the conventional forces must be increased to help to right the imbalance.

(b) An important adjunct to a government's strategic force in any war, specially valuable because of its comparative cheapness, is a guerilla force of its own which can be infiltrated into enemy territory and can pay enormous dividends.

40 . Leaders of all levels of government, politicians as well as policemen, soldiers, airmen, sailors and civil servants, must have a thorough understanding of counter-insurgency and the joint and several responsibilities of all departments in this type of warfare.

(a) It is not enough to be resolute, it is not enough to rely upon the police and the fighting forces or upon antiquated laws like martial law. All leaders and government officials, especially in the higher echelons, must be aware of the strategy and tactics required in fighting insurgency.

(b) Reactions .../30

(b) Reactions and decisions that would be considered appropriate for the soldier in conventional warfare and for the civil servant in normal times are not necessarily the right ones in counter-insurgency situations. A soldier fired upon in conventional war who does not fire back with every available weapon would be guilty of dereliction of duty; the reverse could be the case in counter-insurgency warfare where the rule is to apply the minimum force. "No politics" is an ingrained reaction for the conventional soldier whose job is solely to defeat the enemy; yet in counter-insurgency warfare the soldier's job is to help win the support of the population, and in doing so he has to engage in practical politics.

(c) The administrator in peacetime has to preserve a politically neutral attitude towards the population, has to let "a hundred flowers blossom, a hundred schools of thought contend", but not in counter-insurgency where his duty is to see that only the ~~right flower~~ blossoms and not the weed, at least until the situation becomes normal again.

(d) The minds of the leaders, and this includes the civilian as well as the military, must be adapted to the special demands of revolutionary warfare.

CONCLUSION

41. Not all revolutionaries are Communists, but all Communists are revolutionaries, and all non-Communist revolutionaries use Communist doctrine in revolutionary warfare.

42. Since it is the population that is at stake, the struggle will assume two aspects: political, direct action on the population; and military, the struggle against the armed forces. The enemy will not open hostilities again until he is reasonably confident of success. By that time his infiltration of our position will be profound and extensive. It will be possible to eradicate it only by powerful means, determination to prevail and a considerable investment in time and money. - This is the challenge of our time.

31 APPENDIX "A" TO "LESSONS LEARNT FROM PAST REVOLUTIONARY WARS".

SUMMARY

OF

LESSONS LEARNT

1. A revolutionary war is a political war.
2. The objective, for both sides, in a revolutionary war is to gain the support of the mass of the population, their approval, sympathy and active participation.
3. A government must gain the political initiative over the insurgents by having a cause even more attractive than that inspiring them.
4. It is essential to create an environment that is not conducive to a successful revolution.
5. The government must be strong parliamentarily.
6. Time is on the side of the insurgent.
7. It is essential to identify the enemy exactly - and then isolate him from the population.
8. A government must not allow to go unheeded any signs of a developing pattern of revolution or spontaneous uprising.
9. The danger of complacency (i.e. refusal to recognise the true situation) before and during revolutionary war must be avoided.
10. The judicial system must be adapted to each stage of the threat.
11. A declaration of a state of emergency at the earliest opportune moment is imperative.
12. The life of the people under the government must be made perceptibly better than that offered by the insurgents or that in areas infested or controlled by insurgents.
13. Since the stake in revolutionary warfare is the control of the populace, the first essential is to assure the people of their protection by active measures and by giving them the means of defending themselves, especially against terrorism.
14. Revolutionary war will tax to the utmost the full resources of any State.
15. It is essential that the normal functions of government be continued.

16. A government .../32

16. A government must have an efficient, imaginative and effective information and psychological operations service.

17. The morale of the population must be kept high.

18. A government's aim must be not only to annihilate the insurgent but especially to eradicate his influence upon the population.

19. The population must be educated as to what revolutionary war means and what steps the government has to take to counter it.

20. Effective government control of the education of the indigenous population is imperative.

21. A government must establish joint control machinery (political, civil administration, police and armed forces) under single command at all levels for the implementation of the strategy laid down by the Cabinet.

22. There must be a first class intelligence organisation that is fully representative of all information agencies, properly integrated and able to collate, evaluate and disseminate to leaders on the spot day to day tactical information that will enable them to fight their battles successfully. It must also collect, evaluate and disseminate to the appropriate leaders all other types of intelligence. The opinions of this co-ordinated intelligence organisation must be accepted and acted upon.

23. The highest possible standard of security, particularly in government departments, the police and the fighting forces is imperative.

24. Reprisals, as a long term policy that might harm possibly innocent persons, are to be avoided at all costs.

25. A government must re-establish authority over the population by following a firm and demonstrably resolute policy through all its agencies.

26. Conservatism or text-book wisdom is fatal whether in battle, civil administration, psychological operations or political direction: initiative and ingenuity are vital.

27. Bureaucratic delays and inactivities caused by long established departmental and interdepartmental procedures are frustrating enough in normal times but are as dangerous in revolutionary war as is subversion itself.

28. In the fight .../33

28. In the fight against insurgents territorial borders must be possible of being disregarded by government forces, preferably by previous international arrangements. Internal boundaries within the country, administrative, police and armed forces, must coincide.

29. The government must be ready to conscript, direct and control labour.

30. Propaganda, terrorism and guerillas are only one stage of modern warfare, designed to create a situation favourable to the build-up of conventional forces for the purpose, eventually, of confronting government forces on the battlefield and defeating them.

31. Leaders at all levels of government, politicians as well as policemen, soldiers, airmen, sailors and civil servants, must have a thorough understanding of counter-insurgency and the joint and several responsibilities of all departments in this type of warfare.

34 APPENDIX "B" TO "LESSONS LEARNT FROM PAST REVOLUTIONARY WARS"

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Bewysstuk G5

Plaaslike Vingerafdrukkantoor .....

Verwysingsno. PR .....



Stasie KWAZAKELE M.R 373/06/85

Album opgestel deur KOL. J. JONKER

SLEUTEL TOT FOTO'S

FOTO 1 – Toon Strandstraat.
Gefotografeer in 'n suidelike rigting.

FOTO 2 – Toon Strandstraat.
Gefotografeer in 'n suidelike rigting.

FOTO 3 – Toon Strandstraat.
Gefotografeer in 'n noordelike rigting.

PUNT A OP FOTO 1 + 2 – Toon parkeermeter nommer 10234.

PUNT B OP FOTO 1 – 3 – Toon parkeermeter nommer 10235.

PUNT C OP FOTO 3 – Toon parkeerarea te Victoria Kaai.

PUNT D OP FOTO 2 – Toon ou Sanlam gebou. Police head quarters

PUNT E OP FOTO 3 – Toon ou Polisie voertuig parkeerarea.

AFSTANDE

A – D = 82 meter

A – E = 21 meter

B – C = 200 meter

LT-KOL

.....

J ZONKER

FOTO 1

TOON GEDEELTE VAN STRANDSTRAAT, PORT ELIZABETH

PUNT A - TOON PARKEERMETER NR. 10234

PUNT B - TOON PARKEERMETER NR. 10235



FOTO 2

TOON GEDEELTE VAN STRANDSTRAAT, PORT ELIZABETH.

PUNT A - TOON PARKEERMETER 10234

PUNT B - TOON PARKEERMETER 10235




FOTO 3

TOON GEDEELTE VAN STRANDSTRAAT, PORT ELIZABETH.

PUNT B - TOON PARKEERMETER 10235

PUNT C - TOON PARKEERAREA TE VICTORIA KAAI (QYAY)

AFSTAND VAN PUNT B - C = 200 METER



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MEMORANDUM OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA BAR COUNCIL, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIETY OF ADVOCATES, IN REGARD TO THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO SECURITY LEGISLATION

INTRODUCTION BY EDITOR

On 25 January 1983 the Bar Council of South West Africa requested the Administrator-General to appoint a judicial commission "to consider the problem of security legislation and practices; the abuse of power; deaths in detention and other irregularities and malpractices relating to detention without trial; ways and means of protecting the citizen against abuse."

On 2 November 1983 a Commission of Enquiry into matters relating to Security Legislation in South West Africa was instituted by Proclamation AG 159 of 1983. This proclamation reads as follows:

"APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY INTO SECURITY LEGISLATION
IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA

It is hereby notified for general information that His Excellency, the Administrator-General, has appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Security Legislation in South West Africa with the following terms of reference:

In view of the revolutionary onslaught on the territory of South West Africa and the terrorist struggle which is being waged in certain parts of the said territory, to

enquire into, and to report on and make recommendations as to the adequacy, fairness and efficacy of legislation pertaining to the internal security of the said territory.

The Commission shall consist of -

The Honourable Mr Justice H.P. van Dyk, as Chairman;

and

Mr H.J. Taljaard
Adv. J.D. du Bruyn
Adv. G.S. Coetzee
Mr G.J. Muller,

as members."

The Bar Council objected to and dissociated itself from the preamble to the above Proclamation on the ground that it:

"will be seen by many as the political and sectional value judgment of the government and a section of the population ...Many citizens in our divided society do not see their side as 'terrorists', nor do they regard the struggle as an 'onslaught on the territory of SWA'" (letter of 9 December 1983 to the Secretary of the Commission of Enquiry).

The Bar Council also criticized the composition of the Commission of Enquiry on the ground that it consisted only of whites despite the fact that the majority of the population of South West Africa/Namibia is black and blacks are the people mostly affected by the security laws (ibid.).

Despite these objections, and after receiving some assurances from the Chairman of the Commission, Mr Justice H P van Dyk, the Bar Council reluctantly decided to submit a memorandum to the Commission. The opening sections of the memorandum, dealing with the exchange of views between the Bar Council and the Commission, and the need for the Commission to receive evidence from detainees, are excluded.

TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM

General approach of the Society of Advocates:

1. It is one of the most important aims of the Society of Advocates incorporated in its constitution to uphold the Rule of Law, i.e. law and order based on justice, and in accordance with longstanding traditions, precepts and institutions, recognised and upheld in civilised and progressive societies.

We believe that the Rule of Law so defined, is indispensible in the long run for the survival of civilisation itself.

1.1 We realise however that the ideals and norms of the rule of law cannot always be maintained in a war situation or in the case of some other national emergency.

Nevertheless, vigilance is necessary to ensure that modifications are only made when absolutely necessary, and for so long as is absolutely necessary.

1.2 It is because of human weakness that wide and unrestrained power leads to the abuse of power.

1.3 The abuse of power is apparent in the application of security laws and practices in our country today.

1.4 In Namibia the institutions of the Rule of Law such as the Police, the Courts, the legal practitioners and the law itself, are suspect in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of our people.

1.5 A large section of the population never had any confidence in the security forces and security laws applicable to this country and probably has less confidence in them today.

1.6 This Commission can make some contribution to instil and/or regain confidence in some of our institutions in this country by a courageous, impartial and objective search for the truth, analysis and recommendations.

2. It is a grave error of judgment and a pity that His Excellency the Administrator-General and his advisors have deemed it fit to formulate terms of reference and after objections, to retain it, which will be seen by many as a political and sectional value judgment of a government and a section of the population.

It seems that it was the intention of the authorities to force the Commission into the position that it had to accept as an immutable and incontrovertible fact that there

was a revolutionary onslaught on the territory and a "terrorist" struggle and that its only task was to test the adequacy, fairness and efficiency of security laws against the aforesaid immutable and incontrovertible fact.

It must here be noted that in South Africa, the South African government wisely refrained from such partisan language in the terms of reference of the Rabie Commission and wisely stated:

".....to examine the necessity, adequacy, fairness and efficacy of legislation pertaining to the protection of internal security .....".

.1 Many citizens in our divided society do not "see their side as terrorists" neither do they see the security forces as their protectors, nor do they see an "onslaught on the territory of South West Africa", but rather a resistance, which includes "armed struggle" against a "foreign power" which is seen by them and the majority of the international community and its institutions, as "illegally" occupying the territory of South West Africa.

It must be accepted that the government of the day, the majority of the white population as well as a section of the black and brown citizens of the country, share the view expressed in the terms of reference that there is a revolutionary onslaught against the country by terrorists.

.2 The differences between our situation and that in the R.S.A. and particularly the causes of the armed struggle, have been investigated and debated in trials before the Supreme Court of South West Africa such as:

The State v Josef Sacharias and Others 1983(1) SA 833
The State v Angula Muvala Supreme Court of S.W.A., 26.5.1983 unreported.

2.2.1. It is a matter of some concern that very few cases of persons charged under the Terrorism Act have been brought before our Courts in recent years. It seems that the policy at present is to take alternative action against alleged "terrorists" and those who assist them. This matter also deserves the attention of the Commission.

3. Many Namibians are caught in the physical and political crossfire between opposing forces. They are threatened by both sides and live in fear from day to day. It is in the face of such division and strife and in such circumstances that there is a need for all those who serve in the administration of justice, whether as State employees, judges, advocates or the staff of the Attorney-General's office or advocates and attorneys in private practice, to attempt to remain impartial and uphold the ideals of the Rule of Law in so far as circumstances permit.

We are aware of atrocities committed by all sides and some positive contributions made by all sides.

We see the profession of policemen as a noble one without which justice cannot prevail, but then their task must remain the protection of society, the bringing of alleged offenders to trial and not that of licensed and programmed killers.

We welcome the establishment of our own police force, but hope that care will be taken to build on sound foundations.

Comment on some decided cases and submissions flowing therefrom:

1. Security laws and abuse of power related to it has a long history in this country.

The case of Wood and Another v Ondangwa Tribal Auth. and Ors. 1975(2) SA 294 AD., is an example of the abuse of power for political purposes on a massive scale by Tribal authorities.

Although the Appellate Division in this case did not deal with the part played by the government, the security police and others, it was well known at the time and known to some of the members of the Society of Advocates that the government and the Minister of Native Affairs of S.A., were not only aware of the abuse, but approved of it and even encouraged it and that the Security Police in S.W.A. actively aided and abetted the malpractices. In many cases the Security Police would detain a person suspected of political agitation and after some time hand the detainee over to tne Tribal Authorities for punishment. The law used at the time for widespread detention against people opposing the government and government policy, was a proclamation issued by the State President of S.A., namely Proc. R17 of 1972. Many politicians in Owambo, leaders and even women were beaten and disgraced in public. The con-

sequence was that many more people became disillusioned with our system of justice - fled their country and joined the resistance.

In this case the reluctance and/or the inability of the S.W.A. Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa was amply demonstrated, as in later cases such as Franciscus Petrus v Minister of Police and Another and Ashipembe, Nakaua and Nahanga v Minister of Police and Others.

The Appeal Court pointed out the inability of the individual victim in an area such as Owambo to take his case to court timeously.

2. Perhaps the most dramatic exposure of the abuses of security laws and malpractice in S.W.A. appears in the recent case of U Kakuva and Another v Administrator-General and Minister of Police, supra presently on appeal.

In this case, which was an application by the wife of one Johannes Kakuva, for a declaration presuming his death, his Lordship Mouton J. found that Johannes Kakuva together with a number of other citizens of Kaokoland in S.W.A. were detained by the Security Police at Opuwa. All were detained in a small room without sufficient light or air. The detainees were blindfolded to disorientate them. A large number of those detained were detained and blindfolded even though the Security Police knew from the outset that there were no legal grounds for their detention. When released, after two days or more, those released were left to their own means of returning to their homes approximately 60 kilometres away.

The Court found that several of those detained for longer than two days, including Johannes Kakuva, were beaten by Security Police and that Johannes Kakuva died at Opuwa in detention. Those not released at an early stage were held in chains and one was kept in a toilet for days and another in a small cubicle for a gas bottle - where he could only crouch.

The respondents' version was that Johannes Kakuva and others were detained under AG 9 of 1977 and that on the first day of his questioning, Kakuva had agreed to become a spy for the Security Police. He was taken the day after to some remote spot in Kaokoland to make contact with SWAPO insurgents and then to meet the Security Police subsequently to pass on whatever information he had obtained. The story goes on to say that Kakuva did not keep his appointment and was never seen again and the respondents also accepted that he was dead, but not as a result of any assault by them.

It was common cause that Johannes Kakuva was a person with a strong personality, a relatively rich man and an influential and respected man in his area - with a close and happy family - including wife and about 8 minor children - father - brothers and sisters and so on.

It was common cause that when enquiries were initially made by relatives, friends and even headmen at the Security Branch, Opuwa, members of the Security Branch deliberately lied to those who enquired and for a substantial period persisted with the story that Kakuva was still held at Opuwa.

It was common cause that no members of the Security Branch ever took the trouble to enquire whether Kakuva had a family, had dependants and no effort was ever made to inform these people of the circumstances of Kakuva's disappearance and presumed death.

It was common cause that the attorneys for applicant before the institution of legal proceedings informed the Administrator-General of the dissatisfaction of the family at the disappearance of Kakuva, but the Administrator-General merely called in the head of the Security Police and accepted a written report, unverified by affidavits.

It was also common cause that the then head of the Security Policy only relied on the mere say-so of Captain King, the most senior of the team of Security Police interrogating the detainees at Opuwa at the relevant time.

When legal proceedings were launched in which grave allegations were made by several surviving detainees, the Administrator-General and the Minister of Police gave instructions to defend the good name of the Police.

Neither the Administrator-General nor the head of Security Police took any further steps to investigate the matter, but left it in the hands of the State Attorney. A member of the Security Police, a non-commissioned officer, was however assigned to assist the aforesaid State Attorney and he admitted in evidence that he became in effect a mere messenger of the State Attorney.

He explained that he had refrained from questioning the detainees themselves and merely acted under the instructions of the State Attorney.

It is significant that at no stage was there any indication from the authorities that proper investigation would be instituted with a view to a possible criminal prosecution - not even after the damning evidence in the course of the trial and the clear judgment of the Court on 14th June 1983.

It must be stressed here that even if the story of the Security Police was true, their own story amounted to the gravest abuse of the rights of a detainee, i.e. to send the detainee on a dangerous mission on the basis of a so-called consent obtained in detention when there was no opportunity for the exercise of his own free will. At no stage was any attempt made to compensate the widow and children for the loss of a father on alleged active service of the government.

The Security Police could not produce any record of the detention at Opuwa and explained that they were not required to keep records of AG 9 of 1977 detainees. They all confirmed that they knew of no standing order, regulation or other instructions from higher authority pertaining to the detention by them of detainees.

However, it was alleged that certain investigation diaries had been kept, that some of these diaries had been destroyed by them after use but that those of Johannes Kakuva and four of the other detainees had been kept.

When Applicant applied for the disclosure of these diaries, the Administrator-General stepped in and issued a certificate in terms of Section 29(1) of Act 101 of 1969 which forbade the disclosure of the said investigation diaries.

The Court was powerless to question this order.

Prima facie, the disclosure of these documents could only aid the search for the truth.

Again this particular exercise of the powers of the Administrator-General in terms of the aforesaid General Laws Amendment Act on the ground that the security of the State could be prejudiced by the disclosure of the aforesaid investigation diaries, is unacceptable and should be throughly investigated by the Commission.

This law should be amended in S.W.A. to at least empower the Court to override the decisions of the executive in certain circumstances.

This law, used in conjunction with security legislation, the Official Secrets Act No. 16 of 1956 and Section 153 of the Criminal Prosedure Act 51 of 1977 often effectively prevents the exposure of crimes and/or malpractices. By so doing the system of administration of justice becomes suspect.

The cases continued for several months before a decision was given.

The Court found that a lot of time and money could have been saved if the Administrator-General had launched an impartial and thorough investigation when requested to do so by the attorneys for Applicant.

It was also clearly established that the Administrator-General acted on mere letters from the Security Branch without any substantiation on affidavit, for orders for further detention of detainees held under Proc. AG 9.

In some cases it approved the documents presented to Court, that were prepared in advance by the Security Police and were merely rubber-stamped by the representative of the Attorney-General. The explanation for this remained uncertain and confusing throughout the trial.

It was also clearly substantiated at the trial that the letters written by the Security Branch in support of applications for authority for further detentions, was often inaccurate and contained serious misrepresentations.

It was clearly established at the trial that Proc. AG9 of 1977 was used 'to remove citizens from society', without trial, and that this interpretation and policy enjoyed the support of the Security Police and the Administrator-General and some members of the Ministers Council.

This was given as the explanation why people detained for months were only questioned on one occasion, on the second day of their detention and why no written statements were even taken from them.

It was also common cause that a strange construction existed at the regular place of detention at Opuwa. The possible inference to be drawn from the mere existence of this structure, was that it could be used for irregular interrogation methods.

Whenever the Applicant's Counsel attempted to put questions on the use of this structure, Counsel for the Administrator-General and the Minister of Police objected that it was irrelevant and the Court upheld this objection.

Nevertheless it is submitted that it will be justified and advisable if this Commission can establish the facts in this connection.

It was also clearly established in this trial that it would be impossible for the ordinary individual to take a matter such as this to Court without financial assistance from others.

It was apparent at the trial that many of the local community, including some headmen, were very unhappy with the conduct of the Security Police.

It is an example of how abuses and malpractices under the shield of security laws, can lead to the alienation of our people, rather than their protection and survival.

It is submitted that the combination of provisions to keep certain facts secret used in conjunction with Security Laws and practices may in some cases assist in the protection of the security of the State, but in others it may serve merely to cover up scandalous actions, and thereby undermine State Security in the long run.

We are convinced that the review of these provisions is necessary.

AG9 of 1977 should be drastically amended to provide only for detention for the purpose of interrogation and not for indefinite detention without trial. Without adequate controls, legislation such as AG9 of 1977 cannot stand without abuse and that controls even by the highest executives can never protect the citizen.

What is required is access to the detainee by his family and/or a legal representative of their choice and access to the Supreme Court at an early stage.

In addition no prescription should run against any detainee for actions instituted against the State by him or

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In addition no prescription should run against any detainee for actions instituted against the State by him or

by his dependant for the period in detention and/or the period from detention to date that his death is established or presumed.

A recent case which lifted the veil of secrecy on the activities of the special police unit "Koevoet" must be mentioned.

We refer to the application of Kandohombo vs Hamakali, Ruben and the Administrator General which served before the Supreme Court of SWA on 22 JUly 1983.

In this application applicant, a shopkeeper in Owambo and a man of some means, applied for an interdict against certain members of Koevoet to be restrained from threatening him and from molesting him. He averred that it served no purpose to lay complaints with the police against Koevoet because the ordinary police were reluctant to interfere in the affairs of Koevoet and he and the people of Owambo lived in fear of Koevoet. In support of his allegation that he feared for his life, he stated that another person was shot and killed the previous year at a nearby restaurant at Oshakati by members of Koevoet without reason.

The Supreme Court granted a rule nisi, serving as an interim interdict and referred the matter to the Attorney General for action and suggested that Counsel for Applicant, B O'Linn S.C., should see the Attorney General and bring to his attention some matters apparent from the papers.

It appeared from the papers that the dead man referred to, one Moses Aaron, was apparently removed from hospital

by members of Koevoet and buried, without notice to his relatives, in some unknown grave and without any prior investigation of inquest. It appeared from the papers prima facie that some serious offences had been committed by some unknown senior police officers and or officials in allowing or instructing such a course.

The Attorney General was fully apprized of these facts and informed that, not only the client and the Court, but also the Bar Council were interested in this matter.

The Attorney General ordered a prosecution against the said Hamakali for pointing a firearm at the said Kandjohomba and Hamakali, represented by the State Attorney, was duly convicted and his subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, dismissed.

It the meantime, the said Koevoet policeman, Hamakali, allegedly died after detonating a landmine.

At the criminal trial aforesaid, a senior officer of Koevoet, Major Winter, gave evidence for the accused and stated that he had sent the aforesaid Hamakali and another member of Koevoet to go and warn the aforesaid Kandohomba for having lodged complaints against Koevoet. What sort of "warning" and his right to do so was not investigated in Court.

Counsel for the Applicant, on behalf of his client and the Bar Council pointed out to the Attorney General, Mr Brunette, on several occasions the need for investigating and establishing under what right Koevoet was acting when they "warn" citizens and under what right Koevoet buried the man shot without an enquiry, without an inquest and

without notifying the relatives. It was pointed out that prima facie offences under the Inquest Act and even the offence of attempting to defeat the ends of justice had been committed.

The Attorney General informed Counsel that he had no power to take any initiative, that he could only take decisions on matters referred to him by the police and that it appeared that no inquest had ever been held and that the police (undisclosed), had given the explanation that the man killed was a terrorist who had tried to escape and that they could apparently not understand why their action should be queried.

Counsel pointed out to the said Attorney General that according to the affidavits supporting the aforesaid application, the deceased, although an alleged "Terrorist" brought back from Angola about two years prior to his death, had been in the pay of the government for a substantial period and there was no support in the available affidavits for the allegation that the deceased was "a terrorist shot when attempting to escape".

The Attorney General subsequently informed the said Counsel that his successor Adv. T Louw, had ordered an inquest into the death of the deceased, Moses Aaron.

Counsel, Adv. O'Linn also explained to the said Adv. Louw, after the latter had become Attorney General, the concern of the Bar Council.

On or about 24th March 1984, the lastmentioned Attorney General informed the said Adv. O'Linn that an inquest had been held and that it was unsatisfactory and

that he had raised certain queries. He was unwilling to allow Counsel insight into the inquest documents at this stage. To date, no investigation has been conducted into possible offences under the Inquest Act and no prosecutions have taken place in this connection.

It is submitted that the Commission should also as a matter of urgency, investigate the following questions:

(i) The circumstances surrounding the killing and burial of Moses Aaron and particularly whether or not there was a cover-up by the police involved.

The aforesaid witnesses Ephraim Iyambo and Lebeus Shipoke, should be called by the Commission as witnesses.

(ii) In view of the alleged allegations by unknown members of the Police Force that the deceased Moses Aaron was a terrorist who had tried to escape, an investigation is required into the conditions under which "terrorists" are held and particularly who the inmates are of the "police camp" known as "Onaimundi-basis" at Oshakati.

(iii) What are the rights of Security Forces such as Koevoet to kill and bury citizens of Owambo, without informing the relatives, without an open enquiry or inquest and in their unfettered discretion.

(iv) Can Koevoet do this to an alleged terrorist killed in a place like Oshakati and not in the heat of battle?

(v) Is the mere say-so of members of Koevoet that a slain person was a "terrorist", enough?

(vi) Is this a practice?

(vii) In which cases has this practice been followed?

(viii) Where are the graves of people so killed and buried?

(ix) Why and in terms of which law, does Koevoet warn citizens who had complained against them?

(x) Who controls Koevoet, and what are these controls? How do you qualify for membership of Koevoet and what is the need and task of such a unit?

(xi) What machinery exists for the investigation of complaints against Koevoet?

(xii) What has happened to prisoners, alleged SWAPO terrorists, arrested or detained by Koevoet and other units of the Security Forces?

(xiii) Under what laws are these people detained at Oshakati, Mariental and elsewhere?

(xiv) What controls are there relating to the conditions of detention?

(xv) For what purposes are these detainees used and what is required from them to qualify for "rehabilitation"?

(xvi) The effectiveness and appropriateness of the present inquest procedures, even when applied, as a means to establish the truth.

(xvii) Whether or not the office of the Attorney-General requires more powers to take initiatives in cases of this nature and to what extent amendments of the law are required.

(xviii) The need to end the division of the Police Forces into those doing ordinary police work and those special units with a mandate to kill rather than to arrest and charge before the courts of law.

The submission is that there is no need for any police unit with instructions to kill in the first place instead of to arrest and bring to trial.

If the authorities feel the need for such a unit, they should be completely divorced from the Police Force as such and not go under the name and title of police.

The case of the State v Nagel SWA Division of the Court of SA, 26th August 1981, is a further case in point.

Here a young member of a so-called police special task force unit had shot a black civilian in cold blood in the streets of Windhoek and was convicted of culpable homicide. Evidence was given of the training of this unit,

most of it in camera by the officer in charge. We are reliably informed that the aforesaid officer had told the court he was responsible for training the members of the unit to be programmed killers and would very much like to have the accused back in his unit even though the latter had commited a heinous crime.

Recently a photograph was displayed of a senior member of this unit wearing a vest with the motto "killing is our business - business is good".

The evidence of the officer given in camera as well as that of the psychiatrist called to testify in mitigation, should be studied by the Commission to get an insight in the norms applied by these units and the effect thereof on the administration of justice and our community.

It seems clear that the norm of the "policemen" of Koevoet and this special task force is to shoot first and ask questions later - even if the person in front of them is outwardly an unarmed civilian.

Instead, therefore, of the first duty to protect the civilian, the purpose here is rather protect the "policeman" and sacrifice the civilian.

Furthermore, the rule is not to wound the suspect so that he may be arrested and taken into custody but to empty the magazine and to kill in order to prevent the possibility of the suspect defending himself. The policy and method is even more dangerous and explosive when the elements of "race" and ideology are part and parcel of the indoctrination.

The policy and method of "programming" members of these units may certainly enable the security forces to kill more terrorists, but certainly also more civilians.

We believe there is a need for an urgent investigation by the Commission into the methods of training of this unit and to propose ways and means to bring this unit nearer to the tasks and norms of conduct of the true police officer. Alternatively, to abolish it or in the further alternative, to separate this unit also completely from the police force as such.

5. In the most recent case of the State v J Paulus and P Matheus, members of the police unit known as Koevoet, went on a spree of murder, rape and robbery.

J Paulus was convicted of murder, attempted murder, rape and several counts of robbery and sentenced to death whereas, P. Matheus was convicted of robbery and attempted murder and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment effectively.

See Judgment dated 5 December 1983. Supreme Court of S.W.A.

It is important to note that according to his own evidence, the said J Paulus was an ex-Unita fighter and had seen and experienced violence from an early age. He was absorbed into Koevoet where he underwent counter-insurgency training.

P Matheus was an ex-SWAPO guerilla.

It seems that above were the only qualifications for joining the so-called police unit Koevoet.

In evidence under oath the said J Paulus said that people in villages who do not co-operate sufficiently in the view of Koevoet, are often assaulted by members of Koevoet. He testified that money is paid to members, described as "kopgeld" for every alleged terrorist killed. It was clear from the evidence that the inhabitants of Owambo live in fear of Koevoet.

The State witness Simon Nghoshi, a warrant officer in the S.W.A. Police with 14 years service in the police force and investigating officer in this case, refused to answer questions about the activities of Koevoet under cross-examination because he feared for his own life should he do so. He, however, testified that there is a state of lawlessness in the township of Oneshila, Oshakati, in Owambo, due to the fact that there is no control over weapons and ammunition issued to Koevoet members and that undisciplined Koevoet members commit crimes of violence against the inhabitants and that the lives of policemen attempting to investigate these crimes are often in danger.

The Judge presiding at the trial, Strydom J., said in his judgment at p 250 of the record:

> "Uit sy getuienis en die stellings wat aan hom gemaak is het 'n verontrustende toedrag van sake na vore gekom ...."

> "Alvorens ek oorgaan om die beskuldigdes te vonnis wil ek verwys na die getuienis van A/O Nghoshi in verband met die probleme wat deur die polisie ondervind word om in geval van misdade deur lede van Koevoet arrestasies uit te voer. Ek vind dit egter onverstaanbaar dat daar in so 'n geval nie 'n groter mate van koordinasie is tussen bevelvoerders van die onderskeie eenhede nie ....".

The evidence of Dr Shubitz, a psychiatrist-neurologist with 32 years experience in practice, testified about the indoctrination by both Unita and Koevoet which made the accused in effect a programmed killer. The learned judge apparently accepted this evidence.

It is submitted that the Commission should take a close look at this evidence and even call some of the witnesses to testify before the Commission.

6. The case of the State v Victor Nkandi was a murder trial in which Nkandi was charged before the S.W.A. Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa with the murder of Chief Elifas. The case followed the trial of Aron Mushimba and others for the same murder. 7.

Mushimba was convicted of murder, and sentenced to death but the conviction and sentence was quashed on appeal by the Appellate Division on the ground of grave irregularity, viz. the use of a partner of the defending attorneys firm as a spy of the security police to inform them of particulars of the defence prepared on behalf of the accused. See State v Mushimba and Others, 1977(2) SA p829 AD. Mushimba's case demonstrates the lengths to which the Security Police are willing to go in order to achieve their objectives.

In Nkandi's case the State attempted to prove several confessions. The confessions were severely attacked by the defence on the ground to assaults, intimidation and other irregularities. At the end of this cross-examination the Attorney General's representative withdrew his application for admission of the affidavits and thereupon the case collapsed.

.y)

It was established in this case that the Security Police had taken several suspects and potential witnesses to a secluded area for extensive questioning. The detentions were alleged to have been in terms of Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967. When records were demanded at the trial, one of the officers testified that he had destroyed whatever records that had initially been kept. The ease with which the provision for visits of magistrates to detainees could be evaded, was also demonstrated in this case.

In the case of Fransciscus Petrus v Minister of Police and Col. Schoon, an interdict was asked for preventing assaults on the son of the applicant allegedly detained by the Security Police in terms of Section 6 of the Terrorism Act.

Many affidavits were attached in support of other detainees who alleged that they had been tortured, including photographs of some injuries sustained.

The South West Africa Division turned down the application and an application for leave to appeal, but leave was subsequently granted by the Appellate Division. The appeal became academic and was therefore withdrawn, because the Security Police released the detainee before the appeal could be heard.

In this case the ineffectiveness of the safeguard for visits by a magistrate was again clearly demonstrated. In terms of the law the magistrate could not communicate with the legal representatives. A report was however attached

to the reply of the respondents, stating that the detainee had never complained.

Counsel agreed that such a report was of no value inter alia because a detainee will not be inclined to confide in a magistrate who could only report to the police and had no power to protect the detainee or ensure his release.

The learned judges were still busy delivering their judgment and rejecting Counsel's argument, when a report was received that the detainee had now made a report to the magistrate that he had been assaulted. The Court was informed of this development but after a while resumed reading the judgment in which it rejected the application. At the end of the judgment the Court however stated that the information received would have made no difference to their judgment.

8. The case of Rauha Ashipemba and Francisca Nakaua and Others v Minister of Police and Others was an habeas corpus application wherein the applicants asked for an order compelling the police to produce their husbands to Court. The applicants averred that their husbands had disappeared and that they believed that they had been taken into custody by members of the Security Forces.

In the case of Nakaua it was alleged that people in camouflaged uniforms and F M rifles had broken into the residence of the Nakaua family and had taken Mr Johannes Nakaua into custody and removed him from the scene with a heavy vehicle which sounded like an "Ondjamba" (elephant) -

a type of vehicle alleged to be used by the Security Forces. Matthia Ashipemba disappeared when on his way to Windhoek to meet his wife Rauha, who was due to arrive in Windhoek from vacation in Germany. When Rauha arrived in WIndhoek, Matthias failed to turn up and was never seen by her since.

The third man, Mathias Nkanga was a plain man, uneducated, apolitical, who only wanted a lift to go and seek work at Tsumeb.

Both Nakaua and Ashipemba were suspects of the Security Police.

Counsel for the respondents objected in limine to alleged formal defects in the supporting affidavits and after two days of argument before Badenhorst, J., judgment was reserved but never delivered.

Subsequent to the aforesaid hearing the legal representatives on both sides agreed to an impartial investigation by a highranking police officer from the R.S.A., namely Brigadier Coetzee. The investigation was unsatisfactory and remained indecisive. It was however confirmed from army records that the motor vehicle in which Matthias Ashipemba and a passenger Mattheus had travelled to Windhoek, was last seen and recorded at the Oshivelo gate on the road from Ondangwa to Windhoek. It was stated by the aforesaid Brig. Coetzee that in the time at his disposal he could not trace the soldier who had compiled the record. This information was never followed up by the police and the soldier who had made the note was never identified.

It is submitted that with some real effort, the soldier who made the note could have been traced.

The missing people are still missing today, including the vehicle of the aforesaid Ashipemba. No accident was ever reported and no damaged vehicle found. The only reasonable inference is that Ashipemba and Nakanga had been killed by someone and their vehicle destroyed.

This application for habeas corpus was eventually withdrawn, each party to pay their own costs. However, the matter had a further sequel in the Supreme Court.

Mrs Rauha Ashipemba and her sister Mrs Willibaldine Mapupa instituted action for damages against the Minister and Security Police for unlawful arrest at Oshivello gate and subsequent unlawful detention for a month at Tsumeb.

The facts were these:

When Mrs Rauha Ashipemba returned to Oshakati from her overseas visit, she made enquiries about the whereabouts of her husband. Witnesses told her, including her sister, Willibaldine, that her husband had actually set off with his car for Windhoek where he had intended to meet his wife. Information was also received that he was last seen at Oshivello.

Rauha Ashipemba and her sister, Willibaldine, therefore set off for Oshivelo to make enquiries about her husband's disappearance. They slept at Oshivello with a friend the first night and discreetly enquired whether people had not seen her husband.

However, the next day they were questioned by members of the Police who were apparently stationed at the gate.

Mrs Ashipemba and Mapupa enquired from the police what had happened to her husband, but the police told them that they had no knowledge of tne matter. Thereupon the aforesaid Rauha Ashipemba and Willibaldine were forthwith instructed to get into a police vehicle, removed to Oshakati and there detained for a month by the Security Police without being asked any questions.

The respondents in their plea explained that they had information which they could not divulge, that the two women were SWAPO spies and that they were detained in terms of AG 9 of 1977. The Security Police admitted that the two detainees had never been questioned, but explained that this was because they knew that the detainees would lie.

The Respondent eventually offered a payment as damages of approximately R5 000,00 and in consequence the matter was settled out of court.

It seems tnat the purpose of the detention was intimidation.

The grave suspicion is that Ashipemba, Nakana and Nakanga were abducted and murdered by people other than SWAPO and that there is a cover-up of the true facts.

It will be necessary for the Commission to attempt to find answers to the questions left open in this case.

It will be interesting to establish whether any steps were taken by the authorities to discipline the Security Police involved for the abuse of AG 9 of 1977 and the scandalous treatment meted out to two women who needed sympathy and assistance for the loss of a husband and were instead incarcerated by the very "protectors" of the community.

If not, it will only strengthen the suspicions of many that these practices carry the official approval of the government in high places.

9. The State v Stephanus, Matthue and le Roux, Supreme Court of S.W.A., 11th November 1982 is a case where a native woman of Owambo was detained at the army camp and there raped by two black soldiers after suggestions by the white sergeant.

Questions to be examined here are inter alia:

(i) Why was this woman detained and by whom?

(ii) What are the powers of army personnel to arrest and detain?

(iii) What rights and protection have detainees detained by members of the army?

10. The case of the State v Kruger and van der Heever Supreme Court S.W.A. 11th February 1983, presently pending appeal to the Appellate Division was a case of coldblooded murder and armed robbery.

Kruger and van der Heever were convicted of murder, but acquitted on armed robbery on the ground that Section 103 ter of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 applied.

The undisputed facts were that a group of Defence Force soldiers of Owambo, dressed in SWAPO or FAPLA uniforms, with blackened faces had proceeded to a kraal and removed a 4 wheel drive vehicle. A black guard discovered them whereupon they forthwith removed the guard and the vehicle to the army camp. Subsequently it was decided to execute the guard because he was a witness. The vehicle was burnt out and the guard shot without much ado.

Unfortunately, the owner of the vehicle and the employer of the guard was a headmen, a member of the Owambo Legislative Assembly and a man of some influence and he complained.

The body of the guard was discovered and the burnt out vehicle found.

Some features of this case must be stressed:

(i) It demonstrates an abuse of Section 103 ter and the need to amend it. The minimum amendment required is the addition of the words "on reasonable grounds" after the words "bona fide" and the scrapping of the words "in connection with".

(ii) The question is: how many cases never come to court because of the existence of Section 103 ter, which

provides for absolute immunity for members of the Security Forces whenever the deed is done bona fide for the purpose of or in connection with the prevention or suppression of terrorism in any operational area.

(iii) The mentality of many members of the Security Forces is here demonstrated because although only two members were eventually charged - a third volunteered to aid in the execution of the "kaffir" "terrorist" when volunteers were openly called for this purpose in the army pub.

Apparently none of the other members engaged in the robbery, had any objections.

(iv) The access by members of the Security Forces to SWAPO and PAPLA uniforms and AK 47 rifles and the opportunities to commit crimes in the name of SWAPO.

11. In the State v Diedericks and Cloete, S.W.A. Supreme Court, 13th April 1982, two members of the army doing duty in Owambo were convicted on two charges of murder of a black civilian.

The accused were members of a group of soldiers who molested and threatened civilians, detained two and eventually beat them to death. One body was concealed in a stormwater drain and one covered under leaves and branches. The one put into the stormwater drain was probably still alive when pushed into the drain.

Here again two members were charged and convicted, but apparently other members of the group did not discourage the accused.

12. The case of the State v du Plessis, Supreme Court S.W.A., is one of a European member of the Defence Force who took an army vehicle, a "Buffel", raped the wife of a prominent shopowner, Mr Eliazer Hambili and destroyed the supermarket and bottle store of the aforesaid Mr Hambili by using handgrenades. The alleged damage ran into hundreds of thousands of Rand.

Du Plessis was duly convicted, but the State refused to compensate Mr Hambili even though his life's work was totally destroyed.

From information received it appears that Mr Hambili is regularly detained under AG 9 of 1977.

It may be a co-incidence but we submit that the reasons for this victim's repeated detentions should be investigated.

The Commission should also investigate the adequacy of provisions for compensation to victims caused by crimes or malpractices of soldiers, whether strictly acting in the execution of their duties or not.

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P. Time and space does not allow us to deal with the large number of so-called "special police" and "home guards" charged and convicted by the Supreme Court for murder, culpable homicide, assault, rape, robbery malicious injury to property etc.

It seems that "special police" are trained by the regular police forces to hunt down and kill SWAPO insur-

gents. Often they are uneducated and underdeveloped people with an inferiority complex and a lethal weapon in hand. There is little control over the carrying of firearms and the nearest they come to the profession of "policeman" is the name.

Again this policy has been the cause of many tragedies and the loss of faith in the willingness and ability of the authorities to protect the citizen.

* * * * * * *

1. It is often claimed that law and order and the administration of justice is in a healthy state.

These people point to the cases that come before Court and say:

"There may be malpractices, but cases are investigated if complaints are made and culprits duly brought before the Court. Just look at the cases heard before Court."

2. This unfortunately is not the whole picture.

The true test is:

The number and extent of people killed, raped, robbed, assaulted and extorted that never come before Court.

2.1 This question cannot be answered without investigation into the number of people who disappear without trace; the number murdered by unknown persons; the number who do not complain because of fear and lack of trust in the institutions of justice; the cases where people are killed and buried without investigation or inquest; the cases where people are not prosecuted because of the shield of protection provided by Section 103 ter of the Defence Act.

3. Submissions have been made as to laws to be reviewed as part of the analysis of cases dealt with above.

3.1 Some of the security laws applicable only to South West Africa have not been dealt with specifically as no case relating to them has been brought before our Courts.

One such law which, however, deserves further attention is AG 26 fo 1978 - "detention for the prevention of political violence and intimidation".

We see no justification whatsoever for the wide powers of the Administrator-General, including indefinite detention without trial, the exclusion of access to the Courts of law and the failure to provide for compensation to a person so detained.

This law should be drastically amended.

3.2 In general we support the principle of consolidation of all security laws applicable to South West Africa.

3.3 We also believe that in the special circumstances of South West Africa, the death penalty should be abolished for all contraventions of security laws.

3.4 In so far as legislation and practices of the R.S.A. are relevant and applicable to S.W.A. our views co-incide substantially with those in the publication entitled Report

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ACCOUNTABILITY IN NAMIBIA

Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy

August 1992

An Africa Watch Report

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3. BACKGROUND TO THE WAR

SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES

SADF and SWATF

Pretoria deployed an array of military, para-military, security and police forces to wage its counter-insurgency campaign. By 1986, it was estimated that there were some 60,000 SADF troops, most of them conscripts, in Namibia. SADF first began organizing units of black Namibians in 1974 and established additional "homeland" units in 1976 and 1977.[1] In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the South Africans systematically began to re-organize their forces in order to more thoroughly "Namibianize" the conflict. The SADF sought to recruit black Namibians into the armed forces to sow divisions among the population; to reduce casualty rates among white South Africans; to transform the independence struggle into a civil war; and to alleviate manpower shortages.[2] In April 1980, the Administrator General of Namibia announced that a transfer of "some control" over military and police forces would begin once the necessary structures were in place.

While the newly established Council of Ministers[3] had the authority to draft soldiers, Pretoria retained functional command over the military units in Namibia. In August 1980, the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) was launched, recruited and organized along ethnic lines. By mid-1985, the strength of SWATF was reported officially to be 21,000 with just over 60 percent said to be black.[4] At a press briefing in June 1985, General George Mering, Commander of SADF and SWATF, said that up to 40,000 South African and Namibian soldiers were on the Angolan border, 61 percent of them Namibians.

Koevoet

The effort to organize para-military forces was accelerated in the late 1970s. The most infamous unit was *Koevoet*—"Crowbar" in Afrikaans—otherwise known as the Special Operations K Unit of the South African Security Police. This special counter-insurgency unit was modelled after the Selous Scouts of Rhodesia, a unit of black Rhodesians who had been known to disguise themselves as insurgents during the war there.[5] Hans Dreyer, a Colonel in the South

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[1] Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine*, (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1986), p. 199.

[2] Ibid.

[3] In 1980, the Administrator General's Advisory Council was converted into a Council of Ministers that consisted of twelve members. Each member represented a population group. The Administrator General was empowered to veto decisions of the Council and act independently in times of emergency.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Cawthra, *Brutal Force*, p. 123.

African Security Police in Natal Province. was appointed to form the unit in late 1978.[6] Thoug Koevoet functioned as a para-military force, it was designated a police unit. The "police designation had a particular significance: under the terms of UN Resolution 435, police units would continue to carry out their functions during the transition to elections and independence Thus, Koevoet, as a police unit, would be charged with maintaining order during the elections

Koevoet numbered no more than 3,000, including a core of white officers recruited from the ranks of the South African Police, the Selous Scouts, and other former Rhodesian mercenaries.[7] Ninety percent of Koevoet's personnel was black, recruited predominantly from the Ovambo population. Koevoet constables were not recruited through the usual police o security recruitment process. They were drawn from the poorly educated, and often had criminal records. Later Koevoet recruits came from the ranks of UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) and the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) in Angola. Captured SWAPO guerrillas were also coerced into joining. Among many in the north Koevoet personnel were known as *makakunya* (bloodsuckers).

For a time, Koevoet's existence was kept secret. Its existence became public in June 1980 when a local religious newspaper printed an article about a South African force specially created to assassinate prominent individuals in Ovamboland believed to be sympathetic to SWAPO. The article named fifty people who were alleged to be on a "death list"; several of those on the list had already died in mysterious or suspicious circumstances. Reportedly, these individuals were to be eliminated before the election that would determine the country's future.[8] Though denying the existence of the death list, the South African authorities acknowledged the unit's existence and praised its effectiveness.

In court cases filed against Koevoet, it was revealed that the unit had access to uniforms and weapons similar to those used by SWAPO combatants. Koevoet members received a bounty payment (*kopgeld*) for every alleged PLAN combatant they killed. Koevoet reportedly achieved a "kill ratio" of PLAN combatants twenty-five times greater than that of the SADF.[9] During its ten years' existence, Koevoet reportedly had 1,615 military engagements with PLAN units. It killed 2,812 PLAN fighters and captured 463 against a loss of 151 killed in action.[10] In addition

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[6] Peter Stiff, *Nine Days of War and South Africa's Final Days In Namibia*, (Johannesburg: Lemur Books, 1991), p. 142.

[7] Cawthra, *Brutal Force*, p. 124.

[8] Jonathan Steele, "Fifty named in death list," *The Guardian* [U.K.], June 9, 1980.

[9] D. Herbstein and J. Evenson, *The Devils Are Among Us; The War For Namibia*, (London: Zed, 1989), p. 64.

[10] Stiff, *Nine Days of War*, p. 142.

to launching "track and destroy" missions against PLAN fighters infiltrating or operating in Ovamboland or Okavango, Koevoet terrorized the civilian population of the north.

Prior to 1985, Koevoet came under the jurisdiction of the South African Security Police. In 1985, Koevoet's name was officially changed to the South West Africa Police Counter Insurgency Unit (SWAPOL COIN) and the unit was ostensibly transferred to SWAPOL's control. Koevoet remained under the control of the SADF. While the command structures had been separate, SWAPOL's Security Police and Koevoet had always worked closely together, often exchanging detainees for interrogation purposes. South Africa's Minister of Law and Order acknowledged Koevoet's origins and aims in a Parliamentary debate:

> Furthermore we have the Koevoet unit which started out with a small number of Security Police officers. This unit was formed at the request of the Defence Force and their duty is to act as the eyes and ears of and to collect information for the military. The Koevoet grew eventually to its present strength of approximately 1,000 men. Approximately 750-800 of these men are from the local population who are basically trained for two or three months and then posted to the Koevoet unit, while some of them are posted to the *kraals* [traditional Ovambo homesteads] of headmen to do security duties. They are under the command of a SA Police officer, and in all there are about 200 South African policemen involved in Koevoet. The rest of the Koevoet unit are members of the South West African Police. They are paid on our account. But the unit as such is the responsibility of the Minister of Law and Order in South Africa. This unit basically started off as our eyes and ears but they have developed into a strong military machine.[11]

Security Police

The South African Security Police, a separate branch of the police structure, had a large contingent assigned to Namibia. With units at many police bases, the Security Police were responsible for the interrogation of political prisoners and witnesses.[12]

Prior to 1980, the police in Namibia were part of the South African Police (SAP). The Commissioner of the South African Police commanded the police forces in Namibia and all police powers in South Africa applied there. In September 1980, ministerial control of the police in Namibia was transferred from the South African Minister of Police to the Administrator

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[11] Manfred Hinz and Nadia Gevers Leuven-Lachinski, *Koevoet Versus The People of Namibia," Report of A Human Rights Mission to Namibia On Behalf of the Working Group Kairos*, (Utrecht: Netherlands, 1989), p. 5

[12] Cawthra, *Brutal Force*, p. 194.

Matthew Goniwe (1)

UITERS GEHEIM

99

CRADOCK
CD7/17/21/189
1985/07/02
Sers. Koni

1985/07/02

WH.11
Tegnies

LEE BOZALEK:(G/L) ORGANISASIE
LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE
(S7/17/21/189):SKAKELING MET
NYAMEKA GONIWE S/VROU (G/L)

G/L : S7/17/21/189

1. Bogenoemde bron rapporteer dat
   Lee BOZALEK G/L
   op 1985/07/01 vanaf die
   LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE S7/17/21/189
   Kaapstad met
   Nyameka GONIWE G/L
   in verbinding was.
2. Hieronder volg inligting van veiligheidsbelang
   uit die gesprek:-

BOZALEK - "My name is Lee Bozalek from the Legal Resources Centre in Cape Town. I think my name was mentioned to you. I'm legally representing you people in this matter. I'm coming up to Port Elizabeth tomorrow morning. I just spoke to

Audrey COLEMAN S1/A/2409

and she suggested that I talk to you now. I am coming up for the day and I don't see any purpose of going down to Cradock. I was wondering whether you can't come down to Port Elizabeth?

GONIWE - The problem now is this, our car was burnt out and the only car available now, is my brother-in-law's car and it is being used by the family to go down to Port Elizabeth for the post mortem."

3. Op 1985/07/02 tree Lee BOZALEK weer met Nyameka GONIWE in verbinding en die gesprek verloop onder andere soos volg:-

BOZALEK - I am phoning from Port Elizabeth now. I am coming up to Cradock now. Will you arrange that I see the other wives of the missing as well as the dead men. Can those people be in one place at half-past three?

GONIWE - Ja.

4. Op dieselfde dag het Lee BOZALEK vanaf Cradock met

Molly BLACKBURN (GP1/771) S1/A/2716

te Port Elizabeth in verbinding getree.

5. Hieronder volg inligting van veiligheidsbelang uit die gesprek.

BOZALEK: "I am just coming back to someone there. I was wondering if I can stay in your place and the chap I am coming with.

BLACKBURN: That's no problem. We will leave the light and the kettle on.....
The News papers want to talk to you.

BOZALEK: Is that so? Okay."

6. KONNEKTAAR DEUR SERS. GONI

6.1 Die besoek wat Lee BOZALEK op 85/07/02 aan Cradock gebring het staan vermoedelik in verband met die dood van s/mans

Sparo NKHOMPO (GP4/2950) GP4/2306

Sicelo MHLAULI G/L

en die verdwyning van

Matthew GONIWE (CF4/2850) CA/43670

en

Fort CALATA (CF4/2903) CA/63442

Hierdie kantoor se verslag CD9/823 gedateer 85/07/01 met opskrif "Cradock Residents Association (CRADORA) (89/823) vergadering gehou op 85/06/29 te gemeenskaps-saal, Lingelihle, Cradock" het betrekking.

6.2 Die persoon wat Bozalek te Port Elizabeth wil spreek is vermoedelik

Wesley BALLEY C/L

'n voormalige gesondheidsinspekteur te Cradock en bestuurslid van die

Cradock Residents Association (Cradora) 89/823

Hy is tans 'n gesondheidsinspekteur te Port Elizabeth.

6.3 Op 85/07/01 was Balley met Nyameka GONIWE in verbinding, en het hy haar meegedeel dat hy op 85/06/29 deur Sers. Tungata (nie van veiligheidsbelang nie) wat verbonde is aan die veiligheidstak, Port Elizabeth, voorgekeer is.

7. UITKEERDIG

71 PERSONE

Wesley BALLEY - s/man - tans 'n gesondheidsinspekteur te Port Elizabeth. C/L

Molly BLACKBURN (CP1/771) S1/A/2766

Joe BOZALEK C/L
verbonde aan die Legal Resources Centre, Kaapstad.

Fort CALATA (CF4/2903) CA/63442

Audrey COLEMAN S1/A/2409

Matthew GONIWE (CF4/2850) CA/43670

Nyameka GONIWE - s/vrou - woonagtig te Chinastraat 14 Lingelihle, Cradock eggenote van Matthew GONIWE. C/L

Sicelo MHLAULI - s/man - hy is oorspronklik van Nakuambastraat 17, Lingelihle, Cradock, het daarna onderwys gegee aan die swart Primêre skool, Oudtshoorn, oorlede. C/L

Spero MPONTO (CF4/2950) CA/63396
(oorlede)

7.2 ORGANISASIES:

CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (CRADORA) 82/823

LEGAL ASSOURCES CENTRE 87/17/11/172

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

E. F. N. WINTER
MAJOOR
TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : E.F.N. WINTER

Matthews Jonive (5)

UITSOR GEHEIM

CRAN CE
CD0/023
1985/07/01
Pera. Vani

1985/06/30
Termies

CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION
(CRADORA)(89/023) VERGADERING GE-
HOU OP 85/07/28 TE GEMEENSKAP-
SAAL, LINGELIHLE, CRADOCK.
89/023

1. Op 1985/07/28 is die gemeenskapsaal Lingelihle, Cradock deur die
CRADOCK SOCCER UNION G/L
vanaf 13h00 tot 24h00 bespreek, vir die hou van 'n disco.
2. Die disco het om 19h00 in aanvang geneem en het geduur tot 23h20.
3. Direk daarna is 'n
CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (CRADORA) 89/023

UITSOR GEHEIM

2/...

vergadering onder voorsitterskap van
Gladwell MAKAULA (OP4/999) S4/14532

gehou.

4. Die vergadering is tegnies gedek en hieronder volg 'n vertaalde weergawe van die verrigtinge soos vertaal deur Sers. Koni vanaf Xhosa na Engels.

4.1 Gladwell MAKAULA

"We have four comrades, that is comrade
GONIWE (Matthew) (OP4/2850) S4/43680
a teacher, comrade
CALATA (Fort) (OP4/2903) S4/63442
a teacher, comrade
Sparo (UKHONTO) (OP4/2950) S4/-
and
Sicelo MHLAULI. G/L
These comrades went yesterday to Port Elizabeth for other business. These comrades left Cradock yesterday morning in Goniwe's Honda and up to now they are not yet back. They are used to go to Port Elizabeth so nobody can tell me that they lost their way, all the same they are not yet back up to now. A person named
ELS (nie van veiligheidsbelang nie)
who is attached to the South African Police says that the Honda is burnt out near Bluebay. (meaning Blue Water Bay)"

4.2 Die gehoor het hierop hard MAKAULA geskreeu en het daarna verder soos volg voort gegaan:

"He (Els) says that the registration number in front was a CB registration and a CAT registration at the back. He does not know what happened to the people who were inside the car, but he said that he was of the opinion that they were attacked."

4.3 Hierop het die gehoor weer hard geskreeu en hy het daarna weer soos volg voort gegaan:-

"These are lies, because as I have said that these comrades know Port Elizabeth. If we remember, there are three comrades in Port Elizabeth who were in the executive of
PEBCO (PORT ELIZABETH BLACK CIVIC ORGANISATION) S9/589
who are missing and cannot be traced up to now. They were missing after they were last seen when they went to the air port, and up to this very day they are still missing. They want us to believe that comrades Goniwe and the others were attacked by

which thing I know is lies. The Azapo members did not know that they were in Port Elizabeth and they also did not go to the township, but were only in town till 21h00 and they drove straight from there back to Cradock. They did not turn up but the car is found at Bluewaterbay. This is a sad experience to all of us but not tbethe perpetrator. What we say is that we want them back.

4.5 Die gehoor het geskreeu: "We want them back"
'n Onbekende persoon het Makaula se toespraak na Afrikaans getolk en in Engels het hy gesê:-

"Ladies and gentlemen, something must be done."

4.6 GLADWELL MAKAULA

"We won't fight against each other as in Port Elizabeth. We know that it is not AZAPO, it is them. They want us to fight each other so that they may get a chance of getting in, so I would like to hear from you what you suggest, what should we do.

4.7 ONBEKENDE PERSOON

"It will not help us to fight each other, no blood must be shed. I propose that we don't buy in town, unless these comrades are back."

4.8 Daar het die gehoor "viva" geskreeu.

4.9 GLADWELL MAKAULA

"Comrade you must know that it is your right to buy where-ever you wish to buy, so if you dont buy in town, nobody will ask why you don't buy in town. Now comrades let us not waste time on that because we all agree. As we know that the parents are not here we must therefor notify them of this resolution.

5. Die vergadering is toe verdaag en die disco het daarna weer voortgegaan tot 24h00.

6. KOMMENTAAR MAJOOR VIVIER

6.1 Om 12h00 op 85/06/28 het 'n swartbewaarder van die J.C. Steyn gevangenis, Kirkwood - ene Z. Ngolo (nie van veiligheidsbelang nie) wat tans 'n "Makweta" is, 'n gedeeltelike verbrande lyk naby die ou Redhouse -veerlaaspad Port Elizabeth gevind. Volgens die ondersoekbeampte S/A/O Els (nie van veiligheidsbelang nie) van die Noord en Rooftek, Port Elizabeth, is 2 X ,22 doppies ongeveer 15 meter vanaf die lyk gevind. 'n Bloedkol was op die grond, waar die ,22 doppies gevind is, duidelik sigbaar. Volgens waarneming deur die ondersoekbeampte is dit duidelik dat hierdie persoon twee mesponde in sy bors het. Dit is op hierdie stadium onbekend of hy geskiet is. 'n Saakdossier Kwazakele CR 373/06/85 (Noord) word ondersoek.

6.2 Om 15h30 op 1985/06/28 word 'n uitgebrande Honda Ballade motorkar naby die Aldo Scribante renbaan, Port Elizabeth gevind. Voertuig is totaal uitgebrand. Die volgende uitkenbare nommerplate word op voertuig gevind.

6.2.1 Agterkant - CAT 8479 - geregistreer in die naam van Matthew GONIWE (CF4/2850) S4/43680

6.2.2 Voorkant - CB 10627 - geregistreer in die naam van A. MZIWA G/L Makalenistraat 3, New Brighton, Port Elizabeth. By navrae deur ondersoekbeampte is bepaal dat genoemde onbekend by hierdie adres is.

6.2.3 Geen dokumentasie is in voertuig gevind nie, voertuig met moontlike inhoud vernietig.

7. Op 1985/06/29 om 13h00 het 'n onbekende persoon die radiostasie te Louis Le Grange plein, Port Elizabeth, geskakel en hulle meegedeel dat 'n gedeeltelike verbrande lyk, op 'n sandduin naby Blou Waterbaai, Port Elizabeth lê. By ondersoek deur S/A/Off. Els het hy genoemde lyk daar gevind.

7.1 Heel van persoon aan linkerkant afgesny.

7.2 17 meswonde in bors sigbaar, regterhand afgekap.

7.3 Gedeeltelik uitgebrand, maar nog uitkenbaar.

7.4 'n Dossier swartkops MR140-06-85 (Moord) is geopen en word ondersoek.

8. Die voetspoor op toneel waar voertuig uitgebrand is, is identies met spore wat by hierdie lyk voorkom. Spore is egter baie dof.

9. Op 85/06/29 het swartman

Steti SEWEYIYA G/L

beide lyke positief soos volg uitgeken:-

9.1 Lyk gevind soos beskryf in paragraaf 6.1 as die van swartman

Sparo NKHOFTO.

9.2 Lyk gevind soos beskryf in paragraaf 7.1 as die van swartman

Sicelo MHLAULI.

10. Op 85/06/30 het Mev.

Judy CHALMERS S1/-

Dr. D. KHATZOW G/L

'n Forensiese deskundige vanaf Johannesburg laat kom, wat die voertuig ondersoek het en verskeie fotos van die voertuig geneem het. Op sy versoek het die ondersoekbeampte S/A/Off. Els, hom na die twee moordtonele, sowel as waar die voertuig uitgebrand het, geneem

waar by bloed, grondmonsters en foto's geneem het.

11. Die afstand tussen die plek waar die lyk in rondgraaf 6.1 geneem, gevind is, is radelaars ongeveer 10 km vanaf die plek waar die voertuig gevind is. Die lyk van Mhlauli is gevind ongeveer 2km vanaf die plek waar die voertuig gekry is. Die afstand tussen die twee moordtonele is ongeveer 10km.

12. Swartvrou

Nyameka [redacted] G/L

ernenste van Matthew [redacted] het volgens 'n berig in die E.L. Herald, gedateer 25/06/22 beweer dat die volgende persone om 17h00 op 25/06/22, Cradock verlaat het om 'n vergadering te Port Elizabeth by te woon.

12.1 Matthew [redacted]
12.2 Port CALATA
12.3 Sparo [redacted]
12.4 Sicelo MJALILI

13. Volgens dieselfde berig beweer Kleurlingman

Derrick [redacted] CR/2151

dat genoemde persone 21h10 vanaf Golvendale Kleurlingwoonbuurt, Port Elizabeth na Cradock vertrek het nadat hulle 'n genenaamde "weekly briefing" bygewoon het.

14. Dit is op hierdie stadium onbekend wat van Matthew [redacted] of Port CALATA geword het. Hulle het nog nie by hul woonings opgedaag nie en word ook nie deur die S.A. Polisie aangehou nie.

15. Die boikot van besighede te Cradock bly: sukses vol te wees.

16. Dit wil voorkom asof vergaderings deur Cradock en ander organisasies in die toekoms onder die naam van 'n nokkerklub gehou gaan word om die verbod op vergaderings te omseil.

17. UITKENNING

17.1 IDENTE:

Port CALATA ([redacted]/2003) CR/ [redacted]

Judy [redacted] (CR1/-) CR/-
Lid van die Swart Here (CR2/102)

Matthew [redacted] ([redacted]/2050) CR/[redacted]

Nyameka [redacted] - s/vrou - ernenste van Matthew [redacted] Woonagtig te Ohlsenstraat 44, Lingelihle, Cradock.

Gladwell [redacted] (CR4/099) CR/11550

Sicelo [redacted] - s/man - 38 jaar oud - woonagtig te Makwembestraat 17, Lingelihle, Cradock - onderwyser te Oudtshoorn.

	Sparo MOKOTO (CPA/2950)	SA/
	A. MZIWA	Onbekend
	Dr. D. KUATZOO Forensiese Deskundige vanaf Johannesburg.	C/L
	Steti SWEZIYA - m/man - woonagtig te Lusestraat 5, Limelihle, Cradock.	C/L
	Derrick SWARTZ	83/3151
17.2	UITKEUSING : ORGANISASIES	
	AZAPO (AZANIAN PEOPLES ORGANISATION)	83/552
	CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (CRADORA)	83/823
	CRADOCK SOCCER CLUB	C/L
	IEBCO (PORT ELIZABETH CIVIC ORGANISATION)	83/509

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

E. F. N. WINTER
MAJOOR
TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : E.F.N. WINTER

Matthew Goniwe

(11)

GEHEIM

CRADOCK
CD22/2
1985/07/01
A/O Gcani

85/06/29 + 30
WH.11 en Operatief
Tegnies + Operatief

DAVID JAMES WHITE: (G/I)
EERSTE SEKRETARIS VERBONDE AAN
DIE BRITSE AMBASSADE, PRAETORIA:
BESOEK AAN CRADOCK OP 85/06/30

S22/2

1. Op 85/06/25 twee onderwerp in verbinding met Matthew GONIWE (174/2250) 84/13699 te Cradock.
2. Onderwerp vra aan Goniwe of hy kan onthou wat hulle bespreek het in verband met 'n advies kantoor tydens sy (onderwerp) se besoek aan Cradock gedurende Maart 1985.
3. Goniwe deel onderwerp mee dat daar alreeds 'n advieskantoor te Cradock geopen is.

GEHEIM

(12)

Onderwerp deel Conive mee dat hy Cradock op 95/06/30 besoek, waartydens hulle kon beraad watter tipe hulp die britse ambassade aan die adviesbeampte kon gee.

4. Op 1995/06/22 om 17h45 arriveer onderwerp te Cradock, en gaan tuis in die Victoria Hotel. Onderwerp was alleen en het gereis met 'n Ysblou Ford Sierra - registrasie nommer BIJ 565B.

5. Op 1995/06/30 rapporteer bron [illegible].11 dat onderwerp vanaf die Victoria Hotel, Cradock met

Gladwell [illegible] (C 4/979) [illegible]

in verbinding was.

6. Onderwerp deel Mabaula mee dat hy voorgestel het om Matthew [illegible] om 10h00 op genoemde datum te ontmoet, waar dat hy in 'n toerant gelees het dat Conive verdwyn het.

7. Mabaula deel onderwerp mee dat Matthew [illegible] se motor aan die brandgestook is en dat die uitgebrande lyke van

Sparo [illegible] (C 4/2950) [illegible]

en

Sicelo [illegible] [illegible]

wie saam met [illegible] in die motor was, gevind is, maar dat Matthew [illegible] en

Fort CALATA (CA4/2903) [illegible]

nog nie opgespoor is nie.

8. Onderwerp reel met Mabaula om hom om 10h30 te ontmoet.

9. ONBEKEND

9.1 Op 1995/07/01 verskyn 'n berig in die Eastern Province Herald dat die uitgebrande motor van vier swart rooneskarsleiers op 95/06/28 naby Fort Elizabeth gevind is, en dat die uitgebrande lyke van twee van die vier insittendes naamlik

Sparo [illegible]
en

Sicelo [illegible]

naby die motor gevind is.

9.2 Die ander twee swartmans wat na bevering ook in die motor was, naamlik Matthew [illegible] en Fort CALATA kon nog nie opgespoor word nie.

10. [illegible] [illegible] A/O VAN [illegible]

As gevolg van die onrus situasie in die [illegible] swartwoonbuurt, Cradock kon onderstaande nie volledig dagraleu word nie. Dit is onbekend wie hy nog besoek het, en hoe lank hy die [illegible] swartwoonbuurt verlaat het.

11. UITLEWERING

11.1 LEWERE:

Matthew [illegible] (0[illegible])	SA/[illegible]
Gladwell MABAULA (0 4/209)	SA/14532
Sicelo MULAULI - s/man - woonagtig te Makwembastraat 17, Lingelihle, Cradock - onderwyser te swart Hoër Primêre skool, Oudtshoorn.	S/L
Spero MKHUTU (0[illegible]4/2350)	S/L
David James WHITE - w/man - eerste sekretaris verbonde aan die Britse ambassade, Kaapstad.	S/L

Die Afdelingshoofbeveelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

2. Telefoniese gesprek tussen A/Off. van Rooyen en Insp. (V) Weitz op 1985/07/01 het betrekking.

E. F. N. WINTER
MAJOOR
TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : E.F.N. WINTER

CD.4/532

(14)

CD9/823

TELEKS

1985/06/27

CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (CRADORA) (S9/823): VERGADERING TER HERDENKING VAN DIE 30 JARIGE BESTAAN VAN DIE FREEDOM CHARTER GEHOU IN DIE GEMEENSKAPSAAL TE LINGELIHLE SWARTWOONBUURT, CRADOCK OP 1985/06/26.

1. Op 1985/06/26 het 'n Cradora vergadering in die gemeenskapsaal te Lingelihle swartwoonbuurt, Cradock plaasgevind ter herdenking van die aanvaarding van die Freedom Charter 30 jaar gelede.
Die gemeenskapsaal was in die naam van die Cradock Sokker Union gehuur. Ongeveer 1,200 swart mense van beide geslagte en alle ouderdomsgroepe het die vergadering bygewoon en het vanaf 19h00 tot 22h45 geduur,

2. Die S.A. Weermag optrede in Angola (Kabinda provinsie) en Botswana (A.N.C. teikens) asook die S.A. Polisie optredes en dood van swart burgelikes tydens onlus situasies , was sterk aangeval.

3. Matthew GONIWE (S4/43680) het agterrgrond geskiedenis aangaande die stigting en vordering wat die A.N.C. (S9/126) tans maak gegee.

4. Tydens die verloop van die vergadering het dit bekend geword dat 'n "Cradock Workers Union" (G/L) gestig is.

5. Verskeie sprekers het oor die aanvaarding van die Freedom Charter gepraat en die doel daarvan verduidelik.

6. KOMMENTAAR DEUR S/A/O HOUGH

6.1 Die stigting van die "Cradock Workers Union" word ondersoek en bestuurslede sal mettertyd rapporteer word.

6.2 Die vergadering was tegnies gedek en volledige verslag volg. Die verrigtinge was gekenmerk deur die sing van vryheidsliedere en skreeu van slagspreuke.

6.3 Geen insidente het voor, tydens en na die vergadering voorgekom nie.

GEHEIM

CRADOCK
CD22/2 D.8
1985/06/25
A/O Van Straaten

1985/06/17
OPG571 OPG572
B B
1

HERDENKING VAN SOWETO DAG:
1985/06/16 DIENSTE GEHOU TE
CRADOCK, ADELAIDE, BEDFORD
SOMERSET-OOS EN KOOKHUIS.

1. Op 1985/06/16 is daar herdenkingsdienste te herdenking van Sowetodag op Cradock, Adelaide, Bedford, Somerset-Oos en Kookhuis gehou. Die verrigtinge het onderskeidelik as volg verloop:-

2. CRADOCK

2.1 Om 16h30 het ongeveer 2000 swart jeugdiges en volwassenes van beide geslagte in die Ascention kerksaal, Lingelihle Cradock vergader onder die voorsitterskap van

EERW. JEGILE G/L

Die aanwesiges is deur genoemde predikant meegedeel dat die diens gereël is ter herdenking van Soweto dag, asook ter herdenking van al die persone wat gesterf het tydens die huidige onluste in Cradock en Uitenhage. Hy het die gehoor verder versoek om te bid sodat

P.W. BOTHA (nie van veiligheidsbelang nie)

se magte verminder word, sodat die swartes die beheer van die land kan oorneem.

.2 Nomsa FRANS (CP4/2924) S4/A9291

as volgende spreker en deel die gehoor mee dat sy namens die moeders van Cradock praat. Sy sê dat elke swartvrou die onderdrukking van die blankes meer voel as die res van die gemeenskap deurdat hulle na twee huishoudings moet omsien en dus hul eie huishouding moet afskeep, anders word hulle bloot afgedank en soos slog honde weggejaag. Sy doen dan voorts 'n beroep op al die swartvrouens om te verenig en hul kinders by te staan in die stryd om vryheid.

.3 'n Onbekende swartman het namens die skoliere opgestaan en versoek dat die gehoor in hul gebede moet dink aan die ouers wat kinders moes afstaan tydens die 1976 onluste te Soweto. Hy sê ook dat die swartes moet besef dat hulle nie 'n regering of polisiemag van hul eie het nie, en bestempel dat ook die S.A. Polisie as moordenaars, verwysende na die Langa voorval as 'n voorbeeld. Hy versoek die gemeenskap om te bid sodat die swartes hul eie regering en polisie kan kry, aangesien alle eise gestel deur die skoliere, met die dood beantwoord word deur die huidige regering en die S.A. Polisie.

.4 Kleurlingman

Eddie [illegible] (CP3/190) G/L

volgende aan die woord en bedank die aanwesige kleurlinge vir hul belangstelling. Hy sê dat dit al opmerklik raak dat die kleurlinge van Cradock die regte houding begin inneem, aangesien hulle ook die beoogde verhoogde huishuur te Michausdal gaan beveg.

.5 Mbulelo [illegible] (CP4/2902) S9

namens die jeug van Cradock aan die woord en verwys na die sielkundige oorlog wat die S.A. Polisie en S.A. Weermag op Cradock uitgevoer het toe hulle die swartwoonbuurt omsingel het en gebruik gemaak het van vliegtuie, helikopters en verskeie militêre voertuie. Hy doen dan 'n beroep op die gemeenskap om te bid dat al hierdie tipes van onderdrukking tot 'n einde moet kom, aangesien die persone in beheer van Suid-Afrika al hul wapentuig van Amerika af kry.

/33607

(17)

2.1 Hierna het verskeie predikante van die onderskeie kerke te Cradock, gedeeltes uit die Bybel gelees en kort preke gelewer, waarna die verrigtinge afgesluit is om 19h00 en verdaag is sonder enige voorvalle.

2.2 ADELAIDE

2.2.1 Op 85/06/15 om 15h00 het ongeveer 500 swart volwassenes en jeugdiges van beide geslagte in die Vuyisile kerk, Swartwoongebied, Adelaide, bymekaar gekom onder die voorsitterskap van

FATI MAKAKA. G/L

2.2.2 Tamsanqa HAHI

het opgetree as gesprekker en die gehoor meegedeel dat hierdie verrigtinge ter herdenking van Sowetodag gereël is, en dat dit ook 'n dag is vir gebed, sodat die swartes in Suid-Afrika hulp kan ontvang om sukses te bepaal in hul stryd om vryheid teen die huidige regering.

2.2.3 Mpasala JERROS G/L

as volgende spreker en versoek alle moeders om hul kinders by te staan in die stryd om vryheid. Sy verseker die gehoor dat met gebed en vereniging hulle sal kry wat hulle wil hê, en dat sodanige vryheid vir die swartes baie naby is. Sy versoek dan ook die hele gemeenskap van Adelaide om nie in die blanke woongebied by enige van die besighede te koop nie.

2.2.4 Fati MAKAKA aan die woord en versoek alle skoliere om hulle te vereenselwig met die organisasies tot hul beskikking. Hy doen ook 'n verdere beroep tot die skoliere om nie in klein groepies te veg na vryheid nie, maar wel in een massa onder die vaandel van die organisasies tot hul beskikking.

2.2.5 REV. MATINCA G/L

het die verrigtinge om 16h00 met gebed afgesluit. Hy het tydens gebed 'n beroep op God gedoen om die swart gemeenskap van Suid-Afrika by te staan in hul stryd om vryheid om sodoende die swart nasie die nagte te gee om die huidige regering te oorwin.

2.3 Na die verdaging van die verrigtinge is almal ordelik huis toe, en het daar geen voorvalle te Adelaide plaasgevind nie.

3 BEDFORD

3.1 Op 85/06/16 om 17h00 het ongeveer 300 swart volwassenes en jeugdiges van beide geslagte in die Presbiteriaanse Kerk te Bedford bymekaar gekom onder die voorsitterskap van

Hadoda JACKIE (CP4/2904) S4/55607

(15)

2.3.2 Madoda JACOBS het opgetree as eerste spreker en die aanwesiges meegedeel dat hierdie verrigtinge ter herdenking van Soweto dag gehou word. Hy het voorts gesê dat die gemeenskap nie die Polisie moet vrees nie, maar hulle in massas moet trotseer. Hy het ook die volwassenes verseker dat die klipgooiery nie sal einde kry alvorens daar aan al die eise van die jeug voldoen word nie.

2.3.3 Mopo MENE G/L

as volgende spreker, en open sy gesprek met 'n gebed, waartydens hy bid dat die magte van President BOTHA verminder moet word, sodat die swart nasie hul doel makliker kan bereik. Hy doen voorts 'n versoek dat alle huisbewoners nie enige huishuur moet betaal nie en stel ook voor dat die jeug en die ouers elk hul eie afsonderlike organisasie moet stig waaronder die gemeenskap dan gesamentlik kan verenig.

2.3.4 Elizabeth SIBANDA (CP4/215) S4/5181

volgende aan die woord en noodig al die ouers aan om hand in hand met hul kinders te veg na vryheid, en nie hulle kinders te verkoop aan die blankes nie. Sy versoek dan ook die vrouens van Bedford om ook as 'n eenheid te verenig en hul eie organisasie te stig waaronder hulle op hulle beurt ook 'n positiewe bydrae kan gee tot die geveg om vryheid.

2.3.5 Die vergadering is afgesluit deur 'n kort skriflesing en gebed deur 'n onbekende swartman wat vermoedelik afkomstig is van Alice. Na die afsluiting is die gehoor ordelik uit mekaar sonder enige voorvalle.

2.4 Die herdenkingsdienste wat te Somerset-Oos en Kookhuis gehou is, is in breë trekke dieselfde as wat reeds in hierdie verslag uitgebeeld is.

3. KOMMENTAAR DEUR A/O VAN STRAATEN

3.1 Gesien in die lig dat

Matthew GONIWE (CP4/2850) S4/43680

die organiseerder is van die

United Democratic Front (U.D.F.) S13/436

in die Oos-Kaap, is dit opmerklik dat daar Cradock verteenwoordigers by al die verskillende herdenkingsdienste in die onderskeie dorpies was, en dat die trant van die verrigtinge steriotiep verloop het, wat 'n aanduiding gee dat Matthew GONIWE die hele situasie in hierdie gebied manupileer.

(19)

4. UITBREIDING:

4.1 PERSONE

Nomsa FRANS (CF4/2924) S4/A9291

Mbulelo GCHINE (CF4/2902) S4/63608

Matthew GCHINE (CF4/2850) S4/45680

Tamsanqa HANI s/man 33 jaar oud. Woonagtig te Pukwanestraat 12, Lingelihle, Cradock en werksaam te O.K. Bazaars, Cradock. G/L

Madoda JACOBS (CF4/2904) S4/63607

Eerw. BATANDWA ELBERT JEZILE s/man 37 jaar oud. Woonagtig te Mazosiwestraat 45, Lingelihle, Cradock. Werksaam as predikant van die Methodiste kerk in Afrika te Cradock. G/L

Fati MAHANA s/man 31 jaar oud. Woonagtig te 323 Reyini swartwoongebied, Adelaide en tans werkloos. G/L

Eerw. S. MATIKINCA - s/man 40 jaar oud. Woonagtig te Presbiteriaanse kerkmanse, Adelaide en werksaam as predikant van die Khobonqaba Presbiteriaanse kerk, Adelaide. G/L

Mopo MENE s/man 19 jaar oud. Woonagtig te Koulungastraat 62, Lingelihle Cradock en tans werkloos. G/L

Eddie MEYERS (CF3/100) kleurlingman, 33 jaar oud. Woonagtig te Lynleystraat 40, Michausdal, Cradock en werksaam as n onderwyser by die Moërskool, Michausdal G/L

Upasala PETOS, swartvrou, 38 jaar oud. Woonagtig te 182 Mdubane swartwoongebied, Adelaide en tans werkloos. G/L

Elizabeth SIBAGDA (CF4/215) S4/51181

4.2 ORGANISASIES:

UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (U.D.F.) S13/436

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

2. CF3/773 (Kapt. Scheepers) gedateer 1985/05/28 het betrekking.

E. F. N. WINTER

MAJOOR
TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : E.F.N. WINTER

CD.4/532

(20)

GEHEIM

CRANCK
CD13/382
1985/06/25
A/O Msoki

1985/06/21
NR.11
Tapmica

NATIONAL EDUCATION UNION OF S.A.
(NEUSA)(S13/382):BELGIUM WORK-
SHOP: 3 + 4 AUGUSTUS 1985 TE
ALIWAL-NOORD.
S13/382

1. Bogenoemde bron rapporteer dat
Ian HOHL — Onbekend
op 85/06/21 vanaf Johannesburg met
Matthew GOUTHE (CP4/2850) — S4/43690
in verbinding was. Die gesprek het onder
andere soos volg verloop:-
HOHL: We were discussing at our last nati-
nal executive meeting to have some kind of
national workshop, to try and get people

(21)

from all these new centres together and discuss some new aspects. What I'd like to do is to try and arrange a workshop in Aliwal North, on about the 3rd and 4th of August. The reason we chose Aliwal North, is because it seems to be an equal distance from all the different centres. Do you think this 3rd and 4th will be a suitable day, and secondly do you think that there will be a venue in Aliwal North, that we might be able to use?

GONIWE: The 3rd and 4th will be okay. I'm not so sure about the Venue.

MOHL: I've been in touch with churches there and I'm still waiting for a response from them. Could you let people know about the 3rd and 4th. I'll keep in touch with you about the venue.

2. Op 1985/06/24 tree

Barry DU TOIT Onbekend

vanaf Grahamstad met Matthew GONIWE in verbinding in verband met bogenoemde workshop. Die gesprek het onder andere soos volg verloop:-

DU TOIT: I have got here with me the following titles. The first one is "Township unrest; Political and economic rights." The second one is "Students and Education struggles," that will be on a panel with some people from the Transvaal, they will be speaking as well.

GONIWE: What is the duration of the inputs?

DU TOIT: Something like twenty minutes. I think on the first title one should compare the unrests of all neighbouring towns.

3. KOMMENTAAR A/O MSOKI

3.1 Ter aanvang van die gesprek het hy (MOHL) hom aan GONIWE bekend gestel as "Ian MOHL verbonde aan NEUSA (S13/382) te Johannesburg."

3.2 Die beoogde workshop op die 3de en 4de Augustus 1985 te Aliwal-Noord word vermoedelik deur NEUSA gereël.

4. UITKENNING

4.1 PERSONE

Barry DU TOIT W/Man S1/Onbekend
Woonagtig te Africastraat 51, Grahamstad.

(22)

Matthew GONIWE (OP4/2850) S4/43680

Ian MOHL W/Man Onbekend

4.2 ORGANISASIES

NEUSA (NATIONAL EDUCATION UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA) S13/382

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

L. Wentzel

W29869N S/A/O
N/TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : L. WENTZEL

GEHEIM
SECRET

(23)

////////// X50

CD4/532

S/A/O Hough
(0481) 3437

KANTOOR VAN DIE TAKBEVELVOERDER
VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK
5880

1985/06/25

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

MATTHEW GONIWE: S4/43680: STIGTING VAN ORGANISASIES: NOORD-OOS KAAP GEBIEDE.
OP4/2850 (KAPT. SCHEEPERS) gedateer 1985/06/12

1. Die ongeidentifiseerde persone, Sam GONIWE en MAKHAWULA, soos genoem in paragraaf 1.1 van bovermelde verslag word as volg identifiseer.

1.1 Sam GONIWE (X2) identies met
Sameul GONIWE @ SAM (G/L)
S/man - 1935/04/01 gebore - P.N. 122511118
Werksadres : Provinsiale hospitaal, Cradock.
Woonadres : Qhinastraat 55, Lingelihle, Cradock.

1.2 MAKHAWULA (X3) is identies met
Gladwell Monwabisi MAKAULA (OP4/999) (S4/14532)

L. Wentzel

W29869N S/A/O
N/TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : L. WENTZEL
: A.O.D.

GEHEIM
SECRET

Kopie Nr. 2 van 3 Kopieë

G.P.S.-2-00252

SAP 67

24

SEKERHEIDSKLASSIFIKASIE

GEHEIM

VEILIGHEIDSVERSLAG

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
VEILIGHEIDSTAK
1985 - 10
SECURITY BRANCH
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE
VIR V H K GEBRUIK

VIR V H K GEBRUIK

Dokumentnommer

Op dokumentebasis ingevoer

Datum

Datum van ontvangs POLISIE
1985 -06- 21

Takkantoor

Naam MIDDELBURG K.P.

Verw. MG. 4/V/3 V.10

Datum 1985/05/27

Ingedien deur LUIT. J.H. BOTHA

Datum inligting ontvang 1985/05/24

Kodenr. van bron OPERATIEF

*Waardebepaling van bron

†Betroubaarheid van inligting

Verspreidingsbeperking (indien enige)

Afdelingshoofkantoor

Naam SUID WESTELIKE DISTRIKTE

Verw. SWD 4/A/182 V.8

Datum 1985-06-04

Verspreiding (slegs na V H K)

Eenheid	Kopienr.	Eenheid	Kopienr.
D4	Oorspr.		
A4	1		

Opskrif

Mathews GONIWE S4/43680 : STIGTING VAN ORGANISASIES : NOORD-OOS KAAP GEBIEDE

H K Verw. S4/43680

Afdelings

A OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE - Kopie nr. 2

B

C

D

E

Verslag, kommentaar en uitkenning

1. Op 1985/05/24 tydens ondersoek te HOFMEYR, het die volgende inligting aan die lig gekom.

1.1 Op 1985/04/26 om ongeveer 13h20 het ondergenoemde persone HOFMEYR besoek met die doel om n Jeugorganisasie te stig.

Mathews GONIWE (X1) S4/43680

Sam GONIWE (X2) ..... S/M-G/L

MAKHAWULA (X3) ..... S/M-G/L

Verwysings

N 6/2/06

* Waardebepaling van bron:

TAKBEVELVOERDER VERW. DATUM

INLIGTING, VERDERE NODIGE STAPPE EN/OF HANDELING, STUUR BYLAE TERUG.

AFD. BEVELVOERDER VEILIGHEIDSTAK
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE.

Betroubaarheid van inligting:

1 Bevestig deur ander onafhanklike en betroubare bronne
2 Waarskynlik juis
3 Moontlik juis
4 Twyfelaftig
5 Waarskynlik vals
6 Kan nie beoordeel word nie

GEHEIM

SEKERHEIDSKLASSIFIKASIE

85-06-10

5. KOMMENTAAR DEUR LUIT. BOTHA

5.1 Dit is vir my duidelik dat Mathews GONIWE die stigter sowel as die organiseerder is van al die organisasies in dorpe van die takgebied.

5.2 Dit wil ook voorkom of GONIWE op n groot skaal besig is om die jeug te aktiveer vir die onrus in hierdie gebied.

5.3 (X1) Mathews GONIWE 34/43600
Onderwyser en afkomstig vanaf Cradock.

(X2) Sam GONIWE ..... S/M-G/:
Onderwyser en afkomstig vanaf Cradock

(X3) MAKHAWULA ..... S/M-G/:
Afkomstig vanaf Cradock.

3/.....

(26)

6. VERBINDING – LIASONS

6.1 GONIWE Mahlaba ..... S4/43?

6.2 GONIWE Mon ..... S/M-G/

6.3 MAKHAWULA ..... S/M-G/

7. UITKYKING – ORGANISASIES

HOMEIR YOUTH ORGANISATION ..... G/L

RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION ..... G/L

eendorsgenommerde
heidshoofkantoor

A. 1. Ter inligting tesame met afdruk van Verklaring.

2. Is Sam GONIWE en MAKHAWULA aan u bekend.

AFDELINGSBEVELVOERDER : KAPT.
AFDELING S.W. DISTRIKTE: VEILIGHEIDSTAK
OUDTSHOORN

J. H. DEYZEL

Plaaslike Verspreiding

SWD 4/A/102 V.8 – Kopie nr. 3

CD.4|532

(27)

CD22/2

TELEKS

1985/06/24

BEGRAFNIS ONRUS SLAGOFFERS TE OUDTSHOORN OP 1985/06/29.

1. Op 1985/06/24 rapporteer bron MM.11 dat Mbulelo (van onbekend) (S/onbekend) vanaf Oudtshoorn met Matthew GONIWE (S4/43680) te Cradock in verbinding was en hom (Matthew Goniwe) meegedeel het dat die begrafnisse van drie onrus slagoffers op 85/06/29 om 12h00 te Oudtshoorn sal plaasvind.

2. Mbulelo het Goniwe versoek om by die begrafnisse teenwoordig te wees en ook om 'n predikant te bekom om die begrafnis dienste waar te neem.

Matthew Goniwe

(25)

GEHEIM

CRADOCK
CD22/2
1985/06/24
A/O Msoki

1985/06/23
WH.11
Tegnies

THEMBILE LUMKO SKAKELING MET
MATTHEW GONIWE (OP4/2850)

S4/43680

1. Bogenoemde bron rapporteer dat
Thembile LUMKO Onbekend
op 85/06/23 vanaf Hofmeyr met
Matthew GONIWE (OP4/2850) S4/43680
in verbinding was.
Hieronder volg 'n uittreksel uit die gesprek tussen Lumko en Goniwe wat van veiligheidsbelang is.

2. <u>LUMKO:</u> I just wanted to report to you that

(29)

the boers and the police were provoking us so we stoned them, they ran to town. We chased another black policeman here in the township, he could not run and we caught him. We've beaten him up and took his service revolver.

GONIWE: Where is the revolver now?

Lumko: It is here with me.

GONIWE: Hey man you'll be shot there by the police. I don't know what advice to give you, but as I say you are busy with a difficult battle which you will not win. What you can do try and restore peace there.

3. UITKENNING

3.1 PERSONE

Matthew GONIWE (OP4/2850)	S4/43680
Thembile LUMKO - s/man van Hofmeyr.	Onbekend

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

2. Die Takbevelvoerder, Veiligheidstak, Middelburg(Kaap) was op 1985/05/23 telefonies ingelig van bogenoemde inligting.

MAJOOR
TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : E.F.N. WINTER

GEHEIM

Matthew Goniwe (30)

CRAD CK

CD4/CO V.3
1985/05/21

Vers. Inbuschagne

85/05/29 - 85/06/14
VU.11 & Operatief

GLADWELL MAKAULA:- OVERLEDE
M.P. FRANKLIN SCOTT EN WILSON
V.O.I

CA/14532

1. OP4/999 (Luit. Taylor) rapporteer 1985/05/13 het betrokkene.
2. Bogenoemde bron rapporteer dat
   Gladwell MAKAULA (OP4/999) CA/14532
   op 1985/05/20 met
   Franklin SCOTT C/I
   in verbinding was.
3. Die rapport het nooit volg verloor:-
   MAKAULA: Matthew GONIWE (OP4/CR50) CA/13670

GEHEIM

2/...

rejected to go to Graaff Reinet. I'm sure if he agreed on that he would get trouble somewhere.

SCHN: We can't go there. I will have a lunch with Dr De Beer (nie van veiligheidsbelang nie). We must try that Mr GOOLAM are reinstated next term.

MAKAULA: I'm sure that 80% of Cradock's trouble would be stopped as soon as Mr. GOOLAM is reinstated.

SCHN: I was very worried about you people when I heard over the radio about the Commando horses.

4. Op 1985/05/14 het Makeula weer met Franklin SCHN gesprek gevoer en die gesprek, het soos volg verloop:

4.1 MAKAULA: We met Mr Vermaak (nie van veiligheidsbelang nie) and he said that there's not much he can do, but that we could expect something within ten days. He did not want to come out with it but as I can see the Minister would like to see Mr. GOOLAM.....(onduidelik) what surprises me is that Mr Vermaak said that he had information that Mr.

CALATA (CP4/2903) [illegible]

is no more interested in teaching, so they will not consider his reinstatement.....(onduideli-) I can not understand where they got that information from.

SCHN: I will tell him also to attend to Mr CALATA's case I sincerely hope that they would be returned to their postsnext term.

MAKAULA: I was very cross when they did not want to meet with Dr De Beer but I became glad when they realised that they had made an mistake.

5. Die ongekwalifiseerde onderwysers wat by die plaaslike swart skole aangestel is word soos volg geïdentifiseer:-

5.1 Nocebo Lie-Lex ABRAHAMS - s/man - 26 jaar oud gebore C/L 1959/09/08 P.N. 1/6735390/1, woonagtig te Ohinestraat 53, Cradock. Hy gee tans onderwys by Lingelihle swart hoër-skool.

Patrick THANDI GUTSI - s/man - P.N. 1/7081926, woonagtig te Phenetyaanstraat 71, Lingelihle Cradock. Hy gee tans onderwys by die Solomon Akena Hoër primêre skool, Cradock.

Nomonggesi Miriam JACOBS - s/vrou - P.N. 5/6405931/9 woon- C/L agtig te Ntshelelostraat 22, Lingelihle Cradock. Sy gee tans onderwys by die Solomon Akena Hoër primêre skool, Cradock.

Themba Raimond MAGAS - s/man - P.N. 1/6444197/4 woonagtig C/L te Sambodlastraat 46, Lingelihle Cradock. Hy gee tans onderwys by die Solomon Akena hoër primêre skool, Cradock.

Pensa MANGOLA - s/vrou - P.W.N.B. woonagtig te Alexanderstraat 21, Lingelihle, Cradock. Sy gee tans onderrys by die Sam Xhallie Sekondêre skool, Cradock. G/L

Mziwoxolo Elijah MBALI - s/man - 25 jaar oud gebore 59/10/05 I.N. 1/7144458/2 woonagtig te Balweterstraat 64, Lingelihle Cradock. Hy gee tans onderrys by die Lingelihle swart hoërskool, Cradock. G/L

Mondyebo MONAVUKA - s/vrou - 42 jaar oud p.n.n.b. woonagtig te Thembenistraat 51, Lingelihle Cradock. Sy gee tans onderrys by die Sam Xhallie sekondêre skool, Cradock. G/L

Mxolisi Goodwell MPILALE - s/man - 25 jaar oud p.n. 1/6943517 woonagtig te Mongostraat 22, Cradock. Hy gee tans onderrig by die Sam Xhallie sekondêre skool, Cradock. G/L

Mandisi MPILALE - s/man - 23 jaar oud. P.W.N.B. woonagtig te Mongostraat 22, Lingelihle Cradock en gee onderrys by die Sam Xhallie sekondêre skool, Cradock. G/L

Fezeka Veronica MZILILI - s/vrou - 23 jaar oud I.N. 5/6510225 en is woonagtig te Eluxolwenistraat 82, Lingelihle Cradock. Sy gee tans onderrys by die Macambe laer primêre skool Cradock. G/L

Zondile Phillip MAMTJIE - s/man 33 jaar oud, woonagtig te Thembenistraat 7, Lingelihle Cradock. Hy gee tans onderrys by die Sam Xhallie Sekondêre skool, Cradock. G/L

Monde SETUELE - s/man - woonagtig te Mayosiestraat 35, Lingelihle Cradock. Hy gee tans onderrys by die Sam Xhallie sekondêre skool, Cradock. G/L

4. UITKENNING

4.1 LINGELIHLE:

Fort CALATA - s/man (OF4/2303) S4/[illegible]

Matthew GONJE - s/man (OF4/2350) S4/[illegible]

Gladwell MAFAULA - s/man (OF4/999) S4/[illegible]

Franklin SOPH G/L

4.2 Vir die uitkenning van ander persone sien paragraaf 5.1

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING GESELEKTEERDE PERSONE

1. Vir u inligting.

E.F.N. WINTER
MAJOOR
AFDELINGSBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : E.F.N. WINTER

Matthew Goniwe (33)

GEHEIM

CRADOCK
CD4/532
1985/06/21
S/A/O Hough

1985/06/21
Operatief

DEURSOEKING VAN WONING: MATTHEW
GONIWE OP 1985/05/27

S4/43680

1. Tydens die deursoeking van
Matthew GONIWE (OP4/2850) S4/43680
se woning op 1985/05/27, is op 'n hoeveelheid
lywige dokumente beslag gelê waarvan sommige
dokumente nog bestudeer moet word om vas te
stel of dit wel van veiligheidsbelang is.
2. 'n Dokument met opskrif
"SOUTH AFRICA'S ONGOING OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA"
waarvan 'n afdruk (gemerk aanhangsel "A") aange-

(34)

heg is, is van die dokumentasie wat in Goniwe se slaapkamer gevind is.

3. Uit die lees van die inleidings gedeelte van die dokument blyk dit dat die dokument deur

Molly BLACKBURN (OF1/771) S1/A/2766

opgestel is tydens 'n besoek deur haar en

Di BISHOP G/L

gedurende September 1984 aan die operasionele gebied in S.W.A. Dit is duidelik dat die V.S.A. en R.S.A. betrokkenheid in S.W.A. (operasionelegebied) volgens die dokument uit die bose is. Sy (Blackburn) doen ook 'n sterk aanval op die veiligheidsmag in die naam van Koevoet en die S.A. Weermag in die operasionelegebied betreffende die pleeg van wandade teenoor swart burgerlikes, terwyl die

SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION (SWAPO) S/Onbekend

se teenwoordigheid in S.W.A. normaal en aanvaarbaar is.

4. KOMMENTAAR: S/A/O HOUGH

4.1 Uit die inhoud van die dokument is dit duidelik dat Blackburn die S.A. Regering sowel as die S.A. Polisie, en S.A. Weermag in swak lig wil stel terwyl SWAPO se bedrywighede in S.W.A. vir haar aanvaarbaar is.

5. UITKENNING

5.1 PERSONE:

Di BISHOP - w/vrou - P.F.P. L.P.R. Tuine, Kaapstad. G/L

5.2 ORGANISASIES:

SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION (SWAPO) S/Onbekend

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

E. F. N. WINTER

MAJOOR
TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : E.F.N. WINTER

(35)

SOUTH AFRICA'S ONGOING OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA

Prepared for the Black Sash National Conference -
Port Elizabeth - March 1985

Molly Blackburn (E. Cape)
Di Bishop (W. Cape)

INTRODUCTION

During the period 15/09/84 - 30/09/84 we visited Namibia in an attempt to better acquaint ourselves with the current situation there. We had both been on earlier SADF tours to the Northern Area and Di had previously been on a private fact-finding visit to Windhoek and Walvis Bay.

Our September visit included a 4000 km tour by car during which we spent a few days at a Mission Station about 30 km from the Angolan border. We entered the war-zone at Oshivelo where there is a police post. We were required to state our names and destination and this information was checked again when we left. No permit was required to enter the area and we travelled unhindered in Ovambo.

From 11/03/85 permits will be required, however, the aim of which "is first and foremost to ensure the safety of the public" according to Lt.-General A.J.C. Gouws, head of the SWA/Namibian police.

During our trip we were privileged to meet a cross-section of people who we believe are amongst the best-informed in Namibia today. Many asked that their names not be used for fear of intimidation.

Our Impressions

1. The might and degree of entrenchment of the S.A military machine in Namibia is an indisputable fact.

   In Ovambo we were constantly aware of being in the "operational area" or war-zone. The indigenous growth has been cleared for ± 50 metres away from the sides of the roads. There are massive army and airforce installations in the area along with many Koevoet (the S.A. Police special counter-insurgency unit) camps in the villages near Oshakati, Ongwidiva and Ondangua. We observed fighter planes flying north towards Angola and heard gun-fire at night. (We were told that this was a nightly occurence staged for the purpose of re-assuring "whites" in the area). Armoured personnel carriers, tanks and other military vehicles were everywhere. Residential areas were wired off. The "white area" of Oshakati is surrounded by a high double row of barbed wire fencing. Between the fencing the ground is burnt. Every vehicle entering the area is searched and armed guards record details of drivers. Bomb-shelters are much in evidence in the grounds of white schools and the homes of whites. Not so in the black schools and black areas, however.

2. However, the S.A.D.F. campaign to "win the hearts and minds of people" has clearly not succeeded.

South Africa is seen to be a foreign, occupying force. It was made clear to us that no bodies or authorities elected on an ethnic basis will ever have the support of the majority of the people. The lack of civic authority in the war-zone has led to a situation bordering an anarchy.

The vast majority of people support Swapo. It was often mentioned that not everyone who supports Swapo does so because of a commitment to the Swapo manifesto, but because Swapo symbolizes freedom from the current oppression.

The generalized marxist label attached to Swapo is false. The majority are Christians belonging to the Lutheran, Catholic and Anglican churches. (The total population of Namibia is one million of whom half are Ovambo-speaking. Membership of the ELOK (Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Ovambo Kavango) church totals some 300 000). We understand that all Swapo camps have Chaplains.

3. As in all wars, atrocities have been committed by both sides. But a hatred of South Africa has been built up as result of the imposition for several years of a dusk-to-dawn curfew in the war-zone with a shoot-on-sight instruction after curfew, the presence of the despised Koevoet, and the now documented evidence of a number of atrocities perpetrated by men in S.A. uniform.

Wide powers of detention are exercised in terms of the Terrorism Act (still in operation in Nambia) and Proclamations AG9 and AG25. There are no public records of detentions and no standing orders or regulations controlling the way and conditions in which people are held. It is unknown how many people are currently in detention in Namibia. There is ongoing harrasment of the civilian population e.g. the army conducted a Sunday round-up of 800 civilians on their way to church (March 1984) during which people were individually photographed and questioned as to who they would vote for in an election. An official complaint was lodged which elicited the response that such actions were designed to prevent or suppress terrorism.

4. Many people expressed immense fear and suspicion of each other. Several emphasized that no one trust anyone else, not even his brother.

5. Our most overriding impression was one of tired, worried people who feel that they have been abandoned, and are in fact expendable. They are disillusioned and see an end to the war and a free Namibia as remote possibilities. They are equally disillusioned with the international - and particularly American - involvement in Namibia.

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We were left with no doubt as to where the responsibility lay for achieving an end to the war and setting the country on the long hard road to building a free independent Namibia. South Africa must bear a major portion of the responsibility for what has happened in Namibia. It is in the interest of every South African and every Namibian that South Africa stops the 12 year old war, ends its occupation of Namibia and that Resolution 435 (viz Annexure A) be implemented without further delay. We believe that the attainment of a just peace in Namibia could become a reality if every organisation - including the Black Sash - placed the attainment thereof high on its agenda in 1985.

Let us re-affirm our commitment to our 1984 statement on Namibia (Annexure B) and resolve to fight for freedom in Namibia in 1985.

SOME SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN NAMIBIA 1984 - 1985:

1. On 31/1/84 Mr. P.W. Botha stated in Parliament that S.A. could not be "expected to continue to bear the heavy burden of S.W.A....." (HANSARD Col. 9913)

2. In the wake of a failed attempt to establish a State Council, the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) was established. The six-member MPC met Mr. P.W. Botha in Cape Town in February 1984 and were told that it would be necessary to scrap Namibia's present constitution i.e AGC of 1980 on which the 10 ethnic second tier government rest, in order to draw up a new constitution (Cape Times 4.2.84).

3. Foundation member of Swapo, Mr. Andimba Toivo Ja Toivo was released after spending 15 years on Robben Island.

4. Talks between Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Pik Botha, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Chester Crocker, ~~At last~~ continued throughout the year. At most One such meeting was attended by Mr. A. Ja Toivo. The MPLA government in Luanda has accepted the principle of Cuban troop withdrawal.

5. South African plans for establishing a pre-independence interim government in Namibia (possibly by June 1985) are apparently well-advanced. Part of the plan (not confirmed by S.A) is that the post of Administrator-General will be downgraded and a more junior official will be sent to oversee S.A interests, Dr. W. van Niekerk will be recalled (? to become the new Minister of Health and Welfare in S.A.), and all key posts (except for Defence and Foreign Affairs) will be taken over by the interim govt. (Cape Times 14/1/85)

(35)

6. April 1984 - three Namibian bishops - Bishop K. Dumeni (Lutheran), Bishop J. Kauluma (Anglican) and Bishop B. Haushiku (Catholic) - brought an application to court on behalf of 37 Cassinga prisoners held at the Mariental detention camp South of Windhoek. The application called upon the Minister of Defence, the Administrator-General, the General O.C. of the S.W.A. Territorial Forces and Major J.J. Coetzee, O.C. the Mariental Prison camp to show cause why the prisoners should not be released forthwith from custody. They had been held since 1978 after what they called "unlawful abductions" from Cassinga, a refugee camp in Southern Angola.

The Minister of Justice, Mr. K. Coetzee, effectively banned the court case by issuing a certificate under an obscure section of the Defence Act, Sec. 103 Ter. He also ordered that no appeal could be made to any court of law against the certificate. A debate in Parliament on the plight of the detainees was ruled inadmissable on 18/5/84 because "the matter was sub-judice". This action elicited national and international condemnation.

May 1984 - Dr. W. van Niekerk announced that 54 of the 140 detainees would be released. All but 75 of the detainees were released later in May 1984. The rest were released on 18/10/84 (Windhoek Observer, Argus and Cape Times).

Thirty-six of the released detainees are now suing the Minister of Defence and Administrator-General for a total in excess of R1 million for alleged unlawful detention and assault.

(Cape Times 24/11/84).

7. 10 May 1984 Namibian Independence talks took place in Lusaka between Swapo and a S.A. delegation headed by the Administrator-General, Dr. W. van Niekerk.

Mr. Anton Lubowski became the first "White Namibian" to publicly declare his allegiance to Swapo.

8. 9 June 1984 - Thirty-seven people- including members of Swapo were detained under AG9 on Catholic Church property on the eve of Mr. P.W. Botha's audience with the Pope.

9. <u>The horros of the war continued throughout the year.</u>

* Two U.S. diplomats lost their lives when a bomb exploded at the Oshakati garage where they had stopped for petrol.

A bomb explosion in the crowded Ondangua Post Office on 31/12/84 claimed four lives. Seven others were critically injured. Swapo claimed responsibility (Windhoek Observer 5.1.85).

* On 27/2/85 a bomb exploded in an Oshakati shop claiming the lives of 2 and injuring eight others..

* 6/3/84 - A high-level Anglican Church delegation, sent to Namibia by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Runcie reported that people in the north live in a "state of perpetual fear and suspicion, and fear the army and Koevoet far more than they fear Swapo. (Cape Times 6/3/84)

* The S.A. Catholic Bishops' Conference issued a follow up report (to their well-known 1982 report) subsequent to the visit of an ecumenical delegation in Nambia early in October. The report records with concern the militarization of Namibia and atrocities committed by troops, including Koevoet.
(Report date 24/1/85 - released to the press by Archbishop Hurley 26/1/85

* The army is being Namibianized - in spite of wide spread resistence to the idea, all men between the ages of 17 and 55 are being registered. Argus 23/10/84 and Windhoek Observer 10/11/84) Compulsory universal military conscription has exisced in Namibia since 1980.

* The Namibian Bar Council submitted a memorandum to ~~the~~ Van Dyk Commission of Inquiry into Namibia's "security legislation" which contains serious allegations about actions and methods used by Koevoet (Argus 25/5/84).

Minister of Law and Ordedr, Mr. L. le Grange responded by launching an unbridled attack on the Bar Council and sections of the press. He stongly defended Koevoet actions. (Cape Times 28/5/84)

* The S.A. government paid out R80 000 to victims of the Koevoet unit for the first time ever just prior to the trial of Archbishop Hurley who was alleged to have made allegations of misconduct by Koevoet. (Cape Times 29.1.85)

* No action has as yet been taken against the four non-comissioned officers of Koevoet who were warned as possible accused following the death in detention of a school teacher, Mr. J. Hamukwaya .33. (Cape Times 29.1.85)

* On December 14, 1984 the Minister of Police and S.W.A. government failed in their application for leave to appeal against the Windhoek supreme court finding in October 1982 that Mr. J. Kakuva had "died of injuries while in police custody" (Windhoek Observer 15/12/84)
Mr. Justice Houton's findings in the 1982 judgement were significant in that it was the first time - in either Namibia or South Africa - that a court had found that a person had died of injuries while in detention.

* An inquest court found that a member of the S.A.D.F. was responsible for the burning to death of four members of a family in Kavango in August 1984. (Argus 8/2/85)

* A man who lives at the Oshivelo border post - allegedly a soldier - went beserk with a G3 automatic rifle in Tsumeb on 30/9/84, killing two women and their children and seriously injuring a man. (Cape Times 3/10/84)

* Two boys, each 10 years of age, were blown up by a landmine which they stepped on in the Ohongo area. The presiding magistrate at the inquest returned a verdict of criminal liability on the part of unknown persons. The papers before him stated on the condition of the bodies :"utterly destroyed". (Windhoek Observer 6/10/84)

* Ondangua 13/2/85. An inquest magistrate found that two civilans were shot and killed by a police patrol unit who mistook them for insurgents. They were not held criminally liable for the deaths of the two civilians.
(Windhoek Observer 16/2/85)

* 25/1/85 (Cape Times) At least 10 people - most them members of the Anglican church - were detained by the S.A. security police in Ovambo on 11/1/85 in terms of AG9. The press were requested not to publish their names.

* 8.9.84 - The death sentence imposed on ex-Koevoet member, Jonas Paulus (23 years), (on 5/12/83) was upheld by the Appelate Division.

  Paulus was described during the course of his trial as a 'programmed killer'. He was convicted of charges of murder, rape and roobery. Giving expert evidence at his trial a neurologist and psychiatrist, Dr. Schubitz, said that Paulus was fearless in the face of danger, emotionally flat, he could not distinguish between good and bad and explained everything with "there is a war on".

In his own evidence in mitigation of sentence, Paulus told the judge of his war experiences, of planes bombing settlements and of people in flames. He said his war was against Swapo and the MPLA. Evidence during his trial of Koevoet fighters earning "kopgeld" (bounty) for Swapo guerillas killed served to confirm widespread rumours of this nature. (Windhoek Observer 29.9.84)

* Two soldiers of the S.W.A. Territorial Forces were each fined R50.00 for spit-roasting a 63 year old civilian, Mr. Ndaro Kapitango. His right arm was amputated as a result of the ordeal. Mr. Kapitango is suing the Minister of Defence for ..50 000. (Cape Times 28/2/84 and 1/3/84)

10. 14 September 1984 - Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA, attended the inauguration of Pres. P.W. Botha in Cape Town.

11. October 1984 - with the increasing diplomatic confrontation over the Coventry Four, the S.A. Ambassador at the U.N. Security Council, Mr. K. Von Schirnding warned the World body that South Africa "will withdraw our contribution to peace in Southern Africa" unless hostility towards S.A. stopped. (Cape Times 25.10.84)

12. July 1984 - The Windhoek Observer was banned. It was well-known as one of the most ferocious opponents of apartheid.

It was unbanned in August 1984 and has continued to function without its political editor Ms. Gwen Lister.

13. Ms. Lister has been subjected to on-going harrassment. She now works as BBC correspondent in Windhoek. On 14/12/84 she was detained for three days and was due to be charged under the Official Secrets Act for illegally opening mail which was not addressed to her (Cape Times 15/12/84).

When she was scheduled to appear in court, the prosecutor informed the presiding magistrate that charges would no longer be pressed (W.O. 2.2.85).

The incident related to Ms. Lister being sent a letter which was intended for the Postmaster-General in Windhoek. The letter, marked "Top Secret", was from the Commissioner of Police in Pretoria requesting the Postmaster-General to intercept all mail addressed to and sent by Ms. Lister "in the interest of state security".

14. On 13.10.84 Archbishop Denis Hurley pleaded 'not guilty' to a charge of contravening Sec. 27(b) of the 1958 Police Act after alleging that Koevoet has perpetrated atrocities.

The trial was due to proceed on 18.2.85. Senior Clergymen from overseas were due to attend the trial and there was widespread support for the Archbishop both from within and outside the Catholic Church. Charges against him were suddenly withdrawn on 15/2/85.

The Afrikaans press has been particularly outspoken on the government's handling of the court action against the Archbishop.

They have pointed out that the end of the case against the Archbishop has decidedly not closed the dossier on Koevoet and other allegations.
(Cape Times review of Afrikaans press 5/3/85)

15. PFP Spokesman on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colin Eglin M.P., called on the Botha Administration to get out of Namibia without delay. (Hansard Col. 297. 31.1.85)

16. A huge military operation - Exercise Thunderchariot - took place in the Northern Cape from 24/8/84 to 22/9/84. The provisional cost of this exercise is R24 million. (Cape Times 13/2/85)

(Civilians in Ovambo expressed great fear that this exercise may be the forerunner to another raid through Ovambo into Angola).

In January 1985 a two-day military exercise of mechanized forces - Exercise Vuiswys - was undertaken in Ovambo.

At a press briefing, Col. Kleynhans, senior staff officer of the S.W.A. Territorial Forces said that a cross-border attack on Swapo headquarters in Angola should not be ruled out. (Argus 20/12/84 & Cape Times 22.1.85)

From 11/3/85 the Northern Border of Namibia with Angola and Zambia and a large area of Namibia's eastern frontier with Botswana have been declared "security areas". Access will be prohibited unless a visitor has been issued with a permit by the police.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The economy of Namibia is in a mess. The war itself costs over R1 milion per day, but the multiple government system has an even more devastating effect. In the first five years of having 10 different ethnic "governments" state spending rose from 32,7% of Gross Domestic Product to 62%. The salaries alone of the vast number of civil servants exceeds the total tax income of Namibia.

There is a lesson for South Africa to be learned from this experience. The new South African Constitution of "Own Affairs Governments" is based on the failed Namibian experiment. South Africa's economy is being crippled by ideological spending.

In a very interesting review of Namibia published on 7.1.85, Mr. Tony Heard, editor of the Cape Times, refers to allegations of overmining and corporate tax-dodging. One cannot help wondering whether - if and when South Africa pulls out - it plans to leave a completely collapsed economy, and every citizen armed in order to create another Matabeleland-like situation.

ANNEXURE A

RESOLUTION 435 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2087th meeting on 29 September 1978

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 385 (1976) and 431 (1978), and 432 (1978)

Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) (S/12827) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),

Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12841),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/12827) for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and his explanatory statement (S/12869)

2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 (1976);

3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the abovementioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;

4. Welcomes SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of SWAPO dated 8 September 1978 (S/12841);

5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolution 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and this resolution are null and void;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council not later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.

10. *Namibia*

The Black Sash National Conference welcomes the release of Mr Herman Toivo ja Toivo and affirms its deep desire for justice and peace in Namibia and throughout Southern Africa.


We object to the loss of civil liberty occasioned by the lie of the "total onslaught" which is of the government's own making. This is propaganda of the most dishonest, insidious and dangerous kind. It is deliberately creating a war psychosis throughout the region and is leading to disastrous civil war.

Therefore the Black Sash says:

- Release all Namibian political prisoners and detainees;
- Disband the notorious paramilitary police task force Koevoet;
- Abolish the Terrorism Act and all the AG Proclamations relating to security in Namibia;
- End the illegal occupation of Namibia by implementing Resolution 435 without further delay;
- Recognise the truth in the following statements from Mr Ja Toivo's speech from the dock:

(The world is divided) but it is a matter of hope for us that it at least agrees about one thing — that we are entitled to justice and freedom. Violence is truly fearsome, but who would not defend his property and himself against a robber? And we believe that South Africa has robbed us of our country.

Only when we are granted our independence will the struggle stop. Only when our human dignity is restored to us as the equals of the whites will there be peace between us.



Matthew Goniwe (47)

CRADOCK
CD22/2
1985/06/19
Sers. Koni

1985/06/18
VH.11
Tegries

HERDENKING VAN SOWETO-DAG TE
NOUPOORT OP 1985/06/16

S22/2

1. Bogenoemde bron rapporteer dat
Edith NHLAPHO Onbekend
op 1985/06/18 vanaf Noupoort met
Matthew GONIWE (OP4/2950) S4/43680
in verbinding was.
2. Hieronder volg 'n uittreksel uit die gesprek tussen s/vrou Edith Nhlapho en Matthew GONIWE wat van veiligheidsbelang is:-
GONIWE: *How was the service there?*

(45)

NHLAPHO: It was allright and we were so pleased by the presence of

Mbulelo(GONIWE) (OP4/2902) S4/63608

and he spoke really nice.

3. KOMMENTAAR DEUR SERS. KONI

Dit is duidelik dat Mbulelo GONIWE as spreker opgetree het by die Soweto-dag herdenkingsdiens te Noupoort.

4. UITKENNING

4.1 PERSONE:

Matthew GONIWE (OP4/2350) S4/43660

Mbulelo GONIWE (OP4/2902) S4/63608

Edith NHLAPHO - s/vrou Onbekend
47 jaar oud. P.N. 59698/8 woonagtig te Matanzimastraat 219, Noupoort.

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

E. F. N. WINTER

TAKBEVELVOERDER : MAJOOR
CRADOCK : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
: E.F.N. WINTER

(49)

CRADCCK
CD30/2
1985/06/19
S/A/O Wentzel

1985/06/17
Operatief

CRADCCK GEMEENSKAP ASSOSIASIE
VERGADERING GEHOU DEUR EDDIE
MINERS MICHAUSDAL GEMEENSKAP-
SAAL OP 1985/06/15.

1. [redacted] rapporteer soos volg:-
Verbatim:
Op 1985/06/15 om 18h00 het ek 'n
CRADCCK GEMEENSKAP ASSOSIASIE G/L
vergadering in die Michausdal gemeenskapsaal
Michausdal, Cradock bygewoon.
2. Die vergadering is deur ongeveer 700 kleurlinge van beide geslagte en alle ouderdomsgroepe by gewoon.

9. Eddie MINERS het gesê dat die mense moet begin besef dat hulle swaar kry in Michausdal, en dat die tyd ryp is vir die jeug om die onderdrukkers aan te pak. Hy praat ook oor die swak onderwys wat in Michausdal is. Dat daar geen ontspannings geriewe is nie. Die salarisse is laag, en die huishuur is hoog. Dit is dus onmoontlik vir die minder bevoorregtes om die verhoogde huur te betaal, want as hulle die huur betaal sal hulle nie eers brood hê om te eet nie. Die minder bevoorregtes moet dit staak om hulle geld by die Cradock Inn uit te mors, en eerder daardie geld gebruik vir die opvoeding van hulle kinders. Hy het gesê dat daar 'n petisielys rond gestuur gaan word wat die inwoners moet onderteken.

10. Charles HOLSTER het aan die gehoor gesê dat die huishuur te hoog is, en die mense nie geld sal hê vir kos as hulle die hoë huishuur moet betaal nie. Dat die swaarkry van die mense verlig kan word indien die jeug in opstand kom teen die bestuurs komitee. Die jeug moet ook besef dat hulle die grootmense van môre is, en as die jeug nie die huidige bestuurs komitee van die boere kan uitwoel nie, en hulle eie bestuurs komitee verkies nie, sal hulle dinge nooit reg kom nie. Die jeug het 'n roeping, en dit moet by die skool bespreek word. Hulle moet organisasies by skole stig om sodoende die opdraand uit te kom.

11. Almore CUPIDO wil van die gehoor weet of die huidige bestuurskomitee enig iets vir hulle gedoen het wat goed is. Die gehoor het geskree "nee" Hy sê dit is 'n duidelike bewys dat hulle op die agtergrond is, en dat die jeug hulle moet help om op die voorgrond te kom.

12. Jonathan VALENTINE deel die gehoor mee dat as daar mense is wat vir die boere wil gaan sê wat hier bespreek was moet hulle weet dat die

UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (U.D.F.) S13/436

het geld om borgtog te betaal vir die mense wat tydens die "struggle" gearresteer word. Die U.D.F. sal selfs tot op R1,000-00 betaal vir borgtog. Hy versoek dat almal hulle volle steun moet gee, en hulle name op die petisielys te sit, en verduidelik wat die petisielys is.

13. <u>KOMMENTAAR DEUR S/A/O WENTZEL</u>

13.1 Dit is duidelik dat Eddie Miners en sy trawante die doelstellings van die U.D.F. volg deur die huidige verkoosde bestuurskomitee in slegte lig te stel, en hulle sodoende te laat bedank, sodat hulle voorgenome organisasie die bestuur kan oorneem.

13.2 Eddie MINERS is gedurig in die geselsskap van Matthew GONIWE (CP4/2850) S4/43680
en dit kan aanvaar word dat Miners van voornemens is om die situasie in Michausdal af te stuur soos die in Lingelihle swartwoongebied, Cradock.

13.3 Die Cradock Gemeenskaps Assosiasie is nog nie amptelik gestig nie.

13.4 Die huishuur is met R4,00 per maand verhoog sien Aanhangsel "A" gemerk (in hakkies) om tarief bokant nuwe tarief.

13.5 Vind aangeheg petisielys aanhangsel "B"

13.6 Program aanhangsel "C".

14. UITKENNING

14.1 PERSONE:

Clide ADAMS - k/man - 39 jaar oud - werksaam by Le Doux Engineering en woonagtig te Vernonstraat 2, Cradock. G/L

Herdrie ALEKANDER - k/man - 29 jaar odd - pensioenaris en woonagtig te Lynleystraat 1, Cradock. G/L

BRITZ - w/man - ongeveer 45 jaar oud - werksaam by die Munisipaliteit, Cradock en woonagtig te G/L

Almóre CUPIDO - k/man - 26 jaar oud, gee onderwys aan die Michausdal Hoërskool, Cradock en woonagtig te van Wykstraat 11, Cradock. G/L

Simon FISH - k/man - 40 jaar oud - werksaam by Landbank, Cradock en woonagtig te Violastraat 14, Cradock.

Matthew GONIWE - s/man - (CP4/2850) S4/4368(

Mnr. HARE k/man - 50 jaar oud G/L
Eienaar van Hare Enterprizes en woonagtig te Gordonstraat 9, Cradock.

Charles HOLSTER k/man - 29 jaar oud - Ambagsman van beroep en woonagtig te Lynlerstraat 41, Cradock. G/L

Thomas JANSEN k/man - 29 jaar oud - woonagtig te Henriettastraat 4, Cradock en werkloos. G/L

Eddie MINNERS - k/man - 30 jaar oud - gee onderwys te Carinus Laerskool, Cradock en is woonagtig te Lynleystraat 40 Cradock. G/L

Joseph PIETERS - k/man - 23 jaar oud - werkloos en woonagtig te Hartstraat 8, Cradock asook by Newstraat 12, Cradock. G/L

Aunt SIEMPIE - k/v - 52 jaar oud - is identies met Siempie HOLSTER werkloos en woonagtig te Rietbokstraat 26, Cradock. G/L

Jonathan VALENTYNE k/man - 29 jaar oud gee onderwys te Carinus Laerskool, Cradock en woonagtig te Henriettastraat 6, Cradock. G/L

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14.2 ORGANISASIES

CRADOCK GEMEENSKAP ASSOSIASIE G/L

UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT S13/436

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

E. F. N. WINTER
MAJOOR
TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : E.F.N. WINTER

Aansoek vir bamatie

49 54

Matthew GONIWE
Quina st. 44, Cradock
Tel: 2471

Eienaar is die president van die
CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION S9/823
en die
CRADOCK YOUTH ASSOCIATION S9/791
te Cradock.

Beide organisasies is geaffillieer aan die
United Democratic Front S13/436

Eienaar is n swartmag aktivis wat hom beywer vir swartmag-bewustheid en wat ondergronds organiseer om die regering omver te werp. Die perseel te Quinastraat word gebruik om vergaderings te hou waar ondermynende aktiwiteite wat daarop gemik is om die staat se gesag te ondermyn gehou word en ook waar die huidige skole onrus te Cradock deur eienaar en sy trawante beplan is en voortgesit word.

Eienaar ontvang ook besoeke van ingeperktes en ander swartmag aktivise van elders in die Republiek by perseel.

SUIDAFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST. 18
VEILIGHEIDSPOLISIE
1984-02- 22
SECURITY POLICE
CRADOCK
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

UITERS GEHEIM

CRADOCK
CD4/532
1985/01/14
Luit. Fouché

Oor tydperk
WH.11 en Operatief

BESOEK AAN MATTHEW GONIWE (S4/43680) DEUR LID VAN AMERIKAANSE AMBASSADE PRETORIA

S4/43680

1. OP4/2850 (Kapt. Scheepers/Kst. Wessels) gedateer 1985/01/03 verwys.
2. Dane O'GRADY G/L
   derde sekretaris verbonde aan die Amerikaanse Ambassade Pretoria, vergesel deur 'n onbekende wit vrou het op 1985/01/04 'n opwagting te Cradock gemaak.
3. O'GRADY, wie gereis het met 'n silwer Toyota 4 X 4 sedan, registrasie nommer DIP 720 D,

het vanaf 10h30 tot 13h15 samesprekings gevoer met die volgende persone te Qhinastraat 44, Cradock:

Matthew GONIWE (OP4/2850)	S4/43680
Fort CALATA (OP4/2903)	S4/63442
Gladwell MAKAULA (OP4/999)	S4/14532
Sparo MKHONTO	G/L
Tamsanga HANI	G/L

4. Weens tegniese probleme het die tamatie te Qhinastraat 44 nie verslag gelewer nie.

5. O'GRADY het om 10h20 op pad na Qhinastraat fotos geneem van huise in Sikulustraat.

6. Op 1985/01/09 was

Mono BADELA (OP4/602) S4/12344

verslaggewer verbonde aan die City Press met Gladwell MAKAULA, president van die

CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (CRADORA) S9/823

in verbinding (WH.11) in verband met O'GRADY se besoek.

Die gesprek tussen BADELA en MAKAULA het onder andere soos volg verloop:

MAKAULA: "We discussed with him about the situation in Cradock and the situation of the republic as a whole"

BADELA: "Republic and schools neh?"

MAKAULA: "Ja and schools"

BADELA: "What was his purpose of going there?"

MAKAULA: They wanted to know the cause of unrest. Its so many things, its cause of unrest."

BADELA: "And detentions?"

MAKAULA: "Detentions and the ruling of the government, how we look at it and how we look at apartheid itself. He also wanted to know how can we make the government to change or the government know that apartheid is not good and acceptable policy to the people"

BADELA: "Good, and then he is taking up the matter of these two teachers."

MAKAULA: "Yes he also told about that and he said he is going to take up the matter with the authorities"

7. Op 1985/01/08 was O'GRADY vanaf Pretoria met MATTHEW GONIWE te Cradock in verbinding (WH.11). Die gesprek tussen O'GRADY en GONIWE het onder andere soos volg verloop:

O'GRADY: "Have you heard anything from the authorities? (Verwys na GONIWE se aansoek om heraanstelling as onderwyser te Cradock)

GONIWE: "No we didn't receive anything so far"

O'GRADY: "Nothing at all?"

GONIWE: "Nothing"

O'GRADY: "The schools start tomorrow?"

GONIWE: "Yes the schools start tomorrow"

O'GRADY: "Well thats a shame. I don't know what they're doing but I want to check your stand and if you don't mind I will probably tomorrow and thursday check again. Why are they waiting so long to help you?"

GONIWE: "I'm afraid I cannot say really its difficult to say.

8. Aangeheg afdruk van koerant berig deur Mono BADELA "US SHOCKED AT CRADOCK" wat op 85/01/13 in die City Press verskyn het.

9. KOMMENTAAR DEUR LUIT. FOUCHÉ

Dit kan aanvaar word dat die samesprekings gehandel het oor onder andere Matthew GONIWE se afdanking deur die departement onderwys en opleiding en sy pogings om as onderwyser te Cradock her-aangestel te word, die skole boikotte en die toestande in die woonbuurt gesien vanuit Cradora se oogpunt. Dit blyk uit die gesprek gerapporteer in paragraaf 6 dat Cradora se strategie met betrekking tot sy opposisie tot die staatsbeleid ook bespreek was.

10. UITKENNING

10.1 PERSONE:

Mono BADELA (OP4/602)	S4/12344
Fort CALATA (OP4/2903)	S4/63442
Matthew GONIWE (OP4/2850)	S4/43680
Dane O'GRADY - w/man - derde sekretaris verbonde aan die Amerikaanse Ambassade, Pretoria.	G/L
Tamsanga HANI - s/man - 33 jaar oud - p.n. 1-4848132-9 woonagtig te Pukwanastraat 12, Lingelihle Cradock en werksaam te S.A. Vervoerdienste, Cradock.	G/L
Gladwell MAKAULA (OP4/999)	S4/14532
Sparo MKHONTO (OP4/2950) s/man - 33 jaar oud - p.n. 5052957, woonagtig te Ntenetyanastraat 91, Cradock en tans werkloos.	G/L

10.2 ORGANISASIES:

CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (CRADORA) S9/823

Die afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Vir u inligting.

LUITENANT
TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : H. FOUCHé

Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		Can you Talk to him about that?
		FORT I talk to him before I come here
		Matthew I don't know I respect him tonight.
		FORT He is Still in Durban?
		Matthew No he is Kganare he went to Durban.
		FORT What Happened.
		Matthew We Fail to make any follow up you see the problem was that when we go there
		FORT Some information was that the fees and Mbeki to must go and they go to finance.
		No I understand. I will see you.
95-06-21		IAN MOHR FROM NUSAE IN JOHANNESBURG FOR MATTHEW PHOSWE
		IAN- Listen, we were discussing at our last national executive meeting, having some kind of national workshop to try and get people from all these new centres together and discuss some new

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Volgnommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence

aspects and what I'd like to do is to try and arrange a workshop in Alwal North on about the 3rd and 4th of August. The reason we chose Alwal North it is because it seems ~~to~~ to be equal distance from all the different ~~end~~ centres. What I want to ask you is first of all do you think this 3rd and 4th will be a suitable day and secondly do you think that the will be a venue in Alwal that we might be able to use.
MATTHEW - 3rd and 4th will be okay I'm not so sure about the venue.
IAN - I've been in touch with churches there and I am still waiting for a response from them. Could you let people know about the 3rd and fourth aug

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		Will keep in touch with you about the verein.
85-06-21		EDITH NHLAPHO OF NOUPOORT FOR MATTHEW MONIWE.
		EDITH - I have a problem here. I tried to contact the father of the children (the lawyer - probably Siwisa) to report to him an incident of the children. You know, the children were singing here in the location and a police van came. The police van came out of the location without a scratch. We saw the van coming back again and they beat one boy here and they claim that the van was stoned, and they are assaulting this poor boy so I thought of instructing [redacted] their father (Siwisa) to take the matter up.
		MATTHEW - No you can do that. You must not only tell him but instruct him.

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
85-06-21		JOHNSON : HLITHANI FROM DE AAR FOR MATTHEW PHONINE
		JOHNSON - I just wanted to inform you that we got the body only yesterday so we will arrange the funeral to be held next week. Will you be able to come.
		MATTHEW - No man, I won't be able next week because I'll be having some other commitments but don't worry I will send other people to you, we have some strong people here. Don't worry.
		JOHNSON - Okay. Please do let Makanda know,
85-06-21		JOHNSON HLITHANI FOR MATTHEW PHONINE.
		JOHNSON - Things have changed we're starting tomorrow at 10:00 in the morning. The only thing we've forced this it is because we wanted you to be present. So if

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		you leave here at about 06h00 you will surely be here in time.
		MATTHEW - Okay, we will see what we can do.
		JOHNSON - Wait you be able to come).
		MATTHEW - I'm coming see you tomorrow.
'85-06-21		JOHNSON HLITHANI FOR MATTHEW CONIWE:
		JOHNSON - The funeral is proving to be a failure again. You know the pathologist in Bloemfontein finished up late so the body is still in Bloemfontein. We will be holding the funeral ~~tomorrow~~ next week and not tomorrow.
		MATTHEW - Okay. It is a pity neh! But we will send some people down next week!
85-06-22		THEMBANI FROM HOFMEYR FOR MATTHEW CONIWE:
		THEMBANI + I just wanted to report to you that the boys and the

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Volgnommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		police was provoking us so we stood them and they ran to town and we chased another black policeman here in the township but as he could not run we caught him we've beaten him up and took his service revolver.
		MATTHEW - where is the revolver now.
		THEMBANI - It is here with me.
		MATTHEW - Hey man you'll be shot here by the police. I don't know what advice to give you but as I say Town are busy with a difficult battle which you will not win. What you can do try and restore peace here.
		SAP 67. Meld dat Middelburg op 85-04-23 Adjutant inge...

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
85-06-24	BRIGETTE OF THE "CHARROOD FOR MATTHEW CLONINGE.	
	BRIGETTE- We're getting a bus from Buddhoom. So I wanted to know whether it would not be easy for the people to get a bus from here up to buddhoom and again another one from buddhoom to Cape Town. Now, the second bus will be from us.	
	MATTHEW - I think I will leave that to the people concerned.	
	BRIGETTE - I will phone you tomorrow to find out what do they think about that offer.	
85-06-24	ABRAHAM VISAGIE FOR MATTHEW CLONINGE	
	ABRAHAM - Rev. Tungtsa and the other ministers will be going down to Ceres-Karoo, we are meeting in Ceres-Karoo tomorrow so I thought that we will also see you there. There is something I would	

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		like to discuss with you.
		In fact I am going
		to Cape Town tomorrow
		after that meeting and I
		will be meeting some
		you people then. Klaas
		House wants us to start
		with the Middlands
		Council of Churches
		So our meeting tomorrow
		will be based on that.
		MATTHEW. I don't think
		I will be able to
		go to Graaff-Reinet, but
		I will see what I can
		do.
85-06-24		MBULELO (Surname not known) FOR MATTHEW
		CIONIWE.
		MBULELO - All the
		arrangements are through
		for Saturday.
		CIONIWE - I will attend
		if it is Saturday then
		are you starting.
		MBULELO - At 12h00.
		Can you arrange
		bus. Daba is in
		Uitenhage at Comp.

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Volgnommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		MATTHEW - Man, the guy is always busy but if I don't get him I will get someone but you will have to pay his travelling expens. MBULELO = Okay that will be okay.
		Major.
	1	Brigette wants Matthew Ephine to organise people to attend some kind of a workshop in Cape Town
	2.	Matthew is going to attend the meeting in Crossroads - Reinet tomorrow although he is pretending as if he is dumbing.
	3.	The arrangements Mbulelo is talking about is for the funeral in Cradock. Cradock will be going to the funeral in Bredasdorp.
85-04-24		MR. WHITE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN CAPE TOWN FOR MATTHEW EPHINE
		MR. WHITE - Is Mr. Ephine Her.

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		CHILD - No he is not at home.
		WHITE - Could you tell him that I am visiting Crodock this weekend on Saturday. I will ring tomorrow morning at about 9 o' clock.
		CHILD - Okay I will tell him.
85-06-24		Mr. TUTA FOR ALEX GONIWE
		TUTA - I wanted to ask you to take me to Mortimer because they told me that he (Mda) is at Mortimer so my car is not here now. my son went to see a doctor somewhere and would be back by tomorrow.
		ALEX - Okay I will tell Matthew
85-06-24		@ MATTHEW GONIWE FOR JENETT.
		MATTHEW. I wanted to finalise on the papers. Are the papers still the same as you gave me

(2)

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		JENETT - Let me check the programme.
		(BARRY DUTOIT TOOK THE PHONE AND WENT ON AS FOLLOWS).
		BARRY - Someone was suppose to phone me today with some information but I will phone you tomorrow. I've got here with me the following titles. The first one is "Township unrest", "Political and economic rights", the second one is "Students and education struggles", that will be on a panel with some people from the Transvaal, they will be speaking as well.
		MATTHEWS - What is the duration of the inputs.
		BARRY - Something like 20 minutes. I think on the first title one should compare the unrests of all neighbouring towns see you then.

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
85-06-24		MATTHEW CHONIWE FOR DERECK SWARTS
		MATTHEW - Man can you help me with some facts there I am busy with my speech of the 3rd and the 4th June.
		DERECK - I will give you on Wednesday.
		MATTHEW - I would be here on wednesday. ~~Wed~~ Maybe a day thereafte
		DERECK - what is the date on wednesday?
		MATTHEW - The 26th.
		DERECK - Oh, I have forgotten
		Majoor. Vir verdere inligting in hierdie verband sien Ondersoek ~~of~~ van Bladay 227 ~~on~~ IAN MOOI en Matthew Choniwe.
		Sgt.
85-06-25		MR WHITE FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN CAPE TOWN FOR MATTHEW CHONIWE

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Volgnommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		WHITE - You remember when we met in March we said something about the advice office.
		MATTHEW. We've got an advice office already here.
		WHITE - Yes I believe so now we will discuss what help we can give to you on Sunday the 30th at 10h00 cause I'll be coming back on Saturday and Sunday. See you on Sunday at 10h00
		MATTHEW - looking forward to meet you on Sunday.
85-06-25		NTOMBOMZI SIMISA FROM PORT ELIZABETH FOR MBULELO RONINGE
		NTOMBOMZI - Could you tell Simo Mwagwani that when the people from Mdantsane who are suppose to be there there he should tell them that we don't get a bus here.
		MBULELO - what should they

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		do then?
		NTOMBOMZI - They must just turn back to East London from Cradock.
85-06-26		MATTHEW CONIWE FOR JO-ANN BEKKER
		MATTHEW - I am just reporting about terror - that's been put to people by the police in Adelaide. I was wondering if you cannot send a reporter to Adelaide
		JO-ANN - Have you tried any body else? I mean like the Black Sash. The news paper is now relying on sworn statements.
		MATTHEW - I will try Molly also.
85-06-26		MATTHEW CONIWE FOR MOLLY BLACKBURN
		MATTHEW - I'm bringing you work again. Apparently the police are ~~terror~~ havoc in adelaide. I have right now in our house here about 12 people with allegations that

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~~Volg-~~ nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		these people (police) are committing all sorts of terror there. I've just phoned Jo-Ann and ~~she~~ she says that the papers are now seemingly relying on sworn statements and she was ~~suggesting~~ suggesting that I should get in contact with you.
		MOLLY - Is there any chance of anybody getting down here.
		MATTHEW - The allegation of the doors of houses being broken down with ~~de~~ demolishing some parts of houses will need an eye ~~on~~ so that you can hand first hand experience of the thing.
		MOLLY - I've got to go to Johannesburg this week end. How bad are these people but.
		MATTHEW - I dont see any body but Lee.
		MOLLY - I will prefer next wednesday that

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		is the 3rd. will that be too late.
		MATTHEW - That can be okay.
		Molly - Are you going to be with - then?
		MATTHEW - No but there are quite a number of young guys there who will be able to cope up with everything
		Molly ~~MATTHEW~~ - Because I must know where we will meet and so on.
		MATTHEW - You may contact Don Petros and his phone number is 402
		Molly - Now what I'm going to do I will try to make the same arrangements as in De Aar. A Church must be made available for the sworn statements to be taken.
		MATTHEW - Fortunately they have a good Minister there and he is ~~Rev~~. Rev. Matikinca, his

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		phone number is — I don't have it now but I'll look for it and give you a ring.
		MOLLY - Now Matthew tell me did you receive any letter in connection with your appointment.
		MATTHEW - Not as yet but it is probably on the way
		MOLLY - I would like to be part of your celebration.
		MATTHEW - O okay (They laugh)
85-06-25		SIMON BURTON FOR MATTHEW CHONWE
		SIMON - I was made to understand that Cradock is sending down youth representative to the Crossroads workshop in Cape Town so someone from our youth would like to have a lift down.
		MATTHEW - I was in touch with the youths and they're probably having some problems so they're not more attending the workshop.

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
	88.06.26	Matthew Comine for HENRY FAZZIE OF U.D.F. OFFICES PORT ELIZABETH.
	Matthew	Hallow TABO how are you.
	TABO	No we all right Ma— But things are bad here. they Came and said here
	Matthew	ja I saw ~~there~~ that thing in the news paper.
	TABO	which paper.
	Matthew	in todays HERALD
	TABO	They said our OFFICE. they got that machine of detecting metal
	Matthew	Who was in the office?
	TABO	it was me NTATE (HENRY FAZZIE) and DERICK. (Swartz) they Search NTATE (HENRY FAZZIE) they said that they got in formation that NTATE got fire Arm. Here's NTATE you can Speak with him.
	HENRY	yes Comine. ~~We~~ We are in that trouble here
	Matthew	I just See that thing in the HERALD and I think that I must phone and find out what was going On.
	Henry	I was here in the OFFICE alone and I went to Tea Store, when

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		I came back I find a Civil Standing outside she said that they said we must not go inside they are still busy (Police) I said two guy they said that you must get inside I find that it was detectives I'm already inside and I was ..... you know and they Strike me below the belt No I want up ....but.... (the langer) how do you like that? then came Van zyl he did not search any body here he came to me and said that Mr Pazzie they said that you are carrying a gun on I'm sure you are not bee Search let me Search you. I Told him you left people carrying em in the Street And I call that person I told him that he Speak one language of Magins that I have a grenade it's Magins language he said that it's not a joke I told him that its not a joke I told you. they Only find a book being

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		did not get anything. that Boek was not ban its their fulishness
	Matthew	So there's no chance of being to be this Side
	Henry	On your Side: in the weekend?
	Matthew	is'll that thing they want. from the head office they went there today. you understand me? So you did not get them
	Henry	No, ofcourse we did for many time there's this boycott. we are going up and down the whole night Boeke was here. Malish was also here
	Matthew	What did he say?
	Henry	they say they were preparing to buy that thing (CombI) Stone (Sizani) suppose to go up. down the weekend and bring the Cash. So that we can buy it our self here in this Side. we don't know they make it not either it's many times
	Matthew	Okay I will See you
85	06:36	[illegible female voice] Matthew

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		Comms.
	F/Voice	Mam I had a bad news cuz we have a query of comrade been shot in PORT ELIZABETH. the funeral will be on Saturday he was murdered by this gang of MAGICA
	Matthew	what are you telling me now
	F/male	Voice there's rumours that he was a comrade We are not sure but the information will be getting tonight I told them that I must let you know that there's that query
	Matthew	I wonder I we 't be there On Saturday I will be at Cradock I was invited over there there will be a funeral of three comrades there any case you must phone and inform us you see we will see if we can send some people over there
	F/male	Voice I can be very glad.. Did Nyamie tell you that I felt like that there's this people here (Police) we don't know what is going to happened.

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
	Matthew	You did tell me about that thing. I doubt they can do anything
	F/MALE Voice	there's wrong information they got that this children are planning to do something on Monday Morning. They sleep here on Sunday. They think there's something we are going to do to find out there's nothing, so they are still around.
	Matthew	they must stop that nonsense (children)
	F/male Voice	No we talk with them.
	Matthew	we don't like to talk over their dead bodies. it is not nice that thing
	F/male Voice	they want to go away because this gang (police) always investigate that things But up to now its quiet. Well I will inform you.
	Matthew	Okay bye.
85-06-26		Brigette of the Grassroots to Matthew
	Matthew	I met this guys apparently they met this is like Youth guys and they were saying

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Dag en datum
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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		that because of financial problems they were not in the position to send any person up there that is through really our relation is in the financial strange so that is out for us to send some body down there.
		Brigelle Matthew what is the cost to send someone up here.
		Matthew for Cobstock?
		Brigelle ja
		Matthew its about forty Rand single
		Brigelle that means its eighty Rand return we just talk out with that problem and they say they can afford to pay for one person you see if you have someone in mind to send you see you can take up with P E. people because I'm not sure they are coming down but we can organise a lift with them we can see if we can not assist in finance you see
		Matthew Actual you are interested in one person in coming?

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Day of week and date.....

Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
	Brigatte	I don't know if they can afford with more than one person.
	Matthew	We had in mind but because of the problem we will wait for you then
	Brigatte	there's some people going down to Cradock over the funeral in this weekend
	Matthew	I think I will also be down there but we are moving down by car and the car will be full you see it going to be another person's car
	Brigatte	we can be able to give a person a lift from Cradock
	Matthew	I think you express that
	Brigatte	I will find out for PE people and then if it is eighty or ~~sixty~~ Ninety Rand we can afford. But I will check up Okay. Bye.
88-06-26		TO ANN BECKER of Eastern Province HERALD for Matthew Louw's
	TO ANN	Can you able to get hold of Xolani Jita
	Matthew	Do you phone his place?
	TO ANN	I can't get his phone Number.

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Day of week and date.....

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		Matthew its 23:03 okay all right Thank you very much. you are very Scarce. I think we will see each other okay bye man.
	85-06-26	Prince Monty for P.E. for Matthew Enquiries
		Matthew What is happening over there
		Prince its just Still quiet.
		Matthew I hope it will be that.
		Prince hey man there's nothing going on there this weekend.
		Matthew No there's nothing in this weekend.
		Prince okay then bye. otherwise what is going on.
		Matthew No there is okay there's nothing But there's Something going on tonight otherwise there's nothing over the weekend. Sure man.
		Prince okay MATTHEW.
	85-06-26	Brigatte for Matthew Enquiries.
		Brigatte listen Matthew there's nobody from Port Elizabeth is Coming. We thought to take two people from Cradock so we will Supply transport money Okay
		Matthew we will See what we can do. okay Bye.
	85-06-26	Dilins from Somerset east for Matthew Enquiries

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Dag en datum
Day of week and date.....

Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
	Dilima	it's Dilima Speaking for Somerset East & just want to know what time Start the meeting tonight.
	Nyameka	I think Sometime to six I don't know. They always Start half past six.
	Dilima	May you please just ask him, the exactely time.
	Nyameka	He said that its tonight.
	Dilima	what time?
	Nyameka	I don't know.
	Dilima	Okay bye. My sister.
85-06-27		MATTHEW COMMIE for DERRICK SWARTZ of PORT ELIZABETH.
	DERRICK	Hallow.
	Matthew	Hallow Com. How is it
	DERRICK	I'm all right and you.
	Matthew	I'm all right I just want to find out, if you are awake
	Derrick	ja, ja. What is the time now?
	Matthew	Just about half past five WEK I will be seing you okay.
	Derrick	listen Man you must phone this Comm Barry do I not already know this Comm Barry?
	Matthew	Ja

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Dag en datum
Day of week and date.....

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Volgnommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		DERRICK 77 Sr GRAHAMSTOWN you know.
		Matthew When?
		DERRICK you can please call tomorrow Morning in connection with Brigs you know. in connection with that you know.
		Matthew otherwise I will see you this afternoon. okay
		DERRICK ja okay brotha Sure.
	85.06.27	Matthew Enquiries for Barry du Toit of GRAHAMSTOWN.
		Matthew anything new?
		Barry for your information?
		Matthew ja ~~I prepared it later last night.~~
		Barry I prepared it late last night That is economic of the parents Situation, the people are particular in the Eastern Cape you can Spoke this and the question of information an organisation as well how they are reacting on the Situation in particular for instance in the local authorities the councillors how did they react in that direction been taken up.
		Matthew How did they react on what?
		Barry How did they react in the organisation that issue has been taken up. I'll tell you what Steve (Sizani)

Dag en datum
Day of week and date.....

Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		will be given talks in the first night. So you will be covering the talks in the most General way. Specifically in the Eastern Cape there in CRADock & think the question they are going to ask you, is how the people react on that.
	Matthew	So is that all So there is no second talks
	Barry	the other one is An Education that one you were talking about from Transvaal Crisis & think also the kind you give us here this year. Specifically the parents Rulers Area the Community Parents workers as Community in Education Crisis
	Matthe	what is the title of the talk it self.
	Barry	ON Education and Students
	Matthew	So you think I must talk under the Topic The Student And workers' and parents Community. Particular in the Rule Areas okay Thank you Very much okay Barry. So you Say this issue will

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Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		take about twenty minutes
	Barry	the first one is little bit
		longer its half an hour.
		the second one will
		be twenty Minutes
Maj 8sg. 06-28	Matthew	okay bye. thank you
	THEMBEKILE	Mankisen of 66
		ZAMBODLA Street for Matthew
		coming from Steynsburg
	NOVELI	Qin Barry Matthew is not
		here we also look for
		him. when Qin speaking?
	Thembekile	its Thembekile Mankise
		of no 66 ZAMBODLA Street Laddock
		Qin here at Steynsburg Now.
	NOVELI	there's any message?
	Thembekile	We need Matthew here in
		Steynsburg.
	NOVELI	When you need him?
	THEMBEKILE	Next because most of
		the people were going to school
		we want him to meet this people
		before they go back to School
		My phone number here is 255
		Steynsburg.
	NOVELI	When he phone whom he must
		ask?
	THEMBEKILE	he will get the owner of
		this house, and they were going to

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Dag en datum
Day of week and date.....

Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		let us know. then we are going to phone for him Can I speak with SPARO MKhonto
	Nonceli	He is not here
	Thembekile	If he can not afraid to come over here, the people said that he must tell us when we can come and see him.
	Nonceli	I will tell him okay.
		MAJOR. This Telephone they used No 255 is belong to N.M. Ngcobo 207 Nomzamo Township. Steynsburg.
85.06.28	W/O ELS	of Murder an Robbery Squad for Khanive family
	ELS	Can you tell me the Registration number of Khanive's Car.
	Thembekile	its CAT 84-79.
	ELS	We find that Car at Blue water Bay it was burn out. Can you tell me what clothes he was wearing?
	Thembekile	My father go down.
		Major. This Thembekile did not understand

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Dag en datum
Day of week and date.....

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Volgnommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		what did W/O ELS tell him.
		And W/O ELS TELL him that he
		must tell his father to phone
		him at 0810-0: tomorrow morn.
		at this Number 547554 Ext.
		NO2275. I. Lang
85.06.28		Nyamuka Examine by Molly
		Blackburn.
	JOANN	Are you all right Nyami
	Nyamuka	Yes all right Before of
		that-time we heard about
		Matthew's Car was burnt out
		there's a certain Cls. Phone
		for us from Port Elizabeth
		he said that they found
		Matthew's Car burnt out but
		there's no sign of anybody
		they want us to believe
		that they were attack Whereas
		they detained that people.
		They did not even touch
		the Location the only people
		Now Matthew was On the Road
		Surely was the Security Police
		it is strange enough because
		this person we Met at the Location
		police saw them and the police
		Station is far from the Road.
		it give us some indication

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Dag en datum
Day of week and date.....

Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		that they know.
	TO ANN	its terrible man its quite many people get missing recently apparently STONE Dizani as well
	Nyameka	the story that we must believe that people have been attacked at Blue water Bay, who new they were going to BaST Blue water Bay at that particular time? so I can not believe that story I'm sure they have a Road Block.
	TO ANN	Who else was with MATTHEW and FORI.
	Nyameka	it was SPARROW Mkeremto. And a teacher (Sicelo Mhlauli) who was teaching at Cradockrom. he is on holiday but come to voice Mr. Sicelo Mhlauli
	TO ANN	Nyami do you want to speak with Molly.
	Nyameka	Ja
	TO ANN	you must contact us if you find anything out.
	Nyameka	Ja Sure
	TO ANN	Okay good luck.

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Day of week and date.....

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Volgnommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence

Molly Nyam don't tell me the whole story again because I will get it from JO ANN BEKKER. I just want to know that you are all right?

Nyameka Yes Ma'm. We have been checking Matthew all over the place with actual time's no trace of him the only police man said he saw Matthew was at Cookhouse police Station Ma'm Since the last Cookhouse when they were on their way to PORT ELIZABETH. Cookhouse Somerset East. So in their way back they were intercepted. It was between PORT ELIZABETH and Cookhouse

Molly Where they were intercepted

Nyameka Surely there was Some form of Road Block. What I believe

Molly What about the Story of the Car.

Nyameka its Rubbish. who ever burnt the car who new that Matthew was in PORT ELIZABETH and was to pass a Certain point at particular time

Molly Nyame I ask Savage to investigate

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Dag en datum
Day of week and date.....

Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		We phone the police on this side and he spoke to Mr Van Rooyen and Mr Van Rooyen said that they now there's a burnt out Car.
	Nyameka	that is the story that we were expecting we know they will go to say they did not know.
	Molly	What more we can do at this side, What more would like us to do
	Nyameka	I appreciate your effort Moly
	Moley	But I want to help you as more as we can but I don't want to do any thing that will interfere
	Nyameka	Anything you think will help of you have my justice and my family
	Moley	all right Nyam you just keep in touches with us
	Nyameka	Okay bye.
55-06-28		Nyameka Received for Service of Maintenance.
		Maja She tell him the Same Story She

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Dag en datum
Day of week and date..... 244

Volg-nommer Serial No.	Tyd Time	Aard van voorval Nature of occurrence
		above for JO-ANN BEKKER and Molly Blackburn. and she also Give him the phone NO of WOLF: ELS 547554 EXT 2275.
	MBulelo	Dingamandla (Hintsa Siwisa) there's a Coastal Coloured boy boy Shot by the police on his leg So he is bee charge for public Violents. he will be appear on the 5th of July.
	Hintsa	what's his name?
	MBulelo	his Name is CHRIS but I don't know his Surname I will try to get his Surname tonight and phone you.
	Hintsa	you must phone me at half past TEN
	MBulelo	Okay Sir Gamandla I will do So
	55:06:29	Molly Blackburn for Nyameka Louise.
	Molly	Nyami How are you
	Nyameka	I'm all right
	Molly	Still no news?
	Nyameka	Nothing
	Molly	Nyami I just talking with Andrew Savage and I said to him I think it will be very good if the family demanded

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION)

G 11

CASE NO:

In the matter between:

M T GONIWE	First Applciant
and	
F D CALATA	Second Applicant
and	
G M MAKAULA	Third Applicant
and	
S T MKONTO	Fourth Applicant
and	
CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (also known as CRADORA)	Fifth Applicant
and	
CHIEF MAGISTRATE A GROENEWALD	Respondent

AFFIDAVIT OF HENRI FOUCHE

I, the undersigned, HENRI FOUCHE, do hereby make oath and say:-

1. I am a Lieutenant in the South African Security Police. I have been a member of the Security Police since 1971 and have been stationed at Cradock since the 13th January, 1981. As such I have an intimate knowledge of the circumstances prevailing in Cradock and more particularly in the Black townships surrounding Cradock.

2. The information set out hereafter falls within my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated.

2/...3. The

3. The Fifth Applicant is affiliated to the United Democratic Front of South Africa. The United Democratic Front of South Africa is, according to my information and belief, a front organisation of the African National Congress which is banned in South Africa. I can state that, according to my own knowledge, the United Democratic Front has worked hand in hand with the African National Congress in various other incidents of unrest in South Africa.

4. It is clear that the United Democratic Front will play a significant part in the meeting to be held on Sunday. I can state this of my own knowledge but I also refer to Annexure "D" annexed hereto. The United Democratic Front is a militant organisation and it supports an armed struggle against the authorities in South Africa. In this regard I refer to a pamphlet issued by the United Democratic Front and annexed hereto as annexure "E".

5. I also refer to a copy of the report that appeared in the Eastern Province Herald of the 18th November 1983, annexed hereto as Annexure "F". It is my belief and information that the Black Councils resigned as a consequence of intimidation which was blatant and forceful by the Fifth Applicant. The report in the Eastern Province Herald, annexure "F" hereto supports that belief.

6. I can state that I have good knowledge of the ANC, the United Democratic Front and the Fifth Applicant in this matter and I am fully aware of their intentions and

3/...other

other organisations with which they relate. It is my experience that where meetings of this nature, which is intended to be held on Sunday is held, violence normally ensues after such a meeting or even during such a meeting. The people are activated and incited, they sing freedom songs, give Black power salutes, and when they disperse one invariably finds that vehicles are stoned, houses are stoned and property is damaged and lives are endangered. I respectfully in this regard refer to the statements "A", "B" and "C" annexed to the Respondent's Affidavit hereto. I confirm the contents thereof. I say further that the contents of Annexures "B" and "C" clearly support the decision by the Respondent in this matter to ban the said meeting.

7. I refer to the Affidavit of the Respondent annexed hereto and confirm the contents thereof.

8. I can sincerely state to this Honourable Court that I genuinely fear that should the meeting to be held tomorrow go ahead, that peoples lives will be endangered and that property will be damaged. I also have other information at my disposal which are of such a sensitive nature that I am not able to disclose it to this Honourable Court.

9. I furhter wish to draw attention to the fact that a funeral is held today at Beaufort West of a black person

4/...who

who died as a consequence of alleged police action. Most of the persons who will attend this ceremony are coming to Cradock tomorrow for the meeting in question. These persons will have been incited and emotions will run high. All these circumstances make for an extremely explosive situation which should be prevented at all costs.

I certify that the Deponent has acknowledged that he knows and understands the contents of this Affidavit which was signed and sworn to before me at GRAHAMSTOWN on this the 2nd day of FEBRUARY, 1985. In administering this oath the requirements of Regulation No R 1258 dated 21 July 1972, as amended, have been fulfilled.

WL 07229 H
(W. T. NEL) KST.
COMMISSIONER OF OATHS
WILLEM THOMAS NEL
S.A. POLISIE NEWSTRAAT GRAHAMSTAD
KONSTABEL S.A.POLISIE

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST. 12
AANKLAGKANTOOR
1985 02-02
CHARGE OFFICE
GRAHAMSTAD/GRAHAMSTOWN
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

Q12 "A"

LANDDROS
31 -1- 1984
CRADOCK
MAGISTRATE

Henri Fouché verklaar:

1. Ek is 'n luitenant in die Suid Afrikaanse polisie en is gestasioneer te Cradock waar ek takbevelvoerder van die veiligheidstak is sedert Januarie 1981.
Skole bywoning te Cradock was gedurende 1981 normaal en slegs een insident van openbare onrus het te Cradock plaasgevind.
Op 81/04/05 is een skoot met 'n haelgeweer op 'n groep oproeriges te Cradock wat die polisie met klippe gegooi het, afgevuur.
'n 15 jarige swart jeugdige Kolikele JAM JAM is gewond en het die volgende dag in die provinsiale hospitaal Cradock beswyk.
Gedurende 1982 en 1983 het geen skole boikotte of openbare onrus te Cradock plaasgevind nie.

2. Op 1983/08/12 tydens 'n massa vergadering van swart persone te Cradock is 'n organisasie gestig Cradock Residents Association (Cradora).
Die doelstellings van dié organisasie blyk duidelik uit 'n berig wat op 1983/11/18 in die koerant E.P. Herald verskyn het en waarin Matthew GONIWE die voorsitter van Cradora soos volg aangehaal is:
"Mr. Matthew GONIWE said yesterday, proffesional persons in the community should remember, they too were members of the oppressed and should therefore not join dummy bodies. We call on church ministers, doctors, lawyers, teachers and other proffesional persons in our community to ignore the temptation to serve on bodies which do not represent our community in the true sense, said Mr. GONIWE. He said his association (Cradora) had been holding public meetings for some time in a sustained effort and well organised campaign against the impending introduction of community councils (village council). The last meeting in a church was on November 4 (1983) and the community came out vehemently against the concept of community councils and the recent increases in our rents."

'n Jeug beweging Cradock Youth Association is op 83/08/07 te Cradock gestig. Op 83/12/17 het beide die Cradora en Cradoya met die United Democratic Front affilieer. Cradora en Cradoya het begin om vergaderings te Cradock te hou waartydens verbode African National Congress slagspreuke en die sing van vryheidsliedere wat die persone wat die vergaderings bygewoon het opgesweep het tot geweldpleging aan die orde van die dag was.

'n Totale skole boikot het op 1984/02/03 te Cradock in aanvang geneem en onrus en onluste is op 84/03/25 te Cradock ontketen.

Op 84/05/25 het al die lede van die Lingelihle dorpsraad 'n memorandum opgestel oor die onrus en geweldpleging te Cradock vir voorlegging aan die minister van wet en orde.
Paragraaf 2 van die memorandum wat die aandeel van die organisasies Cradora en Cradoya in die ontketening van die onluste weergee word hieronder verbatim aangehaal.

PRESENT SITUATION IN LINGELIHLE RESIDENTIAL AREA:

The inauguration of the Lingelihle Village Council was conducted by His Honourable the Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr. G. de Villiers Morrison, M.P., on 16 January 1984.

2/...

It was evident right from the start that the newly-established Village Council was in for an uphill struggle. Anti-Council groups were formed overnight who were totally against the new concept of local authority status for Blacks. This opposition was clearly the result of negative influences from outside Lingelihle and was well organised.

As early as October 1983, when it became known that the Cradock Community Council had been successful in its application for fully-fledged local authority status, an anti-faction was established in Lingelihle and became known as CRADORA (Cradock Residents' Association). This association was formed to oppose the so-called high rentals in Lingelihle. The Village Council met with representatives of CRADORA on which occasion the sliding scale for house rental was explained in detail. It was also pointed out to the CRADORA delegates that service charges in Lingelihle had not increased over the past three (3) years and that the service charges of R25,96 per month per site would, if possible, not be increased during the 1984/85 financial year. Despite the comprehensive explanations given to CRADORA, the group persists in creating unrest in the township and takes advantage of ignorant residents. It was obvious from the onset that the dissatisfaction regarding the rentals was only used as a pretext to create unrest in the township. The actual reason for the negative campaign is opposition to the concept of local authority status for Black townships. Economic issues were used in order to cover up political activities.

Early during 1984 CRADORA intensified its campaign in Lingelihle and CRADOYA (Cradock Youth Association) was established to involve young people in the activities of CRADORA. The opposition to the Village Council as a governing body, hereby, took on a new image. The intervention of CRADOYA resulted in the general boycott of the seven (7) schools in Lingelihle. It is a well-known fact that scholars only attended school for ten (10) days during the first quarter of 1984 and on 21 May 1984 only seven (7) pupils from a total of 4500 attended school. Whenever scholars tried to attend classes they were attacked, the parents were intimidated and houses severely damaged.

The following is a <u>summary of the subversive activities at present:</u>

(1) houses of Village Council members are being damaged by petrol bombs and stones;
(2) streets are barricaded with rocks, motor wrecks and all kinds of obstructive material;
(3) The lives of Councillors and law-abiding citizens are being threatened and a general spirit of vandalism is present in the township.

Since February 1984 Councillors have been scorned, mocked and intimidated the Council cannot convene any public meetings for fear of their own lives. The Council is adament that it intends

3/...

to promote the Government policy but, under the present circumstances, Councillors cannot even leave their houses, and those who are employed in Cradock have to be transported in protective vehicles driven by White officials.

The community of Lingelihle is being instigated not to pay any rental with the result that the Council's debts are increasing rapidly.

There is sincere appreciation for the S.A. Police who patrol the streets at regular intervals and for the guards stationed at night in the Councillors' houses.

The barricades in the streets cannot be cleared because the lives of the Council's employees and their families are in constant danger.

At the funeral of the Mayor's mother on 12 May 1984 there was absolute chaos in the township. The funeral procession was stoned and various vehicles, including the hearse, were badly damaged. The coffin had to be transferred to a light delivery vehicle which was also damaged en route to the cemetery. Only very brave people attended the funeral and amongst them were members of the Kayamnandi (Port Elizabeth) and Kwanobuhle (Uitenhage) Town Councils. The Mayor could not attend the ceremony at the grave and had to be rushed to safety.

Since March 1984 four (4) of the ringleaders of CRADORA have been removed from the township and several others have been arrested and are awaiting trial but in spite of this their subversive activities are still part and parcel of our daily life.

'n Algehele skole boikot en sporadiese onrus en geweldpleging het gedurende 1984 voortgegaan en op 1985/01/03 het al die lede van die Lingelihle swart dorpsraad as gevolg van intimidasie deur lede van Cradora en Cradoya bedank.

3. Ek beskik oor inligting dat Cradora, Cradoya Crawo en Cosas te Cradock beplan om 'n gesamentlike vergadering op 1985/02/03 in die gemeenskapsaal te Cradock te hou en dat hulle uitnodigingsgerig het aan al die United Democratic Front streke landswyd om afgevaardigdes van elk van hulle affiliale na Cradock te stuur. Die doel van die vergadering is om soveel van die lede van die U.D.F. landswyd moontlik te Cradock bymekaar te kry om die bedanking van die Lingelihle swart dorpsraad op 85/01/03 te vier en om 'n strategie vir verdere aksies teen die dorpsrade landswyd te beplan sodat hulle ook gedwing kan word om as gevolg van aksies van die U.D.F. en sy affiliale te bedank. Die doel is ook om solidariteit met Cradock se skole boikot wat sedert 1984 heers te betoon.
Duisende mense word deur die organiseerders verwag en op 1985/01/29 is 'n beroep vir fondse met die volgende bewoording per hand by al die besighede te Cradock afgelewer.

4/...

The Cradock Residents Association (Cradora) will be officially launched on Sunday, 3rd February. Thousands of visitors from all over South Africa are expected.
We, therefore, wish to appeal to all business men for financial assistance or assistance in kind to meet the costs of catering for our visitors.
Thanking you in anticipation
Yours faithfully
Cradock Residents Association.

4. Sedert die bedanking van die dorpsraad op 1985/01/03 heers daar n klimaat van verset in die swartwoonbuurt en vergaderings van Cradoya en Crawo wat in die afgelope tyd gehou is het aanleiding gegee tot openbare rus verstoring, geweld en intimidasie te Cradock.

Gerugte doen die ronde in die swartwoongebied dat boikotte van besighede te Cradock met die gepaardgaande intimidasie en volskaalse wegbly van werk beplan word en dat die tye en tydperk van die boikotte bekend gemaak gaan word tydens die gesamentlike vergadering op 1985/02/03.

Ter toeligting word melding gemaak van die rus verstoring wat voortgespruit het uit onlangse vergaderings van Cradoya en Crawo te Cradock.

4.1 Op 1985/01/16 is n Crawo vergadering bygewoon deur volwassenes en jeugdiges van beide geslagte in die gemeenskapsaal te Cradock gehou. Tydens die vergadering is beplanning gedoen vir die gesamentlike vergadering op 1985/02/03 en is vryheidsliedere gesing.

Na die vergadering in die vroeë oggend ure van die 17de is n huis te Notwalastraat 20 waar Fezile GWAYI geslaap het deur n groep jeugdiges aangeval. Die huis is aan die brand gesteek en met klippe bestook. Skade van R330,00 is gely en n saak van brandstigting is geopen. Cradock MR 156/1/85.

(Fezile GWAYI se ouerhuis is op 84/04/15 onder die klippe gesteek omdat hy sedert 84/04/04 klasse by die Lingelihle hoërskool, ten spyte van die boikot, bygewoon het. Tydens hierdie voorval het Fezile GWAYI een van die persone wat sy huis met klippe bestook het met n mes doodgesteek te wete ene Zebenzile JACOBS.)

4.2 Op 1985/01/20 om 14h00 is n Cradoya vergadering gehou in die gemeenskapsaal. Tydens hierdie vergadering is n video opname van onrus elders in die Republiek aan die vergadering getoon en is vryheidsliedere gesing.

Tydens die vergadering is kinders gekies om elke straat in die swartwoongebied na te gaan en te rapporteer waar daar huise is waar die kinders elders skool toe gestuur word om die skoleboikot te omseil.

n Oproep is ook aan die jeug gedoen om toe te sien dat die boikot van die biersaal wat op 84/12/01 begin het effektief is en dat niemand toegelaat word om bier te koop nie.

Na die vergadering is die woning van Fezile GWAYI weer met klippe bestook 14 ruite is gebreek en die woning van Mnr. Magadu, skoolhoof van Sam Xhallie skool is met klippe bestook. Mnr. Magadu is n voorstaander daarvan dat die kinders moet terugkeer skool toe. 10 ruite is by Mnr. Magadu se huis te Notwalastraat 14 gebreek en n saak van openbare geweld is vir die twee insidente geopen.

5/...

4.3 Op 1985/01/07 het 3 kinders na die woning van Mnr. Mkalipi 'n onderwyser by die Sam Xhallie skool te Sikulustraat 55 gegaan en hom gevra waar sy kinders skoolgaan.

Op 1985/01/09 het die groep kinders weer vir Mnr. Mkalipi konfronteer en hom meegedeel dat daar tydens 'n Cradoya vergadering besluit is dat hy opdrag gegee moet word om sy kinders uit die skool te Fort Beaufort te haal en hulle terug te bring na Cradock.

Mnr. Mkalipi het geweier en op 85/01/23 om 02h30 is 'n poging aangewend om sy voertuig aan die brand te steek. Lappe geweek in parafien is op die toneel gekry en die linker voorwiel van die voertuig het swart gebrand. 'n Opsetlike saakbeskadiging saak Cradock MR 215/01/85 is geopen.

4.4 Op 1985/01/23 om 20h55 is klippe gegooi na 'n motoris op die Port Elizabeth/Johannesburg nasionale pad oorkant Lingelihle deur 'n groep swart jeugdiges wat vryheidsliedere gesing het. Die voertuig wat nie stilgehou het nie, is deur die klippe getref.

4.5 Op 1985/01/23 het 'n groep van ongeveer 200 jeugdiges in die swartwoonbuurt van huis tot huis gegaan om 'n opname te maak van alle skoliere verbonde aan swart skole te Cradock wat elders skool gaan. Ouers van leerlinge wat elders skoolgaan is aangesê om hul kinders permanent na Cradock terug te bring. Indien hierdie ouers versuim sal hul huise aangeval en aan die brand gesteek word. Gedurende die vroeë oggend ure van 1985/01/24 is die woning van 'n onderwyser by die Lingelihle hoërskool, James Ngikashe, 'n voorstaander dat die leerlinge moet terugkeer skool toe met klippe bestook. Een venster ruit is gebreek en 'n saakdossier vir opsetlike saakbeskadiging is geopen MR223/1/85. Op 1985/01/24 om 14h00 is 'n Cradoya vergadering aan die woning van Gladwell Makaula voorsitter van Cradoya gehou waartydens Makaula gevra het dat die dreigement teen die ouers van leerlinge wat elders skoolgaan eers na die beoogde loodsing van die Cradock Residents Association op 85/01/03 uitgevoer moet word uit vrees dat indien die dreigement voor die vergadering plaasvind die owerhede die beoogde loodsing in die kan sal doen.

4.6 Gedurende die naweek van 85/01/26 en 27 is rapporte ontvang van groepe jeugdiges wat in die strate marseer en vryheidsliedere sing.

5. Uit die voorafgaande blyk dit dat insidente van geweld weereens voortgespruit het uit vergaderings van Cradoya en ander organisasies wat die afgelope twee weke te Cradock gehou is.

Dit is vir my duidelik dat intimidasie en geweldpleging te Cradock toeneem en dat alles orkestreer word om op 85/02/03 met die beoogde gesamentlike vergadering ontketen te word nl. Die beplande aanvalle op huise van ouers wat hulle kinders elders skool toe stuur, die afdwing van boikotte; die brand van huise van politieke teenstanders ens.

6/...

Dit is my mening dat indien die beoogde vergadering op 1985/02/03 plaasvind die persone wat die vergadering bywoon waarvan duisende persone van oor die hele R.S.A. verwag word, so opgesweep sal word dat die openbare rus te Cradock ernstig in gevaar gebring sal word.

CRADOCK
1985/01/31

H. FOUCHé

"B"

Henri Fouché verklaar:

1. Ek is 'n luitenant in die Suid Afrikaanse polisie en is gestationeer te Cradock waar ek takbevelvoerder is van die veiligheidstak.

   Op 1985/01/31 vanaf 18h50 tot 21h30 is 'n vergadering van die CRADOCK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION (Cradora) gehou in die gemeenskapsaal Cradock.

   Die vergadering is bygewoon deur meer as een duisend swart persone en tydens die vergadering is vryheidsliedere gesing en A.N.C. slagspreuke soos Amandla Ngawethu geskree. Die bewoording van een van die vryheidsliedere wat gesing is is Viva Mandela viva Mhlaba viva Sisulu.

   Na die vergadering is die volgende slagspreuke met olie glans verf deur ongeidentifiseerde persone teen drie van die vier beton mure wat die sportgronde in die Lingelihle swartwoonbuurt Cradock omhein aangebring.

   A.N.C. VIVA MKHONTO WE SIZWE
   A.N.C. VIVA MANDELA SISULU MHLABA MBEKI
   BEWARE BOTHA TAMBO IS COMING LONG LIVE A.N.C. U.D.F. M.K. FREEDOM NOW : NOW
   BEWARE BOTHA TAMBO IS COMING A.N.C. IS STILL ALIVE
   LONG LIVE MKHONTO WE SIZWE LONG LIVE U.D.F. BAN APARTHEID LE GRANGE MINISTER OF DISORDER NO GATHERING WILL CAUSE DISORDER DISORDER IS EXISTING RIGHT NOW CAUSED BY YOU BUT VIVA A.N.C. LET THE STRUGGLE CONTINUE UNTIL JUSTICE IS ATTAINED A.N.C. IS STILL ALIVE VIVA MKHONTO WE SIZWE BEWARE BOTHA TAMBO IS COMING LONG LIVE MANDELA SISULU MBEKI MHLABA
   LONG LIVE A.N.C. U.D.F. CRADOYA.

2. Op 1 Februarie 1985 om 10h00 het ek vergesel van ander lede van die polisiemag na Lingelihle woonbuurt gegaan om kennisgewings wat vergaderings op 2 en 3 Februarie 1985 verbied op openbare geboue op te plak en die verbod per luidspreker bekend te maak.

   Die polisie voertuie is van Ernest Tali straat tot by die Lingelihle gemeenskapsaal in Sikulustraat agtervolg deur 'n skare van ongeveer drie duisend swartes. Toe die kennisgewing by die gemeenskapsaal opgeplak is, is dit deur die skare afgehaal en in klein stukkies geskeur. Die skare het vryheidsliedere gesing en swart mag tekens gegee.


2/...

Ek is vertroud met die inhoud van hierdie verklaring en begryp dit.

Ek het geen beswaar teen die aflegging van die voorgeskrewe eed nie en ek beskou die voorgeskrewe eed as bindend vir my gewete.

H. FOUCHÉ

CRADOCK
1985/02/01



Henri Fouché verklaar:

1. Ek is 'n luitenant in die Suid Afrikaanse Polisie en is gestasioneer te Cradock waar ek takbevelvoerder is van die veiligheidstak.

Op 1985/02/01 vanaf 20h00 is 'n disco, gereël deur die CRADOCK YOUTH ASSOCIATION gehou in die gemeenskapsaal te Cradock.

Gedurende die aand van 1985/02/01 is die volgende slagspreuk met olie glans verf deur ongeidentifiseerde persone teen die muur van 'n openbare toilet oorkant Ncacastraat in die Lingelihle swart woongebied aangebring.

LETS KILL MICHAUSDALS HOTNOTS ON SUNDAY VIVA A.N.C. U.D.F. CRADOYA.

Ncacastraat grens aan die bufferstrook tussen Lingelihle swart woongebied en Michausdal kleurling woongebied.

Die nasionale pad vanaf Port Elizabeth halveer die bufferstrook en die slagspreuk is sigbaar vanaf die nasionale pad.

Ek is vertroud met die inhoud van hierdie verklaring en begryp dit.

Ek het geen beswaar teen die aflegging van die voorgeskrewe eed nie en ek beskou die voorgeskrewe eed as bindend vir my gewete.

CRADOCK
1985/02/02

Luitenant
H. FOUCHé

B. Ek sertifiseer dat die verklaarder erken dat sy/sy vertroud is met die inhoud van die verklaring en dit begryp. Hierdie verklaring is deur die/sy/haar voor my eed verklaar as kontaksteken/bewys/kruisie in my teenwoordigheid geteken/op aangebring.

D. I certify that the deponent has acknowledged that he knows and understands the contents of this declaration which was sworn to/affirmed before me and his/her signature/thumb print was affixed thereto in my presence.

Kommissaris van Ede/Commissioner of Oaths

Volle voorname en van / Full Prenames and surname: JOHAN VAN STRAATEN.

Amp (rang) / Designation (rank): A/OFF

Beroepsadres / Business address: VEILIGHEIDSTAK, ADDERLEYSTRAAT, CRADOCK.

Datum / Date: 1985-02-02 Plek / Place: CRADOCK.

A "D"

EASTERN PROVINCE HERALD, THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1985

Cradock meeting

THE national president of the United Democratic Front, Mr Oscar Mpetha, will be the guest speaker at a rally on Sunday to launch the Cradock Residents' Association (Cradora) and to commemorate the prolonged schools boycott in Cradock's African schools which started in February last year.

According to Mr Prince Msutu, regional publicity secretary of the UDF, other speakers will be Mr Popo Molefe, the UDF's national general secretary, Mr Matthew Goniwe, a listed teacher and founder of Cradora and the Cradock Youth Association, Mr Thomas Fikile Kobese, regional vice-president of the UDF and national organiser of the Motor Assemblers' and Component Workers' Union of South Africa, the Rev Chris Nissen, UDF co-ordinator for the Karoo region and Mr Gladwell Makhawula, president of Cradora.

Last Version

UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT

P. O. Box 25063
FERREIRASTOWN
2048

DOCUMENTS ADOPTED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY SEPTEMBER 1983

A UNITED PEOPLE WILL DEFEAT THE ENEMY

(STATEMENT ADOPTED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SACP - SEPTEMBER 1983)

The road to people's power requires not only regional responses to unpopular measures but also a united national offensive, involving the mass of the people in town and countryside, uniting all the black oppressed and mobilising the support of all classes and strata who reject the rule of the racist autocracy. The regime's attempt to perpetuate white minority rule by fragmenting our people and our country must be vigorously challenged by the masses and counterposed by the vision of one South Africa - united, democratic and non-racial. And; above all, action by the masses is at all times the essential foundation for the unfolding of protracted people's war which is the only viable strategy for the attainment of people's power in our country.

The development of a broad front of popular resistance has taken a significant step forward with the launching of the national United Democratic Front (UDF) at a mass rally of 15,000 people held in Cape Town in August 1983. Already, the UDF is reported to command the organised support of between 1 to 1 1/2 million people drawn from all walks of life and from all corners of our country. Its creation has laid an effective foundation to defeat the regime's constitutional proposals including the Koornhof Bills. The UDF has the potential of drawing together the mass struggles raging in the urban centres and the pockets of resistance in the rural areas, particularly in the hated bantustans. The growth of regional branches of the UDF is a sign that the broad popular front is beginning to take on a structured and organised form and its shape and content is beginning to acquire definition. The urgent and fundamental task facing all genuine revolutionaries and patriots is to build upon this achievement and not to allow petty differences to stand in the way of creating the broadest possible democratic opposition and resistance to race rule in all its forms.

We are in a period in which the very foundation of race rule can be made to crumble by a united people's offensive combined with the escalation of armed struggle involving the mass of our people.

Prime Minister Botha declared in an interview in February 1983 :

shall assist them". He gave his interview to the New York Times, no doubt calculating that his views would be well received by the Reagan Administration. But the judgement of the real leaders of independent Africa was delivered in the words of Botswana President Quett Masire at the Maputo meeting of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference last July: "South Africa threatens our very existence. It is a matter of life and death". Appealing for international action to restrain South Africa, he said: "We fear the situation will deteriorate to the point where international conflict becomes inevitable and orderly development is impossible".

The danger is that South African aggression must inevitably escalate into continental war. Every step taken by the militarist Botha regime is encouraged by the imperialists as part of their global strategy. For the Reagan Administration, South Africa performs the same role in Africa as Israel in the Middle East - as a custodian, a gendarme to be strengthened for the task of curbing the forces of liberation and independence and keeping the people of Africa within the western orbit. Thanks to the policies of the Botha and Reagan Regimes, Southern Africa is today an arena of conflict and confrontation in which the all-consuming flames of world war may be ignited at any moment.

Success in the struggle to prevent not only war in Southern Africa but also a world-wide nuclear holocaust, depends on the unity of all democratic forces in South Africa and the front line states in the fight for peace and social progress. It is our task to built that unity. Communists, said Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto, "labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries". The only guarantee of peace in Southern Africa is the achievement of liberation, the ending of the race exploitation of South African capitalism, the construction of a new society in which discrimination and exploitation on the basis of race and class will be eliminated and all will enjoy equal rights and opportunities. The fight for liberation and the fight for peace are inextricably linked. We owe it not only to ourselves but to all the people of the front line states, indeed all of Africa, to bend all our energies to bring that fight to a victorious conclusion.

F

E.P. Herald 83/11/13.

Cradock call opposes community councils

HERALD REPORTER

THE chairman of Cradock's African Residents' Association, Mr Matthew Goniwe, said yesterday professional persons in the community should remember they too were members of the oppressed and should therefore not join "dummy bodies".

"We call on church ministers, doctors, lawyers, teachers and other professional persons in our community to ignore the temptation to serve on bodies which do not represent our community in the true sense," said Mr Goniwe.

He said his association had been holding public meetings for some time in a "sustained effort" and "well-organised campaign" against the impending introduction of community councils.

"We have had to use churches for our meetings. The last meeting in a church was on November 14, and the community came out vehemently against the concept of community councils and the recent increases in our rents."

CLAYE PELLAFOT
Commissioner of Oaths
Practising Attorney &c.
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913

SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

1983

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SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS
JOHANNESBURG
1984

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in Kavango, were released. It was reported that among those not released were three members of a council of churches' education programme.

Besides these detainees, about 146 undeclared prisoners of war, most of them captured in 1978 during a raid on SWAPO bases near Cassinga in Angola, were being held in October in a detention camp near the southern Namibian town of Mariental. They had been visited periodically by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. They were detained in terms of Proclamation AG 9, the orders concerned apparently having been renewed monthly.[22]

It was reported in October that three SWA security policemen (2 white, 1 African) were facing claims totalling R148 000 from the widow of Mr Johannes Kakuva, who died in police custody in Kaokoland in July 1981, and from three co-detainees who complained of 'pain, suffering and crimen injuria'. The same defendants were being sued for R84000 by the widow of Mr Hamukwaya, who died on 18 November 1982. At the inquest, however, the magistrate found that Mr Hamukwaya's death had been caused by members of Koevoet who could not be identified.[23] At the time of writing three other inquest and criminal cases were in progress resulting from deaths of men from Kavango who were being detained by Koevoet members.

On 28 September Constables Johannes Paulus and Paulus Matheus of the Koevoet unit were together found guilty in the Windhoek Supreme Court on 15 charges involving murder, rape, and robbery with aggravating circumstances. The charges arose from what the court described as a 'rape and robbery spree' which the two men, disguised as SWAPO guerrillas, went on in the Owambo war zone during January. The presiding judge, Mr Justice Johan Strydom, said that a disturbing state of affairs had come to the fore with regard to the activities of Koevoet in the war zone and he commented that the conventional police in SWA seemed to be afraid of Koevoet. The case was held in camera, but certain evidence given by Koevoet leaders in mitigation of sentence was released to the press. They were reported to have said that members of the unit were trained as 'killing machines' and were taught to show 'no mercy' to SWAPO guerrillas.[24]

Giving evidence in mitigation on 22 November, Mr Paulus said he had spent half his life fighting wars, first in Angola, having joined the Angolan rebel movement UNITA at the age of 14, and later in South West Africa. He said he had been trained since that age to hate communisim and to 'wipe out' people he saw as the enemy.

Koevoet's commanding officers issued members not only with SA R1 and American G3 rifles but also with Russian AK47s, Mr Paulus said. The court also heard that Koevoet's special constabulary received bounty money ('kopgeld') based on the number of SWAPO insurgents killed in each operation.[25] Mr Paulus told the court: 'We are called members of the police, but we are only taught to wage war . . . to find SWAPO and wipe them out.' Dr Charles Shubitz, a Johannesburg psychiatrist and neurologist who gave medical evidence to the court, said that Mr Paulus had been so intensely indoctrinated, first as a fighter for UNITA and then by Koevoet, that although he had been a perfectly normal little boy, his 'sense of moral responsibility' had been removed. Although Mr Paulus was not a psychopath, he was a highly disciplined killer. Dr Shubitz said that Koevoet had a common aim to 'exterminate guerrillas' and that the 'overall concept is barbaric'.[26]

In his evidence Mr Paulus also claimed that he had fought for SA forces during the Angolan war and that they had burnt kraals and killed women and children

sympathetic to the ruling MPLA government. They had often seen men, women and children burnt to death by 'bombs which made waves of fire 200 yards long'. These 'bombs' became a major issue during the trial after counsel for the state accused defence counsel of trying to 'discredit' the SA army by alleging that it had used napalm, which is banned under the Geneva Convention.[27]

Mr Paulus was sentenced to death for murder but granted leave to appeal against the court's finding that there were no extenuating circumstances. He was also given an effective jail sentence of 21 years on eight convictions for attempted murder, rape, and robbery with aggravating circumstances. Mr Matheus received an effective 12-year sentence on six similar convictions.[28]

During February two SA soldiers were convicted in the Windhoek Supreme Court of the murder of an African nightwatchman who surprised them stealing a vehicle in Owambo. They were sentenced to 15 years and 9 years respectively. Leave to appeal was granted. Another SA soldier was sentenced in Windhoek during September to 8 years (4 suspended) for the murder of a Herero woman who had refused to have sex with him. He pleaded that her death was accidental: he had meant only to frighten her by shooting over her head.

The machinery set up by the military authorities to investigate complaints against members of the security forces (see 1982 *Survey* p 622) has been augmented by a system of liaison committees representing military, police, and African tribal authorities. Anyone with a complaint was invited to approach such a committee.

During 1981 a delegation from the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference, headed by its president, Archbishop Denis Hurley, visited the operation-area and held discussions with local churchmen and others in northern Namibia. A delegation from the SA Council of Churches made a similar visit early in 1982. Reports on these visits were widely publicised in May 1982. In mid-January 1983 it was announced that the report by the Catholic bishops had been banned under the Publications Act of 1974. In March 1983 an issue of the Anglican newspaper *Seek*, which contained a feature article about the church in SWA and the views of Christian leaders there, was similarly banned. During October a delegation appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and consisting of churchmen from various countries paid a pastoral visit to Anglicans in Namibia. They spent ten days in SWA/Namibia. A spokesman, Mr Terry Waite, is reported to have said they had found that the local African population regarded the SA Defence Force (SADF) as being oppressive and that they objected to its presence. The system of ethnic government was also widely opposed. The delegation had put to the SADF specific allegations of misconduct by SA/SWA soldiers, and had said that members of the local population were reluctant to report such matters to military authorities for fear of reprisals. The SWA Territory Force released a document handed to members of the delegation. It acknowledged that there had been cases of misconduct. Reports of misbehaviour were promptly investigated by the authorities, it said, and if evidence existed the accused were brought to trial in civil or military courts. A list of 11 convictions during the past year was handed to the delegation: terms of imprisonment on those found guilty had ranged from 18 months to 20 years. The SWA Territory Force commented that, while cases of misconduct by its members were widely reported abroad, very little prominence had been given to atrocities committed by members of SWAPO. A list of such alleged acts carried out during the past 9 months was included in the document, which detailed landmine explosions, murders, and abductions.

G14

RACE RELATIONS SURVEY

1985

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JOHANNESBURG
1986

G14

to set up these municipal forces came in the wake of the political unrest in 1984 (see 1984 *Survey* p786).

In January a spokesman for the department of co-operation and development disclosed that 16 of the 32 African local authorities had formally requested the power to establish their own law enforcement units.[33] Eleven of these were in the Transvaal and five in the Cape.[34]

The financing of these forces was the responsibility of individual local authorities. The Lekoa (Vaal Triangle) town council's 289-strong force was expected to cost approximately R2,7m a year.[35] Salaries offered by the Dobsonville (greater Soweto) and Alexandra (Johannesburg) town councils were described as being 'slightly higher' than those paid by the SAP — constables were paid between R2 691 and R7 470 a year, sergeants R6 846 and R11 460, senior sergeants R11 460 and R16 020, and warrant officers R15 450 and R18 288.[36] The minister of constitutional development and planning, Mr Chris Heunis, said in October that an amount of R24,6m had been allocated to assist local authorities with the establishment of their own forces.[37]

A spokesman for the department of constitutional development and planning said that while assisting the SAP would comprise one aspect of the municipal police's work, other functions would be protecting council property, such as beerhalls, hostels, community halls, parks, and sports stadia; tracing outstanding library books, and people who owed rent and rates for services; delivering notices to residents; assisting in census surveys; and also guarding transportation of money belonging to African local authorities. Asked whether the municipal forces were being introduced because of the unrest in African townships and inadequate numbers of policemen in these areas, the spokesman replied that the SAP would remain the main body responsible for the prevention of crime and the maintenance of law and order, and that municipal policemen would not, for instance, act against pass law offenders.[38] Mr Heunis said in November that the Urban Councils Association of South Africa (UCASA) had requested that the powers of the municipal police forces be extended and that consultations in this regard were in progress. He added that at least 5 000 municipal policemen would be trained during the following six months.[39]

Among those opposed to the local forces' establishment was the United Democratic Front (UDF), which claimed in January that they were not aimed at crime prevention but would be 'tools in the hands of the unpopular town councils to defend councillors and suppress mass resistance to arbitrary measures like high rents, and water and electricity charges'. The UDF also said that their establishment would, on the one hand, further deplete available funds needed for the provision of amenities such as housing and recreation facilities, while, on the other hand, the scale of conflict in affected communities would be deepened.[40] Other fears, reported in the *Financial Mail*, were that the 'township armies' would resort to thuggery and strong-arm tactics as had the makgotla courts and well-organised gangs like the Msomi in Alexandra township in the 1950s.[41]

Koevoet

In April during the police vote in the house of assembly, the minister of law and order, Mr Louis Le Grange, said that as from 1 May the command and control of the security police in South West Africa/Namibia would be transferred to the commissioner of the South West African Police and that from the same date control of Koevoet, the South African Police's counterinsurgency unit in Namibia, would also be transferred. He said that members of the South African Police (SAP) attached to the units mentioned would be transferred by way of secondment and according to the needs of the South West African Police and that all other SAP members serving in Namibia would be withdrawn.

Mr Le Grange praised Koevoet and said that it was 'a pity' that there had been regular allegations that members of the unit were guilty of all kinds of misdemeanours (see 1984 *Survey* pp846, 847, 892). He called the misdemeanours isolated cases perpetrated by deserters from Koevoet and said that these people had been apprehended and punished. With regard to actual members attached to the unit, he said that four had been found guilty of misdemeanours.[42] In reply Mrs Helen Suzman (Progressive Federal Party) said that according to information from the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC) and from the Namibian bar council's submission to the commission of inquiry into security legislation in Namibia (the Van Dyk commission), Koevoet had been 'terrorising the civilian population in Namibia'. She said, 'Koevoet is trained for two main reasons — interrogation and elimination.' Among other things, Mrs Suzman said, 'The trial of *the State v Paulus and Mateus* had proved that members had been paid "kopgeld" (bounty) for every insurgent they had killed.' Between February and April of the year under review the minister of law and order had settled claims out of court for costs and capital amounting to R150 000 from relatives of a school teacher who had been killed, and other people who had been illegally detained, Mrs Suzman said. This was 'cheque-book justice', she said.[43]

In February charges against The Most Rev Denis Hurley, president of the SACBC, under section 27(b) of the Police Act of 1958 for statements he had made about Koevoet in February 1983, were dropped. Archbishop Hurley had said that Koevoet was perpetrating atrocities against the local African population. The director of the centre for applied legal studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Professor John Dugard, said that the State had invoked technical excuses to avoid prosecuting Archbishop Hurley because the activities of Koevoet would not have stood up to the scrutiny of a court.[44]

Attacks on policemen

During the political violence which swept the country during 1985, policemen were frequently the targets of attack. The minister of law and order, Mr Louis Le Grange, said that 16 members of the South African Police (SAP) had been killed in unrest in 1985, of whom one died of gunshot wounds, five of assault, two as a result of stonethrowing, and eight of burning. A further ten died in motor accidents, he said. Mr Le Grange added that 381 SAP members had been injured, eight as a result of gunshot wounds, 332 in stonethrowing, nine in petrol-bomb attacks, 19 in assaults, 11 in hand-grenade attacks, and two in motor accidents.[45]

The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) counted 26 deaths in political violence of members of the SAP or South African Defence Force (SADF), development board officials, and defence force members and policemen of the respective 'independent' homelands.[46]

In April the commissioner of police, General P J Coetzee, said that of the 275 acts of insurgency which took place between 1976 and 19 March 1985, 61 were aimed at the police.[47]

Speaking during the police budget vote in April in the house of assembly, Mr Le Grange said that in 1985 the situation of unrest 'began assuming greater proportions and that to an increasing degree attacks had been aimed directly at

received no evidence of a third force involved in the violence. (It defined a third force as 'a sinister and secret organisation or group that [committed] acts of violence in furtherance of some nefarious political aim'.) The commission said that the causes of the violence were 'many and complicated'. They included:

- the actions of security forces which had been used as 'instruments of oppression';
- the unbanning of large political organisations suddenly and unexpectedly;
- the existence of a climate of political intolerance combined with a period of economic deterioration;
- 'state complicity in undercover activities, which include criminal conduct'; and
- the setting up of arms caches in single-sex hostels, informal settlements and township houses.

In July 1992 Judge Goldstone criticised the government and the security forces for failing to act on some of the commission's recommendations. Judge Goldstone said that he was 'distressed that some of the considered and urgent recommendations have been ignored'. At a preliminary hearing into the killings of 48 people at Boipatong (southern Transvaal) in June 1992, Judge Goldstone explained that:

- no action, apart from an allocation of funds for upgrading, had been taken on his recommendation for the immediate fencing off of hostels;
- recommendations concerning the carrying of weapons in public had been 'partially but inadequately implemented';
- the commission's suggestions regarding the controversial 32 Battalion had been met 'with what can generously be described as an unhelpful response from a senior member of the South African Defence Force (SADF)';
- recommendations on policing in Mooi River (Natal Midlands) 'had been ignored...with no reasons furnished'; and
- a police investigation into a prima facie case of police involvement in a plan to assassinate a leader of the African National Congress (ANC) in Schweizer-Reneke (western Transvaal) had 'taken unacceptably long'.

In addition, Judge Goldstone said that whether or not the Koevoet unit of the SADF was involved in political violence, 'the very existence of such a group in South Africa in 1992 is calculated to cause yet further distrust of the security forces'.[19] He stressed that 'no evidence had been submitted to the commission which justified in any way allegations of direct complicity in, or planning of, current violence' by the state president, any member of the cabinet, or any highly placed officer in the SADF.[20]

A special committee of the Goldstone commission, set up to

investigate train violence, announced in Pretoria in July 1992 that 'it cannot be determined who is to blame for the violence on trains on the Reef'. The committee, which investigated violence on trains that had claimed 138 lives between July 1991 and April 1992, also said that 27 hostels along the railway network and adjacent to the townships were a factor in the violence and that records of violence on the trains were destroyed routinely by the police.[21]

In a statement in response to the committee's findings, the ANC said, 'It is an outrage that the statistics of the incidents of violence kept by the police are incomplete due to what the committee calls routine destruction of records' and that the committee's report provided the government with 'additional reasons, if any were needed, why it should immediately phase out the hostels and ban the carrying of weapons in public'.[22]

The Goldstone commission suspended further inquiries into violence at hostels following the record of understanding reached between the government and the ANC in September 1992. The agreement, which included the fencing off of several hostels, was based on an interim report submitted to the state president, Mr F W de Klerk, in September 1992 by the chairman of the hostels subcommittee of the commission, Mr Bob Nuget.[23]

In September 1992 Judge Goldstone established a team of 26 advocates, attorneys, policemen and members of the SADF to head five special investigation units which would be answerable to his commission. The special investigation units, to be deployed in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth/East London (eastern Cape) and Pietermaritzburg (Natal), were intended to help the commission in probing violence.[24]

On 7 September 1992, 29 people were killed and hundreds injured in a march on Bisho (Ciskei) when members of the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) opened fire on the marchers. The march had been organised by the ANC as part of its mass action campaign and to protest against what it described as 'political repression' in the homeland. Mr de Klerk subsequently blamed 'ANC mass action' for the bloodshed, while the ANC laid the blame for the killings on the South African government, which, it said, supported the Ciskei administration.

The Goldstone commission decided to investigate the deaths at Bisho, while the Ciskei administration appointed the chief justice of the Ciskei, Mr Justice B de V Pickard, to investigate the deaths as well.

In his report to the Ciskei administration, Judge Pickard said, 'It seems...to me that a large amount of the blame for what occurred on this fateful day should be laid at the door of the ANC leadership. It seems most unlikely that the bulk of the marchers were aware of the risks they were running and it is extremely likely that a large portion of the crowd at least may have been led into the situation like lambs to the slaughter. In the knowledge of all these risks, the leadership saw fit to lead them on and egg them on and...it seems that their attitude was that they were prepared to sacrifice a number of their supporters for the cause.'[25]

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Mnr. C. Brandt van die kantoor van die Staatsprokureur verskyn vir beskuldigde.

Beskuldigde pleit ONSKULDIG.

Mnr. Brandt deel hof mee dat pleit in ooreenstemming is met sy instruksies.

Die grondslag van beskuldigde se verweer is dat hy op geen stadium 'n vuurwapen op die ~~man~~ Haas gerig het nie. Hy ontken alle beweringe soos vervat in die aanklag.

SALOMO KANDOLOMBA. V.O.E.

Ek is 'n sakeman en eienaar van die Ehafo Supermarket. 10

Op 3/6/83 ongeveer 4.30 nm was ek buite die winkel. Saam met my was nog drie persone. 'n onderwyser Kanko en Evalustus en en 'n polisieman Erastus Munda ook bekend as Nakandangwa. Ons het gestaan en gesels naby die deur van die drankwinkel. Ek het twee manne opgemerk, Karel Namakeli (beskuldigde) en Ruben Josef. Hulle was in 'n drie ~~kwart~~ ton Ford bakkie - blou van kleur. Hulle het met die bakkie stilgehou by die winkel uitgeklim. Beskuldigde het vir my gesê hy is moeg van my en ek moet liewer doodgaan. Ek ken die beskuldigde. Hy het 'n pistool uit sy lyfband aan die linkerkant 20 uitgehaal en dit op my gerig. Hy het dit reg voor op my bors gerig. Beskuldigde was ongeveer 2 meter van my af. Hy het gesê "Ek sal jou doodmaak - ek sal jou terugplaas in jou ma se privaatdeel".

Hy het verder gesê "weet jy nie ek maak mense dood nie".

Terwyl beskuldigde die woorde geuiter het, het hy die pistool terug geplaas.

Hy het die pistool terug geplaas maar op watter stadium kan ek nie sê nie want ek het geskrik.

Beskuldigde het my gevra of ek nie weet dat hy iemand by 30

Soc esp pp 16,17 - evidence

Israel doodgemaak het nie "wat het my gebeur - niks het met my gebeur nie - ek is moeg vir jou".
Toe hy dit sê was die wapen ~~oor~~ op my gerig.
Die rede waarom hy moeg vir my is, is omdat hy 'n brief onderskep het wat ek aan Sam Nujoma geskryf het.
Die tweede brief het ek aan Kalangula geskryf.
Die derde rede is dat hy vier terroriste in my huis gekry het en vir elke terroris betaal ek R100,00 per maand. Dit is die redes waarom beskuldigde vir my moeg sou wees.
Die vierde rede is ek is 'n groot gat in die polisie.
Dit beteken miskien dat ek 'n groot man by die polisie is en ek kry geld by hulle en hoekom weet beskuldigde nie dat ek 'n polisieman is nie.
Die vyfde rede is dat as ek na Windhoek gaan praat ek met 'n sekere Punda sake van die polisie. Punda was op 3/6/83 teenwoordig toe die gesprek gevoer is.
Ek het na die beskuldigde gekyk en daar het 'n polisiebeampte Kandove gekom. Toe hy naby aan my linkerkant kom het hy gesê "Kandalombe wat het jy gedoen.
Toe ek vir Kandove sien het ek geskrik. Toe ek na hom kyk was daar o/g Simon Nghoshi ook by Kandove.
Ruben Josef het toe aan Nghoshi gesê "Jy met jou grootpens wat soek jy hier. Jy rapport my altyd met die olie, jy is ook 'n groot gat by die polisie en die boere".
Nghoshi het toe weggehardloop.
'n Ou man met die naam Erastus Nunda het my toe aan die arm geneem en in die winkel ingelei.
Toe ek in die winkel ingegaan het, het ek net op pakkies daarbinne gaan sit en huil.
Beskuldigde is nie 'n persoonlike vriend van my nie, ek ken

V. Dit wes die enigste twee manne met wie u staan en gesels het?

A. Dit is reg.

V. Niemand anders nie?

A. Nee, niemand anders nie.

V. Op 6/7/83 ongeveer een maand nadat u die eerste verklaring aan die polisie afgelê het, het u weer 'n verklaring in die Hooggeregshof, Windhoek afgelê?

A. Ja.

V. Daar het u gesê dat u met 'n paar vriende gestaan en gesels het?

A. Ja.

V. U het ook genoem die twee persone sowel as Paulus Vunda?

A. Ja, dit is korrek.

V. Die naam van Erastus Nunda het u gladnie genoem nie?

A. Ek het dit genoem.

V. U het dit nie genoem in u beëdigde verklaring wat u op 6/7/83 in Windhoek gemaak het nie?

A. Ek het miskien net vergeet.

V. Het u nie ook self bier daar buite die winkel gedrink nie?

A. Nee.

V. Wat van u vriende wat daar gestaan het?

A. Ek kan nie onthou nie.

V. Toe beskuldigde met sy driekwart-ton Ford bakkie daar aankom wie was almal in en op die voertuig?

A. Daar was net twee persone. Beskuldigde en Josef.

V. Is u doodseker?

A. Ja.

V. Hoe ver van u af het die bakkie gestop?

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A. Getuie wys uit 'n afstand van 5 - 6 meter.

V. Beskuldigde en Josef Ruben het hulle regstreeks na u gekom?

A. Ja.

V. Hulle het nie eers in die winkel ingestap nie?

A. Nee.

V. Hoeveel mense was buite die winkel tydens die aankoms van beskuldigde en Josef Ruben?

A. Ek kan nie presies sê nie.

V. Was dit baie?

A. Ja.

V. Daar het voertuie gekom en gegaan?

A. Nee, net Funda het met sy kar weggery.

V. Daar het baie mense gekom en gegaan want dit was besig?

A. Ja.

V. U was ook besig om met vriende te gesels?

A. Ja.

V. Het u op u vriende gekonsentreer en nie soseer op die omgewing nie?

A. Ja.

V. U kan dus nie met sekerheid sê dat slegs beskuldigde en Ruben met die bakkie gekom het nie?

A. Dit was net hulle twee.

V. Getuies sal sê dat toe hulle by die winkel gekom het was beskuldigde die bestuurder, Nathaniel Lukas was 'n passasier voor in, asook Josef Ruben en agterop was Josef Hofeni en 'n man met die naam Dawid?

A. Nee, dit is leuens - ek ontken dit.

V. Ken u die mense wie genoem is?

A. As hulle naby my kom sal ek hulle kan ken.

(Mnr. Brand roep die volgende persone die hof binne:

Nathaniel Lukas - onbekend aan beskuldigde was ook nie die dag teenwoordig.

Andreas Hofeni - beskuldigde ken hom - ontken dat hy die dag daar was.

Kandove -beskuldigde ken hom hy was die dag op die toneel.

Martha Amuyela - beskuldigde ken haar baie goed - ontken dat sy teenwoordig was.

Simeon Nghoshi - beskuldigde ken hom baie goed - was teenwoordig die dag.

V. Kan u vir àh die hof onder eed sê dat u elke persoon wie die dag buite die stoor gestaan het vandag nog sal uitken en identifiseer?

A. Ja ek sal.

V. Daar mag mense wees wat u gladnie kon sien nie - wie dalk agter ander mense gestaan het.

A. Daar was nie so baie mense nie.

V. Was die mnr. Shitu met wie u staan en gesels het onder die invloed van drank?

A. Dit kan ek nie sê nie.

V. Hoekom nie?

A. Dit was nie vir my van belang nie. Ek was besig met my werk.

V. Maar u het met hom staan en gesels?

A. Dit kan ek nie sê nie.

V. Hy het aan die polisie gesê dat hy kan niks onthou wat tussen u en die polisie gebeur het nie want hy was dronk.

A. Hy is seker net bang hy wil nie getuienis gee nie.

V. Mnr. Shikongo wie ook met u staan en gesels het is mos 'n baie goeie vriend van u?

A. Ja.

V. Hy sal ook nie 'n leuen aan die hof vertel nie?

A. Nee, hy sal nie.

V. Hy het dvir die polisie gesê op geen stadium het beskuldigde 'n vuurwapen op u gerig nie.

A. Miskien het hy dit nie gesien nie, miskien wil hy ook nie getuienis gee nie.

V. Het hy dit miskien nie gesien nie?

A. Hy moes dit gesien het dit was daglig. Al het hy dit gesien sou hy gesê het dat hy niks gesien het nie al sou ek ook dood gewees het. Dit gebeur altyd so.

V. Simeon Nghoshi is 'n adjudant-offisier? 10

A. Ja.

V. U het niks teen hom nie en hy is 'n eerlike en eerbare man?

A. Ja.

V. Ek verstaan u ken hom sedert 1968?

A. Ja.

V. Hy sal sêdat beskuldigde op geen stadium 'n vuurwapen op 3/6/83 by hom gehad het nie en ook nooit 'n wapen op u gerig het nie?

A. Nghoshi het ons daar gekry ek kan sê dat hy dit miskien nie gesien het nie want toe hy daar kom was die besigheid al aan die gang. 20

V. Maar beskuldigde het nog by u gestaan en sy vuurwapen by hom in sy hand gehad?

A. Dit kan ek nie sê nie want ek was deurmekaar.

V. Vanaf die oomblik toe beskuldigde daar gekom het en toe hy weer daar weg is hoe lank het dit geduur?

A. Ek skat 15 minute.

V. Beskuldigde het geen drank of iets eers gaan drink nie? 30

A. Nee.

V. Ken jy beskuldigde ook al baie lank?

A. Ja.

V. Het u ooit enige ernstige probleme met beskuldigde gehad? Hy het altyd by 'n drankwinkel kom drink?

A. Nee, maar hy het al eenmaal 'n geweer teen my opgeneem.

V. Wanneer was dit?

A. So 1 - 2 jaar gelede.

V. Hoekom het u nie 'n aanklag gemaak nie?

A. Ons word nie gehelp nie - daar by die polisie.

V. Het u enige ander probleme met beskuldigde gehad?

A. Nee, maar as hy by my kom koggel hy my.

V. Enige ernstige probleme tussen julle?

A. Eenkeer het hy met 'n geweer daar by my gekom terwyl ek besig was om geld uit my geldkas te haal. Hy het gesê ek is nie goed vir sy suster nie want ek het haar afgedank en moes haar tot die end van die maand betaal. Ek het dit toe gedoen.

V. Het hy ook weer die wapen op u gerig?

A. Nee.

V. Hoeveel keer het beskuldigde die Vrydag 3/6/83 die wapen op u gerig?

A. Drie of vier keer.

V. Het hy dit lank of kort op u gerig?

A. Kort rukkie.

V. Het hy dit elke keer weer teruggeplaas?

A. Ja.

V. Was die woorde wat u genoem het al woorde of was daar ook ander vloekwoorde?

A. Daar was ook ander vloekwoorde maar ek kan dit nie meer

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onthou nie.

V. Op 6/7/83 het u 'n verklaring aan 'n prokureur gemaak toe het u baie vloekwoorde genoem?

A. Ja.

V. Toe het u nog goed onthou maar nou het u weer vergeet?

A. Ja.

V. So u geheue is nie meer so goed oor wat twee maande gelede gebeur het nie?

A. Dit is reg.

V. Het Josef Ruben of enige ander van die mense 'n pistool gehad?

A. Josef Ruben het nie, net polisie wat daar verby gestap het.

V. Hoe lank het u al die Ehafo winkel?

A. Vier jaar.

V. Wat is u maandelikse inkomste gemiddeld uit die kompleks?

A. R20 000,00 maar dit wissel.

V. Was die drinkplek oop vanaf 3/6/83 asook die winkel?

A. Ja.

V. Was dit toe op 3/6/83?

A. Nee, dit was oop.

V. As jy drank ~~vir~~ in die drinkplek nodig het gaan haal jy dit uit die bottelstoor?

A. Nee.

V. Kan jy vir die hof sê of die bottelstoor ook sedert 3/6/83 oop was of gesluit?

A. Dit was gesluit.

V. Hoekom?

A. Beskuldigde kry my altyd by die bottelstoor - dit was dat hy nie meer daar moet kom nie.

V. Maar hy kon u kry by die drinkplek of by die winkel?

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A. Die mense drink altyd by die bottelstoor.

V. Maar u was te vinde by u winkel?

A. Ja.

V. Het u net gehuil toe beskuldigde weg is na die voorval en voortgegaan met u werk?

A. So 10,00 vm die volgende dag het ek weer gaan oopsluit.

V. Het u 'n vuurwapen?

A. Ja 'n .303.

V. Is dit vir selfbeskerming?

A. Ja om my winkel te beskerm. 10

V. Beskuldigde sal sê hy het met sy driekwart-ton Ford by u winkel gekom het, dat die persone wie in die hof geroep is op die voertuig was. Hy en Josef Ruben het na u gestap en gesê "u moenie weer die naam van die polisie sleg maak nie, doen jou werk ons is die polisie ons doen ons werk". Verder sal hy sê sy vuurwapen was in sy voertuig.

A. Nee, dit is leuens.

Herondervraging deur S.A.: Geen vrae.

Deur Hof:

V. Die persoon wie beskuldigde by Israel sou doodgemaak het, weet u wat hy daarmee bedoel? 20

A. Dit is by Israel Jona 'n plaaslike sakeman.

ERASTUS HINDA. V.O.E.

Op 3/6/83 ongeveer 4.30 nm was ek saam met klaer by sy winkelkompleks. self Behalwe ek was daar beskuldigde en twee onderwysers. Ons het gestaan en gesels. 'n Voertuig driekwart-ton Ford het daar aangekom. Beskuldigde en ene Josef was in die bakkie.. Beskuldigde het na die vorige getuie gewys en gesê jy het vir ons met slegte woorde in Windhoek gaan praat. ~~9/8/83~~ 30

Hulle het mekaar toe begin vloek. Ek het gesien dat beskuldigde sy vuurwapen uit sy sy trek en sê "jy - jy ek sal jou doodmaak". Dit is al wat ek gehoor het. Beskuldigde se vriend het hom toe gevat en in die kar ingestoot.
Die vriend van wie ek praat is Josef.
Toe beskuldigde sê ek sal jou doodmaak toe het Josef Ruben ook dieselfde woord as beskuldigde gesê. Die klaer het toe begin huil en ek het hom daar weggevat. Toe Josef Ruben ook vir beskuldigde sê hy sal hom doodmaak toe het beskuldigde vir Josef na die kar geneem.
Hulle het nie gery nie want Josef Ruben wier toe om in die motor in te klim.
Toe Josef Ruben nie in die voertuig wil inklim nie het beskuldigde terug gekom en vir klaer gesê "jy het sleg gemaak".
Op daardie tydstip het Kandove daar aangekom en gesê "wat doen julle nou". Die klaer het gehuil. Ek het toe die klaer geneem en gesê kom ons gaan kamer toe. Ek het hom toe in die stoorkamer ingeneem.
Ek kan nie mooi onthou wat beskuldigde en die klaer alles gesê het nie. Beskuldigde het met tweekeer sy wapen getrek en op beskuldigde gerig, en dan weer gebêre. Die wapen was 'n polisie-rewolwer.
Dit is 'n pistool maar ek kan nie sê watter soort nie.
Ek is spesiale sersant in die polisie Oshakati. Ek is nie met 'n pistool uitgereik nie.
Beskuldigde het die pistool na die klaer gewys. Ek kan nie sê op watter deel van die liggaam nie.

Deur mnr. Brandt:

V. U is 'n baie goeie vriend van klaer?

A. Nie 'n baie goeie vriend nie ons kom wel goed klaar

V. Het klaar ook 'n bier gedrink waar julle gestaan en gesels het?

A. Ja, ons almal het gedrink.

V. Valiranus Shitu was ook daar?

A. Ek weet nie ek ken nie sy naam nie.

(Mnr. Brandt roep 'n persoon die hof binne en sê dit is Shitu).

Getuie bevestig die persoon was teenwoordig).

V. Was Shitu dronk?

A. Ek weet nie of hy dronk was nie.

V. Was dit net uself, beskuldigde en Shitu wie daar staan en gesels het?

A. Die drie het bymekaar gestaan voor 'n voertuig. Ekself het nie by hulle gestaan nie. Ek het by die kattebak gestaan 'n voertuiglengte van hulle.

V. Kon u alles hoor en sien?

A. Nee hulle het sag gepraat, die vloekery was hard.

V. Hoeveel mense was saam met beskuldigde en Josef Ruben?

Nee, ek het net twee gesien. Toe hulle by ons kom was hulle net twee.

V. Was Simeon Nghoshi daar?

A. Ja hy het daar gekom.

V. Kon hy sien wat gebeur?

A. Ja.

V. Ken jy Nathaniel Lukas, Andreas Hofeni?

A. Ek ken Andreas hy het ek die dag nie gesien nie. Martha Simeyela ken ek maar haar het ek ook nie gesien in die nabyheid van die voorval nie.

V. Hoeveel mense was buite die winkel waar die voertuie geparkeer is?

13. E. HINDA.

A. Toe ons aanvanklik daar gestaan het was ons net vier nadat die lawaai gemaak is het baie mense uit die winkel uitgekom na buite.

V. Beskuldigde sal sê dat hy en Josef Ruben en ander mense met die voertuig daar gekom het. Dat hy en Josef Ruben na klaer geloop het. Dat klaer gesê het "jy moenie meer die naam van die polisie sleg maak nie, los vir ons uit, doen jou werk, jy sal besigheid maak, ons is polisie ons doen ons werk".

A. Ja, beskuldigde het so gesê.

V. Beskuldigde sal verder sê dat hy geen pistool by hom gehad het toe hy met klaer gepraat het en dit op geen stadium op klaer kon rig nie.

A. Ek het naby hulle gestaan en sê net wat ek gesien het.

V. Stem u saam met wat beskuldigde sal sê?

A. Ek sê net wat ek gesien het.

V. Hoe lank het die stryery geduur?

A. Nie lank nie toe het ek en Kandove vir klaer weggeneem.

V. Het u gesien die beskuldigde rig die wapen tweekeer op klaer?

A. Ja, net tweekeer.

V. Sou gesien het as hy dit meer as tweekeer gedoen het?

A. Ja, maar daar was ook so baie mense. Ek sê net wat ek gesien het.

V. Is u seun na Angola?

A. Nee 'n dogter van my is in 1960 na Angola.

Deur S.A.: Geen hersondervraging.

SAAK VIR DIE STAAT

Mnr. Brandt roep beskuldigde.

KAREL HAMAKALI V.O.E.

14. K. HANAKALI.

Ek is die beskuldigde in die saak.
Op 3/6/83 was ek by die kantoor van die polisie met my voertuig.
Ek is later na die Ehafo winkel saam in die kar was Josef Ruben, Dawid Mikwete, Andreas Hofeni en Andreas Lukas.
Ek het voor die winkel gestop. Ons het almal afgeklim.
Ek het reguit na klaer wie voor sy winkel gestaan het geloop.
Ek het hom eenkant toe geroep. Josef Ruben was by. Ek het vir hom (klaer) gesê hoekom praat hy sleg van die polisie.
Josef het ook gesê hoekom praat jy sleg. Klaer het gevra wie het so gesê maar ek het geantwoord ek sal nie die persoon noem nie.
Klaer het ontken dat hy sleg gepraat het van die polisie.
Ek sê toe "los die polisie uit, ons doen ons werk, as jy 'n besigheidsman is doen dit en bly dan 'n besigheidsman".
Ek het verder gesê klaer praat altyd van ons sleg. Ek het hom nie gevloek nie. Ek het 'n pistool in my kar gehad op die sitplek maar nie aan my persoon nie.
Ek ontken dat ek 'n vuurwapen op klaer gerig het. Die wapen was in die motor.
Ek weet nie hoekom klaer sulke bewerings maak nie. Ek ken hom lankal. Ons was vriende.
Ek ken die storie van my suster. Sy het by klaer gewerk en hy het haar weggejaag. Ek het haar gesê om haar geld by klaer te vra. Sy was bang en ek het saam met haar gegaan op haar versoek.
Toe my suster haar geld vra het klaer geweier. Ek het vir klaer gevra hoekom hy nie die geld gee nie maar ek het hom nie gedreig nie. Hy het toe vir haar die geld gegee maar ek was nie by nie.

15. K. HAMAKALI.

Ek het op geen stadium vir klaer gedreig, aangerand of met die dood gedreig of 'n vuurwapen op hom gerig nie.
Die gebeure voor die winiel het seker nie langer as 5 - 10 minute geduur nie. Ek was aan dims en het geen drank gedrink nie.
Ek het opdrag gekry om na die Ehafo winkel te gaan en beskuldigde te waarsku om die polisie uit te los. Kaptein Wenter het die opdrag gegee. Na die 5 minute het ek en sersant Josef Ruben gery na die kaptein se kantoor. Hy was nie in nie. Ek ken vir Simon Nghoshi, Nathaniel Lukas, Andreas Hofeni, a/o Kandove en Martha ~~Aanyeta~~ Cwanyela.
Hulle was die namiddag voor die winkel. Ek het hulle gesien.

Deur S.A.:

V. Wat is die klaer se houding teenoor die polisie?
A. Ek kan nie sê nie. Hy het net ~~geskr~~ gesukkel.
V. Wat is die uitlatings wat hy maak teenoor die polisie?
A. Ek weet nie.
V. Hoekom het jy die dag na die klaer gegaan?
A. Ek was gestuur om klaer te gaan waarsku om ons uit te los.
V. Wat doen hy dat jy hom moes waarsku?
A. Hy het gesê ons gaan nie om te gaan veg in die veld nie ons gaan om die plaaslike bevolking te slaan en hulle dode plat te trap.
V. Het u dit self geheer?
A. Eenkeer in sy drankwinkel het ek dit gehoor.
V. Wie sê hy doen dit?
A. Koevoet.
V. Is jy lid van Koevoet?
A. Ja.

16. K. HANAKALI

V. Hoekom het kaptein Winter jou gestuur en nie self gegaan nie?

A. Omdat klaer 'n vriend van my is.

V. Bedoel jy dit is bekend in Oshakati dat jy en klaer vriende is en daarom is jy gestuur?

A. Ja.

V. Het jy op 3/6/83 gegaan om met klaer te baklei . of hom te dreig of om net hom te waarsku.

A. Net te waarsku.

V. Ken jy vir Paulus Punda?

A. Ja.

V. Was hy die dag daar?

A. Ja maar nie in dieselfde groep as klaer nie. Hy het apart bier gedrink.

V. Klaer het gesê jy het hom gedreig met die dood en dat jy hom sal skiet?

A. Nee.

V. Het jy aan klaer gesê jy het al iemand doodgeskiet by Israel Jona?

A. Nee.

V. Kan jy enige rede dink waarom die klaer sal sê jy het hom met 'n vuurwapen gedreig?

A. Nee ek kan nie.

V. Die tweede Staatsgetuie het gesê jy en klaer het mekaar gevloek?

A. Nee dit was nie so nie.

V. Toe jy vir klaer sê hy vertel lekike goed van Koevoet het hy gestry?

A. Ja maar ek het gesê ek het 'n groep van 59 mense wat dit kan bevestig.

17. E. HAMAKALI. en.
E. WINTER

Heronderv raging - Geen.

Deur Hof:

V. Het jy al iemand by Israel Jona se nagklub doodgeskiet?

A. Ja, maar by Oshakati.

V. Het jy en klaer glad nie gestry nie?

A. Nee.

V. Jy het blykbaar nie die ontkenning in so 'n goeie gees aanvaar nie want jy het gesê jy het 59 mense wat kan bevestig dat hy sleg praat?

A. Nee, dit was in 'n goeie gees.

V. Het jy gehoor klaer ontken dat julle sulke groot vriende is?

A. Ja.

V. Weet kaptein Winter ook van jou vriendskap met klaer?

A. Ja.

Deur Hof aan mnr. Brandt:

V. Wil u enigiets vir beskuldigde vra na aanleiding van vrae deur hof?

ERIC WINTER V.O.E.

Ek is kaptein in diens van die polisie se spesiale eenheid bekend as Koevoet.

Ek ken die beskuldigde. Hy is 'n sersant in die S.W.A.Polisie verbonde aan die ondersoekspan van die Eenheid. Ek weet van die voorval wat op 3/6/83 plaasgevind het tussen klaer en beskuldigde.

Ek het persoonlik opdrag aan beskuldigde gegee om klaer te gaan spreek, na aanleiding van inligting wat hy sou gemaak het oor die Eenheid waaraan sowel ek as beskuldigde verbonde is.

Die inhoud van die berigte het neergekom dat die Eenheid

E. Winter en S. Nghoshi.

waaraan ek en beskuldigde verbonde is verantwoordelik is vir wandade teen die plaaslike bevolking.

Sover my kennis strek was klaer en beskuldigde vriende.

Deur S.A.: Geen vrae.

Deur Hof:

V. Welke kennis het u dat klaer en beskuldigde vriende is?

A. Ek is 9 jaar in Owambo en het hulle by verskeie geleenthede in mekaar se geselskap gekry.

SIMEON NGHOSHI. V.O.E.

Ek is 'n adjudant-offisier in die S.W.A.Polisie verbonde aan die speurtak. Op 3/6/83 was ek teenwoordig by die winkel van klaer waar daar 'n stryery tussen klaer en beskuldigde was. Ek het geen wapen by beskuldigde gesien nie. Ek het op geen stadium gesien dat klaer 'n vuurwapen op beskuldigde rig nie.

Deur S.A.:

V. Toe u op die toneel aankom wat het u gesien?

A. Ek het gesien dat beskuldigde stryery maak met klaer in die saak.

V. Wat se stryery was dit?

A. Ek het net 'n paar spesifieke woorde gehoor.

V. Wat was die woorde?

A. Beskuldigde het klaer gesê waar is die mense wat in die nag rondbeweeg en mense doodmaak. Verder het beskuldigde gesê "jy moet nou vir my sê ek maak jou dood". Dieselfde tyd het vriend van beskuldigde genaamd Josef na my beweeg en gesê hy sal my doodmaak. Verder het Josef aangehou om my met vuil woorde te vloek. Ek het die toneel verlaat en na my kar gegaan.

V. Wat se klere het beskuldigde aangehad?

A. 'n Hemp en 'n broek.

V. Sou u 'n vuurwapen gesien het as hy dit gehad het.

A. Ja behalwe as hy dit in sy broek se band gedruk het.

V. Bedoel u dat u dit nie sou gesien het as niks uitgesteek het by sy broek se band nie?

A. Ja.

V. Ken u die klaer en die beskuldigde?

A. Ja ek ken hulle goed.

V. Wat is die verhouding tusse hulle?

A. Ek weet nie maar vroeër terug het hulle saambeweeg.

Herondervraging deur mnr. Brandt:

V. Het u op enige stadium iets gesien wat kan aandui dat beskuldigde 'n vuurwapen by hom het?

A. Nee.

Deur Hof:

V. Het beskuldigde vir klaer gesê hy sal hom doodmaak?

A. Ja.

V. Was daar 'n stryery tussen klaer en brskuldigde?

A. Ja, maar net beskuldigde het gepraat.

V. Was dit 'n normale gesprek of heftig?

A. Dit was 'n giftige gesprek.

V. As beskuldigde vir die hof sê hy het op 'n normale wyse met klaer gepraat is dit korrek of nie?

A. Ek sal nie saamstem nie, toe ek daar kom was klaer besig om te huil.

DAWID SHALUMBU. V.O.E.

Op 3/6/83 was daar 'n stryery tussen klaer en beskuldigde. Ek was daar. Ek en beskuldigde en 'n ander paar het saam met beskuldigde daar gekom.

Beskuldigde het met klaer gepraat. Hulle het buite gestaan en gesels.

Ek het geen wapens of skietery gesien nie, Ek moes dit gesien het maar ek het geen geweer gesien nie.

Deur S.A.:

V. Klaer sê niemand anders as beskuldigde en Josef Ruben het met die blou Ford bakkie daar aangekom nie?

A. Ek, Andreas, Ruben en nog 'n persoon het met die bakkie daar aangekom.

V. Wat het julle ander by die winkel gaan doen?

A. Ons het maar net saamgery en daar biertjies gekoop.

V. Ken jy vir a/o Nghoshi?

A. Ja.

V. Hy sê beskuldigde het vir klaer gesê "vertel ons van die mense wat in die nag loop - as jy dit nie doen nie maak ons jou dood"?

A. Ek het dit nie gehoor nie.

V. Het jy gesien die klaer huil?

A. Nee.

V. Die gesprek tussen beskuldigde en kel klaer was dit ewe rustig of was dit heftig?

A. Aanvanklik het hulle sag gepraat maar later het hulle hard gepraat - ek kan nie sê of hulle gestry het nie.

Herondervraging.

Deur Hof: naby

V. Was jy die klaer en beskuldigde toe hulle gepraat het?

A. Nee.

V. Kon jy hoor wat hulle sê.

A. Nee.

THOMAS KANDOVE. V.O.E.

Ek is 'n adjudant-offisier in die S.W.A.Polisie te Oshakati Op 3/6/83 was ek by die Ehafo Market toe daar 'n stryery tussen

beskuldigde en klaer was.

Die tyd wat ek daar gekom het wat daar gebeur het wat ek gesien het, het ek gesien.

Ek het geen vuurwapen by die beskuldigde gesien nie.

Ek het nie gesien dat beskuldigde op enige stadium 'n vuurwapen op 'n persoon rig nie.

Ek moes dit sien as dit sou gebeur het.

Deur S.A.:

V. Werk u saam met beskuldigde?

A. Ja, ons is albei polisie.

V. Weet jy of klaer en beskuldigde vriende is?

A. Hulle is goeie vriende.

V. Hoe weet u?

A. Hulle bly saam.

V. Woon hulle saam?

A. Hulle kuier oor en weer en as jy hulle bymekaar sien sien jy sommer dit is mense wat van mekaar hou.

V. Het jy op enige stadium gesien die klaer huil?

A. Nee.

V. Klaer sê jy het hom in die stoorkamer ingehelp waar hy op die pakkies sit en huil het.

A. Ek weet niks daarvan nie.

V. Saam met wie het jy by die winkel aangekom?

A. Ek en Josef Ruben het saam met 'n voertuig daar gekom.

V. Was daar iemand anders in die voertuig?

A. Nee.

V. Klaer sê beskuldigde en Josef het daar aangekom. Beskuldigde sê hy en Josef en nog drie mense het daar aangekom.

A. Nee ek weet niks daarvan nie.

V. Wat het beskuldigde vir klaer gesê wat jy gehoor het?

A. Ek het gehoor beskuldigde sê vir klaer hy help mense wat in die bosse is.

Herondervraging

Deur Hof:

V. Is dit al wat jy gehoor het?

A. Ja.

V. Was jy naby die klaer en beskuldigde toe die gesprek plaasgevind het?

A. Ja. (beskuldigde beduie 2 meter on: eveer).

V. Simeon Nghoshi sê die klaer het gehuil - is dit so of nie?

A. Ek het hom nie sien huil nie.

V. Het jy gehoor beskuldigde sê vir klaer hy sal hom doodmaak?

A. Nee.

ANDREAS HOFENI. V.O.E.

Op 3/6/83 was daar 'n voorval tussen klaer en beskuldigde. Ek onthou die voorval.

Ek het buite by 'n voertuig gestaan, ongeveer 6 tree van hulle af gestaan. Beskuldigde het geen vuurwapen by hom gehad nie en ek het nie gesien dat hy 'n vuurwapen op enigiemand rig nie. Ek het met my pa Shikapa se kar daar gekom. Ek was nog by die winkel toe beskuldigde daar weg is.

Deur S.A.:

V. Wat het jy gehoor word daar gepraat?

A. Beskuldigde het net gesê vir klaer "jy moet die veiligheidspolisie se werk uitlos en jou met jou eie besigheid ophou.

V. Saam met wie het jy daar gekom?

A. Saam met beskuldigde.

V. Waar werk jy?

A. By Koevoet.

V. Het jy ooit gesien die klaer huil?

A. Nee ek het nie.

V. Op wat se manier het klaer en beskuldigde met mekaar gepraat?

A. Ek het gesien hulle praat vriendelik asof hulle grappe maak.

Deur mnr. Brandt: Geen hersondervraging.

JOSEF RUBEN. V.O.L.

Ek is 'n sersant in die S.W.A.Polisie spesiale Eenheid bekend as Koevoet. Op 3/6/83 was ek by die Ehafo winkel. Ek het geen vuurwapen by beskuldigde gesien nie. Ek was by toe hy met klaer gestry het.

Ek het nie gesien dat hy enige vuurwapen op klaer rig nie. As hy dit gedoen het sou ek dit gesien het.

Deur S.A.:

V. Saam met wie het jy daar aangekom?

A. Saam met beskuldigde, Dawid, Andreas hofeni.

V. Thomas Kandove - jy het gesê jy het saam met hom daar gekom?

A. Ja.

V. By die Ehafo winkel?

A. Ja. dan

V. Jy het gesê jy het met vyf ander mense daar gekom?

A. Ons het tweekeer na die winkel gegaan. Dit was ek en Thomas Kandove. Die twee de keer was ek saam met beskuldigde.

V. Wat het beskuldigde met die klaer gepraat?

A. Ek het gehoor beskuldigde sê "Kajolomba, los die polisie

dat hulle polisiewerk doen. Hulle het toe begin hard praat.

V. Wat het klaer gesê?

A. Hy het gesê "as dit so is sal ek hierdie saak na die hof toe neem".

V. Watter saak?

A. Soos ek sien het klaer gevoel hy is bedreig.

V. Is klaer gedreig met die dood?

A. Nee want ek het nie lank daar vertoef nie.

Herondervraging:

V. Toe u die eerste keer na die winkel is het u met die voet gestap vandaar na Amtenya se plek?
Hoe ver is dit?

A. Ongeveer 150 meter.

V. Hoe het dit gebeur dat u saam met beskuldigde na klaer se winkel gery het?

A. Beskuldigde het my by Amtenya gekry en gesê hy ry na klaer se winkel. Ek het toe saamgery.

Deur Hof:

V. Het jy vir Simeon Nghoshi gedreig jy sal hom doodmaak?

A. Nee.

V. Die woorde van klaer dat "as die saak so is sal hy dit na die hof neem, is dit al wat jy gehoor het?

A. Ja.

V. Was jy naby klaer en beskuldigde ten tyde van die gesprek?

A. Ja naby (getuie beduie so 3-4 treë).

SAAK VIR VERDEDIGING

O.A.: Na my mening is al aspek van ooreenkoms in die Staat se saak dat beskuldigde die vuurwapen sou gerig het. Klaer sê dit is 3 of 4 keer wat die wapen op hom gerig is.

Die getuie sê tweekeer.

Daar is 'n reeks redes waarom die beskuldigde die klaer sou wou doodmaak maar daarvan sê die tweede Staatsgetuie niks.

Klaer kon nie behoorlik beskrywing van die vuurwapen gee nie.

Getuie ook nie.

Klaer het nog getuies gehad maar Staat het nie kans gesien om hulle te roep nie.

Vir die oorweging van die getuienis sal ek dit in die hof se hande laat.

Deur mnr. Brandt:

Die getuienis deur die Staat is van so 'n aard dat die hof nie 'n bevinding kan maak dat beskuldigde 'n vuurwapen op klaer gerig het nie. Daar is 'n redelike moontlikheid dat klaer 'n leuen vertel. In billikheid kan mnr. Brandt sê dat die getuienis as geheel nie in alle wesentlike opsigte ooreenstem nie. Daar behoort by die hof 'n twyfel te wees wat presies op 3/6/83 gebeur het.

Ek is ook dank verskuldig aan S.A. wat uitgewys het dat twee vriende van klaer teenwoordig was wat baie maklik deur Staat geroep kon wees om klaer te staaf. Een aspek moet klaer in aanmerking neem dat klaer ontken het dat hy bier gedrink het. Getuie Kunda sê klaer het wel 'n bier gedrink.

Klaer sê wapen is 3 - 4 keer gerig getuie sê 2 keer

Die stelling wat beskuldigde aan klaer sou maak het word ontken deur klaer maar erken deur tweede Staatsgetuie.

Klaer kan nie die pistool behoorlik identifiseer nie.

Tweede Staatsgetuie sê rewolwer en dan weer pistool.

Moes die verskil geken het.

Klaer sê hy was deurmekaar - weet nie weens angs of drank.

26. UITSPRAAK.

Die aanklag van rig van vuurwapen kan nie staan teen beskuldigde nie. Al bejeën die hof die getuienis van die beskuldigde met agterdog asook van sy getuienis het mens die getuienis van o/a Nghoshi waar hy sê dat beskuldigde nooit 'n vuurwapen op die klaer gerig het nie. Vra dat beskuldigde onskuldig bevind word en ontslaan word.

UITSPRAAK

SKULDIG soos aangekla.

S.A. bewys nie vorige veroordelings nie. 10

Mnr. Brandt roep beskuldigde:

KAREL HAMAKALI. V.C.E.

Ek is sedert 1968 in die polisie. Ek verdien R700,00 per maand, ek is getroud en het 8 kinders.

S.A.: Niks te sê met betrekking tot vonnis.

VIR VONNIS: Sien J.15

GET. A.H. COETZER

LANDDROS

9/8/83.

"Ek sertifiseer dat voorgaande aantekenings 'n juiste verslag is van die verrigtinge in hierdie saak wat deur my op die .....9e..... dag van .....August..... 1983..... verhoor is.

A.H. COETZER

LANDDROS TSUMEB

IN DIE LANDDROSHOF VIR DIE DISTRIK VAN OWAMBO, GEHOU TE

ONDANGWA

SAAK 507/83

IN DIE SAAK VAN:

DIE STAAT

TEEN

KAREL HAMAKALI

REDES VIR SKULDIGBEVINDING APPÈL

1.

Die beskuldigde het op 9/8/83 in die landdroshof, Ondangwa tereg gestaan op 'n aanklag van oortreding van artikel 8 van Ordonnansie 13 van 1962. (rig van 'n vuurwapen).
Hy is skuldig bevind en gevonnis tot 'n boete van sestig rand (R60,00) of by wanbetaling, sestig (60) dae gevangenisstraf. Die boete is betaal.

Besk. is verdedig deur mnr. F.C. Brandt van die kantoor van die Staatsprokureur wie namens die beskuldigde onskuldig gepleit het en appêl aangeteken het teen die uitspraak van die hof.

Die aanklag spruit voort uit 'n klagte dat die beskuldigde op 3 Junie 1983 'n vuurwapen op die klaer Salomon Kandjobomba sou gerig het.

Vir die Staat het Salomon Kandjobomba en Erastus Hinda (Ninda) getuig. (pagina 1 en 10). Volgens die klaer het beskuldigde vergesel van ene Josef Ruben in 'n motorvoertuig by klaer se sakekompleks opgedaag.
Die klaer en drie vriende Kanko, Evalustus en Erastus Ninda (Hinda) het buite die gebouekompleks gestaan en gesels.
Volgens klaer se getuienis sou die beskuldigde aan hom gesê het dat hy moeg is vir die klaer en dat klaer liewer moet doodgaan, waarop beskuldigde 'n pistool uit sy lyfband aan die ~~binnekant~~ linkerkant uitgehaal en drie of vier keer op die klaer se bors gerig het.
Terwyl die beskuldigde ongeveer 2 meter van klaer was met die pistool op klaer gerig sou hy bygevoeg het "ek sal jou doodmaak - ek sal jou terugplaas in jou ma se privaatdeel" en "weet jy nie ek maak mense dood nie". Ook sou beskuldeide

aan/....

aan die klaer gevra het of hy nie weet dat hy (besk.) iemand by Israel (Israel Jona se nagklub) doodgemaak het nie en dat niks met hom gebeur het nie.

Die beskuldigde sou hierna vyf redes opgenoem het waarom hy vir klaer moeg is, tewete:

(I) beskuldigde sou 'n brief onderskep het wat klaer aan Sam Nuyoma geskryf het;

(II) 'n tweede brief sou klaer aan Kalangula geskryf het;

(III) dat beskuldigde vier terroriste in klaer se huis gekry het en dat klaer vir elke terroris R100,00 per maand betaal;

(IV) klaer is 'n groot gat in die polisie. (Blykbaar beteken dit dat klaer groot aansien by die polisie geniet en deur hulle betaal word);

(V) dat klaer wanneer hy na Windhoek gaan hy oor sake van die polisie praat met 'n sekere persoon genaamd Punda.

Ten tyde van hierdie beskuldigings was Punda teenwoordig. 'n Polisiebeampte Kandove het toe ook op die toneel gekom - so ook het die klaer vir adjudant offisier Simeon Nghoshi in die onmiddellike nabyheid opgemerk.

Ruben Josef, beskuldigde se metgesel, het toe aan adjudant offisier Nghoshi sekere neerhalende woorde gerig waarop mnr. Nghoshi die wyk geneem het.

Erastus Ninda (Hinda) sou hierna klaer die winkel binne gelei het waar hy gaan sit en huil het.

Erastus Hinda (Hinda) was die tweede getuie vir die Staat (Pagina 10).

Hy/....

Hy bevestig dat klaer, hyself en twee getuies buite die gebouekompleks gestaan en gesels en bier gedrink het en dat beskuldigde en Josef (Ruben) daar aangekom het.
Volgens die getuie het beskuldigde aan klaer gesê "jy het vir ons met slegte woorde in windhoek gaan praat. Hy sou ook 'n vloekery gehoor het en dat beskuldigde sê dat hy die klaer sal doodmaak, en het ook gesien dat beskuldigde sy wapen tweekeer op die klaer rig. Ook het hy gehoor Josef sê "ek sal jou doodmaak".
Die klaer het begin huil en die getuie Erastus Hinda (Ninda) het toe vir klaer die winkel binnegelei.

Hierdie getuienis verskil in sekere opsigte van die van die klaer.
Volgens die getuienis van Erastus Ninda het die beskuldigde die wapen tweekeer (pagina 11 - 20) op die klaer gerig en nie drie of vier keer soos die klaer getuig het nie (pagina 8 - 23).

Verder het die klaer getuig dat hy nie gedrink het kort voor of tydens die gebeure nie (pagina 4 - 22) terwyl die getuie verklaar dat almal wie daar gestaan en gesels het gedrink het. (pagina 12 - 3). Ook is daar 'n verskil in die getuienis oor die presiese woorde wat beskuldigde teenoor die klaer sou ge-uiter het.
Klaer gee 'n lang relaas wat aanvang met 'n mededeling dat beskuldigde moet is vir klaer dat klaer ~~asiwer~~ liewer moet doodgaan, gevolg deur die dreigement dat hy die klaer sal doodmaak, dat hy wat beskuldigde is niks sal oorkom nie gevolg deur vyf redes waarom beskuldigde moeg is vir die klaer. (pagina 1 - 18).

Die getuie Erastus Hinda, getuig dat beskuldigde sou gesê het "jy het vir ons met slegte woorde in Windhoek gaan praat". Ook het die getuie 'n vloekery gehoor en die dreigement deur die beskuldigde dat hy die klaer sal doodmaak. (pagina 10 - 30).

Onder kruisondervraging het mnr. Brandt aan die getuie, Hinda gesê wat die beskuldigde oor die gebeure sal kom getuig en ook die woorde genoem wat beskuldigde teenoor die klaer sou gebruik het, tewete dat klaer? (besk.) gesê het "jy moenie weer die naam van die polisie sleg maak nie, los vir ons uit, doen jou werk, jy sal besigheid maak, ons is polisie ons doen ons werk. (pagina 13 - 34, 35).

Die getuie Erastus Hinda het bevestig dat beskuldigde die woorde gebruik het.
Ten tyde van kruisondervraging het mnr. Brandt ook aan die klaer gesê wat beskuldigde sal kom getuig oor die voorval. Hiervolgens sou beskuldigde se wapen in die voertuig gewees het ten tyde van die woordewisseling. (pagina 10 - 11). Volgens mnr. Brandt sou beskuldigde dan daarsan toegevoeg het "u moenie weer die naam van die polisie slegmaak nie, doen jou werk ons is die polisie ons doen ons werk. Klaer het dit as leuens bestempel. (pagina 10 - 17).

'n Verdere verskil in die getuienis van klaer en die Staatsgetuie Hinda is dat laasgenoemde getuig het van 'n "vuurwapen, wapen en rewolwer en 'n pistool (pagina 11 - 20, 22), terwyl klaer getuig van 'n pistool.

Die hof het die gerskille in die getuienis van die twee Staatsgetuies oorweeg en tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat

hierdie kleinere afwykings is wat nie genoegsaam is om hulle as onbetroubare getuies te brandmerk nie en om die volgende redes:

(a) die afwykings raak nie die wese van die aanklag nie. Of die vuurwapen drie keer of vier keer of twee keer gerig is, feit bly staan dat beide getuies vir die Staat onwrikbaar is in hulle getuienis dat dit wel op die klaer gerig is.

(b) Of die klaer bier gedrink het of nie net voor die voorval, is 'n verskil wat nie die wese van die aanklag raak nie.

(c) Oor wat die presiese woord wat beskuldigde teenoor die klaer gebruik het is daar 'n verskil in die getuienis van die Staatsgetuienis.
Op mnr. Brandt se stelling dat beskuldigde sou gesê het "jy moenie meer die naam van die polisie slegmaak nie, los vir ons uit, doen jou werk, jy sal besigheid maak, ons doen ons werk", het getuie Hinda dit bevestig.
Aan die klaer het mnr. Brandt gesê beskuldigde sal kom getuig dat hy bostaande woorde aan klaer gerig het en dat beskuldigde sal getuig dat sy vuurwapen in sy voertuig was. Klaer het dit as leuens bestempel. Hy het die antwoord nie gekwalifiseer nie. Sou hy 'n ongekwalifiseerde "ja" gesê het sou hy homself as 'n leuenaar gebrandmerk het.

Die hof het egter aanvaar dat nie een van die getuies woordeliks alles kan onthou wat gedurende die woordewisseling plaasgevind/....

vind het nie.

In die saak van die Staat v. Ndlovu, T.P.A. 4.12.1969 het Sy Edele Regter Hiemstra homself soos volg uitgelaat rakende hierdie aspek:

"Wanneer verskillende getuies 'n relaas van gebeurtenisse gee, dan is dit heeltemal natuurlik dat hulle weergawes op kleinere besonderhede van mekaar sal verskil. Dit sal inderdaad agterdogtig wees as getuies op sulke besonderhede volkome ooreenstem en die verdenking skep dat hulle met mekaar ooreengekom het. , om 'n sekere weergawe te gee."

In die saak van die Staat v. Dagerman en 'n Ander, 1 81 1PH17 (A) het die Sy Edele die Regter soos volg opgemerk:

"Thin impressions may be coloured by diffirent emotional states such as fear and their powers of recollection may differ.
The fact that there are discrepancies between the accounts of one witness and another does not in itself show that either of them is untruthful or unreliable....."

(d) Die feit dat die getuie Hinda (Ninda) praat van 'n rewolwer, in sy beskrywing van die vuurwapen, beskou die hof as slegs 'n losse woordgebruik by die beskrywing van die wapen.

Vir die Verdediging het beskuldigde getuig (pagina 13 - 30) en getuies is geroep.
Die beskuldigde wie verbonde is aan 'n Spesiale Polisie-eenheid bekend as Koevoet, het getuig dat hy en vier per-

sone/....

sone die betrokke dag na klaer se winkel gery het om met hom te praat oor die neerhalende aanmerkings wat klaer oor die polisie kwytraak. Die optrede sou geskied het op versoek van Kaptein Eric Winter, wie ook verbonde is aan Koevoet.

Volgens Kaptein Winter en die beskuldigde was die beskuldigde die aangewese persoon om hierdie taak te verrig vanweë beskuldigde se vriendskap met die klaer.
(Die klaer ontken hierdie vriendskaplike verhouding (pagina 8 - 11)).
Die beskuldigde het verder getuig dat hy die klaer eenkant toe geroep het en hom op 'n vreedsame wyse versoek het om sy optrede te staak. Die beskuldigde se pistool was in die voertuig gedurende die gesprek.

Die beskuldigde ontken dat hy op enige stadium vir klaer gedreig, aangerand, met die dood gedreig het of 'n vuurwapen op hom gerig het (pagina 14 - 19), maar dat hy slegs na klaer se winkel gegaan het om klaer volgens opdrag "te waarsku om die polisie uit te los".
Hy ontken dat hy vir klaer gevloek het of gesê het dat hy 'n persoon doodgemaak skiet het in Israel Jona se nagklub en bevestig weer sy vriendskap met die klaer. (pagina 14 - 22).
Op 'n vraag van deur die hof het beskuldigde bevestig dat hy wel 'n persoon in Israel Jona se nagklub doodgeskiet het (pagina 17 - 3)

Kaptein Winter (pagina 19 - 19) het bevestig dat die beskuldigde in sy opdrag met klaer gaan praat het oor sy uitlatings verder dat klaer en beskuldigde vriende is sover die getuie se kennis strek. Die kennis spruit voort uit die feit dat

kaptein Winterhulle by verskeie geleenthede in mekaar se geselskap gesien het.

Adjudant Offisier Simeon Nghoshi (pagina 18 - 9) wie verbonde is aan die speurtak van die S.W.A.Polisie getuig dat hy geen wapen by die beskuldigde gesien het nie en ook nie gesien het dat beskuldigde 'n wapen op die klaer rig nie.

Met kruisondervraging getuig hy dat daar 'n stryery tussen klaer en beskuldigde was, dat slegs beskuldigde gepraat het en dat hy het 'n paar spesifieke woorde gehoor het, tewete "waar is die mense wat in die nag rondbeweeg en mense doodmaak" en "[illegible] vir my sê ek maak jou dood". (pagina 18 - 23).

Volgens Inspekteur Nghoshi het ene ~~Joey~~ Josef Ruben, 'n metgesel van beskuldigde terselfdertyd ook gedreig om inspekteur nghoshi dood te maak waarop die getuie die toneel verlaat het.

Die getuie het verder getuig dat as die beskuldigde 'n vuurwapen gehad het, hy dit sou gesien het, behalwe as die beskuldigde dit in sy broek se band gedruk het. Hy het geen aanduiding gesien dat beskuldigde 'n vuurwapen aan sy persoon het nie.

Die getuie het verder getuig dat die gesprek "giftig" was en dat die klaer gehuil het. (pagina 19 - 21 - 24).

Dawid Shabumba (pagina 19 - 27) het getuig dat klaer en beskuldigde buite gestaan het en gestry het en dat hy geen wapen gesien het nie. Hy was blykbaar in 'n posisie om dit te kon sien as daar 'n wapen betrokke was.

Die getuie was nie so naby aan die klaer en die beskuldigde

dat hy kon hoor wat gesê word nie. Volgens hom het hulle aanvanklik sag gepraat later het hulle hard gepraat, maar hy kan nie sê of hulle gesing het nie. Hy het nie die klaer sien huil nie.

Thomas Kandove 'n adjudant offisier in die S.W.A.Polisie (pagina 20) getuig van 'n stryery tussen beskuldigde en klaer en dat die tyd wat hy daar gekom het hy geen vuurwapen by beskuldigde gesien het nie.
Hy was ongeveer 2 meter van klaer en die beskuldigde en volgens hom sou hy gesien het as beskuldigde 'n wapen op klaer sou gerig het.
Ook hy getuig van die vriendskap tussen klaer en beskuldigde. Hy het egter nie gesien dat klaer huil nie alhoewel hy gehoor beskuldigde sê aan klaer "jy help mense wat in die bosse is". (pagina 22 - 1). Die getuie het nie gehoor dat beskuldigde aan die klaer sê dat hy hom sal doodmaak nie.

Andreas Hofeni, ook verbonde aan Koevoet (pagina 22) ontken dat beskuldigde 'n vuurwapen by hom gehad het of dit op klaer gerig het. Die getuie het ongeveer 6 tree van klaer en beskuldigde gestaan en gehoor dat beskuldigde slegs sê "Jy moet die veiligheidspolisie se werk uitlos en jou met jou eie besigheid ophou". Volgens hierdie getuie het klaer en beskuldigde "praat vriendelik met mekaar asof hulle grappe maak". Ook hy het die klaer nie sien huil nie.

Josef Ruben (pagina 23) wie ook lid is van Koevoet, het getuig dat hy so 3 - 4 tree van die klaer en die beskuldigde tydens die stryery was. Dat hy nie gesien het dat beskuldigde 'n vuurwapen op klaer gerig het nie en dat hy dit sou

'gesien het indien dit gebeur het'.
Volgens hierdie getuie het beskuldigde net gesê "Kajolamba los die polisie dat hulle polisiewerk doen". Hierna sou die twee hard begin praat het en klaer sou gesê het "as dit so is sal ek hierdie saak na die hof toe neem".
Op 'n vraag deur die aanklaer "watter saak" het die getuie geantwoord "soos ek sien het die klaer gevoel hy is bedreig".
Op 'n vraag deur die hof het die getuie ontken dat hy vir adjudant offisier Nghoshi met die dood gedreig het.
Die getuie getuig dat beskuldigde nie vir klaer met die dood gedreig het nie en dat hy nie lank daar vertoef het nie.

Oor twee aspekte stem die getuies vir die Verdediging onwrikbaar saam tewete dat daar geen wapen op die klaer gerig is nie, en dat hulle dit sou gesien het indein 'n wapen op klaer gerig is deur beskuldigde.
Oor die konfrontasie tussen klaer en beskuldigde stem weinig van die getuies vir die Verdediging ooreen.

(a) Getuie Nghoshi verklaar dat beskuldigde vir klaer met die dood gedreig het. (pagina 18 - 23).
Beskuldigde ontken dit en alhoewel hy gegaan het om klaer te waarsku, het dit op 'n vreedsame wyse geskied. Hy ontken enige dreigemente.
Dawid Shalumba het 'n stryery waargeneem maar was nie so naby dat hy kon hoor wat gesê word nie. Aanvanklik sou beskuldigde en klaer saag gepraat het maar hy kan nie sê of hulle gestry het nie. Hy het geen wapens of skietery gesien nie)pagina 19 - 32).

Thomas Kandove het volgens sy getuienis ook nie gehoor dat

klaer/....

klaar met die dood gedreig is nie alhoewel hy ongeveer twee tree van klaar en beskuldigde was, maar hy het gehoor dat beskuldigde vir klaar beskuldig dat klaar "help mense wat in die bosse is". Hy het nie gesien dat beskuldigde 'n wapen op klaar rig nie en moes dit gesien het as dit gebeur het. (pagina 21 - 5).

Andreas Hofeni was ongeveer 6 tree van die klaer en die beskuldigde ten tyde van die gesprek. Hierdie getuie het gehoor beskuldigde sê aan klaer om die polisie se werk uit te los. Volgens hom het hulle vriendelik met mekaar gepraat asof hulle grappe maak. Die getuie het ook nie gesien dat beskuldigde 'n wapen op iemand rig nie. (pagina 22 - 20).

Josef Ruben het getuig dat beskuldigde nie vir klaer met die dood gedreig het nie. Hy het egter gehoor die klaer dreig om "die saak na die hof te neem, as dit so is".
Getuie was egter nie lank op die toneel nie, maar sou gesien het as beskuldigde 'n wapen op klaer gerig het. (pagina 23 - 15).

(b) Adjudant offisier Nghoshi staaf die getuies vir die Staat dat klaer gehuil het ten tyde van die konfrontasie (pagina 19 - 24). Nie een van die ander getuienis vir die Verdediging het dit waargeneem nie.

(c) Al die Verdedigingsgetuienis verklaar dat hulle 'n vuurwapen sou opgemerk het aan beskuldigde se persoon as hy een by hom gehad het.
Adjudant offisier Nghoshi het sy getuienis egter gekwalifiseer deur te sê hy sou dit opgemerk het behalwe as beskuldigde dit in sy broek se band ingesteek het sodat geen deel

sigbaar was nie.

Die hof het die getuienis vir die Staat aanvaar om die volgende redes:

1. Dit is gemene saak dat beskuldigde na die klaer gegaan het om hom te waarsku oor sy uitlatings teen Koevoet o.a. dat Koevoet nie in die veld gaan om te veg nie, maar om die plaaslike bevolking te slaan en hulle drade plat te trap.

Alhoewel kaptein Winter getuig het dat beskuldigde in sy opdrag gegaan het om bloot met die beskuldigde te praat "oor inligting wat klaer oor die Eenheid gemaak het", vind die hof dit eienaardig dat kapt. Winter nie self hierdie taak verrig het nie indien daar so 'n gebruik bestaan.

As regverdiging vir beskuldigde se konfrontasie met die klaer voer kapt. Winter aan dat dit hy is wat aan beskuldigde die opdrag gegee het, want sover sy kennis strek is klaer en beskuldigde vriende.
Klaer ontken hierdie vriendskap en voer inteendeel aan dat beskuldigde voorheen hom met 'n vuurwapen gedreig het.
Beskuldigde self het getuig dat dit al vir hom nodig was om klaer te spreek oor geld wat klaer aan beskuldigde se suster verskuldig was.
Die hof het die getuienis aangaande die vriendskap verwerp.

Verder vind die hof dit vreemd dat in persoon gereageer moet word teenoor iemand wie die optrede van die Spesiale Eenheid kritiseer.

2. Die hof het bevind dat hierdie waarskuwing geensins in 'n

gees van vriendskap plaasgevind het nie, maar dat daar 'n stryery was. Behalwe Andreas Hofeni wie getuig het dat klaer en beskuldigde gepraat het asof hulle grappe maak, vind die hof in omtrent al die getuienis 'n mate van stawing vir die Staat se Getuies omtrent die beskuldigde se dreigiment.

Selfs beskuldigde wie op 'n vraag deur die hof verklaar het dat hy wel 'n persoon in Israel Jona se nagklub dood geskiet het, verleen gewig aan die klaer se getuienis, omtrent die woorde wat beskuldigde sou gebesig het, naamlik dat hy klaer dood sal maak.

3. Die hof het verder bevind dat die blote dreigement om klaer dood te maak nie genoegsaam vreesaanjaend is om 'n volwasse man tot trane te dryf en hom in so 'n mate te ontsenu dat hy ondersteuning nodig gehad het om in die winkel in te gaan waar hy op pakkette verder gaan sit en huil het nie en dat die wapen wel op hom gerig is.

4. Die getuies vir die Verdediging het nie een gesien dat beskuldigde 'n vuurwapen by hom het nie en getuig dat hulle sou gesien het as beskuldigde 'n wapen op die klaer gerig het. Verder is hulle getuienis met 'n enkele uitsondering onbevredigendoor die omringende gebeure en die hof het die indruk gekry dat hulle vooraf ooreengekom het wat hulle sal sê omtrent die rig van die wapen.

wat betref die redes waarom die Staat die twee getuies Valerianus Shiteya en Shikongo Kauko nie geroep het nie, kon die hof net oor bespiegel.

Die waarskynlikste rede is dat hulle geen verdere stawing aan die Staat se getuienis kon bied nie. Dit kan voort-

spruit/....

spruit uit die feit dat hulle nie die gebeure waargeneem het nie of omdat hulle nie bereid is om te getuig oor wat hulle waargeneem het nie.

Die klaer het dit soos volg uitgedruk op mnr. Brandt se stelling aan hom dat die genoemde twee getuies ontken dat 'n wapen op hom gerig is. (pagina 7 - 7).


"Hy moes dit gesien het dit was daglig. Al het hy dit gesien sou hy gesê het dat hy niks gesien het nie - al sou ek ook dood gewees het. Dit gebeur altyd so."

A.H. COETZER

LANDDROS/TSUMEB

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CHRISTMAS CHEER DEADLINE EXTENDED

TO give intending contributors more time to finalise their contributions, the Herald Christmas Cheer Fund will be held open until 2pm on Tuesday. The closing list of contributions will be published on Wednesday morning and the list of allocations printed in Thursday morning's Herald. Cheques will be available at Newspaper House from 9.30am on Thursday.

o SA

Mercenaries will be out in 48 hours, says Pik

HERALD CORRESPONDENT

JOHANNESBURG — An embittered Colonel Bob Denard, ordered out of the Comores Islands by French paratroopers yesterday, arrived at Jan Smuts Airport in Johannesburg last night, with 21 of his middle-aged mercenaries.

A heavy security force surrounded the South African transport aircraft when it landed and taxied to a distant corner of the airport.

Foreign Ministry officials were waiting to insist that the mercenaries should leave South Africa as soon as possible.

"It is being made clear to Col Denard and his men that they are in South Africa in transit only — and that is with a capital "T," an official said.

The authorities were trying to find seats for the mercenaries on fully booked scheduled airliners due to leave Jan Smuts Airport for various European destinations last night.

It appeared that Col Denard was insisting on staying put until "safe passage" arrangements had been made for himself and his men.

However, the Government had decided to allow Col Denard and 21 of the men to remain in South Africa on a temporary basis, Foreign Affairs Minister Mr Pik Botha said last night.

Four killed, car ripped apart in mine blast

By JOHANN NEL
Crime Reporter

FOUR people died when a device thought to be a limpet mine exploded under their car on the Coega-Motherwell road outside Port Elizabeth.

The blast occurred shortly before midnight on Thursday.

Three of the dead were Security policemen and the other was a civillian.

The car was ripped apart by what is thought to have been a SPM limpet mine.

It is understood the incident occurred only hours after a telex was sent to police stations countrywide from South African Police headquarters in Pretoria, warning against attacks of this nature.

However, this could not be confirmed yesterday.

The four killed were on their way to Motherwell.

Wreckage and debris of the police vehicle, a Volkswagen Jetta, was strewn over a wide area.

The blast left a crater in the tarred surface of the lonely stretch of road.

No one has claimed responsibility for the blast.

An investigation has been launched.

The mangled wreckage of the vehicle was inspected early yesterday by police experts.

It was then loaded onto a vehicle and carted away for further inspection.

In a terse statement released from Pretoria yesterday, police said the four were killed when an explosive device detonated under their moving vehicle.

The device appeared to have been a limpet mine.

The statement also said the name of the civilian would not be released.

Major Bill Dennis, the police liaison officer for the Eastern Cape, identified the policemen.

☐ To Page 2

465-mile trip is into six stages. They using standard 4.2-metre rubber ducks", each fitted with a 30hp outboard motor.

From Page 1

The helicopter, based at the Summerstrand Lifesaving Club, will be on duty everyday from 8am to 5pm until January 4.

Volunteers from SA Lifesaving will staff the helicopter with a paramedic from Metro Rescue Services.

The emergency telephone number is 311101.

The helicopter will make daily flights along the coast between Coega and Van Stadens rivers.

Mr Slabbert said the public should always provide a clear landing area for the rescue helicopter.

"If they see the chopper is going to land, they must not flock to it but keep back," he added.

□ Six members of the 1990 East Cape Surf Lifesaving Team, set to compete in the interprovincial finals in Durban, were selected recently.

They are Captain Chris Lange, and the King's Beach boat crew of Mr Andre van Rooyen, Mr Ross Buchanan, Mr Roy Laurie, Mr Patrick Billson and Mr Nigel Harvey.

The team, tipped as favourites, regularly competes in events to test their physical fitness and lifesaving skills.

Rail strike violence

From Page 1

Police said the incident appeared to be strike-related.

The Sats employee was not at home during the attack.

His mother and another relative suffered burn wounds.

They were in a "serious condition" in the Kafahong Hospital.

The strike also spread to Durban harbour yesterday.

Shifts were slashed by half.

School pupils were employed to clean railway lines and coaches, a Sats spokesman said.

Sats placed advertisements in three daily newspapers yesterday outlining "central issues" to the strike.

The advertisements also explained the railways' reasons for sacking workers.

While Sats would "gladly" see Sarhwu as a recognised trade union, it could not negotiate until the union was registered with the Department of Manpower.

Four killed in blast

From Page 1

The three policemen killed in the blast were Detective Warrant-Officer G Mgoduka, Detective Sergeant T A Faku and Detective Constable D D Mapipa.

All three were married.

As far as could be ascertained yesterday, WO Faku leaves two children.

No ages or addresses were given, but all three were attached to the Security Branch at Louis le Grange Square.

The incident is believed to be the first of its kind in the Eastern Cape.

A stationary police vehicle was blown up recently in a similar fashion on the Rand.

No one was in the vehicle at the time of the explosion. Major Dennis said the exact movements of the policemen and their passenger before the blast were not yet known.

Therefore, it was not yet possible to suggest when or when the mine had been attached to the car.

It was believed that the mine was fixed to the underside of the car by powerful magnets.

These allow the mine to be attached to virtually any metal object.

The SPM and the mini-limpet mine come from the Soviet Union with various timing devices.

These allow the weapon's detonation to be delayed from between a few minutes to several weeks.

During explosion, the mine generates a massive ball of flame which reaches temperatures of 3 000C.

This is more than double the heat required to melt cast iron.

The most recent incident in which a suspected limpet mine was detonated in Port Elizabeth, occurred on December 8 last year.

THIS newspaper has been produced under emergency restrictions which have the effect of censorship.

South African Transport Services (Sats) this month, is an example of sheer determination.

Mr Erasmus is a proud employee because his achievement is of a dual nature.

Not only has he completed his 40th year of service, he has also advanced from a messenger to deputy director during that period.

Mr Erasmus was born at Louis Trichardt in 1933.

He attended school in Johannesburg and left at the end of Standard 8.

He took up his first position at the then SA Railways as a messenger in the claims department. He became an apprentice signals fitter in 1950 and completed his training in 1954.

He then worked as a leading hand in Maritzburg and also did section duties in Natal. In 1958, he became an instructor at the Railways College, Esselen Park.

During this time he studied part-time and obtained a matric certificate as well as a National Technical Diploma in Engineering.

Mr Erasmus was appointed engineering assistant (Signals) in 1966.

In 1988, he was appointed deputy director (signals).

He is also a keen song writer and singer.

Fares had been inc


Warn

HERALD

ANY cars parked in Road on Monday wh Mile takes place wi Department spokesm


Sections of Beach R the race.

The spokesman said ited on the sea side Ocean Avenue and La land side between St



Mr Jeremy Davis sho The damage was ca Eastern Province and

WEATHER



OUTLOOK:
All areas: Fine to partly cloudy.
Expected wind: South-westerly at five to 10 knots, becoming south-easterly/easterly at 15 knots.
Expected max temps:
Coast: 23C-25C. Inland: 25C-30C.
BFN 28C, CT 29C, DBN 26C, EL 23C, JHB 22C, KBY 29C.
Expected min temps:
Coast: 16C-17C. Inland: 12C-15C.
BFN 12C, CT 15C, DBN 19C, EL 17C, JHB 14C, KBY 16C.

YESTER
Max tem
Min temp
Max hum
Average
Max bou
SSW, 19
Max gust
Rainfall:
Barome
Sea temp

he Greenhouse Tea-house
Tea Garden/Garden Centre
(on Old Cape Road)
PHONE 721283
E WILL BE CLOSED DECEMBER 25 and 26 and NEW YEAR'S DAY
Give indoor plants for Christmas. Choose from our range of unusual gifts.
OPEN SUNDAY 24

CIAL LIN ant) 99 ES

OPLE DOM E BIGGEST OF USED CK PARTS IN STERN CAPE nearly 100 to our existing every month OUTH STREET RT ELIZABETH 541571 KMAN TOWNSHIP 611000 SETTLERS ROAD EAST LONDON 463177 11627

and left six
two-year-old

ead-on about 20km
intersection, with a
m Cape Town smash-
and rolling off the road.
were killed and several
ing the weekend in a spate
tal.
car carrying a family to
rned at Kranskop near
an was killed and another

re also injured, three seri-
ibus crashed into a truck
ass.
reen a bakkie and a car on
ulam on the North Coast
wo people were killed and
jured.
ed instantly in a head-on
tside Harrismith on the

seriously hurt and four
slight injuries in a five-
he Edwin Swales turn-off
reeway.

died in a head-on-collision
and a car in a accident on
burg in the Free State.
seriously injured.
on the Harrismith-
s claimed the life of one
s killed instantly when the

To Page 2



Mirror, mirror on the wall, who's the fattest of them all? . . . joining in the festive spirit on the beachfront at the weekend was Miss Junita van Antwerpen, 18, of Port Elizabeth. **Picture: BARRY LAMPRECHT**

for the failed 1977 takeo
Col Denard has rema
other members of his gr
To the embarrassmen
return to Europe becau
France.
About 30 French and E
Col Denard run the Comc
tected him following th
Abdallah.
Twenty-two left the is
over to French troops.
Mr Abdallah was assass
on November 26. Col Dena

EP panel

KEEPING faith with a cock
Province XI, the selectors
unchanged combination for
Hedges night series clash with
George's Park tomorrow.
Following last Thursd
annihilation of Northern Tra
city crowd of 13 000 is expec
historic ground for the encou
Rice's men.
Eastern Province and Tran
some fascinating tussles in the
largely, to their powerful side

Economists predict inflation rate fall

HERALD CORRESPONDENT

HANNESBURG — Inflation is expected
fall in 1990.
he predicted decline as been attributed
firmer rand and financial policy disci-
e.
lowever, economists are divided as to
extent of the downward trend.
o s of the average inflation rate
yea vary between 13,5% and 14,5%.
t all economists agree that inflation,
easured by the Consumer Price Index
will drop more significantly towards
econd half of next year.
edictions for December 1990 put the
at between 12% and 14%.
CPI, which reached 14,8% in Octo-
s forecast to start the new year at
as bond rate increases have yet to be
ted in figures.
average inflation rate this year is
ed to be around 14,7%. It reached a
15,7% in June from a start of 13,3%
uary.

Nedcor chief economist Mr Edward Osborn says the food price has been a dramatic stabilising influence.

He said a bumper agricultural season had held back the inflation rate.

Food prices had fallen by more than 20% this year, from 13.2% year-on-year in January to 10,4% in October.

Mr Osborn added that core inflation was high and this could drop in 1990.

However, this would not cause a significant decline in the CPI.

Old Mutual economist Mr Riaan le Roux agreed that a dip in inflation next year would be moderated by the possibility of food prices rebounding.

He expected an annual rate of around 14% and did not foresee any decrease in the housing index.

He said an inflation rate between 4% and 5% higher than South Africa's trading partners and the Republic's big debt repay-

□ To Page 2

PE blast probe continues

HERALD REPORTER

POLICE investigations into the limpet mine explosion on the Coega-Motherwell road on Thursday are continuing.

Three policemen and a civilian were killed in the blast.

Major Kobus Jonker, head of the Eastern Cape Murder Squad, said yesterday that no arrests had been made.

The police car in which the four were travelling was destroyed by the mine, believed to have been attached to the underside of the vehicle.

The men killed were Detective Warrant-Officer G Mgoduka, Detective Sergeant T A Faku, Detective Constable D D Mapipa and an unnamed civilian.

gela offered R82m contract

ERALD CORRESPONDENT

N — Veteran television sleuth
ansbury has been offered a massive
ntract to make another series of the
onal hit, *Murder She Wrote*.
e entire family will be cashing in on
ss.
evision chiefs were so desperate to
he series — an international hit —
were willing to agree to almost

"At my time of life I need more time to myself," the London-born actress said.

However, her family have persuaded her to accept the lucrative new contract which does not even require her to take the lead role in every episode. Some weeks she will merely appear briefly to introduce the guest stars.

In terms of the contract she will get the lion's share of the money, plus a starring role in a new comedy series to be produced by her



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BAK
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and I'l
Nissan
New Nissan 1400 Baki
R320 per mor
TRADE-INS
WELCOME COULD
COVER YOUR
FIRST PAYMENT
NISSAN
ST CR

EP HERALD 19/12/89

townships

120, say p



He came to say goodbye . . . retiring Lieutenant-General Bert Wandrag, commanding officer of the Operational Branch of the SA Police Riot Unit, (left) makes his farewells with Brigadier John Botha, Divisional Commissioner of the SAP in the Eastern Cape (centre) and Colonel Laurie Strydom, officer commanding the Eastern Cape Riot Unit. The Riot Unit was officially opened by Lt-Gen Wandrag on November, 6, 1987. He retires at the end of the year.

Limpet mine blast inquiries continue

CRIME REPORTER

AN investigation into the limpet mine explosion which killed three policemen and a civilian on Thursday, is continuing around the clock.

A police spokesman said yesterday that no arrests had been made following the deaths of Warrant-Officer Glen Mgoduka, Sergeant T Faku, Constable D Mapipa and a civilian.

It is suspected that their police vehicle was blown up by a SPM-2 limpet mine which had been attached to the underside of the vehicle.

The four were travelling on a quiet stretch of road between Coega and Motherwell at 11.45pm when the mine exploded.

The mine destroyed the vehicle and blew a crater into the tarred surface the road.

Debris was scatter over a wide area.

☐ Police confirmed th they have not made any a rests following a robbery the SA Permanent Buildi Society's premises in Ma Street on Friday.

The robbers stole a lar amount of cash from tv security guards as th entered the premises.

Three metal trunks co taining money thought amount to R500 000 w snatched from the guar by four masked men aft one of the security office was pistol-whipped.

The robbers escaped in blue Cortina Big Six.

The vehicle, containir the emptied metal trunk was found abandoned Korsten

Denard's destiny still unknown

PRETORIA — Negotiations are still under way between the French and South African governments regarding the future destination of mercenary leader Colonel Bob Denard and three of his companions. This was said yesterday by a spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The four men are at an undisclosed venue on the Witwatersrand until they can leave South Africa.

They were part of a group of 22 who arrived in South Africa late on Friday afternoon from the Comores Islands; 18 left South Africa for France at the weekend.

Col Denard and the other three will leave South Africa as soon as negotiations between France and South Africa are complete.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, told a Press conference at Jan Smuts Airport on Friday night that South Africa had agreed to host the mercenaries temporarily.

☐ Editorial comment on Page 14.

Enough money for the festive season

HERALD REPORTER

BANKS and building societies have assured the Port Elizabeth public that sufficient money will be available in automatic teller machines over Christmas and New Year.

Most institutions said they had people on standby who would fill a machine if it ran out of money. Only one banking institution said they were still discussing the issue.

The Herald contacted various banks and building societies after receiving a number of complaints that some automatic teller machines had run out of money at the weekend.

Concern was expressed that a similar problem would be experienced with the three consecutive non-working days over Christmas.

Views sought on Brookes Hill plan

HERALD REPORTER

MEMBERS of the public have been invited to express their views on the proposed Brookes Hill development scheme as part of a feasibility study on the project.

A model of the scheme will be on view at a kiosk below the Brookes Hill Caravan Park during the holiday period.

The developers, Wonderwonings Proper-

Anglican priest detained in Ciskei

HERALD CORRESPONDENT

EAST LONDON — Ciskei Police yesterday confirmed the detention of a Whittlesea Anglican priest, the Rev Ernest Marashula.

The head of Ciskei Police community relations division, Brigadier Avery Ngaki, said yesterday that Mr Marashula was being detained in terms of section 26 of the Ciskei National Security Act.

Mr Marashula, of St Barnabas Church in Sada, was detained on Thursday, and clergy were refused permission to visit him.

On Friday, Bishop David Russell of Grahamstown sent letters to the State President, Mr F W de Klerk, Minister of Law and

Rumania calls in troops, tanks after weekend protests

BUDAPEST — Rumania sealed off its borders with Yugoslavia and Hungary, and troops and tanks were reported in the streets of the fourth-largest city, Timisoara, news reports said yesterday.

This follows weekend clashes between police and demonstrators.

Travellers leaving Rumania confirmed reports of protests involving thousands of people in two cities.

The demonstrators were demanding the ousting of hard-line communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu, Hungarian radio said.

The disturbances on Saturday and Sunday were believed to be the first serious unrest in two years in Rumania.

The demonstrations were believed to have centered on the weekend ar-

pictures and books with image, Hungarian rac said.

Several Hungarians turning from the troubl region on Sunday, report seeing tanks and troops the streets of Timisoara.

Some said they had bea gunshots, the official Hu garian news agency M said.

Prominent Hungari lawmakers called on t parliament, meeting tod in Budapest, to denoun the violent repression demonstrations and t closing of the border.

UPI

'Hit' sus after ju

C-1.

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Stasie/Station Mothwelo M.R./C.R. No. · G.O./INQUEST No. 66-12-89.

Navraag/Enquiry No:

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
10h00	Lêsie aangifte van misdaad	
1989-12-15	soos pr	A-1
	Lêsie.	
07h50	Na Kpl Brighton inspekteur	
1989-12-18	in kennisgewing van dodelike	
	ondersoek t.o.v. oorledene	
	Lêsie.	
13h00	SAP 377 inkennisgewing t.o.v.	
1989-12-18	oorledene AMOS THEMBA FAKU	
	geïdentifiseer soos pr (Reelsnr. 1927/89)	A-2.
	SAP 377 inkennisgewing t.o.v.	
	oorledene Desmond Dalivanga	
	Mopipa geïdentifiseer soos pr	A-3
	(Reelsnr. 1928/89)	
	SAP 377 inkennisgewing t.o.v.	
	oorledene MBABALAZA Gleen	
	Mgoduka (Reelsnr. 1929/89)	
	geïdentifiseer soos pr	A-4
	Lêsie.	
13h50.	Aanstelling van die mede-klag-	
1989-12-18	gene wat op voorval van	
	misdaad gevind is word	
	in bewaring geneem deur	
	Kopstasie Beamptes.	
	Lêsie.	
11h00		
1989-12-19.	SAP 377 inkennisgewing t.o.v.	

C-2

Tyd, datum Time, date	MOTHERWELL MR. 66-12-1989.	Verwysing Reference
VRO.	Oorledene CHARLES JACK (Reelnr.	
—	1930/89) geïdentifiseer soos per	A-5
	foto's.	
08h30		
1989-12-19		
09h10		
1989-12-19	Vandag is die omgewing	
	van motorvoertuig gedeelte	
	is verband met enige	
	verdagte bewegings wat	
	die aand voor die ont-	
	ploffing. Sander enige sukses.	
	foto's.	
08h10	Is span gerehabiliteerde terroriste	
1989-12-20.	vanaf OVS-Vanderbijlpark is nie	
	Motherwell saamgewerk het	
	ontploffing met die oogmerk	
	om die adres-lê 124	
	Hamilton straat Motherwell	
	onder waarneming te plaas	
	en ook om moontlike	
	teenwoordigheid van terroriste	
	te ontdek. Verskeie foto's	
	van opgeleide terroriste	
	wat spesialis opleiding in	
	plofstof ondergaan het is	
	aan die span gestuur vir moontlike identifisering.	

C-3

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Stasie Station Mothkwena M.R./C.R. No. G.O./INQUEST No. 66-12-89

Navraag/Enquiry No.

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
14h00 1989-12-20	Alle lede van die veiligheids-tak te gaan om hulle beriggewers te arriveer vir die uiteindelike doel om alle inligting in te win rakende die ontploffing en die waardelose item van waardigheid van afgelide ANC./P.A.C. terreur.	
08h00 1989-12-21	Gerestigneer de opsig van Draadtelegram gelaaser 5000 per	B-1
08h50 1989-12-21	Uittreksel uit brief van Andrew 1989-12-15 gelaaser 5000 per	B-2
10h00 1989-12-21	Plofstof deskundiges van Port Elizabeth Veiligheidstak onder leiding van Majoor het die werk van die ontploffings toetsing te Oudtshoorn voortgesit. Die plofstof deskundiges is die eers	

C-4

Tyd, datum Time, date	MOTHERWELL MR. 66-12-1989	Verwysing Reference
ver.	dat die plaastoestel onder die voertuig en aan die agterkant gepaas was en dat die wielmoeryne wat in ladvig was wat die ontploffing veroorsaak het.	
	Lus.	
14h50	Verklaring van Kaptafel	
1989-12-27	S. Gill geliasser soos pr	A-6
	Verklaring van Straat. G.	
	Lourenz geliasser soos pr	A-7
	Verklaring van SI 1710 E.J. van	
	Wyk geliasser soos pr	A-8
	Verklaring van Kaptafel. L. Adams	
	geliasser soos pr	A-9
	Verklaring van Kaptafel. D.W.	
	Kruger geliasser soos pr	A-10
	Lus.	
09h50	Gesertifiseerde afskrif van	
1989-12-28	rekstaat van SAP 65389M	
	die ontploffingsvoertuig geliasser	
	soos pr	A-11
	Lus.	
11h05	Beëdigde verklarings ingevolge	
1989-12-29	Art. 212(7) wet 51 van 1977	
	van regsmedisie hulp	
	Straat. C. de Lange T.O.V.	
	oorledenes:-	
	NB 1927/89 Amos Themba Hadebe	A-12
	NB 1928/89 Desmond Dazimongwa Madida	A-13

G.P.-S. 002-0214 SAP 5

C 5

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Stasie/Station Mothe Wells M.R./C.R. No. 66-12-89
G.O./INQUEST No.
Navraag/Enquiry No.

Tyd, datum Time, daje		Verwysing Reference
VRN	NB 1929/89 MBABALAKA GLEN MGODUKA	A-14
/	NB 1930/89 CHARLES SAEIC	A-15
	[illegible]	
14h30	Beëdigde verklaring Van Eeden	
1989-12-	Engelbrecht Meyer geliasser	
	500 pr	A-16
	[illegible]	
08h30.	Beëdigde verklaring van	
1990-01-03	SIMO BOTS geliasser 500 pr	A-17
	[illegible]	
12h20	Beëdigde verklaring van D. Kot	
1990-01-04	Roelofse geliasser 500 pr	A-18
	[illegible]	
22h00	Spreek S/Wan Wellington MANYA	
1990-01-09	te 124 Hertzog Street, Mot in	
	vergesel deur D. Kot Vanse	
	se hede nie rekan	
	wor dié teenwoordigheid	
	van waarskuwe Terreiste	
	[illegible]	
	verkeerd en hom	
	in verband bly sy kant. Hy	
	het geen verdigting nie oorhand	
	wor dié teenwoordigheid van	
	opgeleide troepe nie.	
	[illegible]	

C-6

Tyd, datum Time, date	MOTHERWELL MC 66-12-1989	Verwysing Reference
1990-01-11	Spreek met Richard Golau	
15h50	Gillies van Old Drift Hotel,	
	Addo Tel nr. 0426/400090	
	in verband met moontlike	
	inligting. Hy bevestig egter	
	nie of die inligting wat	
	deur hoede kan wees nie.	
	Hy het slegs op die tweede	
	Oktober na die ontploffing	
	plaasgevind het.	
	— lw.	
16h30	Ontvangs verklaring van	
1990-01-11	dossier aan Kapt. Botha	
	in die nabooste ondersoek	
	van die oorledenes.	
	— lw.	
11h30	Doodsertifikate van oorledenes	
1990-01-12.	Daliwaqa Desmond Wapipa	
	geliassee soos pr	A-19
	Thembinkosi Amos Falen	
	geliassee soos pr	A-20
	MBAMBALALA Glen Ngodumba	
	geliassee soos pr	A-21
	Charles Jack geliassee soos pr	A-22
	— lw.	
14h30.	Nabooste ondersoek verslag	
1990-01-12.	T.O.V. NB 1930/89 oorhandig	
	en geliassee soos pr	A-23
	Beëdigde verklaring van	
	Dr. G. Lang T.O.V. NB 1930/89	

C -7

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Stasie/Station MOTHERWELL M.R./C.R. No. / G.O./INQUEST No. 66-12-1989

Navraag/Enquiry No.

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
Vm.	geliasser soos pr [illegible] lus.	A-24
14h35.	Radioodse ondersoek verslag	
1990-01-12	T.O.V. NB 1929/89 ontvang	
	en geliasser soos pr	A-25
	Beëdigde verklaring van	
	Dr. G. Lang T.O.V. NB 1929/89	
	geliasser soos pr	A-26
	[illegible] lus.	
14h40	Radioodse ondersoek verslag	
1990-01-12	T.O.V. NB 1928/89 ontvang	
	en geliasser soos pr	A-27
	Beëdigde verklaring van	
	Dr. G. Lang T.O.V. NB 1928/89	
	geliasser soos pr	A-28
	[illegible] lus.	
14h45	Radioodse ondersoek verslag	
1990-01-12.	T.O.V. NB 1927/89 ontvang	
	en geliasser soos pr	A-29
	Beëdigde verklaring van	
	Dr. G. Lang T.O.V. NB 1927/89	
	geliasser soos pr	A-30.
	[illegible] lus.	
	Koerantberig "Eastern Province	
	Herald" gelaaier 1990-01-13	
	waarin dit ANC verbiede dat	

C – 8.

Tyd, datum Time, date	MOTHERWELL MR. 66-12-1989	Verwysing Reference
08h.	Lille vrou woordelikheid aanvaar vir die verbeen oorlewing waarin die persoon oorlede is gelaat soos per	B-3.
90/01/16	Magistraat F. VENTER	
1990-01-17 09h30.	Oorgehoudene Inkwisisie David Madinda word Derban word V.O.V. in opslagplek gevind te Glescandria en Sy waarneem verbeurde wat die oorlewing ha daarbij en dra vrag van hy nie verbeur word wat die oorlewing nie.	
1990-01-22 08h30.	Plan en foto's van Kruisel van Misdaad is nog nie. Aaande word afgewag vanaf P.V.A.I.C.	
1990/01/23 10h00.	Magistraat F. VENTER	
1990-02-10. 10h00.	Briggenes wat gevaal vir enige uiliging rakende die oorlewing	

G.P.-S. 002–0214 SAP 5

C – 9.

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Stasie/Station Motherwell. M.R./C.R. No. 66-12-1989
G.O./INQUEST No.
Navraag/Enquiry No.

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
90/02/19 11h10	Magsien F. VENTER.	
1990-03-08 15h30.	Spreek mej. Esterhuyzen in verband met bloedstaal en foto's wat by P.V.A. is. Sy deel my mee dat foto's nog nie gereed is nie en dat sy dit aan my sal stuur sodra gereed.	
1990-03-19 15h00.	Foto's en plan van Yousef van misdaad nog steeds in-stande.	
1990-04-24 15h30.	Verslonig der kwitansies van myne word geliasseer soos pr	A31
1990-04-25 11h30.	Verslonig der Kopstein Riemwerke word geliasseer soos pr	A-32.
1990-04-26	Aksie vi Grapolisie.	
1990.4.26	UAGESIEN	

C – 10.

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
1990-05-05	Datum vir vaderdse ondersoek	
10h30.	Dr nog nie bepaal nie.	
	Ondersoek dan voort.	
1990-05-21.	Beriggewer word mevrou	
14h00.	gevra om verdere regsiap	
	oor die vrou om uitgelig	
	polisie die vorval te	
	bekoom.	
	Ondersoek dan voort.	
1990-05-28	Dossier vir Gespelsee.	
1990-05-28	NAGESIEN	
1990-06-14.	Ondersoek dan voort.	
10h30.		
1990-06-25	Dossier vir Gespelsee.	
1990-06-26	NAGESIEN	
1990-07-09	Ondersoek dan voort.	
11h30		
1990-07-31	Dossier vir Gespelsee.	
1990-07-31	NAGESIEN	
1990-08-10.	Ondersoek dan voort.	

G.P.-S. 002-0214 SAP 5

C-11

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Stasie/Station ..... M.R./C.R. No. 66-12-89
G.O./INQUEST No. .....
Navraag/Enquiry No. .....

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
1990-08-11	Verklaring van A/Sts Retief	
11h20	geliasseer aan pr	A33
	Verklaring van Kopdeu Botha	
	Geliasseer aan pr	A34
1990-08-11	Foto's van Insel Kaan	
12h10.	Uitgedaan geliasseer aan pr	A35
1990-08-12	Nasien Lêsure met G.D.O	
09h10.	Lêsure na handelas in	-
	Afhandeling van verdagte	
	Strafregtelike ondersoek	
1991-01-14	Nasien en G.D.O Lêsure Aug	
10h30	oorweg vanaf D.C.	
	Pretoria-Generaal Lêsis	
	dat vorder gegaan word wat	
	die ondersoek	
	betreffende van wyle Lêsis	
	Lyders afhandeling van	
	oftreede G.D.O dat	
	onbekende persone in	
	die dood van die slag-	
	offers van verdagte is	

C - 12.

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
1991-01-14	JSB ontvang en gedateer	
10h00	Y.O.V. Anna Fabian 1000 pr	A36
	Y.O.V. Desmond Mapipa 1000 pr	A37
	Y.O.V. Charles Gach 1000 pr	A38
	Y.O.V. Glen Mgobozi 1000 pr	A39
	Bly.	
1991-01-14	Besoek van Prokureur-Generaal	
11h30	ontvang en gedateer 1000 pr	B4
	Bly.	
1991-01-22	Vergader	
	(1) Agtergrond verslae met die ondersoek.	
	(2) Besluit om mediese bewyse te bekom deur die Polisie met getuienisse van die SAPD.	
	Bly.	
1991-01-23	Indiening van Hooggeregshof aksie deur "C" die Lang-kantoor Advokate- wegbreek ordonnansie deur die Minister die Polisie of Mediese Diensverskaffer nie.	
1991-01-23	KOR, Prokureur-Generaal en Adv. Nagelkerke vergader	
08h30.	(1) Ondersoek en vorder	
	(2) Briefings by inisiële konferensie te gehou om vordering te bespreek.	

C-13.

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Stasie/Station ..... M.R./C.R. No. 66-12-89
G.O./INQUEST No. .....
Navraag/Enquiry No. .....

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
hier	(3) Briggewers word onder die kruisgelende WK's verhoor à / ix gedaan oor uitlegting verlende deë verval - ie bekom	
	(4) Besonderhede van kruisgelende WK's en deë gelied à bekom en sal dergevolg word.	
1991-03-05 08h00	Ondersoek deur word	
1991-03-08 10h00	Ondersoek deur word	
91/03/10	Magnus Gerechtsd.	
1991-04-19 10h00	Ondersoek deur word	
1991-05-17 11h30	Ondersoek deur word	
1991-06-14 09h00	Ondersoek deur word Briggewers à nuwers gedaan oor uitlegting ie bekom verlende deë verval	

C - 14

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
91/06/17	Magsuur Uitgestel.	
1991-07-19 10h00	Ondersoek deur vroedvrou	
1991-08-30 11h30.	Ondersoek deur vroedvrou	
1991-09-12 14h30	Ondersoek deur vroedvrou en beriggewing aan beide partye word skeeds gedoen deur enige betrokke party dat hy die saak gebruik het's beleid aan word vanuit die hoofkantoor oor-le deur vroedvrou	
1991-10-17 16h00	Ondersoek deur vroedvrou.	
91/10/17	Magsuur in geheel teenwoordig. Uitgestel	
1991-11-15 15h00.	Ondersoek deur vroedvrou.	
1991-11-22 09h00	Vrouemag V.O.V. dit toevoegsel se beskuldiging. Saak verskuif aan HC. word gelaas. Saak nr	BS

G.P.-S. 002-0214

SAP 5

C-15.

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE  SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Stasie/Station Worcester M.R./C.R. No. 66-12-1989
G.O./INQUEST No.
Navraag/Enquiry No.

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
1991-12-21 15h30.	Ondersoek dra voort [signature].	
1992-01-18 09h30.	Ondersoek dra voort [signature].	
92/01/22	Klagtes [signature]	
1992-03-07 09h30	Aangewys word steeds dra by die hande gevra en enige moontlike misdaad te bekam by die Hof van die Hoofd. [signature]	
1992-03-20 15h30	Ondersoek dra voort [signature].	
1992-05-25 11h30	Ondersoek dra voort [signature].	
1992-07-01 09h30	Ondersoek dra voort [signature].	
1992.07.31 09:30	Dossier by Hoof Kon Wyk aan vir aanklag.	

C 16

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
LW.	Op 1992.07.30 om 19:25 het Kpt Burkert van Kodis my getaster en meegedeel dat Mnr Malherbe MARAIS, Adj. LG van Gibraltar, werk dat sk kom skiet. Mnr. MARAIS is getaster en hy het navraag oor Koevoet dossier gedoen en gevra dat my skoffeltoer onmiddellik gestaak moet word weens veiligheidsrisiko wat gevolg is. Ek het vasgestel dat Kapt Van Wyk die onderdokbeampte is en kom werk onder die Kontrei te gaan en op verdere opdragte te wag. Ek het weer met mnr MARAIS in verbinding getree en meegedeel dat Kapt Van Wyk die onderdokbeampte is. Mnr MARAIS het die werk dat Kapt van Wyk kom skiet. Die werk was aan Kapt Van Wyk oorgedra. Brig C. L. Smith	
1992-07-31 12h30.	Vanoggend vroeg vernag van Brig Smit. Op Vrydag van Brig Smit het ek vir Wel. Mnr Marais	

G.P.-S. 002–0214

SAP 5

C-17

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Stasie/Station Morewell M.R./C.R. No. 66-12-89
G.O./INQUEST No.
Navraag/Enquiry No.

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
WW.	Op 1992-04-30 om 20h50 gebaarel. Hy het aan my die vrae gevra oor	
	Ja wat ek in my	
	1) Naam van Kaval	
	2) Of ek ook skadelaer gebruik	
	Of nie Of die vordering	
	3) Hoe die vordering beweeg	
	4) Wie is die persone Of die vordering	
	5) Die taalle is die by die Veiligheidstak	
	6) Hoe taalle was die lede by die Veiligheidstak	
	7) Wat is die ik die persone se name.	
	8) Wanneer het hy sy taalle begin.	
	9) Wie was sy kaarde	
	10) Hoe ver van die polisiestasie het die Kaval plaasgevind	
	10) Hoeveel is die vordering	

C. 18.

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
Kw..	Opgeblaas as die nie in	
	behoorlike werking was nie	
	4) Is daar voldoende	
	ruimte in die fasiliteit in die	
	kassie wat oorvaard word	
	Hy het my verder meegedeel	
	dat daar twee aandele	
	die kassie is wat hy	
	Oftrek en wat hy nie	
	en die toleraan wat hy	
	nie bepaal nie.	
1992-01-31.	Brig Smit, Gee hy	
1300.	Ondereg dat die kassie nie	
	Brig Williams se aandele	
	oek 1400 waarna hy	
	beskikbaar is.	
	Kpl Van Wyk.	
1992/10/12	Dossier aan Brig. Williamstown	
13:30	Sie PG Knysna 1/4/3 gedateer	
	1992/09/25	
	Vir nodige ondersoek asb.	
	C L Smith	
1992-10-19	Brig	
0800.	Ondereg dossier in	
	hierdie Offisie.	
1992.10.19.	Vroeë K.O.V. adjutant A.G.	
0900.	Maak is as reg!—	

C-19

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Tyd, datum Time, date	Stasie/Station ..... M.R./C.R. No. G.O./INQUEST No. ..... Navraag/Enquiry No.	Verwysing Reference

1) 1989-12-14

2) Afstaffordeurdagie Kaapt. Kleinveldt [illegible] is [illegible] Kydskandelaar gedruk is nie.

3) Verkeerd het beweeg Kydelik eenkloffig

4) 4 Paare het [illegible] verkeerd was, was alle persentasie gemeet behalwe 1 wat in begeer was.

5) 10 jaar lig M/Sak.

6) As Palm of Afo wapelen albei meer as 10 jaar lig M/Sak.
As wapen kleig 3 jaar lig M/Sak.

7) Charles Goch.

8) Hy het 1986 lig M/Sak begin.

9) Maj. Kleinveldt.

10) Verval het angen 3 van hare wapen persentasie plaasgevind.

11) Die persentasie is die verkeerd was wel behoud aan die gemeet en jis

C-20.

Tyd, datum Time, date		Verwysing Reference
[illegible]	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
1992-11-02 1830.	[illegible]	
1992-12-15 0800.	[illegible]	
1993-01-20 0800.	[illegible]	
1993-02-26 1830.	[illegible]	
1993-03-28 1400.	[illegible]	
1993-04-08 0800.	[illegible]	
1993-05-04 1800	[illegible]	

Is a feiteme Elke moontlike poging aangewend om

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK om die skuldiges aan te keer.

4/2C

MOTHERWELL MR 66/12/89

Tyd, datum	Navraag	Verwysing
10h00 1989-12-15	Eerste aangifte van misdaad soos per	A-1
07h50 1989-12-18	Na New Brighton lykshuis vir bywoning van nadoodse ondersoek tov oorledenes.	
13h00 1989-12-18	SAP 377 Uitkenningsverklaring tov oorledene AMOS THEMBA FAKHU geliasseer soos per (Reeksnr 1927/89). SAP 377 Uitkenningsverklaring tov oorledene Desmond Daliwanga Mofifa geliasseer soos per (Reeksnr 1928/89) SAO 377 Uitkenningsverklaring tov oorledene Mbabalala Glen Mgoduba (Reeksnr 1929/89 geliasseer soos per	A-2 A-3 A-4
13h50 1989-12-18	Ontsteker van die mini-kleefmyn wat op toneel van misdaad gevind is word vir bewaring gehou deur kaptein Nieuwoudt.	Uthy
11h00 1989-12-19	SAP 377 Uitkenningsverklaring tov oorledene Charles Jack (Reeksnr 1930/89) geliasseer soos per	A-5 Charles de Lange
08h30 1989-12-19	Nagesien .... Lwlwsi	
09h10 1989-12-19	Navrae is in omgewing van misdaadtoneel gedoen in verband met enige verdagte bewegings met die aand voor die ontploffing. Sonder enige sukses.	
08h10 1989-12-20	'n Span gerehabiliteerde terroriste vanaf Oos-Londen is in die Motherwell swart-woonbuurt ontplooi met die opdrag om die adres te 124 Hansastraat, Motherwell onder waarneming te plaas en ook om moontlike teenwoordigheid van terroriste te ontbloot. Verskeie foto's van opgeleide terroriste wat spesialisopleiding in plofstof ondergaan het, is aan die span getoon vir moontlike identifisering.	wie het hulle uitgesoek
14h00 1989-12-20	Alle lede van die Veiligheidstak is gevra om hulle beriggewers te aktiveer met die uitsluitlike doel om alle inligting in te win rakende die ontploffing en die moontlike teenwoordigheid van opgeleide ANC/PAC terroriste.	

A 42c

Tyd, datum	Navraag	Verwysing
0800 1989-12-21	Gesertifiseerde afskrif van druktelegram geliasseer soos per	B-1
08h50 1989-12-21	Uitknipsel vir Evening Post gedateer 1989-12-15 geliasseer soos per	B-2
10h00 1989-12-21	Plofstofdeskundiges van Port Elizabeth Veiligheidstak onder leiding van ~~mgbonde~~ het die wrak van die ontploffingsvoertuig te Afdelingsmotorhawe probeer rekonstreer. Al die plofstofdeskundiges is dit eens dat die ploftoestel onder die voertuig en aan die agterkant geplaas was en dat dit 'n minikleefmyn met 'n lading was wat die ontploffing veroorsaak het.	
14h00 1989-12-27	Verklaring van konstabel S. Gill geliasseer soos per	A-6
	Verklaring van Sersant G. Lourentz geliasseer soos per	A-7
	Verklaring van S/A/O E.J. van Wyk geliasseer soos per	A-8
	Verklaring van Konst L. Adams geliasseer soos per	A-9
	Verklaring van Konst D.W. Muller geliasseer soos per	A-10
09h00 1989-12-28	Gesertifiseerde afdruk van ritstaat van SAP 65389M die ontploffingsvoertuig geliasseer soos per	A-11
11h05 1989-12-29	Beëdigde verklarings ingevolge Art 212(7) Wet 51 van 1977 van regsmediese hulp Sers C. de Lange tov oorledenes:	
	NB 1927/89 Amos Themba Faku	A-12
	NB 1928/89 Desmond Daliwonga Madipa	A-13
	NB 1929/89 Mbabalala Glen Mgoduka	A-14
	NB 1930/89 Charles Jack	A-15
14h30 1989-12-29	Beëdigde verklaring van Esais Engelbertus Meyer geliasseer soos per	A-16
08h30 1990-01-03	Beëdigde verklaring van S/A/O Lotz geliasseer soos per	A-17
12h20 1990-01-04	Beëdigde verklaring van lt kol Roelofse geliasseer soos per	A-18
22h00 19909-01-09	Spreek s/man Wellington Marnya te 124 Hentsa straat, Motherwell vergesel deur lt kol Venter en lede in verband met die teenwoordigheid van moontlike terroriste. Boge-	

Tyd, datum	Navraag	Verwysing
	noemde swartman is werksaam te Firestone en het 'n winkel by sy huis. Hy het geen inligting in verband met die teenwoordigheid van opgeleide terroriste nie.	
15h50 1990-01-11	Spreek mnr Richard John Gillies van Old Drift House Addo Tel nr 0426/400090 in verband met moontlike inligting. Hy beskik egter nie oor die inligting wat van waarde kan wees nie. Hy het slegs op die toneel afgekom na die ontploffing plaasgevind het.	
16h30 1990-01-11	Oorhandig verklarings van dossier aan kapt Botha vir die nadoodse ondersoek van die oorledenes	
11h30 1990-01-12	Doodsertifikate van oorledenes Daliwanga Desmond Mapipa geliasseer soos per Thembankosi Amos Faku geliasseer soos per Mbambalala Glen Mgoduba geliasseer soos per Charles Gode geliasseer soos per	A-19 A-20 A-21 A-22
14h30 1990-01-12	Nadoodse ondersoek verslag tov NB 1930/89 ontvang en geliasseer soos per Beëdigde verklaring van Dr G. Lang tov NB 1930/89 geliasseer soos per	A-23 A-24
14h35 1990-01-12	Nadoodse ondersoek verslag tov NB 1929-89 ontvang en geliasseer soos per Beëdigde verklaring van Dr G. Lang tov NB 1929/89 geliasseer soos per	A-25 A-26
14h40 1990-01-12	Nadoodse ondersoek verslag tov NB 1928/89 ontvang en geliasseer soos per Beëdigde verklaring van Dr G. Lang tov NB 1928/89 geliasseer soos per	A-27 A-28
14h45 1990-01-12	Nadoodse ondersoek verslag tov NB 1927/89 ontvang en geliasseer soos per Beëdigde verklaring van Dr G. Lang tov NB 1927/89 geliasseer soos per	A-29 A-30
	Koerantberig "Eastern Province Herald" gedateer 1990-01-13 waarin die ANC verklaar dat hulle verantwoordelikheid aanvaar vir die karbom ontploffing waarin die polisiemanne gedood is geliasseer soos per	B-3

Tyd, datum	Navraag	Verwysing
90-01-16	Nagesien, Kol F. Venter.	
1990-01-17 22h00	Aangehoudene Indiërman David Wadurai vanaf Durban word ondervra tov 'n opslagplek gevind te Alexandria en sy moontlike verbintenis met die ontploffing. Na deeglike ondervraging kan hy nie verbind word met die ontploffing nie.	
1990-01-22 08h30	Plan en Fotos van toneel van misdaad is nog uitstaande, word afgewag vanaf PVAK.	
1990-01-23 10h00	Nagesien, Kol F. Venter.	
1990-01-10 10h00	Beriggewers weer getaak vir enige inligting rakende die ontploffing.	
90-02-19	Nagesien, Kol F. Venter	
1990-03-08 10h30	Spreek maj Esterhuizen vir uitstaande toneelskets en foto's by PVAK. Hy deel my mee dat fotos nog nie gereed is nie en dat hy dit aan my sal versend sodra gereed.	
1990-03-19 10h00	Fotos en plan van toneel van misdaad nog steeds uitstaande.	
1990-03-19 10h30	Verklaring deur Luitenant Van Wyk word geliasseer soos per	A-31
1990-04-25 11h30	Verklaring deur kaptein Nieuwoudt word geliasseer soos per	A-32
1990-04-26	Dossier vir Inspeksie.	
1990-04-26	Nagesien, Majoor	
1990-05-05 10h30	Datum vir nadoodse ondersoek is nog nie bepaal nie. Ondersoek duur voort.	
1990-05-21 14h00	Beriggewers word weereens getaak om verdere pogings aan te wend om inligting rakende die voorval te bekom. Ondersoek duur voort.	
1990-05-28	Dossier vir Inspeksie.	
1990-05-28	Nagesien, Maj	
1990-06-14	Ondersoek duur voort.	

Tyd, datum	Navraag	Verwysing
1990-06-25	Dossier vir inspeksie.	
1990-06-26	Nagesien.	
1990-07-09	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1990-07-31	Dossier vir Inspeksie.	
1990-07-31	Nagesien.	
1990-08-10	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1990-08-11 11h20	Verklaring van ssers Retief geliasseer soos per	A-33
	Verklaring van kaptein Botha geliasseer soos per	A-34
1990-08-11 12h40	Fotos van toneel van misdaad geliasseer soos per	A-35
1990-08-12 09h10	Dossier tesame met G.D.O. dossiere na landdros vir afhandeling van nadoodse geregtelike ondersoek.	
1991-01-14 10h30	Dossier en G.D.O. dossiere terug ontvang vanaf PG. Prokureur-Generaal beslis dat voortgegaan word met die ondersoek. Landdros Van Wyk besliut tydens afhandeling van informele G.D.O. dat onbekende persone vir die dood van die slagoffers verantwoordelik is.	
1991-01-14 10h00	J56 ontvang en geliasseer tov Amos Faku soos per tov Desmond Mapipa soos per tov Charles Gade soos per tov Glen Mgoduba soos per	 A-36 A-37 A-38 A-39
1991-01-14 11h30	Beslissing van Prokureur-Generaal ontvang en geliasseer soos per	B-4
1991-01-22	Nagesien. (1) Gaan voort met die ondersoek. (2) Poog om inligting te bekom by WKs wat gaan terugkeer na die RSA.	
1991-01-22	Inligting oor terugkerendes kan by "C" by hoofkantoor bekom word aangesien ons nie almal by ons op rekenaar het nie.	

Tyd, datum	Navraag	Verwysing
1991-01-23 08h30	Kol, opdragte genoteer en sal nagekom word. (1) Ondersoek duur voort. (2) Beriggewers by hierdie kantoor is getaak om inligting te bekom rakende die voorval. (3) Beriggewers wat onder die terugkerende WK's werksaam is, is getaak om inligting rakende die voorval te bekom. (4) Besonderhede van terugkerende WKs in die gebied is bekom en sal opgevolg word.	
1991-02-05 08h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1991-03-08 10h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1991-03-10	Nagesien.	
1991-04-19 10h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1991-05-17 11h30	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1991-06-14	Ondersoek duur voort. Beriggewers is weereens getaak om inligting te bekom rakende die voorval.	
1991-06-17	Nagesien.	
1991-07-19 10h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1991-08-30 11h30	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1991-09-12 14h30	Ondersoek duur voort en beriggewers van hierdie kantoor word steeds getaak om enige inligting wat by die terugge-keerde WKs bekom kan word rakende die voorval aan hierdie kantoor oor te dra.	
1991-10-17 16h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1991-10-17	Nagesien.	
1991-11-15 15h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	

Tyd, datum	Navraag	Verwysing
1991-11-22 09h00	Verklaring tov die vuurwapens se beskadiging soos versend aan .... word geliasseer soos per	B-5
1991-12-21 10h30	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1992-01-18 09h30	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1992-01-22	Nagesien.	
1992-02-01 09h30	Ondersoek duur voort. Beriggewers word steeds deur hierdie kantoor getaak om enige moontlike inligting te bekom vir die oplos van die voorval.	
1992-03-20 10h30	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1992-05-25 11h30	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1992-07-01 09h30	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1992-07-31 09h30	Dossier by kapt Van Wyk gekry vir aantekening. Op 1992-07-30 om 19h25 het kapt Badenhorst van Radio my gekontak en meegedeel dat mnr Malherbe Marais, Adj PG van Grahamstad, versoek dat ek hom skakel. Mnr Marais is gekontak en hy het navraag oor hierdie dossier gedoen en gemeld dat sy hoofkantoor onmiddellik sekere besonderhede verlang aangaande 'n saak waar vier veiligheidstak lede gedood is. Ek het vasgestel dat kapt Van Wyk die ondersoekbeampte is en hom versoek om na die kantoor te gaan en op verdere opdragte te wag. Ek het weer met mnr Marais in verbinding getree en meegedeel dat kapt Van Wyk die ondersoekbeampte is. Mnr Marais het toe versoek dat kapt van Wyk hom skakel. Die versoek was aan kapt Van Wyk oorgedra. Brig C.L. Smith	14/6/93 Mollet Sorys.


Tyd, datum	Navraag	Verwysing
1992-07-31 12h30	Dossier terug ontvang van brig Swart. In opdrag van brig Swart het ek wel mnr Marais op 1992-07-30 om 20h50 geskakel. Hy het aan my die volgende vrae rakende die dossier gevra wat ek in my sakboekie aangeteken het. 1. Datum van voorval. 2. Is 'n tydskakelaar gebruik of nie op die voertuig. 3. Het die voertuig beweeg tydens die ontploffing. 4. Wie is die vier persone ... die voertuig. 5. Hoe lank is ek by die Veiligheidstak. 6. Hoe lank was die lede by die Veiligheidstak. 7. Wat is die 4de persoon se naam. 8. Wanneer het by die Veiligheidstak begin. 9. Wie was sy hanteerder. 10. Hoe ver van die polisiestasie het die voorval plaasgevind. 11. Hoekom is die voertuig opgeblaas as dit nie 'n bekende voertuig was nie. 12. Is daar verklarings van die familie in die dossier wat iemand verdink. Hy het my verder meegedeel dat daar vrae rondom die dossier is wat hy ondersoek en wat hy nie oor die telefoon met my wil bespreek nie.	P. C17
1992-07-31 13h00	Brig Swart, gee my opdrag om dossier na brig Killian te neem om 14h00 wanneer hy beskikbaar is.	Why to the Brig Killian.
1992-10-12 13h30	Kapt Van Wyk, dossier vanaf brig Killian ontvang. Sien PG skrywe 1/4/3 gedateer 1992-09-25. Vir verdere ondersoek asb.	why.
1992-10-19 08h00	Brig, ontvang dossier vir verdere ondersoek.	
1992-10-19 09h00	Vrae tov adjunk AG is as volg: 1. 1989-12-14. 2. Plofstofdeskundige kapt Nieuwoudt kan nie sê of tydskakelaar gebruik is nie.	

Tyd, datum	Navraag	Verwysing
	3. Voertuig het beweeg tydens ontploffing. 4. 4 persone wat op voertuig was, was almal polisiemanne gewees behalwe een wat 'n beriggewer was. 5. 10 jaar by Veiligheidstak. 6. Sers Faku en A/O Mgodubu albei meer as 10 jaar by Veiligheidstak. Sers Mapipa slegs drie jaar by Veiligheidstak. 7. Charles Gade. 8. Hy het 1986 by Veiligheidstak begin. 9. Maj Hattingh. 10. Voorval het ongeveer drie km van Motherwel polisiestasie plaasgevind. 11. Die polisiemanne in die voertuig was wel bekend aan die gemeenskap en juis daarom het die ANC vermoedelik besluit om die voertuig op te blaas. 12. Geen verklarings van die familie in die dossier nie.	
C 19		
1992-11-02 10h30	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1992-12-15 08h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1993-01-20 09h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1993-02-26 10h30	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1993-04-08 09h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	
1993-05-04 10h00	Ondersoek duur voort.	

Description

JETTA 1981 →
THIS MANUAL IS STILL VALID FOR CURRENT FOX MODELS, THERE HAS BEEN NO ACTUAL DESIGN CHANGES TO REAR AXLE.

GENERAL VIEW OF REAR AXLE



WHEELBASE = 2400 mm
REAR TRACK = 1358 mm

The two trailing arms are connected together by means of a cross member consisting of two spring steel leaves welded together to form a T shape. Gusset plates between cross member and trailing arms increase the strength of the axle. Vehicles with the 81 kW engine also have an anti-roll bar.

As in the case of the front axle the coil springs are divided into several load groups and shock absorbers are available in normal and heavy duty versions. Axle beam and spring struts are connected to the body via rubber bushes.

Difference in the Jetta rear axle

The shock absorbers were taken over unchanged from the Golf. To improve support for the buffer at the upper end, they were fitted with a dust cap which has now also been introduced on the Golf.

All vehicles are fitted with an anti-roll bar (18 mm dia. for vehicles with 1.3 and 1.5 litre engine and 20.5 mm dia. for vehicles with 1.6 and 1.8 litre engine (GTI).

The bonded rubber bushes for the rear axle brackets have a greater shore hardness.

See page 38 for Caddy rear axle.

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE

922

~~P~~ VAATSAK 6008

VERW. NR. : S6/22/7/65389M

NAVRAE : Kaptein Nieuwoudt /
Konstabel Gill

TELEFOON : 343434-X

KANTOOR VAN DIE AFDELINGSBEVELVOERDER
VEILIGHEIDSTAK
PORT ELIZABETH
6000 1990-01-03

Die Distrikskommandant
Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie
Privaatsak 6006
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST. 14
DISTRIKSKOMMANDANT
1990 -01- 05
DISTRICT COMMANDANT
PORT ELIZABETH
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

~~BOTSING~~/BESKADIGINGSVERSLAG: STAATSVOERTUIG/-~~VAARTUIG~~ : SMO A 3A/1967

SAP 65389M ..... OP 1989-12-14 ..... (STASIE) VEILIGHEIDSTAK, S A POLISIE, PE

~~MR./VB~~ MR. : MOTHERWELL MR.66-12-89 .

1. Bovermelde voertuig/~~vaartuig~~ is beskadig/~~onherstelbaar betrokke~~, derhalwe word die ondervermelde besonderhede ter inligting deurgestuur:

DEEL A: ALGEMENE BESONDERHEDE VAN DIE BESTUURDER EN STAATSVOERTUIG/-VAARTUIG.

1(a) Kragsnommer S1552828 ..... Rang S/ADJUDANT-OFFISIER .....

Naam M G MGODUKA .....

(Heg sy verklaring (nie 'n proforma verklaring wat slegs deur bestuurder ingevul moet word nie, maar een wat 'n volledige uiteensetting van die voorval gee, aan).

(b) Datum van ~~botsing~~/beskadiging 1989-12-14 ..... tyd 23H50 .....

(c) Waar presies, of op watter pad/straat het botsing / beskadiging plaasgevind?

COEGA-ADDO NASIONALE PAD .....

(d) Is dit 'n private of openbare pad of perseel?

OPENBARE PAD .....

(e) Skets gebeure hieronder kortliks, dog so volledig moontlik, sodat 'n duidelike geheelbeeld gevorm kan word van wat werklik plaasgevind het:

DIE VOERTUIG HET VAN NOORD NA SUID BEWEEG OP DIE COEGA-ADDO NASIONALE PAD, ...
WAARTYDENS 'N ONTPLOFFING PLAASGEVIND HET, EN AS GEVOLG DAARVAN IS DIE .....
VOERTUIG 'N TOTALE WRAK. DIE ONTPLOFFING IS VERMOEDELIK VEROORSAAK DEUR .....
'N KLEEFMYN WAT DEUR ONBEKENDE PERSONE AAN ONDERKANT VAN DIE VOERTUIG GE= .....
PLAAS IS.

.....

.....

2(a) Meld magsnommers, range en name van lede van die mag en/of name en adresse van private persone wat passasiers was op die staatsvoertuig ten tye van die ongeluk/beskadiging:

S155282B S/A/OFFISIER M G MGODUKA

S166481M S/SERSANT THEMBINKOSI AMOS FAKU

S164796E KONSTABEL DALIWONGA DESMOND MAPIPA

BERIGGEWER CHARLES JACK

(b) Verduidelik private persone se aanwesigheid op die staatsvoertuig/-vaartuig bv. klaers, getuies, gevangenes, met vermelding van verwysing/ saaknommers:

CHARLES JACK. HY IS 'N POLISIE BERIGGEWER EN HET DIE LEDE OP ONDERSOEK VERGESEL.

(c) Was enige iemand beseer of gedood in die botsing?
(Vermeld name, ouderdomme en adresse van beseerdes of oorledenes en vermeld die aard en graad van beserings:

DIE VOLGENDE PERSONE WAT INSITTENDES IN DIE VOERTUIG WAS IS ALMAL DOOD.

(1) S164796E KONSTABEL DALIWONGA DESMOND MAPIPA 35 JAAR OUD.

MATROSESTRAAT 41, KWA-MAGXAKI, PORT ELIZABETH.

(2) S166381M S/SERSANT THEMBINKOSI AMOS FAKU 35 JAAR OUD.

CETUSTRAAT 157, KWA-MAGXAKI, PORT ELIZABETH. DIEN LOD BY DOD

L.W.: DIE BESONDERHEDE WAT IN PARAGRAAF 3(A) TOT (B) VERLANG WORD MOET IN ALLE VERKLARINGS/OPSOMMINGS GESTAAF WORD.

3(a) Is die bestuurder van die staatsvoertuig gelisensieerd om sodanige klas voertuig te bestuur/ (Meld besonderhede van lisensie).

JA, NR.C125353 KODE 08.

(3) S155282B S/A/OFFISIER GLEN MGODUKA 46 JAAR OUD.
NXADISTRAAT 23, KWA-MAGXAKI, PORT ELIZABETH.

(4) CHARLES JACK
MKHOBASTRAAT 37, KWADESI, PORT ELIZABETH 36 JAAR OUD.

(b) Is hy/sy gemagtig om te bestuur en deur wie?

JA, DEUR DIE AFDELINGSBEVELVOERDER, VEILIGHEIDSTAK, PORT ELIZABETH.

(c) Het hy/sy 'n bestuurderskursus deurloop?

NEE

(d) Was hy/sy nugter ten tye van die voorval? Indien nie, wat is die uitslag van die Distriksgeneesheer se ondersoek. Is 'n bloedmonster geneem? (Sien paragraaf 18(2)(a)(iv)(aa) - (cc) van hierdie Magsorder).

JA

(e) Was die polisiebestuurder aan diens ten tye van die voorval?

JA

(f) Meld die spesifieke aard van diens wat verrig moet word met vermelding van 'n verwysingsnommer, byvoorbeeld lêernommer, MR, Nr. Voorvalleboek, Dagvaarding, Lasbriefnommer (Sien paragraaf 8(5)(a) en (b) van hierdie Magsorder:

VERTROULIKE ONDERSOEK LÊER OP.9/126

(g) Het die polisiebestuurder aan 'n private party of sy getuies of regsverteenwoordiger aanspreeklik vir die ongeluk erken of onderneem om die private party te betaal? (Sien paragraaf 18(2)(a)(v) van hierdie magsorder) :

NEE. HY IS OP SLAG GEDOOD IN DIE ONTPLOFFING.

(h) Teen watter snelheid het die staatsvoertuig ten tye van die botsing / beskadiging beweeg en enige opmerkings daaromtrent :

DIT IS NIE BEKEND NIE EN KAN OOK NIE BEPAAL WORD NIE.

4(a) As die staatsvoertuig/-vaartuig gebruik is in die bestuurder se eie belang, of vir doeleindes wat geen verband hou met die uitvoering van sy/haar amptelike pligte nie, verstrek dan kortliks besonderhede asook afstand gery en/of enige ongemagtigde passasiers die rit meegemaak het:

N V T

(Die feit dat 'n lid aan die begin van 'n diensskof as die bestuurder van 'n staatsvoertuig aangewys word, verleen aan so 'n lid nog geen magtiging om na willekeur met so 'n voertuig te ry nie. Enige rit moet nog verband hê met diens en gegewens van die besondere diens ten tye van die ongeluk/beskadiging word verlang. Indien die ongeluk/beskadiging buite die wyk van die polisiebestuurder plaasgevind het, moet aangedui word op wie se magtiging of om welke rede hy sy wyk verlaat het).

(b) Hoe ongemagtigde gebruik van die voertuig/vaartuig moontlik was; (waar byvoorbeeld is die skakelaarsleutels gehou en welke lede het nalatige beheer uitgeoefen)?

N V T

(c) Watter stappe gedoen is of beoog word om soortgelyke ongemagtigde gebruik te voorkom:

N V T

(d) In die geval van diefstal, of enige lid se nalatigheid die diefstal van die voertuig vergemaklik het en optrede wat beoog word om 'n herhaling te voorkom:

N.V.T.

(e) 'n Kort opsomming van vorige botsings waarin die bestuurder al betrokke was. Meld SAP-nommers, datum van botsing en uitslag van kriminele saak of tugstappe. (Sien ook par. 20(5) van hierdie Magsorder) :

OP 1985-03-17 SAP.60389R BESKADIGING

OP 1988-12-04 SAP.73569P KWAZAKELE MR. 88-12-88 MOTORONGELUK

(f) Word die lid wat die staatsvoertuig bestuur het nog as bestuurder geëmplojeer? N.V.T. HY IS OORLEDE

5 Is daar enige ander eiendom, van watter aard ookal in die voorval beskadig? Beskryf omvang en aard van skade noukeurig en by benadering die koste van die skade: NEE

6(a) Meld naam van offisier of ander senior lid op standplaas wat die botsings beskadigingstoneel besoek het en heg sy/haar verklaring aan. (Sien par. 35(2)(o) van hierdie Magsorder:

KAPTEIN GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT, VEILIGHEIDSTAK, PORT ELIZABETH.

(b) Heg "aan diens"-verklaring van bestuurder se bevelvoerder aan:

VERKLARING VAN KAPTEIN G J NIEUWOUDT AANGEHEG.

7. Is 'n saakdossier vir ondersoek aangelê? Vermeld MR/VB-nommer (en aard van klagtes, indien MR. geopen is)

MOTHERWELL MR.66/12/89 MOORD

8. Indien geen saakdossier aangelê is nie, moet getikte verklarings (in tweevoud) ter stawing van die gebeure hierby aangeheg word:

N V T

9 Vermeld besonderhede van enige ander onreëlmatigheid rakende die voorval:

GEEN ONREëLMATIGHEID HET PLAASGEVIND NIE.

DEEL B .....

7/....

DEEL B: BESONDERHEDE VAN STAATSVOERTUIG

1. (a) (i) SAP Nommer 65389M

(ii) Model 1984

(iii) Fabrikaat VOLKSWAGEN JETTA

(iv) Tipe voertuig MOTORKAR-SEDAN

(v) (Afstandmeterlesing ten tye van die botsing/beskadiging:

133485 kilometer.

(b) Is die staatsvoertuig beskadig?

JA. DIT IS 'N TOTALE WRAK

(c) Beskrywe skade aan staatsvoertuig so volledig moontlik met vermelding van alle dele en onderdele wat beskadig is:

GEHEEL EN AL VERNIETIG AS GEVOLG VAN 'N ONTPLOFFING.

DIT IS 'N TOTALE WRAK.

(d) Is daar enige bykomstige verlies of skade soos bv. verlies van brandstof, skade aan battery, buitebande, radio's, soekligte, bloustraallampe of gereedskap? Meld reeksnommers waar van toepassing asook afstande afgelê van buitebande so beskadig dat dit nie verder gebruik kan word nie.

GEEN RADIO DETROKKE

BATTERY, BUITEBANDE (5), GEREEDSKAP EN

BRANDSTOF VERNIETIG IN ONTPLOFFING

(e) Is daar enige skade aan ander items wat as vrag op die voertuig was ten tye van die voorval?

DAAR WAS GEEN ANDER ITEMS WAT AS VRAG DIEN OP DIE VOERTUIG NIE.

8/....

(f) Is die staatsvoertuig na die botsing/beskadiging weggesleep of op eie krag verwyder, Indien weggesleep meld, waarnatoe en afstand gesleep (deur wie) : .....

AL DIE STUKKE VAN DIE STAATSVOERTUIG IS OP 'N BAKKIE GELAAI EN NA DIE AFDELINGSMOTORHAWE, PORT ELIZABETH GENEEM.

2. (a) Word dit voorgestel dat die staatsvoertuig herstel of in beskadigde toestand verder gebruik word? (Sien paragraaf 27(3) van hierdie Magsorder).

DIE VOERTUIG IS TOTAAL VERNIETIG EN KAN NIE HERSTEL WORD NIE.

(b) Indien voertuig/vaartuig nie vir herstel na 'n polisiemotorhawe gestuur word nie moet twee of meer behoorlik gespesifiseerde en leesbare prysopgawes verkry en aangestuur word. (Sien ook voetnota, na handtekening van bevelvoerder. Vir beskadigings van windskerms sien paragraaf 34 van hierdie Magsorder.

(i) N V T

(ii) .....

(iii) .....

(iv) .....

3. Word die botsing/beskadiging gewyt aan enige meganiese defek aan die staatsvoertuig soos bv. die remme, stuur, buitebande, ligte en/of het die bestuurder enige aanmerking daaromtrent gemaak?

NEE

L.W. Indien dit die geval is, moet die amptelike voertuigondersoeker ontbied word om die voertuig op die botsing/beskadigingstoneel te ondersoek en breedvoerig verslag daaromtrent te doen. Sy verslag moet hierby aangeheg word. (Sien paragraaf 35(2)(i) van hierdie Magsorder): N.V.T.....

4. (a) Kan bepaal word wat die werklike toestand van die remme or stuur was onmiddellik voor die ongeluk?

NEE

(b) Indien die bestuurder bewus was van enige defek daaraan, waarom die voertuig in die toestand gebruik is?

N.V.T.

.....

.....

.....

.....

(c) Wat die toestand van die remme of stuur was tydens die weeklikse inspeksie voor die botsing-/beskadigingsdatum en wat gedoen is om gebreke dadelik te laat herstel:

IN GOEIE WERKENDE TOESTAND

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

(d) Die uitslag van die ondersoek wat na die beweerde defekte remme, stuur ensovoorts ingestel is:

N V T

.....

.....

OPMERKINGS: Meld enige aangeleentheid van belang of wat bv. nie in voorafgaande paragrawe aangehaal is nie, waarvan kennis geneem moet word:

N V T

.....

.....

Vorms SAP.298 moet voltooi en by die verslag aangeheg word. (Sien par. 27(1)(B)(i) - (ii) van hierdie Magsorder).

N.S.: INDIEN'N STAATSVOERTUIG MET 'N PRIVATE VOERTUIG OF ENIGE ANDER VOERTUIG IN 'N ONGELUK BETROKKE RAAK, MOET DIE AMPTELIKE VOERTUIGONDERSOEKER ONTBIED WORD OM ALBEI VOERTUIE DEEGLIK TE ONDERSOEK EN DIE SKADE TE BEPAAL, AL IS DIE SKADE OOK HOE GERING.
Die verslae van die amptelike voertuigondersoeker moet dan hierdie verslag vergesel. (Sien ook paragraaf 35(1)(h) en (i) van hierdie Magsorder).

.....
~~STASIE-/TAK-/ANDER~~ BEVELVOERDER

DEEL C

G.J. Nikkodt

VERKLARING INSAKE DIENS:

NAAM GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT

EK IS 'N KAPTEIN IN DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE, MAGSNOMMER W56313N EN GESTASIONEER TE VEILIGHEIDSTAK, LOUIS LE GRANGEPLEIN PORT ELIZABETH EK VERRIG DIENS AS EENHEIDSBEVELVOERDER

Ek ken nr. S155282B Rang S/A/OFFISIER

Naam M G MGODUKA

Hy/Sy dien onder my bevel.

Op 1989-12-14 het hy/sy diens verrig as VELDWERKER vanaf (tyd) 07:30

tot (tyd) 23:45

Ten tye van die voorval was hy/sy nugter en gekleed in SIVIELE DRAG

(Verklaarder moet alleenlik oor soberheid verklaar as hy/sy bestuurder persoonlik gesien het ten tye van ongeluk/beskadiging).

Hy/Sy is gelisensieërd. Lisensienommer en kode C125353 KODE 08

gedateer 1977-03-01

*(Ligte, medium, swaar, ekstra swaar lisensie)

Hy/Sy is 'n gemagtigde bestuurder van staatsvoertuie - magtiging S155282B

gedateer 1977-03-01 gegee te PORT ELIZABETH

Op 1989-12-14 om 23:45 j wasen

hy/sy aan diens besig met AMPTELIKE ONDERSOEK en gemagtig om voertuig

SAP 65389M te bestuur ten tye van die BESKADIGING

*Hy/Sy word nog/nie meer as bestuurder emplojeer nie.

*(Skrap wat nie van toepassing is nie)

PLEK PORT ELIZABETH

DATUM 1989-12-20

TYD 10:00

GETEKEN: [signature]

MAGSNOMMER: W56313N

RANG: Kaptein

NAAM: G.J. NIEUWOUDT

bvr

G.P.-S 602-0135

SAP 298

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONGELUK-/SKADEVERSLAG
ACCIDENT/DAMAGE REPORT

Verwysingsnommer/Reference number S6/22/7/65389M

Telefoonnommer/Phone number 343434 X2127

Navrae/Enquiries Luit-Kol. Vercuil

Kantoor van die/Office of the AFDELINGSBEVELVOERDER
SA Polisie/SA Police VEILIGHEIDSTAK, PORT ELIZABETH
Datum/Date 1989-12-20

Die Bevelvoerder/Takbevelvoerder/Branch Commander

SAP Motorhawe/SA Police Garage PORT ELIZABETH

HERSTELWERK AAN POLISIEMOTORVOERTUIG SAP
REPAIRS TO POLICE MOTOR VEHICLE SAP

AS GEVOLG VAN 'N ONGELUK/BESKADIGING OP
RESULTING FROM AN ACCIDENT OR DAMAGE ON 1989-12-14

65389M

1. Die ondervermelde staatsvoertuig word na u motorhawe gestuur vir herstel. Besonderhede is soos volg:
The government vehicle described below is being sent to your garage for repairs. Particulars are as follows:

(1) SAP-nommer van voertuig 65389M
SAP-number of vehicle

(2) (a) Beskrywing van voertuig (bv./e.g. Volkswagen 1300, Volkswagen 1600, Chevrolet 4100)
Description of vehicle (Chevrolet ½-tonbakkie ens./Chevrolet ½-ton delivery van, etc.)
VOLKSWAGEN JETTA 1600

(b) Afstandmeterlesing
Odometer reading 133485

(3) Naam van stasie en polisiedistrik waar voertuig op rekening is VEILIGHEIDSTAK, PORT ELIZABETH
Name of station and Police district where vehicle is on charge
DISTRIK 14, (PORT ELIZABETH)

(4) Skade aan voertuig (kortliks, dog so volledig moontlik uiteengesit)
Damage to vehicle (briefly, though enunciated as fully as possible
TOTALE WRAK AS GEVOLG VAN ONTPLOFFING

(Vervolg op los vel papier indien nodig/Continue on additional leaf if necessary)

(5) Datum van ongeluk of beskadiging
Date of accident or damage..... 1989-12-14

(6) (a) Besonderhede van ongeluk of beskadiging (kortliks)/Particulars of accident or damage (briefly):
VOERTUIG WAS IN BEWEGING GEWEES VAN NOORD NA SUID OP DIE COEGA-ADDO NASIONALE PAD WAARTYDENS 'N ONTPLOFFING PLAASGEVIND HET. DIE ONTPLOFFING IS VERMOEDELIK VEROORSAAK DEUR 'N KLEEFMYN WAT DEUR ONBEKENDE PERSONE AAN ONDERKANT VAN DIE VOERTUIG GEPLAAS IS.

(b) No. van M.R. (indien enige)
No. of C.R. (if any)..... MOTHERWELL MR.66-12-89

(7) No., rang en naam van polisiebestuurder ten tye van ongeluk of beskadiging
No., name and rank of the police driver at time of accident or damage.....
S.155282B S/A/OFFISIER M G MGODUKA

(8) Opmerkings.—(Soos byvoorbeeld verwysing na vorige korrespondensie of magtigings en/of besonderhede van gewone herstelwerk wat terselfdertyd uitgevoer kan word.)

Remarks.—(E.g.—reference to previous correspondence or authority and/or particulars of ordinary repairs that can be effected at the same time.)

GEEN

LUITENANT-KOLONEL
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL
~~Distrikskommandant/District Commandant~~
Bevelvoerende Offisier/Commanding Officer
~~District Detective Station Commander~~
~~Speurtakbevelvoerder/Branch Commander (CID)~~

M.J. VERCUIL

G.23

Rough Sketch of to Barb Scare.
(Not to scale)

G.23.

Rough Sketch of to Bank scene.
(Not to scale)

ADDO →

GRAHAMSTOWN / OEGA →

GRAVEL SIDING

TREES

UITENHAGE

HOUSE.

200 M.

ELECTRICITY PYLON.

23M.

DIRT TRACK.

WATER COURSE / CANAL

45M.

MOTHERWELL / PE.

45M.

35M.

ELECTRICITY PYLONS.

HIGH FENCE.

GRAVEL YARD.

(HOUSE/
MUSEUM)

Doodsondersoek: M. Goniwe en 3 ander Saak Nr: 626/87

Notas van inspeksie ter plaatse op 12 Augustus 1993, te Caltex Motorhawe, Forest Hill.

Getuie: Maj.D. Nieuwoudt word geleentheid gebied om die onderstel van 'n 1983 model Volkswagen Jetta te besigtig.

Adv. Mostert:

Vraag: Bevestig u dat wat u sien onder die motor stem ooreen met hierdie diagram van die agteras?

-- Ek bevestig dit so.

Vraag: Dui asseblief aan waar u sê die model van die bom aangeheg kan word.

Foto 1. --Getuie toon aan die model van die bom kan teen die dwarsbalk waaraan die wringstaaf vas is, vasgeheg word aan die linkerkant.

Vraag: Waar sou die hegband vaskom?
-- Getuie toon aan agter die wringstaaf.

Vraag: Waar sou die 2de lading van 6kg. vaskom?

Foto 2 en 3 -- Getuie toon aan posisie teen die wringstaaf, regs van die eerste lading,en so dat die punt van die 2de lading verbysteek by die regter sleeparm.

Vraag: Hoe sou u die 2de lading vasheg?

--Weer aan die wringstaaf.

Vraag: As daar n 3de lading moes wees, waar sou dit geplaas kan word, en hoe sou dit vasgeheg word?

Fotos 4,5,6 & 7 ---Getuie toon aan 'n posisie waar die punt van die bom tussen die wringstaaf-balk en die onderstel ingesteek moet word, sodanig dat dit teen 'n hoek van 45° vanaf horisontaal hang, en ongeveer 45° na die middellyn van die kar. In die posisie is die 3 bom se onderste punt ongeveer 2cm bo die loopvlak van die band in sy heel onderste posisie.

Vraag: As die derde bom in die posisie was soos u nou toon, stem u saam dan sou daar slegs plek wees vir die eerste bom soos u dit geplaas het aan die linkerkant?

Fotos 8,9, & 10

--Getuie bevestig dat die 2de en 3de bomme nie tesame kon inpas soos hy dit aangetoon het nie.

Uitwysings deur Adv. de Bruyn.

---Daar is 'n gaping tussen die petroltenk en die dwarsbalk waaraan die wringstaaf vas is.

Foto 11.

-- Toon dat een lading voör die bg. balk en een lading daaragter kan kom.

-- Toon aan dat 2 landings dwars langs mekaar agter die balk en een voor die balk kan inpas.

UITWYSINGS DEUR ADV. MOSTERT

Toon aan dat die gaping tussen die motor se uitlaatpyp, en die bom in eerste posisie wat die getuie uitgewys het, ongeveer 1 vingerdikte is.

VRAAG DEUR ADV. HODGEN

Vergelyk asb. die VW Jetta wat u sopas van onder beskou het, met Adv. Goosen se rooi Jetta wat na bewering in 1988 model is, en toon welke een kom ooreen met die motor wat opgeblaas is?

-- Getuie toon dat die opgeblaaste motor soortgelyk aan Adv. Goosen se motor was.

Getuie word nou geleentheid gebied om die onderkant van Adv. Goosen se motor te besigtig.

ADV. MOSTERT

Vraag: Toon die moontlike posisies van 3 ladings aan op hierdie model se agteras.

Foto's 12,13 & 14 — Getuie toon aan een lading agter aan die wringstaaf, die posisie van 'n 2de lading regs van die eerste lading agter die wringstaaf, en die posisie van 'n 3de lading voor die wringstaaf.

Foto 15 — Getuie toon dat daan 'n spasie tussen onderstel en wringstaaf is.

Getuie word nou geleentheid gebied om die ouer model VW Jetta se bagasiebak te besigtig:

ADV. MOSTERT

Vraag: Stem u saam die bagasiebak het plek om tot 3 of meer van hierdie ladings in te laai?
- Getuie bevestig dit.

Vraag: As die noodwiel uit sy nis verwyder word, stem u saam daar is plek daarin vir tot 3 of meer ladings?
- Getuie bevestig dit as korrek.

Getuie word nou die geleentheid gebied om die bagasiebak van Adv Goosen se motor te besigtig.

ADV. DE BRUYN

Foto 16 Ons is bereid om op rekord te plaas dat die 2 motors se bagasieruimte wesenlik dieselfde is.

Foto 17 Toon onderaansig van Adv. Goosen se motor.

BESKULDIGDE/ACCUSED NO. 1

Volle naam/Names in full.....

Datum van geboorte
Date of birth 19...../...../.....

Identiteitsnommer
Identity number

Adres
Address.....

Ras en Geslag
Race and sex.....

Taal
Language.....

Huwelikstaat
Marital status.....

Gearresteer op
Arrested on

Nasionaliteit
Nationality.....

Onderwyspeil
Standard of Education.....

Duimafdruk (regter)
Thumb-print (right)

Geboorteplek
Place of birth.....

Beroep
Occupation.....

V.A. geneem op
F.P. taken on 19...../...../.....

V.A. aan SAKB. op
F.P. to SACB. on 19...../...../.....

SAP. 69 ontvang op
SAP. 69 received on 19...../...../.....

V.A. NR.
F.P. NO. .....

AANKLAG AANGENEEM (V.B. NR.)
CHARGE ACCEPTED (O.B. NO.) .....

.....
Handtekening A.K. Bevelvoerder/Signature C.O. Commander

BESKULDIGDE/ACCUSED NO. 2

Volle naam/Names in full.....

Datum van geboorte
Date of birth 19...../...../.....

Identiteitsnommer
Identity number

Adres
Address.....

Ras en Geslag
Race and sex.....

Taal
Language.....

Huwelikstaat
Marital status.....

Gearresteer op
Arrested on

Nasionaliteit
Nationality.....

Onderwyspeil
Standard of Education.....

Duimafdruk (regter)
Thumb-print (right)

Geboorteplek
Place of birth.....

Beroep
Occupation.....

V.A. geneem op
F.P. taken on 19...../...../.....

V.A. aan SAKB. op
F.P. to SACB. on 19...../...../.....

SAP. 69 ontvang op
SAP. 69 received on 19...../...../.....

V.A. NR.
F.P. NO. .....

AANKLAG AANGENEEM (V.B. NR.)
CHARGE ACCEPTED (O.B. NO.) .....

.....
Handtekening A.K. Bevelvoerder/Signature C.O. Commander

BESKULDIGDE/ACCUSED NO. 3

Volle naam/Names in full.....

Datum van geboorte
Date of birth 19...../...../.....

Identiteitsnommer
Identity number

Adres
Address.....

Ras en Geslag
Race and sex.....

Taal
Language.....

Huwelikstaat
Marital status.....

Gearresteer op
Arrested on

Nasionaliteit
Nationality.....

Onderwyspeil
Standard of Education.....

Duimafdruk (regter)
Thumb-print (right)

Geboorteplek
Place of birth.....

Beroep
Occupation.....

V.A. geneem op
F.P. taken on 19...../...../.....

V.A. aan SAKB. op
F.P. to SACB. on 19...../...../.....

SAP. 69 ontvang op
SAP. 69 received on 19...../...../.....

V.A. NR.
F.P. NO. .....

AANKLAG AANGENEEM (V.B. NR.)
CHARGE ACCEPTED (O.B. NO.) .....

.....
Handtekening A.K. Bevelvoerder/Signature C.O. Commander

Vir bykomende beskuldigdes kyk A.
For additional accused see A.

SAP. 13, SAP. 43 of "A" verw. SAP. 13, SAP. 43 or "A" ref.	Rekord van dokumentêre- en ander bewysstukke Record of documentary and other exhibits	
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428

SAP:
C 1

NAME EN ADRESSE VAN GETUIES IN DRUKSKRIF/NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF WITNESSES IN BLOCK LETTERS

1. ..... TEL. NR. / TEL. NO. [ ]

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2. ..... TEL. NR. / TEL. NO. [ ]

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V.A. ONDERSOEK VAN TONEEL VAN MISDAAD, VOERTUIG OF VOORWERP
F.P. EXAMINATION OF SCENE OF CRIME, VEHICLE OR OBJECT

O.R.NR. / F.P. NO. ..... POSITIEF/NEGATIEF / POSITIVE/NEGATIVE — DATUM UITSKAKELING V.A. VERSEND / DATE ELIMINATION F.P. FORWARDED [ ]

SIRKULASIE
CIRCULATION

RADIO VERVOLG NR. / RADIO SERIAL NO. ..... DATUM GEREKENARISEER / DATE COMPUTERISED [ ] (Heg Rekenaaruitdruk aan) / (Attach computer outprint)

KANSELLASIE / CANCELLATION ..... DATUM GEKANSELLEER / DATE CANCELLED [ ]

DATUM SAP. 55 AAN S.A.K.B. / DATE SAP. 55 TO S.A.C.B. [ ] — DATUM REKENAARUITDRUK ONTVANG VANAF S.A.K.B. / DATE COMPUTER OUTPRINT RECEIVED FROM S.A.C.B. [ ]

TYD EN DATUM / TIME AND DATE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK/INVESTIGATION DIARY

(Indien 1 tot 3 hieronder nie nagekom is nie, moet redes verstrek word)
(Reasons are to be given if 1 to 3 hereunder are not complied with)

1. BESOEK AAN TONEEL VAN MISDAAD: RESULTAAT
VISIT TO SCENE OF CRIME: RESULT.....

2. KLAER GESPREEK—RESULTAAT
COMPLAINANT INVTERVIEWED—RESULT.....

3. RESULTAAT VAN NAVRAE IN DIE OMGEWING UITGEVOER, en NAME VAN PERSONE WAT GESPREEK IS
RESULT OF ENQUIRIES CONDUCTED IN THE VICINITY AND NAMES OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

4. (1) WORD IEMAND VERDINK? JA/NEE
IS ANYBODY SUSPECTED? YES/NO
(2) INDIEN WEL, GEE BESKRYWING
IF SO, GIVE DESCRIPTION .....

5. MELD REDES VIR VERDENKING
GIVE REASONS FOR SUSPICION .....

6. BESKRYF AARD VAN ENIGE LEIDRADE EN RESULTAAT VAN OPVOLGING
DESCRIBE NATURE OF ANY CLUES AND RESULT OF FOLLOWING UP.....

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SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE
DIST. 14
1989-12-15
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

/// D R I N G E N D ///

1. VERTROULIK
2. 1989 12 15
3. VAJ NAUDE
4. 1989 12 15
5. AR VTAK OP (PER BRIG GILBERT)
6. OP13/1/6
9. 1989 12 15
10. ONTPLOFFING : MONUMENT KRUISING - ADDO PAD : 89 12 14 OM 23:50 : BERIG04
11. S13/1/6
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B VTAKKE RSA
C AK OP
D KOMPOL x04 PTA (TIM) ((HEN HANTRAM))
E DORPOL PTA

21. OP 89 12 14 OM ONGEVEER 23:50 WAS MR'S S1552328 SAO MG MGODUKA, S1664319 SERS TA FAKU, S1447046 KST DP MAPIPA EN N OP BPON DEUR KAPT NIEUWOUDT GETAAK OM IN MOTHERWELL SUB TE HAAL OM N BOOM TE SPREE EN OBSERVASIE TE HOU. HULLE HET GEREIS MET SAPAGTBOM. KAPT NA HUL VERTREK VANAF KAPT NIEUWOUDT HET N ONTPLOFFING PLAASGEVIND. MET SY AANKOMS OP DIE TONEEL V/D ONTPLOFFING HET KAPT NIEUWOUDT GEVIND DAT HAAR N PLOFTOESTEL IN V/TUIG SAPA5328M ONTPLOF HET. AL 3 LEDE ASOOK DIE BOOM IS GEDOOD TYDENS DIE ONTPLOFFING EN DIE V/TUIG IS N AL= TOT= VERN. OP DIE TONEEL IS DIE OORBLYFSELS VAN N VZD-3M ONTSTEKER GE= VIND.

22. BESONDERHEDE V/D TERREURDAAD:-

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2. RSA
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4. PORT ELIZABETH
5. MOTHERWELL
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9. PLOFTOESTEL ONTPLOF IN V/TUIG SAP6538OM
10.1 PLOFTOESTEL IN V/TUIG
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FAX 322 0177

X204

JW/MS

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Your Ref.

REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA • REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

FEDLIFE FORUM
SUIDTORING • SOUTH TOWER
Van der Waltstraat
Van der Walt Street
PRETORIA

DIE STAATSPROKUREUR
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Private Bag
PRETORIA
0001

Navrae: J WAGENER
Enquiries:

5 Februarie 1993

PER GEREGISTREERDE POS

Mnr L du Plessis
Violetlaan 6
Sunridge Park
PORT ELIZABETH
6045

Meneer

GEREGTELIKE DOODSONDERSOEK : M GONIWE EN DRIE ANDER

Ek verwys na u konsultasie van 3 Februarie 1993 te Johannesburg met myself en Advokate A Mostert SC en B Knoetze en bevestig graag die volgende:

1. In bogemelde aangeleentheid tree ek en Advokate Mostert SC en Knoetze op namens die S A Weermag.

2. Op hierdie stadium is dit nog nie vir my moontlik om u mee te deel dat die dienste van gemelde regspan vir u persoonlik beskikbaar sal wees tydens die Ondersoek nie.

3. Na aanleiding van voormelde is dit reg aan die begin van die konsultasie aan u gestel dat die verhouding tussen uself en die regspan tans nie soos tussen 'n prokureur en sy kliënt is nie, maar dat u beskou word as 'n getuie vir die saak van die S A Weermag.

4. Terselfdertyd is u meegedeel dat dit u vrystaan om die konsultasie nie voort te sit sonder die teenwoordigheid van u eie regsverteenwoordigers nie, maar nadat die aangeleentheid bespreek was, het u aangedui dat dit kon voortgaan soos voormeld, met ander woorde met uself as 'n blote getuie.

2/...

5. Indien dit sou blyk dat daar geen belangebotsing bestaan tussen uself en die S A Weermag nie, is die gemelde regspan beskikbaar en gewillig om u by die Ondersoek te verteenwoordig. 'n Finale besluit in hierdie verband is tans nog nie moontlik nie, en sal eers geneem kan word na afhandeling van sekere konsultasies en bestudering van bepaalde dokumentasie. Sodanige besluit sal dan onverwyld aan u oorgedra word.

Ek berig dus mettertyd weer aan u.

Die uwe

J WAGENER
NMS : STAATSPROKUREUR (PRETORIA)

G31

J 417

☎ 322-6522
✾ "GOVAT"
FAX 322 0177

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PRETORIA
0001

Navrae: / Enquiries: J. WAGENER

2 Maart 1993

Mnr L. du Plessis
Violetlaan 6
Sunridge Park
PORT ELIZABETH
6045

Meneer

GEREGTELIKE DOODSONDERSOEK : M. GONIWE EN 3 ANDER

Met verwysing na par. 5 van my skrywe van 5 Februarie 1993, is ek nou in 'n posisie om u mee te deel dat ek, saam met advokate Mostert S.C. en Knoetze, u nie sal verteenwoordig by bogemelde ondersoek nie.

Waar u gedagvaar is om te getuig op 9 Maart 1993, beveel ek aan dat u so spoedig moontlik die dienste van u eie regsverteenwoordigers bekom. Die ondersoek hervat op 8 Maart 1993 met die getuienis van Genl van Rensburg en u regsverteenwoordigers sal waarskynlik daar teenwoordig wil wees.

Ten einde u in staat te stel om voor te berei vir u getuienisaflegging, heg ek hierby aan 'n volledige stel van die dokumente wat op 1 Maart 1993 by die Hof ingehandig is as bewysstukke.

Die uwe

J. WAGENER
nms STAATSPROKUREUR

DISTRIBUTED TO
GOVT OFFICIALS + MPs
BY STATE SECURITY COUNCIL

THE ART OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR

JOHN J. McCUEN

(1966)

CONTENTS OF THE ART OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR : JOHN J. McCUEN (1966)

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REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE : UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM

A number of comparatively small

REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

have inflicted stunning defeats on much larger and stronger

GOVERNING POWERS

by using

PSYCHO - POLITICO - MILITARY STRATEGY

A poorly equipped and trained

REVOLUTIONARY FORCE

wishes to fight and win a

relatively modern and well-equipped

ARMY

The only way

TO WIN ULTIMATE VICTORY

lies in a

STRATEGICALLY PROTRACTED WAR

To win such a war, the revolutionaries must try to

REVERSE THE POWER RELATIONSHIP

by

A. WEARING DOWN THE ENEMY'S STRENGTH

with the

CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MANY CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES

B. BUILDING THEIR OWN STRENGTH

through

(1) MOBILIZING THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE

(2) ESTABLISHING BASES and

(3) CAPTURING EQUIPMENT

C. GAINING OUTSIDE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT

THE BASIC THREE CONCLUSIONS

A. TOO MANY PEOPLE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM

Protracted Revolutionary Warfare is

a radically

NEW APPLICATION AND COMBINATION

of

OLD MILITARY, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES

FUSED TOGETHER

into a

BRILLIANTLY SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY

If we DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS,

we DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM

and we are COURTING DEFEAT

THE CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES

of this strategy ARE CLEARLY DEFINED

even though their

APPLICATION MAY DIFFER

from

COUNTRY to COUNTRY

Revolutionary armed struggle in

ANY COUNTRY

has

COMMON FUNDAMENTAL LAWS

Revolutionary armed struggle in

EACH COUNTRY

has

CHARACTERISTICS AND LAWS

OF ITS OWN TOO

We must learn the

STRATEGIC CONCEPT,

ITS PRINCIPLES, and

ITS VARIOUS TECHNIQUES

If we expect to

COUNTER AND DEFEAT THEM

A GOVERNING POWER CAN DEFEAT ANY REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

if it

ADAPTS THE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND PRINCIPLES

and

APPLIES THEM IN REVERSE

TO DEFEAT

THE REVOLUTIONARIES

with

THEIR OWN WEAPONS

on

THEIR OWN BATTLEFIELD

The Governing Power must

(1) make

A CAREFUL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

(2) evolve

REALISTIC LONG-TERM PLANS

(3) commit

SUFFICIENT RESOURCES IN TIME

to regain

THE INITIATIVE

REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE : ORGANIZATION AND COUNTER-ORGANIZATION.

Introduction.

1. A number of revolutionary wars took place in modern world history. All these wars followed certain basic phases/facets and principles on how a revolutionary war should be waged. Small changes were made to this "revolutionary strategy" to fit in with the circumstances in a particular country, but the basic philosophy underlying the strategy was maintained by all the revolutionary organizations.

2. Before any counter strategy can be successfully implemented, the originator of the counter strategy should understand the phases/facets and principles of revolutionary warfare.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL PHASE (ENEMY)

3. A revolution is normally planned by a group of frustrated dissidents. The dissidents start from "zero", and go through an organizational phase to establish the revolutionary organization for the revolution.

4. The dissidents initially form underground political cells which later expand into a well coordinated cell network.

5. Political propaganda groups are formed around each cell to obtain popular support from the masses, as well as forming terrorist groups to intimidate where the propaganda effort fails.

6. The revolutionaries will then form fronts, parties and pressure groups to try to mobilize popular support amongst the masses.

7. The revolutionaries will then infiltrate agents into the administration, security forces, trade unions and other important groups/organizations.

8. A widespread and very effective underground intelligence network will be established.

9. The revolutionaries will instigate demonstrations, strikes, sabotage and riots to exacerbate propaganda against the government/administration.

10. All shortcomings in political, administrative and social systems will be exaggerated and exploited by the propaganda machine of the revolutionaries.

11. When the government/administration reacts against the revolutionaries, the latter become more hardened, formidable and experienced.

THE COUNTER-ORGANIZATION

12. While the revolutionaries are still engaged with the organizational phase of their revolutionary strategy, the government should counteract the revolutionaries' organization with an effective COUNTER-ORGANIZATION.

The question however is : HOW?

EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION

13. Organizing an effective administration, especially in isolated areas/places is the first and most important action in counter-strategy.

14. The level of administration is more important than its form. It should be able to function on a person-to-person level.

15. The administration must be able to pay heed to the needs of the individual (i.e. the masses)

16. In isolated areas/places the government is normally represented by a local leader, a chief or a board/council. The government by name/person is never seen at grass roots level by the individual (masses). The government is something remote, inhuman and nameless.

17. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, are among the people and their presence is "felt" by the individual. Because of this presence, the revolutionaries are more able to determine the problems and the reactions of the masses. The revolutionaries have intimate knowledge of the needs of the masses.

18. The revolutionaries can therefore analyse and exploit a given situation better than the government. They are therefore normally much more in control of the situation than the government.

19. To act effectively against the revolutionaries, the government (administration) must have the support of all groups, large and small.

20. The administration must have a clear and well defined NATIONAL STRATEGY/ POLICY or programme for the future. They must know in which direction the country is going.

21. An effective and well motivated administration will deny revolutionaries the initiative.

CASE STUDY MALAYA

22. Prior to World War II the British had a good administration in Malaya. Malayans were included in the administration. They underwent good training at the Kuala Lumpur College and the British could control the effectiveness of the administration through their officials at government level.

23. The Japanese occupation of Malaya during World War II totally disrupted the administration and large numbers of the masses escaped to the jungles of Malaya.

24. After the war the British implemented a federal system. The nine states of Malaya were subdivided into administrative districts, subdistricts and MUKIMS (committees). Contact with the masses was good, and in general the administration had good control over the masses. The police force was represented in the smallest community and formed the backbone of the defence system during the first few months of the emergency situation.

25. There was, however, one serious error in the administration, namely the administration lost contact with 400 000 - 500 000 Chinese and 38 000 Sakai native squatters who had to escape to the jungles during the Japanese occupation of Malaya.

26. It was here amongst the squatters, the MIN YUEN, that the revolutionaries settled.

27. The MIN YUEN acted as spies, couriers, food suppliers, debt collectors, propagandists and general agents for the revolutionaries (MRLA).

28. After the start of the emergency situation the main aim of the British counter-offensive was to maintain control over the squatters by way of effective administration.

29. A resettlement scheme was launched for the Chinese squatters and they were put under strict and effective administration.

30. The security forces established a great number of "jungle posts" in the jungles and established effective administration of the SAKAI natives by way of medical and trading posts.

31. This effective administration together with sustained military pressure on the revolutionaries resulted in the revolutionaries losing their grip on the squatters and thus also their firm base in Malaya.

LESSON LEARNED

32. The British administration maintained effective control over the majority of the Malayans but they lost control over the Chinese and SAKAI squatters. The revolutionaries exploited this weakness and established a revolutionary organization among the squatters. Victory was only achieved after effective administration had been restored.

CIVIL EDUCATION

33. The government should organize a large-scale civil training programme if contact with the masses by means of effective administration is to be maintained.

34. Local members of the administration should be dedicated, sympathetic, efficient, attentive and loyal. A good working relationship between the administration and the masses is essential for success. Selection of local members for service in the administration is a problem.

35. It is essential that the administration identifies problems locally and then has the necessary authority for implementing corrective measures as soon as possible.

36. The aim of the civil training programme must be to train promising, loyal leaders, as well as the youth for the administration.

37. Persons under training as well as trained individuals must receive good remuneration to prevent the enemy from bribing members of the administration.

38. Political training of local members of the administration is essential. Members must be aware of the National Strategy or programme.

39. During a counter-organizational-programme, the training of local members must be one of the first steps. Regarding the long-term arrangements and because of economical reasons, it is better to employ experts, college and technical graduates and qualified instructors. In the heat of the revolution, however, the emphasis should rather fall on the short-term arrangements, and the local population must be trained.

40. It must always be borne in mind that an IMMEDIATE end to the revolution is the primary aim.

CASE STUDY - ALGERIA

41. The French trained proprietors of small shops, ex-soldiers and local loyal leaders with the necessary potential for employment at grass roots' level (villages). The youth also received enormous attention.

42. Training of local members for service in the administration is a civilian task, but in the absence of civilian instructors, the security forces should take over this training function.

COUNTER ORGANIZATION OF THE MASSES

43. After an effective administration has been established, the counter-organization for the population should commence.

44. Members of the administration must identify and involve members of the local population who are interested in their activities. Cells must be formed and informal training of the local population should take place.

45. The interest of the local population must be extended to other activities. Cultural, sport and other organizations must be established and in this way control of the population must be effected.

46. New leaders in all walks of life must be identified and trained. Advanced training can take place in the main towns/cities.

CASE STUDY - ALGERIA

47. Different organizations were established among clergymen, shepherds, fishermen, ex-soldiers, women, the youth, etc. Close liaison especially with the population in the rural districts (76% of the population) was brought about in this way.

48. Nationalism meant little to the general public in Algeria. The revolutionaries therefore found it difficult to incite the masses as a whole and they had to resort to intimidation.

49. The French regrouped and resettled the various population groups. Self-defence units were established to protect the population against intimidation. After this regrouping it was found to be much easier to control the population.

50. Because of their loyalty to France, ex-soldiers were trained and appointed as community leaders. One of their main tasks was to influence the masses.

51. Counter-organization of the population should be a civilian function. Psychological persuasion must be done in a subtle way and there should be no harsh intimidation by the administration. The military, who is clearly involved in persuasion operations, should not meddle with politics. Political policy/guidelines must be clearly defined by the governing authority.

52. Because of a shortage of civilian administrators, the counter organizational function, to an increasing extent, became a military responsibility. Soldiers became frustrated and started to commit atrocities against the population. Because France had no clear strategy or programme for Algeria and the military leaders had to fight their political battles increasingly in a political vacuum, the military leaders initiated their own political strategy and in this way became involved in politics. In 1958 this military involvement in politics was the main reason for General De Gaulle's appointment as President.

LESSON LEARNED

53. A clear national political policy or programme is essential for the effective counter-organization of the population by an effective administration. "FIRM NATIONAL POLICY, ESTABLISHED ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE POPULATION INTO HOMOGENEOUS GROUPS WILL BLOCK A REVOLUTION, FACILITATE PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION AND ALLOW BROAD CONTROL OF THE MASSES."

SELF-DEFENCE

54. The most important part of counter-organization of the masses is the establishment of self-defence units to work against intimidation and blackmail.

55. If the masses do not have the will or means to resist, their need for personal safety will overshadow their loyalty to the ruling authority.

56. During the early stage of a revolution, the establishment of an auxiliary police service and a military militia must receive high priority.

57. Members of the auxiliary police service must be posted at every community (village).

58. One of the most difficult tasks during the training of the auxiliary police service and the militia is the selection of recruits. The Council of local chiefs is essential.

59. Recruits should preferably have former military training, for example national service.

60. The militia supported by the security forces constitutes the backbone of a self-defence system. The militia should be orientated towards the environment and be armed with small arms, automatic rifles, LMGS, grenades and mortars.

61. Members of the auxiliary police service and the militia form a bridge between the administration and the masses. Their influence value should not be underestimated; they should therefore be politically orientated.

CASE STUDY - MALAYA

62. Special constables were responsible for the protection of most of the economic targets in Malaya.

63. Recruiting in Malaya took place too late and too fast. After the emergency situation, the auxiliary police service expanded as follows: July 10 000, September 24 000, after six months 30 000.

64. Good training of the auxiliary police service and the militia is essential.

STUDY - GREECE

The best example of the successful use of a militia is the ΛΑΪΚΑ ΕΘΝΟΦΥΛΑΚΗΑ ΑΝΥΝΗΣ (TEA) during the civil war in Greece.

TEA was geographically orientated and comprised 4 to 6 panies per battalion. They had their own command network to ens and fell under the command of a retired general. Regular icers assisted at brigade and company headquarters levels while toon and section commanders were reserve officers. It is ortant that the officers of the militia undergo political ining because one of the main tasks of the militia is to fluence/mobilize the masses.

E INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

. No revolution can be opposed without an effective internal ntelligence system. In this case the concept internal intelligence ncludes, inter alia, the functions of counter-intelligence.

8. The problem of gathering information is not only a military roblem. Initially it is mainly an administrative and political one.

9. A country whose political system is based on a free democratic foundation, is very vulnerable to revolution. Preparations for a revolution are sometimes organized by a secret organization within a legitimate political party without the leaders of the party realising this. It is essential for the government to have a covert intelligence system with roots among the masses and all organizations. The state must be able to identify revolutionary and non-revolutionary political organizations.

70. The gathering, processing and dissemination of information must be carried out jointly by the security force and administrative and political institutions.

71. Information must be jointly evaluated, interpreted and exchanged at all levels. An effective counter-offensive cannot be planned or carried out without joint interchange of intelligence. Such interchange must be monitored at all levels by a joint committee.

72. The intelligence committee's chairmanship will be determined by the area of responsibility in which the committee will operate.

AREA DEFENCE

73. Military units must be deployed in such a way that minimum contact is made with the masses.

74. The number of military posts or nations will depend on how ... the area is. A large number of small stations in an ... than a few large ones.

75. The command structure of the military organization must be parallel to that of the administration. Effective liaison between the military and the administration is guaranteed in this way. Good coordination between the military and the administration during the counter-organizing phase is most important.

76. The military must use its equipment and personnel to support civilian projects. The military assists administration with the building of roads, dams, irrigation schemes, schools, churches, etc. The military must immediately assist the masses during disasters.

77. Military stations must assist the self-defence system during operations and assist with training, transport and logistics.

78. Atrocities against the population by the security forces must be avoided.

MOBILE FORCES

79. Security forces must be extremely mobile and be able to support self-defence units immediately.

80. Security forces must be able to move fast to any place within in their area of responsibility by parachute, helicopter or by way of road transport.

81. Well trained reconnaissance forces must be available. Close air support must be available at night.

82. Naval units must be able to control and block rivers and sea routes if necessary.

83. The greatest shortcoming in any counter-offensive is lack of air mobility.

SUMMARY

84. Despite the fact that an effective and highly mobile force is a prerequisite for success, counter-organization remains the main weapon against revolutionaries. Partial actions do not succeed.

85. An effective counter-organization must include the following:

a. Effective administration.

b. Civilian training.

c. Counter-organizing the masses.

d. Establishment of a self-defence organization.

e. A good intelligence system.

f. Area defence.

g. Improvement of the mobile forces.

TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION

1. The term terrorism is freely used today although its actual meaning is not known. To rectify the situation, it is necessary to look at the definition of terrorism and also at other aspects.

DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

2. Terrorism is a resort to violence by a dissident faction in order to intimidate and coerce people for political ends. (This may manifest itself in deeds like bombings, assassinations by individuals or small groups, or in the form of ambushes or attacks on civilians or police by larger bodies of terrorists). Terrorism is aimed at the population, influencing the minds of the population directly and forcefully.

GENERAL ASPECTS

3. The revolutionary may resort to terrorism where the terrain and/or its organization is insufficient for guerrilla warfare. Revolutionaries must, however, make use of terrorism if they are not able to establish political and military organizations to support guerrillas. For this reason, terrorism is called the weapon of weakness for the revolutionary with small/few resources.

4. Despite the successes achieved by terrorism it cannot be described as an effective type of war. The revolutionary cannot obtain permanent support from the population by way of deeds of terror. Terror may drive people to support the administration, provided the government can offer safety. The wise revolutionary will, therefore, halt terrorism as soon as possible in order to prevent this drastic action of the people. J.J.McCuen said: "The revolutionaries will find terrorism necessary unless their cause quickly attracts the open support of an overpowering majority of the people".

5. Terrorists form small groups (4-5 members) who are able to bring about clandestine political administrative organizations in each town or village through violence. Where there is resistance, the people responsible for it are murdered. The others will then keep quiet. In this way the local population is cut off from the administration. These groups commit sabotage, murder and plan ambushes. Such groups stay among the local population on a permanent basis.

COUNTER-TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION

1. It is clear from the discussion on terrorism that the terrorist strengthens his position among the local population by way of terror and political actions.
Here the question arises: What should be done to counter the situation? In the further discussion of possible counter-terrorist actions, possible actions that should be taken will be emphasized.

2. J.J. McCuen identifies tasks that should be undertaken and summarizes as follows:

a. "Failure of the governing authorities to act in time will allow revolutionaries to implant their organization and initiate terrorism to break the government's control of the population.

b. The governing authorities are faced with :
   i. Isolating revolutionaries from the population without alienating the people.

   ii. Critical shortage of time and men to react to multiple incidents.

c. Lacking the means to meet the entire threat, the tendency is to react to each incident without comprehensive plan or strategy.

d. The counter-revolutionary strategist must:
   i. Concentrate his means and efforts on decisive objectives.

   ii. Winning the country back step by step".

3. Tasks that should be undertaken:

a. .Counter-organization of strategic bases.

b. Police actions.

c. Area consolidation

d. Civic action.

e. Mobile operations.

f. Counter-organization of the population in sparsely populated areas.

g. Unity of effort.

COUNTER-ORGANIZATION OF STRATEGIC BASES

4. To carry out the counter-organization of strategic bases effectively, the following must be done:

a. Counter-organize strategic bases in areas that are not affected.

b. Bring about a strong administration.

c. Train officials to handle administration.

d. Organize the population.

e. Establish a good intelligence system.

f. Prepare self-defence forces for the protection of the people.

5. Apart from the training of the self-defence force the civilian authorities are responsible for all the tasks.

6. Administrative centres must be established on a regional/tribal area basis. These centres also serve as training centres, gathering points and places of safety for the local population.

7. To make the counter-organization of strategic bases possible, it will probably be necessary to grant the authorities greater power for:

a. Economic expansion.

b. Agricultural credit

c. Recruiting for public services.

d. Improvement of salaries and work conditions.

e. Industrialisation.

f. Area re-organisation.

g. Administrative re-organization.

h. Movement control.

i. Control over gatherings.

j. Control over the press and media.

k. More severe punishments for rebels and deserters.

l. Discharges and transfers of officials.

m. The allocation of certain civilian functions to the military.

8. Where all the tasks are carried out efficiently, the military operations become secondary.

POLICE ACTION

9. The main objective in the strategy of counter terrorism is the annihilation/neutralization of the enemy political organization amongst the local population. As long as the enemy organization exists among the local population, the annihilation of terrorists will not have much meaning as the organization supplements its losses by way of new recruits. The annihilation of the organization is mainly a police responsibility.

10. To carry out the task, the police must:

a. Expand the intelligence network and build up contacts.

b. Develop their ability to act against terrorists.

c. Bring about close cooperation between them and the Defense Force.

d. Not compete with the defence force, but they must be able to act alone against terrorists.

e. Make the gathering of information their main task on the strength of their day to day contact with the local population.

f. Arrange the rapid establishment of an auxiliary police service to carry out protection tasks.

AREA CONSOLIDATION

11. The aim of area consolidation is to obtain control over the local population and to bring about contact with them and not as such to occupy territory.

12. The defence force must concentrate its efforts on densely populated areas or critical areas that are affected by terrorism.

13. In order to consolidate the area properly, the following must be done:

a. Distribute security forces over the area to carry out area protection tasks.

b. The military and the administration must be parallel and act in concert.

c. Military intelligence and operations must be coordinated with police and civilian institutions.

d. The defence force must concentrate their efforts in cooperation with the local police to suppress terrorism in their territory so that the counter-organization of the local population can be initiated.

e. Suppression of terrorism will not succeed merely by reacting to incidents or by protecting installations. Regular patrols must criss-cross the area to keep terrorist movements in check.

14. The security forces can gain the initiative by:

a. Establishing a good intelligence system.

b. Carrying out day/night operations so that terrorists will have no rest.

c. Regular patrols.

d. Setting up ambushes.

e. Tracking down arms caches and depots.

f. Making contact with the local population.

g. Destroying the terrorist organization.

15. The main problems that occur during counter terrorist actions, are:

a. Tracking. Not all soldiers are able to track, so that terrorists cannot be tracked and wiped out. The training of a large number of trackers to overcome this shortcoming must be emphasized.

b. Wearing Heavy Equipment and Provisions. A soldier who bears too heavy a load, is not able to carry out rapid follow-up actions against terrorists. Planning must be done to replenish by air or by way of road transport.

16. For the execution of area consolidation Lt Gen Briggs formulated his Briggs Plan. He defined the military problem as follows:

"Protect the populated areas, cut the enemy lines of communication and force him out to battle."

17. His plan covered four basic objectives:

a. "To dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security, which would in time result in a steady and increasing flow of information coming from all sources.

b. To break up the communist organization within the populated areas.

c. To isolate the bandits from their food and supply organizations in populated areas.

d. To destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack the security forces on their own grounds."

18. Briggs further formulated the responsibility of the Po. Defence Force as follows: "Police would give primary attention carrying out their normal duties in towns and villages. The army would maintain a permanent framework of troops deployed in close cooperation with the Police to cover towns and villages which the police could not adequately handle themselves. Army's principal task is to dominate the jungle up to about 5 hours' journey from a town or village. Troop units were to establish their HQ in inhabited areas to increase the sense of security of the population".

CIVIC ACTION

19. The destruction of the revolutionary organization must be followed by civic action to establish counter-organization of the population which is the main objective of counter insurgency operations.

20. Civic action can be more effectively carried out as a team effort between the military and civilian authority.

21. The composition of teams will depend on local conditions and the degree of control that the enemy has over the population. In isolated areas where there is adequate civic administration, the teams will be predominantly military. In other cases it must be predominantly civilian to make the quick transfer to the civic administration possible and to ensure that troops are available for other tasks.

22. Composition of the Civic Action Team (Town Management)

a. Leader - Administration and law aspects.

b. Military adviser - organizes self-defence, military and auxillary police.

c. Doctor or medical orderly.

d. Engineer.

e. Teacher.

f. Agricultural extension officer.

g. Protection element.

23. Tasks of the Team

a. Break the enemy's control over members of the kraal/village by means of redeploying the kraal, placing of local population in kraals, control over food, movement control, curfew and carrying of IDs. Measures must be instituted simultaneously and not one after the other.

b. Offer the local population security against terrorism and intimidation (initially by the team, then by local population).

c. Training of local population by various specialists. Political indoctrination must be emphasized as well as the rapid reorganization of the local population.

d. When the counter-organization has progressed sufficiently, the team may delegate tasks to the local population and move to the next kraal/village.

MOBILE OPERATIONS

24. The government still has the problem of what to do regarding sparsely populated areas until it can make administrative arrangements for the area.

25. Mobile forces (defence force) must be used to prevent the enemy from establishing base units here, while operating in other areas.

COUNTER-ORGANISATION OF SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS

26. The counter-organization of the population in these areas gives rise to problems that are not found in densely populated areas, because of the distribution of the population.

27. In order to reach the population effectively to undertake counter-organization, it may be necessary to establish population islands of controllable/defensible groups in the area. To do this, a resettlement programme must be launched.

28. To also involve members of the population who cannot be reached by the resettlement programme, civic action teams must be integrated with mobile operations.

UNITY OF EFFORT

29. There is considerable overlapping of the responsibilities of the administration, police and defence force. All of them work among the local population and must act against portions of the revolutionary organization.

30. Community leaders should participate, advise and support all counter-terrorist operations.

31. All the efforts in the fight against terrorism must form a unit.

32. At every government level there must be someone in charge who accepts the responsibility for success and failure. This requirement can result in a conflict between military and civilian authorities. Especially the division of responsibilities and effort between the police and defence force. The deciding factor in the allocation of roles and umbrella powers must be the degree of effectiveness of the civilian administration in a specific area.

33. Where the civic authorities have a good organization under their control, the control of counter-terrorist operations rests with them. Within their limits, police must be responsible for the destruction of terrorism. The military forces will then support the civil authorities.

34. Where the civic authority's administration is not effective, the area is declared an emergency/security area under military administration. Civic authorities and courts can still function depending on the security situation. Such military administration will include control over the civilian administration and the police. The aim must then be to destroy the revolutionary organization, to protect the area, undertake counter-organization and reinstitute the civic administration as soon as possible.

35. No matter who is in charge, what has to be done has to be decided on a day to day basis. The various operations of the administration, Police, psychological operations, military and community leaders must be closely coordinated to ensure that all work towards a common objective.

"GEN TEMPLER CIRCULAR TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Any idea that business of normal government and business of the emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated."

GUERRILLA AND COUNTER GUERRILLA WARFARE

GUERRILLA WARFARE

ESTABLISHING GUERRILLA BASES

1. General: Establishing a base area is normally done in a rural area, in difficult terrain where supervision and government control is at its weakest.

2. Course of Events

a. By means of revolutionary and political agents and propagandists, people are recruited to form local guerrilla gangs.

b. By way of intimidation and persuasion, control of isolated communities is taken over where guerrilla bases are established.

c. Establishing parallel administrations and law structures.

d. As a result of intimidation and persuasion, the population finds it more advantageous to cooperate.

e. Increase political and guerrilla capability by concentrating on the youth.

f. Start with conducting low intensity operations such as ambushes and strikes from the base area.

g. The guerrilla's safety is ensured by the population's fear for continued presence of the terrorist.

EXTENSION OF BASE AREA (CONSOLIDATION)

3. General. After one to three years, larger and better equipped guerrilla groups are able to operate in the external areas of their own base by using other revolutionary dominated communities as temporary bases. Fighting becomes a full time occupation and their ranks are supplemented by recruits from other communities. They become area bound.

4. Course of Events

a. Expansion of guerrilla action to the external area.

b. Communities are combined to form larger bases by way of political action.

c. Establishment of administration and law structures parallel to the existing order.

d. Establishment of the necessary infrastructure for the support of an extended war.

e. Giving high priority to the mobilization of the population in support of their cause. Making effective use of the population's grievances and aspirations, isolating the population from external influences. The commissar makes use of person to person contact.

f. The guerrilla establishes a government authority and organizes the population so that everyone can be involved, influenced and supervised.

g. Development of local defence forces and guerrilla groups to police the area, supervise the population as well as giving support to regional forces.

h. Establishment of guerrilla gangs and bases on the external edges of the controlled area.

i. Infiltrating military and political agents into the external area to form new cells, new political networks and new guerrilla gangs. (The application of the OIL SPOT strategy to expand bases until the entire area is under control).

CREATING THE IMAGE

5. After consolidation of its base areas, the revolutionary must establish an image of legitimacy to obtain total internal and international support.

6. Forming a central government in a safe base area or in a friendly neighbouring state.

7. Laying claim to representing the real aspirations of the population.

8. The leadership comes to the fore on the international political platform to mobilize pressure against the existing system in order to realise their objectives.

THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT FORCES

9. The nature and extent of the threat is underestimated. Government forces act against that which is visible and its operations are mainly reactive.

10. The conspicuous counter-action during the guerrilla's settlement phase, namely to isolate the population against the guerrilla, is counter-productive in obtaining and retaining the population's support.

11. As a result of inadequate force levels, government forces are deployed in critical areas giving the guerrilla freedom of movement in other areas.

12. The guerrilla concentrates on attacking weak targets.

4. The guerrilla has the ability to disappear when confronted by stronger forces.

4. The guerrilla has a good intelligence system.

5. The guerrilla's political network is based within the population.

6. Government forces are not sufficient to dominate all areas on a full time basis and to protect the population against retaliation.

7. Mobilizing forces from your own strategic base for deployment elsewhere renders the home base vulnerable to infiltration and contamination.

COUNTER GUERRILLA WARFARE

INTRODUCTION

18. The government authorities responsible for the fight against a guerrilla onslaught is faced with a situation in which the three phases in the development of the onslaught take place simultaneously, namely a guerrilla onslaught over a large area, deeds of terrorism in other areas and organization in most other areas. The reality of the situation/onslaught is that the revolutionary takes total control over the population or a percentage of the population.

19. The problem of the fight against guerrilla warfare is not merely defensive to prevent attacks, but also offensive to regain "control" over the area.

20. The mobilization of counter-revolutionary means and efforts must be based on that which is necessary to enable coordinated offensive operations in the military, political and psychological fields.

21. Government forces will never have sufficient means to fight off all the attacks and to prevent others from starting. Hence it is necessary that a phased plan, based on the realities of the situation must be developed, which achieves critical objectives in logical sequence. The perception should be that to win will take very long.

THE PLAN

22. The proposed plan of action must include some of the following:

a. The "Oil Spot" strategy

b. The territorial offensive

c. Military civic action teams

d. Resettlement of populations

e. Mobile operations

f. Prohibited areas/strips

g. Counter guerrillas

h. Cordon Sanitaire/prohibited areas

"OIL SPOT" STRATEGY

AIMING

This is the establishment of strategic bases and their steady ansion until the whole area is recovered. this implies:

a. Establishing effective control over the population in one or more strategically situated bases in the affected area.

b. Recovering control over the population in other important areas by operating from the strategic base or bases as mentioned in sub par 23 a (Balanced attention must be given to urban as well as rural areas, especially important producer areas).

c The coordinated application of area protection forces and initial military civic affairs teams.

EQUIREMENTS

4. Establishing strategic bases requires immediate counter-organization of the unaffected; loyal population and instituting total government control.

5. Subsequently the population within the strategic base must be able to:

a. protect themselves through area protection operations;

b safeguard installations and vulnerable points;

c serve as source of soldiers and administrators

PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION

26. Concentration of effort and means in the establishment of the strategic bases

27. In areas where terrorism occurs, Government forces must use the same destructive and constructive strategy as the guerrilla.

28. Maximum effort and means must be applied in predetermined important areas within the strategic base (division of means and effort on a permanent basis is not recommended). A gradual expansion of the strategic base to neighbouring areas must only take place after the strategic base has been consolidated by way of military, political and psychological action.

29. Military action must be taken to take over guerrilla activated areas within the strategic base.

This includes the following :

a. Destruction of the guerrilla military structure;

b. Neutralization of the revolutionary's political/ administrative structure;

c. Development of the own strategic base by means of counter-organization in the political, socio-economic and psychological fields

30. The maintenance of full time area protection forces in support of trained paramilitary forces, recruited and trained from the population.

31. Establishing a mobile offensive reserve for utilisation within the strategic base.

32. Sufficient forces must be allocated in relation to tasks.

33. Time must not be a determining factor in the development of a strategic base.

34. During counter-organization there must be a sound balance between military, political and psychological action.

THE TERRITORY OFFENSIVE

MEANING

35. This is the allocation of small offensive forces to each of a variety of areas in which they have to move and operate. Tasks such as strikes, ambushes, patrols, search and destroy action, building up of an intelligence system, contacting and assisting population, must be undertaken (gaining military control and initiative).

AIM

36. The aim of territory offensives is to

a. establish military control and initiative in a particular area ;

b. clean the area of guerrilla-presence; and

c. regain control over the population.

REQUIREMENTS

37. Small mobile self-supporting forces with scant logistic support. The size of the force must be in relation to the ability of guerrilla forces in the area or forces that the enemy can concentrate in an area.

38. Must be equipped as lightly as possible to increase mobility. (The forces should preferably operate on foot.) Mobility may be increased through the employment of helicopters.

39. Local knowledge and expertise, discipline, loyalty, valour and initiative are qualities that one looks for in such forces.

COMPOSITION OF FORCES

40. A core of regular troops.

41. Well trained trackers.

42. Troops recruited from the population, and trained (for local expertise).

PRINCIPLES

43. Speed/ mobility.

44. Surprise.

45. Day and night operations.

46. Maintenance of force levels until the population is fully under control by way of counter-organization.

47. Aggressiveness, mainly through armed infiltration and fast strikes.

48. Coordination of action between areas.

49. Sufficient funds for recruitment/training and equipment of locally recruited military and paramilitary forces

50. Keeping a mobile reserve at all command levels.

51. Territory offensives must be supported in depth by counter-organization.

GENERAL

52. The author is of the opinion that enveloping operations as well as a large percentage of defensive tasks can be carried out more economically through the concept of territory offensives.

53. Enveloping operations will only succeed if

a. accurate information on the guerrillas' presence is available;

b. sufficient time and mobility are available to get troops in positions;

c. deception and secrecy are brought about to gain surprise;

d. sufficient troops are available for effectively cutting off the guerrillas;

e. sufficient time is available for search and destroy actions;

f. the principle of flexibility in planning is incorporated to make redeployment of forces possible.

54. Defensive and static deployments, such as protection of communication lines and important places, must be kept to a minimum. Alternatives must be considered and para-military forces must be trained for this purpose.

ITARY CIVIC ACTION TEAMS

ICTIONS

The team have two important functions to fulfil, namely

a. the development of a self-defence system for the population (this is the primary activity); and

b. to win back the control over and the goodwill of the population.

QUIREMENTS

5. The teams must make provision for their own security

7. The leadership element and personnel must be selected on the asis of its efficiency and ability to operate alone.

8. The teams must be given far-reaching initiative and flexibility n the execution of their tasks within the limitations of local onditions.

9. Individual members and teams must be deployed long enough to chieve practical results.

60. The protection of the population is the primary task. (Counter-organization cannot start if the population does not feel secure).

61. Special funds, weapons and supplies, must be available immediately to support self-defence and counter-organization operations.

62. Teams must be supported by local territory forces.

FUNCTIONS OF CIVIC ACTION TEAMS.

63. Self-defence

a. The development of control, loyalty and mutual trust between teams and the population in order to be able to arm elements of the population.

b. Recruiting, training and employment of self-defence forces.

c. Close cooperation and coordination with area protection forces.

d. Institution of influx control and an identity card or book system.

64. Counter-organization

a. Protecting, controlling, administering and supporting the population.

b. Bringing about close contact with the population to identify and correct signs of intimidation and dissatisfaction in good time.

c. Caring for the population and leading them.

d. Presenting literacy classes.

e. Organizing needlework classes.

f. Organizing sport.

g. Establishment of post offices.

h. Sanitary advice and health services.

i. Agricultural advice.

j. Improvement of community facilities.

k. Development of local industries and employment of local production factors.

l. Potential leaders must be identified and trained to take over civic responsibilities.

m. Regulations must be issued and punishments awarded, where due.

n. Provision of water supply, power, etc.

COMPOSITION

65. Initially mainly military, but covering all disciplines to carry out identified tasks.

66. As soon as the situation has been consolidated and there is full control over the population, this control may be transferred to civilian authorities.

RESETTLEMENT

MEANING

67. Resettlement means the shifting of the population from one area to another.

68. This includes the resettlement of isolated population concentrations or it can be the grouping of various smaller communities in larger concentrations which are easier to defend.

MOTIVATION

69. The resettlement of the population may be necessary to

a. carry out the task of protecting the population better (civic action objective);

b. bring about the isolation of the guerrilla from the population (area protection objective).

PROBLEMS

70. The population does not like being shifted.

71. High costs.

72. Development of slum areas by refugees.

ADVANTAGES

73. It is easier and more economical to protect the population.

74. The population is isolated from the guerrilla.

75. Better living conditions such as housing, sanitation etc. can be obtained.

76. Curfew arrangements can be applied more easily.

77. It is easier to counter-organize and influence the population.

78. Saving on the number of civic action teams.

79. It is easier to control the population.

80. More effective application of psychological means such as films, television, newspapers, pamphlets, radio etc. can be obtained.

81. Counters enemy propaganda and influences.

REMARK

82. The problem of slum areas and refugees must also be solved by resettlement.

MOBILE OPERATIONS

GENERAL

83. As a result of an unavoidable shortage of area forces and civic action teams, area offensives and resettlement can only take place in a few (strategic bases) critical areas. Remark: The area forces must stay in the area until the civic action teams have trained self-defence units as well as militia to take over the area protection function. The civic action teams must keep on operating until the population is able to resist the infiltration and intimidation. These forces are then available for the promotion of the "Oil Spot" strategy.

84. Mobile operations mean the employment of forces from the strategic bases to the outside, particularly to rural areas, to prevent the building up of guerrilla bases and mobile forces.

85. The operations are defensive and will not destroy the enemy's revolutionary political or military structure under the population or bring about control over the population. (This can only be achieved by the actions to establish a strategic base, namely sustained protection of the population and civic affairs action for counter-organization.)

CONCEPT

86. The concept requires the composition of mobile forces (ground, air transported and air dropped) with close air and helicopter support to carry out sweeps, enveloping actions and raids/strikes on enemy bases, headquarters, logistics, concentrations and communication lines.

REMARK

87. Good, accurate intelligence will increase the effectiveness of mobile operations and is a prerequisite for success.

PROHIBITED AREAS/REGIONS

GENERAL

88. Prohibited areas/regions are very valuable, especially in uninhabited or sparsely populated areas and they can increase the effectiveness of mobile operations and accelerate regaining control.

CONCEPT

89. The concept entails the removal of the population from an area, its resettlement and prohibition to enter the area without permission.

ADVANTAGES

90. Removes the revolutionary's source of support and strength - the population (protection, recruiting, intelligence, food etc) from the area.

91. The guerrilla is exposed.

92. Mobile forces gain freedom of action.

93. It is easier to counter-organize the resettled population.

DISADVANTAGES

94. Only practically feasible in sparsely populated areas.

95. Extensive facilities and large areas are necessary to resettle the population.

96. It is very expensive to resettle a large population.

97. The loss of production capacity from an area must also be considered.

COUNTER GUERRILLAS

CONCEPT

98. The development of a counter-revolutionary guerrilla force which is employed according to guerrilla tactics to annihilate revolutionary guerrillas and take control over the population.

DEVELOPMENT

99. Government forces can form counter-guerrilla gangs by sending in military teams to get minority or dissident groups together, to arm and train them and even to assume command over them.

REQUIREMENTS

100. An own responsibility area in which to operate must be allocated.

101. Good and effective political and military control and supervision must be exercised.

102. Must be supported by security forces during settlement.

103. Effective cemops and indoctrination must be applied continuously. The inclusion of a political commissar for indoctrinating other ranks and the population must be considered.

104. Security force leadership must receive serious consideration.

105. Carefully controlled recruiting must take place.

106. Ensure that the leader is politically trustworthy.

107. Leadership must be carefully selected.

CORDON SANITAIRE/PROTECTED AREA

MEANING

108. Sealing off a border with a neighbouring country that supports guerrilla forces or from where guerrilla forces operate.

METHODS

109. Complete sealing off by deployment of very high force levels on the border.

110. The deployment of high force levels in combination with artificial obstacles.

111. Prohibited areas with area offensives.

112. The organization and settlement of counter-guerrillas on borders and at external area/level

113. Obtaining political and military support from the population in the border area.

CONCEPT (MORICE BARRIER LINE/ALGERIA/TUNISIA)

114. Prohibited areas established adjacent to the border.

115. A barrier erected comprising three parallel Dennert wire fences the middle one of which is electrified.

116. Barrier line is supported by mine fields, patrols, artillery and aircraft.

117. Tanks, armoured cars and motorised patrols operate on adjacent service roads.

118. During the night the barrier line is illuminated and covered by surveillance radar.

119. Fortified points erected two to three km apart.

EFFECT

120. This played an important role in the restriction of movement and logistic supply over the border.

121. Initially small-scale strikes were made against the barrier line.

122. Total sealing-off was not brought about, however, and limited infiltration still took place.

DISADVANTAGES

123. Defensive and static deployment of very high force levels.

124. Very expensive to erect.

125. This is a time-consuming exercise.

126. Remark: The nature of the terrain may considerably affect all the disadvantages.

SUMMARY

127. The employment of a strategy to destroy a guerrilla onslaught and to regain full control over the population, is lengthy and exhausting, but possible.

128. A guerrilla onslaught (political, military, psychological) may be destroyed through:

a. The establishment and development of strategic bases by way of area offensives, counter-organization (civic action) and resettlement (OIL SPOT STRATEGY).

b. While the OIL SPOT strategy takes over full control of the area progressively, revolutionary power build up in other areas must be contained by way of mobile operations and supplementary measures such as:

i. the setting up of prohibited areas;

ii. the organization of counter-guerrillas;

iii. the closure of borders.

COUNTER-MOBILE WARFARE

Reference A: McCuen, J.J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

B: Lass, H.R. Die Grondleggers van Revolusionêre Oorlogvoering

INTRODUCTION

1. The term mobile war within the context of revolutionary warfare, is used to indicate the final stage of a revolutionary battle. It must, however, not be seen in isolation, but as part of and in support of guerrilla and terrorist actions that still continue.

2. It forms part of the so-called strategic offensive in which the total extent of the military and political battle are coordinated to give the opponent the coup de grace.

EXTENT OF MOBILE WAR

3. History. Until World War I military operations were characterised by static defensive operations which were aimed at occupying a territory or territories. It was a strategy of attrition where the possession and occupation of a territory formed the basis of military success. With, inter alia, the development of war equipment and the infrastructure, a mobile concept of warfare was born and a strategy of attrition made way for a strategy of destruction or annihilation.

4. Features: within the framework of revolutionary warfare and its philosophy, the features of mobile warfare may be summarised as follows:

a. Movement is linked to quick reaction and flexibility in the concentration and deployment of forces.

b. Offensive, aggressive action.

c. Retaining the initiative.

d. The main objective is the annihilation or destruction of enemy military forces.

e. Area is not occupied except where this has certain advantages for offensive operations.

f. There is coordinated and joint action concomitant with guerrilla and/or terrorist operations.

5. Requirements. The primary requirements for the successful conduct of mobile warfare, are the following:

a. Foreign Assistance and Material Support. Since mobile warfare implies the conduct of conventional type operations, it follows that there must be certain organizational, equipment and tactical adjustments of the existing guerrilla forces, except where a country already has this ability. For this is necessary equipment and expertise which cannot be normally obtained from own sources.

b. Safe Area or "Strategic Base". This is the firm base from where mobile forces operate and to where they can fall back, if necessary. It is an important fact that mobile forces must not be held primarily responsible for the protection of these strategic bases. That is the duty of the area forces and local militia.

c. Adequate Force Levels. As the struggle progresses and guerrilla numbers increase, they must be detached, regrouped and trained for mobile conventional operations.

d. Support and Cooperation of the Masses. Mao regards this as one of the most important conditions that must be realised before a counter-offensive can be organized.

e. Enemy Morale. Enemy forces must be exhausted and demoralized by way of guerrilla operations so that they may lose their fighting spirit.

6. Application. The development towards the mobile war phase, takes place as follows:

a. As guerrilla forces expand, some of them are withdrawn to safe areas.

b. They are now known as regulars and are reorganised, retrained and re-equipped on conventional lines. Groups from battalion to division strength can be formed.

c. Their employment is initially limited to defensive actions within safe areas.

d. As the aforementioned requirements are satisfied the groups are either gradually released for mobile operation or concentrated at a critical point to obtain surprise.

e. Tactics are characterised by dispersed actions and surprise attacks to overwhelm isolated SF bases, towns and installations. These operations do not occur in isolation, but are also carried out in support of the local guerrillas.

f. Actions are not limited to military operations. Political indoctrinations and subversion of the local population take place parallel to this, especially in areas that were so far under control of the SFs. An own system of "peoples administration" is established.

8. McCuen puts it clearly that mobile forces must always keep their primary objectives in mind, namely:

a. Assistance to and protection of territorial forces in the establishment and the expansion of strategic bases, and

b. slowing down the revolutionary development process.

COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

9. The chess board should now have been set up in such a way that the final moves will lead to checkmate. These final moves will therefore deal mainly with the final destruction of the enemy.

10. The counter-offensive is only an expansion of the preceding phases and especially of mobile defence. With the establishment of safe, firm bases mobile forces can be made available to expand to surrounding areas and to attack and destroy/disrupt enemy bases, depots, installations and logistic communication lines in its rear territories. Constant pressure must be exerted on enemy forces so that they do not get a chance to regroup and reorganize.

11. As the enemy's mobile forces disintegrate and their influence on the population fades, the authorities must plan to re-establish the influence over the country in a methodical manner. This can be done through area operations, the development of additional bases and the establishment of an administrative system.

12. True to tradition and the principles of revolutionary warfare, guerrillas will split into smaller groups, flee to safe rear territories or disappear among the local population. It is important here that a lesson from history is not ignored, namely that own actions must be geared and be flexible enough to adapt to this. Own tactics must be adapted to fit those of the enemy and he must not be given a chance to progress to the next stage.

SUMMARY

13. Counter mobile war is a long process and positive results must not be expected too soon. Good planning, the total involvement of all power bases, persistence and faith are the keys to success.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE : STRATEGIC PHASES

INTRODUCTION

1. Military writers agree that there are various phases that revolutionary warfare must follow in order to succeed. It is also clear that there is a set progressive sequence. The characteristics of the country in question at the time of the inception of revolutionary warfare will dictate which phases and in what sequence they are to be followed. These phases may at any point in time be changed in order to adapt to the changing situation. Writers differ about the detailed break-up of the sequence of events but agree that the revolutionary war progresses as the climate for war improves.

BASIC PHASES OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR STRATEGY

2. Trotsky's Five Phases

   a. First phase : Building the active nuclei of the organization.

   b. Second phase : Expansion of the network of urban and rural organs - infiltration of official and unofficial organizations and organizing demonstrations and strikes.

   c. Third phase : Open insurrection through acts of terrorism, sabotage, intimidation, psychological action and the formation of bases.

   d. Fourth phase : The linking of the small bases together to form liberated zones so that larger bands can be joined to form regional forces.

   e. Fifth phase : The counter-offensive phase making use of mobile warfare.

3. McCuen's Four Basic Phases

   a. Organization

   b. Terrorism

   c. Guerrilla warfare

   d. Mobile warfare

Examples of Strategies

a. When fighting the Nationalists of Chang Kai-Chek, Mao developed a two-stage strategy which started with guerrilla warfare and slowly progressed to mobile warfare and victory. The situation after the Second World War which was preceded by the Chinese Revolution was ripe for the commencement at the guerrilla stage.

b. A change in sequence is illustrated by Mao's three-stage strategy which he adopted during the Japanese invasion. This he could do because he already had a large number of troops available. The stages were :

   i. Defensive mobile warfare in order to delay and punish the invaders.

   ii. Return to guerrilla warfare when the enemy threatened to destroy them thus endeavouring to create a stalemate stage.

   iii. Rebuilding from this stalemate and returning to his two-stage strategy i.e. guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare.

c. Giap followed this three-stage strategy of Mao against the French in Indo-China. The Vietminh had a small army and the government in Hanoi. As in the case with Mao the Vietminh attacked the French, broke up into protracted guerrilla warfare and concluded with a counter-offensive stage. He described it as a people's war, with the characteristics of a nation-wide, all-out protracted war that must pass through three stages :

   i. A defensive stage (contention).

   ii. A stage of equilibrium.

   iii. Counter-offensive stage.

d. Revolutionary war in a colonial region where the process starts from scratch, is a difficult and prolonged war. It is thus divided into two stages which incorporate all the known phases e.g. Trotsky's five stages.

   i. First stage : Preservation of known forces, expansion, annihilation of the enemy until a fundamental change occurs wherein the comparative strength is reversed.

   ii. Second stage : The mobile warfare stage (counter-offensive).

SUMMARY

5. The counter-revolutionary strategist is confronted with the fact that he is faced with a well-defined strategy which may be broken down into various ill-defined phases. It is important to be able to define in which phase the war is, because each phase has certain military, political and psychological implications. It is also important to note that the phases are not necessarily simultaneously applicable to the entire war zone. Different phases might occur in different areas.

6. Our doctrine tends to agree to a large extent with Trotsky's five phases of revolution. McCuen is of the opinion that for the development of a counter-revolutionary strategy the four-phase breakdown appears best i.e. :

   a. The organization phase. In this phase the authorities must initiate large-scale civic action.

   b. Terrorism phase. According to McCuen mainly a police responsibility.

   c. Guerrilla warfare phase. Low-level military action.

   d. Mobile warfare phase. Conventional military action.

COUNTER-ORGANIZATION TASKS

EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION

1. The Administration Itself.

The Administration itself must :

a. Be expanded and improved at grass roots level, especially in isolated areas/places.

b. Be made effective at all levels.

c. Satisfy the needs of individuals.

d. Involve local population in all fields and especially in isolated areas.

2. Ignorance. The Administration at all levels must be made aware of the national strategy and what this strategy will entail for it in the future.

3. Motivation. The members of the administration must be motivated regarding the national strategy and their involvement in the struggle.

4. Delegated Powers. The Administration must delegate powers and make sufficient funds and means available in isolated area, in order to achieve daily visible results.

CIVILIAN TRAINING

5. Training. Training of the local population must take place on a large-scale for employment in the administration, especially in isolated places.

6. Higher Posts. Identified leaders from the above mentioned training scheme must receive advanced training in order to fill senior (higher) posts in the administration, especially in isolated area.

COUNTER-ORGANIZATION OF THE MASSES

7. Establishing Societies, Clubs and Organizations. A well considered attempt must be launched to activate the masses to establish societies, clubs and organizations at all levels.

SELF-DEFENCE

8. Protection of the Masses. The existing self-defence committee organization must be improved and expanded.

a. More auxiliary police must be trained and supplied.

b. A military militia must be instituted.

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

9. Expansion of Current Organization. The current intelligence system must be expanded and improved, especially regarding :

a. JIS It must be ensured that the JIS system functions effectively at all levels.

b. Sources The sources network to obtain accurate information must be expanded, especially regarding :

i. Political activities.

ii. Revolutionary activities.

iii. Counter-information and security activities.

AREA DEFENCE ORGANIZATION

10. Current Deployment. The existing deployment of area protection forces must be reconsidered and contact between the masses and the SFS must be improved.

11. Interaction. The existing good interaction between the JCS's and local authority set-ups must be assured and expanded.

12. Military Assistance. The existing military assistance to the masses and the effectiveness of the self-defence units must be assured.

13. Atrocities. All atrocities against the masses must stop.

MOBILE FORCES

14. Mobility. The mobility of reaction forces must be sufficiently improved to act quickly and effectively during the day and/or night.

...S FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

...NTER-ORGANIZATION OF STRATEGIC BASES

Strategic bases must be organized into areas which are not ...ected.

The following tasks must be undertaken:

a. A good, strong administration must be established.

b. Officials must be trained (motivation).

c. The population must be organized.

d. An intelligence system must be instituted.

e. Self-defence forces must be established.

...LICE ACTIONS

Expansion of the intelligence network must be continued.

The ability must be developed to act alone against terrorism.

SAP/SADF cooperation must be maintained and expanded.

The establishment of an auxiliary police service must be a priority task.

AREA CONSOLIDATION

7. In order to bring about area consolidation, the following tasks must be carried out:

a. Area protection.

b. Counter-organization of the local population.

c. Security force patrols, day and night.

d. Personal contact must be brought about with local population.

e. A good, strong administration must be established.

f. Terrorist organization must be found and eliminated.

CIVIC ACTION

8. The Following Tasks Must be Undertaken by Way of Civic Action:

a. Break the enemy's hold over local population.

b. Offer security to the local population against terrorism and intimidation - training for self-defence.

c. Train the local population.

d. The local population must become involved in the fight against terrorism.

COUNTER-ORGANIZATION IN SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS

9. Population islands must be established, where necessary.

10. Civic action teams must be deployed together with the security force mobile operations.

11. Local population must be resettled, where necessary.

UNITY OF EFFORT

12. Briefing and motivation of administration to establish purposeful actions against revolutionary forces.

13. Greater involvement of community leaders must be obtained.

14. Coordination of effort in Kaokoland and Caprivi.

15. Day to day decisions must be taken at grass roots level, by means of

a. close cooperation with community leaders;

b. full utilisation of the JCS system.

16. It must be assured that the JSC's carry out its coordinated function effectively.

COUNTER MOBILE WAR

AIM

1. To prevent that the enemy achieve or go over to the mobile war phase.

TASKS

2. Deny the enemy safe areas within effective range from the SWA border.

3. Maintain sufficient force levels to ensure a favourable power balance and prevent enemy recruiting.

4. Ensure the support of the masses in SWA.

5. Enforce and maintain the morale of SF's, the administration and the broad population of the RSA and SWA.

6. Ensure foreign support for own effort.

   a. Armament

   b. Political/economical

   c. Finances

7. Ensure SWA as a strategic base area.

8. Plan and organize mobile defence in the external level and middle areas.

9. Plan and organize a counter-offensive to destroy enemy base areas/forces.

PRINCIPLES : REVOLUTIONARY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR

FIRST PRINCIPLE : PROTECT YOURSELF AND DESTROY THE ENEMY

DESCRIPTION OF THE PRINCIPLE

1. Mao Tse-Tung said that this first principle is indeed also the aim of any war. He said it is the essence of war and the basis for all war activities

2. To explain what is meant by this principle, he used examples ; namely:

a. A rifleman or sharpshooter takes cover and then fires for effect - cover to protect himself and fire to destroy (or kill) the enemy.

b. During an attack the assault troops are responsible for the destruction of the enemy while the containing forces protect own forces, and the reserve force can be used for destruction or protection.

RULES ARISING FROM THIS PRINCIPLE

3. Mao developed three fundamental rules for a decisive battle, namely :

a. To fight inexorably when victory is certain.

b. To avoid a decisive battle when victory is not certain.

c. To avoid a strategically decisive battle when the future of a nation is at stake.

4. It is therefore clear that the avoidance of decisive battles will mean that "gaining and keeping ground" as in a more conventional battle is not relevant and very unimportant. The revolutionary must indeed have the courage to yield ground when (and only when) circumstances demand.

5. It is also clear that the importance of keeping captured ground is scaled down in favour of a more fluid situation.

ESSENCE OF THE PRINCIPLE

6. The principle therefore consists of two parts or facets, namely :

a. Safeguard protect yourself.

b. Destroy the enemy.

Of these two, the first, namely protect yourself, is primary and the most important for the revolutionary and after that the destruction of the enemy.

7. Moreover, McCuen stresses that "as long as these forces exist in some form", the war will continue and the government of the day will have to continue with expensive and tiring operations. These operations can become so unpopular that the government will even have to stop the war, like the French in Algeria.

8. It is therefore clear that the revolutionary is not in a hurry and that he will even withdraw to survive when he comes into contact with the enemy. He will also go back to a former phase, if necessary.

APPLICATION IN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE

9. We must, therefore, also apply the principle in the counter-revolutionary struggle in this way, namely to protect yourself as first priority and then to destroy the enemy. Who are you? You are not only the fighting forces, but also your bases and the population; with the emphasis on the population. And then McCuen warns that this is "the most violated principle of counter-revolutionary warfare "

10. As we have previously seen, the deterioration of bases and populations is ignored and underestimated until it is too late, as deterioration mostly occurs underground. It is not as visible as the more overt (conspicuous) revolutionary operations.

11. Later in the struggle it happens that government forces are concentrated in order to destroy the enemy. As a result the population has to defend itself against the revolutionary. Not only against the physical onslaught but also against the psychological onslaught.

12. Consequently the dilemma of the government forces is : must they deploy to protect critical places or must they concentrate to destroy the enemy. The answer is undoubtedly that the protection of your own bases and population is the primary requirement. If this is ensured, it will serve as basis for the deployment of own forces to destroy the enemy.

13. "The counter-revolutionary strategist should adhere simultaneously to the dual imperatives of preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy."

SECOND PRINCIPLE : ESTABLISHING BASE AREAS (STRATEGIC BASES)

INTRODUCTION

1. Mao Tse-Tung emphasized the principle of "establishing base areas (strategic bases)", and said : "When a war becomes extended and starts to get merciless, it is impossible to maintain a guerrilla war in the enemy's rearguard, without base areas."

WHAT ARE BASE AREAS FOR A GUERRILLA WAR?

2. Those are strategic bases from where a guerrilla war is supported to carry out its strategic tasks in order to protect itself, to expand and to destroy or drive off the enemy.

3. History proved that many wars conducted by roving-type rebels were never a success.

REVOLUTIONARY FORCE ACTION

4. In order to succeed in its aim, the revolutionary force must do the following :

a. Change the undeveloped areas to advanced, consolidated base areas.

b. Establish large military, political, economical and cultural revolutionary bastions in order to fight the enemy who uses the cities to attack the rural areas.

5. From the above it is therefore very clear that bases must have the following :

a. Territory

b. Population

THREE CATEGORIES INTO WHICH THE WHOLE AREA MUST BE DIVIDED

6. The view of the revolutionary forces is that the whole area must be divided into the following three categories:

a. First category. Those base areas that are controlled by the revolutionary, military and political forces.

b. Second category. Those base areas that are controlled by the governing power.

c. Third category. Intermediary regions that are contested by both forces, also called "guerrilla" areas.

MAIN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

7. The main strategic objectives of prolonged revolutionary warfare are:

a. Expansion of the revolutionary base areas and guerrilla areas.

b. Reduction of the base areas of the governing power.

c. Conversion of the governing power's territory into guerrilla areas through slow creeping expansion.

d. Conversion of the guerrilla areas into revolutionary base areas until the entire area has been captured.

HOW IS THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY SEEN?

8. The counter-revolutionary strategy must be seen as the opposite of what is mentioned above, namely:

a. The governing power must first convert the population and areas which are not yet under its control into close strategic bases or base areas, on which it can rely to carry out its strategic tasks in order to reach its objectives to protect itself, to expand and to destroy or drive off the enemy.

b. The government must then expand its forces to the contested and revolutionary controlled areas and build up the undeveloped areas into advanced consolidated base areas.

c. The base areas must then be changed into large military, political, economical and cultural counter-revolutionary bastions.

9. From the above it is clear that it is of the utmost importance that the governing authority ensures that bases are founded on:

a. Population.

b. Territories.

10. For this reason the term "strategic base" is probably better for the counter-revolutionary than "base area".

VIEW OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIST

11. The view of the counter-revolutionary strategist must be to divide the area into three categories, namely:

a. The strategic bases that are controlled by the governing authority.

b. The basic areas that are controlled by the revolutionary forces.

c. Intermediate regions that are contested by both forces, namely the guerrilla areas.

MAIN STRATEGIC AIMS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

12. The main strategic aims of counter-revolutionary warfare must be to:

a. Expand the strategic bases and the contested areas.

b. Reduce the revolutionary base areas.

c. Establish counter-revolutionary bases by making use of slow creeping expansion.

d. Change the contested areas to strategic bases until the whole territory has been recaptured.

13. The fact that the governing authority has indeed regular forces available should expedite the process to change revolutionary bases to contested areas.

14. As can be seen, the principle of settlement of base areas (strategic bases) is not only applicable to Revolutionary Strategy, but it is also applicable to Counter-revolutionary Strategy.

THIRD PRINCIPLE: MOBILIZE THE MASSES

REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

1. For the revolutionary the mobilization of the masses is more than merely persuasion. This requires inter alia intimidation and organization with a strong psychological emphasis.

2. Persuasion Techniques for Political Mobilization (PMO)

a. The population must be made aware of the political aim - they must understand in which way the revolutionary battle concerns them.

b. The aim should not only be explained. There should be a specific political programme to make the population aware of the objective.

c. All available communication media must be utilised to mobilize the masses.
"How to mobilize? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through schools, through mass organizations and through cadres..."

d. The task of making the people aware must be continuous. The population must get involved in the development of the struggle and make it their own.

e. Tell the population what they would like to hear, even though it may be contrary to the long-term revolutionary aim.

3. The Technique. Mao puts it as follows: "corr[illegible] leadership can only be developed on the principle of "from the masses to the masses".

This is brought about by:

a. Making a systematic and thorough study of the attitude of the population. This attitude must then be presented to the population in popular form until they accept it as their own and take a view in favour of this.

b. The above mentioned action must be maintained. The "new opinion" must be summarised repeatedly and presented to the people in popular form, until the people support it whole-heartedly and it becomes indispensable to them.

"Mobilizing the masses is a science and a fundamental principle of revolutionary warfare."

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

4. Counter-revolutionary Strategy

a. Cripple the revolutionary attempt to mobilize the masses.

b. Mobilize the masses. The majority of the masses is usually neutral and initially uncommitted. Mobilization cannot be brought about through persuasion; it must be preceded by organization, protection and possible violence.

5. Steps to Mobilize Population

a. Step A. Destroy the revolutionary organization or neutralize its effect on the population. In the case of terrorism, police and military are necessary. Violence and punitive measures (not terror or torture) are essential for extraordinary circumstances to counter the fear for the terrorist, to destroy the terrorist organization among the population, to break its control over the population and to protect the population from further pressure. This must be done in good time and with the maximum speed but with the necessary sympathy. This implies the following: strict curfew measures, movement control, regrouping of the population and villages, food rations, martial law and maximum punishment for support to terrorists, and the carrying of weapons.

b. Step B: Give the necessary support to the population in order to prevent terrorist retaliation. The protection must be visible, effective and purposeful so that the population can become aware of and rely on this. Protection can be brought about in the following way:

i. The government must initially establish protected villages.

ii. As the population is organized they become responsible for their own protection by means of militias. This will commit them to oppose the terrorist, inspire trust and release security forces for other tasks. "At Go Cong the population was assembled and president Tran-Van-Huu told of his desire to see communal councils functioning. Initially no one responded, then a notable took the floor and presented us with the following reasoning: 'The troops came here nearly three years ago and communal councils were elected, then the troops left and the notables were slaughtered. We have no desire to repeat that experience. It is necessary for you to decide whether you are going to leave or stay.'"

c. Step C: Organize the Population for a Counter-revolution.

i. As contrasted with the terrorists' intimidation methods, the government must win the favour of every possible person by getting him involved through persuasion. There must be visible proof that he benefits by this. The government must take the lead under all groups, classes, clubs and societies with the organization of social, career, sport, agricultural, education, medical, religious and military activities. This must be done on a person to person basis by sympathetic and helpful personnel. The population must become involved and identify with the group's activities. The aforementioned also ensures good control.

ii. Successful persuasion requires that something better be given to the population than that which the terrorist can offer. Requirements for persuasion:

(1) At national level, the government must formulate a firm but acceptable policy for the future. This must be done in close cooperation with the population so that it will be in accordance with their aspirations. The same communication media as those which the terrorist uses must be used. (See sub par 2. c.)

(2) Effective persuasion requires concrete proof of action and implementation at local level. Even though resistance is found in departmental ranks, certain reform processes must still take place, in order to obtain the population's support.

(3) The persuasion process must be sustained. The government must identify the population's day to day problems and provide in their needs. The majority of the population is more interested in the aforementioned and in their safety than in details of government matters.

iii. Other Persuasion Techniques.

(1) Indoctrination of security forces (SFs). The SFs must realise that the final objective is not only the destruction of the enemy, but also to mobilize the masses in favour of the government. The SFs must exercise their influence over the population by means of the spoken word, the example they set, friendliness and direct aid. (Item 9 of the Vietminh-soldier's code of honour as formulated by Giap:

"Respect the people.

Help the people.

Defend the people...in order to win their confidence and affection and achieve a perfect understanding between the people and the army".)

(2) SF's must maintain good relations with the population. Avoid:"Shotgun approach" by, for example, accepting a number of losses amongst the population just to "get a few heads"; blind bombardments; total massacre and destruction.

(3) Give medical treatment that is given to SFs to everyone wounded in combat.

(4) Make the most of each opportunity to carry out civic action. Through this it will be proven that SFs are the friends and protectors instead of the destroyers.

iv. Individual terrorists must be persuaded to become involved in the counter revolution. Schools for retraining or centres for re-indoctrination must be established from where the persuasion process can be carried out. Persuasion is a better method than intimidation to win over a captured terrorist.

6. Conclusions

a. During any phase of a revolutionary war, the population remains the centre of all military, political or psychological action.

b. The mobilization of the masses requires more than persuasion; it requires:

i. Sufficient force to break the insurgents' hold on the population.

ii. Sufficient protection to enable the population to choose the alternative instead of the revolutionary way out.

iii. In-depth organization to mobilize popular support.

FOURTH PRINCIPLE: OUTSIDE SUPPORT.

INTRODUCTION

1. This principle contains two aspects namely:

a. outside support to terrorist forces;

b. outside support to existing government.

EXAMPLES OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT

2. China. Mao Tse Tung acknowledged the importance of outside support in 1935. It was indeed due to the fact that Russia made available large quantities of captured Japanese weapons that the Chinese Communists were enabled to change from the guerrilla phase to mobile war.

3. Vietnam (French Era). In 1954 outside support to Giap amounted inter alia to:

a. 2 000 tons of armament per month.

b. 40 000 Vietminh soldiers trained in China.

c. 300 Russian advisers.

d. 30 000 - 35 000 Chinese advisers and volunteers.

e. Places of safety for terrorists in China.

4. Greece. Terrorists obtained assistance from Yugoslavia. After Yugoslavia retreated from the Soviet bloc, aid was stopped and this led to successes of government forces.

5. Algeria. An expensive border control system was implemented by France. This restricted outside support to rebels fairly effectively. Outside political support could, however, not be prevented in this way.

6. Malaya. Isolation of border areas was brought about through political pressure from Britain or its neighbour. The prevention of outside support to terrorists contributed to successful action against them.

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO TERRORIST FORCES

7. This support consists of the following :

a. Provision of supplies and equipment.

b. Training of terrorists.

c. Advisers.

d. Volunteers.

e. Places of safety in neighbouring states (for training and as sanctuaries).

f. Political support.

8. Financial aid can be added.

9. SWAPO receives aid in all respects with the exception of volunteers to physically act against SWA.

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY

10. This type of support is described as:

a. Direct Military Support.

i. Personnel in the form of troops who are physically employed against terrorists.

ii. Supplies.

iii. Equipment.

iv. Finances.

b. Indirect Military Support.

i. Advisers.

ii. Instructors.

iii. Specialist personnel for attachment to COMOPS teams.

c. Political support.

11. It is very important that foreign troops are not used at an early stage during the terrorist phase. If so, it offers an ideal propaganda weapon that can be used against the government of the day.

12. It is also mentioned that if foreign troops are employed, this should be done:

a. during the mobile war phase against enemy concentrations ;

b. in a Comops role with the main objective to make friends with the local population.

13. Advisers and Inspectors must try to convey their particular knowledge to the government forces as soon as possible.The faster the government forces gain confidence and act on own initiative, the more successful their training will be.

14. A warning is given that outside support in armament must be realistic and be adjusted to the particular local circumstances. Equipment that is too sophisticated for application cannot be regarded as aid.

15. In order to obtain outside political support, the government of the day must bring the terrorist forces into disfavour in the eyes of the international community. It must be clear that the existing government looks after the wishes of the masses and not those of the terrorist forces.

16. It must be pointed out that even if outside support is obtained by the government of the day, this will not mean the end of the terrorists' propaganda attempt. It is, however, possible to neutralize the attempt and this must be the endeavour.

SUMMARY

17. Outside support is usually decisive in a revolutionary struggle.

18. The existing government must realise the importance of this very quickly, as it is its resources that might prove to be insufficient in this struggle. The terrorist can concentrate his onslaught on specific objectives, but the government forces must protect all important objectives.

FIFTH PRINCIPLE : UNITY OF EFFORT

INTRODUCTION

1. In order to unify the total attempt and make it one, the basic principle is to ensure effectiveness in all aspects of revolutionary strategy, tactics, planning and organization. This principle has already been applied since 1902 when Lenin changed revolution into a science. The communists use terms such as "democratic centralism" "party" and "front" so often in their revolutionary vocabulary that the West often does not realise the real meaning of these terms. They imply dedication, discipline, militarism and sincerity of thoughts, objectives and actions. In other words - unity of effort.

APPLICATION

2. Mao repeatedly emphasized that political, military, economic and educational preparedness are necessary for armed resistance and that <u>everyone</u> involved in the struggle must be used with the least possible delay. To the revolutionary the different media are not separate battlefields, but different approaches to achieve a single objective. As well trained soldiers they launch the struggle in different ways to achieve the main objective. They have also learned that this can only happen when their various attempts can be properly coordinated and then preferably under a unified command.

3. <u>Methods to bring about unity</u>

a. <u>First</u>. Not only the communists, but also other revolutionary organizations achieved this unity through a good "Party Organization." Through a harmonious, well disciplined party of which the members have positions of critical importance in political, military, economic and educational organizations, such a party can effectively use all its essential weapons for revolutionary warfare.

b. <u>Second</u>. In order to achieve this there must be unity in planning and unanimity in decision-making at all levels.That is at urban, provincial and national levels.

c. <u>Last</u>. It is a mistake to think that revolutionaries are more politically inclined than the military. This is a dangerous misconception which is usually formed when a revolutionary war is measured against our own system of values. It is true that revolutionaries make use of political, economic, educational and psychological and military concepts.It is important, however, that they use these concepts as weapons of revolutionary warfare. To use these weapons effectively, they must be well trained, disciplined, professional soldiers who are able to determine objectives, do detail planning and use the right weapon at the time. They must therefore be able to understand and apply military and political strategy and tactics.

d. It is therefore clear that with such a philosophy, linked to with a unified effort, the revolutionary war is usually won.

4. The Alternative.

a. To think that the counter-revolutionary struggle can be won with an uncoordinated attempt is fatal. It does not necessarily mean that military control is imperative.

b. A joint attempt from Government side needs a unanimous objective from civilian and military people at all levels

c. Counter-revolutionary warfare requires the use of military,political, psychological, economic and organizational actions at all levels, in other words ; coordinated in unity of doctrine and joint planning to achieve specific objectives.That is, the application of a unified attempt in a more effective way than the enemy does it.

5. The Problem and its solution.

a. This unified effort is very difficult to bring about, as it must combine the civilian and military functions to win battles which have mainly political objectives. As both the military man and the civilian administrative officer function best in their own spheres, they choose not to move on the other's terrain and each one proceeds on his own with a periodic coordination session.

b. If there is, therefore, no unity of effort, this condition is exploited effectively by the enemy's unified attack which increases the gap between the government and the military set-up with the result that mutual support is no longer possible.

c. It is therefore clear that the only solution for the situation is the combination of all attempts with a common objective of winning the war. All other objectives must be secondary to this until this objective has been achieved.

d. Unity of effort can be brought about in two ways ;

i By a single commander, usually military - the French approach.

ii By a committee under civilian leadership - the English approach

e. Both approaches can work - must work - because if a unity of effort cannot be brought about, this is the shortest road to defeat.

SIXTH PRINCIPLE

1. Five strategic principles for revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare have been identified, namely :

a. Self-preservation and destruction of the enemy.

b. Establishing strategic bases.

c. Mobilizing the masses.

d. Acquiring outside support.

e. Unity of effort.

2. In addition, there are also a number of essential tactical principles, for example, initiative, intelligence, mobility, surprise, etc without which no operation can succeed.

3. The most important fact, however, remains that to win the counter-revolutionary war, the effective application of all principles is necessary.

4. The five principles form a basis for an effective strategy but cannot be applied in isolation. They are closely interdependent and the successful application of one can hardly take place without application of the other. It can therefore be said that the all-embracing principle should be Unity of Principle.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

1. Revolutionary principles. Revolutionary wars are conducted according to the following principles :

   a. Protect yourself and destroy the enemy.

   b. The establishment and systematic expansion of bases and strategic bases to cover the entire country.

   c. Internal and external support through the judicious coordination and merging of psychological, political and military operations to continue the revolution through the phases mentioned below.

   d. Foreign assistance which includes the provision of training, supplies, advisers, volunteers, places of safety and political support.

   e. The total attempt must be unified.

   f. Unity of Principle. This implies the effective unified application of all principles.

2. Phases. Revolutionary wars develop through the following phases:

   a. Organization

   b. Terror

   c. Guerrilla warfare

   d. Mobile warfare

3. Survival As a result of set-backs, the organization is judiciously maintained, while the revolutionary goes from base to base through all the above mentioned phases. When the opportunity presents itself the revolutionary again starts with his expansion and strikes.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

4. Strategy. The revolutionary principles as explained above, can be applied with the development of a counter-revolutionary strategy. A counter-revolutionary strategy can be divided into the same phases as that of the revolutionary strategy. Government forces must develop their own strategic bases and other bases country wide and psychological, political and military operations must be integrated in order to obtain maximum internal and foreign support in order to increase the rate at which the revolutionary can be defeated - irrespective of the phase or combination of phases of warfare he may encounter.

5. Goal. An important goal should be to exploit all advantages which arise from sustained contact and maintaining of initiative during the repelling of the revolutionary organization from base to base and phase to phase.

6. Problems. Possible problems are:

a. Inability to adjust own operations to the fast changing revolutionary strategy.

b. Slow reaction resulting in breaking off sustained contact with the enemy and may end in loss of initiative.

IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

7. Government Actions. During a hard and prolonged revolutionary struggle, the government must stop the revolutionaries and drive them back, no matter which phase they have reached. This requires sufficient means and also the right means to solve two great problems of the revolutionary war, namely:

a. Isolation of the revolutionary without harming the local population;

b. Ability to concentrate sufficient forces to destroy the revolutionary bases while own forces have to be scattered to protect their own bases.

8. Evaluation of the Situation. An accurate evaluation of the situation is essential.

a. Determining the Phase. The revolutionaries can be in different phases of the struggle in different parts of the country. Counter actions must be taken according to the particular situation in the specific area.

b. Development of a Strategy. Develop an applicable strategy which will

i. ensure that the revolutionaries will not infiltrate into own strategic bases;

ii. prevent further development of revolutionary bases.

The destruction of enemy bases must not be undertaken before own bases are secure. Regarding this, regimental forces must initially join all possible forces, as one large decisive operation can prevent a large number of smaller operations.

c. Long-term Counter-revolutionary Plan. Develop a long-term counter-revolutionary plan with due regard to the revolutionary's knowledge of revolutionary strategy and his possible ability to react, with the aim of halting the revolutionary, taking away his initiative and driving him back through the different phases and finally neutralising him. Total destruction is almost impossible.

d. Execution. During the execution of the counter-revolutionary plan, is is essential that all resources are mobilized and organized over a long period and applied resolutely to ensure success.

CONCLUSION

9. If the government reacts quickly, fewer forces, less resources and less time are necessary to end the struggle. In many cases the government will need considerable outside aid in the form of money, equipment, armament, advice and training for the struggle, even manpower in cases where the situation had already deteriorated to an extent. A serious and the most general danger in counter-revolutionary warfare is to do too little too late.

10. Counter-actions must be in accordance with the phases of the struggle. Counter-actions, however, are cumulative, for example, in the mobile warfare phase provision must be made for guerrilla warfare, terrorism and organization operations.

11. All counter-revolutionary techniques must be flexible and adjustable to the situation, the environment, enemy and population.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY : TASKS

1. Rationalise and hone the tasks for each target area, as these arise from :

   a. the current state of the revolutionary situation in SWA;

   b. the concept of the applicable counter-revolutionary phase.

2. Ensure the application of all six principles of counter-revolutionary strategy in respect of each target area as these arise from the consideration of the application of each principle.

3. Develop from the aforementioned tasks a strategy which will arrest the revolutionary situation, take away the revolutionary's initiative, drive him back from strategic base to strategic base and from phase to phase and eventually neutralize him, should total destruction be impossible. The strategy must ensure the timeous application of sufficient numbers of the right resources in order to

   a. prevent further development of revolutionary bases;

   b. prevent infiltration of own strategic bases;

   c. bring about the destruction of revolutionary bases.

4. In addition, develop a long-term counter-revolutionary plan with due regard to the revolutionary's knowledge and application of revolutionary strategy and its probable reaction ability.

5. Ensure that all means are mobilized, organized and applied over a long period in a determined manner during successful execution of the counter-revolutionary plan.

MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME

1. Determine what is to be done

2. Plan how it is to be done; who will be doing what, where, when and how.

3. Create the organization which is required for the execution of the plan.

4. Activate the organization and let it carry out the plan : do functional planning and go into action.

5. Check the results obtained and the progress made according to the prescribed time-scale and target dates.

6. Determine and initiate adjustments, as necessary.

Hierna verklaar ek Lt-maj A.J.P. TOLBERT (AFGETREE) van Pretoria as volg onder eed.

1

In Rolnommer getitel "Aanbeveling BSB aan HSAK/HSAW ingevolge gedateer 28 April 87 betreffende uit is getuigenis, wat ek gehoor het en persoonlik weet is verskaf op 10.4.93 aan my gedoen.

2

Ek identifiseer die aangehegte dokument as 'n opname wat in ons ontleedprofiel van 'n verweerder wat ek persoonlik hoef te doen het, na die hele van my eie persoonlike waarneming en die inligting wat deur die verweerder verskaf.

3

Dit was 'n tipiese voorlopige verslaggewing aan die HSAK/HSAW waarin ek 'n opinie gegee het oor die BSB se hantering van die saak. Later het ek 'n finale verslag gelewer wat ek nou voor my het.

4

Ook my weet gaan die volgende
mense teenwoordig:

HSAVL - Lyn Lyddenburg;

BG-SM - Lyn-maj Jonker;

BSB Direkteur - Kol Vosloo;

HSAVL PSO - Brig Lombard;

BSB Steekhof - Kmdt Mentoor (?)
Sekretaris (Christien vorige)

Die vergaderings taal gaan wees
Engels in die geval van Lyn
Lyn in BSB aanwesig is.

5.

Ons het alle dokumente
gekwesbrieve, kontrakte (alle-
gebeie) elk bon nie as sulks
onderskryf word nie, tensy
die Lyn dan die BSB nie in geval
bedanksgeval funksioneer het.

6

Die inhoud van die dokument
spreek vanself, en behoeft geen

wat dit sê. Hierdie dokument is 'n spesiale geval van dat daar 'n algehele beheer en kontrole oor die BSB aktiwiteite was.

7.

Die rede waarom paragraaf 7 geformuleer is soos dit is, is omdat dit bekend is as negatiefgat met opsetlik nie 'n objektiefgisteerde omskrywing van die staat ("NY") = nyerd. Die standaard wapens is almal akkoord om onaanvaarbaar te verklaar.

8

Die punte met nie gesluit wat, maar die woorde wat in paragraaf 7 gebruik is, dat alle tipes produksie, mens, tipes wapens

9

Ek was ook teenwoordig op die vergadering van 12 Mei 85 waarop daar gepraat is

10

Ek kan bevestig dat die woord op bevinding

melagers nie in Lyss-myte af
BSB operasie was nie!

11.

Ek wil pertinent vra om
kommentaar te lewer oor die
15.5 en die verwysing na
Komaps (Kommunikasie-Operasies)
kantoor. Komaps is tans besig
met die verwerwing en strategiese
kommunikasie in die Lyss gees
of-koorsinasie in die staat.

12

Die volgende terminologie
kan as die norm verduidelik

OG = Oudiens-generaal
BG-SM = Bevelvoerder Generaal
Spesiale Magte
DTI = Direktoraat Teen-inligting
BSB = Buro vir Staatsveiligheid
Buro
AMI = Afdeling militêre inligting

Ek is op die hoogte met die
inhoud van die verklaring (bek
bek) deur self uitgevoer.

Ek het die bepalings van die
oplegging van die voorgeskrewe
eed nie) en dit is my eed
en ek sal die waarheid spreek.

Die verdagte is deur my
onderteken die [illegible]
my teenwoordigheid
deur die [illegible] op 1993
te H.F. Verwoerdlughawe
in Port Elizabeth

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST :
AANKLAGKANTOOR
1993-07-09
CHARGE OFFICE
H.F. VERWOERDLUGHAWE/AIRPORT
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

Handtekening / Signature: B [illegible]
Volle Name / Full Names: Pieter Erinus van Heerden.
Besigheids Adres / Business Address: S.A. Polisie H.F. Verwoerd
Lughawe Walmer Port Elizabeth.

Vrederegter/Justice of the Peace
Ampshalwe Kommissaris van Ede/
Ex Officio Commissioner of Oaths

Ampsbenaming (rang) / Designation(rank): Adj.Off. Republiek en Suidwes-Afrika / Republic and South West Africa
Datum / Date: 93-07-10 Plek / Place: Port Elizabeth.

FROM

"G 33"

Hiermee verklaar ek Genl-maj A J M JOUBERT (AFGETREE) van Pretoria as volg onder eed.

1

'n Dokument getitel "Aanbieding BSB aan HSAW: HSAW kommentaar gedateer 28 April 87 bestaande uit 15 paragrawe, wat ek hierby aanheg en parafeer, is vandag 10.7.93 aan my getoon.

2

Ek identifiseer die aangehegde dokument as 'n afskrif van 'n outentieke notule van 'n vergadering wat ek persoonlik bygewoon het, na die beste van my herhindering weerspieël dit 'n redelike weergawe van die vergadering.

3

Dit was 'n tipiese voorligtings vergadering aan die HSAW waartydens, beplanning, koördinering en optredes rakende die BSB se hantering bespreek is. Tydens hierdie vergadering is sekere aspekte in detail bespreek en het die HSAW riglyne verskaf.

4

Na my wete was die volgende mense teenwoordig:

HSAW - Genl Geldenhuys.

BGSM - Genl-maj Joubert.

BSB Direkteur - Kol Verster.

HSAW PSO - Brig Sonnekus.

BSB Streekbest - Kmdt Meerholtz.
Sekretaris (Intussen oorlede)

Die vergadering het plaasgevind in die noord-oos Tvl by 'n BSB standplaas.

5

Ons het die dokument as geklasifiseerd hanteer (uiters-geheim) dit kon nie as sulks indensifiseer word nie, weens die feit dat die BSB in 'n privaat hoedanigheid funksioneer het.

6

Die inhoud van die dokument spreek vanself, en beteken presies wat dit sê. Hierdie dokument is 'n sprekende bewys dat daar te alle tye beheer en kontrole oor die BSB aktiwiteite was.

7

Die rede waarom paragraaf 7 geformuleer is soos dit tans daar uitsien, is omdat dit beskou is as regsgeldige militêre optrede teen 'n ge-identifiseerde amptelike vyand van die Staat. ("Vy") = vyand. Nie standaard wapens is gemik daarop om

terugspoorbaarheid te verhoed.

8

Die indruk moet nie geskep word, weens die woorde wat in paragraaf 7 gebruik is, dat alle teikens noodwendig menslike teikens was nie.

9

Ek was ook teenwoordig op die vergadering van 12 Mei 87 waarop soortgelyke besprekings hanteer was.

10

Ek kan bevestig dat die moord op Goniwe en sy meelopers nie 'n Spes-magte of BSB operasie was nie.

11

Ek is pertinent gevra om kommentaar te lewer na par. 15.5 en die verwysing na Komops (kommunikasie-operasies) kontrakte. Komops in hierdie konteks verwys na Strategiese-kommunikasie in die breë soos ge-koordineer in die staat.

12

Die volgende terminologie kan ek as volg verduidelik

OG = Ouditeur - generaal
BGSM = Bevelvoerende Generaal Spesiale Magte
DTI = Direkteur teen inligting
BSB = Burgerlike Samewerking Buro
AMI = Afdeling militêre inligting.

Ek is op die hoogte met die inhoud van die verklaring (Ek het dit self uitgeskryf)

Ek het nie beswaar teen die aflegging van die voorgeskrewe eed nie, en beskou die eed as bindend op my gewete.

(Geteken)

Die verklaring is behoorlik onderteken en be-eedig in my teen woordigheid op hede die 10 dag van Julie 1993 te H. F. Verwoerd Lughawe in Port Elizabeth

Handtekening (geteken)
Volle name Pieter Irinus van Heerden
Besigheids Adres S.A. Polisie H.F.Verwoerd Lughawe Walmer Port Elizabeth
Vrederegter
Ampshalwe Kommissaris van Ede
Ampsbenaming (rang) Adj Off Republiek en Suidwes-Afrika
Datum 93-07-10 Plek Port Elizabeth

28 APRIL 1987 (33)

AANBIEDING BSB AAN H SAW : H SAW KOMMENTAAR

KOMMENTAAR TOV BGSM INLEIDING

1. H SAW voorsien nie dat BSB n formele struktuur sal hê nie - aanvaar egter verduideliking dat die tweede stadium van ontwikkeling volgens beplanning hierdie aspek sal opklaar.

2. Duplikasie van fasiliteite tussen BSB en AMI kwel H SAW nie en waar dit in die toekoms op laer vlak probleme mag oplewer moet dit in gedagte gehou word dat dit deur H SAW aanvaar is.

3. H SAW sien BSB as n langtermyn projek en gee dit nie n riglyn dat die kort- en mediumtermyn operasies nie BSB projekte moet ondermyn of benadeel nie.

4. Aanvaar nie dat BSB n beheerprobleem het nie, voel dat die projekte gedesentraliseer moet word en dat beheer afhang van die mate van kundigheid van die bestuurders.

BESPREKINGSPUNTE : KOMMENTAAR H SAW

5. H SAW stem saam met die probleem tov tydsaspekte en bevestig dat dit verband hou met punt 3.

6. Tipe operateurs wat aangewend word stem H SAW saam mee en bevestig weereens dat dit verband hou met beide punt 3 en 6. ?

7. Metodes wat aangewend word. H SAW sien die optredes nie as "moord" nie en definieer dit as volg : "n Aanval op n individuele (vy) teiken met nie-standaard uitreiking wapens op n onkonvensionele wyse - om nie onskuldiges te raak nie."

8. Dokumentasie. H SAW voel dat die dispuut tussen BGSM en Adm Putter hanteer moet word en n onderlinge reëling getref moet word. Riglyn is die moontlikheid van n AMI lid wat op DTI sterkte bly maar by BSB werksaam is.

9. Binnelandse Optrede. H SAW bevestig dat BGSM opdrag ontvang het om die binnelandse vermoë te verdubbel. Die volgende verdere punte word deur H SAW gemaak :

   9.1. SAP/Spes Magte skakeling moet self deur BSB en BGSM verbeter word.

   9.2. Eliminering van spesifieke teikens - n kanaal vir hantering van hierdie aspekte word tans daargestel. Die kanaal word 12 Mei bespreek en BGSM sal by wees.

10. Beskerming van BSB Operateurs. Hierdie aspek tov aanbiedings sal ook 12 Mei bespreek word, spesifieke plek van aanbieding word deur BGSM bepaal. Die volgende punte word deur H SAW gemaak :

    10.1. Breë beginselmagtigings vir projekte voorsien hy nie.

10.7

10.2. BSB mag voorstelle maak vir teikens maar dit moet langs BGSM kanaal direk na H SAW gaan.

10.3. Moet nie beskermingsaksies te ver probeer voer nie, moet egter die papiervol sny.

10.4. OG Leide. H SAW beslis dat hulle insae in dokumente totaal verkeerd is. Hierdie aspek moet ssm met Adm Bekker bespreek word deur BGSM en die probleem moet so spoedig moontlik opgelos word.

10.5. Aankoopprosedures. H SAW beslis dit moet soos punt 10.4. hanteer word.

OPSOMMENDE KOMMENTAAR : HSAW

11. Verlang professionele optrede gebasseer op gesonde doktrine.

12. Navorsing moet gedoen word en n doktrine moet ontwikkel word.

13. Werwing van operateurs moet volgens n spesifieke konsep of doktrine gedoen word.

14. Beginsels vir optrede onder dekking moet nagevors word en lede moet opgelei word, miskien sal dit nie n formele tipe opleiding wees nie.

15. Kundigheid is n faktor wat nie buite rekening gelaat moet word nie, waar ons in gebreke is, moet dit gekoop word of op een of ander wyse beskikbaar gemaak word. Hier geld die volgende aspekte :

15.1. Fisiese wet.

15.2. Regsaspekte.

15.3. Maatskappye en organisatoriese aspekte.

15.4. Hantering van fondse onder dekking.

15.5. Moontlikheid om van komops te leer moet ondersoek word - BGSM moet skakel om BSB op Komops kontakte te laat kapitaliseer.

28 April '87

C.A.J. MEERHOLZ

10.7

	BYNAME	
	Naam/Plek	Eynaam
1.	Van der Merwe	Hoof Direkteur
2	KD M	Mede Direkteur
3.	Georg M	Bestuurder
4.	Hall	Mede Eienaar
5.	Mok	Rekenkundige Ekonoom
6.	du Plooy	Onder Bestuurder
7.	Van Rooyen	Boekhouer
8.	Klaas S	Rekenmeester
9.	Lenie S	Handelaarster
10.	Maria	Hoof Kantoor
11.	Lang M	Ko Ruseur
12.	Kwaai S	Onder Rekenmeester
13.	XWB	Korporasie
14.	Mamba S	Ouditeur
15.	Liza Lenie	Winkelkapy
16.	Spes Magte (RSA)	Sakekantoor
17.	Spes Magte (Transkei)	Sakekantoor
18.	CSE	Effektebeurskantoor
19.	Port Elizabeth	Plaas
20.	Bisho	Kantoorkamp
21.	Oos Londen	Vakansiegoed
22.	King Williamstown	Mynbouprojek
23.	Eliminer	Bank Aksepte
24.	Rob Beyers	Prokureur Assistent
25.	Pretoria	Fabriek
26.	R R Daily	Direkteur
27.		

(2. 13.)
81/142289

UITERS GEHEIM 1/36

(7) 150/36

Brig vd Westhuizen - Bev
Genl Joubert - BC
Kol More - Projekleier
Brig Schoon SAP
Mnr Neville Hall NI
Kol Grijbenaam SAP
" Hall SAW
Kmdt van Rooyen "
" du Plessis. "

GENL JOUBERT.

1. Tal moet reg wees.
2. Fase 1 moet bepl en geimplimenteer word.
3.

BRIG VD WESTHUIZEN.

3 Gee voorligting ten ALAN KATZEN

INL ASPEKTE.

G.P.-S.

[redacted]

Telefoon : 041-5022114

Hoofkwartier
Kommandement Oostelike Provinsie
Posbus 115
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

15 Oktober 1991

Bevelvoerder
Kmdmt OP

Brigadier

AANWENDING BY KOMMANDEMENT OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE HOOFKWARTIER

INLEIDING

2. Soos duidelik blyk uit die bogenoemde dokumente het ek nie vir vervroegde pensioen aansoek gedoen in terme van H Leër se skrywe in par 1.d hierbo nie. [redacted]. Ek het dit deurgaans duidelik gestel dat ek egter in diens moet bly omrede ek verpligtinge het tot ouderdom 60 jaar.

[redacted]

3. [redacted] Ek was egter uit die bloute, in terme van H Leër se skrywe in par 1.d, op vervroegde pensioen geplaas. [redacted]. Ek het in reaksie daarop my verklaring, par 1.e, ingedien en my saak verduidelik.

4. Gedurende Mei 1990 was ek na aanleiding van vermelde ver= klaring na Pretoria ontbied en het samesprekings met Genls [redacted] gehad. [redacted] was ook teenwoordig. Hierdie samesprekings het gelei tot my aanstelling, volgens beplanning, in 'n siviele hoedanigheid [redacted]. Daar was dus geen diensonderbreking nie. Ek was ook die versekering gegee dat ek in diens sou bly tot ouderdom 60.

5. Ek is terdeë bewus van die nuwe verwikkelinge wat ontstaan het [redacted] wat nie strook met die lynfunksie van die SA Leër nie en dat my aanstelling [redacted] verval het [redacted] Dit plaas my in die onbenydingswaardige posisie dat ek nou in 'n ander pos aangewend moet word, wat sal beteken dat ek in 'n siviele hoedanigheid onder offisiere wat voorheen my juniors was, wat nie oor die kwalifikasies beskik en ook nie ondervinding en agtergrond het waaroor ek beskik nie, moet werk. Ek is van mening dat dit ongewens is uit beide oogpunte gesien. Finansieël sal ek slegter af wees aangesien die byvoordele wat ek in my vorige aanstelling geniet het, verval.

VOORTGESETTE AANWENDING

6. Ek het groot waardering vir die feit dat die Bevelvoerder Kmdmt OP uit sy pad gegaan het om my by Kmdmt OP HK aan te wend. Ek sien egter nie my weg oop om die aanbod te aanvaar nie, vir die volgende redes:

[redacted]

a. Die feit dat dit reeds algemeen aangekondig is en aanvaar word, in die militêre en siviele gemeenskappe, dat ek op vervroegde pensioen afgetree het.

b. Dat ek ondergeskik sal wees aan offisiere wat voorheen my juniors was en nie oor die kwalifikasies, agtergrond en ondervinding as myself beskik nie.

c. Dat ek finansieël slegter af sal wees as in my vorige aanstelling.

d. Dat dit logies is dat dit vir my moeilik sal wees om weer aan te pas by die roetine van 'n Kmdmt HK na 20 maande in my vorige aanstelling.

VERDERE FEITE WAT HIERDIE SAAK BEÏNVLOED

7. Tydens my samesprekings met Genls [redacted] (kyk par 4) het ek aangedui dat my aanvaarding om op vervroegde pensioen te gaan (vir doeleindes soos in par 2 uiteengesit) afhang van wat die bedrag van my gratifikasie sal beloop, sowel as wat my maandgelde sal wees, omrede ek sekere verpligtinge teenoor my familie het. Genl [redacted] het daar en dan vir Brig [redacted] opdrag gegee om te bepaal wat die bedrae sou beloop. Ek moes hom by sy kantoor bel die aand van die onderhoud, voor 19:00, wat ek wel gedoen het. Hy het my verwittig dat gratifikasie net oor 'n R100 000-00 sou beloop en die maandgelde net oor die R2 000-00 per maand. Dit was voldoende en ek het Brig Botha gesê dat ek bereid is om op sterkte van daardie bedrae, op vervroegde pensioen te gaan.

Ek is egter slegs ongeveer die helfte van die gratifikasie uitbetaal en die maandgelde beloop net oor R1 000-00 per maand.

8. Gedurende Mei 1990 het Brig [redacted] my hier in Port Elizabeth besoek en my in kennis gestel dat my diens as [redacted] beëindig word met ingang van einde Julie 1991 sowel as my diens as 'n siviele werknemer van die SA Leër. Ek het my situasie aan hom verduidelik

[redacted]

en hy het onderneem om die saak op te volg en my te laat weet. Hy het my later laat weet dat ek moontlik na einde Augustus 1991 by die Kmdmt HK sal moet diens verrig. (Kyk par 6). Hierdie aangeleentheid het groot onsekerheid by my tot gevolg gehad.

9. Die situasie waarin ek myself tans bevind was nie as gevolg van toedoen van my kant nie, maar te wyte aan 'n ongelukkige sameloop van omstandighede.

VOORSTEL TER REGSTELLING

10. Ek is van mening dat dit regverdig sal wees en dat ek tevrede sal wees as my geval as volg hanteer word:

a. Die saak moet hanteer word asof ek nie afgetree het op 31 Mei 1991 nie en asof ek aangebly het in die rang van Kolonel en op die salarisskaal is wat ek sou gewees het indien ek nie afgetree het nie.

b. Dat ek dan huidiglik botallig is.

c. Dat my diens beëindig word op 31 Desember 1991 of so gou moontlik daarna.

d. Dat ek vyf jaar pensioendraende diens by my diens kry soos bereken op aftreedatum.

e. Dat al die ander voordele van aftrede soos in H Leër se skrywe [redacted] gedateer 17 Januarie 1990, my toeval.

L. DU PLESSIS : KOL (AFGT)

939

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM

Leêrverwysing/
File Reference: [redacted]

3 Januarie 1992.

Telefoon / Telephone : 5022911

Byfyn / Extension : 2148

Navrae / Enquiries : Mej. Z. van Niekerk

Van / From : Lt. Buckleboog

Aan / To : S. Mag Pers. Afdeling

Onderwerp / Subject : 01497353 TW/VPA 069114 Kpl L. du Plessis

1. Ek meen gedateer 3 Januarie en brief van Ad Lêer gedateer 17 Desember 1991 verwys.

2. Ek het bo-genoemde skrywer met Kapt R. Damant bespreek en bevestig dat die nette afwesigheid (26 Sept - 23 Okt) o.g.v. alkohol misbruik ontstaan het.

3. Dit is verder meen en optrede.

(Z. VAN NIEKERK)

OFFISIER IN BEHEER : MAJ

07722 SAPE T. BERFONTEIN

Officer Commanding: Eastern Province Command

[redacted]

Hiermee verklaar ek, nr 74565139PE, majoor HENDRIK JOHANNES LUUS, as volg onder eed:

1. As hoofregsoffisier te Kmdmt Wit was ek getaak deur kmdt Van der Walt (DMRA 012 3434) om 'n kol L du Plessis op die lughawe te kry vir konsultasie met senior advokaat ANTON MOSTERT met die oog op die Goniwe ondersoek (Geregtelike Doodsondersoek).

2. Uit die staanspoor was dit duidelik nadat ek alleen vir die kol opgetel het en afgevoer het na die Holiday Inn (Garden Court) Johannesburg dat die kol aanhoudend wou gesels.

3. Hy het vir my vertel dat:

   a. Hy 'n persoonlike vriend en weeklikse raadgewer was van genl Bantu Holomisa van Transkei.

   b. Dat hy "onlangs" mnr Mandela te woord gestaan het en heel waarskynlik weer sal terwyl hy in Johannesburg is.

   c. Dat hy een van die hoofrolspelers is in die Goniwe ondersoek.

4. Die persepsies wat ek afgelei het uit die gesprek was:

   a. Dat kol du Plessis moontlik 'n alkoholprobleem het aangesien

      i. ek in uniform was die aand by die lughawe en die volgende dag in 'n pak klere waartydens die kol my nie herken het nie en homself weer eens bekend gestel het.

      ii. Lt GERT NEL het die volgende dag na konsultasie met adv Mostert die kol terug lughawe toe gevat maar moes eers stop by 'n drankwinkel op versoek van die kol.

   b. Dit het voorgekom asof hy finansiële probleme het uit verskeie terloopse opmerkings.

   c. Dit het voorgekom of hy huweliksprobleme het uit terloopse opmerkinge.

5. Die algemene indruk was dat die kol in 'n vroeër stadium jare terug wel baie "competent" was maar nou iets wil weergee vir persoonlike gewin.

(GET H LUUS) MAJOOR

8 Maart 1993

Hiermee verklaar ek no 3453139 F Majoor Hendrik Johannes Kruus as volg onder eed;

1. As hoofregsoffisier te Kmdmt W.t was ek gevra deur Kmdt van der Walt (DMKA 012 391 3434) om n Kol du Plessis op die Lughawe te kry vir konsultasie met Senior Advokaat Anton Mostert met die oog op die Goniwi - ondersoek (Geregtelike Hooforsoek)

2. Uit die stasmospoor was dit duidelik nadat ek alleen vir die Kolonel opgetel het en afgevaar het na die Holiday-Inn (Garden Court) Jhb dat die Kolonel aanhoudend was gesels

3. Hy het vir my vertel, dat
i. Hy h persoonlike vriend en werklikse raadgewer was van Genl. Bantu Holomisa van Transkei
ii. Dat hy "onlangs" Mnr Mandela te word gestuur het en heel waarskynlik weer sal terwyl hy in Jhb is.
iii. Dat hy een van die hoofrolspeler is in die Goniwi ondersoek.

H-L

4. Die persepsies wat ek afgelei het uit die gesprek was

i. Dat Kolonel Du Plessis moontlik 'n alkohol probleem het aangesien a. ek in uniform was die aand by die lughawe en die dievolgende dag in 'n pak klere waar tydens die Kolonel my nie herken het nie en homself weereens bekend gestel het.

ii. Dit het gert Nel het dievolgende dag na konsultasie met Adv Madtert die Kolonel terug lughawe toe gevat maar moes weers stop by 'n drankwinkel op versoek van die Kolonel.

ii) Dit het voorgekom asof hy finansiele probleme het uit verskeie terloopse opmerkings

iii) Dit het voorgekom of hy huwelik probleme het uit terloopse opmerkings.

5. Die Algemene indruk was dat die Kolonel in 'n vroeër stadium jare terug wel baie "competent" was maar nou iets wil weergee vir persoonlike gewin.

Adriaan Meyer
elz/a2

HER-ROEP GETUIE NO 6

Ek, no 01497353TW kol Lourens du Plessis bevestig dat ek steeds onder eed is en as volg op die vrae soos aan my gestel, antwoord:

X Antwoord. Toe ek die Kmdmt verlaat het, het ek alle ander dokumentasie oor die spesiale projekte wat nie op die amptelike Kmdmt.lêers geliasseer moes word nie, met my saamgeneem na die standplaas vanwaar ek gewerk het. Met my vertrek op pensioen het ek dokumente wat nog van belang kan wees aan kol Liebenberg oorhandig. Die res het ek vernietig.

[redacted] 24/8

PM 10/1/1/1

No. .....

84

REPUBLIEK VAN TRANSKEI — REPUBLIC OF TRANSKEI

graphic Address } "BOTWE"

ss Bag X5039

RIES }

} 22510/310436

23876

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL
UMTATA

07 May 19 92.

Your Excellency
The State President
ETORIA
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Dear Mr President

POSSIBLE LEADS TO THE MYSTERIOUS DEATH OF GONIWE AND OTHERS

1. For many years the mysterious death of the abovementioned persons has been a matter of public speculation and concern. The RSA Government stated it could not find anyone responsible for the gruesome death of these. Be that as it may, we do not expect the RSA Government to claim that the deliberate and planned massacre of these political activists occurred in the past should evidence pointing to and incriminating very senior security personnel be made available to you and the Government by concerned members of the public.

2. You will recall, Sir, that you stated on numerous occasions that persons with incontrovertible evidence indicating the part played by the CCB and security forces in eliminating political

ersaries of the Government and in the permanent disappearance some members of the communities must bring it forward.

3. The attached copy of the signal message ordering the disappearance of Goniwe et al can assist the entire South African public and your Government in laying bare the true facts regarding the death of these gentlemen.

4. If this proves to be true it can be a sad commentary on the trustworthiness of the Government which kept on assuring the public of bringing activists suspected of any offence to the courts of law. The barbaric death of these activists strongly deserves your personal attention as security force role therein is unquestionable.

5. Political activists are still the targets of the unknown forces. The security forces always claim that they have exhaustively investigated these brutal murders to no avail. Their failure to arrest the culprits in the past and present occurs under the rule of the National Party; the continuous eliminations take place today under the same Government.

6. Sir, drastic steps against the alleged plotters of the elimination of political activists will assist you greatly in your efforts of creating a new South Africa and minimise the chances of accusations that your Government has a double agenda.

(80)

I wish to stress that persons involved in the killing of the harmed champions of rights of the disenfranchised people must be rought to justice and face the consequences of their brutal ctions. No civilized society can cover up and condone these avage acts.

3. I therefore earnestly appeal to you to cause all members who ere serving in the State Security Council in 1985 to publicly account for the disappearance of the said activists.

9. I am grateful to the Almighty God for the manner in which the attached copy landed in my hands. Transkei buries now and again victims of the violence raging in the townships. It will be a cause for grave concern if the security officers mentioned in the signal form are still serving in the present security forces because that will reinforce the argument that there is a white hand in the so-called black-on-black violence.

10. I have noted accusations levelled at me and others for ing inflammatory statements by Your Minister of Police, Mr H. Kriel.

11. At this moment a file detailing the NP Government's and its security apparatus's involvement in destabilising, killing, financing, training and equipping killers in the black community has just landed in my desk.

12. Minister Kriel is therefore advised to apologise publicly

a

Note. Compiled by IBIR.

(81)

portraying us as warmongers because the file in my possession ves the opposite.

3. We are keen to save the peace process and negotiations, we e also committed to saving you from the sinister forces operating behind your back.

4. You will recall that in 1990 I was the first homeland leader o inform you of the SAP connivance at attacks by Inkatha on ownship residents and our migrant labourers. I was proved orrect by the revelations of the slush funding of the IFP (Inkatha) by the RSA Government and the training and arming thereof by the same.

15. In 1990 I again complained about the training and arming of Transkei nationals opposed to our government by South African security forces. The November 1990 abortive coup against Transkei was hatched in South Africa and launched from its soil. The evidence led in our courts so far has amply corroborated our claims.

INB.

16. The abortive coup severely strained relations between the two countries to the extent that Transkei's 1991-1992 budget was approved in October 1991. I mention these matters to alert you on the dangers of being fed with incorrect information by some state departments.

In the light of all the above information I wish to inform u that the information contained in the said file pointing to he white hand in the planning, direction and orchestration of the so-called black-on-black violence will be shared with the entire black community and all its leaders.

NB.

18. The Military Intelligence, National Intelligence Service and the Police Intelligence have, it is clear, been feeding you with wrong information and intelligence on the black-on-black violence and covering up their orchestration thereof.

19. We hope that all the culprits in the ranks of the security forces will be tried in the courts of law. Blacks found in possession of weapons are arrested and remain in police custody. There are white rightwingers who have committed serious offences like bombing government property but they move freely among the public like Mr Botha, the suspended MP for Wonderboom.

20. This letter is being telefaxed but I will bring the original copy on 11 May when I address UCT students.

21. We hope Transkei will go down in history as the champion of peace and harmony. The people of South Africa expect good governance even before the dawn of the new era. We can be pleased if you weed your government of rotten elements hellbent on sowing anarchy in the country.

(90)

th highest considerations

(H.B. HOLOMISA)
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL : MAJOR-GENERAL
REPUBLIC OF TRANSKEI

cc. To all interested organizations and parties.

The Message

The signal message form that turned out to be the death warrant for the eastern Cape activists was first sent anonymously to Transkei's Major-General Bantu Holomisa. In the letter below, he communicates the documents chilling message to the Transkei's director of military intelligence.

TO: DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: Lt Col Ndzwayiba

FROM: MINISTER OF DEFENCE: Major General B Holomisa

TOP SECRET DOCUMENT IN MY POSSESSION

Please find attached hereto a copy of the self-explanatory memorandum in Afrikaans. This document was amongst the 'papers' sent for my attention without a covering note. I tried to reach the acting commander of the TDF, Brig. T.T. Matanzima but I was told that he has already left his office for the Easter Weekend.

My Observations:

This is a copy of a signal message from the Eastern province command to state security council Pretoria, sent by Senior Staff Officer Intelligence, Lt. L. Du Plessis.

This message was transmitted on 7th June 1985 through the Eastern Province Command Signal Unit in Port Elizabeth and signed by Du Plessis whose extension telephone number was 112. This signal message was for the personal attention of General van Rensburg who was probably one of the security personal holding a key position in the state security council.

This signal message refers to a telephone conversation between General van Rensburg and Brigadier V.D. Westhuizen on 7 June 1985. If I can still remember correctly, Brigadier V.D. Westhuizen was the Commander of the Eastern Province command at the time.

It is clear that Brig V.D. Westhuizen called L. Du Plessis to confirm in writing the telephonic conversation between General Van Rensburg and himself – hence this written signal message.

The most striking aspect of this signal message is para 3 which categorically states the urgency for the PERMANENT REMOVAL OF MATTHEW GONIWE, MBULELO GONIWE AND FORT CALATA from the community. Matthew Goniwe has taught in Cradock for a number of years; he taught at Ngqamakwe and at Holomisa Senior Secondary School, Mqanduli. He was well known in Transkei and his mysterious death in Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage has aroused intense concern up to this movement here and beyond our borders.

I doubt very much if 14 days passed after this signal message was written before the Goniwe and Calata were found dead. The commemoration of their death always takes place in June.

Godolozi, Hashe and Calela had disappeared and people are eager to know the mysterious circumstances surrounding their vanishing. The signal message para 4 envisages a wide reaction which can assume national proportions. In view of the importance of these persons, especially Matthew Goniwe, should they disapear like Godolozi, Hashe and Calela (PEBCO officials). Reaction of leftist politicians like Molly Blackburn. Protest in the case of Oscar Mpetha in sympathy (with his arrest).

There is no doubt that the physical elimination of Goniwe and Calata was approved at the highest echelons of the state security council comprising President P.W. Botha, General Malan, Mr Adriaan Vlok, Mr Pik Botha, the commissioner of police, the chief of the SADF and the head of National Intelligence Services.

I hope that I have properly translated the contents of the signal message from Afrikaans into English. (Stern u saam?). The RSA government has hotly denied its complicity in perpetration of the atrocities. The job of the politicians concerned has been made very easier. Concerned groups can check and verify the authenticity of the document by calling on handwriting experts to prove the truth.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Bring this to the attention of the commander of the TDF Brig. TT Matanzima on his return from the Easter Holidays..

2. Because of the sensitivity of the matter, it should be brought to the attention of political organisations and lawyers for Human Rights for their scrutiny as well as the RSA president. Hopefully he was not a member of the state security council at the time.,

3 If you concur with these recommendations, I will immediately dispatch this information to these bodies and persons. It is hoped that political organisations will learn the lesson of avoiding reliance on the state for the investigation of political murders in which it is deeply involved.

Finally I would like to state clearly that the attached copy seems to have been detached from files in South Africa. There is no doubt that it is the first copy (1 of 1 pages) of the original stamped on 7-6-85 at Eastern Province counsel signal unit, communication centre P.E.


Kindly advise

(H.B. Holomisa) Maj. Gen

Comments: I read the memo and the contents of the signal. I fully endorse the suggested actions. I'll brief the commander when he arrives.

M. NDZWAYIBA

DIRECTOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE



G43 DD 979

21/4/92.

I, Col Lourens du Plessis herewith confirm that the document OPGBS/191/7 Jun 85 is a genuine document. I further confirm that I am the author of the document concerned and was signed by myself.

Furthermore I confirm that the document was sent to the State Security Council Secretariat by teleprinter.

Tel: 041 - 306236.

Handling Instructions / Hanteringsinstruksies

5 1

/ 191 / 7 JUNIE

RG

=/BRIG VD

VAN BG)

VIE PERMANENT

INGENDHEID,

L AS NASIONAAL

VAN HIERDIE

DIE VIANO BV

RDUYTING VAN

(TAPSDRAERS)

O. TEARSTE VAN LINKSE POLITICI SOOS MOLLY BLACKBURN

C. PROTES SOOS GEVAL OSCAR MPETHA IN SWAPATE

Page / Bladsy	of / van	pages / bladsye	Refers to a classified message / Verwys na 'n geklassifiseerde berig	Drafter's name / Berigskrywer se naam	Appointment / Aanstelling	Phone No. / Foon No.
1	1		Yes/Ja ☐ No/Nee ☒	LAURENS	SSO	112

For signals use / Vir gebruik van seindiens		Date / Datum	Time / Tyd	System / Stelsel	Op / Bdnr		Date / Datum	Time / Tyd	System / Stelsel	Op / Bdnr	Releasing officer's signature / Goedkeuringsoffisier se handtekening
	Q					V					
	R					D					Designation / Amptstitel

VOLKSKAS BANK

BANKSTAAT
BANK STATEMENT

KOERS(E) VANAF/RATE(S) FROM 920328, 25.250% TOT/TO R65000 29.000% DAARNA/THEREAFTER

DIENSGELD/SERVICE FEE,- R0.75 PER R100.00 MINIMUM R0.75 MAKSIMUM/MAXIMUM R12.20

MNR L DU PLESSIS
VIOLETLAAN 6
SUNRIDGE PARK
6045 PORT ELIZABETH

				Rek nr / A/c no	1400-290-020
		LIMIET	65 000	Blad nr / Page no	96
		DIENSGELD (TE DEBITEER) / SERVICE CHARGES (TO BE DEBITED)	KREDIETE/CREDITS (+) (DEPOSITO'S/DEPOSITS BNO/ETC) / DEBITE/DEBITS (-) (TJEKS/CHEQUES BNO/ETC)	Tak / Branch	NPARK
	BESKRYWING / DESCRIPTION			DATUM / DATE	SALDO / BALANCE
	SALDO/SALDO/BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD			21-03-92	66 045,45-
	GARAGEKAART DEBIET/GARAGE CARD DEBIT		0,60-	21-03-92	66 046,05-
079	TJEK/CHEQUE 001221	0,75	66,00-	21-03-92	66 112,05-
080	TJEK/CHEQUE 001232	3,75	431,08-	21-03-92	66 543,13-
081	TJEK/CHEQUE 001231	0,75	66,77-	23-03-92	66 609,90-
082	0000000000UNIVERSITY MOTORS PORT E719184163		30,00-	24-03-92	66 639,90-
	GARAGEKAART DEBIET/GARAGE CARD DEBIT		0,60-	24-03-92	66 640,50-
083	TJEK/CHEQUE 001234	1,50	129,00-	24-03-92	66 769,50-
061	TJEK/CHEQUE 001224	0,75	17,00-	25-03-92	66 786,50-
062	TJEK/CHEQUE 001228	0,75	50,00-	25-03-92	66 836,50-
063	0000000000SUNRIDGE SERVICE STATI SUNRIDG719184163		62,60-	26-03-92	66 899,10-
064	0000000000SUNRIDGE SERVICE STATI SUNRIDG719184163		60,00-	26-03-92	66 959,10-
065	0000000000FERNGLEN SERVICE STAT. PORT E719184163		30,00-	26-03-92	66 989,10-
066	0000000000FERNGLEN SERVICE STAT. PORT E719184163		30,00-	26-03-92	67 019,10-
	GARAGEKAART DEBIET/GARAGE CARD DEBIT		0,60-	26-03-92	67 019,70-
	GARAGEKAART DEBIET/GARAGE CARD DEBIT		0,60-	26-03-92	67 020,30-
	GARAGEKAART DEBIET/GARAGE CARD DEBIT		0,60-	26-03-92	67 020,90-
	GARAGEKAART DEBIET/GARAGE CARD DEBIT		0,60-	26-03-92	67 021,50-
069	KREDIET/CREDIT TAPE 000000		15 000,00-	28-03-92	52 021,50-
084	DIENSGELD/SERVICE FEE 1400290020		11,25-	28-03-92	52 032,75-
085	0000000000SUNRIDGE SERVICE STATI SUNRIDG719184163		40,00-	28-03-92	52 072,75-
			16 206,00	28-03-92	R52 072,75-

29/3/Mon11

E04

96

DIE AFRIKAANSE SAKEKAMER VAN CRADOCK

SAMESPREKINGE MET DR. G. MORRISON L.P.

A. AGTERGROND

* Die klaarblyklike organiseerder van die huidige onluste en skoolboikot is Mnr. Matthew Goniwe en vier handlangers.

* Hierdie organiseerders word met raad bedien deur verskeie blankes, onder andere Mev. Molly Blackburn, Mnr. Malcomess, Mnr. Savage en Mev. Di Bishop.

* Mnr. Goniwe is nie toepaslik gekwalifiseer om as skoolhoof op te tree nie. Hy het tronkstraf in die Transkei uitgedien vir ondermynende bedrywighede. Hy is lid van die Kommunistiese Party.

* Sedert September 1983 het veral Mev. Blackburn gereeld na die Lingelihle woonbuurt gekom.

* 'n Liggaam, bekend as die Cradock Residents' Association (CRADORA) is gestig om die oproer te orkestreer. Hierdie beweging beveg die owerheid op alle geleenthede waar daar gepoog word om sy bedrywighede hok te slaan en verloor selde 'n hofsaak. Hierdie organisasie is geaffilieer by die UDF, die politieke vleuel van die ANC.

* Mnr. Goniwe en sy helpers was in hegtenis geneem, maar is weer vrygelaat en het dadelik met hul vergaderings en oproermakery voortgegaan.

B. DIE MOTIEF VAN DIE OPROER ORGANISEERDERS

* Die mense se beweegredes is polities van aard. Hulle is teen die plaaslike Dorpsrade vir swartes. Hulle wil direkte inspraak in die sentrale parlement hê en is dus geheel gekant teen die huidige politieke ontwikkelinge - veral die drie-kamer parlement.

* Hulle stel nie noodwendig belang in die lot van die plaaslike swartes nie. Verbetering van paaie, rioolgeriewe en elektrisiteit sal nie die oproer beëindig nie, hoewel dit die wetsgehoorsame swartes meer tevrede sou stel.

* Omdat die oproer polities geïnspireer word, staan die plaaslike bevolking magteloos om dit te bestry op 'n wettige manier. Daarom word die hulp van politici nou benodig.

C. VORIGE VERSOENINGSPOGINGS

* Op inisiatief van die sakekamer is werkskomitees gestig om die probleme te probeer oplos.

* Plaaslike swartes is hierby betrek. Die eerste vergadering is deur 'n persoon wat die UDF goedgesind is bygewoon. Daarna het hy nie weer opgedaag nie.

- Die aanvanklike vordering wat met die samesprekings gemaak was het tot niet gegaan. Die swart verteenwoordigers het die vergaderings nie meer bygewoon nie - waarskynlik vanweë intimidasie. Die burgermeesteres van die swart dorpsraad het bevestig dat opheffing van die woongebied se geriewe nie sal bydra dat oproermakers hul bedrywighede stop nie.

- Die polisiemag het tot dusver 'n lae profiel gehandhaaf. Hulle het met prysenswaardige selfbeheer vermy om te skiet op die oproermakers, al het hulle volle rede gehad om dit te doen. Die rede hiervoor is dat kinders betrokke is in groot getalle. Indien kinders gedood word laat dit emosies net hoër loop.

- Mnr. Goniwe en CRADORA is by herhaling gevra om te onderhandel, maar hulle weier enige gesprekvoering.

D. GEBEURE TOT OP DATUM

- Gedurende 1984 het kinders vir een week skoolgegaan. Nou dwaal hulle in die drop rond.

- Daar is nog geen teken dat skole in 1985 bygewoon sal word nie.

- Klipgooiery na die polisiemag is algemeen. Oor die algemeen word kinders gebruik en dit bemoeilik die taak van die polisiemag.

- Die situasie het in die onlangse verlede skielik vererger en intimidasie word al groter, soos hierna genoem.

- Ouers wat hulle kinders na skole buite Cradock stuur se huise word nou afgebrand.

- 'n Polisieman is met klippe doodgegooi en veelvuldige meswonde toegedien.

- 'n Aantal [illegible] is afgebrand, veral die van onderwysers en staatsamptenare.

- 'n Vergadering te gereël waar daar na bewering meer as 10 000 swartes van buite sou opdaag, meestal aanhangers van die UDF.

- Die bl[illegible] hierbo genoem kom nog gereeld na Cradock om die organisasie te verteenwoordig. Hulle neem beëdigde verklarings van "polisiegeweld" op, maar niks word gehoor van klipgooiery - beserings wat die [illegible] nie.

- Die [illegible] misleidende en halwe waarhede op 'n baie gereelde basis.

- Motor[illegible] pad na Port Elizabeth word met klippe gegooi.

- 'n Sake[illegible] dreigbrief ontvang.

- Die [illegible] vrees vir hul lewens van dag tot dag. Hulle [illegible] Die swart dorpsraad neem die Minister kwalik [illegible] dat Mnr. Goniwe nie gou sal terugkeer nie.

- 'n Blad[illegible] Mthaundul "Hotnots on Sunday" is binne [illegible] gebring. Die Kleurlinge vrees dat

hul skole afgebrand sal word as vergelding vir hul deelname aan die grondwetlike bedeling.

* Bydraes vir CRADORA word in die blanke dorp gevra en gekry (ongeveer R1 300 tot op datum).

* Die swart N.G. Kerk in Afrika se predikant se familie moes die woonbuurt verlaat. Hyself leef in gedurige vrees vir sy lewe.

* Van die intimideerders se kinders woon self plaasskole in die omgewing by. Bywoning by plaasskole is normaal, maar ook hul onderwysers word tans bedreig.

E. OORSAKE VAN KOMMER

Klankbord.

* Dit lyk asof Cradock die proefkonyn geraak het waar ondermynende bedrywighede 'n aanvang neem. Sodra sake hier verkeerd loop, begin die oproer binnê 'n paar maande in die groter sentra.

* Die intimidasie en dade van geweld het mettertyd al hoe erger geword. Indien daar nie 'n streep getrek word nie, weet 'n mens nie waar dit sal eindig nie.

* Dit wil voorkom asof die blanke gedeelte van die dorp ook die teiken van geweldenaars gaan word. Tewens, was dit nie vir die opoffering van die polisie, wat die swart woongebied soms dag en nag onder observasie hou, glo ons dat dit lankal reeds sou gebeur het.

* Cradock is op toerisme aangewese vir ekonomiese welvaart, eerder as op fabriekswese. Daar is al hoe meer bevestigde gevalle van voornemende besoekers wat hul besoeke kanselleer.

* Deurverkeer vermy die dorp al meer. Die dorp is op die hoofroete tussen Johannesburg, Bloemfontein en Port Elizabeth. Daar is egter 'n alternatiewe roete.

* Die dorp is ideaal geleë en het die infrastruktuur vir die bediening van omliggende dorpe soos Middelburg, Hofmeyr, Steynsburg, Molteno, Tarkastad, Bedford, Adelaide, Cookhouse, Pearston en Somerset-Oos. Tans vervul die dorp hierdie rol, maar die huidige situasie sal dit mettertyd in die wiele ry.

* Die skoolloopbaan van duisende kinders word in die wiele gery. Hulle kennis bly nie staties nie, maar gaan agteruit.

F. MOONTLIKE STAPPE WAT GEDOEN KAN WORD

* 'n Vergadering moet belê word met ons L.P., Dr. G. Morrison, waartydens ons diepe kommer uitspreek oor die toekoms van ons dorp indien die huidige situasie voortduur of verder versleg.

Ons moet ~~Dr.~~ idem Morrison versoek om as voorsitter van ons komitee oor te neem en 'n afvaardiging van drie of vier persone te lei na die Parlement ten einde betrokke Ministers vir daadwerklike optrede te vra.

- [illegible] deeglik en stem saam dat die regering graag 'n beeld van vreed- [illegible] wil handhaaf weens die aanslag van die buitelandse en plaaslike [illegible] en pers. Nogtans kan wetteloosheid en wanorde nie onbepaald [illegible] word om te eskaleer nie. Netsoos die vyand Cradock as [illegible] gebruik, kan ons dit ook gebruik om te sien hoe wetteloosheid [illegible] gesmoor kan word.

- [illegible]ke optrede teen die oproermakers sal in die kort termyn ook [illegible] publisiteit vir Cradock wees, maar behoort in die langer termyn [illegible] voordeel te wees.

- [illegible] oorsaak van die oproer is polities. Persone soos Mev. Black- [illegible] oneties op en moet te alle koste verhoed word om oproer te [illegible], deur hulle die distrik te verbied of enige ander effektiewe [illegible]

- [illegible] genoemde nie help nie, moet Mnr. Goniwe en sy helpers ook [illegible] distrik verwyder word. Al die aanwysers is dat hulle die [illegible] figure is. Toe Mnr. Goniwe toegesluit was, het skoolbywoning [illegible] verbeter. Sedert sy vrylating is dit gestaak.

- [illegible] kinders moet by die skool gekry word, selfs al sou hardhandige [illegible] nodig wees.

- [illegible] skoolkinders moet verhoed word om die blanke gebied in skoolure [illegible] te gaan.

- [illegible] moet besluite kom oor die toekoms van die skole en, indien sinvolle [illegible] nie kan plaasvind binne 'n neergelegde tyd nie, moet die besluite [illegible] word en nie hersien word alvorens sinvolle onderwys kan plaas- [illegible]. Ten tye van die bekendmaking van die besluit moet geen beloftes [illegible] word wat as 'n skuiwergat vir die owerhede gesien kan word om [illegible] weer in te gee nie.

- 'n [illegible]ingsaksie moet gestig word om alle bevolkingsgroepe op hoogte [illegible] van die werklike feite.

- [illegible] van 'n TV2/3 diens kan help om verveeldheid en kwaaddoen [illegible] enigsins aan bande te lê. Dit kan ook vir positiewe beriggewing [illegible] word.

- [illegible] moet hulle daarop instel om Mev. Blackburn en Mnr. Goniwe [illegible] negatiewe aksies in die openbaar in slegte lig te stel. Hoe [illegible] hom verneder in die oë van die publiek, hoe meer sal hy genood- [illegible] wees tot positiewe aksie wat hom sal blootstel aan wettige en [illegible]le vervolging.

3. [illegible]

- [illegible] het nie die inligting of insig om werklik die omvang van die probleem [illegible] meer nie of om die ideale oplossing voor te stel nie.

- [illegible] probleem is polities en sal polities en deur wetgewing, indien [illegible] regelos moet word.

- [illegible] versoek egter dat die probleem aandag op die hoogste vlak moet [illegible] en dat daan spoediglik en met beslistheid opgetree word.

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

X50

Verw./Navr. CD22/2/15 (17) V.1

Navrae/Inq.: Majoor Winter

TEL.: (0481) 2446

KANTOOR VAN DIE TAKBEVELVOERDER
VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK
5880

1988/08/18

Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

ALGEMENE VEILIGHEIDSITUASIE - CRADOCK.

1. Op 1988/08/08 het die OP.-G.B.S. Dagbestuur te Cradock vergader. Verteenwoordigers van die Cradock Sub-G.B.S. se VEICOM, SEMCOM en KOM-KOM het die vergadering bygewoon. Hierdie vergadering het 'n voorlegging aan NAS-GOS gedoen waarin toestemming gevra is vir sekere VEICOM aksies te Cradock. Hierdie VEICOM aksies behels onder andere die verwydering van 'n groep geïdentifiseerde radikales uit die swart gemeenskap van die Lingelihle onbuurt. NAS-GOS het toestemming verleen tot die VEICOM aksies.

2. Op 1988/08/18 is 'n totaal van 15 radikale leiers opgespoor en ondervra. Vyf van hierdie radikales het na vore getree met 'n versoek om met die takbevelvoerder van die Veiligheidstak te vergader. Indringende bespreking oor die toestand te Cradock het niks nuuts opgelewer nie. Dit het egter duidelik na vore gekom dat die kwessie van teenkanting teen die Munisipale Verkiesings in Oktober 1988 'n nasionale aksie is met die U.D.F. as dryfveer daar agter. Cradock kan dus nie as geïsoleerde eenheid in hierdie teenkanting gesien word nie. Met ander woorde, sover dit die Munisipale Verkiesings aanbetref reageer die plaaslike swart gemeenskap na die wense van die U.D.F.

3. Dit dien gemeld te word dat CRADORA en CRADOYA affiliale van die U.D.F. is. CRADORA en CRADOYA geniet die oorweldigende meerderheid steun van die swart gemeenskap te Cradock.

4. Gedurende die onluste van 1976 en 1977 het verskeie jeugdiges op politieke vlak na vore getree en was hulle direk betrokke by die beplanning van die onluste. Van hierdie jeugdiges is aangekla vir openbare geweld en ander dergelike oortredings waarvoor hulle gevangenisstraf uitgedien het. Hierdie jeugdiges is huidiglik in die ouderdomsgroep van 25 - 35 jaar en vorm die kern van radikales te Cradock, wat meebring dat daar inderdaad 'n geslag van radikales te Cradock is. Die huidige jeug van Cradock tot op die ouderdom van 25 jaar het opgegroei in 'n rewolusionêre klimaat. Dit het

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5. Gesien in die lig van paragrawe 3 en 4 is hierdie kantoor die mening toegedaan dat die aanhouding van radikales geen positiewe resultate sal oplewer nie. Om resultate uit aanhoudings te verkry sal dit dus beteken dat feitlik alle jeugdiges aangehou sal moet word, wat in die praktyk onmoontlik is. Selektiewe aanhouding dien verder ook geen doel omdat die plek van 'n aangehoudene onmiddellik deur 'n ander aktivis ingeneem word. As alternatief sal gesprekvoering en kommunikasie beter resultate oplewer. Laasgenoemde kan gestaaf word uit die gesprek wat gevoer is soos genoem in paragraaf 2, waaruit dit duidelik geblyk het dat radikales nie onwillig is om te kommunikeer nie. Dit dien egter gemeld te word dat daar ooglopende wantroue tussen radikales onderling is en dat hulle nogsteeds CRADORA as verteenwoordigende organisasie van die swart gemeenskap beskou. Dit is dan ook een van die redes waarom daar geen belangstelling in 'n verkiesing is nie.

6. Die aanhouding van radikales word voorgehou as die hoof oorsaak vir teenkanting teen die Munisipale verkiesings.

7. Etlike Staatsdepartemente word op die plaaslike SUB-G.B.S. verteenwoordig. Tydens SUB-G.B.S. vergaderings doen die Veiligheidstak verslag oor die veiligheidsituasie van die streek. Dit is duidelik dat die verteenwoordigers van die onderskeie Departemente hulle eie evaluering van die veiligheidsoorsig doen. Dit is ongelukkig so dat hierdie evaluasies nie altyd objektief is nie, met die gevolg dat verdraaide feite die hoër hoofkwartiere bereik. Laasgenoemde bring mee dat Cradock sonder meer as 'n brandpunt geoormerk word. By die bestudering van weeklikse veiligheidsoorsigte is dit egter duidelik dat Cradock geensins 'n uitsondering is sover dit progressiewe politieke bedrywighede aanbetref nie. Wat Cradock egter 'n voorsprong gee ten opsigte van progressiewe politieke bedrywighede is die feit dat 'n mens hier te make het met 'n relatief klein homogene swart gemeenskap wat uit die aard van die saak 'n hegtige eenheid vorm.

8. Opsommend kan gemeld word dat die rewolusionêre klimaat te Cradock deel is van 'n nasionale situasie en die persepsie dat Cradock uitgesonder kan word nie noodwendig die werklikheid is nie. Inteendeel is dit so dat organisering op progressiewe politieke vlak te Cradock vanuit die groter sentra beheer word.

MAJOOR
TAKBEVELVOERDER
(E.F.N. WINTER)

SECRET

Kantoor van die Staatspresident

Tuynhuys
8001 KAAPSTAD

AAN AL DIE LEDE VAN DIE STAATSVEILIGHEIDSRAAD

DORHOOFSE GBS-PLANNE TER BESLEGTING VAN BESONDERE KNELPUNTE IN DIE REWOLUSIONÊRE OORLOG

1. AGTERGROND

Die NKK het op 23 April 1986 besluit dat die GKS en WS die dokument in bovermelde verband moet verwerk en die uitvoerbaarheid van die planne met die verskillende departemente uitklaar.

Die verwerkte planne moet by die volgende vergadering ingedien word vir voorlegging aan die SVR vir goedkeuring.

2. KOMMENTAAR

2.1 Die voorstelle is onmiddellik met die tersaaklike welvaartsdepartemente opgeneem en van die veertien departemente is terugvoering van tien departemente ontvang. Die kommentare van die volgende departemente is uitstaande:

Nasionale Opvoeding
Raad: Administrasie van Verteenwoordigers
Buro vir Inligting
Administrasie Volksraad

2.2 Uit die aard van die uiteenlopende kommentare wat gewissel het van gedeeltelike instemming tot nie-aanvaarding, is dit nie prakties moontlik om die planne in besonderhede te bespreek nie.

2/...

2.3 Departemente se kommentare ondersteun die beginsel van gesamentlike en gekoördineerde optrede teen die rewolusionêre magte, dog voorsien wesenlike probleme met die voorgestelde toepassing van etlike van die planne.

3. ALGEMENE STANDPUNT TEN OPSIGTE VAN DIE REWOLUSIONÊRE OORLOG

3.1 Die rewolusionêres het magsoorname ten doel en wil as eerste stap, die land onregeerbaar maak deur landswyd oor plaaslike owerhede en plaaslike omstandighede beheer te verkry.

3.2 Die sukses van rewolusionêre beheer op plaaslike vlak is 'n aanduiding van die mate waartoe die land onregeerbaar is.

3.3 Ten einde die destabiliserende aksies teen te werk behoort 'n nasionale doelwit nagestreef te word. Sodanige doelwit behoort die versterking en herstel van die plaaslike owerheidstelsel as instrument te wees.

4. DEPARTEMENTELE STANDPUNTE OOR GBS-PLANNE

4.1 Met as uitgangspunt dat departemente dit as hoofdoel nastreef om plaaslike owerhede te stabiliseer en om stabiliteit op plaaslike vlak te herstel, word die volgende gevolgtrekkings gemaak:

4.1.1 Dié planne is in vele opsigte doelstellings in eie reg en hou nie rekening met gesamentlike sentrale doelwitte nie.

4.1.2 Die uitvoerbaarheid en prioriteite van sommige aksies en voorgestelde teenoptredes wat deur die GBSe voorgestel is word bevraagteken. 'n Ander aspek waaroor beswaar bestaan is die gefragmenteerde wyse waarop die probleme aangespreek word. Die GBS-planne maak voorsiening vir ad hoc optredes in gebiede wat plaaslik reeds onregeerbaar is. Hierdie situasie kan deur die rewolusionêres gunstig uitgebuit word. Die simptome word aangespreek terwyl die basiese probleme nie noodwendig opgelos word nie. Dieselfde probleme geld ten opsigte van werkskepping, hoëmasbeligting, paaie, onderwys, ensovoorts. In gedestabiliseerde gebiede soos in die Oos-Kaap

sal radikales daarop aanspraak maak dat hulle sukses bereik het.

4.1.3 Die hantering van sosio-ekonomiese probleme is nie noodwendig die oplossing van die rewolusionêre aanslag nie. Die ware doel is politieke oorname. Sosio-ekonomiese toestande word slegs as mobilisasiepunte gebruik.

5. ALTERNATIEWE VOORSTELLE

5.1 Departemente gaan akkoord dat gesamentlike en gekoördineerde optredes nodig is. Die klem val daarop dat die implementering van die planne noukeurig beplan moet word. Die volgende punte is van kardinale belang;

5.1.1 Aanvaar die sentrale doelwit van die versterking en herstel van die plaaslike owerheidstelsel as instrument om orde en stabiliteit in Swart gemeenskappe te herstel en te handhaaf.

5.1.2 Versterk eers daardie owerhede waar dit nog relatief rustig is ten einde te verhoed dat die revolusie verder versprei. Dit sal op beplande en subtiele wyses moet geskied aangesien die vyand sekerlik sal reageer op sulke optredes.

5.1.3 Herstel plaaslike owerhede sistematies vanaf die punte waar die vyand die swakste is. Suksesse moet verseker word en moet met slegs die noodsaaklikste polisie- of militêre mag bereik word.

5.1.4 Stabiliseer die herwonne gebiede deur middel van polisiebeskerming, verwydering van die vyandige leierskap, inwerkingtreding van ontwikkelingsprojekte, samewerking van naasliggende blanke en ander plaaslike owerhede, instelling van gemeenskapsontwikkelingsprogramme, herstel van skoolstelsel, ensovoorts.

5.1.5 Publiseer die suksesse ten einde teenaksies nasionaal te mobiliseer maar op so 'n wyse en tyd dat die gemagtigdes nie blootgestel sal word aan verdere intimidasie nie.

5.1.6 Namate die program vorder en sterker 'vyandige vestings' aangedurf word, sal sterker optrede van veiligheidsmagte nodig wees en sal dit langer neem om die gebiede te stabiliseer. Dit

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sal ook groter insette van die Welvaartdepartemente vereis sodra die veiligheid verseker is. Departemente sal hiervoor moet voorberei en toegerus word.

5.1.7 Die onderhandelingsproses oor politieke strukture en politieke inspraak moet versnel word. Raadslede van plaaslike owerhede moet waar nodig en moontlik sigbaar by die prosesse betrek word.

(Bogeneomde voorstelle van die Departement van Staatkundige Ontwikkeling en Beplanning is met die Minister van Staatkundige Ontwikkeling en Beplanning uitgeklaar).

6. AANBEVELING

Dit word aanbeveel dat -

6.1 Bogeneomde alternatiewe voorstelle, soos volg opgesom, aanvaar word naamlik:

(a) Gesamentlike gekoördineerde optrede.
(b) Aanvaarding van die doelwit: Herstel van plaaslike owerheidstelsel.
(c) Herstel van plaaslike owerhede volgens plan.
(d) Stabiliseer herwonne gebiede.
(e) Reklameer suksesse met stabilisering.

6.2 Die Departement van Staatkundige Ontwikkeling en Beplanning as uitvoerende departement versoek moet word om met die vestiging van plaaslike besture voort te gaan soos voorgestel.

6.3 Die gedeeltes van die planne wat vir departemente aanvaarbaar is met spoed uitgevoer word.

SEKRETARIS: WELVAARTBESTUURSTELSEL

7/5/86.

G E H E I M SECRET GEHEIM

MINI-GBS VERGADERING BYEENGEROEP OP DONDERDAG 9 JANUARIE 1986

OM 14H00 TE LOUIS LE GRANGEPLEIN

TEENWOORDIG:	VERTEENWOORDIG:
Kmdt. N.J. Shamley (Voorsitter)	Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag
Lt. Kol. P.J. Ras (Mede Voorsitter)	Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie
Vaandrig D.M. Williams (Sekretaris)	Suid-Afrikaanse Vloot

LEDE:

Maj. I.M. Ferreira	Louis le Grangeplein
Maj. C. Venter	Nuwe Geregshowe
Maj. R.F. Berg	Reaksie-Eenheid
Kapt. J.S. Moolman	Walmer
Lt. J.S. Best	Radiobeheer
Lt. H.J. de Beer	Kabegapark
Lt. E.A. Taylor	S.A.P. (V)
Mnr. D.S. Werth	Buro vir Inligting.
Mnr. G.J. Barnardt	OKOR
Mnr. D. Reinecke	Staatkundige Ontwikkeling
Mnr. F.P.J. Herbst	P.E. Munisipaliteit
Mnr. D.L. Davel	Onderwys en Opleiding

VERWELKOMING:

Die Voorsitter verwelkom die lede teenwoordig.

DOEL VAN VERGADERING:

Spesiale Vergadering: Walmer as probleemgebied:
SWART KOL IN BLANKE WOONGEBIED

Die Voorsitter stel Lt. Kol. Ras aan die woord.

Walmer is lank reeds onder bespiegeling. Hy het 'n populasie van +- 12 000 inwoners. Lt. Kol. Ras versoek OKOR om die presiese popu= lasie vas te stel. Dit is 'n gebied wat voortdurend:

(1) Kriminele elemente huisves
(2) Sporadiese klipgooiery

Verskeie vrae hang oor hierdie gebied, naamlik:

(1) Wat is Walmer se bestaansreg?
(2) Wat is die doel van hierdie gebied binne Blanke gebied?
(3) Het Walmer nog bestaansreg?
(4) 99 Huurpagwet - gaan dit in hierdie gebied toegepas word?
(5) Kan Walmer verskuif word? of
(6) Beperking van mense in Walmer gebied

Daar is slegs een Laer Primêre Skool en een Hoër Primêre Skool wat ondoeltreffend is en dan moet Hoërskoolleerlinge wat in Walmer woo in ander swart woongebiede skoolgaan. Die Walmer woongebied is o higiënies en Lt. Kol. Ras vra die vergadering wat die doel van Walmer se daarstelling was.

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Mnr. Werth sê dat Walmer lank gelede sy eie munisipaliteit gehad het, daarom is die swart woonbuurt opgerig. Maj. Berg sê dat daar sedert 1978 pogings aangewend was om Walmer te skuif en toe is daar 'n klomp mense verskuif. Ministers het die gebied besoek en besluit dat Walmer moet bly.

Lt. Kol. Ras sê dat daar opskrif bepaal moet word wat voorheen gesê of besluit was en versoek die Voorsitter om die vergadering oop te stel vir bespreking vir die verskuiwing van Walmer.

Maj. Berg sê dat die L.V. Kleinhans gesê het dat Walmer bly en die verskuiwing is op Ministriële vlak afgelas.

Mnr. Reinecke sê dat gedurende die volgende Parlementsitting daar bepaal gaan word of Walmer gaan bly of nie. Daar is geen ontwikkeling in die gebied en dat daar gewag moet word vir 'n politieke beslissing.

Maj. Berg sê 'n gemotiveerde verslag is belangrik. Daar is geen behoorlike behuising nie. Skole word afgebrand - asbesgeboue. Walmer is so geleë waar daar geen ontwikkeling kan plaasvind nie.

Kommandant stem saam met gemotiveerde verslag en vra vir enige teenstemme.

Mnr. Dafel sê hy stem saam. Aangesien die politici weet van die omstandighede en indien daar 'n teregwysing is, kan daar altyd terugverwys word na die verslag.

Mnr. Werth sê dat volgens die Staatspresident het hy belowe dat daar geen gedwonge verskuiwings sal wees nie. Mense wie onwettig in gebied woon, kan deur middel van klopjagte verwyder word. Die omstandighede moet so moeilik as moontlik gemaak word en hulle byna dwing om te skuif. Daar moet 'n beperking wees vir die hoeveelheid mense daar woonagtig. Die gebied is te klein vir verdere uitbreiding. As gevolg van versekering deur die Staatspresident maak hulle soos hulle wil met brande en onluste.

Mnr. Herbst beveel aan dat die verslag so diepgaande en deeglik as moontlik moet wees, byvoorbeeld die noodsaaklikheid van die verskuiwing as gevolg van die omstandighede. Port Elizabeth Stadsraad is verantwoordelik vir Walmer gebied. Gesondheidsinspekteur moet inspeksies doen. Daar sal ook teenkanting van die besighede wees as gevolg van finansiële verlies.

Die verslag moet die volgende bevat, naamlik, onrus, gesondheid, sosiaal en beperking van uitbreiding.

'n Komitee word saamgestël vir die inspeksie:

1. Kapt. Moolman
2. Mnr. Naude
3. Mnr. Scholtz
4. Mnr. Reinecke - Sekretaris
5. Mnr. Herbst

Maj. Berg sekondeer.

Die vergadering verdaag en sal op 1986.01.28 om 14h00 te Louis le Grangeplein vergader vir 'n verslag van die Komitee.

NOTULE OPGESTEL DEUR SERS.(V) R. VELTHUYSEN.

SERS.(V)

''S·E·R·R·E·T·A·R·E·S·S·E''
(R. VELTHUYSEN)

/LvT

G E H E I M

CRHEIM

Mnr. D. Reyneke	Samewerking en Ontwikkeling [illegible]
Mnr. F. Scholtz	Ibayi Stadsraad
Mnr. J. Steyn	PEM Gesondheidsafdeling
Mnr. A. Swart	PEM Burgerlike Beskerming
Mnr. [illegible]	Ibayi Stadsraad
Kapt. A.J. Coolman	SS Mulmer
Mnr. P.J. Swart	Ontwikkelingsraad

Die [illegible] is almal baie welkom en berig [illegible] GBS berommerd is oor die situasie in die Malan [illegible]

Kapt. Coolman deel die vergadering mee dat die huidige inwonertal tussen 10.000 en 12 000 is terwyl die inwonerregister 5000 reflekteer. Daar is dus plus minus 5000 onwettige inwoners wat in plus minus 1000 onwettige strukture woon.

Die totale oppervlakte van die geproklameerde gebied is 23,21 morg en die gebied, wat bufferstroke uitsluit, word ten volle bewoon.

Die werkloosheidsyfer beloop tans plus minus 50% en die huur wissel tussen R25 en R30 per maand. Daar is twee skole, verskeie perke en sportgronde (Sien aanhangsels A en B)
Die feit dat daar geen ontwikkeling mag plaasvind nie [illegible] in kontras te wees met sekere ontwikkelings wat toegelaat word deur die ontwikkelingsraad, soos bv. die [illegible] die drankwinkel en 'n nuwe skool. Die situasie gee tot aanleiding tot friksie onder die swart gemeenskap.

Gereelde vullisverwydering, sanitêre verwydering en watervoorsiening vind plaas en die toestand by veral die plakkersgebied is beter as in sekere van die ander swart plakkersgebiede. [illegible] verskaffing van gesondheidsdienste word egter [illegible] tydens onlussituasies.

Wat die misdaadsyfer aanbetref word die [illegible] deur Kapt. Coolman verskaf. (Jan 85 - 31 Des 85.)

a)	Dronk	338	
b)	Handel in drank	78	
c)	Betreding	289	
d)	Ronddrentel	68	
Minder ernstige misdade		Totaal	773
a)	Aanranding ernstig	130	
b)	Moord	38	
c)	Poging tot moord	12	
d)	Roof	33	
e)	Diefstal van vee en bere	19	
f)	[illegible] diefstal	872	
g)	[illegible]	108	

l)	Verbrygting	16
m)	Diefstal uit woonperseel	124
n)	Inbraak Winkels	16
o)	Swart besigheidsperseel	10
p)	Swart huisperseel	
	Huisbraak	124

Sedert 7 tot 9 Desember is 8 plekke tot stand, en 3 verdere aangemeld. Die gevelde syfers kan as normaal beskryf word. Die woongebied is ook soos ander gebiede in twee dele, te w.t. m AZAPO en UDF gebied, verdeel.

Die grootste probleem in die gebied is dat die gebied hoofsaaklik nie groot genoeg is om die natuurlike aanwas van die bevolking te akkommodeer nie. Die tendens geen aanleiding tot die groot persentasie van onwettige strukture, wat op sy beurt weer aanleiding gee tot die feit dat werkloses nie begerig is om die arbeidsmark te betree nie. Inkomste deur dié persone word primêr verkry uit die verhuring van onwettige strukture.

Op die huidige stadium vind onwettige plakkery op n groot skaal plaas. Die gesondheidstoestand in die gebied is egter geensins swakker as in enige ander soortgelyke gebied nie.

Opsommend kan gesê word dat die algemene gevoel van die subkomitee was dat die neem van n finale polisiële besluit nou onafwendbaar geword het sodat die nodige aandag aan Walmer gegee kan word ten einde te verseker dat waar sokal die l[illegible] voorregtig is, hulle [illegible] regstaat sal kan voer.

Die vergadering verdaag om 11h20.

M E M O R A N D U M

THE TOWN CLERK
IBHAYI TOWN COUNCIL
PORT ELIZABETH

WALMER TOWNSHIP

COUNCIL HOUSES 216

PRIVATE HOUSES (Shacks) 175

ILLEGAL SHACKS 1 024

POPULATION 5 296

Males 2 296
Females 3 000

UNEMPLOYED 50.%

RENTS

SHOPS

Privately Owned	1	R23.66 per month
Council Owned	3	R23.47 per month
		R33.71 per month
		R39.90 per month

HOUSES AND SHACKS

RENTAL		AREA	HOUSES	TYPE
R21.11	Service Charges	A	1	Mission Charges
R22.56	Service Charges	A	175	Wood and Iron
R23.03	Rent 0.47 Service Charges R22.56	A	2	1 Room Cement Privately Built
R23.87	Rent 1.31 Service Charges R22.56	B	20	1 Room Cement Privately Built
R24.22	Rent R1.66 Service Charges R22.56	B	42	1 Room Cement Privately Built
R24.88	Rent R2.32 Service Charges R22.56	B	13	2 Roomed Built
R25.07	Rent R2.51		141	3 Roomed H.C.W

SCHOOLS	2	(1 Lower Primary and 1 Higher Primary)
BOTTLESTORES	1	
LIBRARY	1	
COMMUNITY HALL	1	
CINEMA	1	(R11.19 Per month)
SPORTS FIELDS	NIL	
CHURCHES	6	(R11.19 per month)
BOTTLE DEALERS	1	
FRUIT AND VEGETABLES	1	
CEMETERY	1	

E. MITCHELL
SENIOR HOUSING MANAGER: NEW BRIGHTON
IBHAYI TOWN COUNCIL

2/4/1/8
20 January 1986
/thk

	ACCT 18	CASH	ACCTS
HUGH SAVAGE VILLAGE	R3 536.05	R2 691.58	R8 304.93
A.B.C.D	5 765.57	4 435.43	13 549.07
TRADERS	130.74	30.00	900.84
MISCELLANEOUS	67.14	55.95	3 925.45
TOTAL	R9 500.10	R7 212.96	R26 680.29

SPESIALE MINI GBS-VERGDERING BYEENGEROEP OP DINSDAG 4 FEBRUARIE 1986 OM 14 HOO TE LOUIS LE GRANGEPLEIN, P.E.

TEENWOORDIG	VERTEENWOORDIG
Kmdt. N.J. Shamley (Voorsitter)	S.A. Weermag
Lt.-Kol. P.J. Ras (Mede-voorsitter)	S.A. Polisie, Distrikskommando
Sers. (V) R. Velthuyser (Sekretaresse)	S.A. Polisie

.....

LEDE:

Maj. Ferreira .....Louis le Grangeplein
Maj. Venter .....Nuwe Geregshowe
Kapt. Knoetze .....Kabegapark
Kapt. Moolman .....Walmer
Lt. Botha .....S.A.S.P. (Hawe)
Lt. Strydom .....S.A.P. (V)
Lt. Els .....S.A.P. (V)
A/O Swartz .....S.A.S.P. (Lughawe)
Mnr. Jacobs .....Lughawebestuur
Mnr. Peterson .....Staatkundige Ontwikkeli
Mnr. Scholtz .....Ibhaye Stadsraad
Mnr. Potgieter .....Ibhaye Stadsraad
Mnr. Nako .....Ibhaye Stadsraad
Mnr. Mpondo .....Ibhaye Stadsraad
Mnr. Jemaana .....Ibhaye Stadsraad

.....

VERWELKOMING:

Die Voorsitter verwelkom alle lede [illegible] Ibhaye Staa

DOEL VAN DIE VERGADERING:

[illegible] nvatbaarheid van Walmer [illegible] woongebiede.

Die voorsitter sê daar is tans 'n Komitee wat [illegible] van Louis le Grangeplein val, naamlik "Joint Management Committee" wat met probleme aldaar behulpsaam is.

Hy vra die Ibhaye Stadsraad om met hul idees vir die oplos van hierdie probleme [illegible] te kom. Die Voorsitter verklaar dat [illegible] om te praat.

[illegible] op die kaart in wat [illegible] lig is en watter gebiede, byvoorbeeld [illegible] grens.

Gaan [illegible]

HOOFPROBLEME:

1. Walmer swartwoonbuurt is vir 'n sekere hoeveelheid mense gebou. Huidiglik is daar geen ruimte vir uitbreiding in hierdie gebied nie. Indien hierdie gebied uitbrei, tot op die uiterstes van sy grense, kan daar 'n populasie ontploffing plaasvind. Die gebied moet nie 'n krotbuurt word nie. Hierdie gebied huisves ook 'n groot aantal kriminele.

   Suid van Walmer swartwoonbuurt is een van ons Nasionale Sleutelpunte, naamlik die lughawe wat bedreig kan word indien daar verdere uitbreiding plaasvind. Verder in die aangrensende gebiede is daar die golfbaan dwaar daar in plus minus 2 weke 4 sake van aanrandings en rowe gerapporteer is. Daar is ook 'n groot gebied waar bosslapers voorkom.

2. Inspeksies toon dat huise aan die linkerkant ná die ingang is slegs tydelike huise (shacks). Hieruit ontstaan onhigiëniese toestande. Sal dit nie beter wees as die mense na 'n groter woongebied gaan om onder beter omstandighede te leef en waar 'n beter moontlikheid vir uitbreiding is nie? 'n Groot bedrag geld was toegestaan vir die opgradering van Walmer swartwoongebied, byvoorbeeld die verbetering van paaie, ensovoorts. Kan die geld nie beter gebruik word nie? Walmer het al probleme geskep en veroorsaak, maar wat beheer kan word. Daar is net twee skole en die hoogste standerd is St. 5. Wat is die ouers se onkoste as die kinders na hoërskole in ander woongebiede moet gaan, byvoorbeeld die hoeveelheid busse en busgeld?

   Die Voorsitter versoek die Ibhaye Stadsraad om na vore te kom en die probleme te bespreek.

Mnr. Mpondo bedank die Voorsitter vir die uitnodiging na die vergadering sodat hulle ook hulle kant van die saak kan stel. Die Voorsitter het gesê dat die vergadering nie polities is nie, maar die uitvoering daarvan is polities. 'n Memorandum is reeds deur hulle aan die Staatspresident gestuur.

Walmer swartwoongebied bestaan sedert 1929. Die tydelike huise (shacks) wat daar staan is nie onwettig nie, aangesien dit die tipe huis was wat vir die mense opgerig is (1929) en hulle is daaruit gebore.

In die memorandum aan die Staatspresident is hy versoek dat Walmer opgegradeer moet word vir die moontlikheid van verdere uitbreiding. Terwyl Dr. Morris besig was met die verskuiwing van Walmer is besluit dat die agterplaasverkopers na Zwide verskuif moet word. Die mense was gewillig en is toe na Zwide verskuif sonder enige probleme.

Na 'n tyd sal daar 'n populasie ontploffing wees net soos in die Tooi Lokasie se geval. Die probleme by die golfbaan, naamlik aanranding en roof is nie deur inwoners van Walmer gepleeg nie, maar wel deur mense wat in die bosse daar naby slaap. Die bewoners van Walmer swartwoongebied het al verskeie kere gekla

G E H E I M

dat 'n "dorpie" in die bos ontstaan het. Die bos moet skoon=gemaak word. Ibhaye Stadsraad kan nie daarvoor sorg nie, aan=gesien dit buite hulle gebied is. Mnr. Mpondo voel dat Walmer swartwoongebied moet ontwikkel en dat die mense in beter huise moet woon.

Wat skole aan betref moet daar uitbouing plaasvind. Die deklarasie aan die Regering hou Ibhaye Stadsraad terug, want niemand weet wat van Walmer gaan word nie en daarom kan daar nie vooruitbeplanning wees nie.

Die Voorsitter som Mnr. Mpondo se voorstellings as volg op:

(a) Walmer swartwoongebied moet opgegradeer word
(b) Walmer moet behoue bly.
(c) Die huise moet verbeter word.
(d) Die kinders sal gewillig wees om te skuif indien daar 'n populasie ontploffing plaasvind.

Mnr. Mpondo bevestig dit en voeg by dat hulle nie aan die Staats=president genoem het van die populasie ontploffing nie.

Mnr. Nako sê dat Walmer nie 'n probleem gebied is nie. Die kin=ders is voltallig by die skole en daar heers geen onlussituasie nie. Walmer moet nie verskuif word nie.

Die Voorsitter sê dat die Regering nou vinnig sal moet besluit wat gaan word en indien hulle besluit dat Walmer gaan bly, moet hy opgegradeer word.

Mnr. Scholtz som Walmer se bewoners as volg op:

1 000 Tydelike huise (shacks)
1 500 Huise
12 00 Inwoners

Daar was donasies gemaak vir die opgradering van Walmer, naamlik:

R56 000 Verbeterings aan strate
R50 000 Elektrisiteit
R50 000 Sportfasiliteite
R30 000 Verbeterings en vergroting van begrafplaas

En by die bogenoemde donasies is die skoonmaak van bosse ingesluit. Die gesamentlike bedrag beloop R186 000,00 vir die opgradering.

Lt.-Kol. Ras hou die mense in die bosse in gedagte en hy is bewus van die probleem wat hulle skep. Die matrikulante wat tans by hulle ouers in Walmer woon, waarheen gaan hy na matriek en wat gaan hy doen? Hoe gaan die woonprobleem opgelos word?
Zwide, die Rooi Lokasie is nie in 14 Distrik nie, daarom word hulle nie gereken nie en word daar nie in daardie gebiede belang=gestel nie.

Mnr. Jemsana sê dit help nie om teen mekaar te praat nie, want dit gaan nie die probleme oplos nie. Hy het daar grootgeword en opgegroei en die besluit van 'n verskuiwing is teen die inwoners van Walmer. Wat die beste vir die inwoners is moet in gedagte gehou word.

G E H E I M

Onmiddellik as daar van verskuiwing gepraat word, is daar chaos. Daar moet vooruit beplan word. Die kriminele faktor is nie die inwoners se skuld nie, as daar probleme is, moet daar na die verantwoordelikes gekyk word. Daar is al jare terug geveg vir die opgradering van Walmer. Wie is verantwoordelik vir die bos=slapers? Waarom moet die inwoners daarvoor geld? Die tydelike huise is Walmer munisipaliteit se skuld. Hulle het dit in 1929 laat oprig.

Skole en onkostes daaraan verbonde kan nie in parallel met werk vergelyk word nie. Wat is die koste dat ek as werker 3 - 4 busse na my werk moet neem? Die koste is niks as ek my kind net vir 5 jaar in 'n ander gebied moet laat skoolgaan nie. Dit is 5 jaar, ek werk tot ek doodgaan.

As Xhosa raak die Swart tradisie my, want my voorvaders (ouers) is in Walmer begrawe.

Die Voorsitter sê dat daar hulp moet aangebied word vir die opgra=dering van Walmer. 'n Brief sal aan die Regering gerig moet word dat hulle nou binne 2-3 maande tot 'n besluit moet kom. Wanneer was die versoek deur die Ibhaye Stadsraad aan die Staatspresident gerig.

Mnr. Scholtz sê dat op 27 Augustus 1985 was daar met Minister Heunis onderhandel en hy het belowe om dit verder te voer.
Op 27 Januarie 1986 was 'n skriftelike versoek gerig en 'n afspraak met die Staatspresident was belowe.

Mnr. Jacobs sê dat Minister Heunis op 22 Februarie 1986 weer Port Elizabeth besoek en daar moet gereël word vir onderhandelinge.

Lt.-Kol. Ras sê Walmer was "skoongemaak" en verbode elemente was verwyder.

Volgens lede van die Ibhaye Stadsraad is daar met tye 'n invloei van mense uit alle oorde. Huis-tot-huis deursoeking kan onge=wenste elemente identifiseer en hulle kan verwyder word.

Die Voorsitter sê indien Walmer swartwoonbuurt bly, moet daar mense wees wie die invloei van mense kan beheer.

Lt.-Kol. Ras vra die Ibhaye Stadsraad of hulle tevrede sal wees as S.A. Polisie lede in Walmer swartwoonbuurt ingaan en 'n deeglike huis-tot-huis deursoeking doen. Daar is onwettige inwoners en daar sal probleme wees. Hoe voel Ibhaye Stadsraad daaroor?

Mnr. Jemsana sê politikusse is bang vir mekaar en is bang om die "sambok" te gebruik. Is gevoel hierby betrokke? Het die S.A. Polisie lede al omgegee as hulle besig is om hulle werksverplig=tinge uit te voer?

Die Voorsitter vra of die Ibhaye Stadsraad teenwoordig sal wees.

G E H E I M

Mnr. Jemsana sê NEE, want dit is nie hulle werk om misdaad te bekamp nie.

Die Voorsitter sê 'n versoek sal nou aan die Regering gerig word om finaal te besluit. Dan sal daar weer met Ibhaye Stadsraad onderhandel word.

'n Ander probleem wat bespreek was, is die vullishoop by Walmer. Daar is vasgestel dat die P.E.M. die tuinvullis daar stort en 'n versoekskrif sal gerig word aan die betrokke instansie om dit af te las.

NOTULE DEUR SERS (V) R. VELTHUYSEN OPGESTEL.

LT.-KOL.

PORT ELIZABETH
1986.02.06
/LvT

.....
DISTRIKSKOMMANDANT : NR. 14 DISTRIK
(P.J. RAS)

SECRET
GEHEIME

BESOEK AAN PE MINI CBS : OP CBS VOORSITTER 20/3/87

A G E N D A

SECRET
GEHEIME

(62)

OORSIG TOV PORT ELIZABETH


1. Sedert instelling van die Noodregulasies, is 'n algehele afplatting van onrus-verwante voorvalle in hierdie distrik ondervind. Sedert 1 Januarie 1987 toe inwoners van Ibhayi die stadspolisie met klippe bestook het, het geen verdere onrus-verwante voorvalle voorgekom nie. Die situasie is beslis gestabiliseer en inwoners van Walmer Swartwoongebied toon 'n meer positiewe gesindheid. Die positiewe gesindheid kan toegeskryf word aan die feit dat agitators betyds geïdentifiseer en uit die gemeenskap verwyder kan word.

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MINI GBS PLAN: STERKSTROOM

NVEN WBS

EP REGIONAL JMC



OP STREEK GBS

NS AND WMC

(125)

GEHEIM

AANHANGSEL D BY SS GBS/22/7/1
DD 30 SEP 85

VEILIGHEIDSPLANNE : VEIKOM

WET EN ORDE

1. So spoedig moontlik 'n gesamentlike veiligheidsmag kordon en soektog operasie in die swart woongebied uitvoer om :

a. Intimideerders en verdagte persone te verwyder.

b. Dieselfde dag nadat die belhamels verwyder is die kinders terug te neem skool toe.

c. Die persone wat dan agterbly bymekaar te kry en hulle dan positief te motiveer :

i. Deur 'n bekwame persoon soos mnr Hoyane van Buitelandse Sake te kry om hulle toe te spreek.

ii. Met hierdie geleentheid aan hulle te verduidelik wat die vyand besig is om aan hulle en die land te doen.

d. Direk hierna moet daar oorgegaan word om 'n behoorlike ge= kose aksie komitee van twaalf te kies om in 'n adviserende hoedanigheid waar te neem totdat daar 'n wettige gemeenskaps raad gekies kan word.

e. Daar sal dan ongeveer tien SA Polisie agterbly om wet en orde in die woonbuurt te handhaaf.

BEVORDERING VAN SELFBESKERMING

2. Daar moet so spoedig moontlik na hierdie operasie 'n plaaslike munisipale polisiemag van ongeveer vyf en twintig sterk gestig word.

PRO-AKTIEWE AKSIES

3. Aangesien die skoolkinders heelwaarskynlik van die meeste proble= me ter stabilisering van die huidige situasie kan verskaf moet doelge= rigte pro-aktiewe aksies op hulle toegespits word :

a. Indien die skoolkinders vrywilliglik skool wil gaan moet daar toegesien word dat daar deur positiewe onderwysers onderrig gegee word.

b. Na skool ure of indien daar probleme is met skoolbywoning moet daar toegesien word dat daar behoorlike vryetyds be= steding georganiseer word :

GEHEIM

(12)

AANHANGSEL E BY SS GBS/22/7/1
DD 30 SEP 85

STAATKUNDIGE BEPLANNING : SEMKOM

AKSIE KOMITEE

1. Aangesien drie uit die ses gemeenskapraadslede bedank het moet daar tydelik een of ander liggaam wat adviserend kan funksioneer in die lewe geroep word :

a. Nadat die belhamels en intimideerders met 'n VEIKOM aksie verwyder is moet daar nog dieselfde dag 'n aksie komitee van twaalf gekies word om die tydelike leemte te vul.

b. Daar moet dan die nodige reëlings deur die dorpsbestuurder getref word om so spoedig as moontlik 'n wettige gemeenskapsraad weer daar te stel.

UITSKAKELING VAN REWOLUSIONÊRE INSTELLINGS

2. Nadat bogenoemde VEIKOM aksie voltooi is moet daar tenminste tien swart SA Polisie ontplooi word om wet en orde te handhaaf en sodoende die rewolusionêre instellings stelselmatig uit te skakel.

3. 'n Munisipale polisiemag van tenminste vyf en twintig polisie moet onmiddellik hierna gestig word om selfbeskerming te bewerkstellig.

OPVOEDING

4. Opvoeding van plaaslike bestuur om staatkundige en teenrewolusionêre kundigheid te verbreek, deur :

a. Bywoning van kursusse deur raadslede wat aangebied word deur staatsinstellings.

b. Hulp en leiding deur blanke munisipaliteit.

c. Stelselmatige opvoedingsprogram deur dorpsbestuurder.

(A.M. HECHTER)
VOORSITTER SEMKOM S STERKSTROOM MINI-GBS : MEV

GEHEIM

VERTROULIK
CONFIDENTIAL

HIERDIE DOK IS ALLEEN IN 'N LÊER, SONDER ENIGE AANGEHEGDE DOKUMENTE

(137)

SOVERGET-OOS

1. IDENTIFIKASIE EN OPSKRYWING VAN PRIORITEIT KNELPUNTE:

Sien aangehegte dokument.

2. (1) Intimidasie

a. Wat was gedoen om knelpunte op te los:

i. Belhamels was gearresteer deur Veiligheidsmagte terwyl hulle nog besig was met die beplanning.

ii. Strate was deur weermagstroepe gepatrolleer.

b. Wat kan gedoen word om dit op te los:

i. Deur vol te hou met die verwydering en aanhouding van belhamels totdat normalisering ingetree het.

ii. Die verspreiding van pro-pamflette deur veiligheidsmagte.

iii. Die sudsesvolle werwing van beriggewers om vooraf inligting te bekom en moontlike beplannings.

c. Watter eksterne hulp versoek word vir hierdie oplossi

Geen bykomende eksterne hulp bo en behalwe die weermag lede wie tans hier diens verrig nie.

d. Watter tydskaal word hieraan gekoppel:

Tot die toestand in die gebied heeltemal genormaliseer het.

e. Watter beraamde koste word voorsien:

Geen. Behalwe uitgawes van Veiligheidsmagte wie afgedeelde diens verrig.

(2) Propaganda.

a. Wat was gedoen om knelpunte op te los:

i. Aktiviste was geidentifiseer en met Veiligheidsmagte saam gery deur woonbuurt en gesien te word saam met Veiligheidsmagte.

ii. Pamflette was versprei.

b. Wat kan gedoen word om dit op te los:

GEHEIM
SECRET

169

Kopie no 23 van 32 Kopieë

H LEëR/D OPS/522/1/1/1/1 (12)

Telefoon : 291 2159
Navrae : Brig B.A. Ferreira

EASTERN PROVINCE COMMAND
OFFICER COMMANDING
2485
PORT ELIZABETH
BEVELVOERDER
KOMMANDEMENT OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

SA Leërhoofkwartier
Privaatsak X172
Pretoria
0001

27 Maart 1985

NOTULE VAN BEPLANNINGSKONFERENSIE : SA LEëR SE STRATEGIE VIR DIE BE=KAMPING VAN STEDELIKE ONLUSTE EN DIE NORMALISERING VAN ONRUSSITUASIES : H LEëR MET BEVELSKADER TE MILITêREBASIS WONDERBOOM OP 7 MAART 1985

23. Min Kobie Coetzee

a. Ons moet selektief die mense na die howe neem en hulle dan skuldig bevind.

b. Vir die res moet ons hulle - die baie oortreders - liewer op kleiner oortredings meer dikwels voor die hof kry.

c. Ons moet die inisiatief ssm terug kry.

d. Die aggitators ssm uit die gemeenskap verwyder.

e. Gesamentlike optrede deur al die depte onder 'n sentrale beheer.

REWO OORLOG

G.P.-S.

147

P. 21 81/143198

STAAT EN OPENBARE SEKTOR

OPERASIES, PROJEKTE, PROGRAMME

STABILISEER | WEERBAARMAKING | NORMALISEER

ELEMENTE VAN DIE STAAT SE MAGSBASIS

VEILIGHEID (VEIKOM)		SIELKUNDIG (KOM KOM)			WELVAART (SEMKOM)		
OPS (GOS)	INL (GIS)	EIE MAGTE	BEVOLKING	VYAND	STAATK OF POL	EKON	MAATSK

INLIGTING

DE-STABILISEER | WEERLOOSMAKING | AB-NORMALISEER

GEWELDS- EN NIE-GEWELDSAKSIES

MIL VY EN POL AKTIVISTE

948

F.1

AUG 30 '93 09:31 CHB-SAT 340 (041 5841323)

VOLKSKAS BANK

7. Dycon (Pty) Ltd. SB. Bonaire 15000-00

VOLKSKAS BANK — KITS ASSIST BANK

KOL L DU PLESSIS 10H59 27-03-93

WS31909 DEPOSITO VIR R15000-00

NA TJEK 14[illegible]0820 ANNAAR

PLAAS IN KOEVERT MET DEPOSITO

ABSA BANK
TAS P E
33-46-47
28 MRT 93

VOLKSKAS BANK BEPERK (REG NO 7601/006/06) VOLKSKAS BANK LIMITED (REG NO 7601/006/06)

0 14.00 2900 20

Dit het R15.000:- gelok deur Dycon (Pty) Ltd.
op Standard Bank, Bonaire Corner.

30/8/93

LDP PROMOTIONS

949

Tel: 0404 - 31258
Telefax: 0404 - 31387

50 Longmarket Street
ALICE

September 1991

Mr. C. Ramaphosa
African National Congress Head-office
JOHANNESBURG

Dear Sir

1. My conversation with Mr. Salojee on 5 September 1991 refers.

2. I am a retired Colonel from the S.A. Army and at present living in Port Elizabeth. I retired at the end of May 1990. I served in the SADF since 1953, firstly as a ballotee and later as a career officer. I took early retirement for reasons that I am prepared to explain and discuss on a personal basis should it be required. I am an old friend of Maj. Genl. Holimisa and have no doubt that he would vouch for me and my attitude on the situation in the RSA prior to the de Klerk era.

3. Since my retirement I have decided to go into business to supplement my pension (I have four sons still dependant on me). After much deliberation and discussions with the local inhabitants (especially the students). I decided to open a high class fast food outlet in Alice, Ciskei. The business opened it's doors on the 6th of June 1991.

4. I have however, since that date experienced problems that I could never have anticipated in view of what I expected from people/organisations involved in building a new South Africa. I am listing them in chronological order.

a. A boikott was imposed on my business (and several others) from 4th June 1991. Even before I opened doors. Pamphlet herewith (Annexure A)

b. On the 18th June 1991 I was informed by Mr. David Voorslag that the boikott would probably be lifted against all the other businesses in the Border area by the end of June except against my business. The reason for this being that I have been a Colonel in the SADF. This boikott according to Mr. Voorslag was applicable for life. In my view, based on the policy of the ANC of reconciliation in a new South Africa, this attitude is utterly wrong, and not conducive to creating good relations.

2/.....

c. At the same meeting I was informed that I am also conducting business from the wrong premises. The building which I am hiring belongs to Chief Lent Maqoma. He is unacceptable to the ANC, as a member of the Ciskei Goverment and a traditional chief, according to Mr. Voorslag.

d. During July 1991 a poster was distributed throughout Alice, emphasising that the boikott had been lifted in the whole of the Border area, except against my business. (American Fried Chicken). The poster was issued under the banner of the Alliance. Copy enclosed as Annexure B. This poster threatened/intimidated potential customers. An action also directly against declared ANC policy.

e. During July a rumour was spread, also in the villages, that I was responsible, and gave the order resulting in the Langa killings during the unrest period of 1984/86. This is utter nonsense. The Kannemyer inquest documents are available to anybody to varify this.

f. At the end of August 1991 I was forced to lay off two members of my staff because of the financial difficulties I am experiencing, mainly due to the boikott against my business. A meeting is now being planned by the ANC to take place on 6th September 1991 to determine how to finally put me out of business.

5. I have all along attempted to render top quality service to the people of Alice. Most inhabitants support us because of the quality of our products, but are bowing to threats and intimidation. At this rate I will be forced to close my shop in the near future.

6. I would however like to emphasise the following.

a. I have only received the most respectful and gentlemanly audiences from Mr. Voorslag. His demeanour and behaviour is a credit to the ANC.

b. It is my well considered view that some of the business people in Alice is feeling threatened by my presence and is contributing to my problems.

c. That all the people, Mr. Hani, Mr. Salojee, Mr. Makoti secretaries etc. that I have spoken to at ANC Head-office have been extremely courteous and helpful.

7. Sir, your attention to this matter will be highly appreciated.

Respectfully yours

L. DU PLESSIS : COL (RTD)

MZIWAKOWETHU"

NANJENGOKO SIYAZI INTLUNGU ESIKUYO PHANTSI
KWENGCINEZELO YO RHULUMENTE WAMAHIULU,
NOO NOMGOGWANA BAMAPHANDLE, IPHULO LOKUXINZELELA
KWIIMFUNO, NAMALUNGELO ABANTU, KWABA RHULUMENTE
BEGCUNTSWANA, LELOKUBA KUNGATHENGWA E ALICE, BISHO
KING WILLIAM'S TOWN, BISHO, EAST LONDON.
IQALA NGE 3-06-91
APHA EDIKENI ASITHENGI KWEZI:

AMERICAN FRIED CHICKEN (STEAK HOUSE)
FAIRWAYS
SMART CENTRE
DAN HANDS
UYANDA
FRASER FURNISHERS
PICK 'n PAIR
BERGERS
SCOTTS
PEP STORES
ELLERINES
BUFFALO TIMBERS
EDWORKS
[redacted]
SHOOZ
CISKEI CO-OPERATIVE
HARTIES
AMANDLA" NGAWETHU" MATLA" KEYARONA"

VIVA ANC SACP COSATU ALLIANCE"

ANC LIVES!

ANC LEADS!

COSATU

ANNEXETRE A.

UKWAYO NTENGO LURHOXISIWE KUZO ZONKE IIVENKILE EBEZIKWAYIWE APHA EDIKENI NAKWI NGINGQI YE-BHODA JIKELELE. NANGONA KUNJALO UKWAYO NTENGO (CONSUMER BOYCOTT KWA AMERICAN FRIED CHICKEN LU-SAQHUBEKEKA, KWAYE LUZAKUJONGWA NGAMEHLO ABANZI. IZAPHUSELANE EZITHENGAYO KWA AMERICAN FRIED CHICKEN (STEAK HOUSE) ZAKUYICELA IVUTHIWE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE'''

ABANTU BAYAKULAWULA

ANC LIVES!

ANC LEADS!

AN INJURY TO ONE IS AN INJURY TO ALL

COSATU

ANNEXURE B

9507

GEHEIM

Kopieno 18 van 21 kopieë

H LEëR/D PLAN/501/5
H LEëR/D PLAN/501/5/2

Telefoon : 26-9721
Bylyn : 396

SA Leërhoofkwartier
Privaatsak X 172
Pretoria
0001

31 Januarie 1983

BEVELSKRIF : BEVELVOERDER KOMMANDEMENT OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

Verwysing : Vol 3 Voorspelling en Breë Konsep van Operasies : SA Leër

Aanhangsel A : Bevelstatusse : SA Leërformasies en Eenhede

AANSTELLING

1. U word hiermee as Bevelvoerder Kommandement Oostelike Provinsie aangestel.

SITUASIE

2. Die RSA se nasionale beleid mbt die beveiliging van die RSA, vereis dat SA Leërformasies en eenhede binne of buite die RSA grondwetlike gebied ontplooi en aangewend word.

3. Die SA Leër se Operasionele Strategie vereis tydige offensiewe optredes in buurstate.

OPDRAG

4. U moet die veiligheid van Kommandement Oostelike Provinsie se territoriale gebied en inwoners verseker teen konvensionele landwaartse aanslae van buite die RSA, sowel as teen - militêre insurgensiebedreiging van buite of binne die grondwetlike gebied van die RSA.

UITVOERING

5. Algemeen

a. Die aanwending van SA Leërmagte is onderhewig aan die bepalings van die Verdedigingswet, regulasies, orders, beleidsvoorskrifte, doktrines en omsendbriewe soos neergelê of van tyd tot tyd uitgevaardig.

b. Optredes buite die grense van die RSA geskied binne die bepalings van beleid tov eksterne operasies soos neergelê en van tyd tot tyd aangevul of gewysig.

6. Bevel en Beheer. U is as Bevelvoerder Kommandement Oostelike Provinsie onder my bevel. Magte wat vir konvensionele operasies benodig mag word, sal vir daardie doel deur my aan u toegewys word.

a. Verantwoordelikheidsgebied. U verantwoordelikheidsgebied word deur die huidige grense van Kommandement Oostelike Provinsie omsluit.

b. Invloedsgebied. Dit sluit die omliggende kommandementsgebiede, die buurstate van Lesotho en Transkei wat u verantwoordelikheidsgebied aangrens, Ciskei wat binne u verantwoordelikheidsgebied geleë is en die gebiedswaters wat teenoor die kommandementsgrens geleë is in.

c. Bevelsbevoegdheid. SA Leëreenhede, soos in Aanh A gelys, wys ek aan u toe ooreenkomstig die bevelsaffiliasie spesifiek aangedui teenoor elke eenheid. Tydelike toevoegings en/of afdelings mbt Kommandement Oostelike Provinsiesal deur my in aparte instruksies of orders gelas word.

d. Gesamentlike Operasies. Ander weermagsdeeleenhede sal permanent of tydelik, ondersteunend aan u toegewys word.

7. Opleiding. Ek hou u verantwoordelik vir die handhawing van 'n hoë standaard van opleiding. In hierdie verband is u verantwoordelik vir :

a. Opleiding ter voorbereiding van operasionele aanwending tov eenhede aan u toegewys vir operasies.

b. Die voortgesette opleiding van SA Leërformasies, eenhede en personeel aan u toegewys om sodoende 'n effektiewe gevegstandaard te bereik en te handhaaf.

8. Kommunikasie-operasies. U moet taktiese kommunikasie-operasies en gesindheidsbeïnvloeding van die inwoners van u gebied ter uitvoering van u opdrag, onderhewig aan die voorskrifte en instruksies wat van toepassing is, beplan en uitvoer.

9. Burgerlike Beskerming. U moet burgerlike beskerming in u verantwoordelikheidsgebied bevorder en evalueer en die nodige leiding verskaf.

10. Finansiële Bestuur. Ek hou u verantwoordelik vir die doelmatige behoeftestellings en die ekonomiese besteding van fondse deur eenhede onder u bevel of Permanent in Gebied, asook vir die effektiewe bestuur van enige fondse en inrigtings, behalwe SAWI winkels, wat deur sodanige eenhede bedryf word.

11. Logistiek. U pligte en verantwoordelikhede mbt uitrusting en voorraad word vervat in "SAW Voorraadvoorskrifte Volume A1, Pamflet 4" wat op 1 Aug 80 deur H SAW uitgereik is. U is persoonlik en finansieël aan my aanspreeklik vir enige verlies van uitrusting en voorrade onder u beheer wat mag ontstaan as gevolg van diefstal, beskadiging, ooruitreiking, brand, bedrog, tekorte of enige ander rede wat uit u foutiewe optrede, nalatigheid of versuim voortspruit. Verder is u tov die eenhede onder u bevel aan my aanspreeklik vir die doeltreffende verkryging, ontvangs, opberging, veilige be-

waring, preservering, onderhoud, verrekening, uitreiking en distribusie van en beskikking oor uitrusting en voorraad.

12. Soort. As Bevelvoerder Kommandement Oostelike Provinsie- is u die voorsitter van die Gebiedsportadviesraad en ook verantwoordelik vir die bevordering van alle goedgekeurde sportsoorte in u kommandementsgebied.

13. GBS. Ek hou u verantwoordelik vir die effektiewe werking en bestuur van die GBS. In hierdie verband moet u binne die raamwerk van die SSVR se beleidsvoorskrifte, opdragte en riglyne optree en wat GBS aktiwiteite aanbetref direk met die SSVR skakel. U moet my egter voortdurend op die hoogte hou van daardie aangeleenthede waar die SA Leër pertinent by betrokke is en pro-aktief daartoe bydra dat 'n revolusionêre klimaat in u verantwoordelikheidsgebied voorkom word.

14. GBR. Ek hou u verantwoordelik vir die effektiewe werking en bestuur van die GBR met Transkei en Ciskei. In hierdie verband moet u binne die raamwerk van beleidsvoorskrifte, opdragte en riglyne soos vervat in H LEëR/D PLAN/311/1 oor H LEëR/D PLAN/303/6/2(G) van 15 Apr 83 "Bedryf van Gesamentlike Bestuursrade (GBRe)", optree.

[illegible] van die bevelskrif sirkel.

HOOF VAN DIE LEëR : LT GENL

DISTR

	Kopieno
Vir Optrede	
Brigadier C.P. van der Westhuizen, SA St K(Leër) Kommandement Oostelike Provinsie	1
Ter Info	
Hoof van die Lugmag	2
Hoof van die Vloot	3
Geneesheer-generaal	4
Hoof van die SA Weermag (HSP)	5
Hoof van die SA Weermag (HSI)	6
Hoof van die SA Weermag (HS Ops)	7
Hoof van die SA Weermag (HSL)	8
Hoof van die SA Weermag (HSF)	9
Kwartiermeester-generaal	10
Intern	
H Leër S Pers	11
H Leër S Inl	12
H Leër S Ops	13
H Leër S Log	14
H Leër S Fin	15
D Opl	16
D Ops	17

D Plan		18
H Leër (Dagboek)		19
Lêers :	501/5(G)	20
. .	501/5/2(G)	21

AANHANGSEL A BY H LEëR/D PLAN/
501/5 OOR 501/5/2 DD 3/ JANUARIE 1983

BEVELSTATUSSE : SA LEëRFORMASIES EN EENHEDE

1. Voortaan Onder Bevel

a. HK Kmdmt OP

b. HK Gp 6

c. HK Gp 7

d. HK Gp 8

e. HK GP 39

f. 6 SAI Opl Eenh

~~g. 1 x Komp 6 SAI (Queenstown)~~

h. UPEME

i. Kaf R

j. RAB

k. RPR

l. PAG

m. 2 Genie Eskn

n. Kmdmt OP Seineenh

o. Kmdmt OP Ondh Eenh

p. Kmdmt OP Wkp

q. 13 OVD

r. Kmdmt OP Pro Eenh

s. Aliwal-Noord-komdo

t. Amatola-komdo

u. Barkly-Oos-komdo

v. Cradock-komdo

w. De Mist-komdo

x. Donkin-komdo

y. Fort Frederick-komdo

z. Gately-komdo

aa. Humansdorp-komdo

ab. Kirkwood-komdo

ab ~~aa.~~ Midland-komdo

ac ~~ab.~~ Oos-London-komdo

ad ~~ac.~~ Port Elizabeth-komdo

af ~~ad.~~ Queenstown-komdo

af ~~ae.~~ Recife-komdo

ag ~~af.~~ Somerset-Oos-komdo

~~ag. Uitenhage-komdo~~

ah ~~af.~~ Winterberg-komdo

2. Permanent in Gebied. Tov Dissipline, Regspleging, Seremonieël, Vryetydsbesteding, Sport, Openbare Skakeling, Sekerheid, Gemeenskaplike Opleidingsgerieue, Gesondheidsdienste, Akkommodasie en Behuising, Instandhoudingsdienste, Onderhoud (Tweede lyn), Daaglikse Onderhoud, R + V Administrasie, Tydelike Administratieue hulp aan administratieue personeel van konvensionele magte, Bouprojekte, Fondse en Inrigtings, Oriëntasiedienste en Kapelaansdienste.

a. 84 TVD (Log Kmdmt)

3. ~~Permanent~~ In Gebied. Tov Gemeenskaplike Opleidingsgerieue, Akkommodasie, Behuising en Instandhoudingsdienste.

a. FC (84 Mot Bde)

b. RU ~~(Kmdmt Log Bde)~~ ~~(73 Mot Bde)~~ (73 Mot Bde)

c. 5 VA Eskn ~~(8 Pant Div)~~ (Kmdmt O Tul)

d. 37 GS Eskn ~~(8 Pant Div)~~ (Kmdmt O Tul)

4. Permanent in Gebied. Tov Dissipline, Seremonieël, Sekerheid, Gemeenskaplike Opleidingsgerieue en Instandhoudingsdienste : Alle kadetafdelings in u gebied van verantwoordelikheid.

Eastern Province Command
P.O. Box 115
Port Elizabeth
6000
Telephone: 51-4185
Extension: 111

Kommandement Oostelike Provinsie
Posbus 115
Port Elizabeth
6000
Telefoon: 51-4185
Bylyn: 111

25 Februarie 1983

Hoof van die Leër
Leërhoofkwartier
Privaatsak X172
Pretoria

BEVELSKRIF : BEVELVOERDER KOMMANDEMENT OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

1. Ontvangs van kopie nommer 1 van u H/LEëR/D PLAN/501/5 oor H LEëR/D PLAN/501/5/2/(G) gedateer 31 Januarie 1983 word erken.

2. Ek het die inhoud van die Bevelskrif bestudeer, verstaan dit en sal dit noukeurig nakom.

(C.P. VAN DER WESTHUIZEN)
BEVELVOERDER KOMMANDEMENT OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE : BRIG

VERTROULIK

Bis 1ée 1
951

MM4

CIRRICULUM VITAE : LUITENANT GENERAAL C.P. VAN DER WESTHUIZEN

PERSOONLIKE BESONDERHEDE

1.	Nommer	:	01477348PE
2.	Rang	:	Luitenant-generaal
3.	Huidige Aanstelling	:	Hoof van Staf Inligting
4.	Huidige Eenheid	:	Afdeling Inligting
5.	Korps	:	SA Staf Korps
6.	Geboortedatum en plek	:	7 Februarie 1942 Kroonstad
7.	Kerkverband	:	Nederduits Gereformeerd
8.	Huwelikstaat	:	Getroud
9.	Huistaal	:	Afrikaans

KWALIFIKASIES/TOEKENNING EN TAALBEVOEGDHEID

10.	Opvoedkundige Kwalifikasies	:	Matriek te Standerton Hoërskool: 1960 B Mil (Universiteit Stellenbosch: 1964)
11.	Dekorasies en Medaljes	:	Suiderkruisdekorasie, Suiderkruis-medalje, Pro Patria Medalje met Cunene-gespe, Algemene Diensmedalje, Medaljes vir Troue Diens (Goud, Silwer en Brons), Hoof van die SA Weermag Aanprysingsmedalje, Hoof van die Leër se Aanprysingsertifikaat
12.	Ander Tale Magtig	:	Engels

LOOPBAANBESONDERHEDE

13. Militêr

a. As Manskap : Rapporteer op 25 Januarie 1961 en ontvang opleiding te Leërgimnasium as vrywillige kwekeling. Word gekeur vir Militêre Akademie en attesteer op 24 Augustus 1961

b. As Offisier

24 Augustus 1961	:	Student: Artillerie- en Pantserskool (Potchefstroom)
10 Januarie 1962	:	Student: Militêre Akademie (Saldanha)
21 Januarie 1965	:	Adjudant, Observasie-offisier, Battery-Kapt, Transport- en Sein-offisier, Opmetingsoffisier: 14 Veldregiment (Bethlehem)

22 Februarie 1966	:	Adjudant: Artillerieskool (Potchefstroom)
18 Mei 1968	:	Evalueerder: Hoof van Militêre Inligting (Pretoria).
2 Februarie 1969	:	Offisierinstrukteur, Senior en Hoofinstrukteur: Artillerieskool (Potchefstroom)
1 November 1973	:	Tweede-in-bevel: 4 Veldregiment (Potchefstroom)
1 Mei 1974	:	Bevelvoerder: 14 Veldregiment (Potchefstroom)
5 Julie 1976	:	Artillerie Projekoffisier: Leër Hoofkwartier en Krygkor (Pretoria)
1 Januarie 1978	:	Senior Stafoffisier Artillerie (Veld) Leër Hoofkwartier en Krygkor (Pretoria)
1 Januarie 1982	:	Direkteur Artillerie (Veld): Leër Hoofkwartier (Pretoria)
1 Januarie 1983	:	Bevelvoerder: Kommandement Oostelike Provinsie (Port Elizabeth)
1 Januarie 1987	:	Bevelvoerende Generaal: Kommandement Witwatersrand (Johannesburg)
1 Maart 1990	:	Adjunk Hoof van die Leër (Pretoria)
1 Desember 1991	:	Hoof van Staf Inligting (Pretoria)

14. BEVORDERINGSDATUMS

24 Augustus 1961	:	Kandidaatoffisier
20 Desember 1963	:	Tydelike Tweede Luitenant
9 Desember 1964	:	Luitenant
24 November 1967	:	Kaptein
1 Oktober 1970	:	Majoor
1 Mei 1974	:	Tydelike Kommandant
1 Julie 1977	:	Kommandant
1 Mei 1978	:	Tydelike Kolonel
1 Januarie 1979	:	Kolonel
1 Januarie 1983	:	Brigadier
1 Januarie 1987	:	Generaal-majoor
1 Desember 1991	:	Luitenant-generaal

15. KURSUSSE BYGEWOON

a. Slaag alle vereiste bevorderingskursusse vir Algemene Diens Offisiere in die SA Leër, Staande Mag.

b. Lang skietkursus vir Staande Mag Offisiere van die SA Artillerie (Veld), te Artillerieskool, oor die periodes 12 Augustus tot 15 November 1968 en 6 Januarie tot 11 April 1969. Slaag eerste in die volgorde van verdienste.

c. Stafdienste, SA Leër (Staande Mag) te SA Leërkollege, oor die periode 7 Mei tot 4 November 1971 en slaag eerste in die volgorde van verdienste.

16. HOOGTEPUNTAANSTELLINGS

a. Bevelvoerder, 14 Veldregiment


b. Artilleriebrigade en Cela Versterkingsmag Bevelvoerders: Operasie SAVANNAH (Angola)

c. Projekoffisier, Nuwe Generasie Artillerie Hooftoerusting.

OPERASIONELE DIENS

21. Rhodesië : Tydperke in 1966 en 1967.

22. Angola : Tydperke in 1974 en 1975.


STOEP
Vd Westhuizen
HvS
Hoof van Staat
TIKSTOR
BEV
KAPLN
Kapelaan
SEKR
SEK HEK
TOILET
STOOR
OPS
OPS
Piet Hall
SSO
Ops
SEIN
KANTOOR
Pik Plessis
SSO
INL
OPS KAMER
OPS
UG EN G
REGISTR-
ASIE
STOOR
KS 2
VERW
VERW
VERW
Verwatungs
VERW
kantore
Stafofficier
inligting
SOI INL/
INS

953

NASIONALE VEILIGHEIDSBESTUURSTELSEL
NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

GEHEIM

Cradock Mini GBS
Posbus 407
CRADOCK
5880

Verwysing / Reference 22/7/3

Navrae / Enquiries Kmdt G.B. Marais

Telefoon / Telephone 0481-3348

3 Februarie 1985.

ONRUS SITUASIE IN LINGELIHLE SWART WOONBUURT TE CRADOCK

1. Verwys na Cradock Mini-GBS verslag tov gebeure te Cradock gedurende die tydperk 7/8/83 tot 25/10/84 soos voorgelê aan OP-GBS vergadering te Port Elizabeth op 25 Oktober 1984. Die verslag word aangeheg as Aanhangsel A vir u gerief.

2. 'n Verdere verslag tov gebeure vanaf 23/10/84 tot 3/2/85 word as Aanhangsel B aangeheg.

3. Die Cradock Residants Association, CRADORA, het onder leiding van MATTHEW GONIWE beplan om op 3 Februarie 1985 'n loodsings vergadering in die gemeenskapsaal te Cradock te hou. Die volgende is uitvloeisels van hierdie besluit.

   a. MATTHEW GONIWE het uitnodigings aan al die UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT streke landwyd gerig om afgevaardigdes van elk van hulle affiliale na Cradock te stuur.

   b. Die nasionale president van die UDF, Mnr. OSCAR MPETHA, sowel as ander sprekers van die UDF sou opgetree het. Mev MOLLY BLACKBURN was ook uitgenooi maar 'n toegangspermit is geweier nadat sy wel daarvoor aansoek gedoen het. Sy het reeds 'n veroordeling weens haar ongemagtigde besoeke in die swart woonbuurt.

2/...

GEHEIM

c. Duisende swartes vanoor die hele SA sou opgedaag het. Bevestiging van busse is uit alle dele ontvang.

d. Op 31/01/85 is die byeenkomste kragtens die wet op Binnelandse veiligheid 1982 (wet 74 van 1982) deur die hooflanddros van Cradock verbied.

e. MATTHEW GONIWE en CRADORA het 'n aansoek op 2/02/85 by die Hooggeregshof te Grahamstad ingedien dat die verbod ter syde gestel word. Die aansoek is na oorweging deur 'n Regter afgekeur.

4. Die doel van hierdie byeenkoms was as volg:

a. Om soveel van die lede van die UDF as wat landswyd moontlik was op Cradock bymekaar te bring om die bedanking van die Lingelihle swart dorpsraad op 3/01/85 te vier. Hierdie bedanking was as gevolg van maande lange druk op die dorpsraad lede deur CRADORA.

b. Om 'n strategie vir verdere aksies teen alle dorpsrade landwyd te beplan sodat hulle ook gedwing kan word om as gevolg van aksies van die UDF en sy affiliale te bedank.

c. Om solidariteit met Cradock se skole boikot wat sedert 1984 heers, te betoon.

5. Die uitvloeisel van die verbod op byeenkomste en die daaropvolgende uitspraak van die Regter is as volg:

a. Alle busse wat Cradock sou besoek, word gekanseleer.

b. Alle organisasies word in kennis gestel dat die vergadering nie meer plaasvind nie.

c. Die vergadering soos gereël, word afgestel.

d. Die gevolge van bg punte is as volg.

i. MATTHEW GONIWE en CRADORA se beeld as sterk leier en organisasie word geskaad.

ii. Die uitsprake dat hulle sal voortgaan en nie deur die Regering verhinder kan word nie, word weerlê.

iii. Die verloor van die interdik is 'n groot oorwinning vir die Regering en word baie moeilik deur CRADORA aanvaar.

iv. CRADORA sit met 'n groot finansiële las, daar hulle alle regskoste moet betaal.

v. Die Regering en veral die Veiligheidswagte in CRADOCK het 'n groot voorsprong op CRADORA weens die feit dat vir die eerste keer in maande die inisiatief aan hulle kant is en CRADORA en MATTHEW GONIWE sal moet herorganiseer om verlore prestige in te haal.

vi. CRADORA sal beslis nie gaan lê nie en sal baie vinnig vergaderings begin reël om sy organisasie se beeld te herstel.

6. Die CRADOCK MINI-GBS neem dus die volgende besluite op 'n spesiale vergadering op 3/02/85.

a. Dat die Dept van Onderwys en Opleiding hierdie inisiatief wat geskep is, moet benut en dit onomwonde aan MATTHEW GONIWE en FORT GALATA moet stel dat hulle NIE weer in 'n onderwyspos aangestel sal word nie. Hierdie besluit moet so spoedig moontlik bekend gemaak word voordat hulle met herorganisasie kan begin, verkieslik teen nie later as Woensdag 6 Februarie 1985.

b. Dat alle skole wat nie in Cradock bygewoon word nie vir 'n tydperk, soos deur die Dept Onderwys en Opleiding bepaal, gesluit sal word, indien die leerlinge nie teen 'n bepaalde datum terugge-keer het nie. Verkieslik nie later as 28 Februarie 1985 nie.

c. Dat indringend gekyk moet word na die betrokken-heid van CRADORA, CRADOYA en ander organisasies by die skoolboikotte en die bedanking van die dorpsraad, sowel as die verbintenis wat hulle met die UDF en die ANC het. Indien die situasie voortduur en hulle voortgaan met intimidasie en die sterk beeld, kan dit daartoe lei dat die druk landswyd op swart dorpsrade kan toeneem.

d. Indien die Dept van Onderwys en Opleiding positief op hierdie aanbeveling reageer mag dit 'n keerpunt in hierdie situasie te weegbring. Dit sal GONIWE en CRADORA dwing om sekere skuiwe te maak wat die Regering en veiligheidsmagte die geleentheid sal gee om tydige en korrektiewe besluite te neem en optrede te beplan.

e. Dit is duidelik dat dmv gesprekke die afgelope maande, niks bereik is nie en dat CRADORA en sy verwante organisasies geweld voorstaan vir verandering. Deur die situasie sodanig te wysig dat hulle die besluite moet neem, kan hulle gedwing word om foute te maak en kan die inisiatief wat nou verkry is deur die Regering, behou word.

7. Geliewe asseblief u uiters dringende aandag aan die situasie te skenk ten einde te poog om hierdie delikate probleem wat duisende manure en Rande kos te probeer oplos.

(G.B. MARAIS)
VOORSITTER CRADOCK MINI-GBS
GBM/AleR

DISTR

Vir Optrede

Voorsitter OP-GBS

Ter Info

Voorsitter OP-Sub GBS

SAMEVATTING TOV GEBEURE IN LINGELEHLE WOONBUURT TE CRADOCK GE= DURENDE TYDPERK 7/8/83 TOT 25/10/84.

INLEIDING:

1. Die gebeure rondom die onrus-situasie wat tans in hierdie woon= buurt heers het reeds en kan in die toekoms vêrrykende gevolge vir vrede, wetstoepassing en verhoudings hê.

2. As agtergrond moet geneem word dat Cradock 'n rekord van onrus het sedert 1923 toe dit een van die stigtersdorpe van die ANC was. Een van die stigterslede van die ANC, Eerw Calata het dan ook baie jare in Cradock gewoon en is gedurende Junie 1983 in Cradock oorlede. Gedurende die onrus van 1976 en 1980 was Cradock prominent en 'n beginpunt van die onrus. Dit kan dan sekerlik ook nie betwyfel word dat die onrus van 1984 sy kop reeds gedurende 1983 in Cradock uitge= steek het en gegroei het tot 'n onrusbarende situasie.

ORGANISASIES.

3. a. Op 7 Augustus 1983 stig 'n groep in Lingelehle die organisasie CRADOYA - CRADOCK YOUTH ASSOCIATION.

b. Op 8 Augustus word PRINCIPALS ASSOCATION gestig.

c. Op 25 Augustus word CRADORA - CRADOCK RATE PAYERS ASSOCIA= TION gestig.

d. Op 5 Maart 1984 word die LINGELEHLE STUDENTS ORGANIZATION gestig.

e. Op 18 Maart 1984 word die CRADOCK WOMANS ASSOCIATION gestig.

DOELSTELLINGS.

4. Op 'n breë front word die doelstellings van hierdie organisasies as volg saamgevat.

a. Om die Gemeenskapsraad te diskrediteer.

b. Om die beoogde Munisipale status vir Cradock Geemeenskaps= raad te verongeluk.

c. Swart volwassenes te politiseer.

d. Om die SAW sportaksies te verongeluk.

BEHEER

5. Vir al hierdie vergaderings word Mathew Goniwe as voorsitter verkies en is Fort Calata die sekretaris. Kennis moet geneem word dat Fort Calata die kleinseun is van Eerw Calata wat in Junie 83 oorlede is. Molile Goniwe en Mododda Jacobs speel ook 'n prominente rol.

VOLGORDE VAN GEBEURE

6. Sien aanhangsel A.

SKOOLBYWONING

7. Sien aanhangsel B.

AKSIES GELOODS.

8. Die SAP te Cradock het op volle sterkte sedert Augustus 1983 normale prosedures gevolg ten einde wet en orde te handhaaf, soms onder uiters moeilike omstandighede.

9. Op 23 Maart 1984 word 'n addisionele 36 lede van die SAP na Cradock gestuur en op 9 Julie staan die getal op 60 man. Vanaf begin Augustus word hulle geleidelik verminder en op 13 Augustus onttrek die finale 30 man.

10. Gedurende hierdie tyd en daarna word die Komdo ook verskeie kere op bystand geplaas, soms vir lang tye, om die SAP te ondersteun indien nodig.

SAMEVATTING

11. Te oordeel na 'n jaar se gebeure kom die volgende feite beslis na vore:

a. Dat Mathew Goniwe 'n besliste rol speel om die gemeenskap te politiseer en oproer aan te hits. Dat sy leierskap en beheer nie onderskat moet word nie is beslis.

b. Dat die UDF, ANC en SAKP 'n besliste sterk invloed uitoefen op die hele situasie in Cradock en die gebeure fyn orkestreer.

c. Dat die gebeure, klagtes en probleme wat voorgehou word slegs 'n medium is om die groter globale doel te bereik.

d. Dat die uiteindelike doel van alles is om volkome beheer te verkry en nie meer deur die Blanke beheer en geregeer te moet word nie.

e. Deur te dink dat die situasie opgelos kan word deur toe te gee aan al die eise wat gestel word sal naïef wees. Hulle sal nooit ophou eise stel voordat hulle nie volkome in beheer is nie.

f. Die stryd gaan teen die huidige stelsel. Goniwe en sy makkers eis die afskaffing van die Gemeenskapsraad onvoorwaardelik.

g. Op verskeie CRADORA vergaderings word die Gemeenskapsraad uitgeskel vir "Puppets of the Government" en stel Goniwe dit onomwonde dat hy nie met die gemeenskaps raad sal praat nie.

h. Daar word beroepe op geweld gedoen, ook die uitwissing van lede v/d GR indien nodig. 'n Voorbeeld hiervan is: "As 'n groot klip in jou pad lê, wat moet jy doen, jy vat 'n groot hamer en jy slaan hom stukkend."

GEVOLGTREKKING

12. Daar is die afgelope jaar te veel gepraat en vergaderings ge= hou wat niks as oplossing tot gevolg gehad het nie. Dit het beslis tyd geword dat iets daadwerkliks nou gedoen moet word voordat chaos en bloedvergieting ons voorland word. 'n Voorbeeld hiervan is die SRC'S wat gevra is, nee voor gesê is en wel later deur die Minister goedgekeur is. Die gevolg - 'n verwerping daarvan en 'n afkraking van owerheidsgesag.

13. Voor ons lê 'n harde pad, maar ons kan dit vergemaklik deur nou te gaan sit; 'n volledige goeddeurdagte waardering van die hele situasie te maak en op 'n beste plan van aksie te besluit wat tot voordeel van die gemeenskappe en SA sal wees. Ons moet egter besef, dat wat ookal die plan sal wees en watter gevolge dit mag meebring, solank dit in die belang van almal betrokke is, daar deurgedruk sal moet word. Die huidige aksies om slegs oplossings vir klein probleme te vind en 'n rondspringery is beslis nie bevorderlik vir die beeld van 'n sterk regering nie.

14. Die gesegde tov Teen Rewo-oorlogvoering kan hier beslis met vrug aangewend word nl. "The enemy is a big, strong allycat. Dogs can't fight allycats, therefor you must get yourself a bigger, stronger a llycat." In eenvoudige taal beteken dit net dat ons die vyand nou op sy eie terrein moet begin aandurf as ons sukses wil behaal.

AANH A

VOLGORDE VAN GEBEURE

Reeks	Datum	Aksie
a	b	c
1	7-8-83	Stigting van CRADOYA
2	8-8-83	Stigting van PRINCIPALS ASSOCIATION
3	25-8-83	Stigting van CRADORA
4	30-8-83	CRADORA VERGADERING - Hierna word verskeie kere met SARK, PEPKO, BLACK SASH en UDF geskakel.
5	3-10-83 tot 17-11-83	CRADORA hou 6 vergaderings waarin die Gemeenskaps raad, huishuur en ander aspekte telkemale aange= val word.
6	8-12-83	CRADORA affilieer met UDF in P.E.
7	12-12-83	Goniwe en ander tree met verskeie skoliere in ver= binding ten einde hulle te oorreed om na die UDF verg in P.E. te gaan.
8	13-12-83	CRADORA verg - Doelstellings van die UDF word voor= gelees.
9	17 en 18-12-83	Goniwe en Fort Calata woon UDF vergadering in P.E. by.
10	2-1-84	Goniwe kry + 200 skoliere in die Asention-saal by= een en deel hulle mee dat hy na Graaff-Reinet ver= plaas is. Vryheidskrete word geskree.
11	3-1-84 tot 10-1-84	CRADORA hou 7 vergaderings - al hierdie verg is spesifiek gemik teen die Gemeenskapsraad.
12	11-1-84	CRADORA vergadering - Goniwe vra dat skoliere skole moet boikot.
13	27-1-84	Goniwe ontslaan homself uit die onderwys deurdat hy sy verplasing na Graaff-Reinet ignoreer. Hy doen verskeie persverklarings teen die Dept v Onderwys.
14	5-2-84	Goniwe en Calata woon COSAS vergadering in PE by.
15	6-2-84	Leerlinge van Lingelehle Hoërskool boikot klasse en eis instelling van SRC.
16	8-2-84	Skoolhoof van LHS vra SAP om leerlinge te verwyder wat op skoolterrein doelloos optree en klasse boikot.
17	8-2-84	Tydens 'n samekoms in die Methodiste Kerksaal vra Goniwa, Fort Calata en Madodda Jacobs 'n algehele skool boikot.
18	10-2-84	Verskeie persverklarings deur CRADORA
19	12-2-84	Tydens 'n afskeidsgeselligheid vir 'n aftredende verpleegster deur die Gemeenskapsraad gehou, ontwrig CRADORA en CRADOYA deur intimidasie en geweld alles.
20	14-2-84	NNXUBA en SAM XHALLIE skole begin boikot.
21	16-2-84	CRADORA verg - Goniwe en Calata protesteer heftig teen die prefekte stelsel.
22	19-2-84	Verskeie persone woon 'n jeugverg van UDF te PE by.
23	5-3-84	Onder leiding van Madoda Jacobs word die Lingelehle Studente Organization gestig. Hulle affilieer met COSAS. Bywoning is 500 vanaf LHS 500 Sam Xhalie 300 Nxuba

a	b	c
24	6-3-84	'n Groot groep jeugdiges jaag die leerlinge van Sam XHALIE uit die skool. 2 x Onderwysers, 2 x ouers en 1 x skolier word aangerand.
25	7-3-84	Jacobs moedig skoliere tydens 'n verg in die Kerksaal aan om te boikot.
26	8-3-84	CRADORA verg - ± 1000 leerlinge teenwoordig besluit dat die 4 skole wat nie boikot nie uit klasse ge=haal moet word.
27	9-3-84	± 500 intimideerders haal NCACA leerlinge uit skool. Daarna volg Solomon Akena en Macembe, hulle mars=jeer na hierdie skole maar word deur die SAP uit=mekaar gejaag.
28	18-3-84	Goniwe tree op as voorsitter tydens Cradock Womans Association se stigting.
29	21-3-84	CRADORA en CRADOYA vier die herdenking van Sharpe=ville.
30	23-3-84	4 x SAP voertuie word deur jeugdiges met klippe bestook en beskadig.
31	25-3-84	SAP vrte deur klippe beskadig
32	26-3-84	SAP vrte deur klippe beskadig
33	27-3-84	In 5 Afsonderlike voorvalle word SAP met klippe en rekkers bestook.
34	30-3-84	Die volgende persone word onder art 28 van die Veiligheidswet gearresteer. Mathew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Madoda Jacobs en Molile Goniwe.
	1-4-84	Verbod op verg tree in werking.
35	11-4-84	4 leerlinge van LHS se huise word met klippe bestook.
36	12-4-84	Petrol bomme word by leerlinge wat skoolgaan se huise gegooi.
37	15-4-84	Leerlinge van LHS wat skoolgaan se huise word met klippe bestook. 1X Klipgooier word doodgesteek.
38	16-4-84	2 x Brandbomme gegooi na G Raad se Burgemeesteres se huis
39	20-4-84	2 Siviele motors word op die PE pad beskadig agv klipversperings.
40	21-4-84	1 motor word op die PE pad beskadig agv klip=versperings.
41	25-4-84	7 x Brandbomme word na wonings gegooi.
42	5-5-84	'n Motor van 'n Administrasieraad werkgewer word in sy erf uitgebrand.
43	5-5-84	SaP met klippe bestook.
44	12-5-84	Burgemeesteres van L.G.R se moeder se begrafnis word ontwrig agv klipgooiery deur ± 40 opstokers
45	12-5-84	LGR se Burgemeesteres se huis met klippe bestook.
46	20-5-84	'n Onderwyser se woning word met klippe bestook.
47	30-5-84	3X vrte word op PE pad deur klipversperrings be=skadig.
48	11-6-84	Beroep word op swart gemeenskap gedoen om nie die 16e te gaan werk en drank te koop nie.

a	b	c
49	13-6-84	1X vrt beskadig op PE pad agv klipversperrings.
50	16-6-84	SAP vrte met klippe gegooi.
51	17-6-84	SAP vrte met klippe gegooi.
52	26-6-84	SAP vrte met klippe gegooi.
53	30-6-84	SAP vrte met klippe gegooi.
54	10-7-84	SAP vrte met klippe gegooi.
55	28-7-84	SAP jaag 'n groot groep oproeriges uiteen.
56	5-8-84	5 vrte word met klippe gegooi.
57	5-8-84	5 vrte word met klippe gegooi.
58	30-9-84	Verbod op vergaderings word opgeheg
59	9-10-84	4X Aangehoudenes word vrygelaat
60	15-10-84	CRADORA verg - eis heraanstelling van Goniwe en Calata as onderwysers en dat LGR ontbind word.
61	17-10-84	Goniwe spreek UDF verg op Graaff Reinet toe.
62	18-10-84	CRADORA verg.
63	20-10-84	CRADORA verg.
64	20-10-84	CASAS hou stigtings-verg
65	21-10-84	CRADOYA hou verg.

AANH B

SKOOLBYWONING

Reeks	Maand	Maks	Min	Moontlikheid
a	b	c	d	e
1	April 84	170	27	
	Mei 84	22	9	
	Junie	Vakanie		
	Julie	48	7	
	Aug	88	51	
	Sept	113	100	
	Okt	114	22	

Aanhangsel B tot 22/7/3

SAMEVATTING TOV GEBEURE IN LINGELIHLE WOONBUURT TE CRADOCK GEDURENDE TYDPERK 23/10/84 TOT 302/85

INLEIDING:

1. Die vorige samevatting en meegaande skrywe verwys.

VOLGORDE VAN GEBEURE

2. Sedert 23/10/84 het verskeie voorvalle weereens plaasgevind en word dit in onderstaande tabel weergegee.

Reeks	Datum	Voorval
a	b	c
1.	23-10.84	CRADORA vergadering toegespreek deur OSCAR MPETHA die Nasionale President van die UDF. ANC slagspreuke en vryheidsliedere ter vereering van NELSON MANDELA en ander ANC leiers gesing.
2.	25.10.84	MOLLY BLACKBURN en DI BISHOP word in swart woongebied voorgekeer. Hulle is nie in besit van 'n toegangspermit nie en word op 19/12/84 te Cradock verhoor en skuldig bevind.
3.	28.10.84	MATTHEW GONIWE spreek 'n UDF rally te PE toe.
4.	29.10.84	COSAS vergader te Cradock. Vryheidsliedere en ANC slagspreuke word gesing en geskree.
5.	6.11.84	'n Gesamentlike CRADORA en CRADOYA komitee vergadering word te Cradock gehou. Een van die persone teenwoordig, ene VUYISANI, stel voor dat die SAP lede doodgemaak moet word.
6.	9.11.84	CRADORA vergadering. Vryheidsliedere word gesing en helde vererings vir die ANC word geskree.
7.	10.11.84	Begrafnis van CRADORA lid te Cradock 2500 swartes is teenwoordig. Hulle sing vryheidsliedere en vereer die ANC.
8.	29.11.84	CRADORA vergadering - Vryheidsliedere word gesing en ANC vereer.
9.	02.12.84	CRADORA vergadering - Vryheidsliedere word gesing en ANC vereer.
10.	05.12.84	Plakkate in die kleure van die ANC word in Lingelihle versprei met oa die volgende bewoording "THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN".
11.	06.12.84	CRADORA vergadering - Vryheidsliedere word gesing en ANC vereer.

a.	b	c
12.	12.12.84	CRADORA vergadering - Vryheidsliedere word gesing en ANC vereer.
13.	16.12.84	CRADORA rally - Vryheidsliedere word gesing en ANC vereering.
14.	17.12.84	CRADORA lede onder leiding van MATTHEW GONIWE nader die LINGELIHLE dorpsraad en versoek hulle om te bedank.
15.	19.12.84	Die biersaal te Lingelihle word met klippe bestook nadat sommige swartes bier gekoop het, wat strydig was met 'n bercep deur CRADORA EN CRADOYA om 'n algehele boikot van die biersaal.
16.	24.12.84	'n Pamflet word deur CRADORA in Lingelihle versprei om 22h35 word die huis van die Burgemeesteres met klippe bestook.
17.	25.12.84	CRADORA vier die sogenaamde BLACK CHRISTMAS Vryheidsliedere word gesing en die ANC vereer.
18.	4.01.85	Lingelihle dorpsraadslede bedank as gevolg van intimidasie van CRADORA.
19.	4.01.85	DANE O' GRADY - die 3de Sekretaris van die Amerikaanse Ambassade in Pretoria voer samesprekings te Cradock met GONIWE en die bestuur van CRADORA ivm die skole boikotte.
20.	7.01.85	'n Onderwyser, Mnr. Mkalipi van die Sam Khallie skool word deur ander kinders gekonfronteer oor waar sy kinders skool gaan.
21.	9.01.85	Mnr. Mkalipi word weer gekonfronteer en meegedeel dat tydens 'n CRADOYA vergadering besluit is dat sy kinders uit Fort Beaufort se skool gehaal moet word en moet terug kom na Cradock toe.
22.	11.01.85	CRADORA lede reis per bus na Kaapstad om SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY te spreek.
23.	16.01.85	'n CRAWO vergadering word deur volwassenes en jeugdiges van beide geslagte bygewoon. Daar is beplanning gedoen vir die gesamentlike vergadering op 3.02.85 en vryheidsliedere word gesing.
24.	17.01.85	'n Huis word deur 'n groep jeugdiges aangeval en aan die brand gesteek.
25.	20.01.85	Om 14h00 is 'n CRADOYA vergadering gehou en video opname van onrus in ander sentra word vertoon. Kinders word gekies om in elke straat na te gaan en te rapporteer waar daar huise is waar kinders elders skool toe gestuur word. 'n Beroep word gedoen om toe te sien dat die biersaal boikot effektief is.

a'	b	c
26.	20.01.85	Na die CRADOYA vergadering word 2 huise, te wete n FEZILE GWAYI en die skoolhoof van SAM XHALIE skool en MNR. MAGADU,, onder die klippe gesteek.
27.	23.01.85	Mnr. Mkalipi se weiering om sy kinders terug te bring Cradock toe het tot gevolg dat n poging om 02h30 aangewend word om sy voertuig aan die brand te steek. Dit veroorsaak geringe skade.
28.	23.01.85	Om 20h55 word klippe deur singende jeugdiges na n bewegende voertuig op die Port Elizabeth Johannesburg pad gegooi. Die voertuig is deur klippe getref.
29.	23.01.85	n Groep van 200 jeugdiges gaan van huis tot huis om n opname te maak van alle skoliere wat elders skoolgaan. Ouers word aangesê om hulle kinders permanent Cradock toe terug te bring. Ouers wat versuim se huise sal afgebrand word.
30.	24.01.85	In die vroeë oggendure word n onderwyser van Lingelihle Hoërskool, wat n voorstaander is dat die kinders moet terugkeer skool toe, JAMES NQIKASHE se huis met klippe bestook.
31.	24.01.85	n CRADOYA vergadering word om 14h00 in die voorsitter, GLADWELL MAKAULA se huis gehou. Hy vra dat dreigemente teen ouers eers na 3/02/85 moet plaasvind sodat die byeenkoms op 3/02/85 nie verban kan word nie.
32.	26 en 27/1/85	Groepe jeugdiges marsjeer in die strate en vryheidsliedere word gesing.
33.	31.01.85	n CRADORA vergadering in die Gemeenskapsaal word vanaf 18h50 tot 21h30 gehou. Dit word deur meer as 1000 swartes bygewoon. Vryheidsliedere word gesing en ANC slagspreuke soos AMANDLA NGAWETHU word geskree. Oa word die volgende gesing. "VIVA MANDELA VIVA MHLABA VIVA SISULU.
34.	31.01.85	Na die vergadering word die volgende slagspreuke met wit glansverf teen drie van die vier mure van die sportgronde in Lingelihle geverf. A.N.C. VIVA MKHONTA WE SIZWE ANC VIVA MANDELA SISULU MHLABA MBEKI BEWARE BOTHA TAMFO IS COMING LONG LIVA A.N.C. U.D.F. M.K. FREEDOM NOW : NOW

Nefas wat gemaak word

a	b	c
		BEWARE BOTHA TAMBO IS COMING A.N.C. IS STILL ALIVE LONG LIVE MKHONTO WE SIZWE LONG LIVE U.D.F. BAN APARTHEID LE GRANGE MINISTER OF DISORDER NO GATHERING WILL CAUSE DISORDER DISORDER IS EXISTING RIGHT NOW CAUSE BY YOU BUT VIVA A.N.C. LET THE STRUGGLE CONTINUE UNTIL JUSTICE IS ATTAINED A.N.C. IS STILLALIVE VIVA MKHONTO WE SIZWE BEWARE BOTHA TAMPO IS COMING LONG LIVE MANDELA SISULU MBEKI MHLABA LONG LIVE A.N.C. U.D.F. CRADOYA.
35.	1.02.85	Om 10h00 gaan SAP en SAP(V) na Lingelihle om kennisgewings van vergaderings se verbod op openbare geboue te plak en per luidspreker bekend te maak. Die SAP voertuie word deur ongeveer 3000 swartes agtervolg. Die kennisgewing word opgeskeur en vryheidsliedere word gesing. Swart mag tekens word gegee.
36.	1.02.85	'n DISCO gereël deur CRADOYA word om 20h00 gehou. Gedurende die nag word die volgende slagspreuk op 'n muur van 'n openbare toilet aangebring. LETS KILL MICHAUSDAL'S HOTNOTS ON SUNDAY VIVA ANC UDF CRADOYA. Die slapspreuk is sigbaar vanaf die PE Nasionale pad.
37.	3.02.85	Die woning van Konstabel SITETO van die Uniform Tak word om 01h50 met klippe bestook deur 'n groep van ongeveer 30 swartes. 'n SAP lid wat saam met SITETO woon, Konstabel BOMALI hardloop weg uit vrees.
38.	3.02.85	Om 12h30 word BOMALI se lyk deur die SAP gevind. Hy is deur die groepe swartes op 'n wreedaardige wyse om die lewe gebring.

In the Heart of the Whore

The story of apartheid's death squads

Jacques Pauw

SOUTHERN
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S 54

ANNEXURE A

Political assassinations of anti-apartheid activists

(February 1971–February 1991)[1]

Details of killing	*Alleged killers*
1974	
Abraham Tiro	
Former South African Students Organisation (SASO) leader, killed in February by a parcel bomb while in exile in Botswana.	Unknown
John Dube	
ANC activist, killed in Zambia when a parcel delivered to him exploded.	Unknown
1978	
Rick Turner	
University of Natal political science lecturer, shot dead on 8 January when he answered a knock at his front door.	Unknown
John Majola	
ANC activist, killed after being abducted from Swaziland.	Unknown
Khela (codename)	
ANC activist who was kidnapped from Swaziland by South African security policemen who ambushed an ANC vehicle carrying ANC guerrillas to the border. According to Dirk Coetzee, Khela was killed by his abductors.	Various Security Branches in Natal and Eastern Transvaal.

Details of killing	Alleged killers
1980	
Patrick Nkosi, Patrick Makau	
Nkosi, 9 years old, and Makau, an ANC guerrilla, were killed on 4 June when two bombs, provided by the technical division of Security Branch Headquarters and Military Intelligence, exploded at ANC transit houses in Manzini in Swaziland. The bombs were planted by a security police death squad led by Captain Dirk Coetzee. The bombs were planted in a revenge attack after the ANC bombing of a Sasol petroleum plant.	Dirk Coetzee claimed he was instructed by brigadiers Jan van der Hoven and Nick van Rensburg. Coetzee's squad included various members of the Ermelo Security Branch.
1981	
Matola Raid – 13 ANC members and 1 civilian killed	
On 13 January, SADF commandos crossed the Mozambique border and drove 70 kilometres to Matola, a suburb of Maputo. They destroyed three houses, killed 13 ANC guerrillas and a Portuguese passer-by. At one house, the ANC fought back, killing two commandos and injuring others. One of the dead was wearing a helmet painted with swastikas; he turned out to be a British mercenary, who had left the British Army to join the Rhodesian SAS and then moved to South Africa after independence.	Planned by Brigadier JJ Viktor, former head of the ANC/PAC desk at Security Branch Head-quarters. Information for the operation was supplied by a "turned" ANC guerrilla, Steven Mashamba, and the attack was carried out by SADF Special Forces.
Joe Gqabi	
Gqabi, ANC Chief Representative in Zimbabwe, was killed on 1 August by a car bomb outside his home. Several attempts had previously been made on his life.	Two South African agents were charged with murder, but acquitted because their confessions had been forcibly obtained. It later turned out that the two agents were part of a South African spy ring set up by the director of closed security, Geoffrey Price. He later fled to South Africa and joined the Security Branch.
Sizwe Kondile	
ANC activist captured, detained and tortured by the Port Elizabeth Security Branch. He was killed in October and burnt to avoid a second "Steve Biko" incident in the Eastern Cape.	According to Coetzee, Kondile was brought to Komatipoort where he was murdered by Dirk Coetzee; Nick van Rensburg, Colonel Hermanus du Plessis and members of the Komatipoort and Port Elizabeth Security Branches.

Details of killing	Alleged killers
Peter Dlamini, Vuyani Mavuso	
Both ANC activists. Dlamini handed himself over to the Security Branch and was brought to Vlakplaas, while Mavuso, a highly trained soldier, was captured in the Matola raid. He refused to co-operate with security police. Both were shot and burnt in October, Mavuso because the SAP did not have enough evidence to charge him, and Dlamini because he was of no use to Vlakplaas.	According to Coetzee, Willem Schoon instructed him to get rid of the two activists. Major Koos Vermeulen shot them. Also involved in the killing were Joe Mamasela and Major Archie Flemington of the Komatipoort Security Branch.
Griffiths Mxenge	
Prominent human rights lawyer and political activist who was killed on 19 November after being stabbed more than 40 times. The day before he was killed, his dogs were poisoned.	Captain Dirk Coetzee and his Vlakplaas death squad (David Tshikalange, Almond Nofemela, Brian Nqulunga, Joe Mamasela), instructed by brigadiers Jan van der Hoven and Willem Schoon.
7 Zimbabwean civilians	
On 18 December, as people were busy with their Christmas shopping, a bomb exploded above the conference room of ZANU's headquarters in Harare, where Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and his cabinet were due to meet. Mugabe's life was saved by the fact that the cabinet meeting had been postponed, but seven innocent civilians were killed and 125 people injured.	The director of closed security at Zimbabwe's Central Intelligence Organisation, Geoffrey Price, fled to South Africa after the bomb blast and joined the Security Branch. It was later established that he had set up a South African spy ring that was allegedly responsible for the killing.
ANC member, SACTU official	
The two men were killed by a car bomb in Botswana.	Unknown
1982	
Petros Nzima, Jabu Nzima	
ANC representatives in Swaziland. Killed on 4 June when their car was blown up. The askaris Joe Mamasela, David Tshikalange and Almond Nofemela did the reconnaissance for the operation.	Vlakplaas death squad
Z Mbali	
ANC representative in Lesotho who went missing on 27 June. He was later found decapitated.	Unknown

Details of killing	Alleged killers
Ruth First Wife of South African Communist Party leader Joe Slovo and researcher at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. Killed by a letter bomb on 17 August.	According to Coetzee, First was killed by a letter bomb prepared by the security police. The SAP's involvement was confirmed to him by Major Craig Williamson.
42 killed in SADF Lesotho raid On 9 December, SADF commandos raided a residential area of Maseru, killing 42 people of whom at least 12 were civilians, including women and children. Some were ANC, including the Lesotho representative, Zola Nguini, but there was no evidence to support the claim that these were terrorist bases.	SADF Special Forces
1983	
Saul Mkhize Driefontein community leader shot dead while addressing a crowd.	Unknown
Keith McFadden, Zwelakhe Nyanda ANC members shot dead on 22 November in an attack on an ANC house in Swaziland. The raiders hurled a grenade into the room and fired with automatic rifles.	In an affidavit, Almond Nofemela said he was part of a security police death squad under the command of Major Eugene de Kock that attacked the house.
1984	
Jeanette Schoon, Katryn Schoon ANC activist and lecturer Jeanette Schoon and her six-year old daughter, Katryn, were blown up on 28 June.	Dirk Coetzee claimed he was sent in 1981 to kill Jeanette's activist husband, Marius, but the operation was eventually abandoned. Shortly after the bomb exploded, Major Craig Williamson told Coetzee that the Security Branch was involved in the killing.
Bongani Khumalo Secretary of the Soweto Branch of the Congress of South African Students (Cosas) was shot dead outside his home.	Unknown

Details of killing	Alleged killers
1985	
Alex Pilane	
An East Rand member of Cosas was abducted and beaten to death in April.	Unknown
Vernon Nkadimeng	
On 14 May, Nkadimeng, son of the general secretary of the SA Congress of Trade Unions, was killed in a car bomb explosion in Botswana.	Unknown, but a strong suspicion that SADF Special Forces or the CCB were involved.
12 killed in SADF Botswana raid	
On 14 June, South African commandos drove to Gaborone where they attacked ten houses and fired at passing cars. Nine of those killed were SA refugees, including three woman, a 6-year-old child and a 71-year-old man. Five of the dead had ANC links. The SADF claimed they had attacked the nerve centre of ANC machinery.	SADF Special Forces
Mathew Goniwe, Sparrow Mkhonto, Ford Calata, Sicelo Mhlawuli	
Goniwe, rural organiser of the UDF, Mkhonto, chairperson of the Cradock Residents' Association, Calata, UDF regional executive member, and Mhlawuli, UDF member, all went missing on 27 June on their way to Cradock. Prior to leaving, Goniwe said he would stop only for a uniformed policeman. The night they disappeared, there was a roadblock on their way. It was later discovered that they were all abducted and killed.	Unknown, but a strong suspicion remains that members of the Port Elizabeth Security Branch were responsible for the murders.
Brian Mazibuko	
Anti-apartheid activist and former Robben Island prisoner, Mazibuko was stabbed to death on the East Rand in August.	Unknown
Gasuebe Hubhuli	
Anti-apartheid activist who was shot dead in broad daylight in Vryburg in the Northern Cape.	Unknown
Victoria Mxenge	
On 1 August, prominent human rights lawyer, political activist and the wife of the assassinated Griffiths Mxenge was shot and stabbed to death outside her home.	Unknown

Details of killing	*Alleged killers*
Toto Dweba	
Dweba, Natal Freedom Charter Committee member, was found on 25 August with his neck almost severed and both hands cut off at the wrist.	Unknown
Thabo Mokoena	
National Federation of Workers Union organiser and UDF member who was abducted and killed in September 1985.	Unknown
Godfrey Phuso	
On 19 September, this standard 7 pupil at Thabo-Jabula High School in Pimville was shot dead. The assassin, a white motorist, fired into a group of pupils who had gathered outside the school premises.	Unknown
Bathandwa Ndondo	
ANC activist and student leader who was shot dead on 24 September by two SA and two Transkei security policemen. Ndondo was shot 8 times, at least 6 bullets entering his body at point-blank range.	Two Vlakplaas askaris: Captain Silumami Mose and Xolelwa Sosha. Two Transkei policemen were charged with murder, but the trial never got underway.
Lefu Rasego	
A member of Cosas who was abducted in December. He was later found burnt to death.	Unknown
Ian Zamisa	
A South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) organiser who was abducted and shot dead in December.	Unknown
Zalisile Matyholo	
A former member of SASO, killed near East London.	Unknown
9 killed in SADF Lesotho raid	
On 20 December, a death squad of eight men, some white, using hand guns with silencers, attacked houses in Maseru. Six ANC members and three Lesotho nationals were killed.	SADF Special Forces

NOTULE VAN OP GBS VERGADERING GEHOU TE HK KMDMT OP [redacted] 23 FEBRUARIE 19[redacted]

TEENWOORDIG	VERTEENWOORDIG	AANSTELLING
Sy Eksellensie M. Botha	Buitelandse Sake	Ambassadeur Ciskei
Brig C.P. van der Westhuizen (Voorg)	SAW	Bev Kmdmt OP
Brig J.R.P. Bekker	SAP Grens	Afd Kom Grens
Brig C.A. Swart	SAP OP	Afd Kom OP
Brig C.A. Wernicht	SSVR	-
Kol J.J. Botha	SASP (PE)	B.O.
Kol G.A. Lamont	SAW	Bev Med Kmdmt Oos-Kaap
Kol P. Le Clus	SSVR	-
Kol S. van Aswegen	SAW	SSO Inl
Lt Kol H. Snyman	SAP(V)	Afd Bev
Kmdt F. du Bois (Sekr)	SAW	SO1 GBS
Maj R. Coetzee	SASP (OL)	Sekunde B.O.
Maj I.F. van der Merwe	SAP(V) OL	Waarn SBV
Kapt F.M.C. Potgieter	SASP(V) OL	COB
Kapt M.C. Vermeulen	SAW	SO3 Inl
Lt G. Barnard	SASP (V) PE	2de IB
AO C.J. Els	SAP (V) OL	-
Mnr J.S. Bekker	Gem Cntw	ASV
Mnr G. de Korte	Pos en Telekom	S.D.
Mnr M.A. du Preez	Mannekrag OL	Afd Insp
Mnr O.C. du Toit	K.P.A.	Adj Direkteur Spes Dienst
Mnr J.D. Fourie	Nas Opv (Sportbev)	Streekhoof
Mnr J.C. Greyling	Mannekrag	Afd Insp
Mnr D.J. Hattingh	Nas Opv (Kultuursake)	Streekhoof
Mnr J.C. Hechter	Radio Xhosa	Bestuurder
Mnr D. Joubert	Radio Xhosa	Hoof
Mnr L. Koch	OKAR	Hoofdirekteur
Mnr T.N.B. Liebenberg	Buitelandse Sake PE	Sen B T Beampte
Mnr G.W. Merbold	O & O	Direkteur
Mnr R. Reynolds	S & O	Spakelbeampte
Mnr G.B. Saayman	SSVR	AIC
Mnr H.C.C. Scholtz	S & O	Asst Hoof Kommissaris
Mnr D.S. Smith	Buitelandse Sake	Streeksdirekteur
Mnr J.M. van Tonder	Buitelandse Sake (OL)	Streekverteenwoordiger
Mnr G. Vermeulen	NI	S/V
Mnr R. Verster	SAUK	Streekdirekteur
Mnr D.J. Werth	Buitelandse Sake	
Mnr L. Zerbst	Pos & Telekom	Adj Streekdirekteur

VERSKONINGS

Kol C.N. Breytenbach	SA Lugmag	Bev PE
Lt Kol J. Sydow	SASP	BO OL
Kol A.P. vd Merwe	SAP (V) OL	Afd Bev
Mnr G.D. Engelbrecht	SA Vervoerdienste	Afd Bestuurder
Mnr C.M. Schoombie	NI OL	SV
Mnr G.P. Reynolds	S & O	Hoofkomm
Mnr J. Galvin	NI PE	SV
Kapt (SAV) K.M. Woolley	SAV	VOIB PE

[redacted]

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See p 5C

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FA Composition of Police

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including the military

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and

GBS kan insteed optree.

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
ITEM 4 : PUNTE VOORTSPRUITEND

	Getrede deur
6. Opstokery te Cradock (V). Die situasie word voortdurend deur die VEIKOM gemonitor. Dept Onderwys en Opleiding versoek dat die opruiers aldaar vasgevat word. SAP(V) noem dat klagtes teen intimidasie reeds ondersoek word, so ook die moontlikheid van voorkomende aanhouding van Mnre Goniwe en Galata OKAR sowel as SAP(V) noem dat hierdie opruiery nie in isolasie plaasvind nie maar dat politieke instansies en geestelikes ook nou daarby betrokke is. Situasie deur SAP(V) gemonitor.	SAP(V)

G56

Dictionary of MILITARY TERMS

U.S. Department of Defense



JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

New Revised Edition

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...mand system by signals ...pment.

...delayed repeater communi... ...ns had the capability of ...ng communications using ...ons. This satellite gave a ...tion of instantaneous micro... ...on.

...messenger (usually a com... ...ed officer) responsible for ...transmission and delivery ...material. Generally re... ...mand or local courier. See ...courier.

...(DOD) The intended direction ...horizontal plane.

...1. The action by land, air, ...(DOD) offense, defense, or ...both. 2. Those measures ...tion to a person, plan, ...or installation from the ...effort and leakage of infor... ...of maintaining a continu... ...with transmitter calibrat... ...not necessarily available ...e. 4. Shelter or protection, ...ificial. (DOD) 5. Photo... ...ered images which show ...round. 6. A code mean... ...between force/base and ...or distance stated from ...over bogey twenty-seven to

...(NATO) 1. The ground area ...agery, photomaps, mosaics, ...geographical presentation ...Cover or protection, as the ...by supporting fire. 3. The ...intelligence information is ...any specified area of ...tion of the geographi... ...times. ...erospace under sur... ...comparative cover.

coverage index—*(DOD)* One of a series of overlays showing all photographic reconnaissance missions covering the map sheet to which the overlays refer. See also covertrace (reconnaissance).

covering fire—*(DOD, NATO)* 1. Fire used to protect troops when they are within range of enemy small arms. 2. In amphibious usage, fire delivered prior to the landing to cover preparatory operations such as underwater demolition or minesweeping. See also fire.

covering force—*(DOD, NATO)* 1. A force operating apart from the main force for the purpose of intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the enemy before he can attack the force covered. 2. Any body or detachment of troops which provides security for a larger force by observation, reconnaissance, attack, or defense, or by any combination of these methods. See also force(s).

covering force area—*(NATO)* The area forward of the forward edge of the battle area out to the forward positions initially assigned to the covering forces. It is here that the covering forces execute assigned tasks.

covering troops—See covering force.

cover (intelligence)—See cover, Part 6.

cover (military)—*(DOD)* Actions to conceal actual friendly intentions, capabilities, operations, and other activities by providing a plausible, yet erroneous, explanation of the observable.

cover search—*(DOD, NATO)* In air photographic reconnaissance, the process of selection of the most suitable existing cover for a specific requirement.

covert operations—*(DOD)* Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on conceal-

ment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

covertrace—*(DOD, NATO)* One of a series of overlays showing all air reconnaissance sorties covering the map sheet to which the overlays refer.

crab angle—*(DOD, NATO)* The angle between the aircraft track or flight line and the fore and aft axis of a vertical camera, which is in line with the longitudinal axis of the aircraft.

crash locator beacon—*(DOD, NATO)* An automatic emergency radio locator beacon to help searching forces locate a crashed aircraft. See also emergency locator beacon; personal locator beacon.

crash position indicator—See crash locator beacon.

crater—*(DOD)* The pit, depression, or cavity formed in the surface of the earth by an explosion. It may range from saucer shaped to conical, depending largely on the depth of burst. In the case of a deep underground burst, no rupture of the surface may occur. The resulting cavity is termed a camouflet.

crater depth—*(DOD)* The maximum depth of the crater measured from the deepest point of the pit to the original ground level.

cratering charge—*(DOD, NATO)* A charge placed at an adequate depth to produce a crater.

crater radius—*(DOD)* The average radius of the crater measured at the level corresponding to the original surface of the ground.

creeping barrage—*(DOD, NATO)* A barrage in which the fire of all units participating remains in the same relative position throughout and which advances in steps of one line at a time.

creeping mine—*(DOD, NATO)* In naval mine warfare, a buoyant mine held below the surface by a weight, usually in the form o chain, which is free to creep along the sea under the influence of stream or current.

crest—*(DOD, NATO)* A terrain feature of s altitude that it restricts fire or observation an area beyond, resulting in dead space, limiting the minimum elevation, or both.

crested—*(DOD)* A report which indicates tl engagement of a target or observation of area is not possible because of an obstacle intervening crest.

crested—*(NATO)* In artillery and naval gunfi support, a report which indicates that engag ment of a target or observation of an area not possible because of an obstacle or intu vening crest.

critical altitude—*(DOD, NATO)* The altitu beyond which an aircraft or airbreathin guided missile ceases to perform satisfactoril See also altitude.

critical information—*(DOD)* Specific fac about friendly intentions, capabilities, and a tivities vitally needed by adversaries for the to plan and act effectively so as to guarant failure or unacceptable consequences fc friendly mission accomplishment.

critical intelligence—*(DOD)* Intelligence whic is crucial and requires the immediate atter tion of the commander. It is required t enable the commander to make decisions tha will provide a timely and appropriate re sponse to actions by the potential/actua enemy. It includes but is not limited to th following: a. strong indications of the immi nent outbreak of hostilities of any type (warn ing of attack); b. aggression of any nature against a friendly country; c. indications o use of nuclear-biological-chemical weapon (targets); and d. significant events within po tential enemy countries that may lead tc modification of nuclear strike plans.

critical item—*(DOD)* An essential item which is in short supply or expected to be in short

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operational control of all active air defenses in the sector area in coordination with those of adjacent sectors. In these tasks he is subject to overall direction by the group or command controller

sector of fire—*(DOD, NATO)* An area which is required to be covered by fire by an individual, a weapon, or a unit.

sector scan—*(DOD, NATO)* Scan in which the antenna oscillates through a selected angle.

secure—*(DOD, NATO)* In an operational context, to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action. See also denial measure.

security—*(DOD)* 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. See also national security.

security—*(NATO)* The condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure. The term is also applied to those measures necessary to achieve this condition and to the organizations responsible for those measures. See also counterintelligence; physical security; port security; protective security; security intelligence; subversion.

security alert team—*(DOD)* Two or more security force members who form the initial reinforcing element responding to security alarms, emergencies, or irregularities.

security assistance—*(DOD)* Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

security certification—*(DOD, NATO)* A certification issued by competent national authority to indicate that a person has been investigated and is eligible for access to classified matter to the extent stated in the certification. (Note: The DOD definition does not use the word "national.")

security classification—*(DOD)* A category to which national security information and material is assigned to denote the degree of damage that unauthorized disclosure would cause to national defense or foreign relations of the United States and to denote the degree of protection required. There are three such categories:

a. top secret—National security information or material which requires the highest degree of protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of "exceptionally grave damage" include armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security; the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to national security.

b. secret—National security information or material which requires a substantial degree of protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples of "serious damage" include disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national security; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security.

c. confidential—National security information or material which requires protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. See also classification; security.

security classification—*(NATO)* A category or grade assigned to defense information or material to indicate the degree of danger to NATO/national security that would result from its unauthorized disclosure and the standard of protection required to guard against unauthorized disclosure.

security clearance—*(DOD, NATO)* An administrative determination by competent national authority that an individual is eligible, from a security stand-point, for access to classified information. (Note: The DOD definition does not use the word "national.")

security intelligence—*(DOD, NATO)* Intelligence on the indentity, capabilities and intentions of hostile organizations or individuals who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. See also counterintelligence; intelligence; security.

security supporting assistance—*(DOD)* Program by which economic assistance is provided on a loan or grant basis, to selected foreign governments having unique security problems. The funds are used to finance imports of commodities, capital, or technical assistance in accordance with terms of a bilateral agreement; counterpart funds thereby generated may be used as budgetary support. These funds enable a recipient to devote more of its own resources to defense and security purposes than it otherwise could do without serious economic or political consequences.

Selected Reserve—*(DOD)* Those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. All Selected Reservists are in an active status. The Selected Reserve also includes persons performing initial active duty for training.

Selected Reserve strength—*(DOD)* The total number of Guardsmen and reservists in the Selected Reserve who are subject to the 200K Presidential recall or mobilization under declaration of war or national emergency.

selective identification feature—*(DOD)* A capability which, when added to the basic Identification Friend or Foe system, provides the means to transmit, receive, and display selected coded replies.

selective identification feature—*(NATO)* Airborne pulse-type transponder which provides automatic selective identification of aircraft in which it is installed, to friend-or-foe identification installations, whether ground, shipboard, or airborne.

selective jamming—See spot jamming.

selective loading—*(DOD, NATO)* The arrangement and stowage of equipment and supplies aboard ship in a manner designed to facilitate issues to units. See also loading.

selective mobilization—See mobilization.

selective unloading—*(DOD, NATO)* In an amphibious operation, the controlled unloading from assault shipping, and movement ashore, of specific items of cargo at the request of the

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SOME POSSIBILITIES IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

H. R. HEITMAN*

Introduction

It is often held that there can be no 'military' solution to an insurgency. As a general rule this is probably true but it is rather dependant on what is understood by terms 'insurgency', 'solution' and 'military'. It is therefore probably worthwhile looking at these terms more closely. For the purposes of this paper these terms will be used in the following sense:

Insurgency — an organization or movement attempting to alter and/or overthrow the existing system in the state concerned, as well as, of course, the process thereof. Such a movement could have one or more of a variety of aims and intentions including the righting of perceived wrongs (social, economic or political); the seizing of power for a group, tribe, race or even an individual; the installation of a different social/political system (e.g. Communism) and even simple anarchy. Additionally, a foreign, perhaps neighbouring, state may be interested in a change of government or system to one more acceptable to itself and more amendable to its plans. Thus an insurgency may be essentially internal, although almost certainly organised and supplied and very often incited, from the outside, or it may amount simply to incursions by groups of terrorists, guerillas/bandits from across the border. Therefore, this term will be used to include everything covered by the German term *Kleinkrieg* as the tactics to oppose such operations are basically the same in all cases.

Solution — the defeat of the insurgency in that it is at least rendered incapable of further illegal operations or entirely eliminated *without the authorities having to give up or alter any part of their principles and basic policies.* An alteration of the latter would imply, at best, an imcomplete victory, at worst, a defeat.

Military — all active operations aimed directly at defeating the insurgents, i.e. intelligence, police, army, etc. Indirectly aimed operations such as publicity, rehousing and counter organization programmes lie on the borderline. They could be seen as 'military' or also 'political' attempts at a solution. As, however, the usual idea of a political solution seems to be limited to either pre-empting the insurgency by/and/or giving in to it, these must probably also be considered as part of the military solution.

Having attempted to clarify the sense in which the above terms will generally be used in this article, two comments on the opening sentence must be made. Firstly, while a 'purely military' solution may be unlikely, there will almost invariably have to be a military component of the authorities' counter-insurgency programme. At its minimum level this would encompass the protection of the population and vital installations as well as the authorities themselves. It would also involve demonstrating to the insurgents that the authorities possess both the means and the will to take more direct action should attempts at an amicable settlement prove fruitless. Secondly, in some cases a 'purely military' solution may indeed prove feasible. Such cases would include that of an incursion by 'foreign' terrorists and operations in occupied territory. In the former case it would be made possible largely by the assumed friendliness of the population towards the authorities and their hostility towards the, as it were, invaders. A further factor would be the 'military' bias of the opponents' operations. In the second case the important factors would be the continuing unfriendliness of the population — the best the counter-insurgent could hope for is neutrality — and the transitory nature of the counter-insurgents' presence in the area. Thus his actions would be far less limited both in scope and nature than would be the case in home territory.

There is another point well worth touching on at this stage: several of the measures to

be suggested below are such as to provoke cries of 'but tha. would reduce us to their level!' Two comments: firstly, pray, onwhich but its own level can an insurgency be successfully combatted? Secondly, the measures concerned can in no way be compared to the moral and physical degeneracy of the terrorists. Unlike those, the of latter, these are aimed only at what are, in effect, combatants and stop very far short of what has become the rule for his behaviour.

At this stage, before moving on to counter-insurgency operations as such, it is worthwhile briefly considering insurgency in order to clarify what, in fact, it is that we are fighting.

The course of insurgency — outline

Many practitioners of both insurgency and counter-insurgency seem to feel that the course of an insurgency can be divided into several more or less distinct stages. While there are different opinions as to the number and exact definition of these stages, the mean would appear to comprise the following four stages:

1) Organization
2) Terrorism
3) Guerilla Warfare
4) Mobile Warfare.

A brief examination of each of these stages will attempt to illustrate the course of an insurgency's development.

1) **Organization:** During this stage the insurgency's main concern will be to build up both its political and its military wing. The emphasis will be on the former which will simultaneously be utilized to gain further recruits for both wings. Initially recruits will be drawn from the politically like-minded, later recruiting procedures can include political conversion, financial or other inducement, blackmail and terrorism. The political wing will also be involved in raising funds, gathering intelligence, creating support among the population, the press, within the security forces and the government and in suitable foreign countries. There will also be a determined effort to create hostility towards the authorities and operations of this nature may well be the first sign of trouble perceived by the authorities.

Such operations will probably commence with a guarded (less guarded as it advances) press and publications (e.g. furthering an importation of suitable literature) programme. The aim of this and other operations would be not only to alienate the population from the authorities but also from the system, to alienate young from old, workers from employers and also the existing state from other countries.

A major aspect of this and the later stages will be a campaign to denigrate the security forces. This will include accusations of torture, individual and mass murders and, on a different tack, corruption and inefficiency. Where necessary, the appropriate physical evidence in the form of bodies and/or injuries may well be provided.

Determined attempts will also be made to infiltrate various organizations and bodies — particularly those youth or worker orientated as well as, for instance, the teaching profession and the 'media'. Apart from helping to further the above-mentioned alienation, such infiltration is also preparatory to the next phase of this stage. This phase involves a gradual (as a rule) increase in student demonstrations, strikes, riots, etc. The emphasis will probably be on 'peaceful' demonstrations or strikes for patently worthwhile and laudable causes, even if these are completely at odds with the insurgency's programme. This emphasis not only makes them easier to organize but also makes their prohibition and/or repression all the more abhorrent, the aim being, of course, alienation and general ill-feeling and mistrust. During the course of these demonstrations it may be felt necessary to take steps to provoke the authorities into a more violent reaction. The more extreme of these steps can range from spitting in a policeman's face or kicking him in the groin to acid filled light-bulbs and razor-blade studded potatoes and gloves as well as so-called 'sap gloves' — loaded with lead shot. These measures have the particular advantage of a low profile relative to television cameras and reporters in general — particularly given a friendly press. Should these measures prove insufficient, or anyway at a later stage, the in-

surgency will move onto stoning, clubs, Molotov cocktails and even sniping. Possibly the most important thing to remember about this stage, is that the operations started during it will almost certainly be continued right throughout the course of the insurgency.

2) **Terrorism:** This stage will comprise operations including bombings with and without prior warning, minings, ambushes, specific assassinations, kidnapping, the seizing of hostages, robberies and riots apart from an intensified application of the stage one operations. It serves several purposes:

(i) To provide both the command and the military wing with experience and training.
(ii) To finally harden and commit recruits by having them commit serious crimes, preferably before witnesses.
(iii) To terrorize selected elements of the population or the population as a whole into co-operation or at least neutrality.
(iv) To shake the population's faith in the authority's ability to protect it.
(v) To demonstrate this same inability to the outside world.
(vi) To panic the authorities into excessively repressive measures.

Operations of this stage may well be initiated in the urban areas, particularly within and in the vicinity of slum areas which provide sanctuary for the terrorists. The use of these also brings with it benefits such as added rich/poor alienation, scenes of persecution and repression of the poor slum dwellers, etc. During later stages of the insurgency the nature of operations within the urban areas may well remain terrorist as other operations are difficult to carry out there. Another factor of these operations is that the insurgents may very well attempt to place responsibility for the more distasteful acts of terrorism on the security forces.

3) **Guerilla Warfare:** This stage is reached when the insurgents decide that they are strong enough to initiate minor actions against army units as well as expanding terrorist attacks into major sabotage operations. This stage will almost certainly be initiated in and largely remain limited to, the rural areas as these are best suited to such operations. The operations of this stage will include attacks on police stations, small army outposts and communications as well as ambushes of military and other traffic and patrols. It will also include a form of terrorism against the rural population who may well have been spared earlier attacks. Apart from those mentioned with regard to the previous two sections, the aims of the operations of this stage will include:

(i) Causing the army to abandon the worst affected areas or, alternatively to concentrate in them leaving apparently unaffected areas at the mercy of the insurgency.
(ii) As an alternative to (i) above or even to some extent in conjunction with it, to cause the army (and other security forces) to dissipate its strength thus

(a) losing control in most of the country and
(b) laying itself open to defeat in detail during this or the next stage.

However, the main aim of operations in this stage will be to consolidate the insurgency in one or more selected areas. An attempt will be made to drive the authorities from these areas and thus to gain complete or near complete control over both the territory and the population, thus creating (or consolidating) a strategic base for the insurgency. Apart from the obvious morale and publicity effects, such areas can now be used to set up and train not only further terrorist and guerilla bands but also regular units. Such an area will very probably be set up near a border so as to facilitate the free movement of personnel and supplies to the insurgents.

4) **Mobile Warfare:** This stage involves semi-conventional operations designed to defeat the opposing forces militarily and to seize final control of the country as a whole. Thus operations will probably but not necessarily be initiated from within the insurgency's strategic bases. An important aspect of this stage and, to some extent the previous one, is that the insurgency's publicity/propaganda campaign will begin to change. The attacks will no longer be on any and all authority but rather they will be aimed directly at the opposing structure. This is necessary in order to facilitate control of the country after the expected victory.

In closing this section there are a number of aspects worth emphasizing:

(i) Throughout its course the insurgency is to a great extent dependant upon the support or at least the neutrality of the population. Not only does the population supply recruits, foodstuffs, clothing and shelter, but it is also an extremely important part of the insurgency's intelligence system, particularly in the vicinity of its bases and camps — and, for that matter, in the vicinity of the army's. Hence the emphasis upon the winning over or terrorizing into co-operation of the population. Further, it is important for the insurgency to alienate the population from the authorities, not only to rob the latter of its support, but also to demonstrate the authorities' lack of credibility and legitimacy both internally and in the eyes of the world.

(ii) The 'stages' of an insurgency will almost certainly overlap and blend into each other rather than being clearly distinct. Particularly the operations of the first two stages will tend to be continued throughout the course of the insurgency. It is also quite possible for the insurgency to be in different stages in different parts of the country.

(iii) The insurgency may well succeed or be defeated in any one of these stages. Similarly it may skip one of them altogether. However, the defeat of the insurgency in one stage may not be a decisive one — it will be prepared to adopt a lower profile and to revert to a previous stage.

(iv) It must at all times be remembered that many of the insurgents and their supporters (active or passive) as well as, for instance, other countries, may well sincerely believe in the declared aims and intentions of the insurgency and also believe that these are indeed the real aims thereof; quite regardless of what the aims of the instigators and leaders are.

Having outlined the threat, let us now proceed to an overview of counter-insurgency followed by a more detailed look at its course and possibilities.

Counter-insurgency — overview

Upon detecting the development of an insurgency, the first step is to determine the type of insurgency and the stage that it has reached. Both of these factors will affect all following actions. A simple incursion or an insurgency almost purely externally mounted and with minimal internal support will obviously require different counter-measures to a, as it were, 'home grown' one. If nothing else, the former will probably be easier to deal with and the reaction may even fall largely within the ambit of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The declared aims of the insurgency are also important determinants of the reaction — particularly with regard to propaganda and psychological operations. In some cases it may be possible to pre-empt an insurgency without the authorities sacrificing their principles. The real aims of the insurgency will not only affect the scale and type of the reaction but may also give clues to
(i) the instigators and supporters and
(ii) the likely operations. These aims can also be utilized for propaganda and to help the Foreign Affairs staff to convince friendly states.

The importance of determining the stage of the insurgency is quite easily apparent in that it will obviously affect the counter-measures required and possible. The first, organization, stage is probably the insurgency's most vulnerable one as it is not yet prepared and is, perhaps, still open to infiltration. The problem here lies in the difficulty of accurately detecting an insurgency during this stage and, having done so, convincing the press, the public and the world of the danger and the necessity of the measures taken to counter it. The successful detection and elimination of an insurgency during this stage will require, above all, an effective intelligence system and the means to use what intelligence is made available. Both requirements are usually not easily met within a democratic system, the reasons for this will become clear in a later section. However, if at all possible, it is best to smash the insurgency during this stage as this can save much bloodshed, destruction and suffering.

During the next two stages the insurgency has become obvious to everyone, but it is still very difficult to come to grips with given the restrictions concomitant with democracy and true liberalism. The difficulties regarding counter-measures during these

stages are much the same as those relative to the first stage. It is only in the later phases of the third stage that the armed forces have a real opportunity to act. During these stages the security forces will quite possibly have to limit themselves to gathering information, harassing the insurgency and protecting, or attempting to, the population, government and installations. Attempts should be made to either force the insurgency back to stage one or to entice it into moving into stage four prematurely thus giving the armed forces the opportunity they need. The final stage, if reached according to the insurgents' plan, will probably result in victory for them as the security forces will by then be both too weak and too dispersed to offer much serious resistance. The latter's only choice then will be either to accept defeat or to themselves become insurgents.

Immediately upon receiving intelligence of an impending insurgency, the authorities should set about preparing or consolidating their strategic base(s). This will require a massive propaganda/publicity programme, possibly improvements in administration,services and the administration of justice and an intensive effort at counter-organization. This latter term refers quite simply to the organizing of the population into groups and clubs of virtually any type and then attempting to link these up with each other and the authorities, thus providing the people with a set of loyalties which are, in all probability, at odds with the insurgency and its real, if not its declared, intentions. Joining such clubs, etc. must, however, remain voluntary if the result is not to be counter-productive. The government should also immediately launch into a programme for gaining and keeping friends in the outside world. These are not only important as a source of aid and assistance, but also as a source and proof of legitimacy and respectability, as, indeed, are the strategic/popular bases. Considerable efforts will also have to be made to prevent disaffection within the administration and security forces.

A major effort will also have to be made throughout the course of the insurgency to open the eyes of those well meaning persons and bodies who, in their incredible naïveté, believe every insurgent accusation against the authorities in general and the security forces in particular. Generally seen as above board and well meaning, such people are almost a greater danger than the insurgency itself — their particular metiér being the sapping of morale. Some, of course, may be neither well-meaning nor naïve.

In closing this general overview, the great importance of good intelligence and the maintenance or at the very least, the contesting of the initiative must be underlined. As long as the counter-insurgent has the initiative he can keep the insurgency on the run, force it to change stages — and be ready for the new stage and, in the end, win.

Following on to the above general overview, the next sections will attempt to give a more detailed look at some of the possible counter-insurgency operations. For the sake of continuity and clarity, they will follow the stages of insurgency outlined above. However it must be emphasized that they too overlap and blend into each other. In recognition of this each section will only deal with those possible operations which are more or less new — i.e. were not mentioned before, although they may well also have applications in earlier stages. Most operations will from the time of their introduction run right through the course of the campaign — albeit modified to suit changing conditions.

Stage one insurgency — counter-measures

In this and the following sections dealing with counter-measures to the various stages of insurgency, those steps that can be taken by the government and the civilian authorities generally will be dealt with first. Thereafter those steps that can be taken by the Intelligence Services, the Police and the Armed Forces. Before proceeding to details it must be made clear that the average democratic state must consider itself lucky if it uncovers an insurgency in this the first stage.

A) **General:** The first steps to be taken by the government and civilian authorities have already been mentioned. Responsible heads of departments, local authorities, members of the security forces and friendly states must be informed as soon as possible of the

t h t o eth g n
future. How much information is given to whom will depend largely on the Intelligence Services' estimates of political reliability. Legislation already in the pipeline that may serve to pre-empt the insurgency should be speeded up and in some cases new legislation may be introduced. However, such steps must on no account be precipitate so as not to warn the insurgents. Further, all such measures should be very carefully reconsidered and perhaps delayed or dropped once terrorism or some other form of pressure has begun to be applied. To carry on with such measures then can only be interpreted as a reaction to the pressure applied, leading to the simple but perhaps erroneous conclusion that such methods are valid. This could also weaken the authorities' stand in the eyes of the population and the world at large.

Efforts can also be made to improve administrative procedures and services in those areas where it may be necessary, hoping thereby to reduce any discontent, perhaps even create some loyalty and, anyway, establish closer contact with the population. Simultaneously a start can be made with efforts at counter-organization as mentioned above. Initial preparations for the regroupment[1] of parts of the population could also advantageously be made during this stage.

As soon as sufficient information on the insurgency is available to form a reasonably accurate opinion as to its structure, origin, aims and strength, a start can be made with a publicity and propaganda campaign. Such a programme's aims would be twofold:

(i) to popularise the authorities and the existing system and
(ii) to denigrate the insurgency, its members and its aims.

If suitable, its declared aims can be attacked and/or ridiculed. Above all, however, its real intentions should be exposed to the full glare of publicity and suitably attacked. Similarly, its supporters and its reliance on them can be a suitable target. However, such a programme must build up very gradually so as to avoid alarming the insurgents, panicking and/or saturating the population. A programme of this nature must also be as subtle as possible and must at all costs avoid fabrication and disproved to the discredit of the authorities. Similarly, particularly during this stage, every effort should be made to avoid withholding news as this could lead to similar results if exposed. The programme would not only involve the media but could also be expanded to include literature, entertainment, art and a 'whispering campaign'. In fact, to be really effective it would have to include all of these. Falling between this and the counter-organization effort, would be operations aimed at countering the insurgency's attempts at alienation.

B) **Intelligence:** The intelligence services will bear the brunt of this stage of the campaign as the other elements of the security forces will in all probability be unable to come to grips with the enemy. Their main functions will be the normal ones of collecting, collating and disseminating intelligence. Additionally they should attempt to infiltrate the insurgency and/or to subvert some of its members. This may be rendered difficult as the insurgency, still being small, will probably have very intensive and effective security measures. However, this difficulty may be offset by the fact that it is still recruiting thus it should be possible to have it come to and recruit the infiltrator. Similarly, at this stage the insurgency probably still comprises mainly idealists who are not easily subverted. However anyone infiltrated or subverted at this stage has a very good chance of rising to an important position within the hierarchy in later stages, particularly if he remains passive for a time.

Other operations can include the sabotage/doctoring of discovered arms or supply caches. The resultant difficulties will sap confidence and morale as well as creating distrust between the insurgency and its suppliers. Such operations should not, however, be overdone so as to avoid creating suspicion. They could range from doctored foodstuffs via mixing petrol with paraffin for lamps and tampering with medical supplies to the placing of instant detonation fuses in e.g. every tenth handgrenade, etc. The preference here would be to the infliction of illness or injury, not death, the former having

1. E.g. into fortified villages/strategic hamlets or even to a different area altogether if the area concerned cannot be held.

the added advantage of sapping morale and straining logistics. The intelligence services can also create some havoc by the supplying of false information, particularly the type designed to create mistrust. Thus a leader of the insurgency could be made to appear as a police-informer by, for instance paying him more or less secretly, or, less subtly, by rewarding him publicly. Other 'misinformation' could be aimed at frustrating the insurgency's later efforts. Such operations would go hand in hand with the tightening up of security generally and a rechecking of all security clearances.

If enough information becomes available during this stage to ensure the destruction of the insurgency, it may be possible to take the necessary steps. However, until that time is reached, it is better to let it continue in what has, after all, more or less become 'the open' rather than driving it further underground and out of sight. This doctrine would not rule out some harassment in co-operation with the police, however. Further, some extra-legal operations may prove beneficial both in eliminating certain key members of the insurgency and in sowing suspicion. Needless to say such operations would need to be suitably disguised and the necessity for them carefully weighed.

C) **Police:** The police force is rather limited in its capabilities versus an insurgency — particularly during this stage. This limitation is largely due to its relation to the concept of the rule of law which must be kept intact at all costs. However the police can utilize its records and its own intelligence and informer systems together with those of the intelligence services and other departments (e.g. statistics, social welfare, or immigration,). The police can also use this stage to make their preparations for future identity card systems, checkpoint networks as well as for the possible regroupment of parts of the population.

More actively, the police can help harass the insurgency by, for instance, prosecuting in even the most trivial cases when a suspected insurgent or supporter is involved, holding on suspicion, taking in motorists (suspects only) for I.D. checks after minor motoring offences and similar. Such harrassment can also be conducted by, for instance health and fire department officials. Given some co-operation by the prosecutors, it may well be possible to remove some members of the insurgency from circulation for some time. The police's main functions will thus lie in preparation and co-operation with the intelligence services. The most obvious feature of the latter lies quite simply in arresting and bringing to trial members of the insurgency against whom sufficient evidence is available. There are two limitations that come into play here, however:

(i) Particularly during this stage it may prove wiser not to prosecute anyone in connection with the insurgency in order to avoid warning the latter of its detection.

(ii) In certain special circumstances it may be desirable to waive prosecution (even for other crimes) in order to:

(a) encourage further desertions/surrenders,
(b) reward individuals for their co-operation and to protect them from retribution and
(c) specifically avoid warning the individual's compatriots.

An opposite situation could also arise where it might be desirable ostensibly to prosecute so as to
(a) create alarm within the insurgency,
(b) protect an informer or
(c) clear an infiltrator.

An important point here is that throughout the course of operation stringent measures will be necessary to prevent the suicide (following instructions) and/or assassination (by the insurgents) of prisoners. This danger will be greatest prior to interrogation and trial as, afterwards, the insurgency can no longer achieve anything thereby.

In order to deal with the type of situation outlined above it may well prove necessary to modify certain laws and/or to grant the police in particular, certain new powers. The modifications required would be to make provision for detention without trial (subject to certain conditions and judicial supervision), the suspension of habeas corpus in certain cases and alterations concerning the rights and procedures for arrest, holding for questioning, search and seizure and evidence (both with regard to the admissibility and giving

thereof). These powers, in order to be of use, must be made available independent of the declaration of a state of emergency — which action has many consequences and may not always be desirable or even practical. To guard against misuse, these powers must, of course, be subject to safeguards — but not so hedged about with the same as to be useless.[2]

The major field of direct action for the police will lie in the control and subduing of demonstrations and riots. While every effort should be made to keep a low profile at first, the means and the will to strike effectively and quickly must be available. In many cases immediate drastic action can avoid later bloodshed. Available equipment can range from truncheons via water cannon to tear and the more effective nausea gas. In some cases firearms may have to be used. Should this become necessary it may be best to shoot at selected and indicated individuals, preferably the agitators, than just into the crowd. Volleys fired over the heads of crowds tend to be ineffective as they encourage the latter's belief in their own invulnerability. When possible the intending rioters should be intercepted close to their gathering point and dealt with then. It may also be possible to clear the area and bar the press thus removing the main point of the riot. While every effort must be made to avoid the use of even the minimum of violence for as long as possible, two factors should be borne in mind:

(i) A sharp shock administered early can be very valuable.
(ii) The riot control force should not be expected to expose itself to injury and possible death without the equipment to defend itself and the permission to use it.

In closing it is worth considering the possibility of utilizing one crowd or group to neutralize another, good intelligence work and some astute bargaining may well be able to achieve this.

A final point is the necessity of the co-operation of the judiciary. This applies particularly to the question of sentences. nothing Is more demoralizing to the security forces than to risk their lives to apprehend someone who then receives a paltry sentence. This also has the opposite effect upon the insurgency.

D) **Armed Forces:** During this stage the armed forces are extremely limited as regards their capability for action. All they can really do is to gradually shift the emphasis of training of the regular and reserve units to irregular warfare and start building up self-defence units. These last are tricky, however, as they should only be started in areas likely to be held so as to avoid a loss of confidence and, for that matter, equipment. Given sufficient intelligence the army might be able to initiate a border closure programme in order to cut off supplies to the insurgency. Some increase in patrolling and aerial and maritime reconnaissance may be practicable but this must be disguised in one or another way if it is not to warn the insurgents. The armed forces could possibly expand their operations in the civic action field although they would have to be very careful to avoid a dissipation of their resources and the exposure of small detachments to attack. Otherwise, they are generally limited to updating maps and doctrine, carrying out some terrain reconnaissance, preparing plans for regroupment and security operations and, of course, improving their own security arrangements.

In closing this section it is again worth emphasizing the desirability of destroying the insurgency during this stage. But such an attempt should only be made given near certainty of success. Any operation that merely warns the insurgency without destroying or at least critically damaging it would only worsen the situation. Failing such an opportunity, every effort must be made to avoid warning the insurgency — rather let it reveal itself in its own time: unaware that it is expected and prepared for, that it has been infiltrated and subverted. In dealing with the next stages of operations only changes in the picture described above will be covered as most of these operations will continue, increasing in intensity as soon as the insurgency has re-

2. A difficult problem! One solution could be for actions taken under such powers to be subject to judicial review at a later date.

vealed itself or sufficient intelligence and capability is available to decisively defeat it.

Stage two insurgency — counter-measures

With the beginning of this stage the insurgency has moved into the open and counter-measures can thus be intensified and some new ones or different versions introduced. In some cases it may of course still be advisable to conceal the fact that the authorities know about something or other until action has been taken — for similar reasons as before. The difference now lies in the fact that waiting too long in the hopes of more or better information or opportunities can lead to more deaths than would have been caused by the forgone opportunities had the security forces moved earlier. Thus, if anything, even more concentrated thought must be applied to the whole strategy.

A) **General:** No attempts should now be made to pre-empt the insurgency except in regard to those of their aims not yet the subject of common knowledge. At all costs the impression of giving way under pressure must be avoided. Plans for possible regroupments can now be carried further and the populations of some smaller villages in isolated areas could already be moved without too much disruption and thus reducing the work load later, when such operations will have to be carried out in the face of guerilla opposition. Diplomatic and political moves should be continued and intensified. It may prove possible to import experts in anti-terrorist or even anti-guerilla operations. Such a course is, however, fraught with many political difficulties and should therefore be approached warily.

B) **Intelligence:** The intelligence agencies must continue with the same operations as before only more intensively. Now, also, it is no longer important to conceal the fact that operations are taking place, thus more general attempts at gathering information may be used. For instance apart from relying upon various modern surveillance equipments, it will now be possible to tap some lines officially from the post office. Similarly, exchange operators, after careful vetting, can be requested to eavesdrop on calls at random in the hopes of picking up a stray item of information. If anything, it is now more important than ever to evaluate and disseminate intelligence quickly — any delay may cost lives.

Extra legal operations will by now possibly have become not only more acceptable but also more important and, perhaps, a little easier due to the lower secrecy requirements. It may even be feasible to set up a counter terrorist organisation although this involves many moral and legal problems as well as creating the difficulties with regard to past, current and future loyalty that the authorities have been trying to create for the insurgency, for the authorities themselves. In some cases these disadvantages may, however, be worth accepting in return for the problems created for the insurgency. It is important to note that such operations are not intended to terrorise any part of the population but the insurgents themselves. It may prove worthwhile activating some of the infiltrated personnel at this stage in order to both speed up the flow of information as well as to interfere with the insurgency's operations.

C) **Police:** The police will also intensify all its operations but with the proviso that police patrols or officers on traffic duty should be covered so as not to present an easy target for terrorists. As far as possible normal duties should be carried out and the image of the policeman as 'friend and helper' should be maintained — but not at the expense of dead policemen. More active police measures might include raids on the advice of the intelligence services or based on their own or other information. In particularly hard hit areas raids might also be conducted at random. This would also be the stage at which to introduce snap checks at road blocks, inspections of personal identification and searches of individuals and their bags, cases, etc. at random and as part of a specific plan one might go as far as Colonel Trinquier's idea of having one man in every family or small group responsible for the actions of its members, one man in a building or street responsible for these men and so on. This combined with a rigorous application of the other methods mentioned could be extremely ef-

fective but is, perhaps, somewhat drastic. The police will of course also be involved in investigating cases of terrorism in co-operation with the intelligence services. Their forensic laboratories and print files will become particularly important during this stage. Thus while the intelligence service is mainly concerned with gathering intelligence on and infiltrating and undermining the insurgency, the police's major task will be to create a climate of uncertainty for the insurgents — as well as absorbing many of their blows. Initially the police will probably also have to protect the fire, ambulance and other services. As the situation deteriorates, this will become the responsibility of the army.

D) **Armed Forces:** The armed forces will still be limited in their functions but the army could, for instance, be used to saturate certain areas and thus make terrorist operations difficult and risky. It is essential, however, that troops do not present themselves as targets by moving around in small groups. At this stage it may also be possible and necessary to mount a thorough border-closure operation. This could range in intensity from thorough patrolling to a system of electrified and floodlit fences 'overwatched' by radar and other surveillance devices and covered by mobile groups. Automated ambushes may also merit serious consideration. It may also be possible to identify rural areas thought likely to serve as future guerilla bases. Frequent, but irregularly timed patrols and, possibly, sweeps, though these can further unsettle the insurgency. The training, equipping and screening of self-defence units can also be stepped up. Initial on-the-spot preparation could now also be made for regroupment operations. The use of forbidden zones, particularly along the border or around terrorist infested areas may also prove effective — particularly given modern sensors and a heli-borne quick force.

As was the case in the previous stage the only hope for a victory during this stage lies in the intelligence field. Failing this the security forces can only harass the insurgency and attempt to force it back into stage one. Alternatively it may be possible to deceive it into proceeding to stage three prematurely — i.e. before it has any form of strategic base in the rural areas and, perhaps, in areas where the army is ready and waiting. Such a move would depend largely on the feeding of false information, the use of decoys and the action of infiltrated intelligence personnel or subverted insurgents.

State three insurgency — counter-measures

The reaching of this stage probably signifies a considerable feeling of confidence within the insurgency although it could also come about as a result of a complete failure of terrorism, which is of course an important determinant of all counter measures, particularly psychological operations.

A) **General:** This is the moment where the final decisions on which areas to hold at all costs and which, perhaps, to give up temporarily must be taken — at the very latest.[3] The emphasis must be on controlling the bulk of the population, food and other resources and territory in that order. Once this decision has been taken, the work of regroupment can begin seriously and efforts at counter-organization must be greatly stepped up — if necessary at the expense of those areas not considered part of the essential strategic base. Other operations would, of course, continue.

B) **Intelligence:** The main change as regards the intelligence services would lie in the greater importance of their rural operations. It may also be possible to set up counter-guerilla groups similar to the counter-terrorists, although the former may be more within the ambit of the army. The earlier comments with regard to the 'doctoring' of captured dumps are particularly important now. Similar methods can be used on deserted guerilla camps, villages evacuated during regroupment operations, etc. — again possibly more an army operation. The intelligence service should provide special intelligence and interrogation teams to the army to operate with its patrols and other units. Alternatively it should provide suitable training to army personnel. The quick passing of information by the army to the

3. In some cases, of course, it may not prove necessary to give up any territory at all, even temporarily.

intelligence services and its quick and efficient evaluation and the dissemination of these results now assumes even greater importance.

C) **Police:** The police may have some of the pressure taken off them during this stage although terror operations are likely to continue at least in the larger urban centres. Rural police will be involved in the regroupment process and will have to co-operate with the army and self defence units. At some stage it may well become necessary to withdraw police personnel from those areas not dominated by the security forces. Simultaneously, administrative personnel will probably also have to be withdrawn. Rural police operations will be greatly hindered by guerilla operations and the police should largely content itself with maintaining law and order within the strategic base. Particularly in the new 'strategic hamlets' or whatever it is decided to call them, the police can be used to enforce curfews and checks.

D) **Armed Forces:** During this stage the military and particularly the army really have an opportunity to act. The army's main task will be the protection and consolidation of its strategic bases. This will involve some garrison work although much of this can be handled by the self-defence units. The manoeuvre units should concentrate on holding the perimeter of these areas and on thoroughly clearing the interior by means of patrols, ambushes, sweeps and 'nomadizing' — that is long term patrols/surveillance teams covering an area on foot and possibly under cover. Liberal use can be made of helicopters for reconnaissance, mobility and casevac.

While these operations are continuing, some elements of the army and, where applicable, the other two services, should attempt to create unease among the insurgents in the remainder of the country. These operations are intended to prevent the formation of an insurgent strategic base. Whether or not he can form a popular base is not within the army's control — that depends on the success of previous counter-organization and propaganda efforts. It may be possible to utilize left behind self defence units as guerillas in guerilla country — i.e. counter guerillas to further this end. The major operations of this type would probably be large sweeps, search and destroy missions, patrols, ambushes, sudden air-cavalry or paratroop raids on suspected insurgent bases and, perhaps, air attacks on identified targets. Simultaneously the army should attempt to keep the borders shut.

Once the strategic bases have been secured the army can turn to expanding its control outward from there. In the selected areas important towns and communication centres can be occupied and screened and cleared. Thereafter surrounding villages can either be occupied or cleared and the population regrouped into more easily defended localities. Counter-organization will prove very important here.Surrounding areas must be saturated with patrols and surveillance sweeps. If possible such an operation could be preceded by one or more major sweeps. While this is going on it will be necessary to keep the insurgents occupied in other areas so as to prevent any reinforcement or, for that matter orderly withdrawal. Thus sweeps, etc. must continue. Automated ambushes and forbidden zones could also be used in less populated areas and perhaps, within or on the perimeter of newly occupied areas. The army will thus attempt a step by step retaking of the country. The other two services must help as best they can, the airforce being the most useful in this respect. It can supply ground support, transport, reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Also leaflet drops, propaganda broadcasts, etc. In strongly riverine countries the navy can help keep up communications, move units and hamper insurgent movements. Elsewhere it will be limited to preventing seaborne resupply.

The most important units of these operations will be the infantry biased ones. The armoured and mechanized units will be of most use in the sweeps and for road patrols and convoy escort, the artillery in a normal, if adapted, role. However, every attempt should be made to find ways and means of using these heavy weapons against the guerillas for it is in these that the regular forces have their greatest superiority over the guerillas — sending small parties of infantry out after small parties of guerillas may not be the only or even the best way of doing it. This aspect deserves more study.

During this stage it may be possible to force a conclusion in military terms — the guerillas may be decisively defeated. However, the most important aims of operations during this stage must be
(i) to survive,
(ii) to keep the initiative or at least contest it,
(iii) to stop the insurgents obtaining a secure strategic base and
(iv) failing a victory over the guerillas, to tempt them into stage four prematurely and thus serve them up to the army's heavy units on, as it were, a silver platter. Probably the most important thing to remember is for the authorities and particularly the army not to allow themselves to be dispersed all over the countryside. The recipe for success is a methodical, thorough spreading-out coupled with distracting and disturbing raids and sweeps.

Stage four insurgency — counter-measures

If this stage has been reached at the place and time desired by the insurgency, the authorities face a bleak future. Should the attempt suggested above have succeeded, however, they may look forward to near certain victory.

A) **General:** Here the emphasis will now be on standard civil defence measures as well as on reconstruction and reorganization. Other operations will, of course, continue. At this time it would be advisable to adjust the propaganda and publicity campaign so as to reduce to a minimum the post-conflict personal bitterness and hatred. Even more than before, attempts should be made to encourage surrenders and desertions and these should be reintegrated into the community as quickly as possible.

B) **Intelligence:** The intelligence operations should continue as before with maximum use now being made of any remaining infiltrators and subverted insurgents at all levels. There will also now be a need for more conventional military intelligence.

C) **Police:** Apart from those operations already discussed, the police will now be largely involved in restoring law and order and in re-establishing itself in its old image and position. Once again some liberties may have to be taken with the course of justice in recognition for services rendered.

D) **Armed Forces:** The armed forces are now faced with a threat very close to the one they were initially trained and equipped to fight. This is the stage where, unless they are too dispersed and/or run down, they should be able to bring all their advantages to bear and to secure victory. This also presupposes, however, that specialist and heavy units have not been disbanded or reorganized to suit irregular warfare — should this be the case the advantage might well lie with the other side.

The description of operations, during this stage has been based upon the assumption that the security forces are indeed in a position to secure victory either as a result of stage four being reached prematurely by the insurgents or as a result of good policy keeping the army together in the face of adversity.

Conclusion

In closing let us again consider some of the most important points and also discuss briefly a singularly apposite allegory. Probably the most important aspects of counter-insurgency operations are the following:

(i) Early recognition.
(ii) Good, well and promptly disseminated intelligence.
(iii) The maintenance of the initiative.
(iv) A methodical approach combined with a willingness and ability to see and grasp opportunities.
(v) The reinforcing and establishing of strategic bases.
(vi) An effective publicity campaign.

Preferably the intelligence system, the necessary police powers, the security consciousness and the basis for counter organization should be present before the insurgency starts.

This is, however, highly unlikely in a democratic state. Thus much will depend upon the speed with which these can be provided.

It would be better if there were no discontent for an insurgency to feed upon, but once it is in the open, reforms are out of place and too late. It is after the defeat of the insurgency that the authorities must show themselves magnanimous and generous. It is also essential to help the population to forget the bitterness and hatred of such a, in effect, civil war — while remembering the lessons.

Finally we come to Chairman Mao's idea of the guerilla as a fish in a sea of people. This well describes the latter's dependance upon the population and has, on occasion, been used as a basis for various descriptions of counter-measures: angling, deoxygnating the water, removing the water altogether and less common, an application of the commercial 'vacuum-cleaning the oceans' concept. This, latter, could be taken to represent the use of heavy weapons and conventional units. But all these methods assume the counter-insurgent to be outside the water. Surely this is false, the counter-insurgent is as much a fish as the insurgent and this simple fact must guide him in his activities at all times.

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* Mr Heitman recently completed his MA at the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London.

KORT KURSUS IN STRATEGIE VIR AMPTENARE

KURSUS NR	LESING NR	ONDERWERP	TYD	DEUR
		FASE I STRATEGIE EN OORLOG DAG 1		
1		Koffie	07h30	
2		Opening	07h45	Mnr A P Stemmet
3		Administrasie	08h00	Kol le Clus
4	1	Oorlog a. Inleiding b. Geskiedenis van oorlog c. Oorlog as die voortsetting van die politiek d. Intensiteitstoename e. Vervaging van die skeidslyn tussen oorlog en vrede f. Veeldimensionele oorlog g. Verhouding politiek/strategie/ oorlog h. Strategiemodusse i. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings	08h15	mnr Lass
5		Bespreking	09h30	
6		Tee	10h00	
7	2	Strategie a. Inleiding b. Strategie en taktiek c. Doel/middelverhouding d. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings	10h15	Mnr Lass
8		Bespreking	11h15	
9	3	Die beginsels van strategie a. Inleiding b. Bespreking van beginsels: i. Doel ii. Inisiatief (vryheid van optrede) iii. Offensiewe optrede iv. Buigsaamheid v. Konsentrasie van mag vi. Ekonomiese aanwending van mag	11h30	Mnr Lass

EKS P-	LESING NR	ONDERWERP	TYD	DEUR
		vii. Maneuver (mobiliteit) viii. Verrassing ix. Sekerheid x. Eenvoud xi. Eenheid van optrede en koördinasie xii. Moreel c. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings		
10		Bespreking	12h20	
11		Middagete	12h30	
12	4	Die strategie van rewolusionêre oor=logvoering a. Inleiding b. Ontstaan as afsonderlike onder=skeibare krygsvorm c. Gevegsfronte d. Fases e. Modelle f. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings	13h15	mnr Lass
13		Bespreking	14h20	
14	5	Die ontwikkeling van die strategiese denke in die USSR a. Inleiding b. Historiese oorsig c. Die verband tussen ideologie en strategie d. Strategie, doktrine en konsep e. Invloed van die kernwapen op die strategiese denke in die USSR f. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings	14h50	mnr Lass
15		Tee	15h00	
16		Voortsetting	15h15	
17	5	Bespreking	15h45	
		FASE II ENKELE TOEPASLIKE VOORBEELDE DAG 2		
18	6	Huidige strategiese konsepte van die USSR a. Inleiding b. Driepuntstrategie: i. Geopolitieke en geostrate=giese oorwegings ii. Beheer oor strategiese grondstowwe	07h30	mnr Lass

IF 17 Camp F

REEKS NR	LESING NR	ONDERWERP	TYD	DEUR
		iii. Strategie van nasionale be=vryding c. Evaluering d. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings		
19		Bespreking	08h15	
20	7	Die ontwikkeling van die strategiese denke in die VSA a. Inleiding b. Beleid van isolasie c. Invloed van liberale demokrasie d. Beskouing van oorlog en vrede e. Verhouding RSA/VSA f. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings	08h30	Dr P du Toit
21		Bespreking	09h40	
22		Tee	10h00	
23	8	Rewolusionêre oorlogvoering in Suide=like Afrika: Rhodesië a. Inleiding b. Rewolusionêre potensiaal (swart verset) c. Organisasies, motiewe en ge=vegsfronte d. Fases e. Regeringsoptrede f. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings	10h15	Mnr Lass
24		Bespreking	11h30	
25	9	Rewolusionêre oorlogvoering in Suide=like Afrika: Die RSA a. Inleiding b. Historiese oorsig c. Rewolusionêre potensiaal (swart verset) d. Organisasies, motiewe, gevegs=fronte e. Fases f. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings	11h45	mnr Lass
26		Middagete	12h30	

VERTROULIK

MAO Mutual Assured Destruction

Massa = Swartes = Swaarlêlt v oorlogshandeling

Chimurenga. Return of the Amazi' Bwa
Woza Albert.

REEKS NP	LESING NR	ONDERWERP	TYD	DEUR
		FASE III FORMULERING VAN STRATEGIE IN DIE RSA DAG 2		
27	10	Noodsaaklikheid van RSA strategie a. Inleiding b. Totaal-strategiese plan c. Strategievlakke in die RSA d. NVBS: SSVR en departementele veiligheidsbestuurstawwe e. Doel en funksies van die nodale punt f. Samevatting en gevolgtrekkings	13h15	kol Le Clus
28		Bespreking	14h15	
39	11	Strategieformuleringsproses in die RSA a. Inleiding b. Proses op nasionale vlak c. Proses op departementele vlak	14h30	kol Le Clus
30		Tee	15h00	
31	12	ATO a. Aard en oogmerke b. Agtergrond en geskiedenis c. Noodregulasies	15h15	brig Van Niekerk
		FASE III (vervolg) DAG 3		
32		Gevallestudie 1	07h30	Kol le Clus
		Bespreking van gevallestudie 1	08h30	
34		Tee	09h30	
35		Gevallestudie 2	09h45	
37		Bespreking van gevallestudie 2	11h15	
38		Middagete	12h45	
39		Bespreking van gevallestudie 2 (vervolg)	13h30	

EEKS R	LESING NR	ONDERWERP	TYD	DEUR
39	13	<u>Strategiemonitering</u> a. Noodsaaklikheid van monitering b. Keerdatums vir departementele vorderingsverslag c. Formaat van departementele vor=deringsverslag d. GBS-verslag e. Verspreiding van SSVR-monitor=verslag	14h30	kol Le Clus
40		Afsluiting	15h00	
41		Tee	15h05	

VERTROULIK

LESING 10

NOODSAAKLIKHEID VAN RSA STRATEGIE

INLEIDING

1. Die RSA is die skyf van rewolusionêre oorlogvoering. In die rewolusionêre oorlogvoeringsproses word die rewolusionêre motief sodanig deur gewaande sowel as werklike knelpunte op die staatkundige, ekonomiese en maatskaplike terreine versterk dat dit mettertyd veiligheidsoptrede vereis. 'n Reaktiewe benadering, waar die klem op veiligheidsoptrede val, lei slegs tot uiteindelike oorgawe; 'n proaktiewe benadering, wat die enigste kans op oorwinning bied, vereis dat daadwerklike optrede op die welvaartsterrein sinvol met veiligheidsoptrede geïntegreer word. Dit kan slegs bereik word indien strategie deurlopend op nasionale vlak bedryf word.

STRATEGIESE PLANNE

2. Vanweë die veelvuldige dimensies van die rewolusionêre stryd moet die aanslag oor die totale spektrum van die staat se middele bekamp word, gevolglik is alle organe van die staat daarby betrokke. Dit volg dan dat die staat se teenvoeter strategiese planne is wat aan die volgende vereistes moet voldoen:

a. Dit moet planne van aksie wees.

b. Dit moet ook planne in aksie wees.

c. Dit moet die aanwending van al die middele tot die staat se beskikking op die staatkundige, ekonomiese en maatskaplike sowel as die veiligheidsterreine behels.

d. Dit is onontbeerlik dat die middele gekoördineer aangewend word.

e. Die proses moet deurlopend plaasvind.

f. Dit moet gerig wees op die bereiking van nasionale veiligheidsdoelstellings.

3. Strategiese planne spruit uit 'n breë, oorkoepelende strategie wat algemene riglyne bevat plus 'n aantal deelstrategieë wat elk 'n spesifieke aspek aanspreek. So bv sou 'n totale strategie teen die ANC/PAC deel van 'n totale strategie vir die bekamping van die rewolusionêre oorlog wees.

STRATEGIEVLAKKE IN DIE RSA

4. Strategie word op verskillende vlakke in die RSA bedryf en bevat al meer detail namate die vlak daal:

a. Nasionale Vlak. Strategie wat op nasionale vlak geformuleer en uitgevaardig word, bevat die doel met die strategie, nasionale doelstellings itv die doel en die taaktoewysing aan departemente om die staat se doel te bereik. Die take dui aan wat gedoen moet word om die doelstellings te verwesenlik maar nooit hoe nie.

b. Departementele Vlak. Op hierdie vlak word die wat van die TS in die departementele hoe omgeskep. Die nasionale strategie se doelstellings en take word verwerk tot departementele doelstellings en departementele uitvoeringstake om die doelstellings te bereik. Dit word deur die departementshoof uitgevaardig en versprei ten einde sy departement se aktiwiteite op die bereiking van die gestelde nasionale veiligheidsdoelwitte te rig. Soms (veral in 'n rewolusionêre oorlog) is dit nie nodig dat departementele strategie as sodanig uitgevaardig word nie maar kan die nasionale strategie direk in departementele uitvoeringsplanne omgeskep word.

c. Operasionele Vlak. Wanneer 'n departement gespesialiseerde subdepartemente het, is dit dikwels wenslik dat die departementele strategie betreklik breed gehou word en dat die subdepartemente gespesialiseerde strategieë op grond van die departementele strategie formuleer.

NASIONALE VEILIGHEIDSBESTUURSTELSEL (NVBS): SSVR EN DEPARTEMENTELE VEILIGHEIDSBESTUURSTAWWE

5. Omdat nasionale veiligheid in 'n veeldimensionele aanslag nie deur 'n enkele departement behartig kan word nie het die RSA se regering 'n beleid van gesamentlike staatsbestuur aanvaar. Die kern hiervan is dat optrede ingevolge nasionale strategie gesamentlik (dws interdepartementeel) beplan word maar departementeel uitgevoer word, en dat die departementele uitvoering weer gesamentlik (interdepartementeel) gekoördineer word. Die NVBS verskaf die masjinerie om die departemente vir hierdie doel byeen te bring en by te staan.

6. Aanhangsel A toon hoe departemente en die NVBS op elke vlak, van die ministeriële tot streekvlak, ineenskakel. Dit is duidelik dat al die organe van die NVBS, met die uitsondering van die Sekretariaat van die Staatsveiligheidsraad (SSVR), op 'n deeltydse grondslag funksioneer en inderdaad uit verteenwoordigers van departemente bestaan. Die noodsaaklikheid van 'n fokuspunt by departemente, waar alle aangeleenthede rakende die bestuur van nasionale veiligheid byeengebring en gekoördineer kan word, het gou in die praktyk na vore gekom en tot die vestiging van 'n "nodale punt" - in effek 'n eweknie van die SSVR - binne elke departement aanleiding gegee.

DOEL VAN NODALE PUNT

7. In die lig van die voorgaande kan die doel van die nodale punt eenvoudig as die behartiging van departementele veiligheidsbestuur omskryf word.

FUNKSIES VAN NODALE PUNT

8. Ten einde departementele veiligheidsbestuur doeltreffend te kan bedryf, moet die nodale punt noodwendig met die volgende funksies beklee word:

a. Skakeling met NVBS. Die behels die behartiging van:

i. Kommunikasie tussen die SSVR en die departement.

ii. Departementele verteenwoordigers by interdepartementele komitees (IDKs).

iii. Departementele verteenwoordigers by gesamentlike bestuursentrums (GBSs).

b. Departementele Veiligheidsinligting. Dit behels:

i. Die ontvangs van veiligheidsinligting van die inligtingsbedrywende departemente sowel as die SSVR en die verspreiding daarvan na belanghebbendes binne die departement.

ii. Die ontvang van inligting uit die departement en die verspreiding daarvan na die ander komponente van die nodale punt sowel as die betrokke inligtingsbedrywende departement(e).

iii. Die beskikbaarstelling van aanvullende inligting vir

die ander komponente van die nodale punt, na behoefte.

c. Departementele Strategie/Uitvoeringsplanne. Dit behels:

i. Die verskaffing van departementeel-geklaarde insette tov konsepriglyne aan IDKs, dmv die departementele verteenwoordiger.

ii. Die verskaffing van departementeel-geklaarde insette tov konsepstrategieë aan IDKs, dmv die departementele verteenwoordiger.

iii. Die behartiging van die formulering en uitreiking van departementele strategie/uitvoeringsplanne aan alle betrokkenes binne die departement, ook op streekvlak.

iv. Die koördinering en monitering van die uitvoering van departementele strategie/uitvoeringsplanne.

v. Die herbeplanning van departementele strategie/uitvoeringsplanne waar nodig.

vi. Die lewering van departementele vorderingsverslae aan die SSVR.

vii. Die lewering van departementele insette tov die ATO.

viii. Die behartiging van die departementele ATO (DATO).

d. Departementele Strategiese Kommunikasie. Dit behels:

i. Die daarstelling van departementele uitvoeringsplanne op grond van departementele strategie.


ii. Skakeling met die Tak Strategiese Kommunikasie van die SSVR (TSK) vir interdepartementele uitvoeringsbeplanning en koördinering.

iii. Skakeling met departementele streekverteenwoordigers om uitvoering op streekvlak te bewerkstellig.

9. Die ondervinding het geleer dat die saamvoeg van die voorgaande funksies in die nodale punt van 'n departement onontbeerlik vir doeltreffende veiligheidsbestuur is. Dit wil egter nie sê dat departemente nie ook ander verwante funksies soos sekerheid hierby mag voeg nie - dit is 'n departementele reëling ten opsigte waarvan die SSVR nie wil voorskryf nie.

ORGANISASIE VAN NODALE PUNT

10. Uit die voorgaande kom die basiese organisasiemodel vir 'n doeltreffende nodale punt duidelik na vore:



11. Dit is natuurlik die goeie voorreg van elke departement om sy nodale punt organisatories te plaas soos hy dit verkies, maar die volgende uiters belangrike aspekte moet tog hier uitgelig word:

a. 'n Nodale punt is 'n organisasie binne 'n departement - 'n "Direktoraat Veiligheidsbestuur" - en nie 'n indiwidu nie.

b. Die bedryf van die nodale punt is 'n voltydse taak.

c. Die personeelsterkte van 'n nodale punt kan wissel na gelang van die omvang van 'n departement se betrokkenheid by totale strategie-uitvoering, maar die funksies kan nie geskei word nie.

d. Die hoof van die nodale punt moet direkte toegang tot die departementshoof hê.

SLOT

12. Die bekamping van die aanslag teen die RSA verg die toepassing van doeltreffende strategie oor die volle spektrum en op al die vlakke van die staatsbestel. Sonder die toegewyde deelname van al die departemente aan die nasionale veiligheidsbestuurstelsel is die RSA tot ondergang gedoem. Departemente kan nie hulle verantwoordelikheid nakom sonder dat hulle oor doeltreffende nodale punte beskik nie. Dit word vertrou dat die bostaande uiteensetting daartoe sal bydra dat hierdie hoekstene van die NVBS nog stewiger gelê word.

SSVR

16 Julie 1985

NOTULE VAN P.E. C.I.S. VERGADERING

1985-05-30

Persone teenwoordig:

1. Lt-Kolonel VAN RENSBURG – S.A.P. (V)
2. Kaptein SCHEEPERS – S.A.P. (V)
3. Luitenant BEETON – S.A.P. (V)
4. Majoor LAAS – Weermag
5. Luitenant MCWATT – Lugmag
6. Mnr. DU TOIT – ~~Onderwys en Opleiding~~
7. Mnr. BEUKES – N.I.
8. Mnr. REYNECKE – Samewerking en Ontwikkeling

S A POLISIE (VEILIGHEIDSTAK) INSETTE

BUSVERVOER IN SWARTWOONBUURTES, P.E.

Samesprekings was tussen PEBCO en die busbestuurders van P E Tramways gehou. Die busbestuurders het by PEBCO ge-eis dat hulle die versekering wil hê dat hulle lewens nie in gevaar sal wees wanneer hulle die busse in swartwoongebiede bestuur nie. PEBCO het hulle die versekering gegee dat hulle (PEBCO) 3 comrades op elke bus sal plaas om toe te sien dat daar nie klippe of brandbomme na die busse gegooi word nie. Indien enige persoon klippe of brandbomme na die busse gooi sal PEBCO self teen hulle optree.

Mnr. COETZER, bestuurder van P E Tramways berig dat hy onderhandelinge met die vakunie TRANSPORT AND A LLIED WORKERS UNION voer. Hy het die vakunie n ultimatum gestel dat indien die busbestuurders nie lede van die vakbond is nie op 1985-06-03 bereid is om die busse in die swartwoonbuurtes te bestuur nie, hulle afbetaal sal word en P E Tramways advertensies sal plaas vir busbestuurders wat wel bereid is om die busse in die swartwoonbuurtes te bestuur. P E Tramways beoog om die busdiens binne die swartwoonbuurtes op 1985-06-03 te hervat met die busbestuurders wat bereid is om die busse in die swartwoonbuurtes te bestuur. Twee busbestuurders sal elke bus beman en sal in besit wees van n brandblusser. Daar sal slegs van ou busse gebruik gemaak word.

Volgens Mnr. COETZER is bykans driekwart van die busbestuurders bereid om in die swartwoonbuurtes te bestuur maar word deur die vakunie ontmoedig om dit te doen.

Die vakunie beraadslaag tans met die busbestuurders en uitslag sal eers later in die dag bekend wees.

2/....

Mnr. COETZER berig ook dat hy nie deur PEBCO geskakel was nie en geen kennis dra van PEBCO "comrades" wat op die busse sal ry om beskerming te verleen nie. Volgens Mnr. COETZER sal enige persoon wat op die busse gevind word sonder 'n kaartjie summier afgesit word.

KOMMENTAAR

Die G.I.S. voorsien die moontlikheid dat probleme vanaf 1985-06-03 kan ontstaan tussen PEBCO die vakunie, die busbestuurders en P E Tramways wat aanleiding kan gee tot hernude aanvalle op busse in swartwoonbuurtes.

BEOOGDE STAY AWAY / BOIKOTAKSIES

UDF geaffilieerde organisasies beplan 'n "stay away" vir 5 dae vanaf 1985-06-03 tot 1985-06-10 in Port Elizabeth.

Dit is huidiglik onbekend of dit wel 'n "stay away" vanaf die werk of 'n boikot van Blanke besighede gaan wees. Die aangeleentheid word deurlopend gemonitor.

EISE

- Vrylating van 3 PEBCO leiersfigure wat vermis word
- Verhoogde broodprys / swak toestand van brood
- Hoë lewensonkostes

KOMMENTAAR

Hierdie beoogde wegblyaksie/boikot is nog nie deur middel van koerantberigte of pamflette bekend gemaak nie.

Die G.I.S. betwyfel dit of so 'n aksie sonder behoorlike organisering reeds op 1985-06-03 geloods sal kan word.

N.I.D. INSET

UDF/AZAPO KONFLIK

1. Informasie is ontvang dat UDF affiliale 'n groep wat bekend staan as "Operation Quma" in die lewe geroep het.

2. Die groep bestaan uit kinders wie se ouderdomme tussen 8 - 15 jaar geskat word. Die groep wil wraak neem teen AZAPO lede, veral Eerw. MAQINA. Die groep wil MAQINA se huis afbrand.

3. Die leiersfigure is onbekend.

KOMMENTAAR

Departement N.I.D. word getaak om verdere inligting in verband met die sogenaamde groep bekend as "Operation Quma" in te win en aan die G.I.S. te rapporteer.

(4. 865 81/153117.

962

THE UNDECLARED WAR

If the neighbourhood is troubled by an alley-cat, it is useless to buy a big fierce dog. The cat will remain out of reach in a tree or on the roof-tops.

What you really need is a bigger, fiercer alley-cat.

'463'

SAP 21 (b)

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

P/sak—P/Bag ~~Posbus/P.O.Box~~ X50

Verw./Ref.:	S163373E/4
Navrae/Inq.:	Luit. Goosen
	Kst(v) Meistre
Tel.:	0481 - 2233

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST. 18
DISTRIKSKOMMANDANT
1987 -10- 20
DISTRICT COMMANDANT
CRADOCK
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

KANTOOR VAN DIE STASIEBEVELVOERDER
CRADOCK 5880

1987-10-19

Die Distrikskommandant
S.A. Polisie
CRADOCK
5880

VERPLASING : NR. S163373E SERS F.Z. KONI
S163373E/4 gedateer 1987-08-26

Bovermelde lid het op 1987-10-19
alhier diens aanvaar.

STASIEBEVELVOERDER : LUIT. CRADOCK
G.J. GOOSEN

/pdl

G 64 SAP 21

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

P/Sak-P:B/G/P/O/S/P/O/ B/G//// X50

Verw./Ref: S163373E/4
Navrae-Inq.: maj. Winter
TEL: (0481) 2446

KANTOOR VAN DIE TAKBEVELVOERDER
VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK
5880

1987/10/19

A. Die Distrikskommandant
S.A. Polisie
CRADOCK
5880

B. Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

C. Die Stasiebevelvoerder
S.A. Polisie
CRADOCK
5880

OOR- EN VERPLASING NR. S163373E SERSANT F.Z. KONI : VANAF VEILIGHEIDSTAK, CRADOCK (BP 1801) NA UNIFORMTAK, CRADOCK (BP 1801).

A.1. U skrywe S163373E/4 gedateer 1987/08/26 het betrekking.

2. Bogenoemde lid is op 1987/10/19 oorgeplaas vanaf die Veiligheidstak Cradock, na die Uniformtak, Cradock.

B.1. Die Bevelvoerende Offisier, Veiligheidshoofkantoor se skrywe S163373E/4 gedateer 1987/08/24 het betrekking.

C.1. U ter inligting.

Sap 172/144/27

MAJOOR
TAKBEVELVOERDER
(E.F.N. WINTER)

////////// X50

S163373E/1

Majoor Grobbelaar
sers (v) Botha

0481-4235

KANTOOR VAN DIE DISTRIKKOMMISSARIS
CRADOCK 5880
1990-07-31

A. Die Kommissaris
S.A. Polisie
Privaatsak X94
PRETORIA
0001

B. Die Streekkommissaris
Streek D (Oos-Kaap)
Privaatsak 6020
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

ONTSLAG WEENS MEDIESE ONGESKIKTHEID : NR S163373E KONSTABEL F.Z. KONI

A. 1. Bogenoemde lid se dienste is op 1990-07-31 weens mediese ongeskiktheid beëindig.

2. Die lid se uitrusting was nagegaan met geen tekorte nie.

3. Daar is geen kriminele of siviele sake teen die lid uitstaande nie.

4. Die lid se adres is steeds Semaphore Farm School, Mortimer, 5870.

5. Oorspronklike sowel een afskrif van SAP 222 gaan hiermee.

B. 1. Ter inligting.

2. Afskrif van SAP 222 hierby aangeheg.

G. GROBBELAAR
MAJOOR

n/DISTRIKKOMMISSARIS : CRADOCK
G. GROBBELAAR

GG/cg

966

TOTAL P.02

Mo Ned
Kmr mens
Van Ops

P.E. BERIG NR 66
85-11-26
VAN : A/B., V/TAK P.E. PER KOL SNYMAN
AAN : A. B/O., X302 PTA (D1)
B. B/O., SWA TEEN-INSURGENSIE-EENHEID OSH (BRIG DREYER)
C. A/K., O.P.
VERTROULIK
W66950H/4 (MAJ VERCUIL)
VERPLASING : W66950H SERS G.H. LOURENTZ

A.1. U DT VERW W66950H/4 BERIG 58 GED 85-06-24 ASOOK U SKRYWE VERW W66950H/4 GED 85-06-25 HET BETREKKING.

2. BOV LID HET OP 85-11-25 DIENS BY DIE V/TAK CRADOCK AANVAAR.

3. HY IS VANAF 85-11-25 GESKIK VIR DIENS GEBOEK.

=+=+=
B+C. TER INLIGTING.

LO///TYD::::15H00.
39 WK
T

G.P.-S.: SAP. 97

No W4045/1 K | Rang / Rank (V) Konstabel | Naam / Name Van Zyl Elizabeth | Stasie / Station [illegible] (In potlood/In pencil)

Datum en plek van indiensneming / Date and place of attestation 82·12·31 Mooreesburg | Geboorteplek en datum / Place of birth and date 64·08·11 Wynberg

Persoonsno. / Identity No. 640811 0035 00 2 | Standaard van opvoeding / Standard of education 10 | Geloof / Religion N.G. Kerk | Pensioenwet / Pension Act

Tale / Languages Afrikaans | Naaste bloedverwant / Next-of-kin Van Zyl A.J.J. (Vader)

Woonplek voor indiensneming / Residence prior to enrolment La Dauphine 101 Koebergweg Milnerton | Etniese groep / Ethnic Group Blank

Datum en plek van huwelik / Date and place of marriage | (X in toepaslike blokkie / X in applicable square)

Kerk / Church	Hof / Civil	Bantoereg / Bantu Custom

Vrou/Man se naam en persoonsno. / Name and Identity No. of wife/husband

Name van kinders, geslag en geboortedatums / Names of children, sex and dates of birth

Ontslag datum / Discharge date 86/10/01 | Rede / Reason Termination beëindig op 86/10/01 i.g.v. Reg. 11 (1)(g) (iii). | Magtiging / Authority A/K -/1 van 86/10/31

Gedrag / Conduct Nie Gepaard | Toekomstige adres / Future address

Bevordering, rangverlagings, aanstellings / Promotions, reductions, appointments	Datum / Date	Magtiging / Authority	Aanprysings, toekennings, medaljes, kursusse, eksamens ens./ Commendations, awards, medals, courses, examinations, etc.	Datum / Date	Magtiging / Authority
Student (V)	7/11/5/32[illegible] dl·82·12·21		Kollege Opleiding Voltooi	83·07·01	83·05·25
Konstabel (V)	41/8/2 dl 83·05·24				

Ek sertifiseer dat hierdie dokument, ware afdruk/kopie is van die / I certify that this document is a true reproduction/copy of the original: [illegible]

W385889N
H.J. BESSINGER A/OFF.

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
STREEKKOMMISSARIS
STREEK D (OOS-KAAP)
PORT ELIZABETH
1993-09-17
PORT ELIZABETH
REGION D (EASTERN CAPE)
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

Datum Date	Indelings, verplasings, ens. Postings, transfers etc.	Magtiging Authority	Oortredings—strawwe opgelê—waarskuwings Offences—punishments—warnings	Datum bekragtig Date confirmed
83:12:31	Mooresburg			
83:01:18	SAP Kollege			
83:07:01	Oshakati			
85:07:04	Cradock.			
86/06/16	U/TAK. P.E. — 1/4 Kol 86/06/02.			
86/09/30	Louis le Grange Adm 1/4 Kol 86/09/17			

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I certify that this document is a true reproduction/copy of the original which was examined by me and that, from my observations, the original has not been altered in any manner.

Handtekening/Signature

H. J. BESSINGER A/OPP.

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
STREEKKOMMISSARIS
STREEK D (OOS-KAAP)
PORT ELIZABETH
1993-09-17
PORT ELIZABETH
REGION D (EASTERN CAPE)
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

NOTICAS MESSAGE

DATE ..... TIME ..... AFB ONDANGWA SICK BAY

NUMBER ..... RANK ..... NAME .....

DATE OF BIRTH ..... MARITAL STATUS ..... CORPS .....

BORDER UNIT ..... S.A. UNIT .....

TYPE OF INJURY .....

CAUSE OF INJURY .....

WHERE DID INCIDENT OCCUR .....

NEXT OF KIN ..... RELATIONSHIP .....

ADDRESS .....

.....CODE.....

TELEPHONE NUMBER .....CODE.....

HOME LANGUAGE ..... RELIGION .....

CONDITION OF MEMBER .....

WAS PERSON ON DUTY : YES/~~NO~~ WAS PERSON AWOL ~~YES~~/NO
WAS INJURY CAUSED BY HIMSELF : ~~YES~~/NO

PATIENT'S KIT TAKEN:

BROWNS: SHIRT : YES/~~NO~~ TROUSERS : ~~YES~~/NO
BOOTS : YES/~~NO~~ OTHER SHOES (TYPE).....
SOCKS : YES/~~NO~~ SHORTS : YES/~~NO~~
UNDERWEAR : PANTS : YES/NO VESTS : ~~YES~~/NO
BUSH JACKET : ~~YES~~/NO IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS : YES/~~NO~~
T/SHIRT : ~~YES~~/NO SLEEPING BAG : ~~YES~~/NO
JERSEY : ~~YES~~/NO MONEY : R..5....00....
WATCH (NAME).....
OTHER VALUABLES 2 Tri circle keys
Yale door key

WEAPON NUMBER ..... TYPE .....
AMMUNITION REMOVED ~~YES~~/NO
OTHER KIT NOT MENTIONED ABOVE .....

.....

.....

.....

.....
SIGNATURE OF PERSON TAKING STATEMENT

.....
PRINT NAME

NOTE:
if answer is yes, cross out no and
if answer is no, cross out yes.

ONE COPY TO OFFICE
ONE COPY TO FILE.

(6)

G.P.S. 1-00048 DD 59

VERPLEEGVERSLAG/NURSING REPORT

Datum/Date	Tyd/Time	Behandeling/Treatment	Handtekening/Signature
23/5/95	23:55	New white male patient admitted from theatre unconscious in recovery ward 4 after insertion of (L) screw-nail was done because of wire in a contact with theatre & wheeled by theatre staff to ward by theatre staff & eye shields (2) on. Dr orders. ① Clonipon 20 mg IMI stat ② Dexamethasone 100 mg IMI ③ Lincocin 600 mg stat IVI Observations BP 120/80 temp 37 pulse 88/min	

GENEESHEER DOCTOR Van Eyl

TEENMED UNIT SAP (K)

Nommer/Number	Naam/Name	Ouderdom Age	Diagnose/Diagnosis	Operasie datum Date of admission
1	[illegible]	2[illegible]	[illegible]	23/5/95

G.P.-S. 1-01027

X-RAYS REQUEST/REPORT
X-STRALE AANVRAAG/VERSLAG

DD 2346

Number / Nommer: 6695OH

Rank / Rang: SGT. Rank code / Rang kode:

Surname / Van: LOURENZ.

Initials / Voorletters: G H.

D.O.B. / Geb. datum: 1 9 5 8 0 7 0 6 Sex / Geslag: M

Military hospital / Militêre hospitaal: 1m

Sick bay and code / Siekeboeg en kode:

Army / Leër 1 | Air Force / Lugmag 2 | Navy / Vloot 3 | SAMS / SAGD 4 | Other / Ander 5

STATUS:

Home unit / Tuis eenheid: SAPK

Detached unit / Afgedeelde eenheid:

Department / Afdeling: CASUALTY.

Date / Datum: 1 9 9 5 0 5 2 9 Time / Tyd: 1 1 0 0

FEMALE PATIENTS ONLY/SLEGS VROULIKE PASIENTE

Pregnant / Swanger: YES / JA | NO / NEE | Not known / Onbekend — If yes: Number of weeks / Indien ja: Aantal weke:

L.M.P.:

Signature / Handtekening:

Previous X-ray examination / Vorige X-strale ondersoek: YES / JA | NO / NEE

Date / Datum:

Nature / Aard:

Reason for this examination / Rede vir hierdie ondersoek: assess

Provisional diagnosis / Voorlopige diagnose: B/K amputation (L)

Clinical findings / Kliniese bevindings: As above.

Service required / Diens verlang: Xray (L) hip, (L) thigh, (L) knee. please

NO EXAMINATION SHALL BE DONE UNLESS TOP HALF OF FORM IS COMPLETED IN FULL
GEEN ONDERSOEK SAL UITGEVOER WORD TENSY BOONSTE GEDEELTE VAN VORM VOLLEDIG INGEVUL IS NIE

Doctor / Geneesheer: GOTTEL (Blockletters/Drukskrif) Doctors' code / Dokter se kode: [illegible] (Signature/Handtekening)

Coding procedure / Kodering prosedure: 0 5 7 2 | 0 5 7 1 | 0 5 7 4

Report / Verslag: (L) hip, thigh + knee

Below knee amputation. No # femur.

K. L. Erlank 95/01/29.

Radiographer / Radiograaf: Code / Kode: Tyd / Tyd: Date / Datum:

No. of exposures / Aantal beligtings:

Fluroscopy / Deurligting: YES / JA | NO / NEE

P Ø1

1993-09-15 15:50

PERSAP INTYDSE PERSAL VERSLAE 15:27:25
3.3.12(02) NAVRAAG : COMPU FINDER 93-09-15

PERSALNOMMER.....: 866890 STELSEL.....: PERSAL
BEDANK DATUM.....:
VAN.....: ROUX VOORLETTERS..: WA
VOORNAME.....: WILLEM ADRIAAN
ID-NO.....: 6004115023000
RANG.....: ADJUDANT-OFFISIER
U-RANG.....: SPEURDER ADJUDANT-OFFISIER
KOMPONENT.....: MISDAADBESTRYDING EN ONDERSOEK
SUBKOMPONENT.....: ONDERSTEUNINGSEENHEID ROOIBERG
BETAALPUNT.....: HOOFKANTOOR VEEDIEFSTALEENHEID

PF9 - ALLE GEKOPPELDE PERSALNOS VAN DIE PERSOON
PF10 - BETAALPUNT ADRES

697

866890 ROUX WA

ALLE VERPLASINGS BESONDERHEDE :

19800103 BEAUFORT-WES	BEHEERSUBKOMPONENT
19800106 MENSLIKE HULPBRONBESTUUR	STUDENTE PRETORIA 1
19800627 MENSLIKE HULPBRONBESTUUR	SA POLISIEKOLLEGE PRETORIA
19831207 JAN SMUTS LUGHAWE	MISDAADINLIGTINGSDIENS
19850601 ONDERSTEUNINGSDIENSTE	INTERSTAATLIKE VERHOUDINGE
19900129 CRADOCK	BEHEERSUBKOMPONENT
19900626 CRADOCK	MISDAADINLIGTINGSDIENS
19910115 MISDAADBESTRYDING EN ONDERSOEK	ONDERSTEUNINGSEENHEID ROOIBERG

ALLE SPESIALE DIENSTE BESONDERHEDE :

GEEN

ALLE KURSUS BESONDERHEDE :

19800627 KOLLEGE OPLEIDING	
19801203 TEENINSURGENSIE	

TOTAL P.02

G.P.-S.002-0222

G70

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

P/Sak-P/Bag/P~~XXXXXXXXX~~ 6008

Verw./Ref: W86689T/4

Navrae/Inq.: Luitenant-Kolonel Vercuil

TEL: 343434 x 2127

KANTOOR VAN DIE STREEKHOOF
VEILIGHEIDSTAK
PORT ELIZABETH 6000

1990-06-28

A. Die Streekkommissaris : Oos-Kaap
Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie
Privaatsak 6020
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

B. Die Distrikskommissaris
Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie
Privaatsak X50
CRADOCK
5880

C. Die Hoof (N1)
Veiligheidstak
Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie
Privaatsak X302
PRETORIA
0001

OOR- EN VERPLASING : W86689T ADJUDANT-OFFISIER W A ROUX : VANAF UNIFORMTAK, CRADOCK (BP 1801) NA DIE VEILIGHEIDSTAK, CRADOCK (BP 1801)
A... U W86689T/4 (Brig de Jongh/A/Off Grundling) gedateer 1990-06-21

A.1. Bovermelde lid het op 1990-06-25 diens aanvaar by die Veiligheidstak, Cradock.

******

B.1. Ter inligting.

******

C.1. Ter inligting.

2. Die oor- en verplasing van bovermelde lid vanaf die Uniformtak, Cradock (BP 1801) na die Veiligheidstak, Cradock (BP 1801) is goedgekeur vide geadresseerde "A" se skrywe Verw Nr W86689T/4 (Brig de Jongh/A/Off Grundling) gedateer 1990-06-21.

2./.....

3. Verklaring van geheimhouding hierby aangeheg.

I.H.J. NEL
.....KOLONEL
n/STREEKHOOF : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
OOS-KAAP (I H J NEL)
/ss

G.P.-S.

SAP 132

Goed Hoedje

BESONDERHEDE VAN VOERTUIG
PARTICULARS OF VEHICLE

SAP-nommer 48549 N
SAP number

Magtiging vir aankoop
Authority for purchase RT 80/82

Fabrikaat
Make FORD

Model
Model 1982

Enjinslagvolume
Engine swept volume 6/2994 cm³/cm³

Masjiennommer
Engine number LL 020577

Drakrag
Carrying capacity

Onderstel- of reeksnommer
Chassis or Serial No. 74501 XR6

Massa
Mass 1205 kg kg

Beskrywing van voertuig
Description of vehicle CORTINA 3000 S 4DR

Gekoop van
Purchased from FORD

op
at P.E.

Prys
Cost

Toegewys aan
Posted to Veiligheidstak, Cradock.

Datum waarop in gebruik geneem
Date taken into use 1982 09 - 12

Verplasings:
Transfers:

Na / To	Datum / Date
"	"
"	"
"	"

Opmerkings
Remarks Vervang SAP. 41211 E

EK SERTIFISEER DAT HIERDIE DOKUMENT 'N WARE AFDRUK (~~AFSKRIF~~) IS VAN DIE OORSPRONKLIKE DOKUMENT WAT AAN MY VIR WAARNEMING VOORGELÊ IS. EK SERTIFISEER VERDER DAT, VOLGENS MY WAARNEMINGS, DAAR NIE 'N WYSIGING OF VERANDERING OP DIE OORSPRONKLIKE DOKUMENT AANGEBRING IS NIE.

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HANDTEKENING/SIGNATURE

MAGSNOMMER
FORCE NUMBER 052220-1

RANG
RANK Lt/Kol

NAAM IN DRUKSKRIF
NAME IN PRINT H. BARENDSE

671A

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

P/Sak–P/Bag/Posbus/Private Bag/Box X50

Verw /Ref.: CD6/14/63514M

Navrae/Enq.: A/C Van Rooyen

TEL.: (0481) 3437

KANTOOR VAN DIE TAKBEVELVOERDER
VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK
5880

1985/09/16

A. Die Distrikskommandant
S.A. Polisie
CRADOCK
5880

B. Die Afdelingsbevelvoerder
Veiligheidstak
AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE

VERVANGING : MOTORKAR SAP 48549N : VEILIGHEIDSTAK, CRADOCK.

1. Motorkar SAP 48549N is vervang met motorkar SAP 63514M wat op 1985/09/11 in gebruik geneem is.

2. Die besonderhede van die nuwe diens is soos volg:-

(a) Ford Sierra 3000
(b) Enjin Nr. RG 05846
(c) Reeksnommer OSBA FG25421
(d) Datum in gebruik geneem: 1985/09/11
(e) Registrasienommer : CAT 12983.

3. Die volgende gereedskap en toebehore is by die voertuig:-

(1)	Wielomslag	1
(2)	Domkragte	1
(3)	Skakelaarsleutels	2
(4)	Afsluitbare petroldop (gebruik selfde sleutel as skakelaar)	1
(5)	Eienaarshandboek	1
(6)	Battery - Motorcraft - Nr. U5EL	1
(7)	Veiligheidsgordels (Stel van 2)	1
(8)	Buitebande (General - 195/60 R X 14	5

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SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST. 18
DISTRIKSKOMMANDANT
1993-09-15
DISTRICT COMMANDANT
CRADOCK

2/...

Nr's GYS 20838, GYS 20838,
GYS 20838, GYS 20838,
GYS 20838.

4. Geliewe 'n aanvraag op die kwartiermeester te plaas vir 'n stel nommerplate met registrasienommer CAT 12983 en ook te reel dat die tweerigtingradio wat in motorkar SAP 48549N ingebou is, oorgeplaas word na motorkar SAP 63514M.

B.1 Vir u inligting.

MAJOOR

TAKBEVELVOERDER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
CRADOCK : E.F.N. WINTER

Ek sertifiseer dat hierdie dokument 'n ware ~~afskrif~~/afskrif is van die oorspronklike wat deur my persoonlik besigtig is en dat volgens my waarnemings, die oorspronklike nie op enige wyse gewysig is nie.
I certify that this document is a true reproduction/copy of the original which was examined by me and that, from my observations, the original has not been altered in any manner.
0637166 2 K ST
P.P. BAARTMAN
Handtekening/Signature

SUIDAFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST. 18
...STRIKSKOMMANDANT
1993-09-15
...ST COMMANDANT
...ADDOCK
...CAN POLICE

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

SAP 49(b)
SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST. 12
DISTRIKSKOMMANDANT
1985 -09- 11
DISTRICT COMMANDANT
CRADOCK
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

P/Sak-P/Bag X254. Tel. ad. "QUAPOL"

Verw./Ref.: Q. 22/7/5/48549N
Navrae/Enq.: Kapt. Homann
Tel.: 86-8121 x 2267

KWARTIERMEESTER
QUARTERMASTER

PRETORIA

0001

1985 -09- 05

A. DIE DISTRIKSKOMMANDANT, S.A. POLISIE, CRADOCK

B. DIE TAKBEVELVOERDER, S.A. POLISIE MOTORHAWE, PORT ELIZABETH

C. DIE AFDELINGSKOMMISSARIS, S.A. POLISIE, AFDELING OOSTELIKE PROVINSIE, PORT ELIZABETH

VERVANGING : MOTORKAR SAP.48549N : VEILIGHEIDSTAK : CRADOCK
KEURRAAD GEDATEER 1985.08.27

A.1. Dit word goedgekeur dat motorkar SAP.48549N van diens onttrek en per publieke veiling as 'n eenheid verkoop word. Die instruksies vervat in hierdie kantoor se omsendbrief Q. 18/3/3 gedateer 1985.04.23 moet nagekom word.

2. Geliewe in oorleg met geadresseerde 'B' te reël dat 'n behoorlik gelisensieerde bestuurder 'n nuwe Sierra GLE sedan, SAP.63514M by die Motorhawe, Port Elizabeth oorneem ter vervanging van SAP.48549N. Instruksies aangaande die inry van nuwe voertuie soos neergelê in S.M.O.(A) 24A/78/2(5), moet stiptelik deur die bestuurder nagekom word.

3. Assuransieteken nr. 6Z 099933, die verslag van gereedskap (SAP.132) ten opsigte van die nuwe voertuig asook vorm VB.16 en die vervaardigersertifikaat word hiermee saamgestuur.

4. U aandag word gevestig op die instruksies vervat in S.M.O.(A) 24A/78/18 soos gewysig (Registrasiemerke : S.A. Polisievoertuie) wat streng nagekom moet word om onder andere enige vrugtelose uitgawe te voorkom.

5. Hierdie kantoor moet onverwyld verwittig word van die enjin-, reeks-, plaaslike registrasienommer en die datum van ingebruikneming. (Sien S.M.O.(A) 24A/78/2(6)).

6. Die lid van die Mag wat die nuwe voertuig gaan oorneem moet in besit wees van skriftelike magtiging daartoe, andersins sal dit onder geen omstandighede aan hom oorhandig word nie.

B. Vir u inligting. Motorkar SAP.63514M moet deur geadresseerde 'A' afgeskryf word.

C. Vir u inligting.

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST. 12
DISTRIKSKOMMANDANT
1993-09-15
DISTRICT COMMANDANT
CRADOCK
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

KOLONEL
COLONEL

KWARTIERMEESTER : S.A. POLISIE
JM/tb H. J. PIENAAR

Ek sertifiseer dat hierdie dokument 'n ware ~~afskrif~~ kopie is van die oorspronklike wat deur my persoonlik besigtig is en dat, volgens my waarnemings, die oorspronklike nie op enige wyse gewysig is nie.
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0637/44-2 KST

0 / S 3-0273

SAP 132

BESONDERHEDE VAN VOERTUIG
PARTICULARS OF VEHICLE

SAP-nommer
SAP number - 63514 M

Magtiging vir aankoop
Authority for purchase RT77/85

Fabrikaat
Make Sierra GLE Sedan

Model en kleur
Model and colour 1985 - Blou

Enjinslagvolume
Engine swept volume 3000cc cm³

Masjiennommer
Engine number RG584647

Drakrag
Carrying capacity

Onderstel- of reeksnommer
Chassis or Serial No. FG25421

Massa
Mass 1205 Kg kg

Beskrywing van voertuig
Description of vehicle Sierra GLE Sedan

Gekoop van
Purchased from Ford

op
at Port Elizabeth.

Prys
Cost

Toegewys aan
Posted to Veiligheidstak, Cradock.

Datum waarop in gebruik geneem
Date taken into use 1985/09/11

Verplasings:
Transfers:

Na / To	Datum / Date
"	"
"	"
"	"

Opmerkings
Remarks Vervang SAP. 485491

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
DIST. 18
DISTRIKSKOMMANDANT
1993-09-15
DISTRICT COMMANDANT
CRADOCK
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

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Handtekening/Signature

5710

G72

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SAP 5

C

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

ONDERSOEKDAGBOEK
INVESTIGATION DIARY

Tyd, datum Time, date	Stasie • Station ..... M.R. • C.R. No. G.O. • Inquest No. ..... Navraag • Enquiry No.	Verwysing Reference

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